Regimes: An Overview
Regimes are sets of principles, procedures, norms, or rules that govern particular issue areas within
international relations. Regimes are important because they facilitate some form of global governance in
an anarchical realm. They reflect the fact that states often have converging interests and are willing to
cooperate to achieve certain outcomes. As a consequence, some scholars believe that regimes play a
significant role in reducing the level of international conflict between states and facilitating cooperation at
the international level.
Regimes can take the form of conventions, international agreements, treaties, or international
institutions. They can be found in a variety of issue areas, including economics, the environment,
policing, transport, security, communications, human rights, arms control, even copyright and patents.
Indeed, they exist in most issue areas where states have similar interests. The World Trade
Organisation (WTO), the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) are all examples of firmly established regimes.
A regime can be bilateral, multilateral, regional or global in scope. It can also be formal and
highly institutionalised or quite loose and informal. The WTO is a good example of a formal and
institutionalized regime, while UNCLOS and the CWC have fewer institutional structures underpinning
them. Yet they are similar in the sense that each requires compliance from states. States that have
accepted the conditions set out by the regime are under an obligation to act according to its principles.
The notion of convergence is crucial to understanding the character of regimes. Regimes
presuppose that states have similar interests across a range of issues and that these interests can best be
served by coordinated action. In other words, regimes provide a regulatory framework for states that
facilitates a semblance of global governance. Imagine, for example, the difficulty in getting mail to
someone on the other side of the world without a formal agreement governing the distribution of mail.
Think for a moment about the chaos in the skies if there were no rules or procedures regulating airline
traffic. Who would risk overseas flight under such circumstances?
Some scholars have argued that regimes function best when power is concentrated in the hands of
a preponderant state. Hegemonic stability theory suggests that the presence of a hegemon makes it
possible (and easier) to enforce rules and norms across an issue area. The role of the United States in
putting in place an open trading system in the aftermath of the Second World War is often cited as an
example of the importance of power in determining the success of regimes.
Since the 1970s, theoretical inquiry into regimes has developed into a growth industry. Today,
there are at least three main divisions within contemporary regime theory:
• Realist theories stress the role of power in generating cooperation between states.
• Interest-based theories highlight the value of regimes in promoting the common interests of states.
• Knowledge-based theories focus primarily on the way that ideas and norms shape perceptions of
international problems and the role of regimes in this process.
Despite the differences of emphasis in these approaches, all agree that regimes are an important
source of stability in the international arena, particularly as states increasingly confront problems that do
not respect territorial boundaries and require international cooperation.
Griffiths, Martin and O’Callaghan, Terry. (2002) International Relations: The Key Concepts. New York: Routledge.
Security Dilemma: An Overview
This concept rests on the assumption that security is something for which states compete. In an
anarchical international system lacking any authority capable of ensuring order, states have to look to
their own efforts for protection. Striving to obtain this, they are driven to acquire more and more power
in order to escape the impact of the power of other states. This, in turn, makes the others more insecure
and encourages them to prepare for the worst. Since no state can ever feel entirely secure in such a world
of competing states, competition follows, and the result is a rising spiral of insecurity among states. The
security dilemma describes a condition in which efforts to improve national security have the effect of
appearing to threaten other states, thereby provoking military counter-moves. This in turn can lead to a
net decrease in security for all states.
The security dilemma encapsulates one of the many difficult choices facing some governments.
On the one hand, they can relax defence efforts in order to facilitate peaceful relations; the problem here
is that they may make their country more vulnerable to attack. On the other hand, they can strengthen
defence preparations, but this can have the unintended consequence of undermining long-term security by
exacerbating international suspicions and reinforcing pressures for arms racing. The result can be
military conflict, and many commentators have argued that a paradigmatic example of the security
dilemma led to the First World War (1914–18).
It is important to note that the security dilemma arises primarily from the alleged structure of the
international system rather than the aggressive motives or intentions of states. This structural basis is
exacerbated by the understandably conservative inclinations of defence planners to prepare for the worst
and focus on the capabilities of their rivals rather than rely on their benign intentions. Ignorance and
competition among different branches of the armed forces for government funds can fuel worst-case
analysis. Thus while the structure of the international system must be seen as a fundamental precondition
for the security dilemma, its intensity is a consequence both of the inherently violent nature of military
capabilities and the degree to which states perceive others as threats rather than allies. Since these two
factors are variable over space and time, the intensity of the security dilemma is very unevenly distributed
among states. It is worth noting how each of them can vary.
First, the intensity of the security dilemma varies depending both on the degree to which one can
distinguish between defensive and offensive weapons, as well as the relationship between them. Other
things being equal, and acknowledging that weapons can be used offensively and defensively, some types
of weapons are more suited to defence than offence. Defensive force configurations emphasise firepower
with limited mobility and range (e.g. anti-tank missiles), and offensive configurations emphasise mobility
and range (e.g. fighter-bombers). Advocates of what is called non-offensive defence believe that the
security dilemma can be muted by the adoption of force configurations that are least likely to provoke
counter-measures by other states. In part this depends on the degree to which defensive military
technology is superior to offensive capabilities. If potential enemies each believe that the best form of
defence (and deterrence) is preparing to attack, it is not difficult to see how they could be locked into a
vicious circle of mutually reinforcing suspicions.
Second, the intensity of the security dilemma varies depending on the political relationship
between states. Capabilities should not be examined in a political vacuum. The degree of trust and sense
of common interest in the international system is neither fixed nor uniform. There is no security dilemma
between Australia and New Zealand because neither state considers the other a threat to its national
security.
At the end of the twentieth century there remains no consensus about the severity of the security
dilemma, particularly between states that possess nuclear weapons. On the one hand, the phenomenon of
mutually assured destruction on the basis of a secure second-strike capability would seem to ensure the
supremacy of defence over offence. On the other hand, there remains doubt over the credibility of a
defensive capability that offers little choice between suicide and surrender. Some scholars argue that the
security dilemma is particularly weak amongst the great powers, simply because the strategic and
economic gains from expanding one’s territorial control are very few. In an age of economic
interdependence, and in light of the degree of economic integration that exists today, it could be argued
that what is called a security community exists, at least in North America, Western Europe, Australasia,
and among some states in East Asia. A security community is one whose members are confident that the
likelihood of force being used to resolve conflicts between them is extremely low. In other parts of the
world, however, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, the dynamics of the security
dilemma remain a potent danger.
Griffiths, Martin and O’Callaghan, Terry. (2002) International Relations: The Key Concepts. New York: Routledge.
Superpower: An Overview
How do we know a superpower when we see one? This question is not as easy to answer as it might
seem. Indeed, some scholars doubt that the concept has any analytical utility in the twenty-first century.
The term was first coined by William Fox in 1944. Recall that at the time, Germany, Italy, and
Japan (the Axis powers) were all but defeated, most of Europe was in tatters, and China was in the midst
of a civil war. Fox defined a superpower as a state that possessed great power ‘plus great mobility of
power’. He argued that only the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain deserved to be called
superpowers because in his view these three states would be responsible for shaping the post-1945 world.
In a sense he was right. Not only did the ‘Big Three’ set out the conditions for Germany’s surrender in
1945, but they also presided over the subsequent division of Europe and were instrumental in setting up
the United Nations.
Yet it would be a mistake to think that these were three states of equal power. While it is true that
the Soviet army almost singlehandedly defeated the Germans on the Eastern Front, it should not be
forgotten that the United States provided it with 15,000 aircraft, 7,000 tanks, 52,000 jeeps, and 376,000
trucks. In other words, the former Soviet Union’s mobility of power was substantially underwritten by
North American industrial and economic might. Of course, any doubt about the status of the Soviet Union
as a superpower evaporated in 1949 when it detonated its first nuclear device.
Similarly, the American Lend-Lease Act was a critical factor in allowing Britain to prosecute the
war in Europe and eventually prevail over Germany. Moreover, at the end of the Second World War
Britain was almost bankrupt and many of its people were on the verge of starvation. Fox justified the
reference to Britain as a superpower by suggesting that its vast human and material resources, advanced
technology, and leadership in the Commonwealth set it apart from other, mere regionally dominant states.
Despite this, it is hard to draw the conclusion that Britain ever really deserved to be called a superpower.
In hindsight, the only real superpower in 1944 was the United States. As the ‘arsenal of democracy’, it
had bankrolled the war effort, enjoyed a monopoly in the possession of nuclear weapons, and had the only
functioning economy of any global significance. Despite protestations from Britain and the former Soviet
Union, the United States also developed the regulatory framework for the postwar international economy.
The term ‘superpower’ implies that there is a hierarchy of power among states. It is a state that
plays a crucial leadership role in the international system and is able to gain the allegiance of other states.
Within its sphere of influence, a superpower can impose its political will on smaller states with relative
impunity. Not only does a superpower have the capacity to project effective military power far from its
territory, but it also has enormous military resources at its disposal. Finally, one might argue that a
superpower has special duties with respect to the maintenance of international order and holds a
privileged status in international forums such as the United Nations.
Some scholars argue that the term does not add anything significant to the much older concept of a
great power. In anticipation of this criticism, Fox argued that there was a qualitative difference between
the superpowers of the post-1945 era and the European great powers of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries such as France, Spain, and Britain. For one thing, the latter were much smaller and carried on
their activities in close proximity to one another. Even though they were significant international actors,
they never had the global reach and influence of the United States and the Soviet Union. Today, after the
collapse of the Soviet Union, there appears to be only one superpower for the foreseeable future – the
United States.
Griffiths, Martin and O’Callaghan, Terry. (2002) International Relations: The Key Concepts. New York: Routledge.