Apocalyptic Discourse K-Carrane 2014
Negative
**TOP SHELF/1NC**
1NC Apocalyptic Discourse Kritik
The 1AC portrays environmental issues through the lens of apocalypse-this
perpetuates an ecology of fear
Swyngendouw 10-Erik, professor of geography at the University of Manchester, former
professor and lecturer in geography at Oxford University (March-May 2010, “Apocalypse
Forever?: Post-political Populism and the Spectre of Climate Change”, Theory, Culture
and Society, SageJournals date accessed 7/14/14) HC
In this consensual setting,
environmental problems are generally staged as universally threatening to the
survival of humankind, announcing the premature termination of civilization as we know it
and
sustained by what Mike Davis (1999) aptly called " ecologies of fear . The discursive matrix through which the
contemporary meaning of the environmental condition is woven is one quilted systematically by the
continuous invocation of fear and danger, the spectre of ecological annihilation or at least seriously
distressed socio-ecological conditions for many people in the near future. 'Fear* is indeed the crucial
node through which much of the current environmental narrative is wove n, and continues to feed the
concern with 'sustainability*. This cultivation of "ecologies of fear*, in turn, is sustained in part by a
particular set of phantasmagorical imaginaries (KLatz. 1995). The apocalyptic imaginary of a world without
water, or at least with endemic water shortages, ravaged by hurricanes whose intensity is amplified by
climate change; pictures of scorched land as global warming shifts the geo- pluvial regime and the
spatial variability of droughts and floods ; icebergs that disintegrate around the poles as ice melts into
the sea. causing the sea level to rise; alarming reductions in biodiversity as species disappear or are
threatened by extinction: post-apocalyptic images of waste lands reminiscent of the silent ecologies of
the region around Chernobyl: the threat of peak-oil that, without proper management and
technologically innovative foresight, would return society to a Stone Age existence: the devastation of
wildfires, tsunamis, diseases like SARS. avian flu. Ebola or HIV. all these imaginaries of a Nature out of
synch, destabilized, threatening and out of control are paralleled by equally disturbing images of a
society that continues piling up waste, pumping CO2 into the atmosphere, deforesting the earth, etc. This
is a process that Neil Smith appropriately refers to as "nature-washing" (2008: 245). In sum. our ecological predicament is
sutured by millennial fears, sustained by an apocalyptic rhetoric and representational tactics, and by
a series of performative gestures signalling an over- whelming, mind-boggling danger , one that
threatens to undermine the very coordinates of our everyday lives and routines, and may shake up the
foundations of all we took and take for granted. Table 1 exemplifies some of the imaginaries that are continuouslv invoked.
Apocalyptic scenario planning renders structural violence invisible-The alternative
embraces the everyday violence in the world as a path for a new form of politics.
Swyndegouw 13-Erik, professor of geography at the University of Manchester, former
professor and lecturer in geography at Oxford University (2/6/13, “Apocalypse Now!:
Fear and Doomsday Pleasures”, Capitalism Nature and Socialism vol 24 no 1, accessed
through ProQuest, date accessed 7/18/14) HC
Against this cynical stand, the third, and for me proper, leftist response to the apocalyptic imaginary is
twofold and cuts through the deadlock embodied by the first two responses. To begin with, the
revelatory promise of the apocalyptic narrative has to be fully rejected . In the face of the cataclysmic
imaginaries mobilized to assure that the apocalypse will NOT happen (if the right techno-managerial
actions are taken), the only reasonable response is "Don't worry (Al Gore, Prince Charles, many
environmental activists____), you are really right, the environmental apocalypse WILL not only happen,
it has already happened, IT IS ALREADY HERE." Many are already living in the post-apocalyptic
interstices of life, whereby the fusion of environmental transformation and social conditions, render
life "bare." The fact that the socio-environmental imbroglio has already passed the point of no return
has to be fully asserted . The socio-environmental Armageddon is already here for many; it is not
some distant dystopian promise mobilized to trigger response today . Water conflicts, struggles for
food, environmental refugees, etc. testify to the socio-ecological predicament that choreographs
everyday life for the majority of the world's population . Things are already too late; they have always
already been too late. There is no Arcadian place, time, or environment to return to, no benign socioecological past that needs to be maintained or stabilized. Many already live in the interstices of the
apocalypse, albeit a combined and uneven one. It is only within the realization of the apocalyptic
reality of the now that a new politics might emerge.
2NC Link Modules
The rhetoric of the affirmative makes environmental destruction an inevitable
catastrophe-they ascribe to the same language as the press and fanatics
Faust and Murphy 9-Christina,Assistant Professor in the Department of Human
Connection Studies at the University of Denver, William Murphy-Doctoral Student and
Graduate Teaching Instructor in the Department of Human Communication Studies at
the University of Denver (“Revealing and Reframing Apocalyptic Tragedy in Global
Warming Discourse”, Environmental Communication vol 3 no 2, accessed through Taylor
and Francis Online, date accessed 7/21/14) HC
Interrogating the press coverage of climate change is important, for a substantial portion of the general
public's knowledge—and their perceptions of the issue's risk— come from the media (Carvalho & Burgess,
2005). As Boykoff and Boykoff (2004) argue, the "coverage of global warming is not just a collection of news articles;
it is a social relationship between people that is mediated by [the) news" (p. 126). Unfortunately, as a
growing literature suggests, the press's power to constitute public interest, and serve the greater good,
may be failing in the case of climate change. Scholars have critiqued the misinformation spread through
the press due to media- corporate ties (Mazur, 1998), and journalistic practices such as using "balanced"
reporting which disputes the scientific consensus that human-induced climate change is a real, urgent
problem (Boykoff, 2007a; Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004). Along with identifying the ways that powerful interests and professional practices
influence the media coverage of climate change, scholars have attended to the press's shaping of global warming as a political issue and
scientific discourse (Russill, 2008). The tool of frame analysis has proven quite useful to these efforts (Antilla, 2005; Boykoff, 2007b; Jones,
2006). Frame analysis not only permits critics to identify constitutive structures in a discourse, but also to consider the structures* possible
impacts in terms of agency, public opinion, policy, and democracy (Ott & Aoki, 2002). The force of hegemonic ideologies, the values of a profitdriven media, and the professional practices and codes of journalism impact the way the press frames important public issues (Iyengar, 1991).
Frames are "familiar and highly ritualized symbolic structures" which "organize the content and serve to close off specific pathways of meaning
while promoting others" (Tucker, 1998, p. 143). Frame analysis assumes that the press not only sets an agenda in terms of what issues are
salient or important for the public, but also shapes how readers may define problems, attribute causes, and evaluate solutions (Entman, 1993;
Scheufele, 2006). While frames "cannot guarantee how a reader will interpret or comprehend" an issue or text, they "play a fundamental role
in structuring the range of likely decoditigs" (Greenberg & Knight, 2004, p. 157), often in ways that support dominant ideologies. For instance,
Antilla (2005) found that US
press coverage framed climate change in terms of controversy, skepticism, and
uncertainty. Such framing upholds prevailing ideologies of "free-market capitalism and neo-liberalism"
(Carvalho, 2005, p. 21). It has impacts beyond individual readers' interpretations, as Boykoff (2007b) argues, opening
"spaces for US federal policy actors to defray responsibility and delay action regarding climate change"
(p. 486). Given its power to shape interpretations, policy, and action, close attention to how the press
frames the issue is crucial to building a political will to mitigate climate change. Apocalyptic rhetoric, we
argue, represents a mediating frame in global warming discourse. Certain versions of this frame may
stifle individual and collective agency, due to their persistent placement of "natural" events as
catastrophic, inevitable, and outside of "human" control. Analyzing them could help explain why some individuals take a
fatalistic attitude toward, or consider their agency very small in comparison to, the challenge of climate change (Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole &
Whitmarsh, 2007). Moreover, apocalyptic framing helps us understand two vocal minorities who might well stand in the way of building a
collective will—the alarmists, who believe global warming's "catastrophic consequences" are veritably unstoppable, and the naysayers, who
view global warming as a conspiracy created by environmentalists and the media (Leiserowitz, 2005, p. 1440). In the ludeo-C-hristian religious
tradition, the apocalypse refers to prophesying, revealing, or visioning the imminent destruction or the world (Zamora, 1982). Common
connotations of apocalypse are influenced by pre-millennial theology, which foregrounds the world-ending moment that precedes the second
coming of lesus Christ. Brummett (1991) and O'Leary (1993) argue that apocalypse
is so prevalent in secular as well as
sacred discourse that it constitutes its own unique genre Apocalyptic rhetoric typically takes shape in
narrative form, emphasizing a catastrophic telos (end-point) somewhere in the future (Brummett, 1991). A
cosmic or natural force drives the linear temporality in apocalyptic rhetoric, such that "certain events
and experiences are inevitable, unalterable, and determined by external forces beyond human control"
(Wojcik, 1996, p. 298). The narrative in apocalyptic discourse typically posits a tragic ending—"a date or
temporal horizon beyond which human choice is superfluous, a final Judgment that forecloses all
individual judgments" (O'Leary, 1993, p. 409). Apocalyptic rhetoric prophesies (directly or implicitly) a new
world order, often accompanied by spectacular, (melo)dramatic, or fantastical images of the destruction
of the current order (Brummett, 1984). Common apocalyptic discourses suggest that the social order is
beyond repair. Given the "unrecuperably evil world" and "bankrupt society on the verge of imminent"
collapse—as well as the cosmic force driving apocalyptic events—there is seemingly no reason to
attempt social change once an issue is framed apocalyptically (Wojcik, 1996, p. 312). Like God's wrath or nuclear war,
the apocalyptic scenario is so much greater than humanity (let alone individual human efforts), that there seems little hope for intervention.
However, some scholars argue that apocalyptic discourse is inherently ambivalent, offering the possibility to inspire human agency even within
a ruinous scenario (O'Leary, 1993). Fatalistic and optimistic views co-exist in some environmentalists' conceptions of apocalypse: Disaster ...
represents a desecration of a sacred world, and it is to be resisted with all of one's passion. It is simultaneously, almost certainly, the only
conceivable path back to a paradise where humans live in harmony within the sacred, natural order, and thus, in the final moment, it may need
to be embraced. (Taylor, 1999, p. 382) We believe that the variations in apocalyptic discourses are not only "in the eye of the beholder." but arc
also identifiable as rhetorical differences in texts themselves. Thus, following O'Leary (1993), we identify two
main variations of the
apocalyptic frame: a tragic apocalypse, characterized by "resignation" (Burke, 1984, p. 37) to a foretold
ending; and a comic apocalypse, discernible through its more forgiving outlook on humanity "not as
vicious, but mistaken" (Burke, 1984, p. 41). The two frames are distinguishable through their construction of agency,
temporality, and telos. Comic variations posit that "time is open-ended, allowing for the possibility of change, while the tragic
conception of Fate promotes a view of time and human action as closed" (O'Leary, 1993, p. 392). Viewing
apocalypse tragically suggests that human agency is limited to "following the divine will and behaving in ways
decreed by God" (Wojcik, 1996, p. 314), toward a catastrophic telos which is clear and unstoppable. Taking a comic
perspective, humans are responsible for a course of actions, giving them some play in influencing their fate (while not totally changing the
disastrous outcome foretold, an outcome which is more ambiguous than the of rhetoric. Apocalyptic rhetoric typically takes shape in narrative
form, emphasizing a catastrophic telos (end-point) somewhere in the future (Brummett, 1991). Acosmic or natural force drives the linear
temporality in apocalyptic rhetoric, such that "certain events and experiences are inevitable, unalterable, and determined by external forces
beyond human control" (Wojcik, 1996, p. 298). The narrative in apocalyptic discourse typically posits a tragic ending—"a date or temporal
horizon beyond which human choice is superfluous, a final Judgment that forecloses all individual judgments" (O'Leary, 1993, p. 409).
Apocalyptic rhetoric prophesies (directly or implicitly) a new world order, often accompanied by spectacular, (melo)dramatic, or fantastical
images of the destruction of the current order (Brummett, 1984).. Taking a comic perspective, humans are responsible for a course of actions,
giving them some play in influencing their fate (while not totally changing the disastrous outcome foretold, an outcome which is more
ambiguous than the tragic telos). Though apocalyptic rhetoric is associated with religious fundamentalism, scientists,
environmentalists, and journalists structure their discourse on climate change through tragic and comic
variants. At times, their framing embraces a limited spirit of optimism concerning humanity's potential
to influence the crisis; and at other times, their framing accepts climate catastrophe as Fated. Comic and
tragic apocalyptic framing has important consequences for amassing a political will to mitigate global warming. While p re-millennial prophets
empower audiences by encouraging them to see their worldviews as correct (Brummett, 1991), they
offer no recourse for
audiences to act upon the changes occurring around them (save for personal actions, such as repentance or agreeing with
the prophet's forecast). Comic features may be better suited to building the broad coalition necessary to curb global warming.
The apocalypse the world of the aff preaches is one without redemption-using this
language further retrenches the world in environmental limbo
Swyngedouw 10-Erik, professor of geography at the University of Manchester, former
professor and lecturer in geography at Oxford University (March-May 2010, “Apocalypse
Forever?: Post-political Populism and the Spectre of Climate Change”, Theory, Culture
and Society, SageJournals date accessed 7/14/14) HC
Of course, apocalyptic imaginaries have been around for a long time as an integral part of Western thought, first of Christianity and1 later
emerging as the underbelly of fast-forwarding technological modernization and its associated doomsday thinkers. However, present-day
millennialism preaches an apocalypse without the promise of redemption. Saint Johns biblical apocalypse, for
example, found its redemption in Gods infinite love. The proliferation of modem apocalyptic imaginaries also held up
the promise of redemption: the horsemen of the apocalypse, whether riding under the name of the
proletariat, technology or capitalism, could be tamed with appropriate political and social revolutions. As
Martin Jay argued, while traditional apocalyptic versions still held out the hope for redemption, for a 'second
coming*, for the promise of a "new dawn*, environmental apocalyptic imaginaries are 'leaving behind
any hope of rebirth or renewal... in favour of an unquenchable fascination with living on the verge of an
end that never comes" (1994: 33). The emergence of new forms of millenmalism around the environmental
nexus is of a particular kind that promises neither redemption nor realization. As Klaus Scherpe (1987) insists, this
is not simply apocalypse now, but apocalypse forever. It is a vision that does not suggest, prefigure or
expect the necessity of an event that will alter history*. Derrida (referring to the nuclear threat in the 1980s) sums this up
most succinctly: ... here, precisely, is announced - as promise or as threat - an apocalypse without
apocalypse, an apocalypse without vision, without truth, without relation . . . without message and
without destination, without sender and without decidable addressee ... an apocalypse beyond good
and evil.
Turns Case-Skepticism
Turns case-apocalyptic framing doesn’t encourage activism-inspires skepticism and
divisiveness
Faust et al 8 (Christina- Assistant Professor in the Department of Human Connection Studies at the
University of Denver, William Murphy-Doctoral Student and Graduate Teaching Instructor in the
Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver, Chelsea Stow-Doctoral
Student and Graduate Teaching Instructor in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the
University of Denver, “Global Warming and Apocalyptic Rhetoric: A Critical Frame Analysis of US Popular
and Elite Press Coverage from 1997-2007,” Paper submitted to the Environmental Communication
Division of the National Communication Association convention, San Diego, California, November 2008,
http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/6/0/1/2/pages260125/p260125
-1.php) HC
Since the release of Al Gore’s award-winning documentary, An Inconvenient Truth, the American public has been faced with an increasing
amount of discourse on climate change. Leiserowitz (2007) concludes that “Large majorities of Americans believe that global warming is real
and consider it a serious problem, yet global warming remains a low priority relative to other national and environmental issues” (p. 44).
Indeed, though the United States emits a shockingly disproportionate amount of greenhouse gases, large-scale policy changes or even a
precursory conversation about changing the energy economy have been slow in coming. Meanwhile, climate scientists
and others
concerned about global warming have continued to sound the alarm with increasing urgency (Moser &
Dilling, 2004). In her review of the 1999 book, The Heat is On, Catherine Keller (1999) identifies a tendency to “read [climate
change] data apocalyptically” (p. 42), which has devastating consequences for motivating the public to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The apocalyptic tone of climate change discourse may not only
encourage a feeling of despair in the face of impending disaster, but also contributes to skeptics’ ability
to discredit climate scientists as alarmists (Leiserowitz, 2007). Yet, as Killingsworth and Palmer (1996) suggest, environmental
advocates like Rachel Carson have relied upon dire predictions of the world’s end to provoke necessary action: “To employ apocalyptic rhetoric
is to imply the need for radical change, to mark oneself as an outsider in a progressive culture, to risk alienation, and to urge others out into the
open air of political rebellion.” (p. 41). Though apocalyptic language often reads as divisive, this particular strategy ultimately
invites widespread attention to environmental issues. Scholars, opinionists and journalists have drawn connections between an apocalypse and
climate change as a discourse and urgent environmental issue; but as our
literature review reveals, no sustained analysis
has been undertaken concerning the prevalence, and possible implications, of an apocalyptic frame for
global warming. As Keller, Leiserowitz, and Killingsworth and Palmer suggest, the possibility of an apocalyptic frame invites attention to
important questions concerning how it is best to shape or present information on global warming to encourage productive public discourse and
social change. Suzanne Moser and Lisa Dilling (2007), scientists at the National Center for Atmospheric Research, conclude that
to inspire
a movement to combat global warming, we need “greater multi- and interdisciplinary research on
communication and social change” (p. 508). Heeding the call, we consider the following questions guide when approaching
communication and climate change: Does apocalyptic rhetoric structure coverage of global warming in the United States’ elite and popular
press? In what ways does the United States’ elite and popular press implicitly and explicitly position global warming within the apocalyptic
frame? What are the implications of framing global warming apocalyptically? Through a qualitative-critical analysis of US elite and popular press
coverage of global warming, we argue that the
apocalyptic frame structures much of the discourse, and may be
responsible for moving the American public, as Al Gore stated in An Inconvenient Truth, “straight from denial to
despair.” By interrogating the apocalyptic frame, we hope to inspire better ways to structure
communication about global warming, lessening barriers to individual and collective agency. Media Coverage
of Global Warming: Situating the Apocalyptic Frame
**LINKS**
Anthro Links
The affirmative’s apocalyptic rhetoric is anthropocentric-homogenizes the animal
populace with the exception of the most human-like
Collard 13-Rosemary-Claire, PhD in geography from University of British Columbia, postdoctoral fellow at University of Toronto, Canada, received several grants from the Liu
Institute for Global Issues at University of British Columbia (“Apocalypse Meow”,
Capitalism Nature and Socialism vol. 24 no. 1, accessed via ProQuest, date accessed
7/17/14) HC
In short, the
human at once relies upon and denies the ultimate dispossessed and abject "other": "the
animal."1 Its exclusions are material as well as symbolic; they are political-ethical-economic; and they
enable multi-species dispossession on a grand and systemic scale. The human is a master accumulation
strategy. I wonder if apocalypse might be recuperated as an opportunity for denaturalizing the human,
fixating on its "abyssal limits" and allowing possibly even the apocalypse of the human, what I here (with
generous narrative license!) call apocalypse meow. It must be confessed at the outset that this paper operates on a rather polemical register. I
gratefully follow Wainwright (2010. 984). who joins Derrida in declaring that polemic is necessary "wherever there
is thinking about
the boundaries and character of a field of knowledge, or discipline." The human is undoubtedly one such
boundary. Onward! .. .To my first TV celebrity encounter. It was not with Rosie O'Donnell or Bob Barker or any other kind of TV star who
probably comes to mind. It was with a gecko. S/he was the lead actor in a commercial for Telus—a Canadian telecommunications company. I
also met the toad star of a Mitsubishi commercial. In both cases I played it cool, although I cannot take too much credit for my reaction,
because the animals did not exactly have the intimidating. lavish lifestyles of the rich and famous. When not on the film set. they live in small
glass tanks furnished with thick green vegetation. Gary Oliver, their caretaker, mists them regularly with water. Oliver keeps over a hundred
exotic animals in a warehouse just south of Vancouver. Canada. Dual animal rental agency and animal sanctuary. Oliver's business. Cinemazoo,
takes in unwanted exotic pets and provides them with food and shelter, renting some animals for films, television, and for presentations at
schools, birthday parties, and corporate events. Oliver sees himself as "a shepherd of different types of animals." Convinced that "seeing
animals in real life" is an essential part of learning to care and respect for them. Oliver has dedicated his life to exhibiting exotic animals that he
refers to as "ambassadors for their species." Oliver's mission echoes modern zoos* mantra. Over the past few decades, zoos worldwide have
remade themselves along conservation lines, advertising a two-fold conservation mandate: species breeding and "real life" encounters with
animals. This mandate obtains traction through two legitimating conditions, the first more debatable than the second: 1) people are
increasingly estranged from animals in their daily life; and 2) some
species populations are so diminished that the only
place humans can guarantee their continued existence at all is in a cage.This is a seriously sad state of
affairs. Some might even say apocalyptic. For many species it might be said that the apocalypse is here
or even has come and gone. Forgive the following classic, anthropomorphizing move and imagine a state
of the world wherein there were so few humans left that to ensure our own species' reproductive
future, the few of us left were kept in quarantined glass enclosures and once a year or so permitted a
conjugal visit for breeding purposes—no pressure or anything, just the future of the human race. With
others watching. Terrifying, right? It is an easy point to make, that apocalypse is denned in almost totally
human terms. Although environmental apocalypticism is tied to statistics about species loss and
habitat destruction, it is only really an apocalypse once human beings (and capitalist production for
that matter) are under threat . Occasionally nonhuman species deemed extraordinary in some
manner (usually in the degree to which either they are most "like us" or useful to us ) may enter into
the apocalyptic calculus — dolphins that can recognize themselves in the mirror, chimpanzees that use
tools. This is further evidence of apocalypticism's anthropocentrism . Leftist critiques of apocalyptic narratives,
while not necessarily incompatible with the previous point, have focused instead on these narratives' depoliticizing tendencies. Swyngedouw
(2010a; 2011) locates apocalypse within
a general trend toward environmental populism and "post-politics," a political
forecloses the political, preventing the politicization of particulars (Swyngedouw 2010b). He argues
that populism never assigns proper names to things, signifying (following Ranciere) an erosion of politics and "genuine democracy...
formation that
(which) is
a space where the unnamed, the uncounted, and. consequently, un-symbolized become named
and counted" (Swyngedouw 2011, 80). Whereas class struggle was about naming the proletariat, and feminist struggles were named
through "woman" as a political category, a defining feature of post-politics is an ambiguous and unnamed enemy or target of concern. As
Swyngedouw (2010b; 2011) contends, the post- political condition invokes a common predicament and the need for common humanity-wide
action, with "human"
this idea soon.
and "humanity" vacant signifiers and homogenizing subjects in this politics. I return to
The affirmative’s discourse furthers anthropocentrism-it doesn’t account for one of
the most important binaries-human and animal
Collard 13-Rosemary-Claire, PhD in geography from University of British Columbia, postdoctoral fellow at University of Toronto, Canada, received several grants from the Liu
Institute for Global Issues at University of British Columbia (“Apocalypse Meow”,
Capitalism Nature and Socialism vol. 24 no. 1, accessed via ProQuest, date accessed
7/17/14) HC **we reject the author’s use of ableist language
Over a decade earlier,
Katz (1995) also argues that ‘‘apocalypticism is politically disabling’’ (277). She writes: ‘‘contemporary
problems are so serious that rendering them apocalyptic obscures their political ecology*their sources,
their political, economic and social dimensions’’ (278). Loathe to implicate‘‘human nature’’ as one of these sources, Katz
instead targets global capitalism, which is ‘‘premised on a series of socially-constructed differences that, in
apocalyptic visions, take a universal character: man/woman; culture/nature; first world/third world;
bourgeoisie/working class’’ (279). Towards the end of her short chapter, she remarks that ‘‘human beings are
simultaneously different from and of a piece with bees’’ (280), calling subsequently for ‘‘a usable
environmental politics [that] takes seriously the political responsibility implied by the difference
between people and bees’’ (280). There is so much to agree with here. But Katz misses a big binary in her list:
human/animal. On the other hand, she clearly if implicitly recognizes not only the productiveness of this
binary and its role in environmental politics (the humans and the bees), but also the attention it
deserves. The question then remains: Although according to Katz ,apocalyptic politics underplays if not entirely ignores
the production process, is this inherent to apocalypticism, or is there potential to train apocalypticism
onto production, particularly of the human and the human/animal binary? Neither a natural order, nor a
pre-given subject position, nor a category that exists beyond politics, the human is rather an intensely
political category whose ongoing production is rife with violence, contestation, and hierarchy. The
central mode of this production is the human/animal binary that Haraway (2008, 18) says ‘‘flourishes, lethally,
in the entrails of humanism.’’This binary is continually re-made and re-authorized politically, legally,
scientifically, religiously, and so on. It is the product of particular epistemologies, ontologies, and power
relations, and it also produces these same structures. The spatial, material and discursive inclusion and
exclusion of animals construct the human/animal binary. Materially, animals are included in the
‘‘human’’ project as laborers, food, clothing, and so on, but are excluded from life itself should their
dead bodies be of economic value. Animals work for us, for free, and are largely ‘‘disposable workers’’ in
a manner similar to and different from the ‘‘disposable women’’ Wright (2006) observes are fundamental to the workings of capital and labor in
Mexican maquiladoras. The similarity lies in how both animal laborers and these women factory workers are devalued as laborers, and this
devaluing of their labor actually contributes to the formation of value in the commodities and capital of the production network. They are
different in that of course the women are still paid*albeit marginally*and their labor is recognized as labor.
Animals do not just labor
for free. They also die for profit and power.
The affirmative is deeply misanthropic -a true political space includes those who are
marginalized and outside societyCollard 13-Rosemary-Claire, PhD in geography from University of British Columbia, postdoctoral fellow at University of Toronto, Canada, received several grants from the Liu
Institute for Global Issues at University of British Columbia (“Apocalypse Meow”,
Capitalism Nature and Socialism vol. 24 no. 1, accessed via ProQuest, date accessed
7/17/14) HC
The most obvious example of industrial meat production aside, capitalism and the liberal state derive significant profits from the ability to
kill*often in mass numbers*wild animals. Killing wolves, bears, cougars, and other animals has been a predominant colonial project, with
bounty often the first laws passed in the colonies. `Not only domesticated but also wild animals have played and continue to play a central role,
materially and symbolically, in capitalism and the formation of the nation state, as produce the human, which is entirely different than saying
that humans are the same as each other or as other animals. Their
differences should not be disregarded for a host of
reasons, not the least of which is the political struggle various groups have made to claim both
difference and not being animals. It is not my aim to ignore, then, the particularities of the human species, although I would
emphasize that these particularities are not universal and are increasingly being shown to be far less particular than we imagined. While
what counts as human shifts dramatically in time and space, what remains for the most part constant is
the animal outside that founds this category. These are not meaningless exclusions, and in the context
of environmental politics, of course, they have especially pronounced momentum and significance. The
naturalization of a superior, distinct species category enables systematically and casually inflicted death
and suffering on an inconceivable scale. What is outside the ‘‘human’’ is far more ‘‘killable,’’ like Haraway
says, more easily ‘‘noncriminally put to death,’’ says Derrida, more ‘‘precarious’’ for Butler. Although Butler’s extensive work on the politics of
the human has been criticized for anthropocentrism, in a recent interview (Antonello and Farneti 2009), she questions what it
might
mean to share conditions of vulnerability and precariousness with animals and the environment, and
suggests it undoes ‘‘the very conceit of anthropocentrism.’’ Such an undoing is precisely what I advocate. While an
entrenched and powerful category, the human is also changeable and fluid. As Derrida (2008, 5) says, ‘‘the list of what is ‘proper’ to man always
forms a configuration, from the first moment. For that very reason, it can never be limited to a single trait and is never closed.’’ The human’s
contingencies, dependencies and destructive, homogenizing effects should be front and center in
environmental politics. To show its strangeness is to show that it could be otherwise. Ultimately, we
might have to reconfigure subjectivity’s contours and topographies, allow for an apocalypse of the
human subject. We might have to get naked in front of our pets. ‘‘A true political space,’’ writes Swyngedouw (2010b, 194), ‘‘is
always a space of contestation for those who are not-all, who are uncounted and unnamed.’’ This true
political space necessarily includes*if only by virtue of their exclusion*animals, the ‘‘constitutive
outside’’ of humanity itself. How we respond to this dynamic ought to be a central question of critical scholarship and philosophizing.
To be a philosopher, says Deleuze in the ‘‘A for Animal’’ entry to the ‘‘abecedary’’ (L’abe´ce´daire de Gilles Deleuze 1989), ‘‘is to write in the
place of animals that die.’’ This is still an imperfect way of describing my objective (for one thing, I am also interested in animals that are still
alive), but it is an improvement over being a ‘‘spokesperson’’ for animals, which are often characterized as speechless and may be rendered
more so having spokespeople appointed to speak on their behalf. To write in the place of animals that die seems a preferable, though still
fraught, characterization. This paper is therefore written in the place of those uncounted and unnamed non-subjects of political space, the
animals that die, the nonhumans, the hundreds of millions of animals that are ‘‘living out our nightmares’’ (Raffles 2010, 120): injected, tested,
prodded, then discarded. We have denied, disavowed, and misunderstood animals. They are refused speech, reason, morality, emotion,
clothing, shelter, mourning, culture, lying, lying about lying, gifting, laughing, crying—the list has no limit. But "who was born first, before the
names?" Derrida 12008, 18) asks. "Which
one saw the other come to this place, so long ago? Who will have been
the first occupant? Who the subject? Who has remained the despot, for so long now?" Some see
identifying (his denial as a side-event, inconsequential, even son of silly. The belief in human superiority is firmly
lodged and dear to people's hearts and senses of themselves. It also seems a daunting task, not a simple matter of
inserting the excluded into the dominant political order, which as Zizek (1999) writes, neglects how these very subversions and exclusions are
the order's condition of being. But if the political is precisely, as Swyngedouw (2010b) suggests, the expansion of a specific issue into a larger
universal demand against "those in power" (an elevation he argues is precluded by the post-political, which reduces an issue to a particular,
contained, and very specific demand), then perhaps the universal demand we need to mobilize in the Left is humanity itself. We need to write
in the place of animals that die, in the sense that our politics must undertake not only a re-writing of our histories of oppression, our
constitutions, our global agreements (and who and what are included in them), but also, necessarily, a radical reconfiguring of how subjects are
positioned in relation to each other. The human can in fact serve as the named subject of this political effort, perhaps most apdy in
environmental struggles. Like Braidotti (2008, 183) argues, "sustainability
is about decentering anthro- pocentrism." It is
about an "egalitarianism . that displaces both the old-fashioned humanistic assumption that 'man' is the
measure of all things and the anthropo- centric idea that the only bodies that matter are human" (183). In
tackling the human category, 1 believe the Left would not only be more relevant, but also could bring a
transformative sensibility to an environmental politics that often seems to want to blame "humankind"
but fails to consider precisely how this material and symbolic category remains untroubled in such
misanthropy.
Oil Spill/Accident Links
The hype surrounding potential accidents such as oil spills is dangerous-it acts as an
endorsement for environmental apocalypticism
Labban et al 13-Mazen, PhD in geography from Clark University, assistant professor of
geography at Rutgers University, David Corriea, assistant professor of geography at
University of New Mexico, PhD in geography from University of Kentucky, and Matt
Huber, PhD in geography from Clark University, assistant professor in geography at
Syracuse University (“Apocalypse, the Radical Left and the Post-Political Condition”,
Capitalism Nature and Socialism vol 24 no 1, accessed via ProQuest, date accessed
7/17/14) HC
The explosion of the BP Deepwater Horizon rig in April 2010 killed eleven men, injured seventeen
others, and spilled five million barrels of crude oil into the Gulf of Mexico. Although thousands of barrels of oil are
spilled daily into the Amazon, the Niger Delta and many other places, and around 80 million barrels of oil are ‘‘spilled’’ into the atmosphere as
CO2 and other gasses, the
BP oil spill rekindled the urgency of an oil-free future. Yet, the number of drilling
rigs across the world continued to increase*including in the Gulf of Mexico. Less than a year later, in
March 2011, the Japanese nuclear plant in Fukushima exploded, and with it the questionable promise of
a more ecologically safe mode of energy generation. Three reactors went into full meltdown, releasing
iodine-131 and cesium-137 isotopes into the atmosphere at levels that exceeded the Chernobyl disaster
in 1986. And the bad news kept coming, prompting some governments to put nuclear power expansion on hold, though without halting the
construction of new nuclear power plants that were already in the process of being built. The Greenland ice sheet collapsed in
July 2012. Climate scientists reported that 97 percent of the ice sheet surface showed some thawing. Two months later satellite
imagery in the Arctic revealed that summer melt reduced frozen sea ice to an area less than 2.2 million square miles, leading some
scientists to predict an ice-free Arctic in the summer months within two decades. What do we make of
these socio-ecological disasters? For many, such incidents do not represent isolated industrial accidents,
let alone surmountable political challenges . Rather, they are events that both symbolically and
materially bring into the present the specter of socio-ecological annihilation—signs of the
apocalypse. A web search of "Fukushima" and "apocalypse," to take one example, returns 1.3
million hits that include, roughly in equal numbers, religious and quasi-religious end-times rants,
wonkish renderings by technopolicy experts, and reports by mainstream and alternative media
outlets all proclaiming an apocalyptic present that threatens human existence on earth.
Despite the fear
and anxiety, few, at least in the West, appear capable of imagining a political solution to the current socio- ecological predicament. In other
words, few
among those concerned with the ecological future of the planet have been capable, or willing,
to pose the ecological problem as a political problem, to question the political economic arrangements
that might have produced it or exacerbated it and accordingly contemplate political responses that
challenge those arrangements.
Sustainability
The affirmative’s concept of sustainability contributes to fear-it denotes a sense of
false urgency
Swyngendouw 10-Erik, professor of geography at the University of Manchester, former
professor and lecturer in geography at Oxford University (March-May 2010, “Apocalypse
Forever?: Post-political Populism and the Spectre of Climate Change”, Theory, Culture
and Society, SageJournals date accessed 7/14/14) HC
In this consensual setting, environmental problems are
generally staged as universally threatening to the
survival of humankind, announcing the premature termination of civilization as we know it and sustained
by what Mike Davis (1999) aptly called "ecologies of fear. The discursive matrix through which the contemporary
meaning of the environmental condition is woven is one quilted systematically by the continuous
invocation of fear and danger, the spectre of ecological annihilation or at least seriously distressed
socio-ecological conditions for many people in the near future. 'Fear* is indeed the crucial node through
which much of the current environmental narrative is woven, and continues to feed the concern with
'sustainability *. This cultivation of "ecologies of fear*, in turn, is sustained in part by a particular set of phantasmagorical imaginaries
(KLatz. 1995). The apocalyptic imaginary of a world without water, or at least with endemic water shortages, ravaged by hurricanes whose
intensity is amplified by climate change; pictures of scorched land as global warming shifts the geo- pluvial regime and the spatial variability of
droughts and floods; icebergs that disintegrate around the poles as ice melts into the sea. causing the sea level to rise; alarming reductions in
biodiversity as species disappear or are threatened by extinction: post-apocalyptic images of waste lands reminiscent of the silent ecologies of
the region around Chernobyl: the threat of peak-oil that, without proper management and technologically innovative foresight, would return
society to a Stone Age existence: the devastation of wildfires, tsunamis, diseases like SARS. avian flu. Ebola or HIV. all
these imaginaries
of a Nature out of synch, destabilized, threatening and out of control are paralleled by equally disturbing
images of a society that continues piling up waste, pumping CO2 into the atmosphere, deforesting the
earth, etc. This is a process that Neil Smith appropriately refers to as "nature-washing" (2008: 245). In sum. our
ecological predicament is sutured by millennial fears, sustained by an apocalyptic rhetoric and representational tactics, and
by a series of performative gestures signalling an over- whelming, mind-boggling danger, one that threatens to undermine the very coordinates
of our everyday lives and routines, and may shake up the foundations of all we took and take for granted. Table 1 exemplifies some of the
imaginaries that are continuouslv invoked.
Water Wars/Water Shortages
Water war rhetoric is an example of fear-mongering-the disaster imagery of their
impact feeds alarmism
Swyngendouw 10-Erik, professor of geography at the University of Manchester, former
professor and lecturer in geography at Oxford University (March-May 2010, “Apocalypse
Forever?: Post-political Populism and the Spectre of Climate Change”, Theory, Culture
and Society, SageJournals date accessed 7/14/14) HC
In this consensual setting, environmental problems are generally staged as universally threatening to the
survival of humankind, announcing the premature termination of civilization as we know it and
sustained by what Mike Davis (1999) aptly called "ecologies of fear. The discursive matrix through which
the contemporary meaning of the environmental condition is woven is one quilted systematically by the
continuous invocation of fear and danger, the spectre of ecological annihilation or at least seriously
distressed socio-ecological conditions for many people in the near future. 'Fear* is indeed the crucial
node through which much of the current environmental narrative is woven, and continues to feed the
concern with 'sustainability*. This cultivation of "ecologies of fear*, in turn, is sustained in part by a
particular set of phantasmagorical imaginaries (KLatz. 1995). The apocalyptic imaginary of a world
without water, or at least with endemic water shortages, ravaged by hurricanes whose intensity is
amplified by climate change; pictures of scorched land as global warming shifts the geo- pluvial
regime and the spatial variability of droughts and floods; icebergs that disintegrate around the poles
as ice melts into the sea. causing the sea level to rise; alarming reductions in biodiversity as species
disappear or are threatened by extinction: post-apocalyptic images of waste lands reminiscent of the
silent ecologies of the region around Chernobyl: the threat of peak-oil that, without proper
management and technologically innovative foresight, would return society to a Stone Age existence:
the devastation of wildfires, tsunamis, diseases like SARS. avian flu. Ebola or HIV. all these imaginaries of
a Nature out of synch, destabilized, threatening and out of control are paralleled by equally disturbing
images of a society that continues piling up waste, pumping CO2 into the atmosphere, deforesting the
earth, etc. This is a process that Neil Smith appropriately refers to as "nature-washing" (2008: 245). In
sum. our ecological predicament is sutured by millennial fears, sustained by an apocalyptic rhetoric and
representational tactics, and by a series of performative gestures signalling an over- whelming, mindboggling danger , one that threatens to undermine the very coordinates of our everyday lives and
routines, and may shake up the foundations of all we took and take for granted. Table 1 exemplifies
some of the imaginaries that are continuouslv invoked.
**IMPACTS**
2NC Structural Violence
Structural violence is the largest impact-it causes millions of deaths and permeates
daily life
Abu-Jamal 98-Mamia, award-winning PA journalist and author (9/18/98, “A Quiet and
Deadly Violence”, accessed via Wayback Machine,
https://web.archive.org/web/20080509142843/http://www.flashpoints.net/mQuietDea
dlyViolence.html date accessed 7/22/14) HC
It has often been observed that America is a truly violent nation, as shown by the thousands of cases of
social and communal violence that occurs daily in the nation. Every year, some 20,000 people are killed by others, and
additional 20,000 folks kill themselves. Add to this the nonlethal violence that Americans daily inflict on each
other, and we begin to see the tracings of a nation immersed in a fever of violence. But, as remarkable,
and harrowing as this level and degree of violence is, it is, by far, not the most violent features of living
in the midst of the American empire. We live, equally immersed, and to a deeper degree, in a nation
that condones and ignores wide-ranging "structural' violence, of a kind that destroys human life with a
breathtaking ruthlessness. Former Massachusetts prison official and writer, Dr. James Gilligan observes; By "structural
violence" I mean the increased rates of death and disability suffered by those who occupy the bottom
rungs of society, as contrasted by those who are above them. Those excess deaths (or at least a
demonstrably large proportion of them) are a function of the class structure; and that structure is itself a
product of society's collective human choices, concerning how to distribute the collective wealth of the
society. These are not acts of God. I am contrasting "structural" with "behavioral violence" by which I mean the non-natural deaths and
injuries that are caused by specific behavioral actions of individuals against individuals, such as the deaths we attribute to homicide, suicide,
soldiers in warfare, capital punishment, and so on. --(Gilligan, J., MD, Violence: Reflections On a National Epidemic (New York: Vintage, 1996),
192.) This
form of violence, not covered by any of the majoritarian, corporate, ruling-class protected
media, is invisible to us and because of its invisibility, all the more insidious. How dangerous is it--really?
Gilligan notes: [E]very fifteen years, on the average, as many people die because of relative poverty as would
be killed in a nuclear war that caused 232 million deaths; and every single year, two to three times as
many people die from poverty throughout the world as were killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews
over a six-year period. This is, in effect, the equivalent of an ongoing, unending, in fact accelerating,
thermonuclear war, or genocide on the weak and poor every year of every decade, throughout the
world. [Gilligan, p. 196] Worse still, in a thoroughly capitalist society, much of that violence became
internalized, turned back on the Self, because, in a society based on the priority of wealth, those who
own nothing are taught to loathe themselves, as if something is inherently wrong with themselves,
instead of the social order that promotes this self-loathing. This intense self-hatred was often manifested in familial
violence as when the husband beats the wife, the wife smacks the son, and the kids fight each other. This vicious, circular, and
invisible violence, unacknowledged by the corporate media, uncriticized in substandard educational
systems, and un-understood by the very folks who suffer in its grips, feeds on the spectacular and more
common forms of violence that the system makes damn sure -that we can recognize and must react to
it. This fatal and systematic violence may be called The War on the Poor. It is found in every country,
submerged beneath the sands of history, buried, yet ever present, as omnipotent as death. In the struggles
over the commons in Europe, when the peasants struggled and lost their battles for their commonal lands (a precursor to similar struggles
throughout Africa and the Americas), this violence was sanctified, by church and crown, as the 'Divine Right of Kings' to the spoils of class
battle. Scholars Frances Fox-Piven and Richard A Cloward wrote, in The New Class War (Pantheon, 1982/1985): They did not lose because
landowners were immune to burning and preaching and rioting. They lost because the usurpations of owners were regularly defended by the
legal authority and the armed force of the state. It was the state that imposed increased taxes or enforced the payment of increased rents, and
evicted or jailed those who could not pay the resulting debts. It was the state that made lawful the appropriation by landowners of the forests,
streams, and commons, and imposed terrifying penalties on those who persisted in claiming the old rights to these resources. It was the state
that freed serfs or emancipated sharecroppers only to leave them landless. (52) The
"Law", then, was a tool of the powerful to protect their
interests, then, as now. It was
a weapon against the poor and impoverished, then, as now. It punished retail
violence, while turning a blind eye to the wholesale violence daily done by their class masters. The law
was, and is, a tool of state power, utilized to protect the status quo, no matter how oppressive that
status was, or is. Systems are essentially ways of doing things that have concretized into tradition, and
custom, without regard to the rightness of those ways. No system that causes this kind of harm to
people should be allowed to remain, based solely upon its time in existence. Systems must serve life, or
be discarded as a threat and a danger to life. Such systems must pass away, so that their great and
terrible violence passes away with them.
Impact-Fear/Anxiety
Environmental destruction has a unique moral effect on humans-it instills a sense of
constant fear and anxiety that is exacerbated by alarmist discourse
Thompson 9-Allen, assistant professor of philosophy at Oregon State University (Spring
2009, “Responsibility for the End of Nature: Or, How I Stopped Worrying and Learned to
Love Global Warming”, Ethics and the Environment, Project Muse, adate accessed
7/15/14) HC **we reject the author’s usage of the word “holocaust”**
So, one outcome of this deep ecological analysis is shared by Vogel's social constructivism—anthropogenic global warming cannot bring about the end of nature. McKibben's ontological claim
is false. According to Vogel this is because there is not, and effectively never has been, any nature to end; on my view this is because human beings are essentially part of a wild nature, which
(for that reason) we are simply incapable of destroying. If global warming cannot cause wild nature to end as a matter of fact, then what becomes of McKibben's significance claim that the
idea of nature as independent of human beings was existentially meaningful but must be abandoned in light of the fact that global warming is anthropogenic? On my view he's right, we must
reading McKibben leads one to believe that the loss of
our idea of nature as autonomous accounts for that great sadness, for that intuition of moral horror
environmentally sensitive people tend to feel about the prospect of global warming. But on my deep ecological analysis,
the idea of nature as autonomous should be abandoned. Yet the intuition of moral horror remains. So if one accepts that
anthropogenic climate change cannot be the end of wild nature but continues to experience an intuition
of moral horror as if it were the end of nature, how (if at all) can any sense be made of this? Put baldly, my puzzle is
this: just what's so bad about global warming? Of course, many environmentalists think this is an inane question. It's so obvious, they think, anthropogenic global
warming is morally odious [End Page 88] for many reasons. First, it's very likely to cause tremendous human
suffering. If something drastic is not done soon to curb emission of greenhouse gases, warmer oceans
and melting ice sheets in Greenland and Antarctica will cause sea levels to raise dramatically, enough to
flood coastal cities worldwide, displacing hundreds of millions of people and upsetting the social and
economic processes that would be called upon to help mitigate the suffering of these refugees. As isotherms
abandon the idea of nature as autonomous, but he is right for the wrong reason. Still,
migrate toward the poles, tropical diseases like malaria will plague societies completely unaccustomed and unprepared to deal with them. Recently, top British climate scientists predict that
by 2100 one third of the planet's land surface may be affected by extreme drought, compared to only about two percent today, rendering agriculture virtually impossible (McCarthy 2006). If
temperatures rise enough to trigger various positive feedback loops, such as melting vast undersea frozen methane hydrates, then, as NASA scientist James Hansen (2006) writes, "all bets are
off." There is good reason to believe that unchecked global warming will cause an astonishing level of human suffering. Further, if we grant to nonanthropocentric environmental holists that
parts of the natural world such as species and ecosystems are morally considerable for their own sake, possessing some form of intrinsic moral value, global warming is obviously morally
objectionable. Predictions regarding the loss of plant and animal species across the globe range from twenty to sixty percent, largely due to loss of habitat—a loss of biodiversity
unprecedented since the last "mass extinction," between the Paleocene and the Eocene epochs, fifty-five million years ago. If species and ecosystems are intrinsically valuable, then it is again
easy to see why global warming is obviously a moral catastrophe of the highest order. So there is a lot wrong with anthropogenic global warming: the loss of many plant and animal species,
the loss of many and perhaps unique bioregional ecosystems, and of course the concomitant sum of human suffering and injustices. All this makes global warming morally bad, and I will agree.
the intuition of moral horror at the threat of global warming feels as though something
even more were at stake. Putting aside McKibben's objectionable dualism, his moral intuition was right:
global warming is fearful as if it were the very end of nature. Consider an analogy with a nuclear
holocaust, or more specifically, a [End Page 89] contrast between nuclear and conventional weapons.4
Someday in the distant future, we may be in a position to know the sum of all the ecological and human
disaster caused by anthropogenic climate change. Now consider the possibility these same
consequences, or similar ones, were brought about by what I'll call conventional means, that is, by
means other than global climate change. This seems possible—we are busy driving untold numbers of species into extinction and destroying many
irreplaceable but regional ecosystems by means other than changing the atmosphere. And of course humans are able to more directly bring
great suffering to bear upon other human beings. Suppose we were to cause all of this suffering,
injustice, and destruction without altering the basic dynamic equilibrium of the global biosphere. Now,
do we feel the same sense of moral horror? Do we have the same intuition, that is, as if it were the very
end of the world? I submit the answer is "no." By hypothesis, the consequences in terms of human
suffering and injustice, on one hand, and the loss of species and ecosystems, on the other, are the same
but the sense of moral horror is not. There is a gap. Global warming is something analogous to warfare
by means of nuclear, rather than conventional, weapons. If this is right, then the question is a sensible one: apart from the obvious, i.e., bad
consequences and injustices, what's so bad about global warming? It may be that the global warming/nuclear weapon analogy goes
further. Of course, nuclear versus conventional warfare commits us to radioactive fallout and
contamination. Maybe causing human suffering and injustice, wiping out species, and destroying
However, my view is that
ecosystems by way of changing basic atmospheric conditions contains some direct analogy. I'm not an
ecologist or an atmospheric scientist but neither are most of the people who share my intuition. So the
missing analog, if there is one, will not fill the gap—it will not explain why many ecologically
unsophisticated people fear global warming more than they would fear the equivalent human and
ecological destruction by some other, more conventional means.
Apocalyptic rhetoric conflates correlation with causation-alarmist statements skew
journalism and isolated incidents as the end
Garrard 4-professor in sustainability at University of British Columbia, National Teaching
Fellow of the British Higher Education Academy, and a founding member and former
Chair of the Association for the Study of Literature and the Environment (UK & Ireland),
PhD in ecological literary criticism with a focus on Nietzsche and Heideggerian
philosophy from University of Liverpool (Ecocriticism, Routledge Press, date accessed
7/16/14) HC
Eschatological narrative, then, brings with it philosophical and political problems that seriously
compromise its usefulness, especially in its radical, tragic form. It tends to polarise responses, prodding
sceptics towards scoffing dismissal and potentially inciting believers to confrontation and even violence,
a pattern familiar from conflicts between liberal society and apocalyptic cults. On the other hand, while radical
ecological groups are rhetorically akin to traditional millenarians, they are sociologically very different, stressing openness to diverse beliefs and
maintaining a solid resistance to charismatic leadership. Even if this is allowed, how- ever, the
propensity of apocalypticism to
turn ugly in relation to population growth must be confronted. A more general problem is that the
rhetoric of catastrophe tends to 'produce' the crisis it describes, as in the Malthusian depiction of
extreme poverty as 'famine*. Moreover, as Richard North shows in two detailed case studies, the political objectives of
campaigning organisations may dovetail too neatly with journalistic desire for scientific integrity to be
sustained in the reporting or ecological 'disaster*. North analyses media responses to the 1993 sinking
of the oil tanker Braer, and claims that they show a marked preference for apocalyptic comments from
campaign organisations over less dramatic assessments from government or oil industry scientists: A
Greenpeace comment seems to have several prime journalistic merits. It stresses the possibility of ecological disaster. It comes from the heart.
It is short and understandable. It comes from people who are not part of 'the establishment'. The media and Greenpeace share an
understanding of the world. Things go wrong because vested interests are careless, and they stay wrong because of the cover-ups which vested
interests go in for. Neither the media nor Greenpeace ever admit that they too are vested interests, with readers and sup- porters to keep
amused and excited. 0995: 99) North
argues that environmental 'doom merchants' may literally be selling bad
news. Another example is the journalistic propensity to interpret every drought or ice storm as a 'sign' of
catastrophic global warming, while climatologists consistently adopt a comic apocalyptic rhetoric that
denies the possibility of linking specific weather events to global climate change. Such caution is
compromised by the need for authoritative pronouncements in the interests of policy, but also by the
danger that projections are often popularly interpreted as predictions.
Impact- Nuclear Apathy/Indifference
The aff marginalizes apocalypse to an aesthetic-spills over to create indifference
about nuclearism
Scherpe and Peterson 86-Klaus, former senior professor of arts and humanities at
University of Berlin, and Brent, professor of German at Lawrence University
(“Dramatization and De-Dramatization of “The End”:The Apocalyptic Consciousness of
Modernity and Postmodernity”, Cultural Critique, accessed via JStor, date accessed
7/19/14) HC
This is not the place to wage a final battle with the "structural" theory of exchange, which is the radical product of the theory of simulation, 101
is it the place for political dissent, which is necessary when Baudrillard, like Glucksmann,8 advocates a high level of nuclear armaments as a
consequence of his theory. Criticism and dissent have already been registered by competent people.9 What is
at issue here, with
reference to the threatened impoverishment of modernity's critical potential, is the unique
phenomenon represented by the transformation of social theory and sodo-critical discussion into a new
aesthetic consciousness, or at least into aesthetic values, most notably in the fascinating power of
"indifference." The statement that finality has lost its power of attraction, that the "big bang" no longer
has its theatrical fascination, can only be justified as an aesthetic expression. It is precisely the abstract
reality of the destructive potential of nuclear weapons that creates a thoroughly concrete reality,
namely that of the threat, which apparently continues to fascinate the aesthetic consciousness. When
railing against the dominance of instrumental reason, the aesthetic consciousness of modernity always admitted its
allegiance to "another state of being," i.e., to the explosive break or rupture with the continual inertia of
linear social development. In the literature written at the turn of the century this was symbolized in the "life of danger" lhai
contrasted with the normality of ordinary bourgeois life. The images and conundrums that were intended to challenge the Weimar Republic's
secure, fact-oriented consciousness exhibit an aesthetic fascination with representations of the "state of emergency [Ausnahmezutand]."
Postmodern consciousness seems to have lost the ability to imagine "another state of being" with its
explosive force. How and why, we might ask, do terrorism, threats, and, more comprehensively, nuclear
deterrence still retain a specifically aesthetic fascination in our era? Postmodern thought thrives on the
destabilization of signifiers, on the destruction of the symbolic order. In a certain sense postmodern
(thought is predicated on the finality of "reality," which it only perceives voyeuristicaliy. When viewing
the "modernist project" retrospectively, one does not even remember the concepts that were proclaimed dead, one after another God, metaphysics, history, ideology, revolution, and finally death itself;
not even "sacrifical death" is accorded an "independent existence."10 Structuralist thought already seals the fate of
the subjective and the humane, freezing them out to the extent that they are based on substantialist assumptions. Poststructuralist thought
adopts the only conceivable perspective left, a sense of deja vu for everything that was proclaimed dead; all that can be done is to add more
items to the list. Baudrillard's theory of simulation seems to have been constructed for the sole purpose of eradicating the last remnants of
substantial ist assumptions and rational calculations. If death had been accepted as the last possible bastion of revolutionary conscious- ness, it
too would be eliminated as a referent in the next publication, left to drown in (he infinite sea of indifference. "The accelerating effect of the
theory, through which the historical temporality of observed phenomena is made to disappear, can be imagined metaphorically as a vampire or
a rapacious Moloch. Finally, the theory even incorporates the eschatological consciousness of the apocalypse. Baudrillard calls the
catastrophic effect of the threat emanating from simulation an "implosion," not an "explosion";12 it
results from the fact that under pres sure from a merely simulated reality every social energy is
expended internally in the "play of signifiers," evaporating and disappearing in some "catastrophic
process." Of note is not only the curious manner in which this form of theorizing constanly creates new
objects in order to make them disappear, but also the complaint that is always inscribed in this signifying
game; in spite of all the indifference there is a noticeable defense against the loss of "eventfulness."
Impact-Serial Policy Failure
Apocalyptic rhetoric triggers serial policy failure-undermines cooperation and causes
zero-sum rationale
Trombetta 8-Maria Julia, teaching fellow in Politics and Environment at University of
Nottingham ( July 2008, “The meaning and function of climate security”, paper prepared
for the World International Studies Committee Conference,
http://www.academia.edu/868266/The_meaning_and_function_of_climate_security
date accessed 7/21/14) HC
In order to do so it considers the discourses framing climate change as a threat and analyses the
arguments against transforming climate change and more generally environmental problems into
security issues. At first, in fact, the concept of ‘environmental security’ appeared to be a good idea,
‘meant to alarm traditional security analysts about the issues that “really” matter’(de Wilde 2001, 2) and
increase the relevance of environmental problems in the political agenda .Buzan emphasised that
‘[e]nvironmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the
essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend.’(Buzan 1991, 19–20) Others
welcomed the concept since it ‘plays down the values traditionally associated with the nation-state—
identity, territoriality, sovereignty—and implies a different set of values associated with environmental
change—ecology, globality, and governance’.( (Dyer 2001,68) Moreover, on analytical grounds, it seemed a way
to provide a better account of new typologies of vulnerability and the potential for conflict and violence
these vulnerabilities can be associated with. Opponents however were quick to warn that the word
security evokes a set of confrontational practices associated with the state and the military which should
be kept away from environmental problems. Concerns included the possibility of creating new
competencies for the military — militarising the environment rather than greening security (Käkönen
1994)—or spreading a nationalistic attitude to protect the national environment (Deudney 1999, 466–468). As
Deudney argued, not only are practices and institutions associated with national security inadequate to
deal with environmental problems, but security can also introduce to the environmental debate a
zero-sum rationality that can create winners and losers and undermine the cooperative efforts
required by environmental problems.
Despite this division and the waxing and waning of the debate, depending on which
issues dominated the international security agenda, the concept gained ground, slowly but steadily.
**ALT**
Alternative-Reject Discourse
The alternative is to reject the affirmative’s discourse and to restructure it to strike a
better balance-it addresses policy problems more effectively
Doremus 2k-Holly, Professor of Law at University of California-Berkeley, Co-Director,
Center for Law, Energy & the Environment at California-Berkeley, Director,
Environmental Law Program at California Berkeley, J.D. from University of CaliforniaBerkeley, PhD from Cornell University in plant physiology (Winter 2000, “The Rhetoric
and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a New Discourse”, Washington and Lee Law
Review, LexisNexis Academic, date accessed 7/13/14) HC
If progress is to be made in the law of nature protection, the political discussion must more closely
address the crux of the problem, asking how humans can live with and in nature. As a practical matter, relatively
brief stories and evocative rhetorical images are well suited to the political process, and can capture the emotions and intuitions that underlie
the urge to protect [*64] nature. Advocates of long-term
nature protection, therefore, might be well advised to
work on identifying or developing stories and images that can help us achieve a viable and satisfying
human relationship with nature. The second-generation discourse should not emphasize the role of
nature as a material resource. Any discourse of nature protection must acknowledge that role, and
ecologists surely should point out material values that might otherwise escape notice, such as
ecosystem services. Nonetheless, despite its political appeal, a discourse grounded primarily in the
material value of nature is unlikely to justify protection sufficiently broad to satisfy nature advocates.
Nature's economic value offers only a limited reason to protect it. A discourse focused on the material is
far more likely to emphasize the competing economic values, increasing nature's vulnerability rather
than its security. For that reason, nature advocates should not rush to jump on the sustainable
development bandwagon. Sustainable development is fundamentally a material story, which cannot
solve the non-material nature problem. The sustainable development story does have two important
elements of a second generation discourse. It promises to balance the human with the natural, and to
balance the needs of the present with those of the future. n298 The problem with the sustainable development concept is
that it is subject to a variety of interpretations. Economists and ecologists tend to think it means sustaining different things. Economists
typically worry about sustaining the level of human well-being, broadly defined, over time. n299 If resources, including the resources of nature,
are fungible or substitutable, as economists are accustomed to believe they are, aggregate capital is the proper focus of sustainability. n300
Ecologists and others who support strong protective measures are less likely to view natural capital as fungible with human-made resources.
n301 They see the maintenance of ecosystem processes, and even individual species, as important in order to provide options for the future.
Realizing the interconnection between earth and humanity is essential to
reforming our relationship to nature-incorporates all socio-economic classes
Swyndegouw 13-Erik, professor of geography at the University of Manchester, former
professor and lecturer in geography at Oxford University (2/6/13, “Apocalypse Now!:
Fear and Doomsday Pleasures”, Capitalism Nature and Socialism vol 24 no 1, accessed
through ProQuest, date accessed 7/18/14) HC
Those who already recognized the irreversible dynamics of the socio-environ- mental imbroglio that has
been forged over the past few centuries coined a new term to classify the epoch we are in. "Welcome to
the Anthropocene" became a popular catch-phrase to inform us that we are now in a new geological
era, one in which humans are co-producers of the deep geological time that hitherto had slowly grinded
away irrespective of humans* dabbling with the surface layers of earth, oceans, and atmosphere .
Noble prize-winning chemist Paul Crutzen introduced "the Anthropocene," coined about a decade ago
as the successor name of the Holocene, the relatively benign geo-climatic period that allegedly
permitted agriculture to flourish, cities to be formed, and humans to thrive (Crutzen and Stoermer
2000). Since the beginning of industrialization, so the Anthropocenic argument goes, humans' increasing
interactions with their physical conditions of existence have resulted in a qualitative shift in geo-climatic
acting of the earth system. The Anthropocene is nothing else than the geological name for capitalism
WITH nature. Acidification of oceans, biodiversity transformations, gene displacements and
recombinations, climate change, big infrastructures effecting die earth's geodetic dynamics, among
others, resulted in knotting together "natural" and "social" processes such that humans have
become active agents in co-shaping earth's deep geological time . Now that the era has been named as
the Anthropocene, we can argue at length over its meaning, content, existence, and possible modes of
engagement. Nonetheless, it affirms that humans and nature are co-produced and that the particular
historical epoch that goes under the name of capitalism forged this mutual determination. The
Anthropocene is just another name for insisting on Nature's death. This cannot be unmade, however
hard we try. The past is forever closed and the future— including nature's future—is radically open, up
for grabs. Indeed, the affirmation of the historical-geographical co-production of society WITH nature
radically politicizes nature, makes nature enter into the domain of contested socio-physica! relations
and assemblages. We cannot escape "producing nature": rather, it forces us to make choices about what
socio-natural worlds we wish to inhabit. It is from this particular position, therefore, that the
environmental conundrum ought to be approached so that a qualitative transformation of BOTH society
AND nature has to be envisaged. This perspective moves the gaze from thinking through a "politics of
the environment" to "politicizing the environment" (Swyngedouw 2011; 2012). The human world is now
an active agent in shaping the non-human world. This extends the terrain of the political to domains
hitherto left to the mechanics of nature. The non-human world becomes "enrolled" in a process of
politicization. And that is precisely what needs to be fully endorsed. The Anthropocene opens up a
terrain whereby different natures can be contemplated and actually co-produced. And the struggle over
these trajectories and. from a leftist perspective, the process of the egalitarian socio-ecological
production of the commons of life is precisely what our politics are all about. Yes, the apocalypse is
already here, but do not despair, let us fully endorse the emancipatory possibilities of apocalyptic life.
Perhaps we should modify the now over-worked statement of the Italian Marxist Amadeo Bordiga that
"if the ship goes down, the first-class passengers drown too." Amadeo was plainly wrong. Remember the
movie Titanic (as well as the real catastrophe). A large number of the first-class passengers found a
lifeboat: the others were trapped in the belly of the beast. Indeed the social and ecological catastrophe
we are already in is not shared equally. While the elites fear both economic and ecological collapse, the
consequences and implications are highly uneven. Mil elite's fears are indeed only matched by the
actually existing socio-ecological and economic catastrophes many already live in. The apocalypse is
combined and uneven. And it is within this reality that political choices have to be made and sides taken.
The way the aff presents warming glosses over multiple viewpoints-provides a
more credible and well-rounded approach
Garrard 4-professor in sustainability at University of British Columbia, National Teaching
Fellow of the British Higher Education Academy, and a founding member and former
Chair of the Association for the Study of Literature and the Environment (UK & Ireland),
PhD in ecological literary criticism with a focus on Nietzsche and Heideggerian
philosophy from University of Liverpool (Ecocriticism, Routledge Press, date accessed
7/16/14) HC
Apocalyptic rhetoric Furthermore rosters a delusive search tor culprits and causes that may be
reductively conceived by conflating very varied environmental problems within the concept of a
singular, imminent 'environmental crisis'. Deep ecologists, for example, attack 'humanity' or 'civilisation',
or, at the conceptual level, 'anthropocentrism'. Ecofeminists criticise androcentrism or the dualistic logic
of domination. Environmental problems, whilst they certainly should not be seen in isolation, might
seem more amenable to solution if they are disaggregated and framed by comic apocalyptic narratives
that emphasise the provisionality of knowledge, free will, ongoing struggle and a plurality of social
groups with differing responsibilities. In this way, problems are not minimised, but those who describe
them become less vulnerable to the embarrassments of failed prophecy and to the threat of millennial
enthusiasms. In Frederick Buell's account, environmentalism has been forced to abandon tragic apocalypticism, in part because of the
changing nature or environmental threats, but also because or concerted anti-environmentalist campaigns that pinpointed examples of
misanthropy and chastised 'doomsters* and apocalypse abusers' (2003: Ioc.278). While Ehrlich's global collapse has not occurred, 'life after
apocalypse presents a more, not a less, sobering picture of environmental crisis-in-progress than 1970s end-of-the-world fantasies ever
achieved' (Buell 2003: loc.930) because of the plural, interlocking, intractable character of the planet's social- ecological problems. For Buell,
Terry Gilliam's 1995 film Twelve Monkeys is a moving and sophisticated commentary on the new dispensation, depicting a temporal oscillation
between America in the 1990s and a radically depopulated future dystopia where people live and labour underground, cut off from nature, as
protection against a genetically engineered virus. Sent back through time to try to avert apocalypse, the protagonist James Cole (Bruce Willis)
learns too late that the culprit was not the '12 Monkeys' group of animal rights activists, who are merely endearingly anarchic, but a 'fanatical
environmentalist of the worst sort — a biocentric scientist turned ecoterrorist' (Buell 2003: loc.5746). After Cole is shot in the last scene of the
film, he is able to make sense of a traumatic memory that has haunted him throughout, realising that, when a child, he witnessed his own
death moments before the first release of the virus. The 'terrible recursive kx>p' of present and future thereby completed is 'the moment of
psychoanalytic excavation but ultimate loss, intimations and glimpses of the past — a past not just of human love but also of air that smelled
sweet, sunlight that felt warm and beautiful places in nature one could still visit' (lex:.5763). Even in the pre-apocalyptic 'present', though, the
film implies, the disaster was already under way, so that environmental mourning infuses the 1990s as well as the dystopian future. As Buell
points out, 'With each revolution of the loop, environmental calamity in 12 Men keys appears more and more as a horror people hopelessly
dwell within, a horror that goes on and on all around them' (loc.5793). The one glimmer of hope in the film is that, in the last scene, another
time traveller takes her seat beside the eco-terrorist, and introduces herself as 'in insurance*. If, as Buell argues, the film returns the viewer to
their own world with a sense of environ- mental values to be defended and work to be done, it makes sense to represent meaningful
intervention as difficult, but not impossible. Only
if we imagine that the planet has a future, after all, are we likely to
take responsibility for it.
Farsightedness is the best approach-focusing on present problems and prevention allows the
most public input
Kurasawa 4-Fuyuki, PhD in sociology from La Trobe University, associate professor in
sociology at York University (11/19/04, “Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of
Prevention and the Work of Foresight”, Constellations vol 11 no. 4,
http://www.yorku.ca/kurasawa/Kurasawa%20Articles/Constellations%20Article.pdf
date accessed 7/19/14)
Lastly,
I contended the work of preventative foresight can parry alarmist misappropriation or resignation
by advocating a process of public deliberation that blends the principles of precaution and global justice.
A farsighted politics can function through the public use of reason and the honing of the capacity for
critical judgment, whereby citizens put themselves in a position to debate, evaluate, and challenge
different dystopian narratives about the future and determine which ones are more analytically
plausible, ethically desirable, and politically effective in bringing about a world order that is less perilous
yet more just for our descendants. Many fora, ranging from local, face-to-face meetings to trans- national, highly mediated
discursive networks, are sowing the seeds of such a practice of participatory democracy. None of this is to disavow the international
community s rather patchy record of avoiding foreseeable calamities over the last decades, or to minimize the difficulties of implementing the
kinds of global institutional reforms described above and the perils of historical contingency, presentist indifference toward the future, or
alarmism and resignation. To my mind, however, this is all the more reason to pay attention to the work of
preventive foresight in global civil society, through which civic associations can build up the latter*s
coordination mechanisms and institutional leverage, cultivate and mobilize public opinion in distant
parts of the world, and compel political leaders and national and transnational governance structures to
implement certain policies. While seeking to prevent cataclysms from worsening or, better yet, from
occurring in the first place, these sorts of initiatives can and must remain consistent with a vision of a
just world order. Furthermore, the labor of farsightedness supports an autonomous view of the future,
according to which we are the creators of the field of possibilities within which our successors will dwell.
The current socio-political order, with all its short-term biases, is neither natural nor necessary.
Accordingly, informed public participation in deliberative processes makes a socially self-instituting
future possible.Through the involvement of groups and individuals active in domestic and supranational public spaces; prevention is a public practice, and a public responsibility. To believe otherwise is, I would
argue, to leave the path clear for a series of alternatives that heteronomously compromise the well-being of those who will come after us. We
would thereby effectively abandon the future to the vagaries of history ('let it unfold as it may'), the
technocratic or instrumental will of official institutions ('let others decide for us'), or to gambles about
the time-lags of risks ('let our progeny deal with their realization'). But, as I have tried to show here, this
will not and cannot be accepted. Engaging in autonomous preventive struggles, then, remains our best
hope. A farsighted cosmopolitanism that aims to avert crises while working toward the realization of
precaution and global justice represents a compelling ethico-political project, for we will not inherit a
better future. It must be made, starting with us. in the here and now.
No Human-Nature Separation
Viewing nature as something that can be terminal is incorrect-humans cannot
separate themselves from nature
Thompson 9-Allen, assistant professor of philosophy at Oregon State University (Spring
2009, “Responsibility for the End of Nature: Or, How I Stopped Worrying and Learned to
Love Global Warming”, Ethics and the Environment, Project Muse, adate accessed
7/15/14) HC
A second advantage to reframing environmental problems in terms of a dichotomy to be resolved
between civilization and the wild is that we can conceive of anthropogenic global warming as a
symptom of excessive civilization, the controlling or dominating influence of human beings—too much
industry, too much energy wasted, too many engines, too many air-conditioners, etc. While it surely is a
great tragedy, global warming cannot be the end of nature, not the end of wild nature. "Wilderness is a
place where the wild potential is fully expressed, a diversity of living and nonliving things flourishing
according to their own sorts of order," Snyder [End Page 87] tells us, and "…[w]ilderness may temporarily dwindle,
but wildness won't go away" (15). Anthropogenic climate change, a symptom of too much human
civilization and domination, cannot bring about the end of nature, because nature is essentially wild.
The worst that we can do is to continue diminishing the wilderness, understood here not as select
nationally designated recreational areas but places where the wild can be fully expressed. Indeed, Snyder tells
us, the "[w]ilderness will inevitably return," however, regrettably, "it will not be as fine a world as the one that was glistening in the early
morning of the Holocene. Much life will be lost in the wake of human agency on Earth, [especially] that of the twentieth and twenty-first
centuries" (15).
**F/W AND PRIOR QUESTION**
Framework
Discursive analysis is good-it allows us to incorporate perspectives that are often at
the periphery
Wilner 13-Kathleen, doctoral candidate at Walhousie University in Nova Scotia (“The
Difference Discourse Makes: Fishieries and Ocean Policy and Coastal Communities in the
Canadian Maritime Provinces”, doctoral submission for Walhousie University,
http://dalspace.library.dal.ca/bitstream/handle/10222/36321/Bigney%20Wilner%20Kat
hleen%20PhD%20IDPHD%20August%202013.pdf?sequence=3 date accessed 7/17/14)
HC
Examining the underlying policy discourses supporting integrated management helps move these
questions to the centre as discourse analysis highlights how some positions, knowledges and
perspectives are privileged at the expense of others, and helps to uncover the mechanisms by which
some groups are granted access to resources (including policy making and natural resources) while
other are not. A critical look at policy for marine and coastal resource management, its impact on coastal
communities and in particular, the choice of integrated management as an organizing strategy for an
ecosystems-based approach, appears to be overdue.
Challenging rhetoric assumptions is good-by doing so, we break the norm that is often
harmful but unquestioned
Wilner 13-Kathleen, doctoral candidate at Walhousie University in Nova Scotia (“The
Difference Discourse Makes: Fishieries and Ocean Policy and Coastal Communities in the
Canadian Maritime Provinces”, doctoral submission for Walhousie University,
http://dalspace.library.dal.ca/bitstream/handle/10222/36321/Bigney%20Wilner%20Kat
hleen%20PhD%20IDPHD%20August%202013.pdf?sequence=3 date accessed 7/17/14)
HC
Discourses can help constitute something as real, by defining and establishing the truth at a given time
in a given context, and by invalidating other truths (Wetherell et al., 2001). They can have material effects
when they alter access to something material, or change policy emphasis, or change attitudes (Wetherell et
al.. 2001). The power of policy discourse is also a matter of routinizing a particular 'parlance of
governance', of excluding or marginalizing alternative ways of seeing" (Hajer. 2003, p. 107). Excluding and
marginalizing perspectives are the subtle ways in which a discourse's power is enacted. By making
certain terms or ways of understanding routine, those terms or knowledges become unquestioned
assumptions that underlie action. Discourses are also resisted and challenged: counter-discourses can
take for granted or challenge the underlying underpinnings of resource management (Nadasy 2007), can
participate in forging switch points (Li, 2007b after Rose, 1999), and can compete for discursive dominance (Hajer, 1995, 2006).
Integration of a critical voice is key-allows better cost-benefit analysis because we
integrate all aspects and opinions
Wilner 13-Kathleen, doctoral candidate at Walhousie University in Nova Scotia (“The
Difference Discourse Makes: Fishieries and Ocean Policy and Coastal Communities in the
Canadian Maritime Provinces”, doctoral submission for Walhousie University,
http://dalspace.library.dal.ca/bitstream/handle/10222/36321/Bigney%20Wilner%20Kat
hleen%20PhD%20IDPHD%20August%202013.pdf?sequence=3 date accessed 7/17/14)
HC
This study used discourse
analysis — an approach that takes the manner in which people discuss, write about and enact policy as not
uncover underlying assumptions that
influence policy implementation and implementation conflicts. By taking an interest in the perspectives
of those often at the margins of policy-making- i.e. coastal communities in this case - this analysis has uncovered
some of the possible effects of dominant discourses. It has also given a voice to critiques and counterdiscourses that contain critical challenges, and illustrated the framework of new understanding of
coastal and marine governance. This critical voice, lacking in both practice and theory of integrated
management (Nichols, 1999), speaks to more than implementation challenges or to the challenges of intergovernmental coordination and politics. The counter-discourses challenge the fragmentation of the
financial economy from social and moral economies and of society and nature. They challenge the cooptation of community that is affected by governance terms, like self-reliance or self-sufficiency. They
problematize the effectiveness of insider and outsider roles in affecting political action and change. This
study has also contextualized dominant governance discourses in a theoretical framework that situates
discourses in terms of neoliberal and networked governance. The theoretical perspective informs an
analysis of the effects of dominant discourses, including governance that uses citizens' own
responsibility to themselves, to their communities of place and of interest.
only meaningful but as constructive of the contexts in which communities live — to help
The rhetoric we use is a key starting point for any policy discussion-it shapes our
perception and the way we create solutions
Doremus 2k-Holly, Professor of Law at University of California-Berkeley, Co-Director,
Center for Law, Energy & the Environment at California-Berkeley, Director,
Environmental Law Program at California Berkeley, J.D. from University of CaliforniaBerkeley, PhD from Cornell University in plant physiology (Winter 2000, “The Rhetoric
and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a New Discourse”, Washington and Lee Law
Review, LexisNexis Academic, date accessed 7/13/14) HC
Rhetoric matters. That is almost too basic to be worth saying, but it bears repeating because sometimes
the rhetoric we use to describe problems becomes so ingrained as to be almost invisible. Even if we are
unaware of it, though, rhetoric has the very real effect of severely constraining our perception of a
problem and its potential solutions. Terminology is one aspect of rhetoric. The words we use to describe
the world around us condition our response to that world. Whether we use the word "swamps" or
"wetlands," for example, may determine whether we drain or protect those areas. n1 Not surprisingly, the
battle to control terminology is an important one in the environmental context. n2 But there is far more to the
rhetoric of law. The way words are put together to form stories and discourses shapes the law and society.
Stories, which put a human face on [*13] concerns that might otherwise go unnoticed, exert a powerful emotional tug. n3 " Discourses,"
loose collections of concepts and ideas, provide a shared language for envisioning problems and
solutions. n4 This Article focuses on the use of rhetoric in political battles over the extent to which law should protect nature against human
encroachment. At some level, all rhetoric in a democratic society can be tied to the political process; any
statement that any member of the political community encounters may influence his or her views,
votes, financial contributions, or other political activities. But some communications are more likely than
others to affect political outcomes or to play a privileged role in the implementation and interpretation
of law. The discussion that follows concentrates on such "political rhetoric," including communications directed to legislatures, agencies, or
voters with the intention of influencing the outcome of political decisions; n5 statements made by legislators or agency personnel to explain or
justify their decisions; and legislative, administrative, and judicial actions.
Questioning the starting point of policies is the best way to make effective decisionsstarting from the right epistemology means poor assumptions aren’t locked in
Doremus 2k-Holly, Professor of Law at University of California-Berkeley, Co-Director,
Center for Law, Energy & the Environment at California-Berkeley, Director,
Environmental Law Program at California Berkeley, J.D. from University of CaliforniaBerkeley, PhD from Cornell University in plant physiology (Winter 2000, “The Rhetoric
and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a New Discourse”, Washington and Lee Law
Review, LexisNexis Academic, date accessed 7/13/14) HC
But political stories can be double-edged swords. They surely can capture the imagination of the political
community and build support for policy changes. But their power does not end with passage of the laws
that solidify those changes. In order to be politically effective, stories must be widely distributed and
often repeated. Those that appeal to the public are readily absorbed into the collective subconscious,
framing assumptions that are then accepted without further principled justification. n204 Those stories
inevitably shape future attitudes and behavior. n205 Adoption of law that rests on and expresses those
stories magnifies their power to mold cultural attitudes because the law itself plays an important role in
defining the community and [*45] its core assumptions. n206 The law, like our most fundamental
societal stories, reminds us not only of what we are, but of what we aspire to be. n207 Stories that
become embedded in law are thus powerful forces in shaping society and social attitudes. They can
point us toward the future, or chain us to the past.
Prior Question
Environmental protection is an ethical prior question-addressing the necessity to act
correctly and precisely is crucial
Doremus 2k-Holly, Professor of Law at University of California-Berkeley, Co-Director,
Center for Law, Energy & the Environment at California-Berkeley, Director,
Environmental Law Program at California Berkeley, J.D. from University of CaliforniaBerkeley, PhD from Cornell University in plant physiology (Winter 2000, “The Rhetoric
and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a New Discourse”, Washington and Lee Law
Review, LexisNexis Academic, date accessed 7/13/14) HC
. It is important that the
political discussion draw on ethical concepts. Ethical intuitions play a strong role in public support of
nature protection, n324 and motivate many of the environmental advocates who seek protective
regulation. [*71] But precisely how to call on those intuitions in a way that will get beyond the limitations of the Noah image while retaining political appeal is a daunting
problem.The notion of ethical obligations to future human generations is probably a good place to start. The
idea that current generations have a responsibility to leave something for the future resonates with a
great many people. n325 Kempton found that even childless people frequently referred to obligations to future
generations as a reason for protecting the environment. n326 He concluded that the "desire to protect the
environment for our descendants appears to be a nearly universal American value." n327 Not surprisingly, this concern for
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of the project of developing a new discourse will be extending the ethical vocabulary beyond the Noah story
the future has already demonstrated considerable political power. It is implicit in the National Parks Organic Act, which directs the Park Service to maintain park resources unimpaired "for the
enjoyment of future generations," n328 and explicit in the National Environmental Policy Act, which declares the responsibility of each generation to act "as trustee of the environment for
Concern for future generations has also played a role in passage of endangered species
legislation, n330 and is an important component of sustainable development rhetoric. n331 But an effective discourse cannot
simply argue that we owe some duty to future generations. The precise nature of that obligation is crucial, as the discussion of sustainable development
succeeding generations." n329
above demonstrates. n332 Nature advocates who are convinced that human ingenuity is not an acceptable substitute for nature's bounty must find a way to make that case to the polity.
One [*72] strategy is to talk about the need to preserve the largest possible range of options for future
generations, enabling them to make their own autonomous choices. n333 Another might take advantage of the observation,
sometimes cited as an objection to the notion of obligations to future generations, that the actions we take today will inevitably affect not only
the number but the identity of people born in the future. n334 That knowledge may actually support the
concept of obligations to tailor our actions now with an eye to the future if we care not only about the
wealth available to future generations, but also about the kind of people who make up those
generations. Opportunities to experience nature, or the lack of such opportunities, will shape the
character of future generations. Nature advocates should openly discuss the kind of people a world without nature will spawn. The discourse of nature also needs
to include some discussion of fairness within the current generation. This may be the most difficult aspect of the project, but it is essential to success. We must begin to talk
about when it is fair to expect individuals to bear the costs, both financial and otherwise, of protecting
nature, and when the public should bear those costs instead. We have plenty of language for talking about the distribution of these costs, but
so far none of it seems to have helped in resolving our disputes. Perhaps it would help to develop a fuller explanation of the benefits
nature offers people to counter the costs it imposes. That explanation might begin with a clearer sense
of the scope of the communities that share in the benefits and costs of nature. Professor Eric Freyfogle has offered one way
to approach this issue, suggesting that burdens should be shared at the appropriate geographic scale by, for example,
requiring that all rural landowners, and "perhaps even some suburban ones," share the burdens of
leaving room for wildlife and maintaining ecosystem processes. n335 I would suggest we need to go even further. By expanding
our political discourse to include stories that help us see and connect to nature even in developed areas
perhaps we could get beyond some of the current disputes about the costs of nature protection by
convincing the public to support additional public funding of protective efforts.
Acknowledging our relationship to nature is critical to policy-making-working from the
ground up is the best way to evaluate proposals
Doremus 2k-Holly, Professor of Law at University of California-Berkeley, Co-Director,
Center for Law, Energy & the Environment at California-Berkeley, Director,
Environmental Law Program at California Berkeley, J.D. from University of CaliforniaBerkeley, PhD from Cornell University in plant physiology (Winter 2000, “The Rhetoric
and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a New Discourse”, Washington and Lee Law
Review, LexisNexis Academic, date accessed 7/13/14) HC
The stories we tell to explain and justify our view of the relationship of humanity with nature are
important determinants of the policies we adopt and the attitudes we develop. To date we have relied on three
primary discourses to explain why and how the law should protect nature. These discourses are all valid. Nature is an important material
resource for human use, a unique esthetic resource for human enjoyment, and most people agree that we have some kind of ethical obligation
to protect nature. While the discourses themselves are both valid and inevitable,
the forms in which they have been brought
to the political debate limit our ability to respond to, and even our ability to fully perceive, the problem
of nature protection. The ecological horror story encourages us to view nature solely as a bundle of
resources for human consumption or convenience, to rely on cost-benefit accounting in making
decisions about what parts of nature we should protect, and to ignore the loss of nature short of
catastrophic ecological collapse. The wilderness story teaches us that nature is defined by our absence, and encourages us to
establish a limited number of highly protected reserves. The story of Noah's ark allows us to believe we are facing a short-term crisis, resolvable
through straightforward temporary measures. None
of these stories addresses the crux of the modern nature
problem, which is where people fit into nature. In order to address the boundary conflicts, distributional
issues, and conflicts between discourses that currently plague our efforts to protect nature, we must
find ways to address those issues in our political conversation. We already have a substantial number of
building blocks that could contribute to a new discourse about people and nature. Constructing such a
discourse should be a high priority in the new millennium for those who hope nature will survive into
the next one.
Their Reps-Human Nature Binary
The aff’s attempts to solve environmental problems are ill-mannered-the language
they use is further retrenchment of the human-nature dichotomy
Doremus 2k-Holly, Professor of Law at University of California-Berkeley, Co-Director,
Center for Law, Energy & the Environment at California-Berkeley, Director,
Environmental Law Program at California Berkeley, J.D. from University of CaliforniaBerkeley, PhD from Cornell University in plant physiology (Winter 2000, “The Rhetoric
and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a New Discourse”, Washington and Lee Law
Review, LexisNexis Academic, date accessed 7/13/14) HC
The crux of the modern nature problem is the need to find an appropriate human role in nature. Human
beings are both of nature, having evolved through the same processes that govern other creatures, and
outside nature, having developed the ability to modify and control the environment on a scale far
beyond any other creature. The nature problem, therefore, is as much about people as it is about
nature. Instead of focusing on how to divide the world between humanity and nature, as we have done
so far, we must consider how best to combine the two.The dominant stories in our current political
discourse do not help us do that. The ecological horror story gives us no reason to see ourselves as a
part of nature or to value contact with nature. The wilderness story tells us that we are not part of
nature and should stay away from it. The Noah story tells us that we may have to share space with
nature to weather a crisis but does not encourage an ongoing relationship with nature.
Individiual Change Solves
The groupthink of the aff fails-only individual change can overcome social relations
Swyndegouw 13-Erik, professor of geography at the University of Manchester, former
professor and lecturer in geography at Oxford University (2/6/13, “Apocalypse Now!:
Fear and Doomsday Pleasures”, Capitalism Nature and Socialism vol 24 no 1, accessed
through ProQuest, date accessed 7/18/14) HC
In light of the above, what is the proper leftist response? I discern broadly three perspectives. The first
one centers on nudging behavioral change in a more sustainable direction. Under the mantra of "it is
better to do something (like recycling, growing organic food, and the like) rather than nothing." many
liberal environmentalists mobilize the apocalyptic imaginary in an effort to encourage individuals to
modify attitudes and behavior, and to impress on politicians and business leaders the need to heed the
environmental clarion call. Sustainability hinges here on individual preference and consumer
sovereignty. They also insist that that catastrophe can still be averted if proper action is taken, action
that does not necessarily overhaul social relations but does postpone the environmental catastrophe so
that life as we know it can continue for a while longer. The second strand fully endorses the
environmental cataclysm and revels in the certainty that this had already been predicted a long time
ago. The standard response here is, "you see, we told you so." This is strictly parallel to forms of Marxist
analysis of the current financial crisis in capitalism: "Don't complain now, we did tell you so."
**AT AFF**
AT Link Turn/Demobilization
Apocalyptic thinking is counterproductive-sweeping generalizations undermine
specific advocacy statements
Doremus 2k-Holly, Professor of Law at University of California-Berkeley, Co-Director,
Center for Law, Energy & the Environment at California-Berkeley, Director,
Environmental Law Program at California Berkeley, J.D. from University of CaliforniaBerkeley, PhD from Cornell University in plant physiology (Winter 2000, “The Rhetoric
and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a New Discourse”, Washington and Lee Law
Review, LexisNexis Academic, date accessed 7/13/14) HC
In recent years, this discourse frequently has taken the form of the ecological horror story. That too is
no mystery. The ecological horror story is unquestionably an attention-getter, especially in the hands of
skilled writers [*46] like Carson and the Ehrlichs. The image of the airplane earth, its wings wobbling as
rivet after rivet is carelessly popped out, is difficult to ignore. The apocalyptic depiction of an impending
crisis of potentially dire proportions is designed to spur the political community to quick action.
Furthermore, this story suggests a goal that appeals to many nature lovers: that virtually everything
must be protected. To reinforce this suggestion, tellers of the ecological horror story often imply that
the relative importance of various rivets to the ecological plane cannot be determined. They offer reams
of data and dozens of anecdotes demonstrating the unexpected value of apparently useless parts of
nature. The moth that saved Australia from prickly pear invasion, the scrubby Pacific yew, and the
downright unattractive leech are among the uncharismatic flora and fauna who star in these anecdotes.
n211 The moral is obvious: because we cannot be sure which rivets are holding the plane together,
saving them all is the only sensible course.Notwithstanding its attractions, the material discourse in
general, and the ecological horror story in particular, are not likely to generate policies that will satisfy
nature lovers. The ecological horror story implies that there is no reason to protect nature until
catastrophe looms. The Ehrlichs' rivet-popper account, for example, presents species simply as the
(fungible) hardware holding together the ecosystem. If we could be reasonably certain that a particular
rivet was not needed to prevent a crash, the rivet-popper story suggests that we would lose very little
by pulling it out. Many environmentalists, though, would disagree. n212Reluctant to concede such
losses, tellers of the ecological horror story highlight how close a catastrophe might be, and how little
we know about what actions might trigger one. But the apocalyptic vision is less credible today than it
seemed in the 1970s. Although it is clear that the earth is experiencing a mass wave of extinctions, n213
the complete elimination of life on earth seems unlikely. n214 Life is remarkably robust. Nor is human
extinction probable any time soon. Homo sapiens is adaptable to nearly any environment. Even if the
world of the future includes far fewer species, it likely will hold people. n215
Apocalyptic framing doesn’t encourage activism-inspires skepticism and divisiveness
Foust et al 8 (Christina- Assistant Professor in the Department of Human Connection Studies at the
University of Denver, William Murphy-Doctoral Student and Graduate Teaching Instructor in the
Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver, Chelsea Stow-Doctoral
Student and Graduate Teaching Instructor in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the
University of Denver, “Global Warming and Apocalyptic Rhetoric: A Critical Frame Analysis of US Popular
and Elite Press Coverage from 1997-2007,” Paper submitted to the Environmental Communication
Division of the National Communication Association convention, San Diego, California, November 2008,
http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/6/0/1/2/pages260125/p260125
-1.php) HC
Since the release of Al Gore’s award-winning documentary, An Inconvenient Truth, the American public has been faced with an increasing
amount of discourse on climate change. Leiserowitz (2007) concludes that “Large majorities of Americans believe that global warming is real
and consider it a serious problem, yet global warming remains a low priority relative to other national and environmental issues” (p. 44).
Indeed, though the United States emits a shockingly disproportionate amount of greenhouse gases, large-scale policy changes or even a
precursory conversation about changing the energy economy have been slow in coming. Meanwhile, climate scientists
and others
concerned about global warming have continued to sound the alarm with increasing urgency (Moser &
Dilling, 2004). In her review of the 1999 book, The Heat is On, Catherine Keller (1999) identifies a tendency to “read [climate
change] data apocalyptically” (p. 42), which has devastating consequences for motivating the public to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The apocalyptic tone of climate change discourse may not only
encourage a feeling of despair in the face of impending disaster, but also contributes to skeptics’ ability
to discredit climate scientists as alarmists (Leiserowitz, 2007). Yet, as Killingsworth and Palmer (1996) suggest, environmental
advocates like Rachel Carson have relied upon dire predictions of the world’s end to provoke necessary action: “To employ apocalyptic rhetoric
is to imply the need for radical change, to mark oneself as an outsider in a progressive culture, to risk alienation, and to urge others out into the
open air of political rebellion.” (p. 41). Though apocalyptic language often reads as divisive, this particular strategy ultimately
invites widespread attention to environmental issues. Scholars, opinionists and journalists have drawn connections between an apocalypse and
climate change as a discourse and urgent environmental issue; but as our
literature review reveals, no sustained analysis
has been undertaken concerning the prevalence, and possible implications, of an apocalyptic frame for
global warming. As Keller, Leiserowitz, and Killingsworth and Palmer suggest, the possibility of an apocalyptic frame invites attention to
important questions concerning how it is best to shape or present information on global warming to encourage productive public discourse and
social change. Suzanne Moser and Lisa Dilling (2007), scientists at the National Center for Atmospheric Research, conclude that
to inspire
a movement to combat global warming, we need “greater multi- and interdisciplinary research on
communication and social change” (p. 508). Heeding the call, we consider the following questions guide when approaching
communication and climate change: Does apocalyptic rhetoric structure coverage of global warming in the United States’ elite and popular
press? In what ways does the United States’ elite and popular press implicitly and explicitly position global warming within the apocalyptic
frame? What are the implications of framing global warming apocalyptically? Through a qualitative-critical analysis of US elite and popular press
coverage of global warming, we argue that the
apocalyptic frame structures much of the discourse, and may be
responsible for moving the American public, as Al Gore stated in An Inconvenient Truth, “straight from denial to
despair.” By interrogating the apocalyptic frame, we hope to inspire better ways to structure
communication about global warming, lessening barriers to individual and collective agency. Media Coverage
of Global Warming: Situating the Apocalyptic Frame
Apocalyptic rhetoric and alarmism causes public complacency-the inevitability the aff
presents is resignation to bettering policy
Kurasawa 4-Fuyuki, PhD in sociology from La Trobe University, associate professor in
sociology at York University (11/19/04, “Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of
Prevention and the Work of Foresight”, Constellations vol 11 no. 4,
http://www.yorku.ca/kurasawa/Kurasawa%20Articles/Constellations%20Article.pdf
date accessed 7/19/14) HC
Foremost among the possible distortions of farsightedness is alarmism. the manufacturing of
unwarranted and unfounded doomsday scenarios. State and market institutions may seek to produce a
culture of fear by deliberately stretch- ing interpretations of reality beyond the limits of the plausible so
as to exaggerate the prospects of impending catastrophes, or yet again, by intentionally promoting
certain prognoses over others for instrumental purposes. Accordingly, regressive dystopias can operate as Trojan horses
advancing political agendas or commercial interests that would otherwise be susceptible to public scrutiny and opposition. Instances of this
kind of manipulation of the dystopian imaginary are plentiful: the invasion of Iraq in the name of fighting terrorism and an imminent threat of
use of 'weapons of mass destruction'; the severe curtailing of American civil liberties amidst fears of a collapse of 'homeland security'; the
neoliberal dismantling of the welfare state as the only remedy for an ideologically constructed fiscal crisis; the conservative expansion of
policing and incarceration due to supposedly spiraling crime waves; and so forth. Alarmism
constructs and codes the future in
particular ways, producing or reinforcing certain crisis narratives, belief structures, and rhetorical
conventions. As much as alarmist ideas beget a culture of fear, the reverse is no less true. If fearmongering is a misappropriation of preventive foresight, resignation about the future represents a
problematic outgrowth of the popular acknowledgment of global perils. Some believe that the world to come is so
uncertain and dangerous that we should not attempt to modify the course of history; the future will look after itself for better or worse,
regardless of what we do or wish. One version of this argument consists in a complacent optimism perceiving the future as fated to be better
than either the past or the present Frequently accompanying it is a self-deluding denial of what is plausible ("the world will not be so bad after
all'), or a naively Panglossian pragmatism ('things will work themselves out in spite of everything, because humankind always finds ways to
survive').37 Much more common, however, is the
opposite reaction, a fatalistic pessimism reconciled to the idea that
the future will be necessarily worse than what preceded it. This is sustained by a tragic chronological
framework according to which humanity is doomed to decay, or a cyclical one of the endless repetition
of the mistakes of the past On top of their dubious assessments of what is to come, alarmism and
resignation would, if widely accepted, undermine a viable practice of farsightedness. Indeed, both of
them encourage public disengagement from deliberation about scenarios for the future, a process that
appears to be dangerous, pointless, or unnecessary. The resulting 'depublicization' of debate leaves
dominant groups and institutions (the state, the market, techno-science) in charge of sorting out the
future for the rest of us, thus effectively producing a heteronomous social order. How, then, can we support a
democratic process of prevention from below? The answer, I think, lies in cultivating the public capacity for critical
judgment and deliberation, so that participants in global civil societv subject all claims about potential
catastrophes to examination, evaluation, and contestation. Two normative concepts are particularly well suited to
grounding these tasks: the precautionary principle and global justice.
AT Perm
The permutation is illegitimate-the affirmative is severing its representations of
climate change-the plan cannot happen in the world of the alternative
Severance permutations are a voting issue:
a. Ground-makes the affirmative a moving target-we predicate our strategy off
the 1AC-kills clash if
b. Fairness-the critique is about the ENTIRE framing of the affirmative-justifies aff
conditionality and kicking an advocacy they should be stuck defending
Examining ocean policy from a discourse-first standpoint is best-being able to critique
the underlying assumptions makes for better policy proposals
Wilner 13-Kathleen, doctoral candidate at Walhousie University in Nova Scotia (“The
Difference Discourse Makes: Fishieries and Ocean Policy and Coastal Communities in the
Canadian Maritime Provinces”, doctoral submission for Walhousie University,
http://dalspace.library.dal.ca/bitstream/handle/10222/36321/Bigney%20Wilner%20Kat
hleen%20PhD%20IDPHD%20August%202013.pdf?sequence=3 date accessed 7/17/14)
HC
The concepts of integrated management are applied in a particular way through the policy and practice of integrated management in Canada's
Maritime Provinces. Jentoft (2007) has argued that research on fisheries pays too little attention power relations among the various actors in
the fisheries sector. To correct this, he proposes that "we
need to understand how power is expressed in fisheries and
coastal management discourse... how management institutions frame, legalize and validate discourse...
who argues what, from what positions of power and with what impact?" (2007, p.433). According to Rosalind Gill
(2000), common to discourse analytical approaches is first a concern with language itself, as opposed to
text as a means of "getting at some reality which is deemed to lie behind the discourse" (p. 175). Second,
underlying discourse analysis is the view that language is both constructed and constructive, in other
words, language helps to construct how we understand our world. These two positions are consistent
with constructivist epistemology. Third, when using discourse analysis, talk and texts are conceived as
"organized rhetorically", or "used to establish one version of the world in the face of competing
versions" (p. 176). According to Gill (2000), "people use discourses to do things — to offer blame, to make
excuses, to present themselves in a positive light" (p. 175). Therefore, a discourse analytical approach takes
words to be a form of action or social practice. The texts for policy analysis are written policy documents and the
like (authored texts) but also what policy makers do (which Yanow calls constructed texts) (Yanow, 2000). The "truth" of
policy is in fact found in what is done as opposed to what is written; thus the relationships and tensions
between the two are a source of great interest (Yanow, 1995). Hajer (1995) adds that the institutional context in
which things are said co- determines what can be said meaningfully. Through a discourse oriented
approach to policy, one can ask "questions that are not asked by the prevailing models of policy inquiry"
(Fischer, 2003, p.14). Those prevailing models include, for example, cost-benefit analyses and advocacy coalition
research (e.g.. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Critical policy analysis sets out to "identify the grounds for
contentions that arise from theoretical assumptions, conceptual orientations, methodological
commitments, disciplinary practices, and rhetorical approaches closely intertwined in policy disputes"
(Fischer. 2003. p. 14). Through this systematic deconstruction, discourse analysis can examine the
assumptions about communities and about ecology and ecosystems that underlie fisheries and oceans
policy (Hajer, 1997). They can expose the underlying paradigms of research management to critique (Nadasy,
2007). Discursive, or narrative, forms of policy analysis aim to identify dominant policy narratives and
uncover how policy narratives developed, by placing them in a broader social-political-economic
framework.
Affirmative
**F/W AND PRIOR QUESTION**
AT Discourse Shapes Reality
The basis of their argument is self-referential-empirics are impossible to generate
because of subjectivity
Roskoski and Peabody 91 -Matthew, former asst. director of debate at UMKC, JD from
University of Michigan, and Joe, former Florida State University debate coach and
professor of Communications (“A Linguistic and Philosophical Critique of Language
“Arguments”, Florida State University,
http://debate.uvm.edu/Library/DebateTheoryLibrary/Roskoski&Peabody-LangCritiques
date accessed 7/13/14) HC
One reason for the hypothesis being taken for granted is that on first glance it seems intuitively valid to
some. However, after research is conducted it becomes clear that this intuition is no longer true. Rosch notes
that the hypothesis "not only does not appear to be empirically true in any major respect, but it no longer
even seems profoundly and ineffably true" (Rosch 276). The implication for language "arguments" is clear: a
debater must do more than simply read cards from feminist or critical scholars that say language creates
reality. Instead, the debater must support this claim with empirical studies or other forms of
scientifically valid research. Mere intuition is not enough, and it is our belief that valid empirical studies do not
support the hypothesis. After assessing the studies up to and including 1989, Takano claimed that the hypothesis "has no empirical
support" (Takano 142). Further, Miller & McNeill claim that "nearly all" of the studies performed on the Whorfian
hypothesis "are best regarded as efforts to substantiate the weak version of the hypothesis" (Miller &
McNeill 734). We additionally will offer four reasons the hypothesis is not valid. The first reason is that it is impossible to
generate empirical validation for the hypothesis. Because the hypothesis is so metaphysical and because
it relies so heavily on intuition it is difficult if not impossible to operationalize. Rosch asserts that "profound
and ineffable truths are not, in that form, subject to scientific investigation" (Rosch 259). We concur for two
reasons. The first is that the hypothesis is phrased as a philosophical first principle and hence would not have
an objective referent. The second is there would be intrinsic problems in any such test. The independent variable would be
the language used by the subject. The dependent variable would be the subject's subjective reality. The
problem is that the dependent variable can only be measured through self- reporting, which - naturally entails the use of language. Hence, it is impossible to separate the dependent and independent
variables. In other words, we have no way of knowing if the effects on "reality" are actual or merely
artifacts of the language being used as a measuring tool.
Even if they win that language shapes reality, there is no quantifiable test to measure
the degree it shapes it-objects aren’t created by words, but vice-versa
Roskoski and Peabody 91 -Matthew, former asst. director of debate at UMKC, JD from
University of Michigan, and Joe, former Florida State University debate coach and
professor of Communications (“A Linguistic and Philosophical Critique of Language
“Arguments”, Florida State University,
http://debate.uvm.edu/Library/DebateTheoryLibrary/Roskoski&Peabody-LangCritiques
date accessed 7/13/14) HC
The second reason that the hypothesis is flawed is that there are problems with the causal relationship
it describes. Simply put, it is just as plausible (in fact infinitely more so) that reality shapes language. Again
we echo the words of Dr. Rosch, who says: {C}ovariation does not determine the direction of causality. On the
simplest level, cultures are very likely to have names for physical objects which exist in their culture and
not to have names for objects outside of their experience. Where television sets exists, there are words
to refer to them. However, it would be difficult to argue that the objects are caused by the words. The
same reasoning probably holds in the case of institutions and other, more abstract, entities and their
names. (Rosch 264). The color studies reported by Cole & Means tend to support this claim (Cole & Means 75). Even in the best case
scenario for the Whorfians, one could only claim that there are causal operations working both ways i.e. reality shapes language and language shapes reality. If that was found to be true, which at this point
it still has not, the hypothesis would still be scientifically problematic because "we would have difficulty
calculating the extent to which the language we use determines our thought" (Schultz 134).
There are two pitfalls to the methodology of the kritik-other languages and
homonyms are examples of reality shaping discourse and not the other way around
Roskoski and Peabody 91 -Matthew, former asst. director of debate at UMKC, JD from
University of Michigan, and Joe, former Florida State University debate coach and
professor of Communications (“A Linguistic and Philosophical Critique of Language
“Arguments”, Florida State University,
http://debate.uvm.edu/Library/DebateTheoryLibrary/Roskoski&Peabody-LangCritiques
date accessed 7/13/14) HC
The third objection is that the
hypothesis self- implodes. If language creates reality, then different cultures with
different languages would have different realities. Were that the case, then meaningful cross- cultural
communication would be difficult if not impossible. In Au's words: "it is never the case that something
expressed in Zuni or Hopi or Latin cannot be expressed at all in English. Were it the case, Whorf could
not have written his articles as he did entirely in English" (Au 156). The fourth and final objection is that the
hypothesis cannot account for single words with multiple meanings. For example, as Takano notes, the
word "bank" has multiple meanings (Takano 149). If language truly created reality then this would not be
possible. Further, most if not all language "arguments" in debate are accompanied by the claim that
intent is irrelevant because the actual rhetoric exists apart from the rhetor's intent. If this is so, then the
Whorfian advocate cannot claim that the intent of the speaker distinguishes what reality the rhetoric
creates. The prevalence of such multiple meanings in a debate context is demonstrated with every new
topicality debate, where debaters spend entire rounds quibbling over multiple interpretations of a few words.
Censorship/Linguistic Debates Good
The negative’s attempt to censor forms of expression leaves us at a scholarly dead
end-pushing linguistic boundaries is key to enacting change
Roskoski and Peabody 91 -Matthew, former asst. director of debate at UMKC, JD from
University of Michigan, and Joe, former Florida State University debate coach and
professor of Communications (“A Linguistic and Philosophical Critique of Language
“Arguments”, Florida State University,
http://debate.uvm.edu/Library/DebateTheoryLibrary/Roskoski&Peabody-LangCritiques
date accessed 7/13/14) HC
As Justice William Brennan observed in his dissenting opinion in Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, "students
do not shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." (Brennan 580). Given that the
Supreme Court has already affirmed the first amendment rights of primary and secondary schoolchildren, it seems logical to assume
that even greater protection would be given to the (theoretically) more mature and responsible
university student. It is for this reason that many label university speech codes as "anathema to a
university," and assert that "speech codes have no place at all on the American campus." (Hyde & Fishman
1486).1 The proper interpretation of these first amendment rights is articulated by the now famous words of Justice Oliver Wendall Holmes,
who declared:
If there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than
any other it is the principle of free thought - not free thought for those who agree with us, but freedom
for the thought that we hate. (Holmes 654). Certainly this principle would prohibit the enforcement of any
language "argument." If one despised the rhetoric of a given debater enough to vote against that
debater, then as Holmes suggests, the principles of the Constitution require one to refrain from
censorship. The Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts articulated the essence of this argument so eloquently that their entire statement
deserves repetition here: When language wounds, the natural and immediate impulse is to take steps to shut
up those who utter the wounding words. When, as here, that impulse is likely to be felt by those who
are normally the first amendment's staunchest defenders, free expression faces its greatest threat. At
such times, it is important for those committed to principles of free expressions to remind each other of
what they have always known regarding the long term costs of short term victories bought through
compromising first amendment principles. (Strossen 487). Certainly debaters and debate coaches, whose entire activity is
premised upon the freedom of expression, ought to be among the staunchest defenders of that freedom. When we are asked to
censor the rhetoric of a debater, as the C.L.U. warns, we ought to think long and hard about the risks
associated with playing fast and loose with free speech. As Brennan notes, the mandate "to inculcate moral
and political values is not a general warrant to act as 'thought police' stifling discussion of all but stateapproved topics and advocacy of all but the official position." (Brennan 577). Not only does the first
amendment create a moral or deontological barrier to language "arguments", the principles it defends
also create a pragmatic barrier. The free and sometimes irreverent discourse protected by the first
amendment is essential to the health and future success of our society. History has borne out the belief
that the freedom to challenge convictions is essential to our ability to adapt to change. As Hyde and Fishman
observe, university scholars must be allowed to "think the unthinkable, discuss the unmentionable, and
challenge the unchallengeable" because "major discoveries and advances in knowledge are often highly
unsettling and distasteful to the existing order." This leads them to conclude that "we cannot afford" to
impose "orthodoxies, censorship, and other artificial barriers to creative thought" (Hyde & Fishman 1485). Given
the rapid pace of political and technological change that our society faces, and given that debates often focus around the cutting edge of such
changes,
the imposition of linguistic straitjackets upon the creative thought and critical thinking of
debaters would seem to uniquely jeopardize these interests. This is not just exaggerated rhetoric, nor is
it merely our old debate disadvantages in new clothes. Hyde & Fishman's claims have been repeatedly validated by
historical events. Had Elie Wiesel debated in Germany, a "Zionist language" argument would not have been unlikely. As Bennett Katz has
argued,
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American Universities is almost self-evident... To
impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the
future of our Nation... Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to
evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die. (Katz
156).
The censorship the negative imposes turns the kritik-encourages the use of the
rhetoric they condemn
Roskoski and Peabody 91 -Matthew, former asst. director of debate at UMKC, JD from
University of Michigan, and Joe, former Florida State University debate coach and
professor of Communications (“A Linguistic and Philosophical Critique of Language
“Arguments”, Florida State University,
http://debate.uvm.edu/Library/DebateTheoryLibrary/Roskoski&Peabody-LangCritiques
date accessed 7/13/14) HC
Language "Arguments" Are Counterproductive There are several levels upon which language "arguments" are actually counterproductive. We
will discuss the quiescence effect, deacademization, and publicization.
The quiescence effect is explained by Strossen when
she writes "the censorship approach is diversionary. It makes it easier for communities to avoid coming
to grips with less convenient and more expensive, but ultimately more meaningful approaches" (Strossen
561). Essentially, the argument is that allowing the restriction of language we find offensive substitutes
for taking actions to check the real problems that generated the language. Previously, we have argued
that the language advocates have erroneously reversed the causal relationship between language and
reality. We have defended the thesis that reality shapes language, rather than the obverse. Now we will
also contend that to attempt to solve a problem by editing the language which is symptomatic of that
problem will generally trade off with solving the reality which is the source of the problem. There are several
reasons why this is true. The first, and most obvious, is that we may often be fooled into thinking that language
"arguments" have generated real change. As Graddol and Swan observe, "when compared with larger social and
ideological struggles, linguistic reform may seem quite a trivial concern," further noting "there is also the
danger that effective change at this level is mistaken for real social change" (Graddol & Swan 195). The second
reason is that the language we find objectionable can serve as a signal or an indicator of the corresponding
objectionable reality. The third reason is that restricting language only limits the overt expressions of
any objectionable reality, while leaving subtle and hence more dangerous expressions unregulated. Once
we drive the objectionable idea underground it will be more difficult to identify, more difficult to root
out, more difficult to counteract, and more likely to have its undesirable effect. The fourth reason is that
objectionable speech can create a "backlash" effect that raises the consciousness of people exposed to
the speech. Strossen observes that "ugly and abominable as these expressions are, they undoubtably have
had the beneficial result of raising social consciousness about the underlying societal problem..." (560).
The second major reason why language "arguments" are counterproductive is that they contribute to
deacademization. In the context of critiquing the Hazelwood decision, Hopkins explains the phenomenon: To escape censorship,
therefore, student journalists may eschew school sponsorship in favor of producing their own product. In such a case, the result would almost
certainly be lower quality of high school journalism... The purpose of high school journalism, however, is more than learning newsgathering,
writing, and editing skills. It is also to learn the role of the press in society; it is to teach responsibility as well as freedom. (Hopkins 536). Hyde &
Fishman further explain that to
protect students from offensive views, is to deprive them of the experiences
through which they "attain intellectual and moral maturity and become self-reliant" (Hyde & Fishman
1485). The application of these notions to the debate round is clear and relevant. If language
"arguments" become a dominant trend, debaters will not change their attitudes. Rather they will
manifest their attitudes in non-debate contexts. Under these conditions, the debaters will not have the moderating effects of
the critic or the other debaters. Simply put, sexism at home or at lunch is worse than sexism in a debate round because in the round there is a
critic to provide negative though not punitive feedback. The publicization effects of censorship are well known. "Psychological
studies
reveal that whenever the government attempts to censor speech, the censored speech - for that very
reason - becomes more appealing to many people" (Strossen 559). These studies would suggest that
language which is critiqued by language "arguments" becomes more attractive simply because of the
critique. Hence language "arguments" are counterproductive. Conclusion Rodney Smolla offered the following insightful
assessment of the interaction between offensive language and language "arguments": The battle against {offensive speech} will
be fought most effectively through persuasive and creative educational leadership rather than through
punishment and coercion... The sense of a community of scholars, an island of reason and tolerance, is
the pervasive ethos. But that ethos should be advanced with education, not coercion. It should be the
dominant voice of the university within the marketplace of ideas; but it should not preempt that
marketplace. (Smolla 224-225).1 We emphatically concur. It is our position that a debater who feels
strongly enough about a given language "argument" ought to actualize that belief through interpersonal
conversation rather than through a plea for censorship and coercion. Each debater in a given round has three minutes
of cross-examination time during which he or she may engage the other team in a dialogue about the ramifications of the language the
opposition has just used. Additionally even given the efficacy of Rich Edwards' efficient tabulation program, there will inevitably be long periods
between rounds during which further dialogue can take place. It is our position that interpersonal transactions will be more effective methods
of raising consciousness about the negative ramifications of language. These interactions can achieve the goals intended by language
"arguments" without the attendant infringements upon the freedom of speech.
Epistemology/Decision Making
Environmental apocalypticism as a narrative acts as a scope for making decisionspeople are more inclined to make sustainable choices if they are aware of the
endpoint
Veldman 2012-Robin Globus, doctoral candidate in religion at the University of Florida,
asst editor of the Journal for the Study of Religion, Nature and Culture (“Narrating the
Environmental Apocalypse: How Imagining the End Facilitates Moral Reasoning Among
Environmental Activists”, Ethics and the Environment, Project Muse, date accessed
7/13/14) HC
The next section explores the implications of that relationship further. [End Page 8] The Apocalyptic Narrative as a Framework for Moral
Deliberation In discussing how apocalypticism functions within the environmental community, it will be helpful to analyze it as a type of
narrative. I do so because the domain of narrative includes both the stories that people read and write, as well as those they tell and live by. By
using narratives as data, scholars can analyze experiential and textual sources simultaneously (Polkinghorne 1988; Riessman 2000). To
analyze environmental apocalypticism as a type of narrative is not to suggest that apocalyptics’ claims
about the future are fictional. Rather, it is to highlight that the facts to which environmentalists appeal
have been organized with particular goals in mind, goals which have necessarily shaped the selection
and presentation of those facts. Compelling environmental writers do not simply list every known fact
pertaining to the natural world, but instead select certain findings and place them within a larger
interpretive framework. Alone, each fact has little meaning, but when woven into a larger narrative, a
message emerges. This process of narrativization is essential if a message is to be persuasive (Killingsworth and Palmer 2000, 197), and
has occurred not only in the rapidly expanding genre of environmental nonfiction, but in much scientific writing about the environment as well
(Harré, Brockmeier, and Mühlhäusler 1999, 69). What
defines narratives as such is their beginning-middle-end
structure, their ability to “describe an action that begins, continues over a well-defined period of time,
and finally draws to a definite close” (Cronon 1992, 1367). Here I will focus on the last of these elements, the ending, because
anything we can learn about how endings function within narratives in general will be applicable to the apocalypse, the most final ending of all.
An ending is essential in order for a story to be complete, but there is more to it than this. Endings are also key because they establish a story’s
moral, the lesson it is supposed to impart upon the reader. In other words, to
know the moral of the story, auditors must
know the consequences of the actions depicted therein, so there can be no moral without an ending. To
take a simple example, when we hear the story of the shepherd boy who falsely claims that a wolf is attacking his flock of sheep in order to
entertain himself at his community’s expense, what makes the lesson clear is that when a wolf does attack his flock, the disenchanted town
members refuse to come to his aid. By clearly illustrating how telling lies can have [End Page 9] unpleasant consequences for the perpetrator,
the ending reveals the moral that lying is wrong. As Cronon explains, it
is “[t]he difference between beginning and end
[that] gives us our chance to extract a moral from the rhetorical landscape” (1992, 1370). Endings play a similar role
in environmental stories. In Al Gore’s book Earth in the Balance (1992), for example, he devotes over a third of
the book’s pages to presenting scientific evidence that disaster is imminent.5 As he sums it up, “Modern
industrial civilization…is colliding violently with our planet’s ecological system. The ferocity of its assault
on the earth is breathtaking, and the horrific consequences are occurring so quickly as to defy our
capacity to recognize them” (1992, 269). He builds this argument so carefully precisely because if the
ending does not seem credible, the moral he wants readers to draw from the story will not be
compelling. If his readers are not convinced that the ending to this story of ecological misbehavior will
be a debacle of colossal proportions, they will not become convinced that they need to dramatically
alter their ecological behavior. Thus the vision of future catastrophe that Gore presents provides a
crucial vantage point from which the present environmental situation can be understood as the result of
a grand moral failure, and Gore’s readers are made aware of their obligations in light of it. Gore himself
appreciates the importance of this recognition, arguing that “whether we realize it or not, we are now
engaged in an epic battle to right the balance of our earth, and the tide of this battle will turn only when
the majority of people in the world become sufficiently aroused by a shared sense of urgent danger to
join an all-out effort” (1992, 269, emphasis added). Here, as in so many other stories, the ending must be in
place for the moral to become clear. To say that endings are essential in order for stories to have morals
is already to hint that stories alter behavior, that they can encourage action in the real world even as
they invoke an imaginary one. This much is clear from Earth in the Balance (1992): Gore does not just want people to
grasp a moral, to perceive some ethic in the abstract—he wants them change their behavior in the here
and now. In constructing a narrative with this goal in mind, he is banking on the ability of powerful
stories to motivate social change, to be, as Cronon puts it, “our chief moral compass in the world” (1992,
1375). Mark Johnson’s insightful synthesis of cognitive science and philosophy helps explain further how this process of moral guidance occurs.
For [End Page 10] Johnson, narrative is fundamental to our experience of reality, “the most comprehensive means we have for constructing
temporal syntheses that bind together and unify our past, present, and future into more or less meaningful patterns” (1993, 174).
Narratives are also critical to our ability to reason morally, an activity which Johnson asserts is
fundamentally imaginative. In this view, we use stories to imagine ourselves in different scenarios,
exploring and evaluating the consequences of different possible actions in order to determine the right
one. Moral deliberation is thus …an imaginative exploration of the possibilities for constructive action
within a present situation. We have a problem to solve here and now (e.g., ‘What am I to do?’…. ‘How
should I treat others?’), and we must try out various possible continuations of our narrative in search of
the one that seems best to resolve the indeterminacy of our present situation. (1993, 180) Put another way, what
cognitive science has revealed is that from an empirical perspective the process of moral deliberation entails constructing narratives rooted in
our unique history and circumstances, rather than applying universal principles (such as Kant’s categorical imperative) to particular cases.
That we use narratives to reason morally is not a result of conscious choice but of how human cognition
works. That is, insofar as we experience ourselves as temporal beings, a narrative framework is
necessary to organize, explain, and ultimately justify the many individual decisions that over time
become a life. Formal principles may be useful in unambiguous textbook cases, but in real life “we can
almost never decide (reflectively) how to act without considering the ways in which we can continue our
narrative construction of our situation” (Johnson 1993, 160). Empirically speaking, “our moral reasoning is situated within our
narrative understanding” (Johnson 1993, 180, italics in original). The observation that people use narratives to reason morally may help explain
the association between environmental apocalypticism and activism. The function of
the apocalyptic narrative may be that it
helps adherents determine how to act by providing a storyline from which they can imaginatively
sample, enabling them to assess the consequences of their actions. In order to answer the question, “Should I drive or
walk to the store?” for example, they can reason, “If I walk, that will reduce my carbon footprint, which will help keep the ice caps from
melting, saving humans and other species.” It is their access to this narrative of impending [End Page 11] disaster that makes such reasoning
possible, for it provides a simple framework within which people can consider and eventually arrive at some conclusion about their moral
obligations.6 More
broadly, it can guide entire lives by providing a narrative frame of reference that imbues
the individual’s experiences with meaning. For example, it is the context of looming anthropogenic
apocalypse which suggests that dedicating one’s life to achieving a healthier relationship with the
natural world is a worthwhile endeavor. Absent the apocalypse, choices such as limiting one’s travel to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions, becoming vegetarian, working in the environmental sector (often for less compensation), or growing one’s own food could seem to
be meaningless sacrifices. Within this context, on the other hand, such choices become essential features of the quest to live a moral life. The
apocalyptic narrative is but one of many ways to tell the environmental story, yet it is one that seems particularly well-suited to encouraging
pro-environmental behavior. First, the
apocalyptic ending discloses certain everyday decisions as moral decisions.
Without the narrative context of impending disaster, decisions such as whether to drive or walk to the
store would be merely matters of convenience or preference. In the context of potentially disastrous
consequences for valued places, people, and organisms, by contrast, such decisions become matters of
right and wrong. Second, putting information about the environment into narrative form enables
apocalyptics to link complex global environmental processes to their own lives, a perceptual technique
Thomashow describes as “bringing the biosphere home” (2002). Developing this skill is essential
because without that felt sense of connection to their own lived experience, people are much less likely
to become convinced that it is incumbent upon them to act (2002, 2). Finally, the sheer magnitude of
the impending disaster increases the feeling of responsibility to make good on one’s moral intuitions. By
locating individuals within a drama of ultimate concern, the narrative frames their choices as cosmically
important, and this feeling of urgency then helps to convert moral deliberation into action.
Apocalyptic narratives inspire moral consequentialism-it’s most pragmatic and
applicable to people
Veldman 2012-Robin Globus, doctoral candidate in religion at the University of Florida,
asst editor of the Journal for the Study of Religion, Nature and Culture (“Narrating the
Environmental Apocalypse: How Imagining the End Facilitates Moral Reasoning Among
Environmental Activists”, Ethics and the Environment, Project Muse, date accessed
7/13/14) HC
With this conceptual overview in place, we can now examine more closely what the relationship between apocalypticism and moral reasoning
looks like in practice. [End Page 12] Apocalypticism as Folk Consequentialism While a number of philosophers and ethicists have discussed the
role of narrative in environmental ethics (e.g. Cheney 1989; Gare 1998; Liszka 2003; Peterson 2001), less is
known about how such
narrative ethics might function in practice. Such a project falls within the domain of descriptive ethics, or
ethical inquiry that seeks to understand not what the results of moral reasoning should be, but what
they are. Instead of looking for abstract, decontextualized or universal principles, a descriptive approach
seeks to understand how specific individuals faced with concrete situations reason morally in everyday
life. As Johnson writes, this approach is valuable “not because it gives laws or rules for acting (which it
doesn’t), but rather because knowing oneself and knowing how human beings work can help one
understand situations, examine problems, and work out constructive solutions” (1993, 189). In other
words, if one wants to solve moral conundrums, it helps to have the facts straight—including the facts
about the practice of solving moral conundrums. The connection between narratives and ethics has
often been developed within the context of the virtue tradition (cf. MacIntyre [1981] 2007; Hauerwas 1981). Certainly
there are aspects of environmental culture that cohere with the idea of virtue (see Cafaro 2001). Yet when people invoke the
narrative of environmental apocalypse, when they use it to evaluate their present day behaviors, I have
not heard it expressed in the context of developing character toward a particular end, but of avoiding
consequences. This suggests to me that in the case of environmental apocalypticism the reasoning
process is better understood as a form of consequentialism, or more appropriately, folk
consequentialism, to indicate that I am referring to what people do to reason morally in everyday life. A
few examples from my field research among environmentalists who subscribe to an apocalyptic narrative should help to illustrate this point. In
the fall of 2007 I joined a climate change-themed discussion group that had been convened by a local environmental non-profit organization
based in Gainesville, Florida. I selected this group because following Leiserowitz (2005) and Maibach, Roser-Renouf, and Leiserowitz (2009), I
reasoned that people who made the effort to participate in such an activity would more likely to consider climate change to be a potentially
dire threat. At the conclusion of the six week series, I conducted semi-structured interviews with four of the ten regular participants in order
[End Page 13] to further probe their perceptions of and feelings about the prospect of environmental disaster. While I cannot draw broad
conclusions based on this small sample, I can say that among
the people I spoke with there was a strong connection
between a desire to heal or protect the Earth and a sense of impending catastrophe. With this focus on
consequences as the primary criteria for moral decision making, their reasoning thus appears to fit
within a consequentialist framework. One way this folk consequentialism became evident was in the way people described their
life trajectories being altered by the conviction that environmental disaster was imminent. One woman I interviewed, “Sarah,”
had been interested in environmental issues for much of her life, but reading Daniel Quinn’s novel
Ishmael (1995) had pushed her to dramatically alter her lifestyle so that it would be more consonant
with environmental principles. In Ishmael, Quinn argues that the environmental crisis is the result of agricultural “Taker” cultures
displacing hunting and gathering “Leaver” cultures worldwide. Taker cultures, which now dominate the planet, hold that the natural world
exists only for human use, whereas Leaver cultures, who have been increasingly marginalized since the invention of agriculture, see humans as
humble members of a larger community of living beings. Whereas Taker cultures therefore feel justified in destroying the planet’s biodiversity
for their own benefit, Leaver cultures tend to limit themselves out of respect for other creatures. Articulating a version of the narrative of
environmental apocalypse, Quinn suggests that if Taker cultures do not realize their error in time, the human species may bring about its own
extinction (1995, 238–40, 263). Sarah used Quinn’s terms to describe the threat she believed increasing human numbers posed, saying
“Overpopulation drives depletion of resource…. So we’re, in Dan Quinn’s terms, Takers instead of Leavers. So all of that combines but the
overpopulation really drives the destruction.” Later, she explained the full extent to which the book had influenced her life choices: Sarah:
[Ishmael] was such a ground-shaking book. I bought about ten copies and started handing it out…. I’ve since read all his books. And so, upon
reading that, I decided I wanted to learn how to grow my own food…. and I just started ‘Food Not Lawns’ . . . I’m on a learning curve, and then
you have to collect all the tools to process [the food you grow].” [End Page 14] Robin: So do you can and all that? Sarah: Yeah. Not freezing
because it takes too much energy. And that actually drove our decision to move away. We sought a place where we felt it was more sustainable
to begin with and where the community was more of a community…. the Pacific Northwest was a place that we knew to be more sustainable
and [so] we purchased a house in [Washington state]. As she explains, it was a comprehension of the deep roots of the unfolding ecological
crisis and its potentially disastrous consequences that inspired her to make a series of substantial lifestyle changes. Subsequent decisions, such
as how to store food (via low energy means), were made with the goal of reducing her own contribution to dangerous climate change as much
as possible. That
she made her decisions with an eye to preventing certain consequences appears to
support the theory that she reasoned morally using a broadly consequentialist logic. The connection between
consequences and moral obligations came up during the group meetings as well. For example, as we went around the circle introducing
ourselves the first night, a
number of people mentioned unusual weather, as well as changes they had noted in
the distribution of various plant and animal species. Rather than just presenting these facts alone,
several people linked them to feelings of guilt and personal responsibility for the crisis. That individuals
linked environmental consequences to a sense of moral obligation suggests that some form of
consequentialism was at work. This connection between consequences and moral obligation also
seemed to be at work at the group level. For example, during almost every gathering, participants
discussed not only what could be done to prevent environmental disaster (given the time and resources
available), but what should be done. In this sense the gatherings served as a forum for collective moral
deliberation, in which various environmental futures were imagined and the group’s moral obligations
evaluated in light of them. This seems to further support the notion that those who have adopted the
environmentally apocalyptic worldview use a consequentialist framework to engage in moral reasoning.
In observing that people appear to use a kind of folk consequentialism to determine what actions are ecologically moral, I do not intend to
promote consequentialism as a basis for environmental ethics, or to imply that my informants made the most ethical or environmentally
sensitive [End Page 15] choices given their means. Rather
my point is to observe that, empirically speaking, those who
use the apocalyptic narrative to guide their ethical decision making appear to use a form of
consequentialism to guide at least some of these choices.7 This seems especially plausible if people do
use narratives to engage in moral reasoning, for narratives are typically time-oriented (Johnson 1993,
174), and therefore generally compatible with the action–consequences framework that also underpins
consequentialism. The reasoning process involved in folk consequentialism may be semi-ad hoc, containing contradictions or leaving
some conundrums unresolved, but it nevertheless does appear to provide people with a working framework for deciding what behavior is
morally justifiable. Moreover, it is compelling enough to get people to act on their decisions. What
makes up in applicability.
it lacks in philosophical rigor, it
Neg’s Analysis Bad
The neg’s analysis of environmental apocalypticism is a form of pre-millennial
prediction-political rhetoric is temporal
Johnson 9-Laura, graduate student at Indiana University (“(Environmental) Rhetorics of
Tempered Apocalypticism in An Inconvenient Truth”, Rhetoric Review vol. 28 no. 1,
http://comphacker.org/comp/engl338/files/2012/08/36076033.pdf date accessed
7/20/14) HC
One possible explanation for Gore's tempered apocalypticism can be found in Killingsworth and Palmer's periodization of environmental
apocalypticism. Their article traces a trajectory that begins with Carson's Silent Spring and Ehrlich's The Population Bomb, texts that exemplify
millennial ecology. Criticisms of these texts brought a tempering of environmental zeal in texts of the 1970s and 1980s. However, Killingsworth
and Palmer argue that this trend shifts back in the environmentally disaffected late 1980s, with a revival of such apocalyptic rhetoric
accompanying widespread scientific acceptance of global warming. Nonetheless, the return to apocalyptic rhetoric represents a moderated
version of that of Carson and Ehrlich. a tempered apocalypticism seemingly characteristic of a text like Gore's.
Killingsworth and
Palmer map a relationship between millennial rhetoric and environmental ism: Millennial narratives
become more apocalyptic in times when environmentalism is weak; such rhetoric then inspires stronger
ties to environmentalism. Stronger environmental ism means less need for apocalyptic rhetoric (because
the audience is already committed to environmental values), which leads to a confident moderation of
such rhetoric. Thus we might read Truth's tempered apocalypticism as evidence of the strength of contemporary environmental ism. Or,
more realistically, we might read the tensions within its construction of apocalypticism and agency as evidence of tensions in contemporary
environmentalism and environmental politics. Even the
title An Inconvenient Truth suggests a muted rhetoric. It
positions the documentary as overtly not apocalyptic; unlike a silent spring or a population bomb. Gore's
inconvenient message suggests nothing monumental or violent, a truth whose effects can no doubt be
reversed with some small, albeit inconvenient, lifestyle changes. Moreover, rather than presenting the inconvenient
truth. Gore offers only one, presumably one among many, again limiting his message, positioning it not as an
overarching answer (even as he argues its global calamitous effects), but as a truth on equal footing with
other truths. Potentially, such a noncompetitive truth could appeal to a broader audience with a range
of religious or ideological interpretations of truth. But even as it invokes a muted apocalypticism, the
title gestures by under- statement toward larger, more millennial truth-claims. Its irony allows it to point
directly toward a tempered, reasoned conclusion while simultaneously suggesting that the real truth of
this truth is that it offers much more, an inconvenience that is no mere inconvenience. Such a title keeps
with Killingsworth and Palmer's trajectory: Because we are not in the era of Carson and the early Ehrlich,
we must temper millennial rhetoric to render it reasonable to a modern audience. How- ever, here
understatement docs more than just temper; it reaches to both ends of the millennial spectrum at once.
Another nuance of the title is that it quietly suggests a critique of progressivism, particularly the sort Killingsworth and Palmer argue is never
really possible for millennial ecology. "An Inconvenient Truth" suggests both under- statement and the possibility of the actually consequential
"truth" of global warming being labeled merely "inconvenient" by some dominant rhetoric, again suggesting a necessary mistrust of those in
political power. Thus we might read the title with scare-quotes around the word inconvenient, ones that place the label in some other mouth
than Gore's. Even as the title points by understatement toward the weightiness of global warming, it suggests that some (most likely the
progressivist forces of big business and big government) may dismiss it as merely "inconvenient," appealing to a conspiracy-theory mentality
that has an undeniable influence on an audience likely already suspicious of such forces. However, because the title suggests such an
interpretation only by nuance, it never really critiques progressivism. Its force is in invoking the critique rather than offering it, which enables it
to draw on conspiracy-theory affect without needing to defend its logic. Truth
interestingly complicates Killingsworth and
Palmer's point that millennial rhetoric, even if it claims to overturn the progressive mythos, can never
fully escape it. While Gore clearly docs not offer an antiprogressive stance, he may nonetheless manage to harness its emotional power
for members of the audience who arc already open to it. Killingsworth and Palmer further argue that the strength of apocalyptic rhetoric
correlates with the radicality of the proposed solution (41); if this is the case, we might take Truth in two ways. Either Gore's tempered rhetoric
indicates that he is advocating no radical break with progressivism, or Truth
anticipates that its audience will have already
made the association between apocalyptic rhetoric and radical antiprogressivism (which they may read as a kind
of left-wing anarchism) and the documentary moves to disassociate the two. By moderating its apocalyptic language. Truth paints the
potential solutions to global warming as less extreme, less revolutionary, in order to appeal to
potentially resistant audience members. And yet, Killingsworth and Palmer conclude that apocalyptic
rhetoric is hardly a strategy of moderation: To employ apocalyptic rhetoric is to imply the need for
radical change, to mark oneself as an outsider in a progressive culture, to risk alienation, and to urge
others out into the open air of political rebellion. The apocalyptic narrative is an expansive and offensive rhetorical strategy.
(41) In these terms, even if it docs not fully reject progressivism. apocalyptic rhetoric a/ways gestures toward this rejection. Thus even the
less radically apocalyptical narratives, like Gore's, allude to "radical change" and '"political rebellion." This
allusion could weaken the appeal of such texts, even as their aestheticized degradation narratives might awaken our dark curiosity about
environmental collapse; logic rejects and affect anxiously embraces. However, I'm
not sure that I buy Killingsworth and
Palmer's conclusion that apocalyptic rhetoric always gestures toward a kind of political rebellion, as it
can be as easily mobilized by the dominant group as the minority. Warnings of terrorism by certain
government officials, for example, have all the vividness and eschatology of apocalyptic appeals. Even
narrowing Killingsworth and Palmer's point to environmental apocalyptic rhetoric seems to war with the message of Truth, which if it includes
allusions to antiprogressivism constructs them so covertly as to render them practically unnoticcable to the audience's logic (although, as I
argued before, a certain conspiracy-theory affect is arguably present).16 Perhaps Killingsworth
and Palmer overstate their
point, or perhaps we are meant to take their conclusion as overshadowing this. Here they argue that the
success and appeal of rhetoric is always wedded to historical situation in ways that are complex and
unpredictable. Thus Silent Spring became a bestseller while similar texts were largely ignored, less due
to rhetorical failings than historical moment. In this light. Truth's complex apocalypticism is a product of
the moment, and its fraught millennialism may have been impossible to predict from the pre—2000
election, prc-9/l 1 moment of Killingsworth and Palmer's article.
**LINK DEBATE**
Link Turn = Encourages Activism
Link turn-the usage of apocalyptic language actually encourages activism to stop
environmental harms -alarmism encourages a more genuinely motivated activism
Veldman 2012-Robin Globus, doctoral candidate in religion at the University of Florida,
asst editor of the Journal for the Study of Religion, Nature and Culture (“Narrating the
Environmental Apocalypse: How Imagining the End Facilitates Moral Reasoning Among
Environmental Activists”, Ethics and the Environment, Project Muse, date accessed
7/13/14) HC
Environmental Apocalypticism and Activism As we saw in the introduction, critics often argue that apocalyptic rhetoric induces feelings of hopelessness or fatalism.
While it certainly does for some people, in this section I will present evidence that apocalypticism
also often goes hand in hand with
activism. Some of the strongest evidence of a connection between environmental apocalypticism and
activism comes from a national survey that examined whether Americans perceived climate change to
be dangerous. As part of his analysis, Anthony Leiserowitz identified several “interpretive communities,” which had consistent demographic characteristics
but varied in their levels of risk perception. The group who perceived the risk to be the greatest, which he labeled “alarmists,”
described climate change [End Page 5] using apocalyptic language, such as “Bad…bad…bad…like after nuclear
war…no vegetation,” “Heat waves, it’s gonna kill the world,” and “Death of the planet” (2005, 1440). Given such
language, this would seem to be a reasonable way to operationalize environmental apocalypticism. If such apocalypticism encouraged
fatalism, we would expect alarmists to be less likely to have engaged in environmental behavior
compared to groups with moderate or low levels of concern. To the contrary, however, Leiserowitz
found that alarmists “were significantly more likely to have taken personal action to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions” (ibid.) than respondents who perceived climate change to pose less of a threat. Interestingly, while
one might expect such radical views to appeal only to a tiny minority, Leiserowitz found that a respectable eleven percent of Americans fell into this group (ibid).
Further supporting Leiserowitz’s findings, in
a separate national survey conducted in 2008, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, and
Leiserowitz found that a group they labeled “the Alarmed” (again, due to their high levels of concern about climate change) “are
the segment most engaged in the issue of global warming. They are very convinced it is happening,
human-caused, and a serious and urgent threat. The Alarmed are already making changes in their own
lives and support an aggressive national response” (2009, 3, emphasis added). This group was far more likely than
people with lower levels of concern over climate change to have engaged in consumer activism (by
rewarding companies that support action to reduce global warming with their business, for example) or
to have contacted elected officials to express their concern. Additionally, the authors found that “[w]hen asked which
reason for action was most important to them personally, the Alarmed were most likely to select
preventing the destruction of most life on the planet (31%)” (2009, 31)—a finding suggesting that for many in
this group it is specifically the desire to avert catastrophe, rather than some other motivation, that
encourages pro-environmental behavior. Taken together, these and other studies (cf. Semenza et al. 2008 and DerKarabetia, Stephenson,
and Poggi 1996) provide important evidence that many of those who think environmental problems pose a
severe threat practice some form of activism, rather than giving way to fatalistic resignation. National surveys
give a good overview of the association between apocalypticism and activism among the general public, but they do not [End Page 6] provide sufficient
ethnographic detail. To complement this broader picture I now turn to case studies, which provide greater insight into how adherents themselves understand what
motivates their environmental behavior. When seeking a subset of environmentalists with apocalyptic beliefs, the radical wing is an obvious place to look. For
example, many Earth First!ers believe that the collapse of industrial society is inevitable (Taylor 1994). At
the same time, the majority are
actively committed to preventing ecological disaster. As Earth First! co-founder Howie Wolke acknowledged, the two are directly
connected: “As ecological calamity unravels the living fabric of the Earth, environmental radicalism has
become both common and necessary” (1989, 29).3 This logic underlies efforts to preserve wilderness areas,
which many radical environmentalists believe will serve as reservoirs of genetic diversity, helping to
restore the planet after industrial society collapses (Taylor 1994). In addition to encouraging activism to preserve wilderness,
apocalyptic beliefs also motivate practices such as “monkeywrenching,” or ecological sabotage, civil disobedience, and the more conventional “paper
monkeywrenching” (lobbying, engaging in public information campaigns to shift legislative priorities, or using lawsuits when these tactics fail). Ultimately,
while there are disagreements over what strategies will best achieve their desired goals, for most radical
environmentalists, apocalypticism and activism are bound closely together.The connection between belief in impending
disaster and environmental activism holds true for Wiccans as well. During fieldwork in the southeastern United States, for example, Shawn Arthur reported
meeting “dozens of Wiccans who professed their apocalyptic millenarian beliefs to anyone who expressed interest, yet many others only quietly agreed with them
without any further elaboration” (2008, 201). For this group, the coming disaster was understood as divine retribution, the result of an angry Earth Goddess
preparing to punish humans for squandering her ecological gifts (Arthur 2008, 203). In light of Gaia’s impending revenge, Arthur found that Wiccans advocated both
spiritual and material forms of activism. For example, practices such as Goddess worship, the use of herbal remedies for healing, and awareness of the body and its
energies were considered important for initiating a more harmonious relationship with the earth (Arthur 2008, 207). As for material activism, Arthur notes [End
Page 7] that the
notion of environmental apocalypse played a key role in encouraging pro-environmental
behavior: images of immanent [sic] ecological crisis and apocalyptic change often were utilized as
motivating factors for developing an environmentally and ecologically conscious worldview; for stressing
the importance of working for the Earth through a variety of practices, including environmental activism,
garbage collecting, recycling, composting, and religious rituals; for learning sustainable living skills; and
for developing a special relationship with the world as a divine entity. (2008, 212) What these studies and my own
experiences in the environmentalist milieu4 suggest is that people who make a serious commitment to engaging in environmentally friendly behavior, people who
move beyond making superficial changes to making substantial and permanent ones, are quite likely to subscribe to some form of the apocalyptic narrative. All this
is not to say that apocalypticism directly or inevitably causes activism, or that believing catastrophe is imminent is the only reason people become activists.
However, it is to say that activism and apocalypticism are associated for some people, and that this
association is not arbitrary, for there is something uniquely powerful and compelling about the
apocalyptic narrative. Plenty of people will hear it and ignore it, or find it implausible, or simply decide
that if the situation really is so dire there is nothing they can do to prevent it from continuing to
deteriorate. Yet to focus only on the ability of apocalyptic rhetoric to induce apathy, indifference or
reactance is to ignore the evidence that it also fuels quite the opposite—grave concern, activism, and
sometimes even outrage. It is also to ignore the movement’s history. From Silent Spring (Carson [1962]
2002) to The Limits to Growth (Meadows et al 1972) to The End of Nature (McKibben 1989), apocalyptic
arguments have held a prominent place within environmental literature, topping best-seller lists and
spreading the message far and wide that protecting the environment should be a societal priority. Thus,
while it is not a style of argument that will be effective in convincing everyone to commit to the
environmental cause (see Feinberg and Willer 2011), there does appear to be a close relationship
between apocalyptic belief and activism among a certain minority.
Alarmist language inspires large groups of people to act-means we resolve the impact
of the K
Veldman 2012-Robin Globus, doctoral candidate in religion at the University of Florida,
asst editor of the Journal for the Study of Religion, Nature and Culture (“Narrating the
Environmental Apocalypse: How Imagining the End Facilitates Moral Reasoning Among
Environmental Activists”, Ethics and the Environment, Project Muse, date accessed
7/13/14) HC
The Apocalyptic Community A
final function of the narrative of environmental apocalypse remains to be
discussed—its social function. As Anna Peterson points out, narrative entails “a social view of self” (2001, 22), communal ways of interpreting and approaching
perceived problems. In the environmental community as well, the narrative of apocalypse gives people the
sense that they are one of many participants in a collective quest. “I’m not sure what I envisioned,” wrote one
environmentalist who had since moved away from an apocalyptic worldview. “[I]t was hard to see exact details of the social order across the general chaos that
would come…. I just knew that whatever happened…. my future would be assured…. I belonged to a new tribe, and the tribe would care for me” (Zencey 1988, 55).8
The importance of community was also clear in Sarah’s desire for like-minded neighbors, and the discussion group’s practice of collective moral reasoning. As
in
other apocalyptic cosmologies, the narrative of environmental apocalypse thus seems to “[establish] a
group ethos through a vision of shared origin and destiny,” while also “[offering] propositions both
descriptive and normative, intended to depict and explain the universe as it is and to orient human
beings toward right action” (O’Leary 1994, 25). This social function, which binds individuals together into a
community of believers, is surely part of what accounts for its seeming power to translate values into
practices. This power should not be conceived just in terms of socialization, but [End Page 16] also in
terms of tradition. That is, the narrative of environmental apocalypse is effective not only because many
share it today but because many have shared it over time. It is what Alasdair MacIntyre might have referred to as a living tradition,
an “historically extended, socially embodied argument” ([1981] 2007, 222) concerning what constitutes the good.9 Some might argue that environmental
apocalypticism is not really old enough to constitute a moral tradition, since it began only in 1962 with the publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring. In
fact
however, the antecedents of this tradition can be traced much further back in history. As early as the
sixteenth century, cultural critics warned that human domination of nature could lead to the decay and
death of the natural world (Lewis 1992). Such critiques were generally overshadowed by the burgeoning optimism that accompanied the Age of
Enlightenment and eventually the Industrial Revolution, but they never died out completely, resurfacing with the Romantic
movement of the eighteenth century, and finally capturing a more mainstream audience beginning in
the 1960s.10 The narrative is no recent invention, then, but in fact represents generations of
environmental interpretation and moral reflection. With both the weight of tradition and the power to
bind people together, the narrative of environmental apocalypse is thus a potent source for motivating
environmentally ethical behavior. Toward Descriptive Environmental Ethics Outside of human minds exist billions of interacting events and
processes—atoms, humans, animals, plants, microbes, and so on—whose ultimate trajectory is uncertain, if not in many cases impossible to predict. I have
suggested that the
apocalyptic ending is one solution to the problem of how to convert this impersonal
complexity into a meaningful story that draws and holds peoples’ attention for long enough to influence
their actions. It does so through a story that simply and succinctly tells listeners that there is a problem,
that it may have disastrous consequences, and that certain kinds of actions therefore must taken in
order to avoid them. And while it is always in this space between the tangible present and the imagined
future that the opportunity for moral engagement with the world arises, I argue that it is especially
when the connection between the two feels tenuous that such an opportunity comes to be experienced
as an obligation. [End Page 17] Certainly the apocalyptic mode has its shadow side. Paranoia, self-righteousness, and feverish hope skirt the edge of
disappointment, leading many both within and outside of the environmental movement to view it with suspicion. Indeed, many environmentalists would do well to
heed Catherine Keller’s call for a more self-critical discourse of “counter-apocalypse” (1996), rather than falling prey to the temptation to demonize the antienvironmental other. But this should not prevent scholars from attending to the important role apocalypticism plays within the movement. As much as some in the
movement try to disclaim such discourse, it is clear that many adherents draw inspiration from it. So much so that they are moving
to distant communities where they believe they will be able to live more ecologically sensitive lives; they are teaching their neighbors to grow their own food
because transporting it from other parts of the country has too large of a carbon footprint; and they are “paper monkey-wrenching” in Washington, D.C. and in
courtrooms around the country in order to ensure that the environment is legally protected to the greatest extent possible. They are putting environmental values
into practice, and many are doing so because they seriously believe that if they do not, disaster will follow. Even if observers of the movement disagree with their
conclusions about what constitutes ethical behavior or worthwhile activism, this demonstrated willingness to make substantial sacrifices seems to make the project
of understanding their motivations worthwhile. With
the environmental and sustainability movements in full swing,
further empirical research examining how people determine what is right and wrong behavior with
regard to the environment could serve as an important complement to the work already completed in
meta- and normative environmental ethics during the past several decades. Such work would be of vital
interest to anyone concerned with the real world implications of ethical theories, potentially yielding
insights about what constraints and limitations humans face as they attempt to draw moral meaning
from the environmental situation. What further insights might be gleaned from the study of how ethics are practiced in tandem with the study of
how ethics should be practiced? With the present study serving as an example, I would submit that exploring how people negotiate, reformulate, and resist making
ethical choices relating to the environment in their everyday lives can yield valuable insights about the important question of how environmental values become
environmentally valuable [End Page 18] practices. In the end, it is possible that such work will be valuable not only for scholars, but for the Earth.
AT Skepticism
It’s try or die for the aff-the perspective the neg adopts rules out every potential
solution-their author
Kurasawa 4-Fuyuki, PhD in sociology from La Trobe University, associate professor in
sociology at York University (11/19/04, “Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of
Prevention and the Work of Foresight”, Constellations vol 11 no. 4,
http://www.yorku.ca/kurasawa/Kurasawa%20Articles/Constellations%20Article.pdf
date accessed 7/19/14) HC
When engaging in the labor of preventive foresight, the first obstacle that one is likely to encounter
from some intellectual circles is a deep-seated skepticism about the very value of the exercise. A
radically postmodern line of thinking, for instance, would lead us to believe that it is pointless, perhaps
even harmful, to strive for farsightedness in light of the aforementioned crisis of conventional paradigms
of historical analysis. If, contra teleological models, history has no intrin- sic meaning, direction, or
endpoint to be discovered through human reason, and if, contra scientistic futurism, prospective trends
cannot be predicted without error, then the abyss of chronological inscrutability supposedly opens up at
our feet. The future appears to be unknowable, an outcome of chance. Therefore, rather than
embarking upon grandiose speculation about what may occur, we should adopt a pragmatism that
abandons itself to the twists and turns of history; let us be content to formulate ad hoc responses to
emergencies as they arise. While this argument has the merit of underscoring the fallibilistic nature of all
predictive schemes, it conflates the necessary recognition of the contingency of history with
unwarranted assertions about the latter*s total opacity and indeterminacy. Acknowledging the fact
that the future cannot be known with absolute certainty does not imply abandoning the task of
trying to understand what is brewing on the horizon and to prepare for crises already coming into
their own. In fact, the incorporation of the principle of fallibility into the work of prevention means
that we must be ever more vigilant for warning signs of disaster and for responses that provoke
unintended or unexpected consequences ( a point to which I will return in the final section of this
paper). In addition, from a normative point of view, the acceptance of historical contingency and of the
self-limiting character of farsightedness places the duty of preventing catastrophe squarely on the
shoulders of present generations. The future no longer appears to be a metaphysical creature of destiny
or of the cunning of reason, nor can it be sloughed off to pure random- ness. It becomes, instead, a
result of human action shaped by decisions in the present - including, of course, trying to anticipate and
prepare for possible and avoidable sources of harm to our successors. Combining a sense of analytical
contingency toward the future and ethical responsibility for it, the idea of early warning is making its
way into preventive action on the global stage. Despite the fact that not all humanitarian, technoscientific, and environmental disasters can be predicted in advance, the multiplication of independent
sources of knowledge and detection mechanisms enables us to foresee many of them before it is too
late. Indeed, in recent years, global civil society's capacity for early warning has dramatically increased,
in no small part due to the impressive number of NGOs that include catastrophe prevention at the heart
of their mandates.17