Rhetoric in Presidential Campaign Ads:
Party Mobilizer, Public Informer or Both? ¹
Joseph Cobetto,
Department of Political Science
University of Missouri, Columbia
113 Professional Building
Columbia, MO 65211-6030 jcxr6@mail.missouri.edu
Abstract: A major debate concerning the level of partisanship within the American electorate
(Fiorina 2006, Abramowitz (20008, 2010) and their ability to find information concerning public matters within major party presidential ads. This paper seeks to offer some insight into the role that partisanship may contribute to both the usefulness of finding policy information within these ads, but also offering implicit assumptions concerning the media strategies candidates must employ in order to have any chance of winning. Using partisanship levels on a seven point scale as my dependent variable and performing content analysis on a set of 275 presidential campaign ads aired between 1952 and 2008, I conclude that while the strongest partisan categories did not appear to have gain much from the presence of policy, personal or valence mentions, those respondents belonging to the most independent categories were shown to have a positive relationship with the presence of these mentions within campaign ads.
*Prepared for the 9 th
Annual APSA Pre-Conference on Political Communication at the
University of Washington, Wednesday, August 31, 2011.
¹I wish to express my gratitude for all of the work offered by my second coder, Daniel Williams, a MPH candidate at the University of Missouri, Columbia for this project, drwww8@mail.missouri.edu
.

Introduction
Politics can be segmented into two distinct yet interconnected facets. There is a politics of actuality highlighted by the shaping and enactment of public policies by policymakers and there is a politics of possibility highlighted by the political campaigns and elections conducted either by those seeking to become or those seeking to remain policymakers. In contemporary American politics, the interplay between the two often blurs the line for many citizens, making it difficult for them to tell where the one ends and the other begins. A major feature helping to blur this line is the role of media in the televised portions of election campaigns and in our wider political discourse. In most state and all national contests, the prospective policymaker’s public image and standing is likely to contribute to both their credibility and electoral success.
Yet, even while candidates make use of media outlets in order to enhance the recognition of the names and policy positions, their competition over the airwaves leaves open the potential for citizens to gain relevant political information. While candidates can perform this role of public informer, it is often not their primary one. Candidates are also the selected representatives of political parties. The two major parties are the single greatest organizing extra-constitutional entities. Political parties historically have been ideologically heterogeneous entities, representing conflicting ideologies even while agreeing on policy interests.
However, the past several decades have seen a shift in both their composition and aims, with the two major parties becoming increasingly ideologically homogenous and their political aims being colored by ideology as much as by interests. With this development in American political parties, a reasonable question worth posing centers

around the purpose and use of political ads for candidates in this changing party environment. If parties are less ideologically diverse and their candidates are still expected to develop an advertising campaign to maximize public support, is the content of ads as relevant today as they were in earlier election cycles? Are campaign ads still a source of information for all voters?
This paper seeks to examine the evidence pertinent for offering possible answers to these questions. Looking at the textual evidence offered by general election campaign ads for major party presidential candidates between 1952 and 2008, an effort will be made to account for the relative utility of ads over time as the national electorate’s partisan makeup has changed, offering an implicit campaign strategy.
A cursory yet thoughtful review of the relevant prior literature will be followed by a thorough discussion of the data and methods employed to examine these questions.
The paper will conclude with a discussion of the results, their possible implications for future research on political advertising and communication. A careful attempt will be made to offer both theoretical and substantive dimensions to this discussion.
Prior Literature
Politics & Media Effects
Television has been with the American public for going on seven decades and its role in electoral politics and its place as a focus for academic research has been around for nearly as long. The ability of words and images from this medium to generate interest is something that candidates have long been convinced of as an acceptable conclusion, even while its level of influence and relationship has been a source of debate for scholars
(Popkin 1994; Graber 1998).

The paper’s opening remarks note this blending of intellectual or cognitive properties associated with media messages and their visual, auditory and otherwise sensory ones. The media effects associated with political campaigns and messages has enjoyed an extensive intellectual history. A number of early studies (Klapper 1960;
Nimmo 1970; Patterson & McClure 1973 & 1976) found only limited significance in the relationship between media exposure and political attitudes and/or behavior generally. A number of recent studies, thought have found a connection between media exposure and political knowledge, issue salience and priority and/or policy opinion
(Iyengar & Kinder 1987; Graber 1988; Zaller 1992; Bartels 1993). Beyond the color and spectacle of elections, the ability of citizens and audience members to gain policy knowledge has been a major focal point within the existing literature. So, too, has been the mood (positive and/or negative) of those messages transmitted (Braden 2006; Geer
2006).
Benoit (2007) helps define the strategic elements of a political media campaign with his functional theory of campaign discourse. This structure, beginning with its assumption that voting being a comparative act and that media messages should focus on highlighting those elements that best advance this aim, is both a sound and reasonable approach by which media messages can be examined with. Its focus on the roles of acclaims and attacks in helping either to make the sponsoring candidate seem more attractive by comparison or to at least appear less undesirable to the opposing candidate by comparison is discernable, testable and replicable in future studies. These features were of importance for my own research.
Within the political science canon more specifically, a significant amount of

research has been conducted concerning the affects negative and/or positive ads have on voter knowledge, attitudes and behaviors (Ansolabehere & Iyengar 1995; Finkel & Geer
1998; Brians &Wattenberg 1999; Geer 2006). Many of these studies look to the ads’ content for clues in discerning a relationship between ad messages and possible affects on political attitudes and behaviors. This focus on ad messages will also be a part of my research efforts.
Political Parties & Partisanship
Political parties have a single central function: to select candidates that can win elections and help shape the creation or preservation of public policy. Political parties therefore do not undertake the expense and effort of staging public spectacle of an election campaign primarily as a source of entertainment for the nation’s electorate. They undertake the effort to both energize interest and behaviors (i.e. voting) amongst their committed membership while also attempting to stimulate interest and support amongst those outside of the membership’s ranks, primarily uncommitted voters and potentially even disaffected members from rival parties. Among the various steps in a political party’s role within a political campaign alongside candidate recruitment, fundraising and policy position formation, voter mobilization can be considered the final or ‘harvesting’ phase of the election campaign timeline.
While the existence of a link between political advertising and voter mobilization has been fairly agreed upon by prior works, the exact relationship has been a point of contention. Hansen & Rosenstone (1993) makes it clear those members of the electorate with a partisan identity have added incentive to cast a ballot and are reminded often enough by their party through direct personal contact. Leighley (1996) and Gerber &

Green (2005) offer further clarification to this point. Leighley cleverly notes that political parties seek to “intentionally mobilize” their members to go to the polls.
As a means for achieving this aim, television exposure, whether through advertisements or newscasts, are chief instruments in any candidate’s campaign strategy.
The national dimensions surrounding a run for the Presidency only make this usage more central in a campaign’s overall general election strategy since it is both unreasonable and highly unlikely that any candidate could or be expected to effectively disseminate his or her message(s) through retail politics.
The presidential general election campaign advertisement is not only the most likely form of exposure individual voters will ever have with the candidates and the chief expenditure of any candidate’s campaign budget, it is also the prime example of the interplay between politics and media. The two need each other. There can be no politics without communication and the media have historically played an informative role in connecting the citizens with government. There have been various stylistic and substantive changes to the content and presentation of campaign ads over the past six decades. Candidates have gone from offering ads with singers singing, offering little substantive policy information to today’s often vicious attack ads, using sound clips and video of rival candidates offering either embarrassing or contradictory statements.
The phenomena of partisanship, which is not be confused with polarization, has been a driving force in political science research since the empiricism revolution in the middle of the past century. Partisanship itself is a characteristic of party identification.
Evidence for the growth in partisanship in recent decades can be found a number of recent works (Bartels 2000; Stonecash 2006). This paper is focused upon the competition

between the parties. Kauffmann, Petrocik & Shaw (2008) correctly note that while recent elections have produced close partisan majorities, these election have not in fact produced evidence a of polarized electorate. Many citizens and scholars may be too quick to jump onto the polarization bandwagon. This is not to say that there are not clear, sincere differences between the opinions of members of the major parties, especially when comparing their most partisan members, but each party also continues to have weak and leaning members that while having a partisan identification are capable of acting furtively against their partisan identity by not helping their party’s candidates
(i.e. not voting) or through more active, though tentative support for the opposing party’s candidate from time to time (i.e. Reagan Democrats). This division between these varying degrees of party members rather than a focus on the partisan identification itself does need to be given greater focus in order to get beyond the more descriptive differences between partisanship’s relationship to various political phenomena.
Campaign Effects & Advertising
At the same time some scholars have been looking at the role of candidates and their messages in relation to having any effect on the citizens’ political attitudes and behaviors, a growing literature has been looking at the role that the effects associated with the overall campaign has affected these same citizens (Holbrook 1996, Shaw 2006).
As elements of the overall general election campaign, television ads present a significant piece to the puzzle. Additional evidence have helped tie ad messages and other elements with the overall reach of partisan identity (Petrocik 1996; Benoit, Petrocik & Hansen
2003). The result is the ability to raise media message that offer cue to partisanship without the candidate or ad explicitly describing itself as either a ‘Democratic’ or

‘Republican’ ad. Understanding how candidates and their campaigns can craft messages capable of reaching a diverse audience without needing to give attention to one’s party label is necessary if one is to account for the role of partisanship in presidential elections.
At the same time, a number of scholar have noted the ability of individual voters to view media messages that fall outside of their own political viewpoint and filter them in such a way as to receive the message without necessarily having the information much alter their opinions, if at all (Lutz 1987; Kaid 1997; Kaid & Johnson 2002). Being able to see if candidates’ ad messages offer information content capable of reaching voters possess of a less partisan identity is worth investigating to help offer some conformation of these earlier findings from the communication literature, and even perhaps to arrive at some additional insights which time over the course of time can make itself apparent.
Even the political marketing literature has begun to offer some insight, if not description of the phenomena under investigation. Maarek (2011) notes that campaign communication can be divided into two main approaches. There is what he describes as ‘conquest’ communication, meaning the candidate’s campaign media strategy seeks to articulate a message intended to not only maintain their own party’s rank and file, but to also reach into the opposing candidate’s likely cast of supporters. The other approach is what he describes as ‘maintenance’ communication, meaning the candidate’s campaign media strategy seeks to articulate a message that will secure their likely supporters while avoiding any attempts to reach out beyond those grouping for fear of losing any likely support (44-46). As the options for members of the electorate for securing their political information continues to grow, the ability for candidates to reach those desired persons with their message has become increasingly segmented, with less in the way that appeal was communicated during the middle of the last century when most

Americans had three or four television channels to choose from.
The challenge this paper sets out to take up is one of determining what role words within campaign ads have in shaping voters’ minds and intents. Decades earlier a long running debate was initiated between thinkers like John Dewey and Walter Lippmann concerning both the capacity of individual persons to become knowledgeable citizens and how technology would play a role in making this happen. In more recent years, a similar debate has was initiated with the advent of the Internet and social media. Using content analysis, I hope to offer some insight into whether certain aspects of presidential general election campaign ads like the number of policy mention candidates employ in their ads, for example, has connections with the viewers’ varying levels of partisanship of and using them to help make assessments concerning whom they are likely to support during the general election. As my research question centers on words, it seems reasonable that words ought to be the focus of my investigation. It is worth determining what implicit campaign strategy one can deduce from the sorts of information being offered by candidates in their ads.
Research Design
Trying to offer insight on factors concerning the texts of political campaign ads made the choice of content analysis appear to be a reasonable, especially as the much of the existing secondary data concerning data elements is largely descriptive or explains other aspects unrelated to this research effort. Content analysis has a long and storied history within the discipline. Lasswell (1965)’s work The Language of Politics is aptly named. He and a number of subsequent scholars understood that political phenomena may not always fit within the contemporary standard of large, survey datasets as now available courtesy of the National Election Studies (NES), the General Social Survey

(GSS), Annenberg, Correlates of War, among many others (Finkel & Geer 1998; Geer
2006). All work using content analysis requires a potential data source and a manner for examining those data points in the form of a codebook. The data source used for this analysis comes from the series of ads made available on The Living Room Candidate website.
While this data is a limited one and does focus mainly on better known ads for each campaign, those ads available being prominent need not necessarily mean their ad text message would be unrepresentative, all concerns being understood (Goldstein and
Freeman 2002). The ads on the website offer an objective source from which one’s results can be replicated and tested. While accepting the limitations my data source presents my analysis, I suspect that even this collection of data should offer analysis results capable of helping me to illuminate the research questions presented in this work.
Using Geer (2006)’s caveats for helping to select the ads chosen, namely 1.) The ad needed to have been aired on television, 2.) The ad needed to be the product of the candidate’s campaign or their political party, 3.) The ad needed to have been broadcast in more than a single state, 4.) The ad had to have been broadcast in English and 5.) I only coded unique ads, and not duplicate ads (26). His first caveat that the ads needed to be no longer than 60 seconds, was accepted in spirit rather than in practice. In practice, any ad longer than 64 seconds was rejected for examination. Using these qualifiers were left me with a total of 275 ads for examination.
These caveats having been adopted, a codebook was drafted and tested. After a revision of earlier attempts at a codebook, the codebook used was finalized. The codebook used has 58 questions. These questions range from identifying questions such the ad’s given name, its spoken

and textual word count, and sponsoring candidates to a series of questions pertaining to mentions of the candidates’ names and parties, the origin of the spoken voice in the ad, any policy positions or public issues, any personal characteristics and any possible mentions of valance issues. Mentions concerning party identification, valence and public policy issues each have two lines of questioning, with one pertaining to direct mentions and another pertaining to indirect mentions. For the purpose of the statistical analyses, direct mention were treated as a one and indirect mentions were treated as a half. As shown in Figure 1, the role in policy mentions in ads has varied over time.
The transcript provided by the website were collected over a period of three days in the middle of June 2011 and a final codebook having been completed and employed for analysis in middle of July 2011. The author also served as the principle coder, coding all 275 cases with a second coder completing 28 cases using stratified sampling. Upon completion of the work, the
Cronbach’s Alpha offered by the combined effort was .865, indicating a solid though not great level of reliability in these findings. These first hand data were then transformed into a series of new data point that helped account for the total number of mentions concerning public policy, personal characteristics and valence issues.
In addition, I also sought to use the policy mention types to help generate new variables concerning whether the predominant issue in the ad could be classified as having a partisan
‘ownership’ or not, and if it did, which party ‘owns’ it. Using prior literature to inform these choices, policy areas such Education, the Environment and Health or Social Spending were classified as issues owned by Democrats while Crime, Defense, Foreign Policy and Taxes were classified as issues owned by Republicans (Petrocik 1996, Petrocik, Benoit and Hansen 2003).
Issue ads involving Social Issues and Reforming Government were not classified with either.

These data were used in tandem with a series of data gathered from the National
Elections Studies (NES) attempting to account for respondents’ level of partisanship, level of party identification, their expressed interest in the given election campaign, whether they were encouraging other people to vote for their chosen candidate in the given election and whether they were following the election campaign on television.
Evidence from Figure 1 would suggest that while policy may not receive as much attention as valence or personal qualities, when policy is presence in an ad message, that message focuses intently upon offering voters at least cosmetic amounts of information. This is not to say that earlier findings relating to ad content should not be kept in consideration, but rather these ratio measures would indicate that policy mentions may be interwoven with other forms of mentions. Two great spikes in the ratio of policy to valence and personal qualities occurred in 1972 and 1984, indicating that perhaps electoral competiveness may make policy mentions relative to other mentions less attractive as a message option.
(Insert Figure 1 Here)
Using partisanship levels on the seven point scale as my dependent variable, I ran a series of four analyses. Each analysis included one main analysis and three analyses each using separate control variables. I did not analyze pure independents in these analyses since the interplay attempting to be examined is the interplay between partisanship and reception of media content. According to a number of prior efforts dealing with negativity, Democrats were likely to suppress voter turnout and other forms of political participation when the ads turned negative while the effects were reduced for Republicans (Ansolabehere & Iyengar 1994, Kahn & Kenney
1999). While this analysis is not concerned with questions of mood as it is with question of facts and the opportunity to acquire them, the potential difference between the two parties and the

varying shades of party identification in terms of their potential for the reception of information, whether it be policy, personal or valence in nature is something that will be looked for.
Careful attention will also be given to the effects accounted for by the three control models. The three behavior being accounted for, advocating for a candidate, viewing the campaign on television and having a general interest in the campaign itself. Each control appears to be a valid and useful measure for accounting for potential variance not accounted for in the main models. Finding out how much variance each of these controls is able to separately account for will also be important for helping to determine the main model’s utility and applicability.
Accounting for the role of interest in the campaign is necessary if one is able to make any statement differentiating between respondents being interested in the campaign and people being informed by the campaign. The main model serves as evidence for determining the relationship between party identification and knowledge gain while the control models serve as evidence for the determining the relationship between party identification and political mobilization. There is something of debate concerning which members of the electorate benefit from ad message most.
Abramowitz (2010), among others, asserts that the most partisan members of the electorate should generally be the most engaged and informed by media message, even if these messages are not fully accepted or the respondent has been inoculated by preexisting viewpoints (Pfau &
Kenski 1990).
On the other hand, it would seem intuitively correct that those with the greatest partisan commitment should be the least concern with acquiring information about the parties and candidates. While there can be described a paucity of policy messages in these ads, they remain for many persons the easiest point of access to policy information pertaining to the candidates

and parties’ positions. Those with less commitment to their stated party should have the most to gain from these ads’ messages.
A cursory analysis of the 275 ads shows descriptive evidence in line with other works. In
Table 1, one can see that while the number of ads with policy mentions (either for the sponsoring candidate or for an opposing candidate), one can see a greater concentration of efforts in these ads towards valence mentions either to help advance or to help stall a given candidate’s appeal.
(Insert Table 1 Here)
As highlighted by prior research, Republican ownership of ad policy messages has been more prominent during the television era than those owned by Democrats. Of the 187 ads which had at least an indirect policy mention, 71 were in Republican owned issues, 60 were in
Democratic owned issues with the remaining 56 being in policy areas not found by prior research to offer either party a significant advantage. This dominance was also found amongst valence and personal mentions.
Part of the task in this analysis will be to demonstrate how this balance between the various forms of ad messages can help explain the statistical findings given. The rate of valence mentions does offer some implicit insight into the candidates’ media strategy. The focus on valence issues (Patriotism, Family, Faith) is capable of helping a candidate expand the electoral playing field in ways that a pure policy or party based approach may not be capable of doing.
While policy should be most effective in helping partisans closer to the middle, valence issues should be able to generate interest amongst all members of the electorate.
In summation, my research hypotheses are 1.) Respondents belonging to partisan categories farther from the middle should be less statistically influenced in the main model by the various messages, particularly policy mentions, since as strong partisans they are likely

already filtering these messages through a clear political lens., 2.) Respondents belonging to partisan categories closer to the middle of the partisan divide should be influenced by all mentions in the main model generally, though personal and valence mentions should be especially more convincing, and 3.) Democrats consistently being a greater proportion of the electorate should be more likely to be influenced generally than Republicans.
Findings
The findings presented in Tables 2 – 6 offer evidence generally supportive of the research hypotheses. Amongst the varying partisan categories, policy mentions were significant in the main model only among Weak and Independent Democrats. None of the Republican categories or the Strong Democrats were found to have any significant relationship with policy mentions.
With respect to valence and personal mentions, Weak and Independent Democrats and
Independent Republicans were found to have significant relationships with valence and/or personal mentions. What is worth noting is how amongst the Independent Democrats and
Republicans the significant relationships are generally in a positive direction, indicating the mentions have been an informative influence while the significant results amongst the Weak
Democrats were in a negative direction, indicating that mentions are not really informing these voters in the same way. If anything, these policy mentions were not helpful in reaching these members of the electorate. Amongst the Strong and Weak Republican respondents in the main or control models, no significant influence is being felt by any manner of ad messages, meaning these messages are neither significantly mobilizing them or informing them. All of the movement appears to be amongst the Democrats’ categories. Considering that over the past several decades the fifty-first voter has consistently fallen within the Democrats’ partisan adherence, these findings should not be particularly surprising.

(Insert Tables 2 – 7 Here)
This point is further supported by the various R² levels. Results for the Democratic categories are consistently greater than among the Republican categories, indicating that among the Republican categories some element or elements helping to explain this relationship are not being accounted for. Results amongst Democrats fell between .31 and .68 while it was between
.31 and .44 for Republicans. These results would at least on the surface to refute
Abramowitz’s assertion concerning an engaged public amongst the most partisan members of the electorate.
If these are the most engaged members of the electorate, then they are gaining their political information beyond the world of political campaign ads. If they are amongst the most engaged members of the electorate, this is a strong possibility, though given the availability of all persons to view a campaign ad, even if the ad is being aired for a favored candidate’s opponent, they should still be as likely as anyone else to view it, even controlling for selective exposure.
Further confirmation was offered by the results given the control models. Within both
Weak Democrats and Weak Republicans they was a significant and negative relationship given for the influence of claiming interest in the given election campaign, indicating that the efforts of the campaigns themselves could at times be counterproductive in their aims. This may be a somewhat curious finding considering that both Independent and Strong Democrats and
Republicans were found to have a significant and positive relationship given for the influence on this same variable, though such a finding both make intuitive sense and is possessed of prior research to support its presence. Those most connect with a party and those whose votes are perceived to be most in play in a given election cycle are the most likely people to be engaged in a campaign. Those lacking with sufficient partisan commitment and/or efforts being made to persuade one politically are going to be less engaged (Bartels 2000; Holbrook & McClurg 2005).

Given the ubiquity of television in American life through this period, it should not be terribly surprising to find that when the effects of those NES respondents claiming to follow the campaign on television was accounted, it produced little impact relative to the main model’s findings. If one is to influenced by television ads, it would be reasonable to expect they would be following the campaign on television.
The last control model concerning the efforts of respondents attempting to convince others to vote for one’s chosen candidate follows a predictable pattern with the most independent voters having a positive, significant relationship with the control and all other partisan categories producing a negative, significant relationship. It would seem that once a voter from the most middle grouping is convinced to support a given candidate, they seek to get others to support the candidate too. At the same time, when members of the strongest partisan categories are presented with an opportunity to convince others to cast a ballot for their given candidate, they are less likely to do so. A significant explanation for this dichotomy could be that those belonging to the most partisan categories likely are surround by other persons sharing their given political outlook, leaving open little opportunity to convince to vote a given candidate since they already intended to do so.
The role of issue ownership in these models is very limited. Amongst Democrats, only among its most independent members is any statistically significant relationship between their level of partisan identity and the role of party-owned themes. In this particular instance, there was a significant, positive relationship towards ads where Democrats own the main policy topic and a significant negative relationship towards ads where Republicans own the main policy topic. Among Republicans, issue ownership proved to be something of a statistical wash, with
Strong Republicans apparently not being significantly influenced by the party’s ownership over

an ad’s issue topic, Weak Republicans being positively and significantly influenced and
Independent Republicans being negatively and significantly influenced.
Overall, there appears to be support for each of the tested hypotheses, though with respect to the research questions, the answers are not as clear cut. While the analyses present a picture of relationships that seems to accept certain point concerning
Abramowitz’s viewpoint, namely that partisan actors are more likely to be engaged members of the electorate, it is important that one thinks about this solely in partisan terms rather than terms of polarization.
These results indicate the degree to which competition exists between the parties. No examination pertaining to issues positions or ideology was offered in this analysis, making any claims on polarization spurious ones. Moreover, his arguments were more often found among the Democrats rather the Republicans in the analyses. Have a credible explanation about only one half of the electorate is not an entirely satisfying result, even if it appears to be a valid one.
In looking at the role ad messages appear to have influenced various segments of the electorate, it would be reasonable to state that the affects have been disproportionally tilted among the Democrats with Republicans appearing not to have been as affected. Potential explanations for this findings could be the disparity between the two parties in terms of their ideological range of opinions. A party with a greater segment of an electorate in a two party system composed of voters evenly distributed across the ideological spectrum should be have more ideological diversity. This statement makes even more sense when one thinks about how the Republican candidate since 1952 has won nine of the last fifteen presidential elections.
Members of the GOP alone could not expect to win this often without considerable electorate assistance from members of the other party.

Future Considerations
There have been various debates that shaped this work: How partisan is the electorate? Is this partisanship as a meaningful indicator?, What impact does partisanship play in the reception and usage of messages gained from candidates’ ads? and What can these results inferred about the informative and mobilizing impact ads will have in future election?. With respect to the first two questions, the answer offered by this analysis would seem to confirm a Fiorina viewpoint, namely that there is some overlap between people’s partisan identities and their willingness to support candidates of other parties. Certainly the models concerning Independent Democrats and Republicans would seem to support that claim. In the language of Maarek, it would be safe assert that major party candidate have been engaging in communication strategies that sought to reach into the opposing party’s membership. It may be precisely this effort at reaching out to these voters from the other party that can help shed some light on the lack of influences facts, valence, and candidate characteristics played in the thinking of the fiercest partisans.
On the other hand, the answers offered by this analysis for the third question would seem to fall more in line with Abramowitz in his assertion that those with greater partisan convictions are more likely to engage the inform provided to them (particularly if the respondent is a
Democrat). No one could assert that candidates’ campaigns are forgetting the political and policy considerations of their most loyal members.
As to the remaining question concerning the future direction of ad campaign messages, the given trajectory of these results would seem not to indicate any reason as to why these general findings from the past fifteen elections would not hold up in subsequent campaigns. A meaningful argument in opposition to this view may assert that with technological changes and greater citizen mobility, many of our findings may not hold up when controlling for these

changes. Of course such an argument presupposes the potential effects of changes in political campaign strategy that are beyond the knowledge and reach of this current research effort. If the past is prologue, then one must think that further and more detailed examination of these relationship will yield more evidence that can help in accurately portending what is yet to come.

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Appendix A
PENULTIMATE CODEBOOK
Case General Descriptive Variables
1. Case ID #
2. Case Year #
3. Case’s Candidate Name
4. Case’s Candidate Party
0 = The Sponsoring Candidate is a Republican.
1 = The Sponsoring Candidate is a Democrat.
2 = The Sponsoring Candidate belongs is an Independent or belongs to a third party.
3 = The Case is not Sponsored by either a Candidate or a political party.
5. Case’s Candidate Status
0 = The Sponsoring Candidate is not an Incumbent President.
1 = The Sponsoring Candidate is an Incumbent President.
6. Case’s Advertisement Name
7. Case’s Time Duration (in # of Seconds)
8. Case’s Spoken Word Count (Textual Words not included in Count)
9. Case’s Textual Word Count (Spoken Words not included in Count)
10. Case’s Advertisement Spoken Language
0 = Case’s Advertisement is presented in English.
1 = Case’s Advertisement is presented in a language other than English.
Case Message Information Variables
Sponsoring & Opposing Candidates’ Mentions
11. Case’s Spoken Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate’s Name
0 = No Spoken Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate’s Name.
1 = Any Spoken Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate’s Name.

Sponsoring & Opposing Candidates’ Mentions (Continued)
12. Case’s Spoken Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate’s Name - #
13. Case’s Textual Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate’s Name
0 = There is no Textual Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate’s Name.
1 = There are Textual Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate’s Name.
14. Case’s Textual Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate Name’s - #
15. Case’s Spoken Mentions of Opposing Candidate(s) Name
0 = There are no Spoken Mentions of Opposing Candidate(s) Name(s).
1 = There are Spoken Mentions of Opposing Candidate(s) Name(s).
16. Case’s Spoken Mentions of Opposing Candidate’s Name - #
17. Case’s Textual Mentions of Opposing Candidate(s) Name
0 = There are no Textual Mentions of Opposing Candidate(s) Name(s).
1 = There are Textual Mentions of Opposing Candidate(s) Name(s).
18. Case’s Textual Mentions of Opposing Candidate Name’s - #
19. Case’s Sponsoring Candidate’s Spoken Presence – Sponsoring Candidate
0 = The Sponsoring Candidate does not speak in Advertisement.
1 = The Sponsoring Candidate does speak in Advertisement.
20. Case’s Sponsoring Candidate’s Spoken Presence – Unspecified Narrator
0 = An Unspecified Narrator does not speak in Advertisement.
1 = An Unspecified Narrator does speak in Advertisement.
21. Case’s Sponsoring Candidate’s Spoken Presence – Other than Unspecified
Narrator or Sponsoring Candidate
0 = There is not a Spoken Presence other than Sponsoring Candidate or Unspecified
Narrator.
1 = There is a Spoken Presence other than Sponsoring Candidate or Unspecified
Narrator.

Sponsoring & Opposing Candidates’ Policy/Issue Position Mentions
22. Case’s Sponsoring Candidate’s Spoken Presence – Other than Unspecified
Narrator or Sponsoring Candidate
0 = The Spoken Presence is an Unspecified Narrator or Sponsoring Candidate.
1 = The Spoken Presence is a family member of the Sponsoring Candidate.
2 = The Spoken Presence is a political colleague of the Sponsoring Candidate.
3 = The Spoken Presence is a celebrity speaking on behalf of the Sponsoring Candidate,
and not a political figure.
4 = The Spoken Presence is an ordinary citizen, not the sponsoring candidate, a celebrity,
a political colleague or a family member.
5 = The Spoken Presence is a person that does not fit into any of the prior categories.
23. Case’s Sponsoring Candidate’s Public Policy or Issue Position Mentions
0 = There are no mentions of public policy or issue positions as advocated by
Sponsoring Candidate
1 = There are mentions of public policy or issue positions as advocated by
Sponsoring Candidate
24. Case’s Sponsoring Candidate’s Public Policy or Issue Position Mentions - #
25. Case’s Sponsoring Candidate’s Public Policy or Issue Position Mentions –
Main Focus
0 = There are no mentions of public policy or issue positions as advocated by
Sponsoring Candidate
1 = The Main Focus is Microeconomic Policy. (Jobs, Wages, Taxes)
2 = The Main Focus is Macroeconomic Policy. (Debts, Deficits, Inflation)
3 = The Main Focus is Defense or Military Policy. (Defense Spending, Wars)
4 = The Main Focus is Diplomacy or Foreign Policy. (Treaties, Alliances)
5 = The Main Focus is Public Corruption or Reforming Government. (Campaign Finance)
6 = The Main Focus is Health or Social Spending Policy. (Medicare, Medicaid, Social
Security, Welfare)
7 = The Main Focus is Education Policy. (Public Education Funding, No Child Left
Behind)
8 = The Main Focus is Civil Rights Policy. (Busing, Desegregation, Women’s Rights)
9 = The Main Focus is Crime and Punishment Policy (War on Drugs, Mandatory
Sentences, Death Penalty)
10 = The Main Focus is Environmental Policy (Climate Change, Global Warming,
Conservation)
11 = The Main Focus is a Social Issue. (Prayer in Schools, Gun Rights, Abortion, GLBT
Issues)
12 = The Case’s Main Focus is on a Public Policy or Issue Position not described by
the previous categories.

Sponsoring & Opposing Candidates’ Policy/Issue Position Mentions (Continued)
26. Case’s Opposing Candidate(s)’ Public Policy or Issue Position Mentions
0 = There are no mentions of Opposing Candidate’s public policy or issue
positions by Sponsoring Candidate’s Advertisement
1 = There are mentions of Opposing Candidate’s public policy or issue positions
by Sponsoring Candidate’s Advertisement
27. Case’s Opposing Candidate(s)’ Public Policy or Issue Position Mentions - #
28. Case’s Opposing Candidate(s)’ Public Policy or Issue Position Mentions –
Main Focus
0 = There are no mentions of public policy or issue positions as advocated by
the Opposing Candidate(s).
1 = The Main Focus is Microeconomic Policy (Jobs, Wages, Taxes)
2 = The Main Focus is Macroeconomic Policy (Debt, Deficits, Inflation)
3 = The Main Focus is Defense or Military Policy (Military Spending, Wars)
4 = The Main Focus is Diplomacy or Foreign Policy (Treaties, Alliances)
5 = The Main Focus is Public Corruption or Reforming Government (Campaign Finance)
6 = The Main Focus is Health or Social Spending Policy (Medicare, Medicaid, Social
Security, Welfare)
7 = The Main Focus is Education Policy (Public Education Funding, No Child Left
Behind)
8 = The Main Focus is Civil Rights Policy (Busing, Desegregation, Women’s Rights)
9 = The Main Focus is Crime and Punishment Policy (War on Drugs, Mandatory
Sentences, Death Penalty)
10 = The Main Focus is Environmental Policy (Climate Change, Global Warming,
Conservation)
11 = The Main Focus is a Social Issue. (Prayer in Public Schools, Gun Rights, Abortion,
GLBT Issues)
12 = The Case’s Main Focus is on a Public Policy or Issue Position is not described by
the previous categories.
Sponsoring & Opposing Candidates’ Party Mentions
29. Case’s Direct Spoken Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate’s Party
0 = There are no Direct, Spoken Mentions of the Sponsoring Candidate’s Party
1 = There are Direct, Spoken Mentions of the Sponsoring Candidate’s Party

Sponsoring & Opposing Candidates’ Party Mentions (Continued)
30. Case’s Direct Spoken Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate’s Party - #
31. Case’s Direct Textual Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate’s Party
0 = There are no Direct, Spoken Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate’s Party
1 = There are Direct, Spoken Mentions of the Sponsoring Candidate’s Party
32. Case’s Direct Textual Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate’s Party - #
33. Case’s Direct Spoken Mentions of Opposing Candidate’s Party
0 = There are no Direct, Spoken Mentions of the Opposing Candidate(s)’ Party
1 = There are Direct, Spoken Mentions of the Opposing Candidate(s)’ Party
34. Case’s Direct Spoken Mentions of Opposing Candidate’s Party - #
35. Case’s Direct Textual Mentions of Opposing Candidate’s Party
0 = There are no Direct, Spoken Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate(s) Party
1 = There are Direct, Spoken Mentions of Opposing Candidate(s) Party
36. Case’s Direct Textual Mentions of Opposing Candidate’s Party - #
37. Case’s Indirect Spoken Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate’s Party
0 = There are no Indirect, Spoken Mentions of the Sponsoring Candidate’s Party
1 = There are Indirect, Spoken Mentions of the Sponsoring Candidate’s Party
38. Case’s Indirect Spoken Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate’s Party - #
39. Case’s Indirect Textual Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate’s Party
0 = There are no Indirect, Spoken Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate’s Party
1 = There are Indirect, Spoken Mentions of the Sponsoring Candidate’s Party
40. Case’s Indirect Textual Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate’s Party - #
41. Case’s Indirect Spoken Mentions of Opposing Candidate’s Party
0 = There are no Indirect, Spoken Mentions of the Opposing Candidate(s)’ Party
1 = There are Indirect, Spoken Mentions of the Opposing Candidate(s)’ Party

Sponsoring & Opposing Candidates’ Party Mentions (Continued)
42. Case’s Indirect Spoken Mentions of Opposing Candidate’s Party - #
43. Case’s Indirect Textual Mentions of Opposing Candidate’s Party
0 = There are no Indirect, Spoken Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate(s) Party
1 = There are Indirect, Spoken Mentions of Opposing Candidate(s) Party
44. Case’s Indirect Textual Mentions of Opposing Candidate’s Party - #
Sponsoring & Opposing Candidates’ Personal Characteristic Mentions
45. Case’s Sponsoring Candidate’s Personal Characteristic Mentions
0 = There are no mentions of Personal Background Characteristics (Prior
Political or Work Experience or Biography)
1 = There are mentions of personal Background Characteristics (Prior Political
or Work Experience or Biography)
46. Case’s Sponsoring Candidate’s Personal Characteristic Mentions - #
47. Case’s Opposing Candidate(s)’ Personal Characteristic Mentions
0 = There are no mentions of Personal Background Characteristics (Prior
Political or Work Experience or Biography)
1 = There are mentions of Personal Background Characteristics (Prior Political
Or Work Experience or Biography)
48. Case’s Opposing Candidate’s Personal Characteristic Mentions - #
Sponsoring & Opposing Candidates’ Valence Issue Mentions
49. Case’s Direct, Spoken Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate’s Valence Issues
0 = There are no Direct, Spoken Mentions of Valence Issues (i.e. Patriotism, Family,
Faith)
1 = There are Direct, Spoken Mentions of Valence Issues (i.e. Patriotism, Family, Faith)
50. Case’s Direct, Spoken Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate’s Valence Issues - #

Sponsoring & Opposing Candidates’ Valence Issue Mentions (Continued)
51. Case’s Direct, Textual Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate’s Valence Mentions
0 = There are no Direct, Textual Mentions of Valence Issues (i.e. Patriotism, Family,
Faith)
1 = There are Direct, Textual Mentions of Valence Issues (i.e. Patriotism, Family, Faith)
52. Case’s Direct, Textual Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate’s Valence Issues - #
53. Case’s Direct, Spoken Mentions of Opposing Candidate’s Valence Issues
0 = There are no Direct, Spoken Mentions of Valence Issues (i.e. Patriotism, Family,
Faith)
1 = There are Direct, Spoken Mentions of Valence Issues (i.e. Patriotism, Family, Faith)
54. Case’s Direct, Spoken Mentions of Opposing Candidate’s Valence Issues - #
55. Case’s Direct, Textual Mentions of Opposing Candidate’s Valence Mentions
0 = No Textual Mentions of Valence Issues (i.e. Patriotism, Family, Faith)
1 = Any Textual Mentions of Valence Issues (i.e. Patriotism, Family, Faith)
56. Case’s Direct, Textual Mentions of Opposing Candidate’s Valence Issues - #
57. Case’s Sponsoring Candidate’s Valence Issues – Main Focus
0 = There are no Mentions of Valence Issues as advocated by the Sponsoring
Candidate.
1 = The Valence Issue being advanced by the Sponsoring Candidate involves Patriotism
or Nationalism.
2 = The Valence Issue being advanced by the Sponsoring Candidate involves Faith or
Religion.
3 = The Valence Issue being advanced by the Sponsoring Candidate involves Home or
the Family.
4 = The Valence Issue being advanced by the Sponsoring Candidate involves Ethics or
Morality though not necessarily Faith or Religion.
5 = The Valence Issue being advanced by the Sponsoring Candidate is a Valence Issue
that is not described by the previous categories.

Sponsoring & Opposing Candidates’ Valence Issue Mentions (Continued)
58. Case’s Opposing Candidate(s)’ Valence Issues – Main Focus
0 = There are no mentions of Valence Issues as advocated by the Sponsoring
Candidate concerning the Opposing Candidate(s)’.
1 = The Valance Issue being advanced by the Sponsoring Candidate concerning the
Opposing Candidate(s)’ Patriotism or Nationalism.
2 = The Valance Issue being advanced by the Sponsoring Candidate concerning the
Opposing Candidate(s)’ Faith or Religion.
3 = The Valance Issue being advanced by the Sponsoring Candidate concerning the
Opposing Candidate(s)’ Home or Family.
4 = The Valance Issue being advanced by the Sponsoring Candidate concerning the
Opposing Candidate(s)’ Ethics & Morality though not necessarily their Faith or
Religion.
5 = The Valance Issue being advanced by the Sponsoring Candidate concerning the
Opposing Candidate(s)’ involves an issue category that is not described by the
previous categories.

Ad Mention Type
TABLE 1
PARTISAN OWNERSHIP OF AD ISSUE MENTIONS, 1952-2008
Owned by Owned by Not Owned by
Republicans Democrats Either Party
Policy
Personal
Valence
71
28
62
60
26
44
56
77
123
TABLE 2
REGRESSION MODELS BY PARTISANSHIP LEVEL, 1952-2008
Strong Democratic Models Main
Model
Control
Model 1
Control
Model 2
Intercept
Policy Mentions
Personal Mentions
Valence Mentions
% Strong Partisans
% Weak Partisans
% Independent Partisans
GOP Owned Ad Theme
Dem Owned Ad Theme
% Claim Interest in
Campaign
% Attempting to Convince
Others to Vote for Candidate
% Watching Campaign on TV
R-Squared
Adj. R-Squared
N
0.55 (0.58)
0.06 (0.96)
-1.49 (0.14)
-0.60 (0.56)
2.97 (0.00) **
-0.57 (0.57)
-0.54 (0.59)
0.52 (0.60)
0.17 (0.86)
N/A
N/A
N/A
0.69
0.68
275
6.90 (0.00)**
1.40 (0.16)
-0.18 (0.86)
1.59 (0.11)
-2.70 (0.01)*
6.26 (0.00) **
-7.23 (0.00) **
-2.29 (0.02)*
-0.08 (0.43)
11.79
(0.00) **
N/A
N/A
0.80
0.79
275
1.87 (0.06)
0.02 (0.98)
-1.58 (0.11)
0.20 (0.84)
2.28 (0.02)*
-1.75 (0.08)
-1.21 (0.23)
-0.37 (0.71)
-0.87 (0.39)
N/A
-7.36
(0.00) **
N/A
0.75
0.74
275
Total
187
121
229
Control
Model 3
-0.81 (0.42)
0.03 (0.98)
-0.50 (0.62)
-0.92 (0.36)
3.39 (0.00)**
0.76 (0.45)
0.13 (0.90)
0.49 (0.63)
0.23 (0.82)
N/A
N/A
2.30 (0.22)
0.71
0.70
255

TABLE 3
REGRESSION MODELS BY PARTISANSHIP LEVEL, 1952-2008
Weak Democratic Models Main
Model
Control
Model 1
Control
Model 2
Intercept
Policy Mentions
Personal Mentions
Valence Mentions
% Strong Partisans
% Weak Partisans
% Independent Partisans
GOP Owned Ad Theme
Dem Owned Ad Theme
% Claim Interest in
Campaign
% Attempting to Convince
Others to Vote for Candidate
% Watching Campaign on TV
R-Squared
Adj. R-Squared
N
4.96 (0.00)**
-2.40 (0.02)*
-3.88 (0.00) **
-2.52 (0.01) **
5.16 (0.00) **
5.95 (0.00) **
4.42 (0.00)**
4.05 (0.00)**
1.78 (0.08)
N/A
N/A
N/A
0.25
0.23
275
5.83 (0.00)** 3.99 (0.00)**
-1.24 (0.22) -2.70 (0.01)**
-0.18 (0.86)
0.39 (0.69)
-4.48 (0.00)**
-1.78 (0.08)
-4.34 (0.00)** 4.70 (0.00)**
-2.45 (0.02) * 5.35 (0.00)**
-7.06 (0.00) ** 4.32 (0.00)**
0.99 (0.33)
1.11 (0.27)
-25.24
(0.00) **
3.43 (0.01)**
0.63 (0.53)
N/A
N/A -10.02
(0.00) **
N/A
0.78
0.77
275
N/A
0.46
0.44
275
TABLE 4
REGRESSION MODELS BY PARTISANSHIP LEVEL, 1952-2008
Independent Democratic Models Main
Model
Control
Model 1
Control
Model 2
Intercept
Policy Mentions
Personal Mentions
Valence Mentions
% Strong Partisans
% Weak Partisans
% Independent Partisans
GOP Owned Ad Theme
Dem Owned Ad Theme
% Claim Interest in
Campaign
% Attempting to Convince
Others to Vote for Candidate
% Watching Campaign on TV
R-Squared
Adj. R-Squared
N
6.86 (0.00)**
2.11 (0.04)*
3.21 (0.00)**
2.58 (0.01)**
-4.15 (0.00)** 7.12 (0.00)**
0.63 (0.53) 3.05 (0.00)**
2.51 (0.01)** 4.85 (0.00)**
0.62 (0.54) 1.76 (0.08)
-7.19 (0.00)**
-5.73 (0.00)**
2.03 (0.00)**
3.98 (0.00) **
-8.55 (0.00)**
-5.79 (0.00)**
-6.73 (0.00)** -4.87 (0.00) ** -8.78 (0.00)**
-4.38 (0.00)**
2.57 (0.01)*
N/A
-1.45 (0.15) -4.27 (0.00)**
-2.83 (0.01)** -1.47 (0.24)
30.74
(0.00) **
N/A
N/A N/A
N/A
0.31
0.29
275
N/A
0.85
0.84
275
19.36
(0.00) **
N/A
0.71
0.70
275
Control
Model 3
-7.28 (0.00)**
-2.15 (0.03)*
-3.06 (0.02)*
-1.88 (0.06)
7.45 (0.00)**
8.09 (0.00)**
6.67 (0.00)**
3.58 (0.00)**
1.38 (0.17)
N/A
N/A
-1.93 (0.05)
0.32
0.29
255
Control
Model 3
7.78 (0.00) **
1.82 (0.07)
3.05 (0.01)**
1.66 (0.10)
-8.21 (0.00)**
-6.76 (0.00)**
-7.89 (0.00)**
-3.84 (0.00)**
-2.08 (0.04)*
N/A
N/A
3.64 (0.00)**
0.36
0.34
255

TABLE 5
REGRESSION MODELS BY PARTISANSHIP LEVEL, 1952-2008
Independent Republican Models Main
Model
Control
Model 1
Control
Model 2
Intercept
Policy Mentions
Personal Mentions
Valence Mentions
% Strong Partisans
% Weak Partisans
% Independent Partisans
GOP Owned Ad Theme
Dem Owned Ad Theme
% Claim Interest in
Campaign
% Attempting to Convince
Others to Vote for Candidate
% Watching Campaign on TV
R-Squared
Adj. R-Squared
N
3.16 (0.00)**
1.83 (0.07)
3.78 (0.00)**
1.58 (0.12)
-3.34 (0.00) **
-2.26 (0.25)
-1.94 (0.05) *
-2.86 (0.01)**
-0.91 (0.37)
N/A
N/A
N/A
0.31
0.29
275
-4.66 (0.00)** 2.40 (0.02)*
0.57 (0.56) 1.85 (0.07)
3.01 (0.01)** 3.91 (0.00)**
-0.91 (0.36) 1.08 (0.28)
3.74 (0.00) ** -2.83 (0.01)
4.69 (0.00) **
6.29 (0.00) **
0.02 (0.99)
0.08 (0.93)
15.52
(0.00) **
-1.58 (0.11)
-1.61 (0.11)
-2.34 (0.02)*
-0.25 (0.80)
N/A
N/A 4.78
(0.00) **
N/A
0.64
0.63
275
N/A
0.37
0.34
275
TABLE 6
REGRESSION MODELS BY PARTISANSHIP LEVEL, 1952-2008
Weak Republican Models Main
Model
Control
Model 1
Control
Model 2
Intercept
Policy Mentions
Personal Mentions
Valence Mentions
% Strong Partisans
% Weak Partisans
% Independent Partisans
GOP Owned Ad Theme
Dem Owned Ad Theme
% Claim Interest in
Campaign
% Attempting to Convince
Others to Vote for Candidate
% Watching Campaign on TV
R-Squared
Adj. R-Squared
N
-6.44 (0.00)**
0.04 (0.97)
-1.11 (0.27)
-0.39 (0.70)
7.02 (0.00) **
9.02 (0.00)**
5.85 (0.00)**
2.04 (0.04)*
2.15 (0.03)*
N/A
N/A
N/A
0.30
0.28
275
6.90 (0.00)** - 6.09 (0.00) **
1.40 (0.16) 0.24 (0.81)
-0.19 (0.85)
1.65 (0.10)
- 1.44 (0.15)
1.28 (0.20)
1.91 (0.06) 7.65 (0.00) **
4.32 (0.00) ** 9.98 (0.00) **
- 0.07 (0.95) 6.79 (0.00) **
- 0.30 (0.77)
1.64 (0.10)
-10.79
(0.00) **
0.80 (0.43)
-0.69 (0.49)
N/A
N/A
N/A
0.51
0.50
275
-15.88
(0.00) **
N/A
0.64
0.63
275
Control
Model 3
-6.01 (0.00) **
0.16 (0.87)
-0.92 (0.36)
-0.21 (0.84)
6.28 (0.00)**
8.25 (0.00) **
5.09 (0.00) **
1.82 (0.07)
1.93 (0.06)
N/A
N/A
-0.70 (0.49)
0.31
0.28
255
Control
Model 3
6.72 (0.00)*
1.72 (0.09)
2.32 (0.02)*
1.59 (0.11)
-6.54 (0.00)**
-5.77 (0.00)**
-4.72 (0.00)**
-2.69 (0.01)**
-0.72 (0.47)
N/A
N/A
-1.26 (0.21)
0.42
0.40
255

N
TABLE 7
REGRESSION MODELS BY PARTISANSHIP LEVEL, 1952-2008
Strong Republican Models
Intercept
Policy Mentions
Personal Mentions
Valence Mentions
% Strong Partisans
% Weak Partisans
% Independent Partisans
GOP Owned Ad Theme
Dem Owned Ad Theme
% Claim Interest in
Campaign
% Attempting to Convince
Others to Vote for Candidate
% Watching Campaign on TV
R-Squared
Adj. R-Squared
Main
Model
- 0.55 (0.58)
0.06 (0.96)
-1.49 (0.14)
-0.60 (0.56)
2.67 (0.01) **
0.57 (0.57)
0.54 (0.59)
-0.52 (0.60)
-0.17 (0.87)
N/A
N/A
N/A
0.44
0.42
275
Control
Model 1
Control
Model 2
-6.90 (0.00)**
1.40 (0.16)
0.18 (0.86)
-1.59 (0.11)
1.87 (0.06)
-0.02 (0.98)
1.58 (0.11)
- 0.20 (0.84)
8.72 (0.00) ** 3.85 (0.02) *
6.26 (0.00) **
7.03 (0.00) **
2.29 (0.02)*
-0.80 (0.43)
11.79
(0.00) **
1.75 (0.08)
1.21 (0.23)
0.37 (0.71)
0.87 (0.39)
N/A
N/A -7.36
(0.00) **
N/A
0.63
0.62
275
N/A
0.53
0.52
275
Control
Model 3
0.81 (0.42)
-0.03 (0.98)
-0.50 (0.62)
-0.92 (0.36)
1.21 (0.23)
-0.76 (0.45)
-0.13 (0.90)
-0.49 (0.63)
-0.23 (0.82)
N/A
N/A
-2.30 (0.22)
0.46
0.44
255