General Argument from Evil
Against the Existence of God
The argument that an all-powerful, allknowing, and perfectly good God
would not allow any—or certain kinds
of—evil or suffering to occur
Two General Versions of the
Problem
• The logical problem (God’s existence is
logically incompatible with the existence of
evil)
• The evidential/inductive/probabilistic
problem (Some known facts about evil
stand as evidence against the existence of
God)
Three Common Theistic
Responses to the General
Argument from Evil
•
•
•
Unknown Purpose Defense (UPD)
Free Will Defense (FWD)
Soul-Making Theodicy* (SMT)
*Theodicy: is an attempt to resolve the evidential problem
of evil by reconciling the traditional divine
characteristics of omnibenevolence, omnipotence, and
omniscience with the occurrence of evil or suffering in
the world. Unlike a defense, which tries to demonstrate
that God's existence is logically possible in the light of
evil, a theodicy provides a framework which claims to
make God's existence probable.
Objections to Theist Defenses
against Problem of Evil
• Objection to UPD: “if you have no idea
what reason God has for allowing evil,
then for all you know there is no justifiable
reason at all for an all-good God to permit
it.”
• Objection to FWD and SWT: “leaves much
apparently gratuitous evil unexplained”
Rowe’s Own Inductive Argument
Against the Existence of God
Some definitions:
Narrow (a)theism: (dis)belief in the existence
of an Omniscient, Omnipotent,
Omnibenevolent Eternal Being Who
Created the World [hereafter, GOD]
Broad (a)theism: (dis)belief in the existence
of some sort of divine being or reality
Three Kinds of Atheism
• Unfriendly Atheism
• Indifferent Atheism
• Friendly Atheism
Rowe’s Argument
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•
•
There exist instances of intense suffering
which a GOD could have prevented without
thereby losing some greater good or
permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
A GOD would prevent the occurrence of any
intense suffering it could, unless it could not do
so without thereby losing some greater good
or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
Therefore: There does not exist a GOD.
Things to notice about the
argument
•
•
It is valid (if the premises are true, the
conclusion must be true)
Given its validity, if we have rational
grounds for believing the premises, we
necessarily have rational grounds for
believing the conclusion.
But do we have rational grounds for
believing the premises?
•
•
•
Consider the second premise: assuming that s is an
instance of intense human or animal suffering which a
GOD could prevent, let us ask what are the necessary
conditions under which it would be the case that a
GOD had failed to prevent s.
Rowe states this necessary condition as a tripartite
disjunction:
Either (i) there is some greater good, G, such that G is
obtainable by GOD only if God permits s, or (ii) there is
some greater good, G, such that G is obtainable by
GOD only if GOD permits either sor some evil equally
bad or worse, or (iii) s is such that it is preventable by
GOD only if GOD permits some evil equally bad or
worse.
•
•
Rowe’s then says that premise (2) of the
Inductive Argument is true because on
all three construals of its meaning, i.e., (i)
or (ii) or (iii) above, if each is true, then
(2) is true.
Rowe concludes that premise (2) of
IAEEG is true and accepted by theists
and atheists alike.
But then, is premise (1) of IAEEG is true? [There exist instances of intense
suffering which a GOD could have prevented without thereby losing
some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse ]
•
The Fawn Burned Alive in the Forest Fire
CASE
What is it about this case that suggests that
(1) is true?
Defending the Theist against the
Inductive Argument for Atheism
• The theist must attack the first premise of
the argument. There are three ways to do
that (see next slide)
First Way
•
That the premise is defective in some way.
PROBLEM: this can only be accomplished
EITHER by arguing that the reasons
supporting premise 1 are in themselves
insufficient to justify accepting it, OR by
arguing that there are other things we know
which, conjoined with these reasons, do not
justify us in accepting it. SINCE the argument
is valid and Premise 2 is likely to be accepted
by the Theist, this commits the Theist to the
view that Premise 1 is actually false, not just
that we lack a good reason to accept it.
Second Way
• Argue that the premise is FALSE. This can
be accomplished in one of two ways:
Direct Attack; Indirect Attack
•
Direct Attack: point out goods, e.g., to
which suffering may well be connected
which a GOD could not achieve without
permitting suffering. PROBLEM: Rowe
doubts this strategy can succeed due to
lack of a way to establish that this is
actually true in any particular case of
suffering and any particular general good
connected to it.
– Indirect Attack: use the G.E. Moore Shift:
•
•
•
I do know that this pencil exists.
If the skeptic’s principles are correct I
cannot know of the existence of the
pencil.
Therefore: The skeptic’s principles (at
least one) must be incorrect.
How Shift Argument Works in
General
Suppose the following
argument is valid:
• P
• Q
• Therefore, R
Attack that argument by
posing the following
counterargument:
(1) not-R
(2) Q
(3) Therefore, not-P
How the Shift Works Against the Inductive Argument: First,
Remember the Inductive Argument
(1) There exist instances of intense suffering
which a GOD could have prevented without
thereby losing some greater good or permitting
some evil equally bad or worse.
(2) A GOD would prevent the occurrence of such
intense suffering unless it could not do so
without thereby losing some greater good or
permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
(3) There does not exist a GOD.
How the Shift Works Against
Atheist Inductive Arg.
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–
–
There exists an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly
good being. (Denies #3 of the original Ind. Arg.)
An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the
occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless
it could not do so without thereby losing some
greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or
worse. (Repeats #2 of the original Ind. Arg.)
Therefore, It is not the case that there exist
instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent,
omniscient being could have prevented without
thereby losing some greater good or permitting
some evil equally bad or worse. (Denies #1 of Ind.
Arg.)
Conclusion:
If this counterargument is sound, the theist
has now offered rational grounds for
rejecting (1), and thus the basic argument
for atheism is unsound (since it has, by
proving that its conclusion, which is the
negation of the first premise of the atheist
argument, proved that premise false, and
thus the argument unsound).
Result: STANDOFF!!
First, why is this a standoff?
Because the atheist accepts their
argument, and so cannot accept the
theist’s counterargument (each will accuse
the other of begging the question with the
first premise of each argument).
What are the atheist’s options under these
conditions? Rowe finds three:
• Unfriendly atheist response: no one is rationally
justified in believing that GOD exists.
• Indifferent atheist response: the atheist takes no
position on whether or not a theist’s belief in the
existence of GOD is based on rational grounds.
• Friendly atheist response: some theists are
rationally justified in believing that the theistic
GOD exists.
Rowe thinks only the third position is justifiable.
Why the Friendly Atheist is Right
First, the friendly atheist (FA) is not taking a
paradoxical or incoherent position,
because in thinking someone can be
rationally justified in holding that the
theistic position on the existence of GOD,
the FA is not committed to the view that a
false belief can be rationally justified. This
is because the truth of a belief is not a
necessary condition for being rationally
justified in having that belief.
Rowe’s defense of the FA depends
on:
Thinking that person X can believe P, which they think they
are rationally justified in believing, while also believing
that person Y is equally rationally justified in believing
the opposite of P.
Rowe’s counterexample: me, my downed plane, and the
rationally justifiable beliefs held by me, and my friends
on shore, about my continued existence.
Rowe’s defense of FA response to theistic belief in GOD
depends on the claim that we can see how someone
could, given other beliefs they hold, come to believe in
the theistic account of GOD’s existence by rejecting the
atheist’s inductive argument against the existence of
GOD.
Does this mean the FA is
committed to a STANDOFF?
No. The FA can understand why the theist
believes their counterargument, and so
rejects the atheist’s inductive argument,
but this does not mean the FA is
committed to the view that their own
argument is unsound. Rather, they can
continue to think that, if the theist saw why
the premises of their argument are true,
they would relinquish their otherwise
reasonable grounds for rejecting it.