Peninsula Campaign and
Shenandoah Valley Campaign
Lesson 6
Principles of War and Elements of
Operational Design in the Peninsula
Campaign
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Objective
Offensive
Mass
Economy of
force
Maneuver
Unity of
command
Security
Surprise
Simplicity
• Synergy
• Simultaneity
and depth
• Anticipation
• Balance
• Leverage
• Timing and
tempo
• Operational
reach and
approach
• Forces and
functions
• Arranging
operations
• Centers of
gravity
• Direct versus
indirect
• Decisive points
• Culmination
• Termination
Peninsula Campaign: McClellan
• George McClellan
– Among the Army’s best educated
officers… “the Young Napoleon”
– Excellent organizer and
administrator
• The right man to rebuild the Federal
Army after the defeat at First Manassas
– Extremely cautious; always wants
more troops and more time to
prepare
• Prone to believe enemy is stronger than
he really is
– Mutual distrust with Lincoln
Peninsula Campaign: McClellan
• One of McClellan’s formative experiences in the
Mexican War was the siege of Vera Cruz
• After the war McClellan was part of a team of US
officers sent to observe the Crimean War
– Studied the siege of Sevastopol there
• No one in the US Army knew more about
conducting sieges than McClellan
• Advocated the limited war and the conciliatory
approaches
Peninsula Campaign: Joe Johnston
• Reinforced Beauregard at First
Manassas
• Highest ranking officer to leave the
US Army for the Confederacy
– However the letter Davis sent to
the Senate requesting
confirmation of his full generals
listed Johnston fourth
– This infuriated Johnston and
from that day on he had a
difficult and quarrelsome
relationship with Davis
• Defensive-minded
Peninsula Campaign: Faulty
Intelligence
• McClellan near Washington
with 100,000 men
• Johnston near Centreville with
40,000
– Allan Pinkerton, McClellan’s
intelligence officer,
estimated Johnston had
150,000
• Pinkerton’s exaggerated
estimate reinforced McClellan’s
natural tendency toward
caution
Pinkerton’s (left) skill in running
a railroad detective agency did
not translate to being a good
military intelligence officer
Peninsula Campaign: Urbanna
Plan
• McClellan preferred an
amphibious operation to an
overland one in order to avoid
Johnston
– Developed the “Urbanna Plan”
which involved a move by water
from Annapolis, MD through the
Chesapeake Bay to the mouth of
the Rappahannock River
– The landing site of Urbanna was a
small hamlet about 60 road miles
northeast of Richmond
Peninsula Campaign: Urbanna
Plan
• McClellan hoped to
avoid attacking
Johnston frontally
• Instead he would insert
himself between
Johnston and
Richmond, forcing
Johnston to evacuate
his strong ManassasCentreville line in order
to defend the
Confederate capital
The Urbanna Plan was designed
to be a turning movement
Peninsula Campaign: Confederate
Withdrawal
• Before McClellan could
launch his plan, Johnston
began to feel vulnerable so
far forward
• Johnston left only a 5,400
man force under Stonewall
Jackson in the
Shenandoah Valley and
withdrew the rest of his
force behind the
Rappahannock River
– This move effectively
negated the Urbanna
Plan
When Federal forces inspect the
abandoned Confederate works
at Centreville they find many of
the suspected defenses were
merely “Quaker guns”
Peninsula Campaign: McClellan’s
Response
• By this time McClellan
was mentally committed
to an amphibious
movement even though
most of its advantages
were gone
• He shifted his landing
site to Fort Monroe
which had remained in
Federal hands after
Virginia seceded
John Wool commanded a 10,000
man force at Fort Monroe
Peninsula Campaign
Peninsula Campaign: Security
• Lincoln was not overly enthusiastic about the
Peninsula Campaign but he was happy that
McClellan was at least doing something
• Among Lincoln’s concerns was the safety of
Washington after McClellan’s army departed
• He asked McClellan to explain his plan for
safeguarding the capital and McClellan never
really gave Lincoln a straight answer
– McClellan was very condescending to Lincoln
– He seemed to think that as a professional soldier he
did not need to bother sharing his plans with an
amateur
Peninsula Campaign: Mass and
Security
• Amphibious movement began March
17
– 121,500 men, 14,492 animals,
1,224 wagons, 200 cannon
– One British observer describes it
as “the stride of a giant” (mass)
• On April 3 Lincoln started asking
serious questions about the safety of
Washington and became convinced it
was inadequate
– He ordered McDowell’s 30,000
man corps to remain in place
rather than join McClellan
(security)
McClellan’s failure to
make Lincoln feel
comfortable about
Washington came back
to haunt him
Peninsula Campaign:
Confederate Defenses
• McClellan began his advance inland on April 4
• Facing him was a 13,000 man force commanded by
John Magruder
– Magruder had a weak defensive line designed to trade space
for time until a more solid defense could be formed
– Magruder was a very high strung personality and he started
sending off panicky reports to Robert E. Lee who was serving
as Davis’s military advisor
• Lee tried to calm Magruder down and began a
“reconcentration” of forces which would ultimately
bring 53,000 Confederates into position to oppose
McClellan (balance)
Peninsula Campaign: Deception
• Magruder was not a particularly distinguished combat
general but he was an amateur thespian
• He put his acting talent to work to deceive McClellan
– Magruder marched a couple of his regiments out of a thicket
into clear view of the Federal advanced guard
– The Confederates then disappeared into another woods,
doubled back around while they were out of sight, and then
repeated the process
Peninsula Campaign: Deception
• The target of a military deception
operation is the mind of the enemy
commander
• It is always easier to make someone
believe what they were already
predisposed to believe
• Thanks to Pinkerton’s exaggerated
estimates and McClellan’s natural
caution, McClellan was predisposed
to believe the Confederates
outnumbered him
• Magruder’s ruse worked perfectly
Magruder’s nickname was
the “Great Demonstrator”
Peninsula Campaign: Yorktown
• Magruder’s deception, poor
maps, difficult terrain,
uninspired actions by
subordinates, and McClellan’s
natural caution led him to stop
his advance within 24 hours and
begin siege operations against
Yorktown (maneuver?)
• Joe Johnston said, “Nobody but
McClellan would have hesitated
to attack.” (offensive?)
Mortars used in the
Federal siege of
Yorktown
Peninsula Campaign: Ironclads
• The Confederates had
converted the old USS
Merrimack into an
ironclad and rechristened
it the CSS Virginia
– The casemate walls
contained 24 inches of
oak and pine timbers
which were then
covered with four
inches of armor plating
Peninsula Campaign: Ironclads
• The presence of the Virginia posed a
serious threat to the Federal fleet
• On March 8, the Virginia made its trial run
and wreaked havoc among the five
Federal blockade ships anchored in
Hampton Roads
• As the tide ebbed the Virginia withdrew to
deeper waters, intending to finish her work
the next day
Peninsula Campaign: Ironclads
• By then however, the
Federal ironclad, the Monitor,
had arrived on the scene
• The two fought to a tactical
draw, but again the Virginia
had to withdraw to deeper
waters giving the Monitor a
strategic victory
• The Virginia remained a
threat, but fears that she
would single-handedly
destroy the Federal fleet
were now abated
Peninsula Campaign: Confederate
Withdrawal
• On May 3 Johnston began
to evacuate Yorktown and
withdraw up the Peninsula
– This opened up the
York and James River
to Federal gunboats
– It also forced the
abandonment of
Gosport Naval Yard
and scuttling of the
Virginia which opened
up the James River to
the Federals
Currier and Ives print of the
destruction of the Virginia
Peninsula Campaign: Williamsburg
and Drewry’s Bluff
• Johnston’s strategy
was to withdraw to the
immediate vicinity of
Richmond in order to
strengthen his
defenses and prevent
McClellan from
outmaneuvering him
• The Confederates
fought a rear guard
action at Williamsburg
to cover the retreat
Williamsburg favored the defense. The
Peninsula is only seven miles wide there
and Longstreet positioned himself between
Queen’s and College Creeks which further
narrowed the distance to three miles.
Peninsula Campaign: Williamsburg
and Drewry’s Bluff
• Williamsburg indicated several themes
that would repeat themselves throughout
the Peninsula Campaign
– The terrain favored the defense
– Frontal attacks would prove very costly
– Synchronizing in order to achieve mass at the
decisive point would be difficult
– McClellan would absent himself from the
tactical battlefield and not provide the
necessary command and control
Peninsula Campaign: Williamsburg
and Drewry’s Bluff
• Without the Virginia
blocking the way,
McClellan also had a
potential water
approach to Richmond
• On May 15, five Federal
ships including the
Monitor advanced up
the James River only to
be blocked by the
Confederate fort at
Drewry’s Bluff, just
seven miles below
Richmond
Peninsula Campaign: Williamsburg
and Drewry’s Bluff
• Drewry’s Bluff was indicative of
problems the Federals had
throughout the campaign of
achieving joint unity of effort
• The Navy had requested “a
cooperating land force” but
McClellan had answered that
he was “not yet ready to
cooperate with them”
Naval commander Louis Goldsborough said, “Without the Army
the Navy can make no real headway towards Richmond. This
is as clear as the sun at noonday to the mind. Goldsborough
and McClellan would fail to achieve unity of effort on the
Peninsula.
Jackson’s Valley Campaign
• While all this is going on on the Peninsula,
Stonewall Jackson was having a big effect in the
Shenandoah Valley
• The Valley represented a potential Confederate
avenue of approach to Washington, which
concerns Lincoln
• Still in his capacity as Davis’s military advisor,
Lee began coordinating with Jackson to help
relieve pressure on the Peninsula
– While “the Confederates were concentrating coastal
troops at Richmond, their immediate response [to
McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign] began with
Jasckson’s important Valley campaign”
• Hattaway and Jones, 176
Jackson’s Valley Campaign
• Shenandoah Valley
– Agricultural support for
Confederacy
– Controlled Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad
– Avenue of approach into
Maryland and Pennsylvania
• Originally Jackson
faced 38,000 Federals
with only 4,500 of his
own men
– Federal force grew to nearly
60,000 which Jackson kept
from threatening the
Peninsula
Jackson’s Valley Campaign
• Jomini (1779-1869):
Swiss military theorist
who influenced many
Civil War generals
through his Summary
of the Art of War
• Very geometrical and
scientific approach to
war
– Stressed interior
lines
Exterior
Lines
Interior
Lines
Jackson’s Valley Campaign
• Jackson neutralized Federal
forces three times larger than
his own.
• Fought six battles between
March 23 and June 9:
Kernstown, McDowell, Front
Royal, Winchester, Cross
Keys, and Port Republic.
• “Jackson’s foot cavalry”
– 676 miles in 48 marching
days; an average of 14
miles a day
Jackson’s Marches
22 March
23 March
24-26 March
17-19 April
30 April-3 May
7-8 May
9-11 May
12-15 May
17 May
19-20 May
21 May
22 May
23 May
24 May
Mount Jackson-Strasburg
Strasburg-Kernstown-Newtown
Newtown-Mount Jackson
Mount Jackson-Elk Run Valley
Elk Run Valley-Mechum’s River Stn.
Staunton-Shenandoah Mount
Bull Pasture Mount-Franklin
Franklin-Lebanon Springs
Lebanon Springs-Bridgewater
Bridgewater-New Market
New Market-Luray
Luray-Milford
Milford-Front Royal-Cedarville
Cedarville-Abraham’s Creek
22
18
35
50
60
32
30
40
18
24
12
12
22
22
Jackson’s Marches
25 May
28 May
29 May
30 May
31 May
1 June
2 June
3 June
4-5 June
8 June
9 June
12 June
17-25 June
(one rest day)
Abraham’s Creek-Stevenson’s
Stevenson’s-Charlestown
Charlestown-Halltown
Halltown-Winchester
Winchester-Strasburg
Strasburg-Woodstock
Woodstock-Mount Jackson
Mount Jackson-New Market
New Market-Port Republic
Port Republic-Cross Keys
Cross Keys-Brown’s Gap
Brown’s Gap-Mount Meridian
Mount Meridian-Ashland Station
7
15
5
25
18
12
12
7
30
5
16
10
120
Jackson’s Marching Rules:
Issued May 13, 1862
• Instructions on filling canteens which would
prevent straggling for this purpose,
• Hourly rest breaks of ten minutes in duration,
• Mess times,
• Location of commanders during the march,
• Procedures for safeguarding weapons,
• Personnel accountability procedures,
• Guidance for transporting baggage, and
• Medical and ambulance support procedures.
– Frank Vandiver, Mighty Stonewall, McGraw-Hill: NY, 1957, p.
232-233.
Soldier’s Load
•
As a general rule, commanders should limit a
soldier’s load to an amount equal to 45% of his
body weight in order to retain agility, stamina,
alertness, and mobility.
• For the average soldier this is 72 pounds.
Soldier’s Load
• In the interest of being able to move rapidly,
Jackson kept his soldiers’ load to the minimum.
– Jackson’s men did not carry extra clothing, overcoats,
or knapsacks.
– They marched with their rifles, ammunition, and just
enough food to keep going.
– Each man carried one blanket or rubber sheet and slept
with a comrade for extra warmth.
– The cooking was done at a common mess so that not
everyone had to carry individual frying pans and skillets.
Even the skillet handle had been spiked so that on the
march it could be stuck in a rifle barrel.
• Marshall, S. L. A. The Soldier’s Load and the Mobility of a
Nation, The Marine Corps Association: Quantico, 1980, p. 25
A. P. Hill’s “Light Division”
• One soldier’s explanation of how Hill picked the
name:
• “Why it was called the Light Division I did not
learn; but I know that the name was applicable,
for we often marched without coats, blankets,
knapsacks, or any other burdens except our arms
and haversacks, which were never heavy and
sometimes empty.”
• W. F. Dunaway quoted in William Hassler, A. P. Hill:
Lee’s Forgotten General, Garrett and Massie:
Richmond, 1962.
Jackson’s Valley Campaign
• Jackson’s success in the Valley affected things on the
Peninsula
• On May 18, McClellan had been told by Secretary of
War Stanton that McDowell’s Corps would be marching
from Fredericksburg where it had been held previously
for fear of Washington’s safety
• Jackson’s new threat caused Lincoln to change his mind
and on May 24 he telegraphed McClellan, “In
consequence of Gen. Banks’ critical position I have been
compelled to suspend Gen. McDowell’s movement to
join you.”
– McDowell complained, “If the enemy can succeed so readily in
disconcerting all our plans by alarming us first at one point then
at another, he will paralyze a larger force with a very small one.”
(simultaneity and depth)
Peninsula Campaign: Seven
Pines
• On May 28 Johnston
received a report from Jeb
Stuart that McDowell was
not moving toward
Richmond but was instead
returning to
Fredericksburg
– With McDowell held in place
thanks to Jackson, the
Confederates could act
more aggressively
• Johnston learned from
other reconnaissance that
McClellan’s army was
divided by the
Jeb Stuart’s cavalry gave the
Chickahominy River
Confederacy an incredible intelligence
advantage over McClellan
Peninsula Campaign: Seven
Pines
• Johnston tried to crush
the isolated southern
wing of the Federal
army in the Battle of
Seven Pines May 31
– Johnston mismanaged
the battle, issued vague
orders, and was
wounded
– Robert E. Lee replaced
him
Robert E. Lee
• Johnston was wellliked by the
soldiers and Lee
was initially looked
at with suspicion
• However, even
Johnston admitted,
“The shot that
struck me down is
the very best that
has been fired in
the Confederate
cause yet.”
Lee Takes Command by Mort Kunstler
Robert E. Lee
• Lee completely changed
the situation
– Good relationship with
Davis
– Offensive-minded and
extremely audacious
– Makes excellent use of
intelligence and cavalry
– Strong advocate of the
turning movement
Seven Days
• Jackson’s success allowed
Lee to concentrate his
forces against McClellan
– Lee will defend Richmond
with 20,000 and use 60,000
to attack
• Plan depended on the
timely arrival of Jackson
who was to attack Porter
from the flank and rear
– Jackson was
inexplicably late
• Result was
Mechanicsville (June 26)
turned out to be an
unsupported frontal attack
rather than an
envelopment
Seven Days
• Gaines’s Mill (June 27)
– Another poor performance by Jackson
limits Confederate victory, but Lee
succeeded in causing McClellan to go on
the defensive
• Savage Station (June 29)
• Frayser’s Farm (June 30)
• Malvern Hill (July 1)
– Federal artillery defeated Confederate
frontal assault
• McClellan withdrew to Harrison Landing
under protection of Federal gunboats on the
James River
Seven Days
It would be 1864 before the Federal army again got as
close to Richmond as it did during the Seven Days
Critique of Jackson’s Performance
on the Peninsula
• Historians have closely scrutinized Jackson’s
poor performance on the Peninsula in contrast
with his brilliant performance in the Valley
• Explanations include
– He did not receive orders to act more aggressively
– He was unfamiliar with the geography
– He could operate better independently than in close
cooperation with others
– He felt other units ought to bear more of the fighting
burden
Critique of Jackson’s Performance
on the Peninsula
• The main reason was that by the time
Jackson got to the Peninsula he was
physically and mentally was exhausted
– Jackson usually required much sleep and he
just did not get it during the rigors of the
Valley Campaign and his subsequent march
to the Peninsula
– His aide Sandie Pendleton wrote on June 7,
“Jackson is completely broken down.”
Principles of War and Elements of
Operational Design in the Peninsula
Campaign
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Objective
Offensive
Mass
Economy of
force
Maneuver
Unity of
command
Security
Surprise
Simplicity
• Synergy
• Simultaneity
and depth
• Anticipation
• Balance
• Leverage
• Timing and
tempo
• Operational
reach and
approach
• Forces and
functions
• Arranging
operations
• Centers of
gravity
• Direct versus
indirect
• Decisive points
• Culmination
• Termination
Next
• Fort Donelson and Shiloh