Part II
Constitutional Law of Corrections
Chapter 15 – Eighth Amendment:
Conditions of Confinement – Cruel
and Unusual Punishment
Introduction: This chapter examines the
phrase “cruel and unusual punishment”
with respect to the conditions under
which inmates are held
Chapter Outline






Conditions in Prison
Opening the Gates
Crowding in Prisons and Jails
Effect of the Prison Litigation Reform
Act
Bell v. Wolfish
Rhodes v. Chapman
Chapter Outline: cont’d

Whitley v. Albers
Wilson v. Seiter
Hudson v. McMillian
Farmer v. Brennan
Helling v. McKinney

Qualified Immunity




Conditions in Prison

Historically, the courts had a “handsoff” attitude towards prisons



Gave no constitutional guidelines for the
management of prisons
Constitution was not seen as providing the
courts the keys to unlock the doors and to
look into prison conditions
This view changed beginning in the
1960s
Opening the Gates

Wright v. McMann (1967) – Inmate in
Clinton State Prison in New York filed
suit, without assistance of counsel,
under Section 1983, claiming prison
conditions in solitary confinement were
deplorable

Said he was in this cell for 33 days,
beginning in February 1965, and another
21 days in 1966
Opening the Gates: cont’d

A few of the claims



Cell was dirty, with no means to clean
Toilet and sink encrusted with slime and
human excrement
Left nude for several days, and later given
only a pair of underwear
Opening the Gates: cont’d



No hygiene items
Windows in his cell were left open, causing
exposure to the cold winter air during
subfreezing temperatures
Had to sleep on the cold concrete floor
without bedding
Opening the Gates: cont’d

Appeals court in Wright gave brief overview of
the history of the Eighth Amendment,
referencing the Supreme Court’s holding in
Weems (1910)
 “[The Constitution]. . . may acquire meaning
as public opinion becomes enlightened by a
humane justice”
 The concept of “cruel and unusual
punishment” is found in an ever-changing
state of public opinion – the views of
American society
Opening the Gates: cont’d

In Wright, the appeals court said the
alleged conditions if established would be
cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of the Eighth Amendment

“The Eighth Amendment forbids treatment so
foul, so inhuman, and so violative of basic
concepts of decency”
Opening the Gates: cont’d

The appeals court in Wright returned the
case to the trial court for a hearing on the
truthfulness of the charges


If proved, Wright would be entitled to relief
under Section 1983
A judge concurring in this holding, warned
that this would open the courts to a flood
of complaints under Section 1983
Crowding in Prisons and Jails

Many prisons are crowded beyond their
desirable capacity

Such crowding can lead to other problems
- budgetary, program dilution, tensions
within prison
Crowding in Prisons and Jails:
cont’d

Term “overcrowding” seen as inappropriate –
as making a judgment on what level of prison
population is bad


Prisons and jails can be effectively run at a
population above capacity – adequate funding
and resources are two factors that contribute to
this
Better way to describe, absent a population that
has reached a truly unmanageable level, is
“crowding”
Crowding in Prisons and Jails:
cont’d

Crowding in prisons has led to many
lawsuits, most under § 1983

Many suits have led to court orders or
consent decrees requiring corrective
actions

At least 40 states have been under such
orders or decrees
Crowding in Prisons and Jails:
cont’d


Consent decrees are agreements by the
parties and approved by the court that
certain actions will occur to improve
conditions
Some defendant–administrators have
signed such agreements because they
agreed with the provisions and wanted to
see the changes
Crowding in Prisons and Jails:
cont’d

Consent decrees also have significant
drawbacks:


The duration of the consent decree – can be
an albatross passed from one administrator
to the next
The requirement for adherence to the
agreement regardless of subsequent
occurrences – failure to adhere could place
prison officials in contempt
Crowding in Prisons and Jails:
cont’d

Interesting question – what right does an
administrator have to sign an agreement
that requires the government to spend large
sums of taxpayer money for programs or
changes he feels are desirable


What right exists to bind future legislators or
governors to that course of expensive changes
Short answer – no such right or authority - the
power to raise money for the government and
to decide where it is spent is with the
legislative branch
Crowding in Prisons and Jails:
cont’d

Some court decisions involving conditions
of prisons or jails led to court-appointed
masters to assist the court in the
administration of the granted relief
Crowding in Prisons and Jails:
cont’d


The appointed masters were to be assistants
to the judges
However, provided wide authority by
appointing judges, masters, at times, became
involved in day-to-day prison management or
were authorized to look over the shoulders of
administrators in many different aspects of
their job
Crowding in Prisons and Jails:
cont’d

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)
provides prison officials with some relief
regarding consent decrees and masters
Effect of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA)


While does not change inmate’s
substantive rights, does establish
guidelines (such as requiring
“exhaustion”)
The PLRA reflects congressional intent
to limit judicial management of prisons
Effect of the PLRA: cont’d

Consent decrees – PLRA defines as
relief entered by the court that is based
in whole or in part upon the consent or
acquiescence of the parties; does not
include private settlements

Relief – refers to all relief that may be
granted or approved by the federal court
and includes consent decrees
Effect of the PLRA: cont’d

Prospective relief in a civil action with
respect to prison conditions may be
granted or approved by the federal
court only upon:


Finding that the relief is narrowly drawn
Extends no further than necessary to
correct the violation of a federal right, and
Effect of the PLRA: cont’d


Is the least intrusive means necessary to
correct that violation
The court must also give substantial weight
to any adverse impact the proposed relief
has on public safety or the operation of the
criminal justice system
Effect of the PLRA: cont’d

On existing consent decrees, the PLRA provides:



For termination of a decree, upon motion of any
party or intervener, no later than two years after
the date the court granted or approved the
prospective relief
One year after the court has entered an order
denying termination of prospective relief; or
For orders issued prior to the PLRA’s enactment
date, two years from the date of the PLRA’s
enactment
Effect of the PLRA: cont’d

A different section of the PLRA places
limitations on special masters, including
a ban on them making findings or ex
parte communications
Effect of the PLRA: cont’d

Miller v. French (2000) – dates back to
1975 and an inmate class action suit
on conditions of confinement

Constitutional violations found and lower
courts ordered injunctive relief, remaining
in effect through current litigation

Last modification occurred in 1988
Effect of the PLRA: cont’d



In 1997, the state, citing the PLRA, filed a
motion to end the prospective relief
Inmates opposed action – saying the
PLRA’s automatic stay provision (temporary
suspension of the court-ordered injunctive
relief) violated the separation of powers
doctrine
Supreme Court held for government –
saying that the stay “merely reflects the
changed legal circumstances”
Effect of the PLRA: cont’d

Court held prospective relief under the existing
decree is no longer enforceable, and that it remains
unenforceable unless and until the court makes the
required findings that
 prospective relief continues to be necessary to
correct a current and ongoing violation of the
federal right
 it extends no further than necessary to correct the
violation of the federal right
 and that the prospective relief is narrowly drawn,
and
 the least intrusive means to correct the violation
Effect of the PLRA: cont’d

Gilmore v. People of the State of California
(2000) – state officials, pursuant to the PLRA,
filed for termination of court orders dating
back to 1972 and consent decrees dating
back to 1980

Appeals court noted that no circuit court has
found the PLRA to violate due process or the
Equal Protection clause; the court said it
declined “to stray from these precedents”
Effect of the PLRA: cont’d

Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rouse
(1997) – dated back to 1971, primarily
involving double-bunking of pretrial detainees



1979 consent decree ratified plan for new
facility with single occupancy cells, and phasing
out old jail
For various reasons, wasn’t until mid-1990s
when new facility was done
Difficulty encountered in adhering to single
occupancy
Effect of the PLRA: cont’d



Consent decree modifications in 1985,
1990 and 1994
Following passage of PLRA, state filed suit
to terminate the decree
Appeals court ordered termination of the
consent decree



Found the PLRA legislation to be rational
Withdrawal of prospective relief does not
diminish the right of access
PLRA does not impair a fundamental right
Effect of the PLRA: cont’d

Imprisoned Citizens v. Ridge (1999) –
appeals court held that while the PLRA’s
provision for immediate termination of
prospective relief singles out certain
prisoner rights cases for special treatment,
it does so only to advance unquestionably
legitimate purposes

“to minimize prison micro-management by
federal courts and to conserve judicial
resources”
Effect of the PLRA: cont’d

Benjamin v. Fraser (2001) – suit first
brought in 1975, alleging conditions in
New York City jails violated pretrial
detainees’ constitutional rights


Original consent decrees dated to 1978-79
State, under PLRA, attempted to terminate
operation of the decrees
Effect of the PLRA: cont’d

Lower courts refused to terminate decree
provisions involving attorney visitation


Family were allowed to visit during “count”;
attorneys were not – no justification for
distinction was provided
No rationale provided as to why the process of
bringing detainees to the counsel rooms could
not begin upon the attorney’s arrival at the
prison, rather than his arrival at the visiting
area

The district court had found that attorneys were
forced to wait 45 minutes to two hours or
longer, after arriving
Effect of the PLRA: cont’d


No reasons provided why a space reservation
policy could not be used in those institutions
with limited visiting areas
Appeals court found measures ordered by
earlier consent decrees to be reasonable


To safeguard the detainees’ constitutional
rights at minimal cost to the department and
The safeguards did not impair institutional
concerns
Effect of the PLRA: cont’d

Appeals court affirmed the “continuing need
for prospective relief to correct an ongoing
denial of a federal right, and that the relief
ordered was sufficiently narrow to satisfy the
requirements of the PLRA”
Bell v. Wolfish (1979)


First Supreme Court case dealing with
conditions of confinement, and interpreting
the Eighth Amendment
Discussed previously with respect to the
publishers-only rule for incoming publications
and the inspection of personal packages in
Chapter 7 (First Amendment), and the issue
of searches in Chapter 10 (Fourth
Amendment)
Bell v. Wolfish: cont’d

Eighth Amendment also a focus in the case




Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC) New
York had a planned capacity of 449 inmates
Primarily single occupancy rooms
Increased confinement numbers led to doublebunking
Issue - is it a constitutional violation to
“overcrowd” – that is to place two or more
inmates in a space planned or designed for
one
Bell v. Wolfish: cont’d

Because the inmates were pretrial detainees,
inmates could not be punished at all; issue
was one of due process


Under the due process clause, a detainee may
not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt
in accordance with due process of law
Court focus was to look at whether the
conditions or restrictions of pretrial detention
amounted to punishment of the detainees
Bell v. Wolfish: cont’d

Court held that if a particular condition
or restriction of pretrial detention is
reasonably related to a legitimate
governmental objective, it does not,
without more, amount to “punishment”

But, if a restriction or condition is arbitrary
or purposeless – a court could permissibly
infer that the purpose of the governmental
action was punishment
Bell v. Wolfish: cont’d

Court held in Wolfish that as a matter of
law, the double-bunking as done at the
MCC did not amount to punishment and
thus did not violate inmates’ rights
under the due process clause

Court held the government must be able to
take steps to maintain institution security
and order
Bell v. Wolfish: cont’d

The Wolfish ruling is important on two
points


It provided the standard for measuring the
constitutionality of conditions for pretrial
detainees, and
It ruled that double-bunking is not per se
unconstitutional
Bell v. Wolfish: cont’d

The Wolfish decision has allowed
jails to be double-bunked and
otherwise crowded, so long as the
conditions do not become “genuine
privations and hardships over an
extended period of time”
Rhodes v. Chapman (1981)

In Rhodes v. Chapman, the issue was
whether the housing of two inmates in a
single cell at the Southern Ohio Correctional
Facility is cruel and unusual punishment,
prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments

Inmates brought the Section 1983 action,
claiming that double-celling resulted in inmates
living too closely together, and that the
crowding strained the prison’s facilities and staff
Rhodes v. Chapman: cont’d




This maximum security prison opened in
the early 1970s
It had 1,620 cells, each 63 square feet
At the time of the lawsuit, the prison had
2,300 inmates, most doing long-term
sentences
Most inmates had to spend 25% of their
time in their cells
Rhodes v. Chapman: cont’d


Court noted that conditions could not involve
the wanton and unnecessary infliction of
pain, nor be grossly disproportionate to the
severity of the crime warranting confinement
This is the current “standard of decency” to
measure whether conditions amount to cruel
and unusual punishment
Rhodes v. Chapman: cont’d

Court, using this standard, found no
cruel and unusual punishment in double
bunking per se, or on the conditions
that prevailed at the prison, saying

“(T)he Constitution does not mandate
comfortable prisons”
Whitley v. Albers (1986)

Whitley v. Albers focused on the use of
force



Inmates at the Oregon State Penitentiary
took control of a two-tiered cellblock
Inmate Albers lived in the cellblock
An officer was taken hostage, and was
being held on the upper tier
Whitley v. Albers: cont’d





Officers formed an assault squad to regain control of
the cellblock
Captain Whitley was going to go to the second tier
in an effort to free the hostage
Three officers were told to shoot low at any inmates
trying to climb the stairs to the second tier –
because they would be a threat to Captain Whitley
or the hostage
Inmate Albers started up the stairs after Whitley had
run up; Albers was shot in the left knee
Hostage was rescued and cellblock retaken
Whitley v. Albers: cont’d

Inmate Albers filed a § 1983 action
alleging Eighth Amendment
deprivations because of the physical
damage to his knee, plus mental and
emotional distress
Whitley v. Albers: cont’d

Court ruled for government, holding
that whether the measure taken
inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain
and suffering ultimately turns on

“whether force was applied in a good faith
effort to maintain or restore discipline or
maliciously and sadistically for the very
purpose of causing harm”
Whitley v. Albers: cont’d

Court held that the situation at the
penitentiary was “dangerous and
volatile”


Saw the shooting as within the good faith
effort to restore prison security
Court held no Eighth Amendment violation
occurred
Tennessee v. Garner (1985)

Case involved the shooting of a
fleeing suspect by a police officer

Court set three standards to be met for
the use of force
Tennessee v. Garner: cont’d
1. Force must be necessary to prevent the
escape of the subject
2. Must be probable cause for the officer to
believe that the suspect poses a significant
threat of death or serious bodily injury to the
officer or others, and
3. If possible there must be some kind of
warning given to the fleeing person before
deadly force is used
Tennessee v. Garner: cont’d

Analysis is seen as applicable in looking at
the use of force in a prison or jail


First element seen as implicit in using force
to stop an escapee or would-be escapee
In a prison disturbance or in an escape,
elements 2 and 3 should also be followed
Tennessee v. Garner: cont’d

In a prison that houses convicted felons or
those accused of violent crimes, 2nd element
appears to be met – to require staff in a
prison or jail to identify a person scaling a
wall or fleeing from the prison, before shots
can be fired, ordinarily would not be
reasonable
Tennessee v. Garner: cont’d

Every facility should establish a policy
on use of force and especially define
those limited situations where deadly
force may be used

All staff should be fully trained on the
policy guidelines
Wilson v. Seiter (1991)


Case involved the conditions of confinement
Inmate in Ohio facility claimed under Section
1983 that his Eighth Amendment rights were
infringed by his treatment




Overcrowding
Excessive noise
Insufficient locker storage space
Inadequate heating and cooling
Wilson v. Seiter: cont’d




Improper ventilation
Unclean and inadequate restrooms
Unsanitary dining facilities and food
preparation, and
Housing with mentally and physically ill
inmates
Wilson v. Seiter: cont’d

Supreme Court qualified its guidance in
Whitley as applying to those
circumstances in which officials were
reacting to an emergency situation

Did not see this high standard – wanton
misconduct shown by actions done
“maliciously and sadistically for the very
purpose of causing harm” - applying to
prison conditions cases
Wilson v. Seiter: cont’d


Held that in general poor-condition cases,
such as Wilson, the state of mind of prison
officials was determinative
To sustain a finding of cruel and unusual
punishment, need to show a “deliberate
indifference” on the part of officials to the
basic needs of the inmate
 Each need of inmates, or each claimed
violation of constitutional standards, would
have to be examined separately to determine
the existence of deliberate indifference
Wilson v. Seiter: cont’d
Not proper to look at “overall conditions” to
decide cruel and unusual punishment
 “Nothing so amorphous as “overall
conditions” can rise to the level of cruel and
unusual punishment when no specific
deprivation of a single human need exists”
Case remanded to the lower courts to
determine whether any one condition violated
the “deliberate indifference” standard


Hudson v. McMillian (1992)

Case looked at what degree of injury is
required before an inmate can claim an
Eighth Amendment—cruel and unusual
punishment—violation


Hudson, a Louisiana inmate, claimed he was
beaten by guards while he was handcuffed and
shackled
Said he sustained minor bruises, some facial
swelling, loosened teeth, and a cracked dental
plate
Hudson v. McMillian: cont’d


Appeals court held there must be a
“significant injury” to constitute an injury
recoverable under the Eighth Amendment
Supreme Court reversed, holding the core
judicial inquiry is that set forth in Whitley 
was force applied in a good-faith effort to
maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously
and sadistically to cause harm
Hudson v. McMillian: cont’d

Court held that a serious injury was not
necessary for an inmate to pursue a cruel
and unusual punishment claim


Court must look at the particular
circumstances
Unjustified striking of an inmate would raise
a serious question about the concepts of
decency that lie behind the Eighth
Amendment
Hudson v. McMillian: cont’d

In Smith v. Mensinger (2002), an appeals
court looked at whether a prison officer
could be held liable if he had a reasonable
opportunity to intervene but refused to do
so


Smith received misconduct reports, including
one for punching an officer in the eye
Smith claims he was handcuffed behind his
back
Hudson v. McMillian: cont’d


Claimed several officers then rammed his
head into wall and cabinets, and knocked
him to the floor, where he was kicked and
punched by one officer
Inmate said officer Paulukonis saw the
beating but made no effort to intervene
or restore order
Hudson v. McMillian: cont’d


Smith filed a § 1983 suit, alleging violation of his
constitutional rights, naming several officers as
defendants, including officer Paulukonis
Federal appeals court said officer Paulukonis could
be held liable, provided he had a reasonable
opportunity to intervene, and simply did not
 “The approving silence emanating from the
officer who stands by and watches . . .
contributes to the actual use of excessive force.
. . . Such silence is an endorsement of the
constitutional violation resulting from the illegal
use of force”
Hudson v. McMillian: cont’d

Appeals court acknowledged that there
could be a greater degree of dereliction of
duty for a supervisor than for an officer of
lower rank
Farmer v. Brennan (1994)


Farmer was a biological male who was
medically diagnosed as a transsexual
He was housed at a federal
penitentiary, where he wore clothes in a
feminine manner
Farmer v. Brennan: cont’d



Inmate usually segregated from the
general prison population due to his own
misconduct and for his safety
He was released into the regular
population, without any objection by him
Within two weeks he was beaten and
raped by another inmate
Farmer v. Brennan: cont’d

Farmer filed a Bivens suit (federal
equivalent of a § 1983)

Claimed he had been subject to cruel and
unusual punishment


When transferred to the prison where
officials knew there were assaultive inmates
And where officials knew he would be
particularly vulnerable to sexual attack
Farmer v. Brennan: cont’d


He claimed this was deliberate indifference to
his personal safety on the part of prison
officials
Lower courts granted prison officials
summary judgment


Held liability could be found only if officials
had actual knowledge of a potential danger
to Farmer
Such knowledge had not been shown
Farmer v. Brennan: cont’d

Supreme Court, in remanding the case,
stated that prison officials have a duty
to protect inmates from violence at the
hands of other inmates
Farmer v. Brennan: cont’d

Court held that a prison official may be
held liable under the Eighth Amendment
for denying humane conditions of
confinement only if he


Knows that inmates face a substantial risk of
serious harm and
Disregards that risk by failing to take
reasonable measures to abate it (is
deliberately indifferent to inmate health or
safety)
Farmer v. Brennan: cont’d


Court said the fact that the inmate had not
given notice that he feared harm was not
sufficient to dispose of the case
Court said lower court would have to
examine the evidence to see if officials had
other reasons to know that the inmate
faced a “substantial risk” of serious harm
and failed to take reasonable steps to
avoid that risk
Helling v. McKinney (1993)


Nevada inmate McKinney filed a § 1983 suit
claiming his involuntary exposure to
environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) posed an
unreasonable risk to his health, in violation of
the Eighth Amendment
Inmate claimed, in part


That he suffered from health problems caused
by ETS exposure
His prison cell mate was a heavy smoker
Helling v. McKinney: cont’d

Court restated its ruling in other cases that
prison officials may not be deliberately
indifferent to an inmate’s health problems


Question whether standard applied only to
current health problems or also to risk of future
problems
In answering, Court held it would be “odd” to
deny an injunction to inmates who plainly
proved unsafe, life-threatening conditions on
the ground that nothing had yet happened to
them
Helling v. McKinney: cont’d

McKinney also argued prison officials
were deliberately indifferent to his
concerns

That current standards of decency do not
support such involuntary exposure as he
was required to face in the prison
Helling v. McKinney: cont’d

Court remanded the case back to the
lower court to inquire into the inmate’s
allegations


To see whether the inmate could show an
Eighth Amendment violation based on ETS
exposure
Court held the following needed to be
proved:
Helling v. McKinney: cont’d




That the inmate was being exposed to
unreasonably high levels of ETS
That the prison’s intervening adoption of a
smoking policy, including the establishment of
nonsmoking areas, did not sufficiently reduce
the risks to the inmate
That the complained of risks violated the
contemporary “standards of decency” and
That prison officials by their attitude and
conduct had shown deliberate indifference to
substantial risks to McKinney’s future health
Helling v. McKinney: cont’d

In Atkinson v. Taylor (2002), an appeals
court looked at the standards of
decency and deliberate indifference


Atkinson was a blind, diabetic inmate, who
shared a cell with constant smokers
He complained he was exposed, with
deliberate indifference, to constant
smoking in his cell for over seven months
Helling v. McKinney: cont’d



He claimed this led to nausea, difficulty
breathing, and other symptoms
His requests to prison officials to change
these conditions were not successful
Atkinson filed a § 1983 suit, claiming prison
officials violated his Eighth Amendment
rights by exposing him to ETS
Helling v. McKinney: cont’d


The appeals court, in addressing the
“contemporary standards of decency” issue
cited Helling and its holding that an inmate
had a right to be free from levels of ETS
that pose an unreasonable risk of future
harm
The court noted that Atkinson had
provided evidence that society has become
unwilling to tolerate the continuous
unwanted risks of second-hand smoke
Helling v. McKinney: cont’d


As to deliberate indifference, Atkinson produced
evidence that after telling prison officials about his
sensitivity to ETS, no change was made
 The court observed that an inmate cannot simply
walk out of his cell whenever he wishes
 Confining a nonsmoker to a cell with a “constant”
smoker for an extended period of time, can
transform a “passing annoyance” into a serious
ongoing medical need
Appeals court held evidence showed deliberate
indifference on the part of prison officials
Helling v. McKinney: cont’d

In Reilly v. Grayson (2002), an asthmatic
inmate charged Michigan state prison officials
with violation of his Eighth Amendment right to
be free from cruel and unusual punishment



Inmate said he repeatedly complained to prison
officials that his medical problems were
worsened by failure to house him in an area free
of ETS
Claimed this exposed him to an unreasonable
risk of harm to his health and
Constituted deliberate indifference on the part of
prison officials
Helling v. McKinney: cont’d

Appeals court held for the inmate


The court stressed the state’s failure to
respond to the repeated medical staff
recommendations that the inmate be
moved to a smoke-free environment
That the record showed the inmate
suffered both an increase in the severity of
his asthma and the risk of future damage
to his health due to his exposure to ETS
Helling v. McKinney: cont’d


Punitive damages were seen as appropriate
based on the defendant’s “reckless . . .
disregard of Reilly’s rights”
The appeals court further noted that the
compensatory and punitive damages and
attorney fees were to be paid by the warden
and two deputy wardens

Liable in personal capacities for harm caused,
and for constitutional violation of Reilly’s rights
Qualified Immunity

Focus – immunity in § 1983 cases,
where officials may be personally sued
because of claimed violations of the
constitutional rights of others
Qualified Immunity: cont’d

Absolute immunity – persons cannot be
sued because actions are protected - in the
interest of public policy – provided the
actions are part of their official duties


Prosecutors, judges, legislators, and jury
members have this immunity available
Government officials in the executive branch,
including prison staff, do not (except for the
president)
Qualified Immunity: cont’d

In Cleavinger v. Saxner (1985), lawyers for
prison staff tried to claim absolute immunity



Involved a suit against prison disciplinary
committee members, who had “tried” a case
involving an inmate’s misconduct
After finding the inmate committed the prohibited
act, the committee imposed a sanction
Government argued committee members were
acting like judges, and persons who acted like
judges in their government roles should be
protected
Qualified Immunity: cont’d

Court rejected the argument




Prisons officials were not sufficiently
independent
Were not professional hearing officers, and
Did not have the procedural requirements
that a judicial officer would have
Qualified, rather than absolute immunity,
is available to prison officials
Qualified Immunity: cont’d

Qualified immunity is available –
how it works:


Inmates need to show a violation of a
constitutional right
If this can be shown, it must further
be shown that the right was clearly
established at the time of the action
complained about
Qualified Immunity: cont’d


If officials can show either of the above
conditions is not met, then they
(officials) are entitled to qualified
immunity
If the court is convinced by the prison
officials’ arguments, the judge will
dismiss the lawsuit
Qualified Immunity: cont’d

Hope v. Pelzer (2002) – Hope, an
Alabama inmate, had been handcuffed
to a hitching post in the prison, due to
his disruptive conduct


He was cuffed with his hands above the
height of his shoulders
First time he was cuffed, he was offered
drinking water and given a bathroom break
every 15 minutes
Qualified Immunity: cont’d

On a second occasion, he was involved
in an altercation with an officer at his
chain gang’s worksite



He was sent back inside the prison,
ordered to take off his shirt, and spent
the next seven hours attached to the post
He received one or two water breaks
He received no bathroom breaks
Qualified Immunity: cont’d


Hope filed a § 1983 action against prison
officials, alleging violation of his Eighth
Amendment rights
Supreme Court held there was an Eighth
Amendment violation


Found in tying Hope to the hitching post
when there was no emergency situation
requiring that action
This resulted in serious discomfort, including
deprivation of bathroom breaks
Qualified Immunity: cont’d

Court saw such conduct as a violation of
the basic concept underlying the Eighth
Amendment – nothing less than the
dignity of man

This met part one of the test for qualified
immunity – there was a violation of a
constitutional right
Qualified Immunity: cont’d

On the second part of the test – was the
right clearly established – the Supreme
Court held it was


Court cited earlier lower court cases
addressing such actions
Also, the U.S. Department of Justice had
advised the state to discontinue the use of
the post in order to meet constitutional
standards
Qualified Immunity: cont’d

In sum, the Court found prison officials
violated clearly established law


“Hope was treated in a way antithetical to
human dignity”
“This wanton treatment was not done of
necessity, but as a punishment for prior
conduct”
Qualified Immunity: cont’d

“Even if there might once have been a
question regarding the constitutionality of
this practice,” the court rulings, plus the
Department of Justice report “put a
reasonable officer on notice that the use of
the hitching post under the circumstances
alleged by Hope was unlawful”
Qualified Immunity: cont’d

Hope shows the importance of
keeping prison policy current with
developing law, and that prison staff
carefully follow the agency’s policy