Major Chris M. Mabis
Seminar 4
EOA Final Paper
Introduction
Perhaps the clearest view of operational art requires a return to the source – Napoleon.
While looking too far into the past distills relevance to the present, the advance of time does not
fog the image at the origin. The campaigns of Napoleon perfected many of the concepts of
operational art and had a profound impact on Clausewitz’ On War – the theoretical basis for
much of the U.S. Army’s current doctrine. Therefore, a review of Napoleon’s operational
approach for the Jena Campaign of 1806 provides an example of operational art and is a useful
study of history to understand current doctrine.
Operational Approach
Napoleon’s plan for the Jen Campaign was a direct approach aimed at the Prussian
Army. The decisive - shaping - sustaining framework provides a broad conceptual orientation for
the campaign.1 The purpose of the Jena Campaign was to destroy the Prussian Army in a decisive
battle to bring the Prussian government to terms. The campaign plan consisted of four phases –
assembly, approach march, main battle, and exploitation and pursuit.
The assembly phase was a sustaining operation to build combat power. This phase
began on 27 September 1806 and ended on 7 October 1806 when the Grand Army departed the
cantonment areas. During the assembly phase, the Grand Army consolidated and prepared for
movement in the vicinity of Bamberg to the southwest of Saxony. Concurrently, cavalry
conducted shaping operations by reconnoitering the routes to the Thüringen Wald while screening
the Fulda gap to mitigate the risk of Prussian attack.
The approach march phase was a shaping operation to identify the main body of the
Prussian Army. This phase began on 8 October 1806 and ended with the identification of the
Prussian Army main body on 12 October 1806. The line of operation was from Bamberg, through
1
U.S. Army, ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of
the Army, 2011), page 13.
the Thüringen Wald, to Berlin. The Grand Army, organized in a mutually supporting square
battalion formation, maneuvered on three mutually supporting roads. Decisive points based on
key terrain were initially a line on the Saale River between Hof and Saalfield, then the line
between Leipzig and Dresden approaching the Elbe River.
The main battle phase was the decisive operation to destroy the Prussian Army. This
phase began on 13 October 1806 and ended with the destruction and withdrawal of what
Napoleon believed to be the Prussian Army main body on 14 October 1806. Upon identification
of the main body of the Prussian Army, the Grand Army converged on a single point to mass
overwhelming combat power against the Prussian Army. The Corps in contact fixed the enemy,
while adjacent corps moved to the left or right flanks to provide additional combat power. Corps
out of contact maneuvered to the flank of the enemy to isolate the enemy main body. Additional
corps out of contact prepared to follow and assume the fixing force to reinforce success.
The exploitation and pursuit phase was a shaping operation to ensure the destruction of
the Prussian Army. This phase began on 15 October 1806 and ended on 1 November 1806 with
the capture of Berlin and advance to the Oder River. The Grand Army once again transitioned to
the square battalion. Based on the withdrawal of the Prussian Army, Napoleon now pursued a line
of operations on four main roads between Magdeburg and Wittenberg. This maneuver severed the
Prussian Army’s line of communication with Berlin and pushed them into northern Prussia. This
led to the capture of two Prussian formations between 28 October and 7 November. While
remnants of the Prussian Army continued to fight, the destruction of the Prussian Army and the
capture of Berlin caused the Prussian government to seek peace in early 1807.
Operational Environment
How did Napoleon devise the operational approach to the Jena Campaign? To develop
the operational approach, Napoleon considered both the current situation and the desired end state
2
– the operational environment.2 Starting with Napoleon’s objectives and end state, the operational
environment takes shape by deductively considering the terrain, threat, and friendly forces.
Napoleon’s objectives and end state were clear. Strategically, his objectives were to
gain a source of men and money for future campaigns, secure a base of operations east of the
Rhine, and control a defensive buffer zone between France and Russia.3 Napoleon saw the
Prussian Army as the center of gravity for Prussia. Thus, he pursued an operational objective of
driving on Berlin in order to lure the Prussian Army into a decisive battle before Russian aid was
available.4 Therefore, Napoleon envisioned his end state as – the Prussian Army defeated in a
decisive battle, Prussia incorporated into the French Empire, the combat power of the Grand
Army preserved, and the border pushed east through Prussia to the Russian frontier.
Terrain begins to define the operational environment. Napoleon sought a decisive battle
on the Elbe River approaching Berlin.5 A western approach from Wesel to Berlin was direct and
covered the easiest terrain. However, this approach would cause the Grand Army to relocate and
the multiple river crossings in northern Prussia were easily defended. A southern approach from
either Mainz or Bamberg was advantageous based on the location of the Grand Army. However,
Saxony was more rugged. Forested low mountains gave way to hills and rolling plains. Roads
were less plentiful, but they were generally mutually supporting and the rivers provided flank
protection. Therefore, a southern attack carried more risk based on the terrain while presenting
opportunity for quickly gaining the central position between Leipzig and Dresden – key terrain
identified by Napoleon.6
2
U.S. Army, ADRP 5-0, The Operations Process (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of
the Army, 2012), page 2-6.
3
David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon (New York: Scribner, 1973), page 449.
4
Ibid., page 462.
5
Ibid., page 464.
6
Ibid., page 464.
3
Analysis of the threat through a wide lens, then focusing on Prussia is useful to
describe the nature of the forces opposing Napoleon. In 1806, Napoleon faced the fourth coalition
of Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, Sweden, and Saxony. Great Britain commanded the seas but
posed little threat on the continent. In late 1805, Napoleon decisively beat an Austro-Russian
coalition at Austerlitz, neutralizing Austria and causing Russia to withdraw. Until Russia
reconstituted their army, Prussia remained the only major land-based power challenging France.
Therefore, Napoleon understood that he needed to guard against Great Britain, keep a watchful
eye on Austria, and strike quickly before Russia could come to the aid of Prussia.
Narrowing the focus on Prussia specifically, Napoleon respected the Prussian Army of
Frederick the Great, but held the current Prussian leadership under Frederick William III in
contempt.7 The Prussian Army was nearly the size of the Grand Army and was well disciplined.
Prussia’s greatest deficiencies were the lack of an organized Prussian staff, inadequate leadership
under Frederick William III, and archaic generals clinging to past glory.8 While the Prussians
enjoyed an advantage in mobilization time, the Prussian leadership proved indecisive,
squandering any advantage the Prussian Army possessed. Regardless, Napoleon believed that the
Prussian Army would defend south of Berlin, using terrain to trade space for time until the
Russians could join the battle. Therefore, it was essential for the Grand Army to strike quickly
and gain control of terrain that denied Prussia assistance from Russia.
The same method of analysis describes the disposition of friendly forces. The wide
view shows how Napoleon arranged forces across the continent to protect the Grand Army and
allow freedom of maneuver. In the north, the Dutch Army secured the northern flank around
Wesel and provided a hedge against British incursions on the continent while in the south, the
7
David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon (New York: Scribner, 1973), page 444.
David G. Chandler Ph.D., “Napoleon, Operational Art, and the Jena Campaign,” in Historical
Perspectives of the Operational Art, ed. Michael D. Krause and R. Cody Phillips (Washington, DC: Center
of Military History, United States Army, 2007), page 37.
8
4
Army of Italy provided a hedge against Austria.9 Along the Rhine River, a corps of the Grand
Army blocked any Prussian thrust into France.10 The Grand Army occupied a relatively safe base
centered on Bamberg behind the Thüringen Wald.
Narrowing the scope, the Grand Army of 1806 was the most integrated and best-trained
force that Napoleon ever commanded.11 The six corps making up the Grand Army were seasoned
veterans of recent campaigns at Ulm and Austerlitz.12 Each corps was an integrated team of
infantry, cavalry, artillery, that operated independently, but could mass on a central point for the
decisive battle. Napoleon’s corps commanders were young and each corps possessed a staff
capable of processing information quickly.13 Based on these advantages, Napoleon pursued the
square battalion formation for the Jena Campaign. The square battalion allowed rapid maneuver
that offered mutual protection and could meet an enemy attack from any direction.14
The Problem Statement
The operational environment aided Napoleon in formulating the problem statement.
How does the Grand Army destroy the Prussian Army in a decisive battle to force the Prussian
government to terms? Speed prevents aid from reconstituted Russian forces. Therefore, the
quickest way to entice the Prussian Army to battle is to threaten Berlin by seizing the central
position between Leipzig and Dresden. The Grand Army, centered on a base of operations in
Bamberg, faces the Prussian Army, mobilizing south of Berlin, of nearly equal size. Maneuver to
the north, attacking through Wesel or Fulda incurs risk for time and requires multiple river
9
David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon (New York: Scribner, 1973), page 466.
10
Ibid., page 465.
11
Ibid., page 454.
12
Ibid., page 453.
David G. Chandler Ph.D., “Napoleon, Operational Art, and the Jena Campaign,” in Historical
Perspectives of the Operational Art, ed. Michael D. Krause and R. Cody Phillips (Washington, DC: Center
of Military History, United States Army, 2007), page 37.
13
14
David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon (New York: Scribner, 1973), page 468.
5
crossings. 15 This approach pushes Prussia back on Russian forces and loses sight of Austria.
Maneuver from the south, attacking from Bamberg to Berlin incurs risk by separating the Grand
Army in the Thüringen Wald, however there is an opportunity for speed and surprise in the
square battalion formation. 16 Thereafter, the Grand Army can maneuver on a line between the
Saale and Elbe Rivers between Leipzig and Dresden, separating the Prussian and Russian forces
while maintaining influence on Austria.
Elements of Operational Art
Returning to the operational approach, the elements of operational art – end state,
center of gravity, decisive points, lines of operations, operational reach, basing, tempo, phasing
and transitions, culmination, and risk – are useful for further discussion of Napoleon’s plan for
the Jena Campaign.17
Napoleon was clear in his desired end state – the Prussian Army defeated in a decisive
battle, Prussia incorporated into the French Empire, the combat power of the Grand Army
preserved, and the border pushed east through Prussia to the Russian frontier. By articulating and
communicating his end state to his subordinate commanders and allies, Napoleon ensured unity
of effort by his corps and encouraged disciplined initiative during exploitation and pursuit.18
Napoleon perceived the Prussian Army as the center of gravity – the source of power
that enabled action for Prussia.19 However, this was one of Napoleon’s mistakes and illustrates
the importance of an accurate assessment of the center of gravity. The Grand Army destroyed the
Prussian Army, yet Prussia did not capitulate and the government would hold out for several
15
David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon (New York: Scribner, 1973), pages 40-41
16
Ibid., page 41
17
U.S. Army, ADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department
of the Army, 2011), page 4-3.
18
Ibid., page 4-3.
19
Ibid., page 4-3.
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more months. Therefore, the Prussian government was arguably the center of gravity, with the
destruction of the Prussian Army a decisive point along the way.
Napoleon utilized both geographic lines of operations and decisive points to define the
Jena Campaign. He described the line from Bamberg to Berlin as the directional orientation that
linked the base of operations with the objective.20 Along this line, the Grand Army would move
on three roads through Thüringen Wald. Along this line, the area past the Thüringen Wald
between Hof and Saalfield marked the location where the Grand Army would converge.
Therefore, this area was a decisive point, giving Napoleon a marked advantage over the Prussian
Army.21 Napoleon also identified the terrain between Leipzig and Dresden as a decisive point.
This was the central location between Prussian and Russian forces, which threatened Berlin.
Tempo was a key element of Napoleon’s campaign plan. The square battalion,
competent subordinate commanders, and inadequate Prussian leadership enabled the Grand Army
to dictate the speed of operations.22 Thus, as the Grand Army transitioned from the approach
march to the main battle, Napoleon overwhelmed the Prussian Army’s ability to counter friendly
actions by committing additional corps to the battle at Jena. While badly outnumbered at
Auerstadt, Davout’s corps dictated the tempo to Brunswick’s larger force, leading to victory.
Operating from a base centered on Bamberg, Napoleon understood that his supply train
limited his operational reach. Therefore, he realized that he would culminate prior to Berlin, more
than likely around Leipzig. In order to extend his operational reach and culmination point,
Napoleon either needed to bring his supply forward of the Thüringen Wald or cut ties with
Bamberg and rely on Mainz. Either of these actions would suffice until the Grand Army could
gain Magdeburg or Wittenberg and establish new bases.
20
U.S. Army, ADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department
of the Army, 2011), page 4-5.
21
Ibid., page 4-4.
22
Ibid., page 4-7.
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Phases and transitions allowed Napoleon to organize forces in time, space, and purpose
to accomplish key tasks inherent to each phase.23 In particular, the approach march and main
battle allowed Napoleon to maximize combat power first to find the Prussian Army, then to
defeat them with overwhelming combat power. Based on previously issued orders and geographic
decisive points, subordinate commanders understood when to transition and what actions to take.
The only apparent mistake was the inaction of Bernadotte’s corps between Jena and Auerstadt.
Finally, Napoleon considered risk and weighed it against opportunity. The advance on
the chosen line of operation posed risk in separating the Grand Army while negotiating difficult
terrain. However, the opportunity outweighed the risk. On this line, Napoleon surprised the
Prussian Army, gained the central position, and kept watch on the Austrians. To mitigate the risk
inherent to the operation, Napoleon employed the square battalion formation to provide mutual
support on the approach march in the face of uncertain enemy location.
Conclusion
In closing, the Jena Campaign did not unfold as Napoleon envisioned. Napoleon made
no fewer than six errors in judgment, yet the campaign was still successful in terms of military
victory.24 While the armies of the great powers were all of similar capabilities in the early
nineteenth century, the operational art exercised by Napoleon was superior to all contemporary
equivalents.25 The operational art perfected by Napoleon allowed France to dominate Europe until
the fateful Russian campaign of 1812.
23
U.S. Army, ADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department
of the Army, 2011), page 4-3.
David G. Chandler Ph.D., “Napoleon, Operational Art, and the Jena Campaign,” in Historical
Perspectives of the Operational Art, ed. Michael D. Krause and R. Cody Phillips (Washington, DC: Center
of Military History, United States Army, 2007), page 64.
24
25
Ibid., page 65.
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Bibliography
Army, U.S. ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of
the Army, 2011.
Army, U.S. ADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of
the Army, 2012.
Army, U.S. ADRP 5-0, Unified Land Operations. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of
the Army, 2012.
Chandler, David G. “Napoleon, Operational Art, and the Jena Campaign.” In Historical
Perspectives of the Operational Art, edited by Michael D. Krause and R. Cody Phillips,
27-68. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2007.
Chandler, David G. The Campaigns of Napoleon. New York: Scribner, 1973.
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