Systemic Conditions
and Security Cooperation:
Explaining the Persistence of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Regime
T.V. Paul,
Cambridge Review of International Affairs
Kristine Boucher
IR 720
Theory and Approaches
Summary
• The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime has
remained a sustainable, expanding entity
despite the unequal status of its members
• Main principle: the spread of nuclear arms
is a threat to international security
• Underlying norm: non-nuclear members
not develop nuclear weapons and all
members refrain from helping other
nations build such weapons
Question 1: Is self interest or domination a key basis for major power
cooperation within the non-nuclear proliferation regime?
T.V. Paul
Yes. “The superpowers opposed even
allied states acquiring nuclear
weapons, fearing that this would help
erode their structural dominance.
Major power cooperation in this realm
has been motivated by a desire to
prevent the rise of new powers with
nuclear weapons. Major powers…had
realized that their nuclear monopoly
provided them with a vehicle for
preventing other potential challengers,
especially within the regions close to
them.” (p. 142)
Baldev Raj Nayar, Regimes, power
and international aviation, International
Organization, Vol. 49, No. 1, 1995, p.
141
Yes. “Even regimes that seem to have
been negotiated may be so only in
form; they may actually have been
imposed if negotiated in the shadow of
preponderant power, with their
articulated principles or norms serving
as an ideological mask for domination,
as in the case of nuclear
nonproliferation.”
Question 2: Is the use of sanctions an effective tool in deterring a state from
violating the principles and rules of the international security regime?
T.V. Paul
John Mueller, The Catastrophe Quota:
Trouble After the Cold War, Journal of
Conflict Resolution, Vol. 38, No. 3,
1994, p. 363
Yes. “When a state uses the [NonProliferation Treaty] as a cover for
weapons acquisition…the Treaty
provides other member states the
legal justification to undertake coercive
sanctions…” (p. 144)
Yes. “With the application of economic
sanctions…the big countries may be
honing a credible, inexpensive, and
potentially potent new weapon for use
against small- and medium-size
aggressors and trouble makers.
Essentially, they have been able to
demonstrate that…they can inflict
enormous pain on such countries with
remarkably little costs to themselves.”
Question 3: Are there questions of credibility regarding the nuclear powers
provision of a nuclear umbrella over non-nuclear member states?
T.V. Paul
Scott D. Sagan, Why Do States Build
Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in
Search of a Bomb, International
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 19961997, p. 57
Yes. “The sheer possession of nuclear
weapons by [a nuclear-armed middle
or small power] could constrain the
maneuverability of the major
power…the major power could thus be
deterred from acting, in the face of the
possibility…that the smaller nuclear
power could use its weapons of mass
destruction…” (p. 142)
Yes. “…weak states do what they
must: they can join a balancing
alliance with a nuclear power, utilizing
a promise of nuclear retaliation by that
ally…but the policy raises questions
about the credibility of extended
deterrence guarantees, since the
nuclear power would also fear
retaliation if it responded to an attack
on its ally.”
Question 4: Do regime norms affect the decision of middle power states to join
or not join a security regime?
T.V. Paul
Perspectives, A Canadian Security
Intelligence Service Publication,
Report No. 2001/10 “Nuclear
Weapons Proliferation”, February 25,
2002
Yes. “Middle powers that are
dissatisfied and that are not protected
by the security umbrella of a major
power, or non-major power states that
are in active conflict with nuclear
weapons states or have been targets
of major power interventions can
oppose security regimes that maintain
monopoly rights of existing major
powers.” (p. 140)
The CIA’s September 2001 public
report on proliferation highlighted
Iran’s pursuit of a uranium conversion
faculty that “could be used in any
number of ways to support fissile
material production needed for a
nuclear weapon…”
Question 5: Do normative constraints and the idea of nuclear weapons being ‘absolute
weapons’ help to ensure that nuclear states will refrain from using them?
T.V. Paul
John Mueller, The Catastrophe Quota:
Trouble After the Cold War, Journal of
Conflict Resolution, Vol. 38, No. 3,
1994, p. 367
Yes. “The nuclear taboo…gives a fairly
strong assurance to non-nuclear
states that nuclear powers are unlikely
to attack them using nuclear weapons.
The potential for total destruction gives
nuclear weapons an all-or-nothing
characteristic…mak[ing] it imperative
that the possessor not use them
against another state except as a last
resort weapon.” (p. 146)
Yes. “Tens of thousands of nuclear
weapons in the hands of the
enveloping allied forces did not cause
Saddam Hussein to order his
occupying forces out of Kuwait in
1990.”
Question 6: Are multilateral (opposed to unilateral) sanctions necessary when
punishing a nuclear non-proliferation regime violator?
T.V. Paul
Dinshaw Mistry, Diplomacy, Sanctions,
and the U.S. Non-Proliferation
Dialogue with India and Pakistan,
Asian Survey, Vol. 39, No. 5, Sept. –
Oct. 1999, p. 757
Yes. “Multilateral sanctions are
essential in order to maximize the
economic damage to a target, since
‘individual senders rarely possess the
market power needed to substantially
damage through unilateral actions.’”
(p. 144)
Yes. Example, 1998 Nuclear tests:
“…the support of all G-8 and Western
states was crucial in implementing
sanctions curtailing IFI [International
Financial Institution] aid, which,
together with Japan’s aid that was also
curbed, accounted for the bulk of
foreign assistance to India and
Pakistan.”
Question 7: Are smaller states generally insignificant players in the
international security regime?
T.V. Paul
David J. Karl, A Boom of One’s Own:
Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging
Nuclear Powers, International
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 19961997), p. 93
Yes. “Most small powers are systemineffectuals and they tend to be
supporters of security regimes that
promote international norms and legal
obligations on the part of bigger
states. Moreover, they are often
coerced into accepting regimes that
major powers construct.” (p. 140)
No. “…ethnic and religious hatreds in
Third World regions may not yield to
fears of nuclear retaliation [and]
leaders of Third World regimes
possess personal value structures
predisposing them to capricious and
illogical acts from which not even
threats of nuclear retaliation can
dissuade them.”
Question 8: Are security issues primarily responsible for the emergence of
international security regimes?
T.V. Paul
Yes. Citing Jervis, “…several systemic
conditions…are necessary for the
emergence of security regimes.
These conditions are: 1) major powers
‘want to establish’ regimes, 2) states
‘must believe that others share the
value of mutual security and
cooperation 3) no state ‘believes that
security is best provided for by
expansion’, and 4) ‘War and
individualistic pursuit of security must
be seen as costly’”. (p. 135)
Errol A. Henderson, Neoidealism and
the Democratic Peace, Journal of
Peace Research, Vol. 36, No. 2, Mar.
1999, p. 226
No. “…international security regimes
are more a function of the alliance and
trade ties among states under
conditions of bipolarity as they seek to
confront problems of market failure in
the global anarchy.”
Question 9: The Non-Proliferation Treaty provides transparency and knowledge about
the nuclear activities of other states though safeguards like the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA). Is this safeguard effective?
T.V. Paul
Roger K. Smith, Explaining the NonProliferation Regime: Anomalies for
Contemporary International Relations
Theory, International Organization,
Vol. 41, No. 2, Spring 1987, p. 259
Yes. “The IAEA offers a more feasible
and less costly mechanism to conduct
inspections than any that a single
state could provide. States tend to be
more agreeable to safeguard
inspections conducted by international
inspectors than by national inspectors
from other countries.” (p. 143)
No. “While the safeguards are a
critical component of the regime, the
IAEA has no mechanism for effective
enforcement; its most potent
instrument is to suspend technical
assistance to a state in violation of the
safeguards.”
Question 10: Are the costs high for the states that do not abide by the rules of
the nuclear non-proliferation regime?
T.V. Paul
Michael Brzoska, Is the Nuclear NonProliferation System a Regime? A
Comment of Trevor McMorris Tate,
Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 29,
No. 2, May 1992, p. 218
Yes. “…the violator can anticipate
being isolated and punished through
coercive economic and military
sanctions.” (p. 144)
No. “One state with nuclear weapons,
Israel, is among the largest recipients
of aid in the world in per capita terms.”
Question 11: Do the norms of the non-proliferation regime influence the
deterrence of nations to acquire nuclear weapons?
T.V. Paul
Yes. “The non-proliferation regime comprises a set of
norms, principles, treaties and procedures through which
countries pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons or help in
their acquisition by other states. International and bilateral
safeguards verify these pledges and thereby prevent
defection and cheating.”
(p. 137)
Question 11 cont’d: Do the norms of the non-proliferation regime influence the
deterrence of nations to acquire nuclear weapons?
CNN.com, “Timeline: North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development”
July 17, 2003
No. Example, North Korea
1994: US and NK sign an agreement whereby NK freezes and eventually
dismantles it nuclear weapons program in exchange for international aid to
build two power-producing nuclear reactors
2002: NK reactivates nuclear weapons programs and removes monitoring
seals and cameras from its nuclear facilities
2003: NK withdraws from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
Question 12: Does the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime look
positive?
T.V. Paul
Nicole C. Evans, Winning Minds, Not
Hearts, Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, Vol. 60, No. 5, Sept-Oct.
2004, pp. 48-55
Yes. “The abandonment of the regime
by the US could…undermine its
effectiveness…this prospect is unlikely
in the near future because…the nonproliferation regime does not
particularly constrain US security
policies…in the nuclear arena. “
(p. 153)
No. “The United States, China and
Russia have all stepped up their
offensive weapons programs since the
dissolution of the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty. Washington’s plans to deploy
“bunker buster” nuclear weapons only
add to Moscow’s and Beijing’s unease.
They are seen as having the potential
to disrupt the existing parity of nuclear
deterrence and drastically alter the
threshold for the use of nuclear
weapons.”