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*****DOD TRADE-OFF DA 1/2*****
*****ALL PURPOSE AFF***** ........................................................................................................... 3
A2: NASA Trades Off With DOD ..................................................................................................................................4
No Trade-off ................................................................................................................................................................... 5
*****ALL PURPOSE LINKS***** .......................................................................................................6
Link – NASA Funding  DOD Trade-off .................................................................................................................... 7
Link – Mars Mission 1/3 .............................................................................................................................................. 8
Link – Space Weapons 1/2 .......................................................................................................................................... 11
Link Booster – Trade-off Snowballs ........................................................................................................................... 13
*****F-35 TRADE-OFF DA***** ....................................................................................................... 14
1NC F-35 Trade-off Disadvantage 1/3 ........................................................................................................................ 15
***Uniqueness*** ........................................................................................................................... 18
Uniqueness – F-35 Funding Now ............................................................................................................................... 19
Uniqueness – Military Spending High Now ............................................................................................................. 20
***Internal Links*** ....................................................................................................................... 21
Internal Link – F-35 Will Be Cut 1/3 ......................................................................................................................... 22
***Impacts*** ................................................................................................................................. 25
2NC F-35 Good – Hegemony ..................................................................................................................................... 26
F-35 Good – Hegemony Extensions ........................................................................................................................... 27
2NC F-35 Good – Economy ....................................................................................................................................... 28
F-35 Good – Economy Extensions ............................................................................................................................ 29
2NC F-35 Good – Russia Expansionism 1/2 ............................................................................................................. 30
2NC F-35 Good – Airpower Internal Link ................................................................................................................ 32
2NC F-35 Good – Airpower Impact (Korea War) ......................................................................................................33
2NC F-35 Good – Airpower Impact (China) ............................................................................................................. 34
2NC F-35 Good – Air Power Impact (Terrorism) 1/2 ...............................................................................................35
A2: F-35’s Will Be Sold ................................................................................................................................................ 37
A2: F-35 Expensive ..................................................................................................................................................... 38
A2: Defense Spending Bad ......................................................................................................................................... 39
A2: No Impact to Cuts ................................................................................................................................................ 40
A2: DOD Won’t Cut Key Programs ............................................................................................................................. 41
***Aff*** ......................................................................................................................................... 42
Non-Unique – F-35 Cuts Now ................................................................................................................................... 43
No Link – No Future Cuts .......................................................................................................................................... 44
No Impact – Long Timeframe ....................................................................................................................................45
No Impact – F-35 Fails 1/2 ........................................................................................................................................ 46
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*****DOD TRADE-OFF DA 2/2*****
*****MTA TRADE-OFF DA***** ......................................................................................................48
1NC MTA Trade-off Disadvantage 1/5 ...................................................................................................................... 49
***Uniqueness*** ........................................................................................................................... 54
Uniqueness – Military Tuition Assistance Funding Now ......................................................................................... 55
***Internal Links*** ....................................................................................................................... 56
Internal Link – MTA Key to Educated Force 1/2 ...................................................................................................... 57
Internal Link – Educated Force Key to Military 1/3 .................................................................................................59
***Impacts*** ................................................................................................................................. 62
Brink – Challenges Coming ....................................................................................................................................... 63
2NC Impact – Conventional Superiority 1/2 ............................................................................................................ 64
2NC Impact – Objective Force Internal Link ............................................................................................................ 66
Impact – Objective Force Internal Link Extensions .................................................................................................. 67
Impact – Objective Force Impact (Army Nuke Power) 1/3 ..................................................................................... 68
Impact – Objective Force Impact (Failed States) 1/4 ................................................................................................ 71
A2: Conventional Forces Not Key ............................................................................................................................... 75
***Aff*** ......................................................................................................................................... 76
Non-unique – Recruit Quality Low 1/3 ...................................................................................................................... 77
Non-unique – DOD Cuts Now ................................................................................................................................... 80
No Internal Link – MTA Not Key ............................................................................................................................... 81
No Impact – Conventional Military Not Key (Drones) ............................................................................................ 82
No Impact – Conventional Military Not Key (Insurgency) ...................................................................................... 83
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*****ALL PURPOSE AFF*****
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A2: NASA Trades Off With DOD
New NASA spending trades off internally in NASA’s budget.
Space Politics.com 5-18-11 Commercial space advocates sound the alert
http://www.spacepolitics.com/2011/05/18/commercial-space-advocates-sound-the-alert/
Advocacy groups, concerned about the effect of potential budget cuts in fiscal year 2012 on
NASA’s commercial crew and space technology programs, are rallying support for those programs on Capitol Hill this week.
Late yesterday the Space Access Society (SAS) sent out an alert about these programs, asking people to contact their representatives by Friday
morning “and ask that they tell the Appropriations Committee that they support full funding for the NASA Commercial Crew and Space
Their concern is rooted in the
the FY12 appropriations allocations released last week that could result in significant budget
cuts for NASA in the coming year. “It’s going to get messy. Any item not strongly defended
could be vulnerable,” the SAS alert warns. The alert continues that the leadership of the Commerce, Justice,
and Science appropriations subcommittee, whose jurisdiction includes NASA, has decided to ask members
of Congress this week what programs they believe should have their funding increased in decreased. A
push now for programs like commercial crew and technology development—potentially vulnerable to cuts—
could have “a considerable impact” on what the subcommittee decides in its markup in July.
Technology programs.” The Space Frontier Foundation also sent our a similar alert last night.
Previous lobbying efforts by SAS and others may have already had an effect: the alert notes that the subcommittee “is now definitely aware
there’s opposition” to the Space Launch System, which the organization dismisses as an “earmark”.
No inter-agency trade-offs – each agency is funded separately
Kenen 11 (Joanne, veteran journalist, senior writer @ New America Foundation, 2/25/11,
http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief_id=41)
This year, of course, each party controls one chamber, and ideological differences run deep. As a result, many observers deem it likely that
the two houses of Congress will fail to agree on a single budget resolution, which would mean that none
will be adopted. Appropriations: With or without a final budget resolution, House and Senate appropriations committees
will eventually have to draw up spending bills to fund specific federal departments, agencies,
and programs. Critics of the Affordable Care Act are likely to use the appropriations process to slash funds needed to administer and
implement the law. Again, any bills targeting health reform in the Republican-controlled House would have to overcome opposition from
Senate Democrats.
Plan is off the table spending – wont trade-off
Riedl 5 (Brian, Grover M. Hermann fellow in federal budgetary affairs @ Heritage, 1/25/5,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2005/01/whats-wrong-with-the-federal-budgetprocess)
The budget process fails to provide a clearinghouse for all spending. The federal budget is supposed to provide an opportunity for Congress
and the President to step back and decide how much the federal government should tax and spend during the following year. In reality, only
the one-third of spending that is classified as discretionary is subject to the appropriations process every year. Almost all other programs
the budget process
denies the nation's policymakers an opportunity to set annual spending and tax priorities with all
programs on the table. Furthermore, the mandatory programs that are "off the table" represent the largest long(classified as mandatory) are left without regular oversight to grow uncontrollably from year to year. Thus,
term threat to the nation's fiscal health. In 2008, the first Baby Boomers will begin collecting Social Security and Medicare benefits, with costs
expected to increase enough to raise federal spending by 5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) by 2030 (the current equivalent of $5,200
per household annually) and 13 percent of GDP by 2050 (the current equivalent of $13,500 per household annually).[2]This would result in
either substantial tax increases or elimination of most other federal programs. A rational budget process cannot simply ignore this issue by
taking these problems off the table. Mandatory
programs are not the only ones excluded from the budget process.
Although natural disasters and other emergencies occur nearly every year, they are not anticipated in the budget
process. Congress regularly allocates all available budgetary resources to non-emergency expenses.
When the inevitable $5 billion to $15 billion disaster relief tab reaches Congress each year, it has no choice but to exceed
the spending levels of the original cap. Although some catastrophic emergencies may be too large to budget for, there is no
reason why Congress cannot set aside funds within each budget for non-catastrophic emergency expenses.
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No Trade-off
No trade-offs – empirics prove
Landis, 95 [Geoffrey, NASA John Glenn Research Center, “ Footsteps to Mars: An incremental
approach to Mars exploration,” Journal of the British Interplanetary Society, Vol. 48, pp. 367-342
(1995); http://www.geoffreylandis.com/Footsteps.pdf]
there has been an alarming tendency in the scientific and space advocacy communities
for advocates to attack one project, in the belief that if that project could be canceled, the
money saved would be used for their own, more desirable projects. This is false. Quoting from senate staffer Steve
Palmer [17]: “What space station and ASRM [advanced solid rocket motor] add up to is a drop in the bucket . If Congress cuts out both space
station and ASRM, will the money be used for other programs of interest to the space industry? The short answer is no”. Arguments to
cancel space projects are eagerly picked up in Congress, by people who have agendas and pet projects that have
nothing to do with space. Further, attacking space projects has the result of making enemies out of allies . When we attack
someone else’s project, we can count on having them attack ours. The result is that the
arguments against both projects will be remembered by a money-starved Congress. It is not
true that manned missions eclipse funds for unmanned science missions. In fact, there is an excellent
case to be made for precisely the opposite correlation: the presence of large manned missions increases
the funding and opportunities for unmanned science missions. Historically, the science budget of
NASA has been a roughly constant fraction of the total budget; any major new initiative which
increases the overall space budget is likely to increase the funding for science . If Mars advocates adopt
Recently
the approach of pushing our initiatives by tearing down other space programs, the likely result is that nothing, neither Mars nor other
programs, will be accomplished.
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*****ALL PURPOSE LINKS*****
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Link – NASA Funding  DOD Trade-off
Increasing funding for NASA directly comes from military spending
Roop 2011 (Roop Lee, a writer at The Huntsville Times)
Brooks, R-Huntsville, said here Wednesday that Congress will "probably" cut defense spending
next year, possibly including R&D programs based in Huntsville, but, if he gets his way, it will boost NASA's
manned spaceflight program. "I hate sounding so melodramatic," Brooks told The Times editorial board, "but I do want to
emphasize the seriousness of (the deficit) .... We're looking at truly catastrophic effects on our country." Brooks took office in January and
joined a new Republican House majority determined to cut federal spending. On Wednesday, he
returned repeatedly to what he called the urgent need spend less while still funding programs he supports, such as
NASA. Those programs benefit taxpayers, he says, as opposed to wealth-transferring entitlements that should be cut. Tax increases on "job
U.S. Rep. Mo
producers" are off the table to bridge the budget gap, Brooks said, but capping unemployment benefits is not. The House will cut spending this
"I hope to increase (NASA)
spending for manned spaceflight," Brooks said. The extra money would come from other agencies or
year to 2008 levels, Brooks predicted, but that will be "across the board, not per agency."
other NASA line items such as studies of global warming, he said. Brooks, who sits on the House NASA oversight committee, said there will be
hearings soon on global warming. Brooks also said money for NASA could come from the National Science Foundation budget. "We might
have to shift money from there," he said. "I think national defense is probably going to lose some ground," Brooks said,
although he will try for "level funding." Asked how cuts might affect Huntsville, Brooks said, "I don't know." There are at least three
independent estimates already before Congress, he said, one of which would mean "$4- to $7 billion in R&D cuts and that's what we specialize
in (at Redstone Arsenal)." Brooks emphasized those estimates are by outside experts with no vote on the outcome.
Democrats "loudly
proclaim there is a lot of waste" in the defense budget, Brooks said, adding, "Heck, it's a government program. I'm
sure there's waste. There always is with any kind of government program. But it is extraordinarily difficult to cut only the waste. How do you
separate the two?"
NASA and DoD are zero-sum
Rambles
11
(Political
Blog,
budgeting.html, accessed 6-30-11)
4/9,
http://drtaxsacto.blogspot.com/2011/04/oregon-trail-
There are at least two judgment calls involved. First, what
percentage of all the defense related stuff not in the DOD
do you add to the DOD budget. For example, is there a military purpose for NASA? Second, what percentage
of the national debt is attributable to current and past wars? That translates into debt service which is a part of the budget. (about 6% now but growing)
There the estimates seem to be ideologically driven. The estimates I have seen range from a low of 15% to a high of 91%.
Ultimately the
conclusion is right. At this point the budget is a zero sum game. Add to one portion and you
need to take from another, especially if 40% of the budget is debt financed. (Consider that of that deficit the military portion is about 8%
of the budget alone.) But in this case the ultimate question just like in Oregon Trail - how do we set priorities.
Tight budgets force trade-offs across agencies
Williams
11
(Jesse,
columnist,
Yale
http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/2011/jan/20/war-of-the-wars/)
News,
1/20,
The budget-tightening weeks are a tough time in Washington. After all, our revenues are finite, so
budgeting is a zero-sum game: every dollar we spend on education is a dollar we can’t spend on the military; every
dime we put into Social Security is one dime that can’t go to NASA, and so on. So when it comes time to cut, every portion of
spending can, in a very real sense, be evaluated against any other portion. Yet, we rarely do that kind of
broad evaluating — we stay busy trying to decide whether we’re giving the Marine Corps a new tank instead of a new jet. That’s not a conversation about
national priorities, and not the kind of conversation we can and should be having. Why not weigh that tank against, say, $12 billion in federal subsidies for
education?
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Link – Mars Mission 1/3
Going to Mars would cost hundreds of billions of dollars and trade off with other
programs – disad turns the case
EASTERBROOK ’04 (Gregg; Fellow – Brookings Institution, “Why We Shouldn’t Go to Mars,”
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,993172-1,00.html, 1/26)
Two centuries ago, Meriwether Lewis and William Clark left St. Louis to explore the new lands acquired in the Louisiana Purchase," George W.
Bush said, announcing his desire for a program to send men and women to Mars. "They made that journey in the spirit of discovery ... America
has ventured forth into space for the same reasons." Yet there are vital differences between Lewis and Clark's expedition and a Mars mission.
First, Lewis and Clark were headed to a place amenable to life; hundreds of thousands of people were already living there. Second, Lewis and
Clark were certain to discover places and things of immediate value to the new nation. Third, the Lewis and Clark venture cost next to nothing
In 1989 NASA estimated that a people-to-Mars program would cost $400
billion, which inflates to $600 billion today. The Hoover Dam cost $700 million in today's money, meaning that sending
people to Mars might cost as much as building about 800 new Hoover Dams. A Mars mission may be the single most
expensive nonwartime undertaking in U.S. history. The thought of travel to Mars is exhilarating. Surely men and
by today's standards.
women will someday walk upon that planet, and surely they will make wondrous discoveries about geology and the history of the solar system,
perhaps even about the very origin of life. Many times I have stared up at Mars in the evening sky--in the mountains, away from cities, you can
almost see the red tint--and wondered what is there, or was there. But the fact that a destination is tantalizing does not mean the journey
makes sense, even considering the human calling to explore. And Mars as a destination for people makes absolutely no sense with current
Present systems for getting from Earth's surface to low-Earth orbit are so fantastically
expensive that merely launching the 1,000 tons or so of spacecraft and equipment a Mars
mission would require could be accomplished only by cutting health-care benefits, education spending or
other important programs--or by raising taxes. Absent some remarkable discovery, astronauts, geologists and biologists once on
technology.
Mars could do little more than analyze rocks and feel awestruck beholding the sky of another world. Yet rocks can be analyzed by automated
probes without risk to human life, and at a tiny fraction of the cost of sending people. It is interesting to note that when President Bush
unveiled his proposal, he listed these recent major achievements of space exploration: pictures of the rings of Saturn and the outer planets,
evidence of water on Mars and the moons of Jupiter, discovery of more than 100 planets outside our solar system and study of the soil of Mars.
All these accomplishments came from automated probes or automated space telescopes. Bush's proposal, which calls for "reprogramming"
some of NASA's present budget into the Mars effort, might actually lead to a reduction in such unmanned science--the one aspect of space
exploration that's working really well. Rather
than spend hundreds of billions of dollars to hurl tons toward
Mars using current technology, why not take a decade--or two decades, or however much time
is required--researching new launch systems and advanced propulsion? If new launch systems
could put weight into orbit affordably, and if advanced propulsion could speed up that long,
slow transit to Mars, then the dream of stepping onto the Red Planet might become reality .
Mars will still be there when the technology is ready. Space-exploration proponents deride as lack of vision the
mention of technical barriers or the insistence that needs on Earth come first. Not so. The former is rationality, the latter the setting of
priorities. If Mars proponents want to raise $600 billion privately and stage their own expedition, more power to them; many of the great
If Mars proponents expect taxpayers to foot their bill, then
they must make their case against the many other competing needs for money. And against the needs
for health care, education, poverty reduction, reinforcement of the military and reduction of the federal deficit, the case for vast
expenditures to go to Mars using current technology is very weak . The drive to explore is part of what makes
us human, and exploration of the past has led to unexpected glories. Dreams must be tempered by realism, however. For the moment, going
to Mars is hopelessly unrealistic.
expeditions of the past were privately mounted.
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Link – Mars Mission 2/3
Launch costs are expensive
Lades, Ph.D, International Space Elevator Consortium, 10 (Martin, “The Space Elevator” Dec. 24,
2010, The Astronomical Review, http://astroreview.com/issue/2011/article/the-space-elevator)
Getting material from the ground to Earth orbit is tough. To reach a real orbit one needs approximately
Mach 25 with a high lateral velocity component . A standard chemical rocket expends around 95% of its
mass to do that. This leaves about 5% payload, following the rocket equation. That is why most of today's
private space tourist industry only aims for ballistic launches. Anything going into orbit currently also has
to be disassembled to fit into a rocket payload bay , i.e., down to 20-30tons. The payload has to be
vibration-proofed because of vibrations encountered during a rocket launch. Once in orbit
everything has to be reassembled and tested. The process ends up being really expensive and
prevents substantial space infrastructure from being built.
Robotic exploration of Mars is perceived as cost-effective by congress
MSNBC, 08 (“NASA Mars project faces technical, cost issues,” Feb, 28, 2008
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23394383/ns/technology_and_science-space/t/nasa-marsproject-faces-technical-cost-issues/)
NASA's flagship mission to land a nuclear-powered, next-generation rover on Mars is facing
development problems and ballooning costs that could threaten its scheduled launch next year. NASA Administrator
Michael Griffin told a congressional hearing this month that engineers had to redesign the heat shield on the Mars Science Laboratory after
tests showed the protective layer would not survive entry through the Martian atmosphere. The
extra work is expected to add
$20 million to $30 million to the $1.8 billion price tag, already $165 million over budget. NASA is
still aiming for a 2009 launch, but the space agency is also mulling alternative voyages in 2010 and 2011, Griffin told the House Science and
Technology Committee on Feb. 13. "Things have gone along more slowly than we would like," Griffin said. Any delay of the Mars Science Lab
would deal a major setback to NASA, which already had to push back a mission to send an atmospheric probe to the Red Planet because of an
undisclosed conflict of interest in the purchasing process. The Mars Science Lab will be the most advanced and expensive unmanned probe
ever sent to the Martian surface. The 9-foot-long mobile robot is larger and can travel farther than the twin rovers Spirit and Opportunity, that
are still alive four years after parachuting to opposite ends of Mars. Both rovers have uncovered geologic evidence of ancient water on the
planet. The goal of the Mars Science Lab is to determine whether the environment could once have been favorable for microbial life using
sophisticated instruments to measure for the presence of life's chemical building blocks and beam the discoveries back to Earth. Science
gleaned by the Mars Science Lab is also expected to help prepare NASA for its long-term plans to fly humans to Mars after a return to the
moon. Engineers initially wanted to use a heat shield like the type on the space shuttle's external fuel tank, but extensive testing last spring
proved it would break. NASA switched to a stronger cover similar to the one that cocooned the Stardust probe, which returned to Earth in
2006 with comet dust. Because Stardust re-entered Earth's atmosphere at twice the speed expected for Mars Science Lab, engineers feel
confident the new shield will hold, said NASA spokesman Dwayne Brown. Griffin said development hurdles are to be expected in such a
complex project and he didn't consider the problems to be out of the ordinary. Some members of the Mars science community expressed
concerns about the mission's progress. Brown University geologist John Mustard said that if the launch date slips, the costs will soar. "It kind
of interrupts what has been an incredibly successful sequence of missions," said Mustard, who heads an advisory group that gives scientific
input on future Mars projects. It's not the first time the Mars Science Lab has run into problems. The project is managed by NASA's Jet
Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena. To control costs, NASA last year cut a camera from the mission and halted work on a laser chemistry tool.
As a result, San Diego-based contractor Malin Space Science Systems agreed to develop the camera at its own expense and the project received
outside funds to continue work on the laser instrument. U.S. Rep. Mark Udall, D-Colo., said in a statement he would not question NASA's
decision to delay the launch if needed. However, Udall, who is on the House committee, added: "I want to be confident that NASA is doing all
Some space policy analysts contend that if the
Mars Science Lab's budget spirals out of control, it could raise questions about the costeffectiveness of robotic exploration. "The repercussions are more pronounced for the future of the space program," said
that it can to carry out the ... development efficiently and effectively."
Howard McCurdy, an American University public policy professor. "Are robots really that much more superior to human beings for going to
the planets? Or are robots harder than we thought to manage?"
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Link – Mars Mission 3/3
A trip to Mars could cost as much as $450 billion
The Register, 07 (“NASA reveals manned Mars mission plans,” The Register UK, Nov. 29, 2007,
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/11/29/nasa_mars/)
According to the plans, the spacecraft will be built in orbit, being far too large to ever be lifted from the bottom of
Earth's gravity well by rocket. The Martian living quarters, which would be nuclear-powered, will be sent to the
red planet two years ahead of the manned mission itself, along with all the cargo. Given the right start date, the
trip to Mars takes roughly six months. Life support on the craft would be a so-called closed loop system, with air
and water having to be recycled, and NASA says it expects the astronauts will grow fresh food en route, taking
advantage of the sun's diminishing rays as they travel. Once there, the team would set up camp and stay
for around 16 months before heading home again. Estimates of the cost of sending people to
the red planet vary hugely, ranging from $20bn to $450bn . Other stumbling blocks include what to do
if the mission should run into difficulties. Resupply wouldn't be much of an option, and an early return to Earth is
unfeasible. (The two planets are positioned for a direct mission roughly once every two years. A craft could fly
back in between times, but the journey would be so much longer as to negate the early start.)
Propulsion to Mars would not be affordable – SEP launch systems would use the
annual world production of xenon for one launch
Space Review, 06 (“The challenges of manned Mars exploration,” Apr. 17, 2006, The Space Review
– essays and commentary about the final frontier, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/602/1)
Woodcock describes a hypothetical SEP
system for orbit-raising of heavy loads. This reference utilizes a payload
of 50 mT driven by a 500 kW solar electric propulsion system with a specific impulse of 2000 sec. The trip time
(up) is 240 days and (down) is 60 days. The required amount of xenon (Xe) propellant per transfer is 41.2
mT. According to estimates on the Internet, world production of Xe is presently 10 x 106 liters/yr = 53
mT/yr. Thus, one transfer would require approximately the present annual world production of
Xe. Furthermore, Xe presently costs about $10/liter so the cost of Xe for one orbit transfer could be
$100M. While it may be possible to increase world production significantly, recent articles on anesthesiology suggest difficulties. The
viability of the SEP tug concept depends critically on use of a hypothetical high-efficiency
lightweight solar array that is likely to be difficult to develop, and lightweight propulsion
components. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that the required amount of xenon propellant could be
obtained, and if obtainable, whether the cost would be affordable. Radiation would gradually diminish the
efficiency of the solar arrays with each passage through the radiation belts. The total cost of the system includes the SEP tug, the mission
operations involved, and the fast transit vehicle to take the crew up to HEO for rendezvous with the Trans-Habitat Vehicle. Because of the long
time required for transfer, several of these “tugs” might be needed. At this point, it seems unlikely that such a scheme would be viable, but
prior to the recent ESAS Report, JSC has argued for SEP orbit-raising as a likely mode for transfers from LEO in Mars missions. At this point,
it appears that SEP for orbit-raising has been discarded by ESAS—and that is to their credit.
Mars mission would be astronomical in cost
Edwards 1 – director of tax policy studies at Cato and editor of www.DownsizingGovernment.org
(Chris,
“Downsizing
the
Federal
Government”,
http://www.cato.org/downsizinggovernment/Downsizing-the-Federal-Government.pdf)
The rest of NASA ought to be terminated or privatized as well. Unfortunately, NASA funding is sustained by politics. As
President Bush was beginning his reelection effort in 2004, the White House cast about for an uplifting initiative. They came up with a nutty
The public has not asked for a Mars
mission, NASA would probably bungle it, and the costs of such a mission would be
astronomical over the next couple of decades—just as the costs of programs for the elderly are exploding. Unfortunately,
scheme to send a manned space mission to Mars called ‘‘Vision for Space Exploration.’’
politics won the day because House Majority Leader Tom Delay (RTX) pushed the funding through Congress because his district— home of the
Johnson Space Center—would be a big winner.47
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Link – Space Weapons 1/2
Space weapons are massively expensive
ANZERA
’05
(Guiseppe;
Asia
Times,
“Star
Wars:
Empires
Strike
Back,”
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Front_Page/GH18Aa01.html, 8/18)
The second problem is economic. Orbital weapons - as the Strategic Defense Initiative showed in the 1980s are extremely expensive. It has been estimated that a space defense system against weak
ballistic missile strikes could cost between $220 billion and $1 trillion . A laser-based system to
be used against ballistic missiles would cost about $100 million for each target.
For instance, the Future Imagery Architecture - a project aimed at the implementation of new spy satellites, which
are vital to identify targets for space weapons - has already reached a cost of $25 billion. It is a legitimate
question, therefore, whether Washington really needs to finance such projects in today's
geostrategic context. Moreover, would these tools be cost-effective in relation to their real
operational capability? The first question raises doubts and the second one remains, at the moment, without
answer. Henceforth, such initiatives resemble more and more Reagan's programs.
Space weaponization is prohibitively expensive
WEINER ’05 (Tim; New York Times, “Air Force Seeks Bush’s Approval for Space Weapons
Programs,”
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/18/business/18space.html?pagewanted=print,
5/18, MM)
International objections aside, Randy Correll, an Air Force veteran and military consultant, told the
council, "the big problem now is it's too expensive."
The Air Force does not put a price tag on space superiority. Published studies by leading weapons
scientists, physicists and engineers say the cost of a space-based system that could defend the
nation against an attack by a handful of missiles could be anywhere from $220 billion to $1
trillion.
Richard Garwin, widely regarded as a dean of American weapons science , and three colleagues
wrote in the March issue of IEEE Spectrum, the professional journal of electric engineering, that "a spacebased laser would cost $100 million per target, compared with $600,000 for a Tomahawk
missile."
Space weaponization requires massive spending on defenses
ANZERA
’05
(Guiseppe;
Asia
Times,
“Star
Wars:
Empires
Strike
Back,”
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Front_Page/GH18Aa01.html, 8/18)
A series of Pentagon initiatives aimed at space militarization and the creation of new types of armament - capable
of precisely striking small targets in every corner of the world and neutralizing most of today's anti-aircraft
defenses - will likely result in a new power battlefield in the near future.
While the implementation of space weapons is likely to increase the capability gap between
Washington and other powers at first, a broader vision reveals dangers involved in the move
that could affect US interests, for it will likely trigger determined reactions by its competitors .
Competitor states could successfully deploy a small number of low-cost orbital weapons, thus forcing the US
to design an extremely expensive space defense system.
Thus, a space weaponization policy may generate more troubles than advantages for Washington.
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Link – Space Weapons 2/2
Space weapons lead to massive defense costs
ANZERA
’05
(Guiseppe;
Asia
Times,
“Star
Wars:
Empires
Strike
Back,”
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Front_Page/GH18Aa01.html, 8/18)
The road to space weaponization is hazardous. The current US administration appears confident that it can
handle the issue successfully. As usual, when a new category of weapons sees the light, it is not clear whether
newcomers will suffer from perpetual disadvantage.
If other powers succeed in implementing low-cost orbital instruments that could endanger
Washington's sophisticated space weapons, the US could rapidly find itself in need of financing
hyper-expensive programs designed to protect the country - a situation that could make the
Pentagon regret having opened the space front to begin with.
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Link Booster – Trade-off Snowballs
Budget Cuts snowball – turns the case
BRADY
’09
(Kyle;
“The
Decimation
of
a
Generation’s
Future,”
Daily
Kos,
http://colonialserf.blogspot.com/2009/06/decimation-of-generations-future.html, 6/22)
Programs are going to be cut, funding to states lessened, and our dreams shattered, since all of history
shows us the lawmakers will protect themselves and their interests first, and be concerned about the general
welfare of the population at a later point. NASA, the ultimate embodiment of American frontierism, is already
on the chopping block, with massive budget cuts and restrictions likely coming down the pipe
– despite being a crucial part of our future, both in terms of space exploration and
technological innovation. And it will likely be a vicious cycle. Funding cuts results in less
interest and progress, creating less gains in a given area, which, in turn, will result in more
funding cuts.
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*****F-35 TRADE-OFF DA*****
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1NC F-35 Trade-off Disadvantage 1/3
F-35s are low-hanging fruit – Pentagon’s giant wishlist forces trade-offs
Newsweek
10
(11/13/10,
http://www.newsweek.com/2010/11/13/the-air-force-s-war-toywish.html)
As Lockheed Martin’s Marietta, Ga., plant prepares to begin building the 187th—and last—F-22 super-fighter, the
military is already dreaming of its successor. In a query to the aerospace industry earlier this month, the Air
Force laid out its wish list, and it wants everything: a plane that can win dogfights, demolish air-defense
missile networks, support ground troops, and run surveillance missions; a partial prototype would be ready by
2020, with entry into service by 2030. This may be wishful thinking, given the saga of the current
wondercraft, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. With a development and production price tag of more than
$380 billion, the F-35 is the costliest acquisition program in Pentagon history. Different versions are
being developed for the Air Force, Navy, and Marines. But the plane is bedeviled by technical problems, everrising costs, and slipping schedules, with the Marines’ incarnation presenting the toughest challenges. Last week
the co-chairmen of President Obama’s deficit-reduction commission proposed gutting the
program. On Nov. 22, a Pentagon review board is scheduled to take a hard look at it.
<insert plan is expensive/causes trade-off>
F-35’s are key to hegemony – provide effective warfight capabilities and deter the
rise of new adversaries
Peck 2007 (Allen G Air Force Institute of Technology, Airpower's Crucial Role in Irregular
Warfare, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj07/sum07/peck.html)
Doctrine defines IW as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the
relevant populations.”1 IW includes counterinsurgency operations and foreign internal defense (FID) (providing
support to/for a regime, typically against internal foes) as well as support for insurgency operations. For example,
al-Qaeda and associated movements, in their quest for power and territory, will likely resort to IW methods,
attacking perceived vulnerabilities in order to influence relevant audiences while avoiding direct confrontation
with US, allied, or partner-nation forces. This type of warfare often takes a markedly different form from
traditional, conventional warfare, requiring the addition of IW capabilities to the “tool kit” from which US forces
can pull. At the same time, however, the Air Force cannot afford to lose its acknowledged edge in
traditional warfare, which has enabled past military successes and will prove necessary in the
future to maintain America’s position as the world’s superpower . The long-war aspect of IW
poses challenges to America’s center of gravity—its willingness to bring considerable resources
to bear and remain engaged in an extended fight. Historically, democracies tend to grow weary of
fighting relatively quickly, as reflected in this country’s experiences in the Civil War, Vietnam, and the present
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Indeed, the network of radical Islamic extremists has produced a plan for a 100year struggle, and democratic nations under their attack are showing signs of fatigue just a few years into the
battle.2 This long-war aspect has implications for today’s Air Force; for instance, junior officers, operating today at
the tactical level, may well be responsible for the strategic aspects of tomorrow’s war. Not only must our
Airmen have knowledge of airpower capabilities in IW, but also they must articulate airpower
concepts as well as educate the joint and coalition communities on the weapons and skills that
airpower brings to the fight.
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1NC F-35 Trade-off Disadvantage 2/3
Strong US power projection is a critical check on the escalation of conflict
Kagan 2011 The Price of Power The benefits of U.S. defense spending far outweigh the costs Jan
24, 2011, Vol. 16, No. 18 • By ROBERT KAGAN Robert Kagan is a contributing editor to The Weekly
Standard and a senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution.
Today the international situation is also one of high risk. • The
terrorists who would like to kill Americans on U.S.
soil constantly search for safe havens from which to plan and carry out their attacks. American
military actions in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, and elsewhere make it harder for them
to strike and are a large part of the reason why for almost a decade there has been no
repetition of September 11. To the degree that we limit our ability to deny them safe haven,
we increase the chances they will succeed. • American forces deployed in East Asia and the
Western Pacific have for decades prevented the outbreak of major war, provided
stability, and kept open international trading routes, making possible an
unprecedented era of growth and prosperity for Asians and Americans alike. Now the United States faces a
new challenge and potential threat from a rising China which seeks eventually to push the U.S. military’s area of operations back to Hawaii and
a nuclear-armed North Korea
threatens war with South Korea and fires ballistic missiles over Japan that will someday be
capable of reaching the west coast of the United States. Democratic nations in the region,
worried that the United States may be losing influence, turn to Washington for reassurance
that the U.S. security guarantee remains firm. If the United States cannot provide that
assurance because it is cutting back its military capabilities, they will have to choose between
accepting Chinese dominance and striking out on their own, possibly by building nuclear
weapons. • In the Middle East, Iran seeks to build its own nuclear arsenal, supports
armed radical Islamic groups in Lebanon and Palestine, and has linked up with anti-American dictatorships in the Western
Hemisphere. The prospects of new instability in the region grow every day as a decrepit
regime in Egypt clings to power, crushes all moderate opposition, and drives the Muslim Brotherhood into the streets. A
nuclear-armed Pakistan seems to be ever on the brink of collapse into anarchy and
radicalism. Turkey, once an ally, now seems bent on an increasingly anti-American Islamist
course. The prospect of war between Hezbollah and Israel grows, and with it the possibility
of war between Israel and Syria and possibly Iran . There, too, nations in the region
increasingly look to Washington for reassurance, and if they decide the United States cannot be
relied upon they will have to decide whether to succumb to Iranian influence or build
their own nuclear weapons to resist it. In the 1990s, after the Soviet Union had collapsed and the biggest problem in the world seemed to be ethnic
exercise hegemony over the world’s most rapidly growing economies. Meanwhile,
conflict in the Balkans, it was at least plausible to talk about cutting back on American military capabilities. In the present, increasingly dangerous international environment, in which
terrorism and great power rivalry vie as the greatest threat to American security and interests, cutting military capacities is simply reckless. Would we increase the risk of strategic failure in
an already risky world, despite the near irrelevance of the defense budget to American fiscal health, just so we could tell American voters that their military had suffered its “fair share” of the
pain? The nature of the risk becomes plain when one considers the nature of the cuts that would have to be made to have even a marginal effect on the U.S. fiscal crisis. Many are under the
illusion, for instance, that if the United States simply withdrew from Iraq and Afghanistan and didn’t intervene anywhere else for a while, this would have a significant impact on future
deficits. But, in fact, projections of future massive deficits already assume the winding down of these interventions.Withdrawal from the two wars would scarcely make a dent in the fiscal
crisis. Nor can meaningful reductions be achieved by cutting back on waste at the Pentagon—which Secretary of Defense Gates has already begun to do and which has also been factored into
deficit projections. If the United States withdrew from Iran and Afghanistan tomorrow, cut all the waste Gates can find, and even eliminated a few weapons programs—all this together would
still not produce a 10 percent decrease in overall defense spending. In fact, the only way to get significant savings from the defense budget—and by “significant,” we are still talking about a
tiny fraction of the cuts needed to bring down future deficits—is to cut force structure: fewer troops on the ground; fewer airplanes in the skies; fewer ships in the water; fewer soldiers, pilots,
and sailors to feed and clothe and provide benefits for. To cut the size of the force, however, requires reducing or eliminating the missions those forces have been performing. Of course, there
are any number of think tank experts who insist U.S. forces can be cut by a quarter or third or even by half and still perform those missions. But this is snake oil. Over the past two decades,
the force has already been cut by a third. Yet no administration has reduced the missions that the larger force structures of the past were designed to meet. To fulfill existing security
commitments, to remain the “world’s power balancer of choice,” as Leslie Gelb puts it, to act as “the only regional balancer against China in Asia, Russia in eastern Europe, and Iran in the
Middle East” requires at least the current force structure, and almost certainly more than current force levels. Those who recommend doing the same with less are only proposing a policy of
insufficiency, where the United States makes commitments it cannot meet except at high risk of failure. The only way to find substantial savings in the defense budget, therefore, is to change
American strategy fundamentally. The Simpson-Bowles commission suggests as much, by calling for a reexamination of America’s “21st century role,” although it doesn’t begin to define what
that new role might be. Others have. For decades “realist” analysts have called for a strategy of “offshore balancing.” Instead of the United States providing security in East Asia and the
Persian Gulf, it would withdraw its forces from Japan, South Korea, and the Middle East and let the nations in those regions balance one another. If the balance broke down and war erupted,
the United States would then intervene militarily until balance was restored. In the Middle East and Persian Gulf, for instance, Christopher Layne has long proposed “passing the mantle of
regional stabilizer” to a consortium of “Russia, China, Iran, and India.” In East Asia offshore balancing would mean letting China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and others manage their own
problems, without U.S. involvement—again, until the balance broke down and war erupted, at which point the United States would provide assistance to restore the balance and then, if
necessary, intervene with its own forces to restore peace and stability. Before examining whether this would be a wise strategy, it is important to understand that this really is the only
genuine alternative to the one the United States has pursued for the past 65 years. To their credit, Layne and others who support the concept of offshore balancing have eschewed halfway
measures and airy assurances that we can do more with less, which are likely recipes for disaster. They recognize that either the United States is actively involved in providing security and
stability in regions beyond the Western Hemisphere, which means maintaining a robust presence in those regions, or it is not. Layne and others are frank in calling for an end to the global
security strategy developed in the aftermath of World War II, perpetuated through the Cold War, and continued by four successive post-Cold War administrations. At the same time, it is not
surprising that none of those administrations embraced offshore balancing as a strategy. The idea of relying on Russia, China, and Iran to jointly “stabilize” the Middle East and Persian Gulf
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Nor is U.S. withdrawal from East Asia and the Pacific likely to have a
stabilizing effect on that region. The prospects of a war on the Korean Peninsula
would increase. Japan and other nations in the region would face the choice of succumbing
to Chinese hegemony or taking unilateral steps for self-defense, which in Japan’s case would
mean the rapid creation of a formidable nuclear arsenal . Layne and other offshore balancing enthusiasts, like
will not strike many as an attractive proposition.
John Mearsheimer, point to two notable occasions when the United States allegedly practiced this strategy. One was the Iran-Iraq war, where the United States supported Iraq for years
against Iran in the hope that the two would balance and weaken each other. The other was American policy in the 1920s and 1930s, when the United States allowed the great European powers
to balance one another, occasionally providing economic aid, or military aid, as in the Lend-Lease program of assistance to Great Britain once war broke out. Whether this was really
American strategy in that era is open for debate—most would argue the United States in this era was trying to stay out of war not as part of a considered strategic judgment but as an end in
itself. Even if the United States had been pursuing offshore balancing in the first decades of the 20th century, however, would we really call that strategy a success? The United States wound
up intervening with millions of troops, first in Europe, and then in Asia and Europe simultaneously, in the two most dreadful wars in human history. It was with the memory of those two
wars in mind, and in the belief that American strategy in those interwar years had been mistaken, that American statesmen during and after World War II determined on the new global
strategy that the United States has pursued ever since. Under Franklin Roosevelt, and then under the leadership of Harry Truman and Dean Acheson, American leaders determined that the
safest course was to build “situations of strength” (Acheson’s phrase) in strategic locations around the world, to build a “preponderance of power,” and to create an international system with
American power at its center. They left substantial numbers of troops in East Asia and in Europe and built a globe-girdling system of naval and air bases to enable the rapid projection of force
offshore balancing
strategy, and they did so because they believed it had led to great, destructive wars in
the past and would likely do so again . They believed their new global strategy was more
likely to deter major war and therefore be less destructive and less expensive in the
long run. Subsequent administrations, from both parties and with often differing perspectives on the proper course in many areas of foreign policy, have all agreed on this core
to strategically important parts of the world. They did not do this on a lark or out of a yearning for global dominion. They simply rejected the
strategic approach. From the beginning this strategy was assailed as too ambitious and too expensive. At the dawn of the Cold War, Walter Lippmann railed against Truman’s containment
strategy as suffering from an unsustainable gap between ends and means that would bankrupt the United States and exhaust its power. Decades later, in the waning years of the Cold War,
Paul Kennedy warned of “imperial overstretch,” arguing that American decline was inevitable “if the trends in national indebtedness, low productivity increases, [etc.]” were allowed to
continue at the same time as “massive American commitments of men, money and materials are made in different parts of the globe.” Today, we are once again being told that this global
strategy needs to give way to a more restrained and modest approach, even though the indebtedness crisis that we face in coming years is not caused by the present, largely successful global
strategy. Of course it is precisely the success of that strategy that is taken for granted. The enormous benefits that this strategy has provided, including the financial benefits, somehow never
We might begin by asking about the global security order that the United
States has sustained since Word War II—the prevention of major war, the support of
an open trading system, and promotion of the liberal principles of free markets
and free government. How much is that order worth? What would be the cost of its collapse or transformation into another
type of order? Whatever the nature of the current economic difficulties, the past six decades have seen a greater
increase in global prosperity than any time in human history. Hundreds of
millions have been lifted out of poverty. Once-backward nations have become economic
dynamos. And the American economy, though suffering ups and downs throughout this period, has on the whole benefited immensely
from this international order. One price of this success has been maintaining a sufficient military
capacity to provide the essential security underpinnings of this order. But has the price not been worth it? In
the first half of the 20th century, the United States found itself engaged in two world wars. In the second half, this global
American strategy helped produce a peaceful end to the great-power struggle of
the Cold War and then 20 more years of great-power peace . Looked at coldly, simply in terms of
appear on the ledger. They should.
dollars and cents, the benefits of that strategy far outweigh the costs.
The danger, as always, is that we don’t even realize the benefits our
strategic choices have provided. Many assume that the world has simply become more peaceful, that greatpower conflict has become impossible, that nations have learned that military force has little utility, that economic power is what counts. This
belief in progress and the perfectibility of humankind and the institutions of international order is always alluring to Americans and
Europeans and other children of the Enlightenment .
It was the prevalent belief in the decade before
World War I, in the first years after World War II, and in those heady days after the Cold
War when people spoke of the “end of history.” It is always tempting to believe that the
international order the United States built and sustained with its power can exist
in the absence of that power , or at least with much less of it. This is the hidden assumption of those who call for a change
in American strategy: that the United States can stop playing its role and yet all the benefits that came from that role will keep pouring in.
This is a great if recurring illusion, the idea that you can pull a leg out from under
a table and the table will not fall over.
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***Uniqueness***
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Uniqueness – F-35 Funding Now
Bipartisan support for maintaining the defense budget – F-35s are protected
Goozner
2/10
(Merrill,
independent
http://gooznews.com/?p=2474)
author,
former
journalism
prof
@
NYU,
the single most costly
procurement program in Pentagon history remains fully funded with bipartisan backing.
House Appropriations Committee Chairman Harold Rogers, R-Ky., who this week proposed $74 billion in cuts to a
broad range of domestic programs, simultaneously proposed a 2 percent increase in defense spending, enough
to fund the purchase of 32 F-35s, a stealth fighter that is slated to replace most of the existing U.S. jet fighter force over the
While a showdown looms between the White House and Republicans over steep cuts in spending,
next several decades. The Pentagon also purchased 32 F-35s in 2010. The combined Air Force, Navy and Marine Joint Strike Fighter program,
which is at least three years behind schedule and significantly over its original budget, is currently slated to cost $382 billion for 2,456 aircraft
The spending resolution being drafted to carry the government through the remainder of the fiscal year also
includes $450 million for continued development spending on a second engine for the F-35, which would be
by 2035.
built by a joint venture between General Electric and Rolls Royce. “It’s our understanding it is in there,” said a spokesman for GE, who was in
the nation’s capital Wednesday as part of a company lobbying team.
New legislation just approve purchase of new F-35s
Bennett et al (John T., and Pete Kasperowicz, ) - 07/08/11 01:15 PM ET “House approves $649
billion in defense spending for 2012”
The measure would give the department $15.1 billion to buy 10 Navy ships; $5.9 billion to purchase 32
Lockheed Martin-made F-35s; $2.8 billion to buy 116 Sikorsky-manufactured Blackhawk helicopters; and $699 million to
acquire 48 General Atomics-built MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aircraft, according to the Appropriations Committee.
U.S. House fully supports F-35 program
Capaccio 6/14 (Tony, Bloomberg News, “House panel OKs funding for 32 F-35s but not alternative
engine”
http://www.star-telegram.com/2011/06/14/3152465/house-panel-oks-funding-for32.html DOA: 7/16/11)
The House Appropriations Committee passed a $649 billion defense spending bill Tuesday for fiscal
2012 that trims $9 billion from President Barack Obama's budget while boosting ground combat vehicles and special operations programs.
The panel increased funding for General Dynamics' M1A2 tank upgrade by $272 million and for commando radios and electronics by $239
The bill also funds the Pentagon's request for 32 Lockheed Martin F-35
joint strike fighters, while cutting $75 million from research. The bill was approved by voice vote. Full House action may come as
million over the Pentagon's request.
early as next week, said Rep. C.W. "Bill" Young, R-Fla., the chairman of the defense spending subcommittee. The committee strongly endorsed
the new Army ground combat vehicle and buying more V-22 Osprey aircraft made by Fort Worth-based Bell Helicopter and Boeing. Rep.
Norm Dicks, D-Wash., said an Osprey was used to ferry the body of Osama bin Laden to a Navy ship after he was killed in a U.S. raid in
Pakistan on May 2.
Rep. Kay Granger, R-Fort Worth, introduced an amendment that was included in the bill that she
said makes clear that the U.S. fully supports the F-35 program. Lockheed is assembling the aircraft and
managing the program at its west Fort Worth plant. The F-35 "is essential for our national security. It will serve
as the backbone of U.S. air combat for the next generation," Granger said.
2012 fiscal budget provides money for F-35
Garamone 11 (Jim, American Forces Press Service, “Proposed defense budget includes pay raises
for troops, F-35 funding” http://scmilitarynews.com/2011/02/15/769/ DOA: 7/16/11)
President
Barack Obama’s fiscal 2012 defense budget request that was announced Monday continues the
department’s reform agenda, but protects personnel and family programs, Pentagon officials said. Overall, the Defense Department budget is
declining, with funding for overseas contingency operations dropping by $41.5 billion, due mainly to military operations winding down in Iraq,
The request also puts
more money into research and development for the F-35 fighter, expected to replace F-16s at Shaw Air Force
officials said. But it includes pay raises for service members and hikes in housing and subsistence allowances.
Base and McEntire Joint National Guard Base, and F-18s at Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort. The proposal, though, defers procurement of
F-35s to the out years. The
president is asking Congress for $671 billion for the Defense Department in
fiscal 2012, which starts Oct. 1. The budget calls for $553 billion in the “base budget” and
$117.8 billion for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
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Uniqueness – Military Spending High Now
U.S. military spending highest since World War II
Ratnesar 11 (Romesh, Time Magazine, “Military Spending Must Be Part of the Deficit Debate”
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2064468,00.html DOA: 7/14/11)
All told, U.S. military spending in 2011 will exceed $700 billion — the most since World War II.
That amounts to more than half of all government discretionary spending. It represents 35% of total military
spending on the planet. And yet it's doubtful that the idea of substantially reducing the defense
budget was raised by either side during last week's negotiations. Instead, the White House celebrated
the meager accomplishment of not increasing the Pentagon budget quite as much as the Republicans had
proposed — though, rest assured, it will still increase. "We won the argument," one Democratic spinner crowed in
an e-mail to the Washington Post.
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***Internal Links***
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Internal Link – F-35 Will Be Cut 1/3
Specifically, F-35s get cut
Goozner
2/10
(Merrill,
independent
http://gooznews.com/?p=2474)
author,
former
journalism
prof
@
NYU,
Critics ranging from the president’s bipartisan fiscal commission to former military officers to
a coalition of liberal and conservative groups backing steep Defense Department cuts have put the F35 at the top of their list of Pentagon programs that could be scaled back or eliminated without
damaging national security. The Fiscal Commission, for instance, called for cutting the program in half. Their
report suggested the fighter fleet could remain at its current size by extending production of modernized F-16, F18 and A-10 jets, which would save $9.5 billion over the next five years. “The unit cost of F-35 aircraft is estimated
at about $133 million compared to $40 million for an F-16 and $80 million for an F-18,” the fiscal commission
report said. “The U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy, the military’s current fourth-generation fighters – the F15, the F-16, and the F-18 – are superior to Chinese and Russian aircraft, and they are less expensive
than the F-35,” noted Gordon Adams and Matthew Leatherman in an article in the latest Foreign Affairs.
DOD wants to hold F-35 procurement at previous levels
DOD 2011 (OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER) / CFO STATES
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FISCAL YEAR 2012 BUDGET REQUEST)
http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2012/FY2012_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf
Hold F-35 procurement in FY 2012 at the expected FY 2011 level: 32 U.S. aircraft. (FY 2011 request
was for 42 F-35s in base budget and 1 in OCO request, but some of its actions suggest that Congress will
fund no more than 32 F-35s.)
McCain opposes the Pentagon’s request to buy new F-35’s
Bennett (John T., one of the founding members of Laughlin, Falbo, Levy & Moresi LLP. He is a
former managing partner of the firm and attained the rank of Captain in the U.S. Marine Corps.) 07/14/11 04:59 PM ET Aide: McCain will oppose Pentagon plan to pay for new F-35 fighter cost
spike
http://thehill.com/news-by-subject/defense-homeland-security/171601-aide-mccain-willoppose-pentagon-plan-to-pay-for-new-f-35-cost-spike
Senate Armed Services Committee Ranking Member John McCain (R-Ariz.) will oppose a Pentagon
request to transfer $264 million from other accounts to begin paying for a new $771 million
cost spike, a Senate aide tells The Hill. That news comes two days after McCain revealed this on Twitter:
"Congress notified that first F-35 jets have cost overruns of $771M." McCain, long a critic of the
Lockheed Martin-led program, and one of the Senate's most outspoken and blunt members let his
feelings about the new cost spikes be known in the same tweet. "Outrageous! Pentagon asking for $264M
down payment now. Disgraceful," he tweeted. The $771 million overrun covers the first 28 F-35s the
Pentagon is buying. The Pentagon informed lawmakers on Monday of a need to move monies within its
budget for a $264 million down payment, as the aide called it, via a reprogramming request sent across the
Potomac River in June.
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Internal Link – F-35 Will Be Cut 2/3
Obama and Gates are on the chopping block for F-35’s because of price, any new
spending would kill them
LEE FERRAN and MARK SCHONE May 25, 2011 Obama Administration Tries Again to Kill Zombie
Jet
Engine
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/joint-strike-fighter-alternateengine/story?id=13684098
Administration officials say President Obama will veto the defense authorization bill if Congress does
not remove language that would extend the life of the controversial second engine for the Joint
Strike Fighter. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter already has a primary engine that is being developed by Pratt
Whitney, and both President Obama and Defense Secretary Robert Gates have said they do not
want work to continue on the alternate engine that GE and Rolls Royce have been developing.
The Pentagon has issued a stop work order for the GE engine and officially stopped payment. "The
Department of Defense today notified the General Electric/Rolls Royce Fighter Engine Team
and the Congress that the F136 Joint Strike Fighter engine contract has been terminated," a Defense
Department release said in April. "The stop work order ended the expenditure of $ 1 million per day on an
extra engine that the [Pentagon] has assessed as unneeded and wasteful."
F-35s are being eyed for cuts
WITN 9 (News Site, 3/13/9, http://www.witn.com/military/headlines/41199997.html)
Hungry budget cutters are eyeing some tasty targets at the Pentagon. Specifically: two of the largest
weapons contracts ever awarded by the Pentagon. The Joint Strike Fighter program is building 2,500 high-tech
warplanes and could cost more than $1 trillion. The program would build F-35s, which are the same jets the
Navy is considering placing at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point in Havelock. The Navy has said it could put
as many as eleven F-35 squadrons at Cherry Point, while other squadrons would go to the base in Beaufort, S.C.
New squadrons of fighter jets would bring a significant economic impact to any military base and surrounding
town. The Government Accountability Office, in a report Thursday, says costs for the Joint Strike Fighter
Program and the Army's Future Combat Systems are likely to balloon because the technology is not fully
proven. The Army's vision of high-tech, interconnected battlefield equipment has a $158-billion pricetag. The
military is under pressure to cut costs as the government devotes trillions of dollars toward righting the
economy. The Obama administration has promised a rigorous review of weapons programs with a view
toward making sure their technology is proven before they go into production.
F-35s are at the top of the chopping block
Goozner
2/10
(Merrill,
independent
http://gooznews.com/?p=2474)
author,
former
journalism
prof
@
NYU,
Critics ranging from the president’s bipartisan fiscal commission to former military officers to
a coalition of liberal and conservative groups backing steep Defense Department cuts have put the F35 at the top of their list of Pentagon programs that could be scaled back or eliminated without
damaging national security. The Fiscal Commission, for instance, called for cutting the program in half. Their
report suggested the fighter fleet could remain at its current size by extending production of modernized F-16, F18 and A-10 jets, which would save $9.5 billion over the next five years. “The unit cost of F-35 aircraft is estimated
at about $133 million compared to $40 million for an F-16 and $80 million for an F-18,” the fiscal commission
report said. “The U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy, the military’s current fourth-generation fighters – the F15, the F-16, and the F-18 – are superior to Chinese and Russian aircraft, and they are less expensive
than the F-35,” noted Gordon Adams and Matthew Leatherman in an article in the latest Foreign Affairs.
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Internal Link – F-35 Will Be Cut 3/3
Obama’s looking to slash F-35s – kills the entire program
Reed 10 (Jon, writer @ DefenseTech.org, http://defensetech.org/2010/11/11/proposed-f-35-cutscould-put-program-at-risk/)
a presidentially-mandated panel is recommending the military
slash numerous big-ticket weapons programs, including the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter, as part of an overall
proposal aimed at dramatically reining-in government costs. The panel calls for the Air Force and Navy to half their planned
Late yesterday afternoon, news broke that
F-35A and C-model buys through 2015 and for the Marines to completely lose their short takeoff and vertical landing F-35B. The greatly
reduced numbers of JSFs would be supplemented by purchase of “new” F-16s for the Air Force and F/A-18EF Super Hornet buys for the Navy.
Air Force officials in recent years who have put all their
eggs in the F-35 basket and refused to consider buying new versions of F-16s or F-15s. Navy officials seem to have hedged their bets
These recommendations fly in the face of all the planning done by the
a little by recently buying an mix of 124 F/A-18E/F Super Hornets and EA-18G Growlers to offset a looming fighter gap. Obviously, the
Marines would be in the toughest spot if the recommendations become reality with their aging fleet of F/A-18 Hornets, AV-8B Harriers and
EA-6B Prowlers that are all supposed to be replaced by the F-35B. All of this begs the question; if (and it’s a big, big if)
these cuts are
throw the F-35 into the death spiral that program-watchers have warned about for
Reduced buys mean cost hikes which in-turn lead to more reduced buys from
international partners, etc.Teal Group Aviation analyst Richard Aboulafia sees all of this as a “seriously worst-case scenario, but it’s
a dire prospect.”If this nightmare scenario for the F-35 does come to fruition, the fate of the program
could indeed hang on the international partners’ resolve to stick with it, according to the analyst. “If it went ahead (I doubt it,
approved by decision-makers will they
years?
but you can’t write off the possibility) then much would come down to the international partners,” Aboulafia said. “If they kept the faith, the
program could keep costs from skyrocketing, and avoid a death spiral. If they don’t,
risk.
the program would definitely be at
However, eliminating the B version would also save development and production costs, and probably keep the program from following
the F-22 death spiral model.”
F-35 on the chopping block
Fenholz 11 (Tim, staff, National Journal, 2/3, http://www.nationaljournal.com/house-gop-callsfor-cuts-in-security-spending-20110203?print=true)
House Republicans are proposing to slash $74 billion in discretionary spending this year, and have included a
surprise cut of $16 billion for defense and other security programs. House Budget Committee Chairman Paul Ryan, R-Wis., is expected to file
a budget resolution Tuesday using unilateral powers granted to him by new House rules. Under those rules, his overall budget numbers will amount to marching orders for the House
Appropriations Committee, which will have to decide on the specific cuts. Because House appropriators have the authority to set specific limits for all categories of discretionary spending,
the security cuts could simply hit programs
that Defense Secretary Roberts Gates has already targeted for cancellation, such as the Marine Corps' Expeditionary Fighting
Vehicle produced by General Dynamics and the Army's surface-launched advanced medium-range air-to-air missile developed by Raytheon. Gates has also put the
Marine Corps' troubled version of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, a Lockheed Martin program, on a twoyear probation that free up cash this fiscal year. Overall, the proposed cuts would be the largest one-year reductions in decades. But they fall
they could choose to ignore Ryan's call to allocate some of the cuts to security programs. Alternatively,
short of the House Republicans' campaign promise to roll back non-security discretionary spending to 2008 levels, or the $100 billion in cuts for this year alone. Indeed, the proposed cuts
are smaller than they first appear, because they are based on President Obama's budget proposal for 2011 -- which was never enacted. Compared with 2010, the proposal would cut total
discretionary spending by only $35 billion.
F-35 is affordable – but austere budgets will force trade-offs
Defense Daily 11 (5/20/11, “Senators Want To Study Alternatives To F-35”, lexis/nexis)
McCain added he sees the F-35 program as being at a "watershed moment," where officials must prove the
aircraft can be delivered on time and budget because of the "austere defense budgets for as far as the eye can
see." Carter maintained that the Pentagon "didn't come up with any better alternatives to the Joint Strike Fighter" during a so-called NunnMcCurdy review triggered by an F-35 cost breach. "We want it," he said. "At the same time, it has to be affordable,
and at the moment in its projections it's not. I think we're determined to make it affordable, and those who are performing the work
for us share in that objective.” The Pentagon now estimates the average cost per aircraft is $95 million in fiscal year 2002 dollars, up from an estimate last year of $80 million derived by the
F-35 program office, according to Christine Fox, director of the Pentagon's Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office. The CAPE last year estimated the $95 million cost, in FY
'02 dollars, but had to analyze whether it's figure or the program office's estimate was most accurate. That current per-unit F-35 cost, adjusted for inflation, is $133 million in FY '11 dollars.
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***Impacts***
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2NC F-35 Good – Hegemony
F-35 key to US military might and allied credibility
Ivey
11
(
Kay,
Lieutenant
Governor
http://ltgov.alabama.gov/PR/PressRelease.aspx?ID=5143&t=28)
of
Alabama,
May,
Wilbur Wright once said, “It is possible to fly without motors, but not without knowledge and skill.” Recognizing education was essential to
success, the Wright brothers founded the first flight school in the United States on the grounds of what would one day become Maxwell Air
Force Base. Those early investments resonate today, as many Alabama higher education institutions carry on that same tradition of excellence
the ability for tomorrow’s graduates to use the
knowledge and skill they cultivate from these highly-specialized programs means they have to have jobs in
which to use them. That’s why supporting multi-service programs such as the F-35 joint strike
fighter are essential. The F-35 program is essential to our national defense needs and the
needs of our allies. China, Russia and other countries continue to invest in developing planes
with cutting edge technology. If we don’t make the same investments, we will fall behind. The F-35
with the next generation of pilots, engineers and astronauts. But
is required to be four times more effective than older fighter jets in air-to-air combat, eight times more effective in air-to-ground combat, and
three times more effective in reconnaissance and suppression of air defenses – while having better range and requiring less logistics support.
the increase in the number of issues we are facing in the Middle East and places like
Libya, America’s ability to retain its air superiority edge is essential to the security of US and
allies forces all over the world.
In light of
Effective conventional military superiority key to global conflict de-escalation
Schuman, TIME, 7-6-’11 (Michael, “Will America's budget deficit bring an end to world
peace?” http://curiouscapitalist.blogs.time.com/2011/07/06/will-america%E2%80%99s-budgetdeficit-bring-an-end-to-world-peace/)
Did you know that the U.S. still stations nearly 50,000 troops in Japan? That's pretty amazing when
you think about it. The war in the Pacific ended 66 years ago, and there hasn't been a conflict in Northeast Asia
since the Korean War of the early 1950s, but America still maintains a hefty military presence in the area.
Another bunch of soldiers are parked nearby in South Korea. Why in the world are all those soldiers still
there? They're keeping the peace.
Not everybody may agree with me on that assertion. I can't imagine Kim Jong Il is too happy that tens
of thousands of armed Americans are sitting on his doorstep. But most of the leadership of Asia
fully realizes that the U.S. military presence in the region has, without question, provided a
stability rarely experienced. The traditional rivalries between local powers (China, Japan and
Korea) have been kept at bay. American security allowed Japan, South Korea and most of the
rest of the region (including China) to focus on economic development and alleviating poverty. It
is because America ensured peace in East Asia that Asians have been able to get rich.
People all over the world have benefited in a similar way. American security for Western Europe during
the Cold War allowed the region to rebuild after World War II. The American security
relationship with Saudi Arabia and its allies in the Persian Gulf has helped oil to flow peacefully
to the world. Year after year, it is American armed forces that most often take the lead in resolving
the world's security issues, whether that has meant stopping genocide in the Balkans or
hunting down Osama bin Laden in Pakistan. Sure, America's military dominance has produced a fair
share of hostility, in Iran, Libya and other countries that have refused to join the U.S.-led global political and
security system. And of course the U.S. has made its share of blunders when flexing its military muscle (Iraq). But
the fact is that the world expects America to use its armed forces to solve the world's problems .
When Washington takes a backseat and lets others drive for a while – as in the current conflict in Libya – the
White House faces stiff criticism.
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F-35 Good – Hegemony Extensions
F-35’s are key to maintaining Heg
Eaglen 2010 “Mind the Gap” Published on September 22, 2010 by Mackenzie Eaglen
http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2010/09/mind-the-gap
Keeping the Joint Strike Fighter Program on track is essential to maintaining U.S. military
primacy and preventing an aircraft inventory shortfall. The epigram, "No good deed goes
unpunished," rings true for today's military, particularly the U.S. Navy and Air Force .
F-35s provide essential capabilities to ensure superiority
Congressional Research Service (Jeremiah Gertler Specialist in Military Aviation) April 26, 2011
The Air Force is procuring the F-35A, a conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) version of the aircraft. F-35As
are to replace Air Force F-16 fighters and A-10 attack aircraft, and possibly F-15 fighters.7 The F-35A is intended
to be a more affordable complement to the Air Force’s new F-22 Raptor air superiority fighter.8 The F-35A is not
quite as stealthy9 nor as capable in air-to-air combat as the F-22, but it is more capable in air-to-ground combat
than the F-22, and more stealthy than the F-16. If the F-15/F-16 combination represented the Air Force’s earliergeneration “high-low” mix of air superiority fighters and more-affordable dual-role aircraft, the F-22/F-35A
combination might be viewed as the Air Force’s intended future high-low mix.10 The Air Force states that “The F22A and F-35 each possess unique, complementary, and essential capabilities that together
provide the synergistic effects required to maintain that margin of superiority across the
spectrum of conflict.... Legacy 4th generation aircraft simply cannot survive to operate and
achieve the effects necessary to win in an integrated, anti-access environment.”
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2NC F-35 Good – Economy
F-35’s key to Economy
Burbage
11
(Tom,
exec-VP,
Lockheed
Martin,
http://armedservices.senate.gov/statemnt/2011/05%20May/Burbage%2005-19-11.)
The F‐35 also leverages the economies of commonality and scale in procurement and sustainment that come with much broader
participation than traditional single‐service fleet recapitalization. From the industrial perspective, we are also recapitalizing the aerospace industry with new manufacturing technologies as
The F‐35 program today involves more than 1,300 suppliers in
47 states and supports nearly 127,000 direct and indirect U.S. jobs. In addition, we are implementing global
industrial partnerships as part of the Government to Government agreements. Those industrial ties will enhance the economic
relationships between the U.S. and participating allied nations and will underscore the military ties that enable coalition burden
sharing in the future. This international participation also makes F‐35 potentially the largest program in the
Department of Defense that can favorably affect the U.S. balance of trade . It is clear that capturing the full potential
we introduce production efficiencies across the industrial partnership.
of F‐35 depends on maintaining a strategic perspective and making decisions that will enable the future success of this program. In this new reality, the value proposition is more relevant
today than ever before.
Interdependence solves escalation of regional wars
Friedberg, IR Prof at Princeton, ‘8 (Aaron, “The Dangers of a Diminished America” WSJ)
Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For
decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use
of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget
deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the
future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic
terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and
Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also
give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous
power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and
our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a
scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the
peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics
who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue
states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum
vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic
competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has
demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global
slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and
access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where
political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian
leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures. As for
our democratic friends, the present crisis comes when many European nations are struggling to deal with decades of
anemic growth, sclerotic governance and an impending demographic crisis. Despite its past dynamism, Japan faces similar
challenges. India is still in the early stages of its emergence as a world economic and geopolitical power. What
does this all mean? There is no substitute for America on the world stage. The choice we have before
us is between the potentially disastrous effects of disengagement and the stiff price tag of
continued American leadership.
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F-35 Good – Economy Extensions
F-35 program has activity in the majority of U.S. states, cutting the program
would result in employment loss throughout the United States
Ewing 6/29 (Philip, Pentagon correspondent for POLITICO, “Your piece of the F-35 pie”
http://www.dodbuzz.com/2011/06/29/your-piece-of-the-f-35-pie/ DOA: 7/15/11)
It’s easier to list the states that Lockheed says don’t have some role in the fighter’s production
than it is to point out the ones that do: North Dakota, Wyoming, Hawaii and Oklahoma all are listed
as “N/A” for economic activity — there may also be some others. But as soon as you begin mousing
over Lockheed’s map of the U.S. you’ll see almost every state light up with a little window
depicting how many F-35 vendors it has, and how big an effect the $380 billion program has
for its economy.
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2NC F-35 Good – Russia Expansionism 1/2
Cut of F-35 causes Russia expansion
David 2010 US Military Primacy: Worth Sacrificing For” December 20, 2010 Jack David
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/255423/us-military-primacy-worth-sacrificing-jackdavid?page
While our relations with Russia today are not as hostile as they were with the Soviet Union (thankfully), Russia’s
reassertion of rights in territories the Soviet Union once occupied is worrisome. Russian airforce fighters already are comparable to the U.S. mainstay, the F15. Russia is developing fighter
aircraft comparable to our now-incomparable F22 (production of which has been terminated to save
money), and it is continuing to develop nuclear-weapon and other military capabilities explicitly
intended to be superior to ours and to defeat us in any conflict. China long has made territorial claims
on the regions surrounding it. Some of these are in areas in the western Pacific claimed by other countries. Others
are in what the U.S. regards as international waters. It is no secret that China is aggressively building a blue-water
navy, has F15-comparable fighters in its own air force, and already is testing an F22-comparable aircraft that will
be deployed in very few years. Moreover, the ships, aircraft, missiles, and space and cyber capabilities China is
developing, like those of the Russians, are explicitly being designed to defeat U.S. air, naval, and
space military capabilities.
These facts are significant. They demonstrate elements of U.S. primacy from the perspective of
Russia and China, showing what U.S. military resources they regard as impeding their plans.
They also show that Russia and China believe there is a significant possibility that they will want
to use military force to achieve an objective contrary to U.S. interests.
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F-35 Good – Russia Expansionism 2/2
Global nuclear conflict escalation
Blank, Nat Security Prof at Army War College, ‘9 (Stephen, March, “Russia and Arms
Control:
Are
There
Opportunities
for
the
Obama
Administration?”
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub908.pdf
Proliferators or nuclear states like China and Russia can then deter regional or intercontinental attacks either by
denial or by threat of retaliation.168 Given a multipolar world structure with little ideological rivalry
among major powers , it is unlikely that they will go to war with each other . Rather,
like Russia , they will strive for exclusive hegemony in their own “sphere of
influence” and use nuclear instruments towards that end . However, wars may well
break out between major powers and weaker “peripheral” states or between peripheral and
semiperipheral states given their lack of domestic legitimacy, the absence of the means of crisis prevention, the
visible absence of crisis management mechanisms, and their strategic calculation that asymmetric wars might give
them the victory or respite they need.169 Simultaneously,
The states of periphery and semiperiphery have far more opportunities for political maneuvering. Since war
remains a political option, these states may find it convenient to exercise their military power
as a means for achieving political objectives. Thus international crises may increase in
number . This has two important implications for the use of WMD . First, they may be
used deliberately to offer a decisive victory (or in Russia’s case, to achieve “intra-war
escalation control”—author170) to the striker, or for defensive purposes when imbalances in
military capabilities are significant; and second, crises increase the possibilities of
inadvertent or accidental wars involving WMD .171
Obviously nuclear proliferators or states that are expanding their nuclear arsenals like Russia can
exercise a great influence upon world politics if they chose to defy the prevailing consensus and
use their weapons not as defensive weapons, as has been commonly thought, but as offensive weapons to
threaten other states and deter nuclear powers. Their decision to go either for cooperative security and
strengthened international military-political norms of action, or for individual national “egotism” will critically
affect world politics. For, as Roberts observes,
But if they drift away from those efforts [to bring about more cooperative security], the consequences
could be profound . At the very least, the effective functioning of inherited mechanisms of
world order, such as the special responsibility of the “great powers” in the management of the interstate system,
especially problems of armed aggression, under the aegis of collective security, could be significantly
impaired . Armed with the ability to defeat an intervention, or impose substantial costs in blood or money on
an intervening force or the populaces of the nations marshaling that force, the newly empowered tier could
bring an end to collective security operations , undermine the credibility of
alliance commitments by the great powers , [undermine guarantees of extended deterrence by
them to threatened nations and states] extend alliances of their own, and perhaps make wars of
aggression on their neighbors or their own people .172
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2NC F-35 Good – Airpower Internal Link
F-35 is the last remaining manned combat aircraft program, its key to Air Force
Power
John
A.
Tirpak
July
2009
“Fighter
of
The
Future”
http://www.airforcemagazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2009/July%202009/0709Fighter.aspx
In the once-crowded field of manned combat aircraft, the F-35 Lightning II fighter now has
become the only game in town. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, with his April 6 budget cut
recommendations, terminated further production of the USAF F-22 fighter, began winding down
the Navy’s F/A-18 carrier-based fighter, and postponed the next generation bomber, which was
supposed to enter service in 2018.
That leaves only the F-35 as a full-fledged manned air program. Gates has heaped on the
aircraft the burden of providing most of the capability and credibility of American airpower for
decades to come.
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2NC F-35 Good – Airpower Impact (Korea War)
Airpower key to stop Korean war
David 2010 US Military Primacy: Worth Sacrificing For” December 20, 2010 Jack David
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/255423/us-military-primacy-worth-sacrificing-jackdavid?page=1
How can we see into a future without U.S. military primacy? One place that points the way is
the past. The absence of U.S. military primacy played a large role in North Korea’s invasion of
South Korea on June 25, 1950. In 1945, the U.S. had 40,000 soldiers in in South Korea. By 1950, there were a mere 472 there. Consistent with the
drawdown, Secretary of State Dean Acheson did not include Korea in a January 1950 speech in
which he enumerated countries that the U.S. would defend. Kim Il Sung concluded that the
U.S. would not interfere with his plan to unify the peninsula by force. He persuaded Stalin and Mao of that view, secured
their promises of support, and invaded the South. Hundreds of thousands died in the conflict . The U.S. suffered 33,746 combat
deaths and 128,650 total dead and wounded. In economic terms, the war cost $67 billion in 1953 dollars, equal to $535 billion in 2008 dollars. Once the Korean War started, the U.S. defense
budget was quadrupled.
Global nuclear conflict
Hayes and Green, 10 - *Victoria University AND **Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute
(Peter and Michael, “-“The Path Not Taken, the Way Still Open: Denuclearizing the Korean
Peninsula
and
Northeast
Asia”,
1/5,
http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/10001HayesHamalGreen.pdf)
The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments, and related
political and economic issues, are serious, not only for the Northeast Asian region but for the whole international community. At worst, there is the
possibility of nuclear attack1, whether by intention, miscalculation, or merely accident, leading
to the resumption of Korean War hostilities. On the Korean Peninsula itself, key population centres are well within short or medium range
missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo
Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust of unprecedented
proportions. But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even a
limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than
global warming. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2
over 20 million.
(by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32
The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in
global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.3 In Westberg’s view: That is not global winter, but the
nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000
years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow...The period of
nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds of millions of people will
die from hunger...To make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere
would cause a huge reduction in the Earth’s protective ozone.4 These, of course, are not the only consequences. Reactors might
Hiroshimas).
also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use. Millions of refugees would flee the affected
The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and
food insecurity, could make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison . How the
great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear
first-use, could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. There could be
many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships 5, with subsequent
nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence, including possible loss-of-control over fissile
material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and aftermath chain-reaction affects
involving other potential proliferant states. The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants
regions.
priority consideration from the international community .
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2NC F-35 Good – Airpower Impact (China)
China is developing now, without a strong air force they will surpass the US
David 2010 US Military Primacy: Worth Sacrificing For” December 20, 2010 Jack David
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/255423/us-military-primacy-worth-sacrificing-jackdavid?page
China long has made territorial claims on the regions surrounding it. Some of these are in areas in the western Pacific claimed by other
countries. Others are in what the U.S. regards as international waters. It
is no secret that China is aggressively building
has F15-comparable fighters in its own air force, and already is testing an F22comparable aircraft that will be deployed in very few years. Moreover, the ships, aircraft,
missiles, and space and cyber capabilities China is developing, like those of the Russians, are explicitly
being designed to defeat U.S. air, naval, and space military capabilities. These facts are significant. They
demonstrate elements of U.S. primacy from the perspective of Russia and China, showing what
U.S. military resources they regard as impeding their plans. They also show that Russia and China believe
there is a significant possibility that they will want to use military force to achieve an objective
contrary to U.S. interests.
a blue-water navy,
China will escalate the conflict – perception of rational escalation ensures US gets
drawn into the nuclear arms race
Glaser, PolSci Prof at George Washington, ’11 (Charles, March/April, “Will China’s Rise
Lead to War?” Foreign Affairs, Vol 90 Issue 2, EbscoHost)
growth in
China's power may nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign policy that Washington will
find disagreeable--particularly regarding Taiwan. Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than
six decades ago, China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a
key political goal for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if Taiwan declares independence, and much of China's
ACCOMMODATION ON TAIWAN? THE PROSPECTS for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but
conventional military buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the United States' ability to intervene.
because the United States and China--whatever they might formally
agree to--have such different attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses
special dangers and challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship, placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea. A
crisis over Taiwan could fairly easily escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the way
might well seem rational to the actors involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan
will declare independence and to make clear that the United States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the United
States would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter
how it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control
Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the United States found itself
following events rather than leading them. Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing
improvements in China's military capabilities may make Beijing more willing to escalate a
Taiwan crisis. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their
ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory
holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining
position. China's nuclear modernization might remove that check on Chinese action, leading
Beijing to behave more boldly in future crises than it has in past ones. A U.S. attempt to
preserve its ability to defend Taiwan, meanwhile, could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms
race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses might be interpreted by China as a signal
Because China places such high value on Taiwan and
of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations.
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2NC F-35 Good – Air Power Impact (Terrorism) 1/2
Air Power solves terrorism
Peck`7 (Allen G Air Force Institute of Technology, Airpower's Crucial Role in Irregular Warfare,
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj07/sum07/peck.html)
In an IW environment, the traditionally recognized ability of airpower to strike at the adversary’s “strategic center of gravity” will likely have
less relevance due to the decentralized and diffuse nature of the enemy.3 The amorphous mass of ideological movements opposing Western
airpower
hold)s a number of asymmetric trump cards (capabilities the enemy can neither meet with
parity nor counter in kind). For instance, airpower’s ability to conduct precision strikes across the
globe can play an important role in counterinsurgency operations. Numerous other advantages
(including information and cyber operations; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
[ISR]; and global mobility) have already proven just as important. These capabilities provide
our fighting forces with highly asymmetric advantages in the IW environment. Innovation and
influence and values generally lacks a defined command structure that airpower can attack with predictable effects. Still,
adaptation are hallmarks of airpower. Cold War–era bombers, designed to carry nuclear weapons, can loiter for hours over the battlefield and
Fighter aircraft, designed to deliver
precision weapons against hardened targets, can disseminate targeting-pod video directly to an
Air Force joint terminal attack controller who can then direct a strike guided by either laser or
the global positioning system (GPS). Unmanned systems such as the Predator, once solely a surveillance
platform, now have effective laser designation and the capacity for precision, kinetic strike.
Airborne platforms offer electronic protection to ground forces, including attacking insurgent
communications and the electronics associated with triggering improvised explosive devices
(IED). Exploiting altitude, speed, and range, airborne platforms can create these effects,
unconstrained by terrain or artificial boundaries between units. Forward-thinking Airmen
developed these innovations by using adaptive tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment
to counter a thinking, adaptive enemy. To be sure, our IW adversaries have their own asymmetric
capabilities such as suicide bombers, IEDs, and the appropriation of civilian residences,
mosques, and hospitals as staging areas for their combat operations. However, they lack and cannot
deliver individual conventional weapons to within a few feet of specified coordinates.
effectively offset unfettered access to the high ground that superiority in air, space, and cyberspace provides.
35
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F-35 Good – Air Power Impact (Terrorism) 2/2
Nuclear terrorism causes global nuclear escalation – national retaliation goes
global
Morgan, Foreign Studies Prof at Hankuk, ‘9 (Dennis Ray, December, “World on fire: two
scenarios of the destruction of human civilization and possible extinction of the human race”
Futures, Vol 41 Issue 10, p 683-693, ScienceDirect)
In a remarkable website on nuclear war, Carol Moore asks the question "Is Nuclear War Inevitable??" [10].4 In Section 1, Moore points out
what most terrorists obviously already
know about the nuclear tensions between powerful countries. No doubt, they've figured out
that the best way to escalate these tensions into nuclear war is to set off a nuclear exchange . As
Moore points out, all that militant terrorists would have to do is get their hands on one small nuclear
bomb and explode it on either Moscow or Israel. Because of the Russian "dead hand" system,
"where regional nuclear commanders would be given full powers should Moscow be
destroyed," it is likely that any attack would be blamed on the United States " [10]. Israeli leaders
and Zionist supporters have, likewise, stated for years that if Israel were to suffer a nuclear attack ,
whether from terrorists or a nation state, it would retaliate with the suicidal "Samson option" against all
major Muslim cities in the Middle East. Furthermore, the Israeli Samson option would also include
attacks on Russia and even "anti-Semitic" European cities [10]. In that case, of course, Russia would
retaliate, and the U.S. would then retaliate against Russia. China would probably be involved as
well, as thousands, if not tens of thousands, of nuclear warheads, many of them much more
powerful than those used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would rain upon most of the major cities
in the Northern Hemisphere. Afterwards, for years to come, massive radioactive clouds would drift
throughout the Earth in the nuclear fallout, bringing death or else radiation disease that would be genetically transmitted to future
generations in a nuclear winter that could last as long as a 100 years, taking a savage toll upon the
environment and fragile ecosphere as well.
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A2: F-35’s Will Be Sold
India buying part of F-35 program boosts U.S. economy
Whadwhani 6/9 (Romesh, CSIS Trustee and Founder of CSIS, U.S.-India Relations: A View from
Capitol Hill Keynote Luncheon, http://csis.org/files/attachments/110609csis-india-keynotes.pdf
DOA: 7/15/11)
The third element of the framework is around defense and regional security. Senator, you mentioned the recent
award of the C-17 contract. It’s a great $4 billion win for the U.S. I would point out, though, that there was
a $10 billion loss to France, which was, you know, the fighter jet program.So, I think making India a partner
in the F-35 program would be very helpful. But I would suggest that there is an even stronger way for the
U.S. defense companies to win more business in India , which is by taking the offset program – as you
know, when a foreign country buys military equipment from the U.S., typically they’ll ask for 25 or 30 percent of
that to be spent locally in offsets.
Selling F-35s key to defense strategies
Warner 6/9 (Mark, Senator of Virginia, U.S.-India Relations: A View from Capitol Hill Keynote
Luncheon, http://csis.org/files/attachments/110609csis-india-keynotes.pdf DOA: 7/15/11)
Second and third would be in the area of defense. We have seen India’s role and challenges in this world
where we not only face challenging nation states but also the potential threat of terrorism . India,
as we all know, has suffered its own 9/11 in Mumbai. And there is enormous opportunity, I think, for
collaboration on the strategic front in terms of our defense communities over the coming year,
both in terms of joint exercises, in terms of closer collaboration.
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A2: F-35 Expensive
F-35s may be expensive, but the money is worth the efficiency
Thompson 09 (Loren, Chief Operating Officer of the Lexington Institute and Chief Executive
Officer
of
Source
Associates,
“Thompson
Files:
F-35
good
value
for
U.S.”
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Thompson_Files_F-35_good_value_for_US_999.html DOA:
7/15/11)
Three things stand out about the F-35 Lightning Joint Strike Fighter. First is its production line. In
an era when U.S. manufacturing is under pressure, the F-35 line in Fort Worth, Texas, is one that will make you
feel good about the United States. The line is a marvel of sophisticated automation, laser-guided
assembly and precision tolerances. The F-35's exterior stealth materials are light years beyond previous
coatings. They go on more evenly and are so durable that factory officials let visitors literally walk on samples of
the radar-absorbing material. Second, the F-35 Lightning is a good value. Yes, it will be expensive
overall because of its sheer magnitude. What makes it a good value is its efficiency. Ramping up
to production of more than 100 aircraft per year will create momentum and help keep unit costs in line. Third,
the F-35 Lightning is a hard-power weapon but a soft-power partnership. Achieving true
interoperability with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its member states and other allies will be doubly
important as air forces shrink because of decreased defense spending.
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A2: Defense Spending Bad
Congress needs to keep defense spending at its current level
Eaglen (Mackenzie, specializes in defense strategy, military readiness and the defense budget as
research fellow for national security studies at The Heritage Foundation) June 7, 2010
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/06/us-defense-spending-the-mismatchbetween-plans-and-resources
President Barack Obama’s defense budget request perpetuates a long-standing pattern of underfunding defense
needs. Defense spending is already near historic lows, and the Administration’s budget would
reduce it to levels unprecedented during wartime. Furthermore, Congress appears poised to
repeat the past mistake of promptly disarming after major combat operations subside. Instead,
Congress should maintain current levels of defense spending to allow the military to reset and recapitalize.
Congress needs to control entitlement growth, domestic spending, and public debt, which are beginning to
threaten national security. Congress also needs to reform military compensation to ease strains within the defense
budget.
US military needs to stay alert for all threats
The Heritage Foundation April 5, 2011 A Strong National Defense: The Armed Forces America
Needs and What They Will Cost
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/04/a-strongnational-defense-the-armed-forces-america-needs-and-what-they-will-cost
Failure to prepare for potential threats is the best way to ensure that they will become real
threats. The world is a dangerous place. The U.S. military is already pressed to meet its commitments because of
the long-term effects of the “peace dividend” taken after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The demands on the
U.S. military will likely not lessen in the mid term. Further cuts in U.S. force structure will only
increase the risks to U.S. forces. Maintaining a military below minimum commonsense levels
would limit the U.S. to undertaking only one major military operation at a time. If faced with
domestic crises like Hurricane Katrina or unexpected overseas contingencies, the U.S. would be forced to
choose between ongoing tasks or simply not responding.
39
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A2: No Impact to Cuts
The defense budget is too complicated--cuts could be irreversible
Christie et al November 19, 2010 (Thomas Christie former Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation Office of Secretary of Defense, Pierre M. Sprey a key designer of the F-16 & A-10, David
Evans Lt. Col. USMC, ret., Franklin C. Spinney former Analyst, Office of Secretary of Defense, GI
Wilson Col. USMC, ret., Winslow T. Wheeler Director, Straus Military Reform Project, Douglas
Macgregor, PhD Col. US Army, ret., Donald Vandergriff Maj. US Army, ret.) “New Letter to Deficit
Commission
on
DOD
Budget”
http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?documentid=4628&programID=37&from_page=../f
riendlyversion/printversion.cfm
The letter argues that there are two essential, interrelated issues: first, while two of the other major proposals
before the Commission and now public fuzz up the actual amount of reductions they recommend for the GatesObama defense budget over the next decade, they all round to $1 trillion. Second, while reform is a byword of
everyone regarding the Pentagon these days, too many overlook the essential foundation for any
defense reform: real understanding of how defense dollars are spent as a basis for decisionmaking in the future. Indeed, if you do not know how defense dollars are spent (and today that
is impossible), how can you cut the defense budget intelligently?
40
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DOD Trade-off Disadvantage
A2: DOD Won’t Cut Key Programs
The DOD might terminate key programs
DOD 2011 (OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER) / CFO STATES
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FISCAL YEAR 2012 BUDGET REQUEST)
http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2012/FY2012_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf
This year, the Department’s major efficiencies included termination of several programs
including procurement of the Army’s Surface-Launched Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air
Missile (SLAMRAAM), the Non Line of Sight Launch System (NLOS-LS), plus the Marine Corps’
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV). The Army terminated SLAMRAAM procurement and the
NLOS-LS program because it judged their promised capabilities to be non-essential, especially in
view of their likely cost. The Army is reinvesting the savings into higher priority programs
focused on the most probable threats. EFV termination is discussed below, as is the DoD plan to
restructure the Joint Strike Fighter program and increase F/A-18 production.
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DOD Trade-off Disadvantage
***Aff***
42
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DOD Trade-off Disadvantage
Non-Unique – F-35 Cuts Now
F-35 already cut
ABC
News
2011
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/budget-cut-house-kills-35-joint-strikefighter/story?id=12933195
Congress voted to strip federal funding for a jet engine the President doesn't want and the Pentagon says it
doesn't need. The second engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter has long been viewed by good-
government groups as the prime example of government spending and pork barrel politics run
amok.
The F-35’s already had serious cuts
Cox
2011
Bob
The
Fort
Worth
Star-Telegram
Read
more:
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/01/07/106332/gates-defense-spending-plancuts.html#ixzz1SEM7n900http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/01/07/106332/gates-defensespending-plan-cuts.html
Defense Secretary Robert Gates outlined a five-year plan Thursday to reduce defense spending
by $78 billion, including a dramatic cut in purchases of the F-35 joint strike fighter. After more
than a year of reviews of the oft-delayed and over-budget program, the Pentagon now plans to
order 325 jets between 2012 and 2016, 124 fewer than anticipated a few months ago.
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No Link – No Future Cuts
F-35 are safe from any defense cuts
Goozner
2011
(Merrill,
independent
http://gooznews.com/?p=2474) JPG 2/10/11
author,
former
journalism
prof
@
NYU,
While a showdown looms between the White House and Republicans over steep cuts in
spending, the single most costly procurement program in Pentagon history remains fully
funded with bipartisan backing. House Appropriations Committee Chairman Harold Rogers, R-Ky., who
this week proposed $74 billion in cuts to a broad range of domestic programs, simultaneously
proposed a 2 percent increase in defense spending, enough to fund the purchase of 32 F-35s, a
stealth fighter that is slated to replace most of the existing U.S. jet fighter force over the next
several decades. The Pentagon also purchased 32 F-35s in 2010.
44
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DOD Trade-off Disadvantage
No Impact – Long Timeframe
The F-35 is years from development
Air
Force
Magazine
10
(http://www.airforcemagazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2010/August%202010/0810endgame.aspx)
On Feb. 24, Schwartz told Congress the Air Force would likely not have its first combat-ready F-35A
unit available until the end of calendar 2015 —a full two years later than the 2013 target date prior to the
program restructuring. Air Combat Command chief Gen. William M. Fraser III said in February at AFA’s Air
Warfare Symposium that ACC was actively re-examining the target date to field USAF’s initial combat-ready unit
of F-35As, in light of restructuring and extension of development by 13 months. "It has got to be about combat
capability—and that is crews trained, spares, supportability, all of that together," Fraser said. Pentagon
acquisition chief Ashton B. Carter, meanwhile, estimated that the Navy and Air Force would actually
have their aircraft operational in 2016.
F-35 won’t be fully developed and useable until at least 2016
F-35
at
Endgame
By
Marc
V.
Schanz
2010
(http://www.airforcemagazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2010/August%202010/0810endgame.aspx)
The Air Force leadership, however, has adjusted expectations slightly. On Feb. 24, Schwartz told Congress the
Air Force would likely not have its first combat-ready F-35A unit available until the end of
calendar 2015—a full two years later than the 2013 target date prior to the program restructuring. Air
Combat Command chief Gen. William M. Fraser III said in February at AFA’s Air Warfare Symposium that ACC
was actively re-examining the target date to field USAF’s initial combat-ready unit of F-35As, in light of
restructuring and extension of development by 13 months. "It has got to be about combat capability—and
that is crews trained, spares, supportability, all of that together," Fraser said. Pentagon acquisition
chief Ashton B. Carter, meanwhile, estimated that the Navy and Air Force would actually have their
aircraft operational in 2016
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No Impact – F-35 Fails 1/2
F-35 fails now
The economist 2011 The future of the Joint Strike Fighter; Coming up short July 14
http://www.economist.com/node/18958367?story_id=18958367&fsrc=rss
F-35’s range of around 600 miles (1,000km) is another problem. The potential adversary that will dominate
China is acquiring weapons, such as accurate
anti-ship ballistic missiles, that will push American carriers out into the western Pacific, well
beyond the range of seaborne F-35s. For all its sophistication, against a “near peer” opponent the F-35 may not be
able to do the job for which it has been intended nearly as well as the next generation of
pilotless armed drones and hypersonic cruise missiles. Indeed, it could be obsolescent only a few
years after it enters service. At a time of shrinking defense budgets, the F-35’s huge cost and the affection of
service chiefs for fast jets flown by brave chaps should not be allowed to crowd out the
development of more capable weapon systems. Cut back the F-35s and spend the money there.
The
American military planning in the decades ahead is China. Even now,
F-35 is insufficient
Majumdar 2011 Report Reveals Undisclosed F-35 Problems By DAVE MAJUMDAR Published: 18
Jan 2011 17:12
The F-35 Lightning II strike fighter has previously undisclosed problems with its handling,
avionics, afterburner and helmet-mounted display, according to a report by the Pentagon's Director of Operational
Test and Evaluation. Both the U.S. Air Force F-35A variant and U.S. Marine Corps' F-35B model experienced
"transonic wing roll-off, [and] greater than expected sideslip during medium angle-of-attack
testing," the report said. The report also says that various components are not as reliable as expected.
Additionally, the Pratt and Whitney F-135 engine has encountered an afterburner "screech," in which airflow
disruptions cause severe vibrations, preventing the engine from reaching maximum power . That
problem has delayed some required testing.
F-35’s don’t produce superiority – Easily matched
Duff
10
(Gordon,
Senior
editor
@
VeteransToday,
http://www.veteranstoday.com/2010/11/02/national-security-alert-f-35-stealth-fighter-spy-coverup/)
Key components of the F-35, from
stealth materials, flight and weapons systems, to tens of thousands of man-hours of systems programming are now “out there,”
available to any potential rival, military or commercial. At best, it could be considered a $300 billion dollar bank
What did America lose? 15 years of research and development? That doesn’t come close.
robbery, by American standards, nothing new in today’s financial world.
Another spy disaster like Pollard, shoved under the rug too long
due to pressure from the powerful Israeli lobby.
At worst, nations whose defense capabilities were decades
behind the US can now be at par, as the F-35 was estimated to be “air superiority capable” until
at least 2040. Data stolen could make production of a comparable aircraft possible in as little as 36 months, particularly with several
projects in the offing, Russia/India and in China, each of which are capable of quickly adapting upgraded systems. The JSF (Joint Strike
Fighter) in its three variants, conventional takeoff/landing (CTOL, carrier variant (CV) and short takeoff/vertical landing (STOLV), are
scheduled for production through 2026 with estimates of service life until 2060 and beyond. Export versions of the F-35, “detuned” are
The F-35 delivers more “punch” per dollar than any current
“legacy” fighter by a margin of as much as 8 to 1.
available for American allies, NATO and Israel.
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No Impact – F-35 Fails 2/2
F-35 has repeated problems
Johan Boeder 2007 F-35 JSF Hit by Serious Design Problems. Dec 03, 2007 20:55 EST
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/f-35-jsf-hit-by-serious-design-problems-04311/
On May 3, 2007, during the 19th test flight of the prototype of the F-35A Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), a
serious electrical malfunction occurred in the control of the plane. After an emergency landing
the malfunction could be identified as a crucial problem, and it became clear that redesign of
critical electronic components was necessary. Producer Lockheed Martin and program officials first
announced there was a minor problem, and later on they avoided any further publicity about the problems. The
delay has become serious, however, and rising costs for the JSF program seem to be certain. In
Holland, Parliament started a discussion again last week. Understanding the background behind these delays, and
the pressures on European governments, is important to any realistic assessment of the F-35’s European strategy
– and of the procurement plans in many European defense ministries.
F-35 fails
Trimble 2011 In-flight failure leads to F-35 grounding
By Stephen Trimble
http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2011/03/11/354281/in-flight-failure-leads-to-f-35grounding.html
The Lockheed Martin F-35 is grounded while programme officials investigate a dual generator
failure and oil leak on the AF-4 test aircraft on 9 March. The in-flight power failure forced the test
aircraft, which is dedicated to mission systems testing, to return and land at Edwards AFB, Lockheed says. The
joint programme office has “temporarily suspended” flights by the F-35 until a root cause is
determined, the company adds.
F-35’s don’t solve Heg, they are comparable to other countries weapons
Duff
10
(Gordon,
Senior
editor
@
VeteransToday,
http://www.veteranstoday.com/2010/11/02/national-security-alert-f-35-stealth-fighter-spy-coverup/)
There was no real question, this was another Israeli operation, their “signature” was all over it. What did
America lose? 15 years of research and development? That doesn’t come close. Key components
of the F-35, from stealth materials, flight and weapons systems, to tens of thousands of man-hours of systems
programming are now “out there,” available to any potential rival, military or commercial. At best, it could be
considered a $300 billion dollar bank robbery, by American standards, nothing new in today’s financial world. At
worst, nations whose defense capabilities were decades behind the US can now be at par, as the
F-35 was estimated to be “air superiority capable” until at least 2040. Data stolen could make
production of a comparable aircraft possible in as little as 36 months, particularly with several
projects in the offing, Russia/India and in China, each of which are capable of quickly adapting
upgraded systems.
47
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*****MTA TRADE-OFF DA*****
48
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DOD Trade-off Disadvantage
1NC MTA Trade-off Disadvantage 1/5
Military Tuition Assistance is on the chopping block
Howell 11 “DoD Budget Cuts — Is Tuition Assistance Next?” By Terry Howell, Managing Editor,
Military.com 2/24/11 http://military-education.military.com/2011/02/tuition-assistance-and-themilitary-budget/5
With all the talk about cutting the DoD budget in 2012, it’s surprising that we haven’t heard
anything official about the Pentagon cutting back on military tuition assistance. But, the fact is there
will be cuts, the writing is on the wall. This week the Chief of Continuing Education Programs,
Carolyn Baker, told the attendees at the Council of College and Military Educators annual
conference that the DoD spent $542 million on tuition assistance in 2010 — $24 million more than 2009.
Baker pointed out that increased demand and the growing cost of college tuition are putting a
financial strain on the DoD budget. “The current program growth is unsustainable,” said Baker.
She also told the CCME audience that the previously promised increase in TA payment rates will
not happen. The looming budget cuts are like the 800 pound gorilla in the room; everyone
knows it’s there, but no one wants to directly acknowledge it. When asked, other DoD education
leaders confirmed that there will be reductions or added usage restrictions which will impact
the military tuition assistance programs. But none of them were able or willing to say how
much or when the cuts would go into effect.
<insert plan is expensive/causes trade-off>
Military Tuition Assistance programs are crucial to an intelligent force
Department of Military Affairs 11 Agency Strategic Plan 7/14/2011 5:40 pm Department of
Military
Affairs
(123) http://vaperforms.virginia.gov/agencylevel/stratplan/spReport.cfm?AgencyCode=123
Tuition Assistance: More than 75 percent of DMA's target recruiting group (ages 18-24) utilize the
Guard's educational benefits. The program is available to eligible Virginia Guard members enrolled in any
state, private, accredited and non-profit institution of higher education in the Commonwealth. This program is
not only a tremendous recruiting tool for the Guard, but it also retains and produces professional
and well-educated soldiers and airmen who bring this education to bear not only on their
military roles, but also their roles as neighbors and members of their local communities.
Recruiting and retention continue to be the organization’s top initiatives as they directly affect
the Guard’s ability to effectively respond to assigned missions. This critical program is funded through
the Commonwealth’s general fund. Beginning for fall semester 2009, DMA implemented an automated
application process for Virginia Army National Guard members, which significantly improved billing procedures,
data management and reporting.
Summary of Potential Impediments to Achievement
One of the greatest challenges for the Virginia National Guard is, and continues to be, the
recruiting and retention of quality men and women, which in turn directly impacts all missions
and objectives. Cutbacks in recruiting funding nationwide made by the Department of the
Army may impact Virginia National’s Guard ability to recruit and retain experienced Soldiers.
49
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1NC MTA Trade-off Disadvantage 2/5
High quality recruits are critical to US effectiveness in hybrid wars that would
otherwise bog down troops and collapse US hegemony
Krepinevich 09 “The Future of U.S. Ground Forces,” March 26, 2009 • By Andrew F. Krepinevich
President
of
the
Center
for
Strategic
and
Budgetary
Assessments,
http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2009/03/future-of-us-ground-forces.
Center
for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessment
The three challenges confronting the U.S. military today—the war against Islamist terrorist
elements, the prospect of nuclear-armed rogue states, and the potential rise of China as a
military rival—differ greatly from those confronted during the Cold War era. Nor do they resemble the threats planned
for in the immediate post-Cold War era, when minor powers like Iran, Iraq and North Korea which lacked weapons of mass destruction and were assumed to present challenges not all that
different from Iraq during the First Gulf War. Nevertheless, this assumption led the U.S. military to focus its attention on waging two such conflicts in overlapping time frames from 1991 until
For the Army, these new challenges all suggest the onset of an era of persistent, irregular
conflict. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq show no signs of ending soon. The same can be said regarding
the war against Islamist terrorist groups operating around the globe. Moreover, the rising youth bulge in Africa, the
Middle East, Central and South Asia, and in parts of Latin America only promises to increase
the strain on governments in these regions, increasing the prospect for further instability and
even state failure. As unprecedented numbers of young people in these parts of the world come of age, they will find themselves competing in a global economy in which they
are hampered by a lack of education and burdened by corrupt and incompetent governments. The communications revolution will enable
radical groups to influence large numbers of these young adults, and attempt to recruit them .
Even if radical elements succeed in winning over only 1 percent of the young as they rise to adulthood,
they will have recruited millions to their cause. For much of history, large numbers of people were required to cause disruption and destruction. Yet as groups
like Aum Shinrikyo,3 al Qaeda, and Hezbollah have shown , thanks to the advent and spread of highly destructive technologies
even small groups can create widespread disorder. It does not end there. Should minor powers hostile to the United States, such as Iran,
the 9/11 attacks. 2
acquire nuclear weapons, they will likely feel emboldened to take greater risks in backing groups pursuing ambiguous forms of aggression. In Iran’s case, this could lead to greater support for
If the United States is unable to convince China to
abandon its attempts to exclude the U.S. military from East Asia and to threaten America’s access to the global
commons, the competition could spill over into irregular proxy wars in developing nations. China
could pursue this path both in an attempt to tie the United States down in costly, protracted
conflicts, and to position itself to secure access to important or scarce raw materials.
Given the advent of an era of persistent irregular conflict, with its emphasis on manpowerintensive operations on land, the Army is destined to play a central role in U.S. defense
strategy. The Service will need to build on its hard-won expertise in conducting these kinds of operations,
whether they go by the name of stability operations; foreign internal defense; internal defense and development; stability, security, transition and
reconstruction operations; counterinsurgency; or irregular warfare.4 At the same time , the Army must also hedge against a resurrection of rivals who look
to challenge its dominance in more traditional, or conventional, forms of warfare. These disparate missions argue for an
Army that can operate effectively across the entire conflict spectrum . However, because the range of missions
radical groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Mahdi Army, as well as others .
is so broad, and the skill sets required sufficiently different, attempting to field forces that can move quickly and seamlessly from irregular warfare to conventional warfare seems destined to
This approach becomes all the more problematic when
one considers the ongoing erosion of quality in the officer and Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) corps,
and in the Service’s recruiting standards. Yet this is what the Army is attempting to accomplish
through its “full-spectrum” force. The Army has understandably felt compelled to pursue the “fullspectrum” approach owing to the need to cover a range of missions within the limitations on its
size imposed by fiscal constraints and its all-volunteer character. Yet even if this approach were viable, the Army remains too
produce an Army that is barely a “jack-of-all-trades,” and clearly a master of none.
small for larger irregular warfare contingencies, let alone those that occur simultaneously. Fortunately, the authors of the U.S. defense strategy have wisely chosen to address the gap between
the scale of the challenges confronting the nation and the forces available to address them by focusing on building up the military capabilities of threatened states, and of America’s allies and
The Army must give greater attention to supporting this strategy, especially with regard to
stability operations, as the best means of addressing the challenge of preparing to conduct
operations at high levels of effectiveness across the conflict spectrum. The Army has
specialized forces. It will need more.
partners.
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1NC MTA Trade-off Disadvantage 3/5
The perception of an effective full spectrum force prevents multiple scenarios for
regional WMD conflict
Horowitz and Shalmon 09 (Michael, assistant professor of Political Science, University of
Pennsylvania, and Dan, Senior Analyst at Lincoln Group, LLC “The Future of War and American
Military
Strategy”,
Orbis
Volume
53,
Issue
2,
2009,
Pages
300-318
http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/36942985/future-war-american-military-strategy
DOA: 7/14/11)
Predicting the future of the security environment is difficult. While it currently seems like
stability operations and low-intensity conflicts are the most likely future contingencies, it is
hard to be sure. Empirically, the “next” war is rarely like the preceding one—especially when comparing larger
conflicts. While groupings of smaller conflicts, like the Banana Wars of the 1920s and 1930s and the humanitarian operations of the 1990s
occur, the next time U.S. forces land on foreign soil with hostile intentions the war is unlikely to look exactly like the post-2003 Iraq war.
the historical record suggests we should be very modest in our ability to peer ahead
beyond the very short-term. Consider how well the typical analyst would have done in predicting the future security
Moreover,
environment twenty years hence, once every decade starting in 1900.28 Focusing on twenty-year increments, a futurist projecting linearly
Linear extrapolations would have missed
both World Wars, and the rise of the Cold War. World War I did not appear on the horizon in
1900 (or 1910 for that matter), while in 1920 and 1930, Germany's lightning wars against France and
Poland were not widely anticipated. Projections from 1950 and 1960 would have nailed the overall global security
from 1900 to 1920, 1910 to 1930, and so on, would have done quite poorly.
environment in 1970 and 1980. However, such analyses probably would not have predicted the significance or outcome of the Vietnam War.
while a linear prediction in 1990
would probably have missed the events of 9/11 and the rise of al Qaeda. The point is not related to any
specific prediction—systemic failure simply suggests that it is incredibly hard to accurately predict the future
security environment. It often changes quite a bit faster than people like to think and in ways that are difficult to foresee. Is
American Conventional Military Superiority Inevitable? There is a big difference between ways of warfare that are
outmoded and strategically choosing to rest on one's laurels, a distinction that is ignored by some analysts. For example, Steve
Furthermore, the 1970 and 1980 predictions would have missed the end of the Cold War,
Metz and Raymond Millen compare a military focused on “rapid decisive operations relying heavily on standoff strikes” to a “16th century armored knight or mid-20th century battleship.”29
Technological changes, such as the advances that rendered cavalry obsolete in the twentieth century can sometimes render capabilities unnecessary. When a category of weapons is no longer
necessary, it means militaries do not need that capability anymore. In a completely different situation, a state may be far enough ahead of the opposition in the area of a given capability that it
can safely relax—for a time. For example, the F-22 procurement is probably a good example of over-building where the United States already has an extensive edge. However, no one would
deny that America needs air superiority. It would be irresponsible for U.S. defense planners to rest on their collective laurels and not attempt to deepen and extend American advantages in
areas with continuing relevance. This is especially true since once the defense industrial base is lost in a given area, it cannot be resuscitated quickly in a crisis, meaning the United States will
simply lack the ability to produce certain types of equipment. Limited foresight also applies to predicting future military innovations and the future of military power. The rate of change in
military capabilities is far from constant. For example, while the battleship, in one form or another, dominated naval warfare for several centuries, the aircraft carrier replaced it at the center
of the most powerful global navies within a single generation. While the British had utilized primitive aircraft carriers by the end of World War I, positing in 1920 and 1930 that the carrier
would replace the battleship in the next war as the centerpiece of naval power would have struck most naval officials, even U.S. Navy carrier advocates, as ludicrous.30 Technology also does
not always determine capabilities in a linear manner. Difficult as it is, it is much easier to track hardware—technologies in the arsenals of adversaries—than to predict or understand
“software”—how future adversaries will use technologies, organize their forces and institutions, and use those forces when war begins. For example, military professionals had studied the
submarine for over a century before it made its strategic debut during World War I. However, nearly everyone, including the Germans, had ignored the potential of the submarine as a
commerce raider.31 Navalists studied the potential for submarine-on-submarine warfare, the ability of submarines to sink battleships, and other force-on-force concepts. However, when the
war started and the German Navy found itself overmatched despite its massive shipbuilding program over the preceding decade, it turned to U-boat warfare and nearly destroyed the supply
lines keeping the British alive in the war. Similarly, small technological changes can have massive, unpredictable impacts on the conduct of war: the Gatling gun, repeating rifle, and telegraph
in the U.S. Civil War, the machine gun, dirigible, airplane and tank in World War I, stirrups, rifling, magnetically-fused torpedoes, radar, sonar, code-breaking, self-sealing fuel tanks in World
Information-age developments
that render capital-intensive platforms less relevant to successful conventional warfighting are
one example of the type of change that could place America's conventional superiority at risk.
Such a change, if the United States does not lead the transition, would level the playing field and
potentially allow rising powers and other states to develop conventional capabilities that could
threaten the United States. Most importantly, traditionalist and COIN-centric visions of the future security environment tend to be one-sided, looking at the
War II and the use of cellular phones and the internet in irregular warfare today are just some of the many examples.32
future and presuming that the United States can choose its strategy in response. There is an action–reaction cycle inherent in both the choice of strategy on the part of the United States and
the character of the global security environment.
Former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld once famously said, “[t]he enemy has a vote.” Adversaries exist in an international context, one that is unpredictably changed when any powerful actor
In addition to inherent uncertainties regarding both the future security
environment and the significance of particular military capabilities, there is an interaction or
feedback loop between the military strategy chosen by a dominant power, in this case the United States, and
the likely wars of the future. Different enemies will engage at different levels of intensity and
asymmetry, depending on the kinds of threats the United States prepares for and how that influences its foreign
policy. If the United States optimizes for a given threat, logically, it makes actually facing that threat less
likely but makes a threat for which U.S. preparation is sub-optimal more likely. The fundamental issue is one of
makes a strategic choice.33
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risk
and
consequences.
DOD Trade-off Disadvantage
Are
Asymmetric
and
Conventional
Wars
Really
Distinct?
The distinction between
asymmetric/irregular and so-called conventional war is not
as clear as some authors and analysts assume. The
concept of “hybrid wars” is one attempt to capture the complex and varied interactions between conventional and asymmetric warfare.34
Indeed, this concept is a vast improvement on the rigid distinctions often used in more traditional analyses.35 Hybrid war advocates point out
the distinction between interstate or “conventional” war and irregular/guerilla warfare is
fuzzy, at best. Future wars are likely to feature interlocking elements, some of which are more
irregular and some of which are more conventional. It is possible to take this point even further to argue that the
strategic-level linkages between irregular and conventional forms and phases of
war necessitate preparing the American military for a range of contingencies that
include both forms of conflict.36 Major state-to-state wars nearly always include irregular elements and phases. World
that
War II, which some COIN advocates perceive as a pivotal event shaping expectations for conventional wars, contained irregular elements: the
Burma Theater and the Philippines from 1942 onwards, for example. America's
a single conflict can,
involvement in Iraq demonstrates that
for practical purposes, include both “regular” and “irregular” wars. That case also
demonstrates that postcolonial great powers tend to face irregular threats after demonstrating they are capable of achieving conventional
victory.37 Even the Vietnam War, so often treated as the paradigmatic COIN war, included conventional phases that arguably precipitated a
logical North Vietnam and the Viet Cong strategy of indirect, irregular war. Even if the United States were to strategically prioritize countering
terrorist attacks, the logic of hybrid counter-strategy would make an irregular warfare-only response ineffective. A strike on the homeland
Some state
sponsors of terrorism and insurgency possess fairly large traditional militaries as well as
dedicated terrorist or insurgent-sponsoring organizations. Examples include Iran in Lebanon,
Israel and Iraq, Pakistan in Kashmir and Afghanistan, and Russia in Georgia and Nagorno
Karabakh.38 A rigid separation between irregular and conventional war is also problematic. In
an uncertain international security environment, small-scale events can spiral
unpredictably, triggering large-scale conflict. The canonical example is, of course, that state-linked
terrorists assassinated Archduke Ferdinand, exacerbating international tensions that unexpectedly
triggered the beginning of World War I. More recently, the escalation from the kidnapping of a few
Israeli soldiers to the summer 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel surprised many observers at
the time. While such escalatory chains are the quintessential low-probability, high-impact scenarios,
they are dangerous enough to keep in mind when planning defense strategies. Considering Hybrid
Wars Under Conditions of Pervasive Uncertainty While many of the states that have “failed” since the end of
the Cold War, like Somalia, were poor, geopolitically marginal, and did not possess arsenals of
highly sophisticated weapons, planners should not assume this will be the case in the future.
Before the recent oil boom, analysts openly contemplated the collapse of the Russian state and
feared a worst-case WMD-rich hybrid war, including U.S. military involvement.39 History suggests
this is not as far-fetched as it might seem; the United States joined the Allied
Intervention in the Russian Civil War, itself a hybrid outgrowth of the conventional conflict in
World War I. Unfriendly regimes could also experience state weakness. A potential WMDfrought North Korean implosion and/or explosion is one obvious example. State failure
or radicalizing, violent regime change in Pakistan is another hybrid war scenario.40 High
technology capabilities for counter-proliferation and counter-WMD operations have relevance
in these hybrid scenarios.
might mean something very different if the attacker is largely state-sponsored, rather than a diffuse network like Al Qaeda.
Even ruling out involvement in any hybrid war involving a WMD-armed foe, future “small wars” in resource-rich areas could include high
Recently, the serving Special Envoy to Sudan bluntly warned
that he considers Sudanese state failure a high-probability short-term possibility. This
would produce a multi-faceted civil war, dwarfing the ongoing Darfur catastrophe.41 An American
peacekeeping commitment to Darfur or Sudan is a distinct possibility, and the country could
easily become a textbook hybrid war. Unfortunately, the United States’ technological edge does not eliminate the risk of
high-technology hybrid threats. Ironically, this is true partly because today's ally in the war on terror may be
tomorrow's state sponsor of terrorism/insurgency. Beyond Pakistan's internal problems,
vulnerable states include Saudi Arabia, Colombia, Mexico, Nigeria, and Indonesia. 42 All are
technology threats to U.S. air and naval assets.
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Each faces a
combination of multi-faceted internal threats: insurgency, inter-communal
strife, violent criminality and/or widespread radicalization. If their militaries
politically fragment, the United States could find itself embroiled in a
sporadically technology-intensive “small war” or stability operation. Finally, the
“soft” side of COIN—understanding foreign cultures, ideologies, engaging in political warfare,
etc. is also relevant to conventional warfighting.43 The United States engaged in large-scale psychological operations
economically vital, oil-producing states friendly to the United States and occupying strategic geographic positions.
(PSYOPs) and propaganda in World War I and World War II. And translated documents show that the Chinese military considers mass
mobilization and control of information to be critical aspects of twenty first century warfare.44 Every country has “human terrain,” which
always affects the conduct of war. But human terrain is often ignored simply because militaries generally lack the wherewithal and resources to
collect the data and map it. Normally, academics conduct these studies; anthropologists in World War II performed “national character”
studies and psychologists did “operational code” analyses during the Cold War. In
the future, when the United States tries
to figure out how to keep a limited war with a major high-tech adversary limited, it will want to
know how adversaries perceive the world as well as weigh costs and benefits in the war. Efforts
to counter Chinese influence in Africa and Latin America, are textbook examples of “political
warfare,” which is usually discussed in “irregular warfare” contexts. The implication of
these inter-linkages between terrorism, irregular warfare, and conventional
warfare is that it would be a mistake to plan for a future threat environment that
focuses on one to the exclusion of the other. While traditionalists might want the American military to get out
of the business of doing counterinsurgency, even a more cautious American foreign policy will likely require
more instances of peacekeeping and stability operations by American forces and some of the
skills required for successful COIN operations are essential for conventional warfare as well.
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***Uniqueness***
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Uniqueness – Military Tuition Assistance Funding Now
Tuition Assistance cuts have been proposed to Congress
Howell 11 “Military Tuition Assistance Cuts Looming” By Terry Howell, Managing Editor,
Military.com June 6, 2011 http://militaryadvantage.military.com/2011/06/military-tuitionassistance-rates-face-cut/
At the time I reported that the Chief of Continuing Education Programs, Carolyn Baker, had told the attendees at
the Council of College and Military Educators annual conference that the DoD spent $542 million on tuition
assistance in 2010 — $24 million more than 2009. Baker pointed out that increased demand and the growing cost
of college tuition are putting a financial strain on the DoD budget. “The current program growth is unsustainable,”
said Baker. It appears Congress has taken this into their own hands by adding an amendment to
the Defense Authorization Act of 2012 (HR 1540) that would direct the DoD to report on the
effects of reduc-ing the current 100% tuition and fees rate by 25%. Currently service members can
get up to 100% of the tuition and fees cov-ered as long as the per semester credit limit of $250 is not exceeded.
Anything tuition costs which exceed the per credit hour cap must be paid through secondary sources like their GI
Bill benefit, scholarships, grants or out-of-pocket. If passed by Congress all service members, no matter
which branch, may soon have to rely on secondary funding sources to help cover their tuition
and fees. The language of the amendment, offered by Rep. Mike Coff-man (R-CO), does not direct
DoD to immediately cut the rates, however, it does call for the Defense Secretary to examine the possible
effects of a cut. In addition, the amendment directs DoD to look for inefficiencies and duplications of benefits - i.e.
service member’s ability to use the GI Bill while on active duty.
Military tuition assistance will be cut
HOWELL, ‘11 (TERRY, A Retired Coast Guard Chief Petty Officer, Terry completed his BS in
Management and Communications using a combination of CLEP exams, credit for military
service, and distance learning while on active-duty. Terry now serves as Managing Editor for the
Education Channel at Military.com) “DoD Budget Cuts — Is Tuition Assistance Next?”
http://military-education.military.com/2011/02/tuition-assistance-and-the-militarybudget/#ixzz1SD2szui4
With all the talk about cutting the DoD budget in 2012, it’s surprising that we haven’t heard
anything official about the Pentagon cutting back on military tuition assistance. But, the fact is
there will be cuts, the writing is on the wall.
This week the Chief of Continuing Education Programs, Carolyn Baker, told the attendees at the Council of College
and Military Educators annual conference that the DoD spent $542 million on tuition assistance in 2010 — $24
million more than 2009. Baker pointed out that increased demand and the growing cost of college
tuition are putting a financial strain on the DoD budget. “The current program growth is
unsustainable,” said Baker. She also told the CCME audience that the previously promised increase in
TA payment rates will not happen.
Congress wants TA to be reduced 25%
HOWELL June 6, 2011 (Terry, A Retired Coast Guard Chief Petty Officer, Terry completed his BS
in Management and Communications using a combination of CLEP exams, credit for military
service, and distance learning while on active-duty. Terry now serves as Managing Editor for the
Education Channel at Military.com.) “Military Tuition Assistance Cuts Looming”
http://militaryadvantage.military.com/2011/06/military-tuition-assistance-rates-facecut/#ixzz1SD4BMVYm MilitaryAdvantage.Military.com
It appears Congress has taken this into their own hands by adding an amend ment to the
Defense Autho riza tion Act of 2012 (HR 1540) that would direct the DoD to report on the effects
of reducing the current 100% tuition and fees rate by 25%.
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***Internal Links***
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Military Tuition Assistance is vital to fund soldier education
The Washington Times 06 Thursday “Military aids work force; Education programs aid postservice
employment,”
Written
by
Chrissie
Thompson
October
19,
2006
http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/?
190,000 to 215,000 servicemen and women leave the military each year, many
seeking civilian careers. He said on-base education programs help make military personnel
more marketable to employers. Education "helps them contribute to America's work force by
rounding out their leadership skills with book smarts," said Mr. Slagel, a former Marine who is
senior vice president of RecruitMilitary, an organization that helps connect military personnel and spouses with civilian
employers. The Department of Defense says 420,000 military personnel annually take
postsecondary classes in the department's voluntary education programs, and 20 percent of active-duty
forces used tuition assistance in fiscal year 2004. The department offers up to $4,500 for tuition each fiscal year for
personnel taking college courses at one of 350 education centers worldwide. In addition, veterans who
Larry Slagel watches
are Montgomery GI Bill participants can receive approximately up to $30,000 for tuition from the Department of Veterans Affairs, according
to Defense Department information. James L. Peebles, a police lieutenant working at the U.S. Supreme Court and a former soldier, received
his bachelor's degree in management on Sept. 9 from Park University. Based in Parkville, Mo., the university has 38 campus centers on
military bases, including Henderson Hall Marine Corps base and Fort Myer Military Community in Virginia, said Thomas W. Peterman, vice
Taking classes at military bases enabled Lt. Peebles to complete his
degree, making him the first in his immediate family to receive a college degree. "I wanted to
try to open up doors of opportunity for my family," he said. "I figured that going back to school and
obtaining my degree 27 years later would inspire members of my family." Lt. Peebles, 45, began his
college career in 1979, when he spent one semester at Halifax Community College, near his hometown of Margarettsville, N.C. His
family could not afford to finance his college education, so he relied on college grants, but when
those grants were reduced, he was not able to continue his education. Enter the U.S. Army. Lt.
Peebles enlisted in 1980 and served until 1995, retiring as sergeant first class in the Military Police Corps. While in the
service, he took college classes on base at Quantico and Henderson Hall Marine Corps bases, Fort Myer Military Community
and Thomas Jefferson Middle School, as well as online, using some tuition assistance from the Veterans Education Assistance
Program. He received an associate degree in 1992 from Central Texas College, which enabled him to enter the senior ranks of
president for distance learning.
noncommissioned officers. He spent 12 years working on the associate degree because of having to drop classes when he was deployed to
South Korea, Japan and the Netherlands. "It's duty first to protect your country," he said. "I always found myself having to start [classes] over
and over and over." Now, however, online class offerings often allow military personnel to continue classes no matter where they are deployed.
L. Dian Stoskopf , director of the Army's continuing education system, said the Army currently has 62,578 soldiers participating in its online
education program. "The Army must constantly change to be able to meet today's and tomorrow's national security challenges," Ms. Stoskopf
said. "[Education] prepares soldiers for the future, allows them to better deal with challenges and provides them with skills to maintain a
competitive edge while in service and after they transition back to civilian jobs." In addition to Army tuition assistance, Lt. Peebles received
help from his current employer. Three years ago, Lt. Peebles once again began taking classes with the hopes of finishing the bachelor's degree
he had started work on while in the Army. He said the U.S. Supreme Court reimbursed him for at least 85 percent of his classes. Lt. Peebles
was Park University's Metropolitan District of Washington outstanding graduate, and he gave a speech entitled "A Second Chance" at the Sept.
"When I look at my life and how I had a lot of roadblocks and hurdles and
obstacles, I could have quit," he said. "[Life] has given me a second chance, and I think with
that the journey hasn't ended. It's just beginning."
9 graduation ceremony.
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US Marine Corps need improvements in department intelligence
RAND 11 “Alert and Ready - An Organizational Design Assessment of Marine Corps Intelligence,”
a book
by Christopher Paul, Harry J. Thie, Katharine Watkins Webb, Stephanie Young, Colin P. Clarke, Susan G. Straus,
Joya Laha, Christine Osowski, Chad C. Serena of the RAND cooperation
As the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) has grown in strength, it has needed to add intelligence
capabilities. Since the end of the Cold War and, especially, since September 11, 2001, USMC intelligence
has had to tailor its organization to meet the evolving demands of the operational environment.
This has resulted in a number of ad hoc arrangements, practices, and organizations. A broad review of the
organizational design of the USMC intelligence enterprise examined how to align it efficiently and effectively with
current and future missions and functions. Specifically, the review, which included interviews with a range of
USMC personnel and civilians, considered the organization of (and possible improvements to) the
Intelligence Department, the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, the intelligence organizations
within the Marine Expeditionary Forces (specifically, the intelligence and radio battalions),
and intelligence structures in the combat elements. A comparison of 48 organizational and
functional issues with a series of USMC intelligence and functional issues resulted in a series of
recommendations to help improve the "fit" of USMC intelligence organizations with their
environmental context. In some cases, the service would benefit not from changing its intelligence structure but
by realigning it; in other areas, restructuring would lend greater efficiency and effectiveness to the USMC
intelligence enterprise.
Education is critical for each branch of the military
NPR STAFF January 2, 2011 http://www.wbur.org/npr/132592329/high-school-graduates-shutout-of-military
Every branch of the military is still reaching its recruitment goals, but the Pentagon's recruiting
chief says he's worried. And a group of former military leaders is calling for significant changes
in the educational system, calling the ineligibility rates a matter of national security.
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Empirics prove-education key to military preparedness
Carafano et al, (James Jay, Deputy Director, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for
International Studies and Director, Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies
Ph.D. and Alane Kochems) July 28, 2005 EXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM #976 “Rethinking
Professional Military Education” http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2005/07/rethinkingprofessional-military-education
In the future, the attribute most needed by military officers is the critical thinking skills that
come from a graduate education program. Thinking skills are the best preparation for
ambiguity and uncertainty. Virtually any graduate program would suffice. In fact, the military
should seek as broad a range of graduate experiences as possible as a hedge against unexpected
operational and strategic requirements. The armed forces have done this in the past. Between World
War I and World War II, the military let officers seek out a diverse swath of educational and
professional opportunities. When the United States later entered the war, the officer corps was
prepared to respond to the wide range of situations that it faced. The U.S. is now in a similar
period of uncertainty. Professional military education needs to acknowledge this and broaden
the opportunities available to the officer corps.
Having inadequate forces kills our national security
Perry in 2006 (William- former secretary of defense and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution,
The U.S. Military, The National Security Advisory Group, p. 11 January 2006)
Finally, it would be a mistake to think that a draft can solve our personnel problems and provide the quality
soldiers we need. However, we need to broaden our notion of national service beyond military
service to take better advantage of two of our nation’s greatest strengths – cultural diversity
and technological prowess. We need to find ways to bring Americans with critical skill sets,
from language skills to computer skills, into national service of some kind, on a full or part time
basis. Conclusion The strains on the nation’s ground forces are serious and growing, and the viability of the AllVolunteer Force is at risk. The United States cannot afford to let this to happen. Not only would it
be costly, difficult and time-consuming to rebuild a broken force, but allowing the force to
break would also endanger U.S. national security. As a global power with global interests, as a
nation locked in a long struggle with violent extremists, and as a world leader, the United
States cannot allow its military to be weakened any further. We must keep faith with the men
and women in our military and with the American people. We need to act now to protect and
restore our armed forces.17.
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Untrained soldiers hurt our security – laundry list of reasons
Kaplan
08 “War
Stories”
columnist
at
Slate,
Dumb
and
Dumber,
http://www.slate.com/id/2182752/pagenum/all/#
First, and most broadly, it's not a good idea—for a host of social, political, and moral reasons—to place the
burdens of national defense so disproportionately on the most downtrodden citizens . Second,
and more practically, high-school dropouts tend to drop out of the military, too . The National
Priorities Project cites Army studies finding that 80 percent of high-school graduates finish their
first terms of enlistment in the Army—compared with only about half of those with a General Equivalency
Degree or no diploma. In other words, taking in more dropouts is a short-sighted method of boosting
recruitment numbers. The Army will just have to recruit even more young men and women in
the next couple of years, because a lot of the ones they recruited last year will need to be
replaced. Third, a dumber army is a weaker army. A study by the RAND Corporation, commissioned by
the Pentagon and published in 2005, evaluated several factors that affect military performance—
experience, training, aptitude, and so forth—and found that aptitude is key. This was true even
of basic combat skills, such as shooting straight. Replacing a tank gunner who had scored Category IV with
one who'd scored Category IIIA (in the 50th to 64th percentile) improved the chances of hitting a target by 34
percent. Today's Army, of course, is much more high-tech, from top to bottom. The problem is that when tasks get
more technical, aptitude makes an even bigger difference. In one Army study cited by the RAND report, threeman teams from the Army's active-duty signal battalions were told to make a communications system operational.
Teams consisting of Category IIIA personnel had a 67 percent chance of succeeding. Teams with Category IIIB
soldiers (who had ranked in the 31st to 49th percentile) had a 47 percent chance. Those with Category IVs had
only a 29 percent chance. The study also showed that adding a high-scoring soldier to a three-man team increased
its chance of success by 8 percent. (This also means that adding a low-scoring soldier to a team reduces its chance
by a similar margin.) Fourth, today's Army needs particularly bright soldiers—and it needs, even
more, to weed out particularly dim ones—given the direction that at least some of its senior
officers want it to take. When the Army was geared to fight large-scaled battles against enemies
of comparable strength, imaginative thinking wasn't much required except at a command level.
However, now that it's focusing on "asymmetric warfare," especially counterinsurgency
campaigns, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, the requirements are different. The crucial
engagements—in many ways, the crucial decisions—take place in the streets, door to door, not
by armored divisions or brigades but by infantry companies and squads. And when the targets
include hearts and minds, every soldier's judgment and actions have an impact.
Education is critical to US national defense
David Wood, Henderson Friday, April 8, 2011 (writes for answerin-islam.org)
(http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2011/apr/08/education-foundation-strong-military/
We have the best-educated military in the world, which we should all be supporting. One of the main
reasons we defeated the imperial Japanese, the Germans, the North Koreans, the Iraqis
(twice), etc., is because of our educated military. If we cut funding for public schools, we are actually
opening ourselves up for an attack from terrorists. If we fail to maintain a highly educated military, we
are weakening our national defense. I surely do not want to be attacked again by terrorists. Not
only is weakening our military wrong, but I would also argue that it aids the enemy. Maybe some
of the needed funds for education should even come from the defense budget.
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Internal Link – Educated Force Key to Military 3/3
Current conflicts demand education
Congressional Research Service (Jeremiah Gertler Specialist in Military Aviation) April 26, 2011
For the Army, these new challenges all suggest the onset of an era of persistent, irregular conflict. The wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq show no signs of ending soon. The same can be said regarding the war against Islamist
terrorist groups operating around the globe. Moreover, the rising youth bulge in Africa, the Middle East, Central
and South Asia, and in parts of Latin America only promises to increase the strain on governments in these
regions, increasing the prospect for further instability and even state failure. As unprecedented numbers of
young people in these parts of the world come of age, they will find themselves competing in a
global economy in which they are hampered by a lack of education and burdened by corrupt
and incompetent governments. The communications revolution will enable radical groups to
influence large numbers of these young adults, and attempt to recruit them . Even if radical
elements succeed in winning. Over only 1 percent of the young as they rise to adulthood, they will have recruited
millions to their cause. For much of history, large numbers of people were required to cause disruption and
destruction. Yet as groups like Aum Shinrikyo,3 al Qaeda, and Hezbollah have shown, thanks to the advent and
spread of highly destructive technologies even small groups can create widespread disorder. It does not end there.
Should minor powers hostile to the United States, such as Iran, acquire nuclear weapons, they
will likely feel emboldened to take greater risks in backing groups pursuing ambiguous forms
of aggression. In Iran’s case, this could lead to greater support for radical groups like Hamas,
Hezbollah, and the Mahdi Army, as well as others. If the United States is unable to convince
China to abandon its attempts to exclude the U.S. military from East Asia and to threaten
America’s access to the global commons, the competition could spill over into irregular proxy
wars in developing nations. China could pursue this path both in an attempt to tie the United
States down in costly, protracted conflicts, and to position itself to secure access to important
or scarce raw materials.
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***Impacts***
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Brink – Challenges Coming
The US military faces significant challenges in the coming future
Krepinevich 09 “The Future of U.S. Ground Forces,” March 26, 2009 • By Andrew F. Krepinevich
President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, an independent policy research
institute. Previous experience includes service in the Department of Defense’s Office of Net
Assessment, and on the personal staff of three secretaries of defense. He also served as a member
of the National Defense Panel in 1997 and the Defense Science Board Task Force on Joint
Experimentation in 2002-03. He currently serves on the Secretary of Defense’s Defense Policy
Board. http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2009/03/future-of-us-ground-forces. Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessment
Introduction: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to appear before you today, and to share my views on the future of U.S. Ground
Forces. As we begin a new administration, we are sobered by the security challenges that have emerged in recent years: the attacks of 9/11; the
deployment of U.S. troops to Iraq and Afghanistan; the erosion of barriers to nuclear proliferation; and the rapid rise of China and resurgence
of Russia. Not surprisingly, there is considerable interest in what this portends for the U.S. military in
general and our ground forces in particular. Of course, any detailed discussion of how our ground forces might best be organized, structured,
trained and equipped to meet the challenges of a rapidly changing security environment should be informed by a sound national security
strategy. Anything less would be putting the cart before the horse. The Obama administration has a strategy review under way. This review
stands to be the most important review since the Cold War’s end. My testimony is focused primarily on the Army, given the dominant position
- The three challenges
confronting the U.S. military today—the war against Islamist terrorist elements, the prospect of
nuclear-armed rogue states, and the potential rise of China as a military rival —differ greatly from those
confronted during the Cold War era. Nor do they resemble the threats planned for in the immediate post-Cold War era,
when minor powers like Iran, Iraq and North Korea which lacked weapons of mass destruction
and were assumed to present challenges not all that different from Iraq during the First Gulf War.
it holds in providing ground forces for our country.1 The National Security Challenges Facing the Army
Nevertheless, this assumption led the U.S. military to focus its attention on waging two such conflicts in overlapping time frames from 1991
until the 9/11 attacks. 2 For the Army, these new challenges all suggest the onset of an era of persistent, irregular conflict. The wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq show no signs of ending soon. The same can be said regarding the war against Islamist terrorist groups operating around
the globe. Moreover,
the rising youth bulge in Africa, the Middle East, Central and South Asia, and in
parts of Latin America only promises to increase the strain on governments in these regions,
increasing the prospect for further instability and even state failure . As unprecedented numbers of young
people in these parts of the world come of age, they will find themselves competing in a global economy in
which they are hampered by a lack of education and burdened by corrupt and incompetent
governments. The communications revolution will enable radical groups to influence large
numbers of these young adults, and attempt to recruit them. Even if radical elements succeed in winning. Over only 1
percent of the young as they rise to adulthood, they will have recruited millions to their cause. For much of history, large numbers of people
as groups like Aum Shinrikyo,3 al Qaeda, and Hezbollah have
shown, thanks to the advent and spread of highly destructive technologies even small groups can create widespread
disorder. It does not end there. Should minor powers hostile to the United States, such as Iran,
acquire nuclear weapons, they will likely feel emboldened to take greater risks in backing
groups pursuing ambiguous forms of aggression. In Iran’s case, this could lead to greater
support for radical groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Mahdi Army, as well as others. If the
United States is unable to convince China to abandon its attempts to exclude the U.S. military
from East Asia and to threaten America’s access to the global commons, the competition could
spill over into irregular proxy wars in developing nations. China could pursue this path both in
an attempt to tie the United States down in costly, protracted conflicts, and to position itself to
secure access to important or scarce raw materials.
were required to cause disruption and destruction. Yet
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2NC Impact – Conventional Superiority 1/2
Less educated soldiers inhibit conventional military performance
Kaplan 06 “GI Schmo - How low can Army recruiters go?” by Fred Kaplan, a war columnist.
Posted Monday, Jan. 9, 2006, at 5:06 PM ET http://www.slate.com/id/2133908/
Faced with repeated failures
to meet its recruitment targets, the Army has had to lower its standards dramatically. First it
relaxed restrictions against high-school drop-outs. Then it started letting in more applicants
who score in the lowest third on the armed forces aptitude test—a group, known as Category IV
recruits, who have been kept to exceedingly small numbers, as a matter of firm policy, for the past 20 years. (There is also a Category V—those who score in the lowest 10th percentile.
They have always been ineligible for service in the armed forces and, presumably, always will be.) The bad news is twofold. First, the number of
Category IV recruits is starting to skyrocket. Second, a new study compellingly demonstrates
that, in all realms of military activity, intelligence does matter. Smarter soldiers and units
perform their tasks better; dumber ones do theirs worse. Until just last year, the Army had no trouble attracting recruits and therefore
Three months ago, I wrote that the war in Iraq was wrecking the U.S. Army, and since then the evidence has only mounted, steeply.
no need to dip into the dregs. As late as 2004, fully 92 percent of new Army recruits had graduated high school and just 0.6 percent scored Category IV on the military aptitude test.
Then came the spiraling casualties in Iraq, the diminishing popularity of the war itself, and the
subsequent crisis in recruitment. In response to the tightening trends, on Sept. 20, 2005, the Defense Department released DoD Instruction 1145.01, which
allows 4 percent of each year's recruits to be Category IV applicants—up from the 2 percent limit that had been in place since the mid-1980s. Even
so, in October, the Army had such a hard time filling its slots that the floodgates had to be opened;
12 percent of that month's active-duty recruits were Category IV. November was another disastrous month; Army officials won't even say
how many Cat IV applicants they took in, except to acknowledge that the percentage was in "double digits." (These officials insist that they will stay within the 4 percent limit for the entire
fiscal year, which runs from October 2005 through September 2006. But given the extremely high percentage of Cat IVs recruited in the fiscal year's first two months, this pledge may be
Some may wonder: So what? Can't someone who scores low on an
aptitude test, even very low, go on to become a fine, competent soldier, especially after going through boot camp and
training? No question. Some college drop-outs also end up doing very well in business and other professions. But in general, in
the military no less than in the civilian world, the norm turns out to be otherwise. In a RAND Corp.
report commissioned by the office of the secretary of defense and published in 2005, military analyst Jennifer Kavanagh*
reviewed a spate of recent statistical studies on the various factors that determine military
performance—experience, training, aptitude, and so forth—and concluded that aptitude is key.
A force "made up of personnel with high AFQT [armed forces aptitude test] scores," Kavanagh writes, "contributes to a
more effective and accurate team performance." The evidence is overwhelming. Take tank gunners. You
wouldn't think intelligence would have much effect on the ability to shoot straight, but apparently it does. Replacing a gunner
who'd scored Category IV on the aptitude test (ranking in the 10-30 percentile) with one who'd scored Category IIIA (5064 percentile) improved the chances of hitting targets by 34 percent. (For more on the meaning of the test scores, click here.) In
another study cited by the RAND report, 84 three-man teams from the Army's active-duty signal battalions were given
the task of making a communications system operational. Teams consisting of Category IIIA
personnel had a 67 percent chance of succeeding. Those consisting of Category IIIB (who'd ranked in the 31-49 percentile on the aptitude
test) had a 47 percent chance. Those with Category IV personnel had only a 29 percent chance. The same study of signal battalions took soldiers who had
just taken advanced individual training courses and asked them to troubleshoot a faulty piece of communications gear. They passed if
they were able to identify at least two technical problems. Smarts trumped training. Among those who had scored Category I on the aptitude test (in the 93-99 percentile), 97
percent passed. Among those who'd scored Category II (in the 65-92 percentile), 78 percent passed. Category IIIA: 60 percent passed. Category IIIB: 43 percent passed.
Category IV: a mere 25 percent passed. The pattern is clear: The higher the score on the
aptitude test, the better the performance in the field. This is true for individual soldiers and for units.
Moreover, the study showed that adding one high-scoring soldier to a three-man signals team
boosted its chance of success by 8 percent (meaning that adding one low-scoring soldier boosts its chance of failure by a
impossible to keep. For the math on this point, click here.)
similar margin). Smarter also turns out to be cheaper. One study examined how many Patriot missiles various Army air-defense units had to fire in order to destroy 10 targets.
Units
with Category I personnel had to fire 20 missiles. Those with Category II had to fire 21 missiles. Category IIIA: 22. Category IIIB: 23. Category IV: 24 missiles. In other words, to perform the
Category IV units chewed up 20 percent more hardware than Category I units. For this particular task, since
each Patriot missile costs about $2 million, they also chewed up $8 million more of the Army's
procurement budget. Some perspective here: Each year the Army recruits 80,000 new troops—which amount to 16 percent of its 500,000 active-duty soldiers. Even if 12
same task,
percent of recruits were Category IV, not just for October but for the entire coming year, they would swell the ranks of Cat IV soldiers overall by just 1.9 percent (0.12 x 0.16 = .0192).
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2NC Impact – Conventional Superiority 2/2
Effective conventional military superiority key to global conflict de-escalation
Schuman, TIME, 7-6-’11 (Michael, “Will America's budget deficit bring an end to world
peace?” http://curiouscapitalist.blogs.time.com/2011/07/06/will-america%E2%80%99s-budgetdeficit-bring-an-end-to-world-peace/)
Did you know that the U.S. still stations nearly 50,000 troops in Japan? That's pretty amazing when you think about
it. The war in the Pacific ended 66 years ago, and there hasn't been a conflict in Northeast Asia since the Korean War of the early 1950s, but
Another bunch of soldiers are parked nearby in South Korea.
Why in the world are all those soldiers still there? They're keeping the peace. Not everybody may agree with me on that
assertion. I can't imagine Kim Jong Il is too happy that tens of thousands of armed Americans are
sitting on his doorstep. But most of the leadership of Asia fully realizes that the U.S. military
presence in the region has, without question, provided a stability rarely experienced. The
traditional rivalries between local powers (China, Japan and Korea) have been kept at bay. American
security allowed Japan, South Korea and most of the rest of the region (including China) to focus on
economic development and alleviating poverty. It is because America ensured peace in East
Asia that Asians have been able to get rich. People all over the world have benefited in a similar way. American
security for Western Europe during the Cold War allowed the region to rebuild after World
War II. The American security relationship with Saudi Arabia and its allies in the Persian Gulf
has helped oil to flow peacefully to the world. Year after year, it is American armed forces that most
often take the lead in resolving the world's security issues, whether that has meant stopping
genocide in the Balkans or hunting down Osama bin Laden in Pakistan. Sure, America's military
America still maintains a hefty military presence in the area.
dominance has produced a fair share of hostility, in Iran, Libya and other countries that have refused to join the U.S.-led global political and
security system. And of course the U.S. has made its share of blunders when flexing its military muscle (Iraq). But the fact is that
the
world expects America to use its armed forces to solve the world's problems . When Washington takes a
backseat and lets others drive for a while – as in the current conflict in Libya – the White House faces stiff criticism.
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2NC Impact – Objective Force Internal Link
High quality soldiers key to the Objective Force
Nardulli, Senior Political Scientist at RAND and Professor at US Naval War College, 02
Transforming
America's
military,
Chapter
4,
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/tam/06_ch04.htm
The Army has launched a major effort to transform itself and the way it conducts land
operations. Officials regard the endeavor as the “most significant and comprehensive effort to
change this Army in a century,” one that will “revolutionize land-power capabilities.”2 The goal is
a ground force that is more rapidly deployable and tactically agile than, but as survivable and lethal as, today’s
heavy forces. It will be a “full spectrum” force, dominant not only in war but also , with minimal
modification, in peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, and disaster assistance operations.
The centerpiece of the fully transformed Army would be the Objective Force, a ground force
that would bear little physical or operational resemblance to today’s Army . But long before the
Objective Force takes shape, the Army will begin to incorporate interim brigade combat teams (IBCTs) equipped
with light armored vehicles and adapted to new tactics. Army transformation thus aims to make change
very rapidly, even while establishing the basis for more dramatic change over the longer term.
Post-Cold War strategic realities, notably the emergence of a broad array of missions in
unpredictable locales, make transformation necessary. Change is made possible by new technologies,
especially information technologies that promise to allow greater situation awareness, more precise fires, and
more distributed, nonlinear operations. The new technologies were producing change even in the Cold War Army.
The demands of the new strategic setting add new dimensions to the transformation in areas such as mobility and
agility. Like any other ambitious endeavor, transformation faces sizable risks . These perils
usually are defined largely in technological terms, many of which are inherent in the Army vision of its
future. Moreover, almost every risk has a technological dimension to it. But the risks here run well beyond those
associated with technology. Can the Army find and train people—followers as well as leaders—able to
fight the distributed, nonlinear, all-arms warfare it envisions? An even larger risk stems from
the steady elimination of a margin for error, ambiguity, or uncertainty. Paring away armor to
reduce weight shifts the burden of force protection increasingly to information. Given what is
available today in the way of light antiarmor weaponry, the need for situation awareness is
dauntingly high.
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Impact – Objective Force Internal Link Extensions
Systemic problem with military - recruitment high but lower standards - dumb
dumbs can’t keep up with objective force
Kong, Department of State Analyst, 01 Manning the Force Through Immigration: Making the
American
Dream
Work
for
the
Armed
Forces,
http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA390629&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf
By FY 2000, however, all the Services, for the first time in years, met recruitment goals. FY 2001
appears likely to see repeat success. Such being the case, some in the Army profess to have "licked" the
recruitment problem. Maybe, but others say the deed is done at the altar of expediency,
i.e., lowered admission, training, and retention standards . If the latter, this portends
problems for the Army as Department of Defense (DOD) research shows that there is a strong
relationship between education credentials and successful completion of the first term of
military service; that education attainment predicts first-term military attrition; and that
recruitment quality is linked to job performance. Further, recruitment success is being paid for
by all branches with either increased intake of recruits without high school diplomas, monthly
stipends and college loans for recruits to go to college before coming on active duty, or
increased average time and money spent getting candidates enlisted. ST 3-0, Operations, dated 1
October 2000, states: "the Army needs competent and versatile soldiers able to accomplish
missions in a challenging and ever changing global environment ...They must employ and
maintain increasingly complex and sophisticated equipment. Current and future technology
requires skilled soldiers who understand their systems." Is there conflict between recruitment
standards and Army requirements? Is there risk? Can an Army with significant numbers of its soldiers lacking a
high school diploma meet Army challenges?24 In FY 97, with ten percent of its enlistees listed as high school
dropouts, the Army already compared poorly with the Air Force, i.e., only 58 percent of the Army's recruits versus
77 percent of the Air Forces had a high school diploma and a score of 50-99 percent on the Armed Forces
Qualification Test (AFQT) test. Clearly, in the Services' drive to meet recruitment numbers, the
Army and Navy accept attrition and performance risk with substandard recruits . To address
studies that show a strong correlation between a diploma and completion of basic training, the Army created
'Insist and Assist," a program of remedial military drills and English language courses for "slow" learners to help
them "survive" basic training. The results have been admirable as the failure rate at the Army's largest training
camp, Fort Jackson, plunged from 23 percent in December 1998 to less than 10 percent a year later.26 Today, the
Army boasts of an overall 98 percent basic training graduation rate.27 Meanwhile, the infamous Marine Corp
Parris Island boot camp failure rate has dropped from 20 percent to about 10 percent. Bravo! But what about the
staying power and functionality of these soldiers? Research says educational achievement is a key
indicator of attrition and job performance. Perhaps the research is wrong. Perhaps, everything will work
out. For now, some in the Army claim to be comfortable with recruitment efforts and standards.29 But what of the
future? Ever lower qualifications; ever higher incentives are not the solutions. The Services
must identify new or underdeveloped recruitment areas that can yield many, many
more high school graduates with CAT MIA and above AFQT test results.
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Impact – Objective Force Impact (Army Nuke Power) 1/3
Objective Force structure underpins the Army’s plans to create and deploy
portable nuclear power plants
Pfeffer, Scientist at Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency, 01 Nuclear Power: An Option for the
Army's Future, http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/SepOct01/MS684.htm
The Army Transformation initiative of Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki represents a significant change
in how the Army will be structured and conduct operations. Post-Cold War threats have forced
Army leaders to think "outside the box" and develop the next-generation Objective Force, a
lighter and more mobile fighting army that relies heavily on technology and joint-force support.
More changes can be anticipated. As we consider what the Army might look like beyond the Objective
Force of 2010, nuclear power could play a major role in another significant change: the shift of
military energy use away from carbon-based resources. Nuclear reactor technology could be
used to generate the ultimate fuels for both vehicles and people : environmentally neutral hydrogen for equipment fuel and
potable water for human consumption. Evolving Energy Sources
Over the centuries, energy sources have been moving away from carbon and toward pure hydrogen. Wood (which has
about 10 carbon atoms for every hydrogen atom) remained the primary source of energy until the 1800s, when it was replaced with coal (which has 1 or 2 carbon atoms for every hydrogen
atom). In less than 100 years, oil (with two hydrogen atoms for every carbon atom) began to replace coal. Within this first decade of the new millennium, natural gas (with four hydrogen
atoms for every carbon atom) could very well challenge oil's dominance. In each case, the natural progression has been from solid, carbon-dominated, dirty fuels to more efficient, cleanerburning hydrogen fuels. Work already is underway to make natural gas fuel cells the next breakthrough in portable power. However, fuel cells are not the final step in the evolution of energy
sources, because even natural gas has a finite supply. Fuel cells are merely another step toward the ultimate energy source, seawater, and the ultimate fuel derived from it, pure hydrogen
(H2). Environmental Realities There are three geopolitical energy facts that increasingly are affecting the long-term plans of most industrialized nations—
Worldwide coal reserves
are decreasing. At the present rate of consumption, geological evidence indicates that worldwide low-sulfur coal reserves could be depleted in 20 to 40 years. This rate of depletion could
accelerate significantly as China, India, and other Third World countries industrialize and use more coal.
Most major oil reserves have been discovered and are controlled by just a few
OPEC [Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries] nations. Some of these reserves are now at risk; Bahrain, for example, estimates that its oil reserves will be depleted in 10 to 13 years
at the current rate of use.
The burning of carbon-based fuels continues to add significant pollutants to the atmosphere. These and other socioeconomic pressures are forcing nations
to compete for finite energy sources for both fixed-facility and vehicle use. For the United States, the demand for large amounts of cheap fuel to generate electricity for industry and fluid fuel
to run vehicles is putting considerable pressure on energy experts to look for ways to exploit alternate energy sources. The energy crisis in California could be the harbinger of things to come.
The threat to affordable commercial power could accelerate development of alternative fuels. It is here that private industry may realize that the military's experience with small nuclear
the military faces several post-Cold War
realities. First, the threat has changed. Second, regional conflicts are more probable than all-out war.
Third, the United States will participate in joint and coalition operations that could take our
forces anywhere in the world for undetermined periods of time. Finally, the U.S. military must
operate with a smaller budget and force structure. These realities already are forcing
substantial changes on the Army. So, as we consider future Army energy sources, we foresee a
more mobile Army that must deploy rapidly and sustain itself indefinitely anywhere in the
world as part of a coalition force. In addition, this future Army will have to depend on other nations to provide at least some
power plants could offer an affordable path to converting seawater into fuel. Military Realities Today,
critical logistics support. An example of such a cooperative effort was Operation Desert Storm, where coalition forces (including the United
States) relied on some countries to supply potable water and other countries to provide fuel. This arrangement allowed U.S. cargo ships to
concentrate on delivering weapon systems and ammunition. But consider the following scenario.
The U.S. military is called
on to suppress armed conflict in a far-off region. The coalition forces consist of the United States and several Third
World countries in the region that have a vested interest in the outcome of the conflict. Our other allies are either unwilling
or unable to support the regional action, either financially or militarily. The military effort will be a challenge to support
over time, especially with such basic supplies as fuel and water. How can the United States sustain its forces? One
way to minimize the logistics challenge is for the Army to produce fuel and potable water in , or
close to, the theater. Small nuclear power plants could convert seawater into hydrogen fuel and
potable water where needed, with less impact on the environment than caused by the current production, transportation, and
use of carbon-based fuels.
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Impact – Objective Force Impact (Army Nuke Power) 2/3
Water wars are coming – army deployment of portable nuclear power key
Pfeffer, Scientist at Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency, 01 Nuclear Power: An Option for the
Army's Future, http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/SepOct01/MS684.htm
For the military, a small nuclear power plant could fit on a barge and be deployed to a remote
theater, where it could produce both hydrogen fuel and potable water for use by U.S. and
coalition forces in time of conflict. In peacetime, these same portable plants could be deployed for
humanitarian or disaster relief operations to generate electricity and to produce hydrogen fuel
and potable water as necessary. Such dual usage (hydrogen fuel for equipment and potable water for human
consumption) could help peacekeepers maintain a fragile peace. These dual roles make nucleargenerated products equally attractive to both industry and the military, and that could foster
joint programs to develop modern nuclear power sources for use in the 21st century. So What's Next?
The Army must plan for the time when carbon-based fuels are no longer the fuel of choice for
military vehicles. In just a few years, oil and natural gas prices have increased by 30 to 50
percent, and, for the first time in years, the United States last year authorized the release of some of its oil reserves for commercial use. As the supply of oil decreases, its value as a
resource for the plastics industry also will increase. The decreasing supply and increasing cost of carbon-based fuels eventually will make the hydrogen fuel and nuclear power combination a
more attractive alternative. One proposed initiative would be for the Army to enter into a joint program with private industry to develop new engines that wou ld use hydrogen fuel. In fact,
private industry already is developing prototype automobiles with fuel cells that run on liquefied or compressed hydrogen or methane fuel. BMW has unveiled their hydrogen-powered 750hL
sedan at the world's first robotically operated public hydrogen fueling station, located at the Munich, Germany, airport. This prototype vehicle does not have fuel cells; instead, it has a
Another proposed
initiative would exploit previous Army experience in developing and using small, portable
nuclear power plants for the future production of hydrogen and creation of a hydrogen fuel
infrastructure. Based on recent advances in small nuclear power plant technology, it would be prudent to consider developing a prototype plant for possible military
bivalent 5.4-liter, 12-cylinder engine and a 140-liter hydrogen tank and is capable of speeds up to 140 miles per hour and a range of up to 217.5 miles.
applications. The Army Nuclear Power Program The military considered the possibility of using nuclear power plants to generate alternate fuels almost 50 years ago and actively supported
nuclear energy as a means of reducing logistics requirements for coal, oil, and gasoline. However, political, technical, and military considerations forced the closure of the program before a
prototype could be built. The Army Corps of Engineers ran a Nuclear Power Program from 1952 until 1979, primarily to supply electric power in remote areas. Stationary nuclear reactors
built at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and Fort Greeley, Alaska, were operated successfully from the late 1950s to the early 1970s. Portable nuclear reactors also were operated at Sundance, Wyoming;
Camp Century, Greenland; and McMurdo Sound in Antarctica. These small nuclear power plants provided electricity for remote military facilities and could be operated efficiently for long
periods without refueling. The Army also considered using nuclear power plants overseas to provide uninterrupted power and defense support in the event that U.S. installations were cut off
from their normal logistics supply lines. In November 1963, an Army study submitted to the Department of Defense (DOD) proposed employing a military compact reactor (MCR) as the
power source for a nuclear-powered energy depot, which was being considered as a means of producing synthetic fuels in a combat zone for use in military vehicles. MCR studies, which had
begun in 1955, grew out of the Transportation Corps' interest in using nuclear energy to power heavy, overland cargo haulers in remote areas. These studies investigated various reactor and
vehicle concepts, including a small liquid-metal-cooled reactor, but ultimately the concept proved impractical. The energy depot, however, was an attempt to solve the logistics problem of
supplying fuel to military vehicles on the battlefield. While nuclear power could not supply energy directly to individual vehicles, the MCR could provide power to manufacture, under field
conditions, a synthetic fuel as a substitute for conventional carbon-based fuels. The nuclear power plant would be combined with a fuel production system to turn readily available elements
such as hydrogen or nitrogen into fuel, which then could be used as a substitute for gasoline or diesel fuel in cars, trucks, and other vehicles. Of the fuels that could be produced from air and
water, hydrogen and ammonia offer the best possibilities as substitutes for petroleum. By electrolysis or high- temperature heat, water can be broken down into hydrogen and oxygen and the
hydrogen then used in engines or fuel cells. Alternatively, nitrogen can be produced through the liquefaction and fractional distillation of air and then combined with hydrogen to form
ammonia as a fuel for internal-combustion engines. Consideration also was given to using nuclear reactors to generate electricity to charge batteries for electric-powered vehicles—a
development contingent on the development of suitable battery technology. By 1966, the practicality of the energy depot remained in doubt because of questions about the cost-effectiveness
of its current and projected technology. The Corps of Engineers concluded that, although feasible, the energy depot would require equipment that probably would not be available during the
next decade. As a result, further development of the MCR and the energy depot was suspended until they became economically attractive and technologically possible.
Other efforts to
develop a nuclear power plant small enough for full mobility had been ongoing since 1956, including a gas-cooled reactor combined with a closed- cycle gas-turbine generator that would be
transportable on semitrailers, railroad flatcars, or barges. The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) supported these developments because they would contribute to the technology of both
military and small commercial power plants.
The AEC ultimately concluded that the probability of achieving the objectives of the Army Nuclear Power Program in a timely manner and at
a reasonable cost was not high enough to justify continued funding of its portion of projects to develop small, stationary, and mobile reactors. Cutbacks in military funding for long-range
research and development because of the Vietnam War led the AEC to phase out its support of the program in 1966. The costs of developing and producing compact nuclear power plants were
simply so high that they could be justified only if the reactor had a unique capability and filled a clearly defined objective backed by DOD. After that, the Army's participation in nuclear power
plant research and development efforts steadily declined and eventually stopped altogether. Nuclear Technology Today The idea of using nuclear power to produce synthetic fuels, originally
proposed in 1963, remains feasible today and is gaining significant attention because of recent advances in fuel cell technology, hydrogen liquefaction, and storage. At the same time, nuclear
power has become a significant part of the energy supply in more than 20 countries—providing energy security, reducing air pollution, and cutting greenhouse gas emissions. The
performance of the world's nuclear power plants has improved steadily and is at an all-time high. Assuming that nuclear power experiences further technological development and increased
public acceptance as a safe and efficient energy source, its use will continue to grow. Nuclear power possibly could provide district heating, industrial process heating, desalination of
seawater, and marine transportation. Demand for cost-effective chemical fuels such as hydrogen and methanol is expected to grow rapidly. Fuel cell technology, which produces electricity
from low-temperature oxidation of hydrogen and yields water as a byproduct, is receiving increasing attention. Cheap and abundant hydrogen eventually will replace carbon-based fuels in the
transportation sector and eliminate oil's grip on our society. But hydrogen must be produced, since terrestrial supplies are extremely limited. Using nuclear power to produce hydrogen offers
the potential for a limitless chemical fuel supply with near-zero greenhouse gas emissions. As the commercial transportation sector increasingly moves toward hydrogen fuel cells and other
The demand for
desalination of seawater also is likely to grow as inadequate freshwater supplies become an
urgent global concern. Potable water in the 21st century will be what oil was in the 20th
century—a limited natural resource subject to intense international competition. In many areas
of the world, rain is not always dependable and ground water supplies are limited, exhausted,
or contaminated. Such areas are likely to experience conflict among water-needy peoples,
possibly prompting the deployment of U.S. ground forces for humanitarian relief,
peacekeeping, or armed intervention. A mobile desalination plant using waste heat from a
nuclear reactor could help prevent conflicts or provide emergency supplies of freshwater to
indigenous populations, and to U.S. deployed forces if necessary.
advanced engine concepts to replace the gasoline internal combustion engine, DOD eventually will adopt this technology for its tactical vehicles.
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Impact – Objective Force Impact (Army Nuke Power) 3/3
More than 300 scenarios for conflict- U.N. Studies confirm
AFP ‘1 Water, the Looming Source of World Conflict, Agence France Presse, March 20, 2001
Demand for clean water, caused by surging population growth, environment abuse and poor
water management, is becoming a dangerous source of friction in many parts of the world,
especially the Middle East, experts say. The peril is being spelt out for World Water Day, a UN-sponsored
event Thursday that is appealing for better international cooperation and smarter use of a precious and declining
resource.
"Just as war over fire sparked conflict among early prehistoric tribes, wars over water may result from
current tensions over this resource in the next few years," says a report by the consultancy
PricewaterhouseCoopers. "The Near and Middle East are the zones where there is the greatest
threat," it said. "Two-thirds of the water consumed in Israel comes from the occupied
territories, while nearly half of the Israeli water installations are located in areas that were not
part of its pre-1967." Friction between Lebanon and Israel rose sharply last week after the
Jewish state accused its northern neighbour of seeking to divert water from a river that feeds
the Sea of Galilee, Israel's prime source of fresh water.
Other big flarepoints in the region are Turkey's plan to build dams to store the waters of the Tigris and
Euphrates rivers, a scheme that is strongly opposed by Syria and Iraq; the Iraq-Iran row over the Shatt al-Arab
waterway; and disputes over the use of water from the Nile, embroiling Egypt, Sudan and
Ethiopia.
UN figures suggest there are around 300 potential conflicts over water around the world,
arising from squabbles over river borders and the drawing of water from shared lakes and
aquifers.
In southern Asia, the biggest problem is the India-Pakistan dispute over the Indus, while in
central Asia "there are high risks of conflict" between Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan over the Amu Daria and Syr Daria rivers and the already depleted Aral Sea, the
PricewaterhouseCoopers study said.
Extinction
Weiner Pulitzer Price Winning Princeton Prof ’90 (Prof. @, The Next 100 Years p. 270)
If we do not destroy ourselves with the A-bomb and the H-bomb, then we may destroy ourselves with the C-bomb,
the Change Bomb. And in a world as interlinked as ours, one explosion may lead to the other .
Already in the Middle East, from North Africa to the Persian Gulf and from the Nile to the
Euphrates, tensions over dwindling water supplies and rising populations are reaching what
many experts describe as a flashpoint. A climate shift in that single battle-scarred nexus might trigger
international tensions that will unleash some of the 60,000 nuclear warheads the world has stockpiled
since Trinity.
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Impact – Objective Force Impact (Failed States) 1/4
Only effective Army stability operations prevent terrorism and failed states
Col. Reisch – US Army National Guard – 5 Timothy, STABILITY OPERATIONS: GETTING IT
RIGHT
IN
THE
GLOBAL
WAR
ON
TERRORISM,
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil22.pdf
The major combat operations conducted by the US in recent conflicts have been of relatively
short duration, however, the forces required to remain in place following combat have heavily
taxed both the active and reserve components as of late. The continuum of activities encompassed under
"stability operations" is very broad indeed. It runs the gamut from delivering food to appreciative people in a
peaceful setting, to conducting close combat operations, to expelling armed groups from a populated
area. Until such time as resistance subsides, and a legitimate, functional government is restored,
stabilization forces must remain in place. The danger associated with these operations requires
that military units be used in virtually all such situations . In addition to requiring huge sums of money, the
redundant deployments needed to maintain the current OPTEMPO throughout the world will be very hard on military personnel and
Ridding the world of terrorism, and stabilizing failed states to prevent the victimization of their
is a huge task. As tempting as it may seem, the US simply cannot "bring the boys
home" and take an isolationist view. In addition to being irresponsible, to do so may result in the most
horrific wide-scale humanitarian abuses that the world has ever experienced. In order to be more
equipment.
people by parasitic groups,
effective in conducting stability operations world-wide, the US should make the following changes: "* Accentuate patience and diplomacy. The
citizens of the US seem to have evolved into a less patient people over time. This characteristic could be affecting the way the US deals with
other nations as well. Possessing a powerful military can tend to overshadow the true value of communication, diplomacy and the use of
flexible deterrents. The Department of State should be given additional resources in order to effectively address the instability issues
throughout the world. All of the elements of national power should always be employed with patience and resolve in order to have the best
chance at attaining positive results.
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Impact – Objective Force Impact (Failed States) 2/4
Great powers view failed states in zero-sum terms – that makes multiple
scenarios for great power draw in and escalation inevitable
Grygiel ‘9, Jakub, George H.W. Bush Assoc Prof, IR, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced Int’l
Studies, Johns Hopkins U (“Vacuum Wars: The Coming Competition Over Failed States,”
American Interest, Jul/Aug 2009, http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=622)
Mention “failed states” in an academic seminar or a policy meeting and you will hear a laundry list of tragic problems: poverty, disease, famine,
refugees flowing across borders and more. If it is a really gloomy day, you will hear that failed states are associated with terrorism, ethnic
cleansing and genocide. This is the conventional wisdom that has developed over the past two decades, and rightly so given the scale of the
failed
states, however, though true, is also incomplete. Failed states are not only a source of domestic calamities; they are also potentially a
source of great power competition that in the past has often led to confrontation, crisis and war.
The failure of a state creates a vacuum that, especially in strategically important regions, draws
in competitive great-power intervention. This more traditional view of state failure is less prevalent these days, for only
recently has the prospect of great power competition over failed “vacuum” states returned. But, clearly, recent events in Georgia—
as well as possible future scenarios in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as southeastern
Europe, Asia and parts of Africa—suggest that it might be a good time to adjust, really to expand, the
way we think about “failed states” and the kinds of problems they can cause. The difference between the prevailing and the
human tragedies in Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda, just to mention the most egregious cases of the 1990s. This prevailing view of
traditional view on state failure is not merely one of accent or nuance; it has important policy implications. Intense great power conflict over
the spoils of a failed state will demand a fundamentally different set of strategies and skills from the United States. Whereas the response to
the humanitarian disasters following state failure tends to consist of peacekeeping and state-building missions, large-scale military operations
and swift unilateral action are the most likely strategies great powers will adopt when competing over a power vacuum. On the political level,
multilateral cooperation, often within the setting of international institutions, is feasible as well as desirable in case of humanitarian disasters.
But it is considerably more difficult, perhaps impossible, when a failed state becomes an arena of great power competition. The prevailing view
of failed states is an obvious product of the past two decades—a period in which an entirely new generation of scholars and policymakers has
entered their respective professions. A combination of events—the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the prostration of
states such as Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti and Bosnia, and most importantly the terrorist attacks of September 11—created two interlocked
impressions concerning the sources of state failure that are today largely accepted uncritically. The first of these is that weak states have
unraveled because of the great powers’ disinterest in them, which has allowed serious domestic problems, ranging from poverty to ethnic and
the Cold War had a
stabilizing effect in several strategic regions where either the United States or the Soviet Union supported recently fashioned states
social strife, to degenerate into chaos and systemic governance failure.1 The basic idea here is that
with little domestic legitimacy and cohesion for fear that, if they did not, the rival superpower might gain advantage. Some fortunate Third
support from the
superpowers ended, many of these states, such as Somalia and Yugoslavia, were torn apart by
internal factionalism. The state lacked the money to bribe compliance or to generate a larger economic pie, degenerating rapidly
into corruption and violence. The key conclusion: The most egregious and tragic examples of failed states in the
1990s occurred because of great power neglect rather than meddling. The related second impression that post-Cold
World neutrals even managed a kind of foreign aid arbitrage, attracting help from both sides. When
War events have created is that the main threat posed by failed states starts from within them and subsequently spills over to others. Failed
states export threats ranging from crime to drugs to refugees to, most dramatically, global terrorism.2 The lawlessness and violence of such
states often spills across borders in the form of waves of refugees, the creation of asylums for criminals and more besides. As the number and
severity of failed state cases rose, Western powers reacted much of the time by hoping that the problems arising from the failure of states, even
those geographically close to the United States or Europe like Haiti and Bosnia, would remain essentially limited so that internal chaos could
simply be waited out. Interventions such as in Somalia, Bosnia or Haiti were driven by a Western public shocked by vivid images of suffering
and slaughter rather than by a sense that these collapsed states directly threatened U.S. national security. The 9/11 terrorist attacks against the
United States changed the perception that failed states could be safely ignored. The Hobbesian world of a failed state could be distant, but it
was also a breeding ground for terrorist networks that could train their foot soldiers, establish logistical bases and plan attacks against distant
countries. Failed states suddenly were not only humanitarian disasters but security threats. As Francis Fukuyama observed in 2004, “radical
Islamist terrorism combined with the availability of weapons of mass destruction added a major security dimension to the burden of problems
created by weak governance.”3 However, 9/11 did not alter the conviction that the main threat posed by failed states stems from endogenous
problems and not from a great power competition to fill the vacuum created by their demise. At least in the immediate aftermath of the
terrorist attacks, there was a naive feeling that the Islamist threat festering in failed or weak states such as Afghanistan was a menace to the
international community writ large, and certainly to great powers like Russia and China, as well as the United States. It was therefore assumed
that the great powers would cooperate to combat terrorism and not compete with each other for control over failing or failed states. As Stephen
David pointed out in these pages, “Instead of living in a world of international anarchy and domestic order, we have international order and
domestic anarchy.”4 The solution stemming from such a view of failed states falls under the broad category of “nation-building.” If the main
challenge of failed states is internally generated and caused by a collapse of domestic order, then the solution must be to rebuild state
institutions and restore authority and order, preferably under some sort of multilateral arrangement that would enhance the legitimacy of
what is necessarily an intrusive endeavor. Great powers are expected to cooperate, not compete, to fix failed states. U.S. foreign policy
continues to reflect this prevailing view.
Then-Director of the Policy Planning staff, Stephen Krasner, and Carlos Pascual, then-Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the
State Department, wrote in 2005 that, “when
chaos prevails, terrorism, narcotics trade, weapons
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proliferation, and other forms of organized crime can flourish.” Moreover, “modern conflicts are far
more likely to be internal, civil matters than to be clashes between opposing countries.” The
prevailing view of failed states is, to repeat, not wrong, just incomplete—for it ignores the competitive
nature of great power interactions. The traditional understanding of power vacuums is still
very relevant. Sudan, Central Asia, Indonesia, parts of Latin America and many other areas are characterized
by weak and often collapsing states that are increasingly arenas for great power competition. The
interest of these great powers is not to rebuild the state or to engage in “nation-building” for humanitarian purposes but to
establish a foothold in the region, to obtain favorable economic deals, especially in the energy sector, and to weaken the
presence of other great powers. Let’s look at just three possible future scenarios. In the first, imagine that parts of
Indonesia become increasingly difficult to govern and are wracked by riots. Chinese minorities
are attacked, while pirates prowl sealanes in ever greater numbers. Bejing, pressured by
domestic opinion to help the Chinese diaspora, as well as by fears that its seaborne commerce will be
interrupted, intervenes in the region. China’s action is then perceived as a threat by Japan, which
projects its own power into the region. The United States, India and others then intervene to protect
their interests, as well. In the second scenario, imagine that Uzbekistan collapses after years of
chronic mismanagement and continued Islamist agitation. Uzbekistan’s natural resources and
its strategic value as a route to the Caspian or Middle East are suddenly up for grabs, and
Russia and China begin to compete for control over it, possibly followed by other states like Iran and Turkey.
In a third scenario, imagine that the repressive government of Sudan loses the ability to maintain control over
the state, and that chaos spreads from Darfur outward to Chad and other neighbors. Powers distant and
nearby decide to extend their control over the threatened oil fields. China, though still at least a decade
away from having serious power projection capabilities, already has men on the ground in Sudan protecting some of the
fields and uses them to control the country’s natural resources. These scenarios are not at all outlandish, as recent events have shown.
Kosovo, which formally declared independence on February 17, 2008, continues to strain relationships between the
United States and Europe, on the one hand, and Serbia and Russia, on the other. The resulting
tension may degenerate into violence as Serbian nationalists and perhaps even the Serbian
army intervene in Kosovo. It is conceivable then that Russia would support Belgrade, leading
to a serious confrontation with the European Union and the United States. A similar conflict,
pitting Russia against NATO or the United States alone, or some other alliance of European
states, could develop in several post-Soviet regions, from Georgia to the Baltics. Last summer’s
war in Georgia, for instance, showed incipient signs of a great power confrontation between Russia
and the United States over the fate of a weak state, further destabilized by a rash local leadership and aggressive
meddling by Moscow. The future of Ukraine may follow a parallel pattern : Russian citizens (or, to be precise, ethnic
Russians who are given passports by Moscow) may claim to be harassed by Ukrainian authorities, who are weak and divided. A refugee
problem could then arise, giving Moscow a ready justification to intervene militarily. The question would then be whether NATO, or the United
States, or some alliance of Poland and other states would feel the need and have the ability to prevent Ukraine from falling under Russian
Another example could arise in Iraq. If the United States fails to stabilize the situation and
withdraws, or even merely scales down its military presence too quickly, one outcome could be the collapse of the
central government in Baghdad. The resulting vacuum would be filled by militias and other groups,
control.
who would engage in violent conflict for oil, political control and sectarian revenge. This tragic situation would be compounded if Iran and
Saudi Arabia, the two regional powers with the most direct interests in the outcome, entered the fray more directly than they have so far. In
sum, there are many more plausible scenarios in which a failed state could become a playground of both regional and great power rivalry,
which is why we urgently need to dust off the traditional view of failed states and consider its main features as well as its array of
consequences. The traditional view starts from a widely shared assumption that, as nature abhors vacuums, so does the international system.
As Richard Nixon once said to Mao Zedong,
“In international relations there are no good choices. One thing is sure—we can leave no vacuums, because they can be filled.”6 The
power vacuums created by failed states attract the interests of great powers because they are an
easy way to expand their spheres of influence while weakening their opponents or forestalling
their intervention. A state that decides not to fill a power vacuum is effectively inviting other
states to do so, thereby potentially decreasing its own relative power. This simple, inescapable
logic is based on the view that international relations are essentially a zero-sum game: My gain is your
loss. A failed state creates a dramatic opportunity to gain something, whether natural resources, territory or a strategically pivotal location. The
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power that controls it first necessarily increases its own standing relative to other states. As Walter Lippmann wrote in 1915, the anarchy of the
world is due to the backwardness of weak states; . . . the modern nations have lived in armed peace and collapsed into hideous warfare because
in Asia, Africa, the Balkans, Central and South America there are rich territories in which weakness invites exploitation, in which inefficiency
and corruption invite imperial expansion, in which the prizes are so great that the competition for them is to the knife.7 The threat posed by
failed states, therefore, need not emanate mainly from within. After all, by definition a failed state is no longer an actor capable of conducting a
foreign policy. It is a politically inert geographic area whose fate is dependent on the actions of others. The main menace to international
because of the competitive nature
of international relations, “expansion would be sure to take place wherever a power vacuum
existed.”8 The challenge is that the incentive to extend control over a vacuum or a failed state is similar for many states. In fact, even if
one state has a stronger desire to control a power vacuum because of its geographic proximity,
natural resources or strategic location, this very interest spurs other states to seek command
over the same territory simply because doing so weakens that state. The ability to deprive a state of
something that will give it a substantial advantage is itself a source of power. Hence a failed state suddenly becomes a
strategic prize, because it either adds to one’s own power or subtracts from another’s. The
security stems from competition between these “others.” As Arnold Wolfers put it in 1951,
prevailing and traditional views of failed states reflect two separate realities. Therefore, we should not restrict ourselves to one view or the
other when studying our options. The difference is not just academic; it has very practical consequences. First and foremost, if we take the
failed states may pose an even greater danger to international security than policymakers and academics currently
predict. Humanitarian disasters are certainly tragedies that deserve serious attention; yet they do not pose the worst threats to
U.S. security or world stability. That honor still belongs to the possibility of a great power confrontation. While the past
decade or so has allowed us to ignore great power rivalries as the main feature of international relations, there
is no guarantee that this happy circumstance will continue long into the future. Second, there is no one-sizetraditional view,
fits-all policy option for a given failed state. Humanitarian disasters carry a set of policy prescriptions that are liable to be counterproductive in an arena of great power conflict. It is almost a
truism that failed states require multilateral cooperation, given their global impact. But the traditional view of failed states leads us not to seek multilateral settings but to act preemptively
and often unilaterally. Indeed, it is often safer to seek to extend one’s control over failed states quickly in order to limit the possibility of intervention by other great powers. Third, the role of
armed forces engaged in failed states needs to be re-evaluated in light of the traditional view. If failed states require only “nation-building”, the military forces of the intervening powers will
have to develop skills that are more like those of a police force: comfortable with a limited use of force, adept at distinguishing peaceful civilians from criminals, able to enforce law and order,
good at managing interactions within the societies and many other tasks as well. However, the traditional view suggests that one must be prepared to apply the full spectrum of military force
in case of a direct confrontation with another great power. Sending a weakly armed peacekeeping force into a situation in which such a confrontation is possible could easily prove disastrous.
Thus the United States should not focus only or overly much on preparing for low-intensity conflicts and counterinsurgency operations to the detriment of preparing for a major war involving
another state. Rather, it should maintain and improve its ability to deny other powers access to regions at stake and increase its readiness for a direct confrontation. Finally, on the political
level, nation-building under the aegis of the United Nations or even NATO may not be the solution to failed states. If they are problems not just of foreign aid and law enforcement, but also of
great power conflict and bilateral diplomacy, we should expect a reversion to an atavistic set of state actions that were supposed to have been made obsolete by the triumph of liberal
internationalism. As to the outcomes of vacuum wars, finally, history suggests four basic possibilities: non-intervention by all powers; partition; unilateral preventive intervention; and war.
If a failed state was too distant and ultimately strategically irrelevant, great powers simply ignored it,
sensing that an intervention would not increase their own power. In many ways the irrelevance of a failed state leads to the most stable
But there are ever fewer areas of the world that fall
into this category. Interconnectedness combined with the growing power-projection capability
of powers such as China creates incentives to intervene in even the most remote areas. The possible
scenarios of Indonesia or Sudan are good examples of this.
situation, one in which the prevailing view is most applicable.
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A2: Conventional Forces Not Key
Nuclear threats aren’t credible – flexible ground forces are key to deterrence.
Michael S. Gerson, research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, “Conventional Deterrence in
the Second Nuclear Age,” Fall 2009, Paramters, Vol. 39, Iss. 3, ProQuest
In the current international security environment, conventional deterrence can be useful against nonnuclear and nuclear-armed adversaries.
For regimes that do not possess nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, US
conventional capabilities will likely be the
most credible and potent deterrent. History suggests that, in general, nations without weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) are not intimidated by an opponent's nuclear capabilities. For example, nuclear weapons did
not give the United States significant advantages before or during the Korean and Vietnam wars;
nor did they dissuade Egypt from attacking Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War11 or Argentina from attacking the British-controlled Falkland
Islands in 1982.12 This circumstance is due in part to the perceived impact of the "nuclear taboo," a moral and political aversion to using
The nuclear taboo reduces the
credibility-and therefore the utility-of nuclear weapons, especially against regimes not possessing nuclear weapons
nuclear weapons that has emerged due to the absence of nuclear use in time of war.
or other WMD.13
Although implicit or explicit nuclear threats may lack credibility against non-WMD regimes, many potential adversaries believe that the
United States will use conventional firepower, especially because America has conventional superiority and a demonstrated willingness to use
it. Consequently, when dealing with non-WMD-related threats, conventional deterrence will be the most likely mechanism for deterring hostile
actions. According to Admiral Michael Mullen, the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, " A
big part of credibility, of
lies in our conventional capability. The capability to project power globally and conduct effective
theater-level operations . . . remains essential to deterrence effectiveness."14
Conventional deterrence also plays an important role in preventing nonnuclear aggression by
nuclear-armed regimes. Regional nuclear proliferation may not only increase the chances for the use of nuclear weapons, but,
course,
equally important, the possibility of conventional aggression. The potential for conventional conflict under the shadow of mutual nuclear
deterrence was a perennial concern throughout the Cold War, and that scenario is still relevant. A perceived nuclear-armed adversary may be
emboldened to use conventional force against US friends and allies, or to sponsor terrorism, in the belief that its nuclear capabilities give it an
effective deterrent against US retaliation or intervention.15 For example, a regime might calculate that it could undertake conventional
aggression against a neighbor and, after achieving a relatively quick victory, issue implicit or explicit nuclear threats in the expectation that the
United States (and perhaps coalition partners) would choose not to become involved.
conventional deterrence can be an important mechanism to limit options for
regional aggression below the nuclear threshold. Given the current US advantage in conventional forces and mobility,
a potential enemy is more likely to attack its neighbors if the regime believes it can accomplish
its objectives before US forces can respond. In other words, a nuclear-armed regime may be more likely to undertake
In this context,
conventional aggression if it believes that a favorable local balance of power would provide an opportunity for a fait accompli.
By deploying robust conventional forces in and around the theater of potential conflict, the United States can
credibly signal that its forces will respond to any aggression early in a conflict . Therefore, the
threatening regime cannot hope to achieve its military objectives while using its nuclear
arsenal to cancel US intervention. If the United States can convince an opponent that US forces
will engage early in the conflict-and that America is willing to accept the human and financial costs of combat- it may persuade
opponents that the United States is resolved to continue the conflict even in the face of nuclear
threats because American blood and treasure would already have been expended .16 Similar to the
Cold War, the deployment of American conventional power in a region, combined with nuclear capability and escalation dominance, may
prevent hostile regimes from thinking
coercion below the nuclear threshold.
nuclear possession provides opportunities for aggression
and
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***Aff***
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Non-unique – Recruit Quality Low 1/3
Army retention and quality low
Tilghman 07 Andrew Tilghman a former Iraq correspondent for Stars and Stripes, is a staff writer
for
the
Marine
Corps
Times,
Washington
Monthly,
December
2007
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2007/0712.tilghman.html#Byline
The dismay of senior leaders at this situation pierces through even the dry, bureaucratic language of Army memoranda. In an internal
document distributed among senior commanders earlier this year,
Colonel George Lockwood, the director of officer
personnel management for the Army's Human Resources Command, wrote, "The Army is
facing significant challenges in officer manning, now and in the immediate future ." Lockwood was
referring to an anticipated shortfall of about 3,000 captains and majors until at least 2013; he estimated that the Army already has only about
half the senior captains that it needs. "Read the last line again, please," Lockwood wrote. " Our
inventory of senior captains is
only 51 percent of requirement." In response to this deficit, the Army is taking in twenty-two-year-olds as fast as it can.
However, these recruits can't be expected to perform the jobs of officers who have six to eight years of experience. "New 2nd Lieutenants,"
Lockwood observed, "are no substitute for senior captains."
Even the pool from which the Army draws its future
leaders is being diluted. Last year, the Army commissioned more officers as second lieutenants than it has since 1989, when the
Pentagon was still planning for a cold war-era force nearly 50 percent larger than the current one. (The commissioning figures are partially a
reflection of the Army's restructuring efforts since 2002, which created a greater number of smaller combat units and increased the need for
Those new officers, however, are not coming from the traditional sources of West
Point and ROTC programs, which supply recruits fresh from college. Instead, they are coming from the
Army's Officer Candidate School—mostly attended by soldiers plucked from the enlisted ranks, who probably entered the
military straight from high school. The number of OCS graduates has more than tripled since the late 1990s, from about 400 a
junior officers.)
year to more than 1,500 a year. These soldiers may turn out to be good commissioned officers. But they are also needed in the
noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps, the parallel structure of senior-level sergeants who form the Army's backbone, responsible for ensuring
that orders are effectively carried out, rather than making policy or strategic decisions. Yet
the Army is
already several thousand
sergeants short and has been reducing NCO promotion times in order to fill the gaps . Sending more soldiers
who are NCOs, or NCO material, to Officer Candidate School is merely robbing Peter to pay Paul. At the most basic level, being in the Army is
a government job. Baby
boomers were once drawn to the officer corps by cushy benefits and generous
pension packages. But since the 1990s, an Army career has seemed less attractive in
comparison with the lucrative opportunities available to a young, educated overachiever in
corporate America. (The income of an Army officer with a college degree and twenty years of experience currently tops out at about
$90,000.) Money isn't necessarily the main factor in a junior officer's decision to quit. But military officers are constantly made
aware of better-paid opportunities. Corporate recruiters view a combat deployment to Iraq as a highly marketable
qualification, and often spam officers' in-boxes with job possibilities. This fall, I attended a job fair in Philadelphia where I saw about fifty
junior officers in their late twenties, dressed smartly in business suits. All the officers I met expected to receive several offers of midlevel
management positions in sectors such as manufacturing or construction, with salaries starting at around $70,000 with the potential of
reaching six figures within several years. The recruiters, in turn, were excited by the officers' leadership and stress management skills. "We're
But the
greatest concern is how the exodus of the best and brightest will affect the Army's long-term
capacity to win wars, counter threats, and keep the peace. Today's lieutenants and captains are
the pool from which three- and four-star generals will be chosen twenty years from now. If the
sharpest minds aren't in that pool, we could wind up—to put it bluntly—with a senior
leadership of dimwits.
looking for leadership," one recruiter for a commercial real estate management firm explained. "We can teach them the rest."
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Non-unique – Recruit Quality Low 2/3
Schools not preparing students for military services
Haycock, President of the Education Trust, 10 (“Shut Out of the Military: Today’s High School
Education
Doesn’t
Mean
You’re
Ready
for
Today’s
Army”,
http://www.edtrust.org/sites/edtrust.org/files/publications/files/ASVAB_4.pdf, DOA: 7/14/11)
In every state in America, the military turns away remarkably high percentages of applicants who ,
despite their high school diplomas, lack the reading, math, science, and problem-solving skills needed to
serve in the armed forces. In addition, because the ASVAB specifi cally assesses readiness in a wide range of
vocational pathways, it’sequally likely that the men and women who don’t pass the test are unprepared for the
civilian workforce. in The military recommends that examinees take a solid core of courses mathematics, English,
and science to do well on the exam. But, clearly, the K-12 system has not responded with a
sufficiently rigorous course of study, depriving many applicants of the knowledge and skills
they need to serve. The loss is theirs—and ours. Our high schools are undermining the
preparedness of too many of the young people who seek to serve their nation, leaving our
country—and our youth—in harm’s way.
Alt. causes for lack of military readiness
NPR STAFF January 2, 2011, Military Recruiting: Are We Passing
http://www.wbur.org/npr/132592329/high-school-graduates-shut-out-of-military
The
Test?
Nearly one of every four high school graduates can't pass the basic military entrance exam, a
new report shows. Combine that with high obesity rates and a rise in criminal records, and the
pool of potential military recruits is getting very shallow. Every branch of the military is still reaching
its recruitment goals, but the Pentagon's recruiting chief says he's worried. And a group of former military leaders
is calling for significant changes in the educational system, calling the ineligibility rates a matter of national
security.
Most recruits exceed weight limit
NPR STAFF January 2, 2011, Military Recruiting: Are We Passing
http://www.wbur.org/npr/132592329/high-school-graduates-shut-out-of-military
The
Test?
Test scores are not the only thing keeping potential recruits out of the military. Earlier this
year, we learned that more than 9 million Americans of prime recruiting age exceed the
military's weight limits.
Obesity causes less recruits—makes military weak
Structure House July 06, 2011 16:56 ET U.S. Military Fights Battle of the Bulge
DURHAM, NC--(Marketwire - Jul 6, 2011) - Rising obesity rates are affecting more
than America's
health. Expanding waist lines are creeping into the U.S. military. The problem costs the
government millions of dollars and limits our nation's recruitment efforts. A recent study reveals
that the problem of obesity in the military is growing at an alarming rate. The proportion of
recruits rejected for being overweight jumped from 12 to 21 percent between 1995 and 2008.
The military also discharges more than 1,200 enlistees each year due to weight problems.
Compounding the issue, it costs the military about $50,000 per person -- or $60 million -- to
recruit and train replacements.*
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SCFI 2011
Silent Nihilists Lab
DOD Trade-off Disadvantage
Non-unique – Recruit Quality Low 3/3
US military lacks intelligence now—makes the impact not unique
Stein (investigative reporter specializing in U.S. intelligence, defense and foreign policy issues. An
Army
Intelligence
case
officer
in
Vietnam)
tuesday,
may
24,
2011
http://spytalkblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/military-intelligence-lacks-skills-for.html
Once again, the quality of war-zone military intelligence is taking a beating. And again, it's from the inside.
According to a recent new Defense Department study that surfaced today, military intelligence agencies are
still poorly equipped to cope with their counterinsurgency mission nearly a decade after U.S.
forces chased the Taliban from power in Afghanistan. Among other problems, “the defense
intelligence community does not have the foreign language and culture depth and breadth
necessary to plan and support COIN operations," the February 2011 Defense Science Board study said.
Intelligence gathered by scientific and technical means--satellites, sensors and the like, where
commanders get most of their information on the insurgents--cannot make up for deficiencies
in human intelligence, the study suggested.
More US Army recruits lack basic education
MARTIN
J.
KIDSTON
–
writer
for
the
Independent
http://www.leatherneck.com/forums/showthread.php?t=78799
Record
-
02/11/09
The active-duty Army missed its benchmark for the number of recruits with a high-school
diploma last year, making it the fourth straight year the goal has been missed, according to a
national study released this week. Compiled by the National Priorities Project, based in Northampton, Mass., the
study found that only 74 percent of Army recruits in 2008 were considered “tier-one,” meaning
they had earned a high-school diploma. The Army’s goal, however, was 90 percent, and while the
2008 findings improved 3 percent over last year, the figures were still down from a high of 83
percent in 2005, according to the study. “I think it signals a struggle for the Army to find qualified
recruits,” said Suzanne Smith, research director for the study. “ It points to whether the Army is
exhausting its potential pool of recruits. We should be paying more attention to whether we
want to have such a wide global footprint.”
79
SCFI 2011
Silent Nihilists Lab
DOD Trade-off Disadvantage
Non-unique – DOD Cuts Now
Current deficit is forcing Military to make harsh cuts as a list of crises continue to
escalate
Cordesman 11The Challenges the New National Security Team Must Meet: Do You Really Want
that Office?” By Anthony H. Cordesman, who holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS
(Center for strategic and international studies) and acts as a national security analyst for ABC
News.
May 5, 2011 http://csis.org/publication/challenges-new-national-security-team-must-meet-doyou-really-want-office
President Obama’s new national security team faces a wide range of major challenges , some
inherited from its predecessors and some shaped by forces outside its control. These challenges range from
restructuring defense spending to regional security issues. Such matters can rarely be addressed in
sequence; rather, the most important challenges will all have to be dealt with simultaneously. At the same
time, Panetta will have to make very difficult cuts and trade-offs in a defense budget that is
planned to total some $671 billion in FY2012. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has been outstanding,
but he has had to concentrate on wars rather than restructuring U.S. strategy, forces, and
defense spending. His Quadrennial Defense Reviews have been 90 percent concept and 9 percent plan, with no
clear percentage left for actual execution. For all the usual nonsense in Department of Defense (DOD)
rhetoric about increased efficiency and effectiveness, the only way forward is to make hard,
unpleasant trade-offs. These trade-offs will include dealing with the constant escalation in the
cost of major weapons far beyond reasonable levels, delays in delivery, and/or cutbacks in
performance. Recent reporting by both the Government Accountability Office and DOD on the cost escalation
of key systems has made it brutally clear that defense procurement is as out of control as ever. North
Korea remains as problematic as ever, and no one can reject the possibility of something
approaching a large-scale conventional war with a risk of nuclear escalation. China is
expanding its military efforts and strategic reach far more quickly than anyone estimated even
a few years ago, and Japan may take years to work out of its current crisis and move forward in
its defense capabilities. Latin America has its own new tensions, and Africa has far too many
troubled countries and local conflicts, some of which involve key suppliers to the United States.
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DOD Trade-off Disadvantage
No Internal Link – MTA Not Key
There are many alternate causes to the Military’s lack of intelligence
Fox News 10 “Study: Nearly 1 in 4 Students Fails Military Entrance Exam” Published December 21,
2010 Associated Press http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/12/21/apnewsbreak-percent-passmilitary-exam/
MIAMI –
Nearly one-fourth of the students who try to join the U.S. Army fail its entrance exam,
painting a grim picture of an education system that produces graduates who can't answer basic
math, science and reading questions, according to a new study released Tuesday. The report by The Education Trust
bolsters a growing worry among military and education leaders that the pool of young people
qualified for military service will grow too small. "Too many of our high school students are not
graduating ready to begin college or a career — and many are not eligible to serve in our armed forces," U.S. Education
Secretary Arne Duncan told the AP. "I am deeply troubled by the national security burden created by
America's underperforming education system." The effect of the low eligibility rate might not
be noticeable now — the Department of Defense says it is meeting its recruitment goals — but
that could change as the economy improves, said retired Navy Rear Admiral Jamie Barnett. "If you can't get
the people that you need, there's a potential for a decline in your readiness," said Barnett, who is part of
the group Mission: Readiness, a coalition of retired military leaders working to bring awareness to the high ineligibility rates. The report
by The Education Trust found that 23 percent of recent high school graduates don't get the
minimum score needed on the enlistment test to join any branch of the military . Questions are often
basic, such as: "If 2 plus x equals 4, what is the value of x?" The military exam results are also worrisome because
the test is given to a limited pool of people: Pentagon data shows that 75 percent of those aged
17 to 24 don't even qualify to take the test because they are physically unfit, have a criminal
record or didn't graduate high school. Educators expressed dismay that so many high school
graduates are unable to pass a test of basic skills. "It's surprising and shocking that we are still having students who
are walking across the stage who really don't deserve to be and haven't earned that right," said Tim Callahan with the Professional Association
of Georgia Educators, a group that represents more than 80,000 educators. Kenneth Jackson, 19, of Miami, enlisted in the Army after
graduating from high school. He said passing the entrance exam is easy for those who paid attention in school, but blamed the education
system for why more recruits aren't able to pass the test. "The classes need to be tougher because people aren't learning enough," Jackson
said. This is the first time that the U.S. Army has released this test data publicly, said Amy Wilkins of The Education Trust, a Washington,
The study examined the scores of nearly 350,000 high school
graduates, ages 17 to 20, who took the ASVAB exam between 2004 and 2009. About half of the
applicants went on to join the Army. Recruits must score at least a 31 out of 99 on the first stage of the three-hour test to get
D.C.-based children's advocacy group.
into the Army. The Marines, Air Force, Navy and Coast Guard recruits need higher scores. Further tests determine what kind of job the recruit
can do with questions on mechanical maintenance, accounting, word comprehension, mathematics and science. The study shows wide
disparities in scores among white and minority students, similar to racial gaps on other standardized tests. Nearly 40 percent of black students
and 30 percent of Hispanics don't pass, compared with 16 percent of whites. The average score for blacks is 38 and for Hispanics is 44,
compared to whites' average score of 55. Even those passing muster on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery, or ASVAB, usually
"A lot of times, schools have failed to step up and
challenge these young people, thinking it didn't really matter — they'll straighten up when they
get into the military," said Kati Haycock, president of the Education Trust. "The military doesn't think that way."
aren't getting scores high enough to snag the best jobs.
Entrance exams for the U.S. military date to World War I. The test has changed over time as computers and technology became more prevalent, and skills like ability to translate Morse code
have fallen by the wayside. The test was overhauled in 2004, and the study only covers scores from 2004 through 2009. The Education Trust didn't request examine earlier data to avoid a
comparison between two versions of the test, said Christina Theokas, the author of the study. The Army did not immediately respond to requests for further information. Tom Loveless, an
education expert at the Brookings Institution think tank, said the results echo those on other tests. In 2009, 26 percent of seniors performed below the 'basic' reading level on the National
Assessment of Education Progress. Other tests, like the SAT, look at students who are going to college. "A lot of people make the charge that in this era of accountability and standardized
testing, that we've put too much emphasis on basic skills," Loveless said. "This study really refutes that. We have a lot of kids that graduate from high school who have not mastered basic
skills." The study also found disparities across states, with Wyoming having the lowest ineligibility rate, at 13 percent, and Hawaii having the highest, at 38.3 percent. Retired military leaders
"The military is a lot more high-tech than in the past," said retired Air Force Lt.
Gen. Norman R. Seip. "I don't care if you're a soldier Marine carrying a backpack or someone sitting in a research laboratory , the things
we expect out of our military members requires a very, very well educated force." A Department of
Defense report notes the military must recruit about 15 percent of youth, but only one-third are eligible. More high school
graduates are going to college than in earlier decades, and about one-fourth are obese, making
them medically ineligible. In 1980, by comparison, just 5 percent of youth were obese.
say the report's findings are cause for concern.
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SCFI 2011
Silent Nihilists Lab
DOD Trade-off Disadvantage
No Impact – Conventional Military Not Key (Drones)
Conventional military strength is being replaced by autonomous technology
Goa 11 “International Law and Technology: The Changing Face of War and its Legal
Ramifications” - Peter Gao, Business Analyst, Carnegie Mellon University, Lancaster University,
University
of
Science
and
Technology
of
China
January
29,
2011
http://triplehelixblog.com/2011/01/law-and-technology-the-changing-face-of-war-and-its-legalramifications/
Over the last ten years, leaps in technology have led to warfare being augmented by
developments that would seem to be more suited to science fiction. However, the use of drone
warfare, cyberwarfare, and data mining has caused a dramatic shift in the way a war is thought
of and conducted, in addition to raising a multitude of legal and ethical issues. The usage of drones in warfare is not only controversial due to the possibility of remotecontrolled or automated killing, but also due to issues of whether an unmanned vehicle can violate a nation’s sovereignty. Cyberwarfare allows an entity to launch difficult-to-trace attacks
with impunity, but also blurs the line between a military combatant and civilian noncombatant. Data mining, though advocated as extremely useful for collecting intelligence, quite possibly
violates a person’s right to privacy. These new tools are powerful assets to a group or nation in the modern world, but carry heavy ethical and legal baggage that must be rapidly addressed.
Over the course of human history, weapons used in war have generally striven to inflict more
damage faster from farther away. The medieval ages saw the development of the trebuchet, designed to knock down castle walls from afar,
reducing the need for soldiers to risk their lives by scaling the castle walls. The last century saw the development of machine
guns, tanks, and effective indirect artillery, all of which contributed to the destruction caused by the World Wars,
among others. However, each of these weapons, though employing some degree of automation, still required the input of a human operator in the process of activation. With the rise
and development of drone warfare, this aspect is being phased out. Autonomous drone warfare poses a plethora of legal and ethical issues that
may change the very nature of our current society’s view of war. Drone warfare may end up “sanitising” the act of killing.
Artillery has the ability to kill from many kilometres away, and statistics from World War II shows that most casualties were inflicted by artillery crews, who were detached from fighting and
. Drone operators are often an entire world’s
distance away from the drones they operate and the people they kill, operating their drones
with video-game like controls and communicating with friendly forces over a long-distance
radio. Would a soldier manning a drone be more inclined to use deadly force because of his/her physical detachment from combat? When the military is
largely composed of robotic ground vehicles with weapons attached, human losses in combat
would be minimal, possibly desensitizing society to the costs and effects of war. Current drones record everything they see, and many clips circulating on the internet
therefore able to perform their job efficiently with little remorse as compared to other soldiers
consist of footage of drones killing or observing intense combat situations. These clips have been set to music and posted on YouTube and other websites, potentially causing society to view
war and bloodshed as entertainment. Ethical issues also arise in using a machine that can kill without the input of a human operator. Almost every weapon used in war needs a human
. Current development of drones includes autonomous sentry guns
(such as Samsung’s recent sentry gun designed to protect the North Korean-South Korean Demilitarized Zone) and aircraft (the Boeing X-45
unmanned combat aerial vehicle) that can engage and destroy targets without the intervention
of a human operator. The closest possible analogue to autonomous drone warfare is the land mine, which is often victim-operated; that is, the victim of the land mine
controller to decide when or when not to engage a target
sets it off. However, due to the indiscriminate nature of land mines, many nations have already signed the Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty, which bans victim-operated land mines [3]. It is as of yet
unknown how autonomous drones, which have software to distinguish between enemies and civilians, will fare. The current laws of war are vague in relation to drone combatants. Because
of their special attributes, drones are regularly operated in Pakistani’s autonomous tribal regions, as they have no human personnel onboard to violate national sovereignty. Drones are
One interpretation of international law would
classify drones as soldiers who would be subject to international law and capable of violating national sovereignty, while an alternate interpretation regards them as
considered military materiél, yet they function in a manner similar to an independent combatant .
simply munitions fired by a human combatant. Currently, many CIA-operated drones are operated by civilian, non-uniformed personnel in Langley, Virginia. In the shaky eyes of the Fourth
Geneva Convention [4], these operators could either be considered unlawful combatants or noncombatants. If drones cause civilian casualties (as has occurred repeatedly in Pakistan), no
precedent or rule exists for the placement of responsibility. And when a glitch causes a malfunction in an autonomous drone that causes civilian casualties, who should be held responsible –
the military who deployed the drone or the company that built it? Currently, UAVs such as the Predator are controlled through unencrypted satellite links. It is theoretically possible for a
third party group to “hijack” a drone by using a similar satellite link and possibly carry out war crimes with the equipment of the nation that originally owned the drone. In such a scenario, it
is difficult to prove that a drone was really hijacked and even more difficult to trace the hijacker. Such questions become extremely important when determining who would be held
. In the
past, manpower has been a significant determining factor in the power of a military or a nation.
With drones, it is theoretically possible for a small group of people to possess a larger or more
powerful military force than a nation state, replacing soldiers with autonomous drones.
Military power would therefore be determined less by traditional markers such as manpower
or morale, but by technological and financial capacity. Additionally, as technology advances,
technology required to build relatively simple drones would become less expensive , allowing a terrorist
responsible for illegal actions committed by an autonomous drone. It is also important to consider how drone warfare affects the current political distribution of power
organization to employ low-cost drones to inflict substantial damage with minimal risk of life to the operator. The most basic example of this philosophy is a RC car filled with explosives,
strapped to a camera, and operated by a laptop. Suicide bombers have already been employed as a popular means of waging asymmetrical warfare, but the availability of cheap, effective, and
widespread drone technology would tip the balance of power firmly in the direction of insurgents. As conventional and unconventional military powers begin to employ drones in greater
, one cannot ignore the possibility of a future where all wars are conducted through robots
against other robots, stripping armed conflict of any human cost and significance [5].
numbers
82
SCFI 2011
Silent Nihilists Lab
DOD Trade-off Disadvantage
No Impact – Conventional Military Not Key (Insurgency)
Conventional armies aren’t suited for this day and age—weighted down by their
“tooth to tail” ratio
Barbara Ehrenreich for TomDispatch, part of the Guardian Comment Network guardian.co.uk
Monday 11 July 2011 12.00 BST http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jul/11/humanrole-robot-war-future
many national leaders are beginning to
acknowledge that conventional militaries are becoming, in a strictly military sense, almost
ludicrously anachronistic. Not only are they unsuited to crushing counterinsurgencies and
small bands of terrorists or irregular fighters, but mass armies are simply too cumbersome to
deploy on short notice. In military lingo, they are weighed down by their "tooth to tail" ratio – a
measure of the number of actual fighters in comparison to the support personnel and
equipment the fighters require. Both hawks and liberal interventionists may hanker to airlift
tens of thousands of soldiers to distant places virtually overnight, but those soldiers will need
to be preceded or accompanied by tents, canteens, trucks, medical equipment, and so forth.
Whatever they may think of what the US and its allies did in Iraq,
"Flyover" rights will have to be granted by neighbouring countries; air strips and eventually bases will have to be constructed; supply lines will
have be created and defended – all of which can take months to accomplish. The sluggishness of the mass, labour-intensive military has
become a constant source of frustration to civilian leaders. Irritated by the Pentagon's hesitation to put "boots on the ground" in Bosnia, thenSecretary of State Madeline Albright famously demanded of Secretary of Defense Colin Powell, "What good is this marvellous military force if
we can never use it?" In 2009, the Obama administration unthinkingly proposed a troop surge in Afghanistan, followed by a withdrawal within
a year and a half that would have required some of the troops to start packing up almost as soon as they arrived. It took the US military a full
month to organize the transport of 20,000 soldiers to Haiti in the wake of the 2010 earthquake – and they were only travelling 700 miles to
engage in a humanitarian relief mission, not a war. Another thing hobbling mass militaries is the increasing unwillingness of nations,
It is no longer acceptable to drive men into
battle at gunpoint or to demand that they fend for themselves on foreign soil. Once thousands
of soldiers have been plunked down in a "theatre" they must be defended from potentially
hostile locals, a project that can easily come to supersede the original mission.
especially the more democratic ones, to risk large numbers of casualties.
83