"Sociology of Everyday life.
Lifestyles, образ жизни,
Theoretical Approaches and
Empirical Findings in Russia."
5. Meeting:
Informal Sector and Informal Practices in Everyday Life
- The Informal Sector in Russia
The Informal Sector in Russia
• Rosser and al. (2000) show that the size of the informal
economy is positively correlated with income inequality
• Foley (1997) and Kolev (1998) find evidence of higher wage
rates in Russia of secondary jobs compared to wage rates of
primary jobs
• Kim (2002) emphasizes that in Russia working in the informal
sector or having more than one job is a way to get well-paid
and to make additional money
c.f.: Beuran/Kalugina 2006: Social exclusion and the informal sector: the case of
Russia
The Informal Sector in Russia
• Even though working in the informal sector presents some
disadvantages (higher job insecurity, worse working
conditions), informal activities provide individuals with an
employment that enables them to fit their needs and increase
their well-being
• Foley (1997) and Kolev (1998) notice that in Russia individuals
participate in informal activities because of the higher
incomes available in this sector despite the higher risk
• furthermore the informal sector provides more autonomy and
flexibility for individual initiative and creativity than the
formal sector (De Grazia, 1982; Renooy, 1990)
c.f.: Beuran/Kalugina 2006: Social exclusion and the informal sector: the case of Russia
The Informal Sector in Russia
• following Goskomstat (2004), shadow economy comprises no more than
25% of the GDP and informal sector employs around 17% of the labor
force
• officials of the Ministry for Internal Affairs, executive agency responsible
for tax enforcement, estimate the size of shadow economy by at least as
much as 40% of the GDP
• Maslova and Baranenkova (2003) conclude that informal employment
amounts to 25 million people, or about 30% of the labor force
• Schneider and Enste (2003) state even higher values of 35 million people
(42% of labor force) in shadow employment
• according to Ryvkina (2001), at least half of Russian population is
employed informally
• Eliseeva and Schirina (2003) state that in case of St.-Petersburg region,
which officially comes very closely to the national average, shadow
economy actually exceeds its official counterpart
c.f. Merkuryeva, Irina (2006): Informal Employment in Russia: Combining Disadvantages and Opportunities, Discussion
Paper, CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC REFORM AND TRANSFORMATION, School of Management and Languages,
Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh , p.1
Set of survival strategies
in the Informal Sector
• (1) having another job;
• (2) using a dacha or other plot of land to grow
food;
• (3) working as private taxi driver;
• (4) renting out one’s apartment;
• (5) business trips abroad (to purchase goods for
resale), and
• (6) renting out one’s garage
(Johnson, Kaufmann, Ustenko 1997:185-6)
5
The Informal Sector in Russia
• worsening of formal employment conditions, reduction in real wages and
quasi absence of social security
• during the first decade of transformation a lot of households with working
age member fall into poverty
• "new” phenomenon of "working poor" has become wide-spread
• facing negative economic conditions, Russian population has to change its
behaviour on the labour market: selfemployment, moonlighting and
informal activities have become a reality for many individuals (Kim, 2002)
• since 1998 the number of persons working in the IS increased
c.f.: Beuran/Kalugina
2006: Social exclusion
and the informal
sector: the case of
Russia
The structure of informal employment in Russia
•
•
•
among all types of informal employment the major input — over 50% — comes from
the employees of informal sector
self-employed, multiple job holders and incompliant formal sector employees
account respectively for 21, 13, and 15%
c.f. Merkuryeva, Irina (2006): Informal Employment in Russia: Combining Disadvantages and Opportunities,
Discussion Paper, CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC REFORM AND TRANSFORMATION, School of Management and
Languages, Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh, p.6
The structure of informal employment in Russia
• age structure of informal employment by gender shows that the highest
informal employment rates are observed among younger age groups
c.f. Merkuryeva, Irina (2006): Informal Employment in Russia: Combining Disadvantages and Opportunities,
Discussion Paper, CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC REFORM AND TRANSFORMATION, School of
Management and Languages, Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh, p.7
The structure of informal employment in Russia
• Informal employment on average provides lower wage rates as well as
lower monthly wage amounts
c.f. Merkuryeva, Irina (2006): Informal Employment in Russia: Combining Disadvantages and
Opportunities, Discussion Paper, CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC REFORM AND TRANSFORMATION,
School of Management and Languages, Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh, p.8
The structure of informal employment in Russia
• the prevalence of formal employment — 90% — is observed in the
organizations owned by different levels of government
• 50% of the employees of private sector are employed on informal basis
• 10% of municipal and 8% of federal and regional employees work
informally
c.f. Merkuryeva, Irina (2006): Informal Employment in Russia: Combining Disadvantages and Opportunities,
Discussion Paper, CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC REFORM AND TRANSFORMATION, School of
Management and Languages, Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh, p.9
"Sociology of Everyday life.
Lifestyles, образ жизни,
Theoretical Approaches and
Empirical Findings in Russia."
6. Meeting:
The Meaning of Blat in the Soviet and Post-Soviet Period
- Informal Networks in Russia
The Informal Sector in Russia
• Rosser and al. (2000) show that the size of the informal
economy is positively correlated with income inequality
• Foley (1997) and Kolev (1998) find evidence of higher wage
rates in Russia of secondary jobs compared to wage rates of
primary jobs
• Kim (2002) emphasizes that in Russia working in the informal
sector or having more than one job is a way to get well-paid
and to make additional money
c.f.: Beuran/Kalugina 2006: Social exclusion and the informal sector: the case of
Russia
The Informal Sector in Russia
• Even though working in the informal sector presents some
disadvantages (higher job insecurity, worse working
conditions), informal activities provide individuals with an
employment that enables them to fit their needs and increase
their well-being
• Foley (1997) and Kolev (1998) notice that in Russia individuals
participate in informal activities because of the higher
incomes available in this sector despite the higher risk
• furthermore the informal sector provides more autonomy and
flexibility for individual initiative and creativity than the
formal sector (De Grazia, 1982; Renooy, 1990)
c.f.: Beuran/Kalugina 2006: Social exclusion and the informal sector: the case of Russia
The Informal Sector in Russia
• following Goskomstat (2004), shadow economy comprises no more than
25% of the GDP and informal sector employs around 17% of the labor
force
• officials of the Ministry for Internal Affairs, executive agency responsible
for tax enforcement, estimate the size of shadow economy by at least as
much as 40% of the GDP
• Maslova and Baranenkova (2003) conclude that informal employment
amounts to 25 million people, or about 30% of the labor force
• Schneider and Enste (2003) state even higher values of 35 million people
(42% of labor force) in shadow employment
• according to Ryvkina (2001), at least half of Russian population is
employed informally
• Eliseeva and Schirina (2003) state that in case of St.-Petersburg region,
which officially comes very closely to the national average, shadow
economy actually exceeds its official counterpart
c.f. Merkuryeva, Irina (2006): Informal Employment in Russia: Combining Disadvantages and Opportunities, Discussion
Paper, CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC REFORM AND TRANSFORMATION, School of Management and Languages,
Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh , p.1
Set of survival strategies
in the Informal Sector
• (1) having another job;
• (2) using a dacha or other plot of land to grow
food;
• (3) working as private taxi driver;
• (4) renting out one’s apartment;
• (5) business trips abroad (to purchase goods for
resale), and
• (6) renting out one’s garage
(Johnson, Kaufmann, Ustenko 1997:185-6)
15
The Informal Sector in Russia
• worsening of formal employment conditions, reduction in real wages and
quasi absence of social security
• during the first decade of transformation a lot of households with working
age member fall into poverty
• "new” phenomenon of "working poor" has become wide-spread
• facing negative economic conditions, Russian population has to change its
behaviour on the labour market: selfemployment, moonlighting and
informal activities have become a reality for many individuals (Kim, 2002)
• since 1998 the number of persons working in the IS increased
c.f.: Beuran/Kalugina
2006: Social exclusion
and the informal
sector: the case of
Russia
The structure of informal employment in Russia
•
•
•
among all types of informal employment the major input — over 50% — comes from
the employees of informal sector
self-employed, multiple job holders and incompliant formal sector employees
account respectively for 21, 13, and 15%
c.f. Merkuryeva, Irina (2006): Informal Employment in Russia: Combining Disadvantages and Opportunities,
Discussion Paper, CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC REFORM AND TRANSFORMATION, School of Management and
Languages, Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh, p.6
The structure of informal employment in Russia
• age structure of informal employment by gender shows that the highest
informal employment rates are observed among younger age groups
c.f. Merkuryeva, Irina (2006): Informal Employment in Russia: Combining Disadvantages and Opportunities,
Discussion Paper, CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC REFORM AND TRANSFORMATION, School of
Management and Languages, Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh, p.7
The structure of informal employment in Russia
• Informal employment on average provides lower wage rates as well as
lower monthly wage amounts
c.f. Merkuryeva, Irina (2006): Informal Employment in Russia: Combining Disadvantages and
Opportunities, Discussion Paper, CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC REFORM AND TRANSFORMATION,
School of Management and Languages, Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh, p.8
The structure of informal employment in Russia
• the prevalence of formal employment — 90% — is observed in the
organizations owned by different levels of government
• 50% of the employees of private sector are employed on informal basis
• 10% of municipal and 8% of federal and regional employees work
informally
c.f. Merkuryeva, Irina (2006): Informal Employment in Russia: Combining Disadvantages and Opportunities,
Discussion Paper, CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC REFORM AND TRANSFORMATION, School of
Management and Languages, Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh, p.9
Infomal Sector does not
automatically mean
Informal Practices!!!
Informal Practices an Activities
• formal institutions of the state socialism broke down
relatively quickly
• informal structures, practices and relation patterns
are resources that the actors in the transformative
process can make use of
• How do these inherited informal structures and
relation pattern influence the transformation
process?
Types of ‘hidden’ (unmeasured, untaxed
and/or unregulated) activities
• informal activities, which are undertaken ‘to meet basic
needs’;
• underground activities, which are deliberately concealed from
public authorities to avoid either the payment of taxes or
compliance with certain regulations;
• iIllegal activities, which generate goods and services
forbidden by the law or which are unlawful when carried out
by unauthorised producers; and
• household activities, which produce goods and services for
own consumption and are outside the SNA production
boundary
c.f. System of National Accounts (SNA, 1993)
23
What are “informal practices”?
• people’s regular strategies to manipulate or exploit formal rules by
enforcing informal norms and personal obligations in formal
contexts
• reflect changes in the balance between constraining and enabling
qualities of the structure
• functions move away from compensating for rigid constraints
toward the active exploitation of weaknesses in the new systems
• it does not mean that informal practices are simply responses to
political and economic constraints; they are also shaped by
historical and cultural factors (c.f. Ledeneva 2008:119)
c.f. Ledeneva, Alena (2008): Blat and Guanxi: Informal Practices in Russia
and China, Comparative Studies in Society and History;50(1):118–144
Grossman’s five types of activities in the
illegal second economy
• Stealing from the state, which involved stealing
anything from enterprise light bulbs and toilet rolls
to output produced, was widespread.
• Speculation
• Illicit production
• Underground enterprises or formal enterprises that
were simultaneously involved in anything from smallscale ‘plan manipulation’ to large-scale illegal
production
• Corruption
c.f. Grossman (1982:249)
25
Grossman’s three types of corruption
• the daily ‘petty bribing’ of Soviet authorities, and
particularly of law enforcement officials
• the tradition of prinosheniye, nowadays
podnosheniye, which involved the regular
bringing of valuable gifts to one’s supervisors;
and the purchase of lucrative official positions
(Grossman 1982:251-2).
• blat, or the use of personal influence to obtain
favours to which a person or firm was lawfully
entitled
Bribery
• a form of pecuniary corruption (monetary corruption)
• an act implying money or gift given that alters the behaviour
of the recipient
• constitutes a crime
• defined by Black's Law Dictionary as the offering, giving,
receiving, or soliciting of any item of value to influence the
actions of an official or other person in discharge of a public
or legal duty
• can be any money, good, right in action, property, preferment,
privilege, object of value, advantage, or merely a promise or
undertaking to induce or influence the action, vote, or
influence of a person in an official or public capacity
Typology of Corrupt Acts
Level I: Everyday Interaction between Officials and Citizens
1.Bribery of public officials to bend rules
2.Obfuscation and over-regulation by officials
3.Misuse of licensing and inspection powers by officials
Level II: Interaction with Public Institutions
1.Self-serving use of public funds (bonuses and hidden salaries; overspending on luxury cars, travel, receptions,
equipment; appropriating cars, apartments, dachas)
2.Profiteering from public resources (selling off environmental assets, leasing offices and equipment for personal gain;
using public employees for private work; quasi-privatization of state-owned enterprises and property)
3. Malpractice and profiteering from privatization and public procurement (steering business and assets to self and
cronies; disregarding conflicts of interest; breaking rules of competitive bidding)
4. Influence peddling, manipulation of personnel decisions (engaging in nepotism, clientelism, favoritism;
sabotaging personnel reform to preserve turf)
Level III: Influence over Political Institutions
1.“State Capture” (building of personal fiefdoms; exploiting public institutions for enrichment of self and network)
2.Forming secret power networks to collude in corrupt acts
3.Undermining elections and political competition (e.g. illicit campaign and party financing)
4.Misuse of legislative power (“selling” laws to private interest, blocking anti-corruption legislation)
5.Corruption of the judicial process (“selling” court decision, false and /or lack of prosecution)
6.Misuse of audits and investigatory powers
7.Using kompromat for political blackmails
8.Corruption in and of the media
Karklins, Rasma (2005): The System Made Me Do It. Corruption in Post-Communist Societies, Armonk & London: M.E.Sharpe, p. 25
Is Post-Communism more Corrupt?
The Regime-Oriented Answer
• Jakob Van Klaveren tried to distinguish between different forms of
constitutional regimes in terms of their corruptibility
• In Klaveren’s analysis there are two preconditions for corruption: first, an
administration that allows its officials a wide margin of autonomy; and
second, a moral code that does not impose any standard of probity on
state functionaries (e.g. oligarchic republics)
• By contrast, the triumph of democracy was expected to put an end to the
schemes of corrupt officials
• official discourse of communist governments also argued that corruption
was embedded in capitalism but alien to socialism, but regime-oriented
explanations seem false
• The argument that communism by its nature is less corrupt than the postcommunist regimes is a theoretical speculation
c.f. Krastev, Ivan (2007): The Corruption Paradox. Why Post-Communism Is/Looks More Corrupt
Than Communism, in: http://www.colbud.hu/honesty-trust/krastev/pub02.doc
Is Post-Communism more Corrupt?
The Regime-Oriented Answer
• the argument was that being more repressive and stronger in
enforcement, the authoritarian state is less inclined to be corrupt
than democracies, which tend to be weak and liberal, is selfdefeating
• this argument already lost its popularity in the 1960s by two major
considerations:
1. the communist system was rife with regulations and permissions;
public officials had great margins for discretion: the ideal
preconditions for corruption
2. In the late 1980s, governments and publics both perceived
communism as corrupt; in the late 1980s, communism was far from
a model of perfect authoritarianism, and the price of corruption
was much lower than in the 1950s
c.f. Krastev, Ivan (2007): The Corruption Paradox. Why Post-Communism Is/Looks More Corrupt
Than Communism, in: http://www.colbud.hu/honesty-trust/krastev/pub02.doc
Is Post-Communism more Corrupt?
The Institution-Oriented Answer
• following Baker’s “ Crime and Punishment” this school seeks to explain the
“corruption paradox” in three major directions
1. weak state institutions combined with high uncertainty and a low standard
of living create conditions in which taking bribes becomes a rational
choice preference
2. privatization and the more general process of large-scale redistribution of
public wealth create greater incentives for corruption, and are thus the
major explanation for the “corruption choice” of many businessmen
3. communist-era corruption is more efficient than the post-communist
corruption
c.f. Krastev, Ivan (2007): The Corruption Paradox. Why Post-Communism Is/Looks More Corrupt
Than Communism, in: http://www.colbud.hu/honesty-trust/krastev/pub02.doc
Is Post-Communism more Corrupt?
The Virtual Answer
• in the communist period, corruption was swept under the
carpet and the public was unaware of its scope
• today, corruption has captured the imagination of the media
and the overproduction of corruption stories has shaped
public opinion, producing the feeling of the overwhelming
presence of corruption in public life
• the lack of freedom of the press in the communist period
both suppressed and fueled the circulation of corruption
stories
c.f. Krastev, Ivan (2007): The Corruption Paradox. Why Post-Communism Is/Looks More Corrupt
Than Communism, in: http://www.colbud.hu/honesty-trust/krastev/pub02.doc
Is Post-Communism more Corrupt?
The Social Capital Answer
• understanding “blat” as social capital
• blat was widespread in socialist period; the dominant
form of corruption in the communist period
• blat was an exchange of favors: even if gifts and
money were sometimes part of blat relations, the
driving force of the transaction was the exchange of
favors, and not a bribe
• Blat was totally conditioned by the existence of the
economy of shortage
c.f. Krastev, Ivan (2007): The Corruption Paradox. Why Post-Communism Is/Looks More Corrupt
Than Communism, in: http://www.colbud.hu/honesty-trust/krastev/pub02.doc
Personal Networking in Russian Post Soviet Life
• Blat emerged in the early socialist state and is still
highly relevant today
• Blat was first observed by Sovietologists in 1950s
(Crankshaw 1956, Berliner 1957)
• a comprehensive sociological study (Ledeneva 1998)
was undertaken in the middle of the 1990s
• recent publications on Russian managerial culture
have continued research into blat.
c.f. Butler, B. & Purchase, S. (2004). Personal Networking in Russian Post Soviet Life,
Research and Practice in Human Resource Management, 12(1), 34-60
Definition and Origin of the Word Blat
• There is no unified, agreed meaning of blat and the term cannot easily
be translated into English (Michailova & Worm 2003)
• for most Russians, however, it is an obvious word which does not need
definition
• blat for Joseph Berliner (1957: 182), “...the term blat is one of the many
flavoured words which are so intimate a part of a particular culture that
they can be only awkwardly rendered in the language of another...”
• There are working definitions of blat:
• Blat is an exchange of ‘favours of access’ in conditions of shortages and a
state system of privileges; ‘favours of access’ are provided at the public
expense (Ledeneva 1998).
• Blat exchange is often mediated and covered by the rhetoric of
friendship or acquaintance: sharing, helping out, and friendly support,
mutual care. Intertwined with personal networks blat provided access to
public resources through personal channels (Ledeneva 1998).
• Blat involves a “reliance for favours upon personal contacts with people
in influential positions” (Kryshtanovskaia 1994: 9).
previous research of blat derives from three
main areas:
• Sociology where blat was studied in a social context as an
instrument of satisfying basic needs of common people in
everyday life (Ledeneva 1998, Ledeneva, Lovell &
Rogachevskii 2000).
• Business ethics where blat was briefly mentioned as a
peculiarity of the Russian business class (Blackwell 1991,
Stojanov 1992, Puffer et al. 1997, Hendley et al. 2000, Hunter
2003).
• Cross cultural analyses of Russian and Western managers that
pointed out the different attitudes towards blat by Western
and Russian managers (Puffer 1994, Puffer & McCarthy 1995).
c.f. Butler, B. & Purchase, S. (2004). Personal Networking in Russian Post Soviet Life,
Research and Practice in Human Resource Management, 12(1), 34-60
Blat has two main meanings
1. refers to personal networking
- the term blat came to Russia from the Polish blat, meaning ‘someone
who provides an umbrella, a cover’
- this in turn is taken from Yiddish blat which means ‘close, familiar’, ‘one
of us’, ‘one of our circle’.
- This meaning of blat contributes to its human face: people give special
treatment and help to those of their circle, but often this help is provided
to meet the expenses of those who are out of their circle
2. alludes to insignificant criminal activity, such as minor theft
- (criminal) meaning that explains the fact that most people either pretend
to have nothing to do with blat or refer to it in other words
- ‘I obtained it by blat’ one could say ‘I received it from an acquaintance’
- In a business context it is acceptable to say ‘I solved this problem using
my connections’ rather than to say ‘I used blat’
c.f. Butler, B. & Purchase, S. (2004). Personal Networking in Russian Post Soviet Life,
Research and Practice in Human Resource Management, 12(1), 34-60
The Concept of Blat (Alena Ledeneva)
• Ledeneva defines blat “as an exchange of ‘favours of access’ to public
resources in conditions of shortages and a state system of privileges”
(Ledeneva, 1998:37)
• blat is the use of personal networks and informal contacts to obtain
goods and services in short supply and to skirt formal procedures
(Ledeneva 1998: 1)
• “blat is a roundabout way of arranging things, circumventing the
formal procedure by using personal contacts” (Ledeneva, 1996:26).
• Through blat networks public resources were redirected to private
uses and to the needs of personal consumption
• These relations were often disguised by the rhetoric of friendship,
such as ‘helping out’ a friend or an acquaintance
• Typical of blat was the misrecognition of the reciprocity of exchanges
• blat was omnipresent and uses in all spheres of society to fulfil
perceived needs and goods - or in other words: blat was normal
39
The meaning of blat in the Soviet period
• often disguised by the rhetoric of friendship or acquaintance,
in terms of “helping out,” “friendly support,” and “mutual
care,” (Ledeneva 1998: 37)
• continue a tradition of give and take practices in Russia
(Lovell, Ledeneva, and Rogatchevsii 2000)
• moral obligations imposed by social relationships compel
people to break formal rules, which results in the
instrumental use of personal networks for achieving goals in
other domains, often in a situation of acute need
• blat gave people in socialist period access to state resources
through personal channels and other redistributive
mechanisms of goods and services in short supply
c.f. Ledeneva, Alena (2008): Blat and Guanxi: Informal Practices in Russia and China, Comparative
Studies in Society and History 2008;50(1):118–144
The meaning of blat in the Soviet period
“Blatmeisters” in the Russian context are people:
- with certain talents to be successful blat transactors
- characters who solve problems and arrange things for others, and
are thus called “useful people” (nuzhnye liudi)
- “brokers” with many contacts, not necessarily pleasant to everyone
but energetic, jolly, and cheerful
• were often employed in professions which delivered personal
services—doctors, beauticians, or sauna workers—or which gave
them special access to goods—shop assistants, or supply and
storage employees
c.f. Ledeneva, Alena (2008): Blat and Guanxi: Informal Practices in Russia and
China, Comparative Studies in Society and History 2008;50(1):118–144
Boren’s (2002) reasons why blat was not effectively
counteracted by the Soviet authorities
• a) The official economy would not have been able to
function without it since it helped in direction the
supply of goods and services to where they were
demand.
• b) Powerful persons were involved in the system and
had no incentive to change it.
• c) It directed people’s attention away from politics
and towards consumption
42
“The Ethics of Blat…
…are the same as the Ethics of Friendship”
(1) obligation to help—help your friends unselfishly and
they will come to your aid
(2) Do not expect gratitude but be grateful
(3) Look to the future—long-term reciprocity
(4) Keep within limits—ask within limits
(5) Know the contexts in which the informal friendship code
has priority over formal legal codes
(6) Socially ostracize those who follow the letter of law
c.f. Ledeneva, Alena (2008): Blat and Guanxi: Informal Practices in Russia and China, Comparative
Studies in Society and History 2008;50(1):118–144
Discussion in Sociology
•
The role of blat in contemporary’s Russia and
its disappearance or continuing
1. The Give Me a Bribe Society
2. The Relevance of Blat-Relations
The “Give Me a Bribe Society”
• disappearance of blat is the key to understanding the post-communist
reality
• end of the economy of shortage and the emergence of real money
changed the rules of the game
• major process to be observed in all transition countries is the
monetarization of blat relations and the replacement of blat by bribe
• for the majority of people, the transition from communism to postcommunism was one from a “do me a favor society” to a “give me a bribe
society”.
• bribery replaced blat as the dominant form of corruption
• the major difference between blat and bribery is their respective functions
in reproducing the social order
• blat was a socially acceptable form of corruption that increased the social
equality and the fairness of the communist society
• in blat transactions participants understood their corrupt activities as
“help” and covered them in the rhetoric of friendship
c.f. Krastev, Ivan (2007): The Corruption Paradox. Why Post-Communism Is/Looks More Corrupt
Than Communism, in: http://www.colbud.hu/honesty-trust/krastev/pub02.doc
How Bribery Reinforces Inequality
The social functions of bribery in post-communist reality differ
from the functions of blat:
• Bribery causes inflation of the social capital defined as blat
• Bribery cannot be covered by the rhetoric of friendship, and
this makes people feel morally uncomfortable
• Bribery contributes to social stratification, making it easier for
the rich to obtain everything they want
• Blat transactions took form in the context of solidarity and
friendship; bribery takes the form of competition
• In a society suffering the rise of social inequality, bribery takes
the form of a selective tax (it helps concentrate power in the
hands of elites)
c.f. Krastev, Ivan (2007): The Corruption Paradox. Why Post-Communism Is/Looks More Corrupt
Than Communism, in: http://www.colbud.hu/honesty-trust/krastev/pub02.doc
Blat as a Personal Network in Former
Command Economy
• One of the key meanings of blat is communication
within one’s circle, or one’s personal network
• according to Michailova and Worm (2003) the three
main features of personal networking are:
- Social resourcing
- Continuity of relationship
- Coexistence of trust and cooperation on the one
hand and power and domination on the other.
Butler, B. & Purchase, S. (2004). Personal Networking in Russian Post Soviet Life,
Research and Practice in Human Resource Management, 12(1), 34-60
Social Resourcing
• As blat exists not only within one’s own network, but also
between blat network members, the phenomenon has
become termed ‘set blatnyih’
• Within ‘set blatnyih’, the members are involved in both
double and multisided relationships  ‘social resourcing’ or
the ability to access various types of resources through one’s
social connections
• following example: Exchange is often facilitated by
participants outside the double-sided relationship. Hence,
obligations might stretch to people whom one does not know
directly or will never meet. In such a network persons A, B
and C have mutual commitments of exchanging favours. In
spite of this, only A and B as well as B and C are involved in
double-side relations. Thus, even without knowing each other,
A and C are mutually committed through their involvement
with B
Butler, B. & Purchase, S. (2004). Personal Networking in Russian Post Soviet Life,
Research and Practice in Human Resource Management, 12(1), 34-60
Continuity of Relationships
• Russians like to develop close long-term personal
relationships which are a prerequisite for the
existence of blat (Sedov 2004, Vandysheva & Gamov
2004)
• Close long-term personal relationships are used to
protect individual and group interests for personal
gain,e.g. people maintain contacts with their school
and university friends, with friends from military
service, with former neighbours and others who can
be trusted
• People often support each other and grow together
personally and professionally (Ryzhova 2004,
Tchumanova 2004)
Butler, B. & Purchase, S. (2004). Personal Networking in Russian Post Soviet Life,
Research and Practice in Human Resource Management, 12(1), 34-60
Continuity of Relationships
• long-term personal relationships of former Komsomol (Young
Communist League in the former Soviet Union) officials help
them to survive and succeed in business and in maintaining
opportunities to acquire greater wealth for people of their
circle
• When interviewed on 23 February 2004, one of our
respondents in Russia indicated, most of the current ‘new
Russians’ – wealthy Russian businessmen – are former
Komsomol officials
• Their ability to ‘go through’ various issues in business can
often be explained not only by their excellent self-discipline
and organisational skills gained in the Komsomol, but to a
large extent by having everywhere a circle of former
colleagues and acquaintances
• They still have better access to government funds and
permissions, bank loans, and resources
Coexistence of Trust and Cooperation on the
one Hand and Power on the Other
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Blackwell (1991) highlighted the following example to illustrate how blat relates to the
features of personal network
Hellof and Fitzgerald, two Canadian business people, who entered the Russian market with
an educational project in the early 1990s experienced the necessity of blat
These two Canadians had their first lesson in the importance of blat when they needed to get
tickets to Leningrad (formerly St Petersburg) to meet Mr. Efimov, one of the project managers
in Russia
Getting tickets for the Leningrad train required waiting in line for nine hours, while flying to
Leningrad was by the circuitous route to Helsinki, Finland, and back to Leningrad
When the Russian project manager, Mr. Efimov, acted, within a few hours a first-class
automobile was ready to transport these Canadian business people to Leningrad
Answering questions on his experience of dealing with the Soviets, Fitzgerald said that it is
important to find the right partner – who understands the Westerners for starters (Blackwell,
1991)
This example highlights how the Canadians’ continuous relationship with one of the Russian
project managers (Mr. Efimov) gave them access to resources (luxury and in-time
transportation), that were generally unavailable
c.f. Butler, B. & Purchase, S. (2004). Personal Networking in Russian Post Soviet Life, Research and
Practice in Human Resource Management, 12(1), 34-60
Change and Continuity in Blat Practices
Three major changes in blat practices:
1.
a certain “monetization” of blat practices has taken place (money has become
the focus of “shortage” and the driving force by which blat connections become
reoriented)  affects the non-monetary nature of the blat exchange of favors
(Ledeneva 2000: 192–93)
2. post-Soviet privatization of state property revolutionized the blat “means of
exchange”—a favor of access
official “gatekeepers” in a centralized state economy provided favors of access on two
conditions:
(1) the “gate” itself was not alienable (it belonged to the state);
(2) gatekeepers had some certainty in staying in charge of re-distribution
 most “favors of access” demanded from officials were about privatizing
resources or converting them into capital by means of licenses, permissions, or
tax allowances
3.
-
scale of blat exchange has changed in the post-Soviet economy
personal businesses are set up with the help of blat connections
state property is privatized, and state budget funds are rerouted in the interests
of private businesses
c.f. Ledeneva, Alena (2008): Blat and Guanxi: Informal Practices in Russia and China, Comparative Studies in Society and History 2008;50(1):118–
144
Lonkila, M. (1997) 'Informal Exchange Relations in
Post-Soviet Russia: A Comparative Perspective'
• compares the informal exchange of favours, goods and
information in St. Petersburg and Helsinki
• Forty secondary school teachers in St. Petersburg and thirtyeight in Helsinki kept a diary of their important social relations
for two weeks
• Each evening they recorded their significant social encounters
of the day in structured questionnaires, e.g. whom they met
• furthermore they added persons whom they had not met
during the study period but whom they nevertheless
considered as significant for their social life
• Clear differences were found between the informal exchange
practices of Russian and Finnish respondents
Lonkila, M. (1997) 'Informal Exchange Relations in
Post-Soviet Russia: A Comparative Perspective'
• Russian teachers exchanged more favours, goods and important
information
• Russian respondents having to use their relatives, friends, colleagues or
acquaintances in order to obtain informally products or different kinds of
services (eg. medical care)
• half of the Russian respondents reported blat exchanges, a practice not
found in the Finnish data
• A good example is Olga who described her mother as 'blatnoi chelovek'
(person inclined to do things by blat) as opposed to her father who never
wanted to use his social relations
• Olga: ...[my own] mother - she is a 'blatnoi' person. Generally there is a
category of people - whereever they go, nobody will ever deny them
anything. But my father ... he was a very intelligent person, always 'please'
and 'thank you'. He was always treated with rough words and left in tears..
Lonkila, M. (1997) 'Informal Exchange Relations in
Post-Soviet Russia: A Comparative Perspective'
• Interviewer: And did not achieve anything.
• Olga: And did not achieve anything. He did not know how to ask, he sent
mother everywhere. I am probably the same kind of person. I love
achieving things myself. Well, of course, if I need something some kind of
contacts appear, it even turned out that I got po blatu to hospital!
• Interviewer: You got there through relations [po znakomstvu]?
• Olga: Yes, I did not expect it! I asked [my student's] mother to come to see
me, the son of whom had started to skip lessons and behave badly. There
were complaints about him, and I asked her to come. During our
conversation she appeared to be an 'uzi' specialist [a doctor specialized in
ultra wave diagnostics] at our maternity clinic. I did not know this at all.
And I complained that I did not feel good and she invited me to her office.
This is how it all happened. ...
Lonkila, M. (1997) 'Informal Exchange Relations in
Post-Soviet Russia: A Comparative Perspective'
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Interviewer: And she also arranged things for you at the hospital?
Olga: She arranged everything, she arranged for me to go very quickly to the
hospital and undergo all these analyses etc. But had I gone myself! You know
how you take care of your own health - you do everything at the last moment.
Interviewer: Yes, that's the way it happens.
Olga: And this happened again - po blatu [by blat].
Interviewer: Now it is interesting; did you feel indebted to her?
Olga: Yes, I brought her a box of chocolates and a bunch of flowers, and - well,
she is just such a tender person, that...
Interviewer: And you resolved the conflict with her son?
Olga: Yes, we resolved it , here everything is ok (laugh)
Interviewer: And what about the doctor? Were you operated on free of
charge?
Olga: Yes, free of charge. ... it was only a maternity hospital, not far from here.
But I was amazed how they took care of patients. Completely gratuitous
maternity hospital ...
Lonkila, M. (1997) 'Informal Exchange Relations in
Post-Soviet Russia: A Comparative Perspective'
• The informal exchanges reported in the St. Petersburg data were more
often carried out with colleagues or other work-mediated relations
• stressing the importance of the Russian workplace as a social milieu
• In the Russian data the informal exchange relations also involved more
examples of informal exchange mediated by a third person, whereas in
Helsinki the relations were more of a dyadic nature
• continuing lack of trust in official institutions and social services was
compensated for Russian respondents with the use of their personal
relations
• through the use of brokers or a common social context, particularly the
workplace
• resulting forms of social life can be characterized as personalized (and
mediated (since the brokers were often used)
• networks of personal relations still continue to play a significant role in the
life of post-Soviet citizens.
Lonkila, M. (1997) 'Informal Exchange Relations in
Post-Soviet Russia: A Comparative Perspective'
• Lonkila illustrates the role of informal exchange in the daily life of St.
Petersburg respondents, based on the case descriptions of two middleaged female teachers
• Irina is a 44-year-old teacher of Russian born in the Ukraine. She met her
husband, currently a teacher of physical education, on holiday in Odessa in
1969. Three years later they were married and Irina followed her husband
to Leningrad where he was studying at a sports institute. They live
together with their 20-year-old daughter in a three room apartment
• Alla is a 36-year-old teacher of literature married to a businessman of the
same age. They have a 16-year-old son and eight-year-old daughter. Alla
joined the Communist party, taking her membership seriously and, in her
own words, was a good communist. Her Komsomol and party relations
resulted in a suggestion to study in the German Democratic Republic. At
present Alla is a rank-and-file teacher at school but thanks to her friends
at the university she can also teach Russian to foreigners.
Irina and Alla: Experts of Informal Exchange
Lonkila, M. (1997) 'Informal Exchange Relations in
Post-Soviet Russia: A Comparative Perspective'
•
•
•
•
-
The social life is marked not only by the great number of their exchange
relations but also by the intensity and nature of these relations
Other 'exchange experts' similar to these two teachers were found in St.
Petersburg but not in Helsinki
Both Irina and Alla have reported numerous informal exchange relations
particularly with their colleagues and neighbours
'All the time I feel the interest of others, how they want to approach me, how
they'd like to make friends with me'.
colleague who helps me with my work
good person who has often helped me [old friend and teacher]
mother's neighbour who helps our family with small repairs
very pleasant woman, always ready to help [neighbour]
we haven't even met but she wants to be helped [sister of an acquaintance]
benevolent and tender person, ready to help [neighbour]
Comparing Irina and Alla
Table 1: Typical Content of the Exchanges of Favours and Material Goods in St. Petersburg and Helsinki
Content of the Exchange
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
1
0.
1
1.
1
2.
St. Petersburg
Helsinki
Obtaining (dostat), bringing or buying (on other
person's behalf with her money) foodstuffs or other
kinds of products
40
(17%)
6
(6%)*
Arranging medical or paramedical aid; eg. arranging a
contact with a doctor, obtaining or bringing medicine
32
(13%)
7
(6%)*
Lending things other than money (eg. books, videos,
computer programs, diskettes, cassettes, sheet music,
clothes)
15
(6%)
19
(17%)
Helping with home repairs or work at datcha (St.
Petersburg) or moving (Helsinki)
13
(5%)
5
(5%)
Arranging useful contacts; eg. business contact,
hairdresser, lawyer
12
(5%)
-
Sending or transmitting a parcel
Arranging somebody's child a place at school
(university, sport camp)
Tutoring others' children; eg. helping colleague's child
in homework
11
8
(5%)
(3%)
3
-
(3%)
8
(3%)
1
(1%)
Giving small gifts (birthday gifts excluded); eg.
children's clothes etc.
Giving a car ride
Miscellaneous small favours or help; eg. taking the
children to or from school, sewing a button on shirt etc.
8
(3%)
6
(6%)
7
56
(3%)
(24%)
29
33
(27%)
(30%)
238
(100%)
109
(100 %)
Total Number of Exchanges
Table 2: Typical Content of the Exchanges of Important Information in St. Petersburg and Helsinki
Content of the
Exchange
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Medicine or
medical cure
Where to buy
(kupit) cheaper
products
(mainly
foodstuff)
Children's
studies
Job
opportunities
Where to find or
how to obtain
(dostat)
products
Official
documents
(passports,
medical
documents etc.)
Common
investment
opportunities
Miscellaneous
Total Number
of Exchanges
St. Petersburg
Helsinki
18
(27%)
2
(22%)
10
(15%)
-
9
(13%)
-
7
(10%)
2
(22%)
6
(9%)
1
(11%)
4
(6%)
-
4
(6%)
-
9
67
(13%)
(100%)
4
9
(44%)
(100%)
"Sociology of Everyday life.
Lifestyles, образ жизни,
Theoretical Approaches and
Empirical Findings in Russia."
7. Meeting:
Gender and Everyday Life in Soviet Russia and GDR
GENDER AND EVERYDAY LIFE IN
SOVIET RUSSIA, GDR and postSoviet Russia
Role of Women
• Article 35 of the Soviet Constitution states that women and
men "have equal rights" and possess equal access to
education and training, employment, promotions, and
remuneration and to participation in social, political, and
cultural activity
• Women also receive special medical and workplace
protection, including incentives for mothers to work outside
the home and legal and material support in their role as
mothers
Role of Women
• Nevertheless, both within society in general and within the
family, the position of women in 1989 was not equal to that of
men
• For example, in the 1980s women constituted just:
over half the country's work force
four-fifths of its health workers
more than two-thirds of its physicians and economists
three-quarters of those employed in education
• authorities neglected to add, however, that the average pay
for most women in these fields was below the country's
average pay
Role of Women
• Moreover, the higher the level in a profession, the smaller the
percentage of women
• in 1984 women constituted 83 percent of elementary school
directors but only 42 percent of secondary school directors and 38
percent of middle school directors
• In the 1980s, 46 percent of all collective farm workers were women,
but they constituted only 1.9 percent of collective farm
chairpersons
• Women were also underrepresented in the CPSU and its leadership
• In 1983 women constituted only 27.6 percent of the membership of
the party and only 4.2 percent of the Central Committee
• in 1986 women were totally absent from the Politburo
Marriage
• Soviet citizens may marry at age eighteen without parental
permission
• Latvian, Estonian, Moldavian, Ukrainian, Armenian, Kazakh, and
Kirgiz republics have lowered this age to seventeen years
• In 1980 approximately 73 percent of the brides and 62 percent of
the grooms were under twenty-five years of age
• One third of all marriages involved persons under twenty years of
age
• in 20 percent of the marriages involving persons under that age the
bride was pregnant
• About 70 percent of childless young couples lived
with parents during the first years of marriage
because of low income or a shortage of housing
Homework
• Most married women in the Soviet Union worked outside the
home in addition to fulfilling their roles of wife, mother, and
homemaker
• As in other industrialized countries, women had difficulty
reconciling the demands of career and home  “double
societal role”
• At home, Soviet women spent more than twice as much time
on housework as men: 28 hrs per week, men: 12 hrs.
• Before marriage, the average woman has had 42 hrs. rs a
week of free time; after marriage 21 hrs.
• Soviet research shows that marital happiness was directly
connected to the extent a husband shared in domestic work
Soviet women’s dual burden
• Women encouraged into the workforce to become
economically independent of men and into education to
achieve their full human potential
• position of women was characterised primarily by the dual
burden — women’s responsibility for paid labour and
domestic labour
• their work in the domestic sphere was regarded as secondary
to that of paid labour
• Heitlinger suggested that, ‘the production of children has a
paradoxical effect on the position of women in state socialist
countries’ arising from ‘the contradiction between the private
nature and collective consequences of biological
reproduction’ (Heitlinger 1979: 29)
Homework
• Husbands and wives from the elite tended to share decisions and
housework to a greater extent than those from other social strata
• In blue-collar and agricultural families, the husband was considered head
of the household
• Nationality appeared to be less of an influence on marital roles than social
status and place of residence
- In mid-1970s, even most Muslim husbands were willing to share in some
housework with their wives
- the higher the socioeconomic status of the family, the more the husband
shared the work
- In Muslim families and in other nationality groups where the patriarchal
system has remained strong, the husband was regarded as the head of the
family and made most of the major family decisions
- in the European part of USSR, the husband and wife shared in the decision
making
Divorce
• with a rate of 3.4 divorces per 1,000 people, USSR was second
only to the US (4.8 divorces) among industrialized countries in
1986
• Soviet divorce rate varied according to region and population
density
• In Soviet Central Asia, it was two to three times lower than in
European areas
• the rate was also higher in cities and in newly developed
regions
• Divorce rates in rural areas averaged about 40 percent of
those in cities.
Divorces
• variety of reasons for divorces:
- drunkenness, incompatibility, infidelity, separation, physical
incompatibility
- Regional differences: acceptance of divorce in Muslim areas
for families with children was opposed by 87 percent of urban
and 84 percent of rural Uzbeks
- In contrast: only 54 percent of urban Russians and 51 percent
of urban Estonians held this view
• Housing problems and the lack of privacy
• 20 percent of divorces occurring during the first years of
marriage due to housing problems
• 18 percent of divorces occurring during the first years of
marriage due to conflicts with parents
Divorces
In 1973 in Leningrad
- 31.7 percent of divorcing couples had lived with
parents or in a hostel
- 62.3 percent in a shared apartment
- only 5.1 percent in a separate apartment
• Divorces cost between 60 and 200 rubles depending
on income and were granted more quickly if the
couple had no children
• In general, divorces were relatively simple to obtain
Sex and Contraception
• Soviet society in general did not approve of unmarried
couples living together
• lack of suitable contraceptive devices and lack of public
discussion about contraception, led to a large number of
unwanted pregnancies
• Studies in Leningrad have shown that 38 percent of all babies
born in Leningrad in 1978 were conceived before marriage
• Although women were officially discouraged from having
abortions, they were legal and were the chief form of birth
control in the country: 8 million each year
• Abortions were free for working women and cost 2 to 5 rubles
for other women, depending on where they lived
• In Muslim regions, the rate of abortion was much lower than
in the European part of the country
Family Size
• depended mainly on the place of residence--urban or rural-and ethnic group
• also influenced by housing and income limitations, pensions,
and female employment outside the home
• typical urban family consisted of a married couple, two
children, and, in about 20 percent of the cases, one of the
grandmothers
• Rural families had more children and often three generations
under one roof
• Families in Central Asia and the Caucasus tended to have
more children than families elsewhere in the Soviet Union
Family Size
• From 1960s to late 1980s, number of families with more than
one child decreased by about 50 percent and in 1988 totaled
1.9 million
• In the Russian, Ukrainian, Belorussian, Moldavian, Estonian,
Latvian, and Lithuanian republics, families with one and two
children constituted more than 90 percent of all families
• in Central Asia those with three or more children ranged from
14 percent in the Kirgiz Republic to 31 percent in the Tadzhik
Republic
Family and Kinship Structures
• extended family was more prevalent in Central Asia and the
Caucasus than in other regions
• Deference to parental wishes regarding marriage was
particularly strong in these areas, even among the Russians
residing there
• Extended families helped perpetuate traditional life-styles
• younger and better educated Uzbeks and working women,
however, were more likely to behave and think like their
counterparts in the European areas
"Sociology of Everyday life.
Lifestyles, образ жизни,
Theoretical Approaches and
Empirical Findings in Russia."
8. Meeting:
Lebensführung, Lifestyles in Global Cities and
Metropoles
Global city
• A global city (also called world city) is a city deemed to be an
important node point in the global economic system
• The concept comes from geography and urban studies
• concept rests on the idea that globalization can be understood
as largely created, facilitated and enacted in strategic
geographic locales according to a hierarchy of importance to
the operation of the global system of finance and trade
• most complex of these entities is the "global city," whereby the
linkages binding a city have a direct and tangible effect on
global affairs through socio-economic means
• terminology of "global city", as opposed to megacity, is
thought to have been first coined by Saskia Sassen in her 1991
work The Global City
Global Cities
• highly concentrated command points of the world
economy and nodes in the network/hierarchy of
world cities;
• key locations for finance and service firms which
have overtaken the importance of the manufacturing
sectors;
• sites of production and innovations in the leading
industries; and
• markets for the products and innovations which they
produce.
80
2004 GaWC studies
• One of the first attempts to define, categorize, and rank
global cities was made in 1999 by the Globalization and
World Cities Study Group and Network (GaWC)
• cities are ranked on their provision of "advanced
producer services" such as accountancy, advertising,
finance, and law
• The GaWC inventory identifies three levels of global cities
and several sub-ranks
• roster generally denotes cities in which there are offices
of certain multinational corporations providing financial
and consulting services rather than denoting other
cultural, political, and economic centres
Ranking
• (1) Global Cities
– Well rounded global cities
– Very large contribution: London and New York City
• Smaller contribution and with cultural bias: Los Angeles, Paris, and San
Francisco
– Incipient global cities: Amsterdam, Boston, Chicago, Madrid, Milan, Moscow,
Toronto
– Global niche cities — specialised global contributions
– Financial: Hong Kong, Singapore and Tokyo
– Political and social: Brussels, Geneva and Washington, D.C.
• (2) World Cities
– Subnet articulator cities
– Cultural: Berlin, Copenhagen, Melbourne, Munich, Oslo, Rome, Stockholm
– Political: Bangkok, Beijing, Vienna
– Social: Manila, Nairobi, Ottawa
Ranking
– (3) Worldwide leading cities
• Primarily economic global contributions:
Frankfurt, Miami, Munich, Osaka, Singapore,
Sydney, Zurich
• Primarily non-economic global contributions:
Abidjan, Addis Ababa, Atlanta, Basel,
Barcelona, Cairo, Denver, Harare, Lyon, Manila,
Mexico City, Mumbai, New Delhi, Shanghai
Statistics of World Cities
Rank
Population of city (proper)
Population of metropolitan area
Percentage foreign born[30]
1
Mumbai
Tokyo
Dubai
2
Shanghai
Mexico City
Kuwait City
3
Karachi
Seoul
Doha
4
Istanbul
New York City
Manama
5
Delhi
São Paulo
Miami
6
São Paulo
Mumbai
Toronto
7
Moscow
Delhi
Macau
8
Seoul
Shanghai
Muscat
9
Mexico City
Jakarta
Hong Kong
10
Tokyo
Moscow
Vancouver
Statistics about World Cities
Rank
Top 10 rail systems by
length
Annual by passenger in a single
airport [31]
Number of billionaires (U.S.
dollars)[32][33][34]
1
London
Atlanta
Moscow
2
New York City
Chicago
New York City
3
Berlin
London
London
4
Madrid
Tokyo
Istanbul
5
Moscow
Los Angeles
Hong Kong
6
Seoul
Paris
Los Angeles
7
Shanghai
Dallas
Mumbai
8
Paris
Frankfurt
San Francisco
9
Beijing
Beijing
Dallas
10
Tokyo
Denver
Tokyo
Statistics of World Cities
Rank
Metro systems by annual passenger ridership
1
Tokyo
2
Moscow
3
New York City
4
Seoul
5
Mexico City
6
Paris
7
Hong Kong
8
London
9
Osaka
10
São Paulo
The world's most expensive big cities – (on cost of living expressed in US dollars)
Rank
2008
Rank
2007
1
1
Moscow
Russia
142.4
134.4
2
4
Tokyo
Japan
127.0
122.1
3
2
London
UK
125.0
126.3
4
10
Oslo
Norway
118.3
105.8
5
3
Seoul
South Korea
117.7
122.4
6
5
Hong Kong
China
117.6
119.4
7
6
Copenhagen
Denmark
117.2
110.2
8
7
Geneva
Switzerland
115.8
109.8
12
13
Paris
France
109.4
101.4
13
14
Singapore
Singapore
109.1
100.4
18
12
St. Petersburg
Russia
103.1
103.0
19
19
Vienna
Austria
102.3
96.9
20
20
Beijing
China
101.9
City
Country
Score
2008
Score
2007
Chart : Urban and Rural Population of the World 1950-2030
6.000
5.000
Million
4.000
3.000
2.000
1.000
Rural
Source: United Nations
Urban
30
20
25
20
20
20
15
20
10
20
05
20
00
20
95
19
90
19
85
19
80
19
75
19
70
19
65
19
60
19
55
19
19
50
0
Chart: Urban and Rural Population of More Developed and Less Developed
Regions of the World 1950-2030
4.000
Million
3.000
2.000
1.000
19
50
19
55
19
60
19
65
19
70
19
75
19
80
19
85
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
20
10
20
15
20
20
20
25
20
30
0
More developed regions, urban population
More developed regions, rural population
Less developed regions, urban population
Less developed regions, rural population
Source: United Nations
30
Chart: Share of World Population Residing in
Urban Areas by Size of Urban Area 1975, 2003, 2015
27
25
Percent
20
20
13
10
11
8
3
5
5
5
5
4
3
0
2
4
1975
10 million or more
0.5 million to 1 million
2003
5 million to 10 million
Fewer than 500,000
2015
1 million to 5 million
Source: United Nations
Chart: Urban Areas with 10 Million Inhabitants or More (Millions)
1950
Urban Area
1975
Population
Urban Area
2003
Population
Urban Area
2015
Population
Urban Area
Population
1
New York, USAa
12.3
1
Tokyo, Japan
26.6
1
Tokyo, Japan
35.0
1
Tokyo, Japan
36.2
2
Tokyo, Japan
11.3
2
New York, USAa
15.9
2
Mexico City, Mexico
18.7
2
Mumbai, India
22.6
3
Shanghai, China
11.4
3
New York, USAa
18.3
3
Delhi, India
20.9
4
Mexico City,
Mexico
10.7
4
Sao Paulo, Brazil
17.9
4
Mexico City, Mexico
20.6
5
Mumbai, India
17.4
5
Sao Paulo, Brazil
20.0
6
Delhi, India
14.1
6
New York, USAa
19.7
7
Calcutta, India
13.8
7
Dhaka, Bangladesh
17.9
8
Buenos Aires, Argentina
13.0
8
Jakarta, Indonesia
17.5
9
Shanghai, China
12.8
9
Lagos, Nigeria
17.0
10
Jakarta, Indonesia
12.3
10
Calcutta, India
16.8
11
Los Angeles,
USAb
12.0
11
Karachi, Pakistan
16.2
12
Dhaka, Bangladesh
11.6
12
Buenos Aires, Argentina
14.6
13
Osaka-Kobe, Japan
11.2
13
Cairo, Egypt
13.1
14
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
11.2
14
Los Angeles, USAb
12.9
15
Karachi, Pakistan
11.1
15
Shanghai, China
12.7
16
Beijing, China
10.8
16
Manila, Philippines
12.6
17
Cairo, Egypt
10.8
17
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
12.4
18
Moscow, Russia
10.5
18
Osaka-Kobe, Japan
11.4
19
Manila, Philippines
10.4
19
Istanbul, Turkey
11.3
20
Lagos, Nigeria
10.1
20
Beijing, China
11.1
21
Moscow, Russia
10.9
22
Paris, France
10.0
Source: United Nations
a
Refers to the New York-Newark urbanized areas; b refers to the Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana urbanized
Chart: Median Age of Population in Selected Cities
Paris
Frankf urt
Moscow
Tokyo
Hong Kong
Beijing *
Toronto
Buenos Aires
Washington
Las Vegas
London
Singapore
New York
Sydney
Los Angeles
Chicago
Dubai
Seoul
Sao Paulo*
Mexico City
Johannesburg
Istanbul
Jakarta
Cairo*
Manila
47
41
39
39
39
37
37
36
35
35
34
34
34
34
32
32
31
31
28
27
27
26
25
25
24
0
5
Source: Compiled from national agencies
10
15
20
25
30
* Estimated
35
40
45
50
Chart: Annual Population Growth Rates for the
World’s 20 Largest Urban Areas
Dhaka
Lagos
Delhi
Karachi
Jakarta
Mumbai
Metro Manila
Sao Paulo
Mexico City
Calcutta
Cairo
Rio de Janeiro
Buenos Aires
Moscow
Los Angeles
Tokyo
Beijing
1975-2000 annual growth rate
Osaka-Kobe
Shanghai
New York
2000-2015 projected annual growth rate
-1
1
2
3
4
Percent per Annum
Source: United Nations
5
6
7
8
Chart:Office Space in Selected Central Business Districts
Tokyo
New York
Paris
London
Chicago
Frankfurt
Washington
Mexico City
Sao Paulo
Toronto
Seoul
Sydney
Singapore
Buenos
Jakarta
Los
Shanghai
Beijing
Manila
Hong Kong
Moscow
Johannesbu
Istanbul
Bangalore
Mumbai
Existing inventory
0
10
20
30
Space under construction
40
Millions of Square Meters
Note: The number at the end of each bar indicates space under
construction as a percent of the existing inventory.
Source: Colliers International
50
60
Chart: Office Space Construction in
Selected Central Business Districts
Cities with the Most Office Space Under Construction in the Central Business District (CBD) in
2004
•
•
•
•
•
•
Beijing
Paris
Shanghai
Tokyo
Moscow
Washington
2,136,000 square meters
1,290,000
944,000
878,000
740,000
582,000
Cities with the Most Office Construction in the CBD as a Percent of Existing Space in 2004
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Beijing
Moscow
Shanghai
Jakarta
Bangalore
Istanbul
Paris
75 %
36 %
33 %
10 %
10 %
9%
7%
Source: Colliers International.
Chart: Share of Workers Employed in Goods and Services Producing
Sectors in Selected Urban Areas
Shanghai
Beijing
Dubai
Singapore
Cairo
Seoul
Moscow
Manila
Toronto
Tokyo
Mexico City
Johannesburg
Los Angeles
Chicago
Jakarta
Hong Kong
Frankfurt
Las Vegas
Sydney
London
Buenos Aires
New York
Paris
Washington
47
53
44
56
40
60
34
66
33
67
26
74
26
74
24
76
24
76
22
78
21
79
20
80
18
82
17
83
17
83
17
83
16
84
13
87
13
87
13
87
12
88
11
89
11
89
5
0%
95
10%
20%
30%
40%
Goods producing
Source: Compiled from various national agencies
50%
60%
70%
80%
Services producing
90%
100%
Sassen’s 4 general trends in
Global Cities
• The locational concentration of major growth sectors with
either sharp earnings dispersion or disproportionate
concentration of either low- or high-paying jobs in major cities
• A proliferation of small, low-cost service operations made
possible by the massive concentration of people in such cities,
in addition to a large daily inflow of non-resident workers and
tourists
• A tendency toward increased economic polarization:
polarization in the use of land, in the organization of labor
markets, in the housing market, and in the consumption
structure
• The growth of economic and social inequalities
97
Sassen’s social and economic restructuring and the
emergence of new social forms
• The growth of an informal economy in large
cities in highly developed countries,
• High-income commercial and residential
gentrification, and
• The sharp rise of homelessness in rich
countries
98
General Trends in Global Cities
• The locational concentration of major growth sectors
with either sharp earnings dispersion or
disproportionate concentration of either low- or
high-paying jobs in major cities
• A proliferation of small, low-cost service operations
made possible by the massive concentration of
people in such cities, in addition to a large daily
inflow of non-resident workers and tourists
• A tendency toward increased economic polarization:
polarization in the use of land, in the organization of
labor markets, in the housing market, and in the
consumption structure
• The growth of economic and social inequalities
99
Third World Cities
• Generally third world countries have a city that is much larger
than the rest of the cities in the country …called a “primate
city”
• why do they form?
– colonialism (infrastructure development, especially railroads & ports)
– post-colonial investment by outsiders
– political and economic instability related directly or indirectly to
external manipulation
– population pressure related to external involvement
• Massive influx of people to the primate city leads to squatter
settlements and grossly inadequate services
New International Division of Labor
• During “industrial era” leading countries engaged in
industry using materials from poor regions
• During “post-industrial era” leading countries have
specialized in services and finance
• Poor countries now provide raw materials and
industrial labor that benefit consumers in wealthy
countries
• Each of the three main world cities is associated with
an economic hinterland, though their ties are global
"Sociology of Everyday life.
Lifestyles, образ жизни,
Theoretical Approaches and
Empirical Findings in Russia."
9. Meeting:
Housing in Russia and Soviet Union II
- The role of „dacha“
Escaping from Appartments –
The role of Dacha
Why to go to dacha?
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
to spend some time close to nature
To escape from communal appartments
To spend holidays
To meet good friends
To have free-time from husband or wife or children
to grow own fruits and vegetables (second economy)
…..
History of Dacha
• The first dachas in Russia began to appear during the reign of
Peter the Great
• they were small estates in the country, which were given to
loyal vassals by the Tsar
• In archaic Russian, the word dacha means something given
• Russian aristocracy used their dachas for social and cultural
gatherings, which were usually accompanied by masquerade
balls and fireworks displays
• Industrial Revolution brought about a rapid growth in the
urban population, and urban residents increasingly desired to
escape the heavily polluted cities, at least temporarily
• dacha became a favorite summer retreat for the upper and
middle classes of Russian society
History of Dacha
• After the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, most dachas were nationalized
• Some were converted into vacation homes for the working class, while
others, usually of better quality, were distributed among functionaries
of the Communist Party and the newly emerged cultural and scientific
elite
• The period after World War II saw a moderate growth in dacha
development
• squatters began occupying unused plots of land near cities and towns,
some building sheds, huts, and more prominent dwellings that served
as dachas
• The 1955 legislation introduced a new type of legal entity into the
Soviet juridical system, a so-called gardeners' partnership
(садоводческое товарищество)
• In 1958, another form of organization was introduced, a cooperative for
dacha construction (дачно-строительный кооператив), which
recognized the right of an individual to build a small house on the land
leased from the government
History of Dacha
• dachas were formed as cooperatives supervised by
trade unions and could not be sold
• typical size of land given by the state to a family
varied from 4 to 12 "sotok", 6 and 8 being the most
common
• now a popular newspaper for dacha owners is titled
"6 Sotok“
• One "sotka" = 100 square meters, so typical dacha
land area of 6 sotok is equal to 0.16 acres
• Statistic says that now more than 30% of Russian
families have dachas
History of Dacha
• collapse of communism saw the return to private land
ownership
• Most dachas have since been privatized
• Russia is now the nation with the largest number of owners of
second homes
• growth of living standards in recent years allowed many dacha
owners to spend their discretionary income on improvements
• Thus, many recently built dachas are fully equipped houses
suitable for use as permanent residences
• market-oriented economy transformed the dacha into an
asset, which generally reflects the prosperity of its owner
Dacha in Germany
• the word "dacha" is well-spread here as well
• however, the meaning of the word “datscha”, loaned from the
Russian language, differs a lot from its traditional variant
• Dachas in Germany started to appear in the mid 19th century
• idea of creating a nature oasis for city residents stroke Daniel
Schreber, the citizen of Leipzig
• Schreber was a doctor and an active supporter of healthy living
• considered that a people should be able to communicate with the
flora and, if lucky, with fauna
• he proposed the city authorities to create original ecological
enclaves with small gardens and lawns
• clear definition: a small plot of land with a trailer or a small house
• German law clearly regulates the size of a plot of land and
permissible activity on it