1
Is Same-Sex Marriage
Wrong?
II
2
David Boonin: “Same-Sex Marriage and the
Argument from Public Disagreement”
Boonin’s Central Argument
Jordan’s argument that the dilemma of same-sex marriage can
ethically be solved by accommodation ultimately fails on several
grounds because Jordan conflates the ethical issue of same-sex
marriage with that of homosexual acts.
3
Recall Jordan’s Argument
P1 If (a) there is public dilemma about X and (b) resolution of the dilemma
by accommodation is possible and (c) there is no overriding reason to
prefer resolution of the dilemma by declaration, then (d) the state
should resolve the public dilemma about X by accommodation.
P2 There is a public dilemma about same-sex marriage.
P3 It is possible for the State to resolve the dilemma by accommodation if it
refuses to sanction same-sex marriage (provided that it permits private
homosexual acts between consenting adults.)
P4 It is not possible for the State to resolve the dilemma by
accommodation if it sanctions same-sex marriage (since that amounts
to resolving the dilemma by declaration and leaves no room for
accommodation).
P5 There is no overriding reason for the State to resolve the dilemma by
declaration.
C
The State should refuse to sanction same-sex marriage (provided that it
permits private homosexual acts between consenting adults).
4
Analyzing Jordan’s Argument
What does P2 mean?
P2
There is a public
dilemma about
same-sex marriage.
• Jordan defines a public dilemma as a
special case of a moral impasse (a
situation where people “hold genuinely
conflicting beliefs regarding the moral
status of x.”)
• So, in the case of the public dilemma
about same-sex marriage, what does x
stand for?
5
Analyzing Jordan’s Argument
 x can stand for acts of homosexual
P2
There is a public
dilemma about
same-sex marriage.
behavior, or it can stand for acts of
participating in a same-sex marriage.
 The former concerns the moral
permissibility of certain forms of sexual
behavior, regardless if the people involved
are predominantly heterosexual or
homosexual in orientation.
 The latter concerns the moral
permissibility of granting certain forms of
social recognition and public benefits to
same-sex couples, regardless of whether
or not they engage in such (or any) sexual
behavior.
6
Is the Dilemma about Same-Sex Marriage?
• It seems the most natural interpretation
P2
P3
It There
is possible
is a public
for the
State
dilemma
to resolve
aboutthe
same-sex
dilemma
marriage.
by
accommodation if it
refuses to sanction
same-sex marriage
(provided that it
permits private
homosexual acts
between
consenting adults.)
that the conflicting beliefs in P2’s public
dilemma are beliefs about the moral
status of acts of participating in a samesex marriage.
• If this is what is meant by P2, then P3 and
P4 are false.
• If we conflate the two possibilities of x into
“the” dispute over homosexuality, P3
seems plausible: each side gets some of
what it wants, and neither side gets all of
what it wants.
7
Is the Dilemma about Same-Sex Marriage?
• But if the conflict is over same-sex
P3
It is possible for the
State to resolve the
dilemma by
accommodation if it
refuses to sanction
same-sex marriage
(provided that it
permits private
homosexual acts
between
consenting adults.)
marriage in particular, this is no
accommodation at all: it is simply a
declaration that one side of the debate is
entirely correct, and the other side entirely
incorrect.
• Compare with pornography: The
equivalent move would be to join together
the distinct (but related) issues as to
whether the government should fund the
arts, and whether it should ban violent
pornography, announce that the
government should permit violent
pornography but not subsidize it, and
declare the debate settled by
accommodation to both sides.
8
Is the Dilemma about Same-Sex Marriage?
• This would not be a resolution by
P3
P4
It is possible
not possible
for the
for
State
the State
to resolve
to resolve
the
the
dilemma
dilemma
byby
accommodation if it
sanctions
refuses tosame-sex
sanction
marriage
same-sex(since
marriage
that
amounts
(provided
to resolving
that it
the
permits
dilemma
private
by
homosexual
declaration and
acts
leaves
between
no room for
consenting
accommodation).
adults.)
accommodation of one dilemma, but a
resolution by declaration of two dilemmas.
• P4 is false for similar reasons as P3.
• If the dilemma is over same-sex marriage
and not same-sex sex, the state could
sanction same-sex marriage, but make it
more difficult to obtain a same-sex
marriage license.
• However, what the defenders of same-sex
marriage demand is that same-sex
marriage be on equal footing with
heterosexual marriage, and opponents of
same-sex marriage demand that there be
no such thing as same-sex marriage.
9
Is the Dilemma about Same-Sex Marriage?
• Of course, this is precisely what Jordan
P4
It is not possible for
the State to resolve
the dilemma by
accommodation if it
sanctions same-sex
marriage (since that
amounts to resolving
the dilemma by
declaration and
leaves no room for
accommodation).
means by resolution by accommodation –
no one side gets everything it wants, but
both sides get something they want:
“[T]he state should find a way to allow
those who wish to engage in the disputed
behavior to engage in it while at the same
time expressing society’s disapproval of or
at least lack of approval of the behavior in
question.” (368)
10
Is the Dilemma about Homosexual Behavior?
• Jordan’s own evidence seems to indicate
P2
P3
It There
is possible
is a public
for the
State
dilemma
to resolve
aboutthe
same-sex
dilemma
marriage.
by
accommodation if it
refuses to sanction
same-sex marriage
(provided that it
permits private
homosexual acts
between
consenting adults.)
that the conflicting beliefs in P2’s public
dilemma are beliefs about the moral
status of acts of homosexual behavior.
• But if this is the case, then P3 and P4 are
again false, for different but parallel
reasons.
• P3 would be false: If the state refuses to
sanction same-sex marriage, but permits
private homosexual acts between
consenting adults, it does not thereby
resolve the dilemma by accommodation;
rather, it declares one side correct and
leaves no accommodation for the other.
11
Is the Dilemma about Same-Sex Marriage?
• P4 would also be false: The state could
P4
It is not possible for
the State to resolve
the dilemma by
accommodation if it
sanctions same-sex
marriage (since that
amounts to resolving
the dilemma by
declaration and
leaves no room for
accommodation).
sanction same-sex behavior in a way that
allows for accommodation, say, by
recognizing both gay and straight
marriages, but making it illegal to have
homosexual intercourse outside of
homosexual marriage.
• Either way we interpret the public
dilemma, Jordan’s argument is proven
unsound.
12
The Mixed-Race Marriage Objection (cont’d)
• Jordan raises a possible objection to his view: that if the state
refuses to sanction same-sex marriage on the grounds of moral
impasse, then it should also refuse to sanction mixed-race
marriage on the same ground. But the claim that the state
should refuse to sanction mixed-race marriage is surely
intolerable, and so, by reduction ad absurdum, Jordan’s
argument fails.
• Jordan provides three responses to this objection.
13
The Mixed-Race Marriage Objection (cont’d)
Jordan’s First Response
The issue of mixed-race marriages is not a public dilemma—
it may have been at one time, but it isn’t any longer.
• Problem: It doesn’t seem true that mixed-race marriage is no
longer publicly controversial: in many communities in the South,
there remains substantial opposition to interracial dating, let
alone interracial marriage.
14
The Mixed-Race Marriage Objection (cont’d)
Jordan’s Second Response
Even if mixed-race marriage is a public dilemma, it is one
that allows for resolution by declaration – “state protection
from racial discrimination is a reason sufficient for a
resolution via declaration” – where the same is not true for
same-sex marriage.
• Problem: A law banning mixed-race marriage would not
discriminate against people on racial grounds—individuals of
each race would be free to marry another individual of that race.
No one racial group would be discriminated against by such a
law.
15
The Mixed-Race Marriage Objection (cont’d)
• Conversely, a law banning same-sex marriage would
discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation: it would allow a
heterosexual man to marry any member of the sex he is
attracted to, while a homosexual man can marry any member of
a sex he is not attracted to. At the same time, a heterosexual
man is forbidden to marry any member of the sex he is not
attracted to, and the homosexual man is forbidden from
marrying any member of the sex he is attracted to.
• The group adversely affected would be solely homosexuals.
• If anything, Jordan has inadvertently shown a reason that the
issue of same-sex marriage should be resolved by declaration
which does not apply to the issue of mixed-race marriage.
16
The Mixed-Race Marriage Objection (cont’d)
Jordan’s Third Response
The grounds for objection in cases of same-sex and mixedrace marriages differs: one concerns racial identity; the other
concerns behavior thought morally problematic. Issues based
on identity may be solved by declaration, but not issues
based on behavior.
• Problem: Those who object to mixed-race marriage do not do
so because of the identity of the individuals. That is, they do not
object to members of any given race marrying members of their
own race – just with marriages across races.
• As such, it is not the individuals’ identity that they object to; it is
the act that they perform (the act of weakening the purity of their
own race, or of violating an obligation to put one’s own
community first).