Using Argus Audit Trails to Enhance IDS Analysis

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Using Argus Audit Trails to Enhance IDS Analysis

Jed Haile

Nitro Data Systems jhaile@nitrodata.com

Overview

• What is an audit trail?

• What is Argus?

• Overview of IP audit trails

• Why are they useful?

• Using audit trails to monitor your network

• Detecting interesting network events using audit trails

• Enhancing IDS analysis using audit trails

What is an IP Audit Trail?

• An IP audit trail is a collection of network flows across some point of a network.

• A network flow is an identifiable exchange of data between two endpoints on a network.

• Flows may be delineated by normal protocol (a

SYN replied to by an RST) or by timeouts.

• Flows may become exaggerated, as not all network traffic is readily broken into correct sessions with available information

What is Argus?

• Written by Carter Bullard as part of a DoD contract while he was at Carnegie-Mellon’s

SEI

• Runs on unix

• The free version is available at http://www.qosient.com/argus

• A commercial version is under development by Qosient

More about Argus

• Argus uses a client server model:

– Data collection engine (Server): Monitors the network using libpcap, collects network data into audit trails. This engine can output the data to a file or to a socket.

– Argus client: Reads audit data from a file or from a socket. There are a number of clients available for various purposes.

Argus Clients

• ra: reads Argus data and displays it on stdout ragator: aggregates flows in arbitrary fashions ramon: produce rmon style reports and tables racount: counts bytes and packets rasort: sorts Argus records raxml: display all fields in xml format

Others:ratop, ragrep, rahistogram, rasrvstats

Lacking: Database client!!

Default RA output

timestamp protocol src IP direction dst IP status

17 Apr 02 09:59:16 icmp 192.172.1.26 <-> 192.172.1.253 ECO

17 Apr 02 09:59:16 tcp 192.172.191.46.458 -> 207.68.162.24.80 FIN

17 Apr 02 09:59:16 icmp 192.172.1.25 <-> 192.172.1.253 ECO

17 Apr 02 09:59:16 tcp 192.18.221.25.119 -> 192.172.191.61.25 FIN

17 Apr 02 09:59:16 tcp 192.172.1.6.3562 -> 209.10.33.195.80 FIN

17 Apr 02 09:59:16 tcp 192.172.1.23.5936 -> 61.200.81.153.80 EST

17 Apr 02 09:59:16 tcp 192.172.191.46.4585 -> 64.4.30.24.80 FIN

17 Apr 02 09:59:17 tcp 192.172.191.46.4990 -> 12.12.162.203.80 RST

17 Apr 02 10:00:04 tcp 192.172.191.46.240 -> 216.33.240.24.80 RST

17 Apr 02 09:59:17 tcp 142.177.221.77.177 -> 192.172.18.27.634 RST

17 Apr 02 10:00:02 icmp 192.172.1.25 -> 192.172.1.253 ECO

17 Apr 02 10:00:02 icmp 129.82.45.220 -> 192.172.1.3 ECO

17 Apr 02 10:00:02 icmp 129.82.45.220 -> 192.172.1.3 ECO

17 Apr 02 10:00:02 udp 205.158.62.41.967 -> 192.172.191.6.53 TIM

17 Apr 02 10:00:02 icmp 129.82.45.220 -> 192.172.1.3 ECO

There is still a lot of other useful data we can capture!!

Data Model

• Source IP address

• Destination IP address

• Source Port

• Destination Port

• Protocol

• Time of first packet

• Time of last packet

• Packets sent

• Bytes sent

• Packets received

• Bytes received

This set of data is surprisingly rich!

Why are these useful?

• This set of data can be analyzed to find network sessions, or sets of session that appear to be suspicious.

• In the case of a compromise, the audit trails can be examined to find out what else might have happened.

• Excellent tool for network policy monitoring. Makes finding unauthorized servers, or services, or backdoors much easier to detect.

• Much smaller than full packet captures, so more can be stored for longer.

• Well suited to statistical analysis

Reducing Record Counts

• A major problem with collecting network flows is the extreme rate and large quantity of records

• Fortunately network flows are readily aggregated

• All flows with the same source and destination addresses and ports can be collapsed to a single row, with a counter

Portscan Detection

• IP audit trails are an excellent tool for detecting network enumeration attempts.

• Snort’s spp_portscan2 uses network flows to detect portscans

• To detect portscanning simply count connections from external hosts to distinct hosts and ports on your network

• A well defined concept of home network versus external network is critical

• A portscan attempt which also correlates to an IDS alert, or to a session that is long or that moves some data might point to a successful compromise

Long Sessions

• Long sessions are common on networks

• Due to the more stateless nature of udp and icmp, distinct network flows might be collapsed into a single network flow

• Long sessions to interesting ports, or inbound to unexpected locations, or with IDS alerts are the things we want to focus on

• Extensive correlation is critical to making the important long sessions stand out

Traffic to Nonexistent Hosts

• Inbound traffic to a host that is known to not exist

• A good way of detecting network enumeration attempts

Traffic to High Ports

• Sessions being initiated to high ports on your home network should always be viewed with suspicion

• There are exceptions (ftp traffic)

• By keeping “state” on your network’s flows you can eliminate many of the valid inbound high port connections

• High port traffic + IDS alert…

High Connection Rate

• High connection rates could point to DOS attempts, port scanning, auto rooter, P2P activity, worm activity, and more

• There are valid network activities which can generate high connection rates

• Correlation of high connection rates to other anomalous activities is what we need to look for

High Packet Rate

• Another example of could be bad, could be good activity

• High packet rates might indicate worm activity, portscanning, or other nastiness

• A sudden appearance of high packet rates linked to a previous session which had IDS alerts associated could indicate a host that has been successfully compromised

Stepping Stone Detection

• A stepping stone is a computer that is used as an intermediate point between two other computers

• Stepping stones are frequently used by attackers to obscure their location/identity

• Stepping stones can be detected by correlation of on/off times between two network flows. This is prone to false positives.

• A better approach is to correlate on and off times of packet activity inside the flow, but requires finer granularity in the data than can be provided by argus.

Summary

• Using IP audit trails is a powerful enhancement to IDS

• IP audit trails also give new ways of looking for anomalous traffic, new services on your network, or for getting a better perspective on your networks operation

• There is lots to be done!

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