Challenges in Resource Allocation and Health Service Purchasing Stellenbosch 1 July 2011 Agenda Major Reform of Purchasing for South Africa Strategic Purchasing Challenges in Contracting and Reimbursement Lessons from Other Systems South African Challenges Functions, Objectives and Goals Health system functions Revenue collection Intermediate objectives of health finance policy Health system goals Equity in access Government Stewardship Optimise Health Equity in finance Quality Pooling Financial protection from impoverishment Efficiency in delivery Purchasing Financial sustainability Cost containment Affordability Service Delivery Choice Transparency and accountability Source: Adapted from Kutzin, J. (2008). Health financing policy: a guide for decision-makers. WHO Europe. Additions from healthcare financing workshop, iHEA Beijing 2009. Responsiveness (public satisfaction) Major Reform of Purchasing for South Africa MoH on NHI Progress, May 2011 “We are working around the clock everyday around this issue of NHI. The problem is that many believe that NHI is just the release of a document. For us in health, we know that it also involves an extensive preparation of the health care system while at the same time preparing a policy document. In this case … the reengineering of the Health Care System is very vital. Under the present health care system whether public or private, no national health insurance can ever survive. … While it is very true that the public health care system is bedevilled by very poor management leading to poor quality of care adding to the very low resources available in the public health sector, I wish to categorically state that the present overall health care system both public and private will be completely re-engineered.” Source: Health Budget Vote Policy Speech, National Assembly, Dr A Motsoaledi, 31 May 2011 MoH on Re-engineering “The reengineering of the Health Care System will be according to three main streams. The first stream will be a district based model. In this model a team of 5 specialist or clinicians shall be deployed in each district. These teams will specifically focus on maternal and child mortality. This will help us arrive at our Millennium Development Goals.” … “The 2nd stream … is a School Health programme”. Will include eye care, dental and hearing problems and immunisation programmes in schools. Later contraceptive health, HIV/AIDS, drug and alcohol abuse. “The last stream will be a ward based PHC model which will deploy at least 10 well trained PHC workers per ward. This method is being put to good use in Brazil” and India. Example of TB care pilot which includes enhanced diagnostics. Source: Health Budget Vote Policy Speech, National Assembly, Dr A Motsoaledi, 31 May 2011 District Management Team “The district management team (DMT) is responsible and accountable for everything that happens in the district.” Source: Re-engineering Primary Health Care in SA, Discussion document, Nov. 2010 Financing and DMTs “It is recommended that all funds for the functioning of the DHS and the associated PHC should be under the control of the DMT both in terms of budgeting and financial management. The DMT should use these funds to purchase selected services from private providers (e.g. doctors, optometrists, audiologists) where these skills are not available in the public sector and where there are gaps. With the NHI in mind it is also recommended that the DMT become the fund holders for any proposed PHC capitation and become responsible for allocation of budgets to ensure the necessary services. In the short term they will probably require provincial support and mentoring for contract management.” Source: Re-engineering Primary Health Care in SA, Discussion document, Nov. 2010 DMT Reform Questions Current National Treasury allocates budget to nine provinces. Risk-adjusted allocation from 2011. Province responsible for facilities and delivery. Some purchasing and private contracting. Proposed 52 Districts Who allocates budget? Risk-adjustment to districts? Problematic data issues. What is a district? DMT responsible for PHC, clinics, community health centres and district hospitals. Also school health and environmental health. Presumably province responsible for regional and tertiary hospitals? Other? Emergency transport? Strategic Purchasing WHO on Purchasing, 2000 Purchasing is the process by which pooled funds are paid to providers in order to deliver a specified or unspecified set of health interventions. Passive purchasing implies following a predetermined budget or simply paying bills when presented. Strategic purchasing involves a continuous search for the best ways to maximize health system performance by deciding which interventions should be purchased, how, and from whom. It involves the use of selective contracting and incentive schemes. Purchasing uses different instruments for paying providers, including budgeting. Source: WHO World Health Report 2000 WHO on Purchasing, 2010 “Health-care systems haemorrhage money.” “While some countries lose more than others, most, if not all, fail to fully exploit the resources available, whether through poorly executed procurement, irrational medicine use, misallocated and mismanaged human and technical resources or fragmented financing and administration.” “All countries can look to improve efficiency by taking a more strategic approach when providing or buying health services, e.g. decide which services to purchase based on information on the health needs of the population and link payments to providers on their performance and to information on service costs, quality and impact.” Source: WHO World Health Report 2010 Reimbursement and Risk Percentage of Premium High Capitation Provider Risk Per Case Per Diem Low Fee-for-Service High Fund Risk Source : Garofalo et al, Managed Care Contracting, 1999 Low WHO on Reimbursement “All provider payment mechanisms have strengths and weaknesses, but particular care should be taken with fee-for-service payments, which offer incentives to over-service those people who can pay or who are covered from pooled funds, and to underservice those who cannot pay.” “Many alternatives have been tried. All have advantages and disadvantages.” “Paying service providers is a complex, ever-changing process and some countries have developed a mixed payment system, believing it is more efficient than a single payment mode.” “Countries will decide where they can operate based on their ability to collect, monitor and interpret the necessary information, and to encourage and enforce standards of quality and efficiency.” Source: WHO World Health Report 2010 WHO on Waste, Corruption and Fraud Estimated 10–25% of public spending on health linked to procurement is lost each year to corrupt practices. Experience has shown that to significantly curb corruption …, two complementary strategies need to be applied: a discipline approach (top-down) based on legislative reforms, establishing laws, administrative structures and processes needed to ensure transparent medicine regulation and procurement; and bottom-up values approach that promotes institutional integrity through moral values and principles, and tries to motivate ethical conduct by public servants. Also, accrediting and licensing health providers, facilities and products (to improve quality), internal oversight and audit functions. Improved governance requires intelligence and better use of information, so that breaches of practice can be identified and changes monitored. Source: WHO World Health Report 2010 WHO on Fragmentation The bigger the risk pools, the better. Large pools offer several advantages, notably a greater capacity to meet the costs of occasional, costly diseases. Small pools are not financially viable in the long run. Small pools are vulnerable. The most efficient health systems avoid fragmentation in pooling but also in channelling funds and distributing resources. Fragmentation can also be inefficient. Systems with multiple funding channels and pools, each with its own administrative costs, duplicate effort, are expensive to run and require coordination. Similarly, fragmentation in other parts of the system – running hospitals, distributing medicines and equipment, supporting laboratory systems – results in unnecessary waste and duplication. This applies also to small government-managed pools, such as a district health budget. In some cases, adequate coverage in poorer districts can be achieved only when there is direct subsidy from central funding pools or districts can share costs. Source: WHO World Health Report 2010 Strategic Purchasing www.euro.who.int/observatory/ Pitfalls in Contracting and Reimbursement Incentives in Building Work Per Uur? Source: Dr Reinder Nauta, Carecross Per Muur? Price Intensity Severity Frequency Actuarial Marketing Percent Premium P I S F A M Capitation P I S F Per Case P I S Per Diem P I Fee-for-Service P Risks Taken Reimbursement Source : Garofalo et al, Managed Care Contracting, 1999 Primary Care Contract Example 1 P Medical Scheme I S F Transferred Capitation Managed Care Organisation P Fee-for-Service GP Practice P I S F I S F A M A M Primary Care Contract Example 1 P National Treasury I S F Transferred Capitation District Health Board P Fee-for-Service GP Practice P I S F I S F A M A M Encouraging entrepreneurial behaviour while protecting core social values www.euro.who.int/observatory/ Impact of Switching to Retrospective Hospital Payments Countries with an emerging health insurance model tend to start with a mixture of retrospective methods of payment and traditional item-byitem funding of medical facilities. [i.e. fee-for-service] Insurers in the Czech Republic, Hungary and the Russian Federation This encouraged hospitals to increase workload and contributed to higher internal efficiency of hospitals [from command and control]. But structural inefficiency has worsened owing to the growth of inappropriate admissions and a lack of constraint on using costly methods of care. Czech Republic: introduction of retrospective payment system: health expenditure increased by almost 40 per cent in 2 years. Need for tougher regulatory requirements for health insurers to use less open-ended provider payment schemes. Source: Regulating Entrepreneurial Behaviour in European Health Systems DRG-based Payments to Hospitals http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/healthsystems-institutional-characteristics_5kmfxfq9qbnr-en Payment for Performance www.euro.who.int/Document/HSF/P4P_Estonia.pdf Lessons from Other Systems New Zealand Aotearoa Auckland: 1.5 m North Island 3.3 m people Total health expenditure: 9.7% of GDP US$ 2,634 per capita pa Government expenditure 80.2% 71% of private expenditure is OOP Oldest NHS in the world – 1938 4.3 m people 18% aged 60 and over Unemployment 6% South Island 1.0 m people Source: StatsNZ June 2010; WHO Observatory 2009 NZ District Health Boards 20 District Health Boards Providing directly or funding the provision of Government funded health care services for the population of a specific geographical area. Risk-adjustment formula to allocate funds to DHBs See: http://www.nationalhealthboard.govt.nz/DHB-Links Health Reform: HBs, AHBs, CHEs, HHSs, DHBs? 1938-1983: Hospital Boards had a strictly hospital focus; publicly elected (DoH ran non-hospital public health and some mental health). 1983-1993: Area Health Boards (AHBs) -hospital and public health services; partly publicly elected and partly appointed by Government. 1993-1997: 23 Crown Health Enterprises (CHEs), 4 Regional Health Authorities and Public Health Commission. Publicly owned companies, boards appointed by Government. 1997: 24 Hospital and Health Services (HHSs) and Health Funding Authority. Publicly owned companies; wider range of health and disability service provision; boards appointed by the Government. 2000: 20 District Health Boards (DHBs) - very wide responsibilities for publicly funded health and disability services, including purchasing of services; bodies corporate owned by the Crown; elected and appointed boards. 2002: Primary Health Organisations (PHOs) formed. 2009: National Health Board (NHB) established. Source: http://www.moh.govt.nz and http://www.health.govt.nz/ Improving Health System Performance The question of determining the appropriate purchasing agent – that is, what configuration buys health services more costeffectively and according to the needs and wants of the population it represents – has yet to be answered. ANYWHERE Source: Purchasing to Improve Health System Performance Canterbury DHB Canterbury District Health Board (DHB) is the second largest by population and geographical area (510,000 people in 2010). Plan, fund, provide healthcare and promote health and well-being. Largest employer in South Island; over 8,000 staff employed in 14 hospitals and numerous community bases. 80% of staff are clinical. Similar number of people employed in delivering health and disability services, funded either directly or indirectly by the Canterbury DHB. Over 500 contracts. Primary health organisations (PHOs) funded by DHBs to support the provision of essential primary health care services through GPs to those people enrolled with the PHO. 46 PHOs (countrywide) vary widely in size, structure; all not-for-profit organisations. GPs in private practice. Some private hospitals and specialists. Centralised budget for medicines administered by Pharmac. NHS Administration The NHS employs 1.4 million staff and has a budget of £100 billion. [Population 61.8 million in 2009; world's biggest employer after Indian rail and Chinese Army; half are clinical staff] Total number of NHS staff increased by around 35% between 1999 and 2009, but the number of managers increased by 82%. “The NHS today faces great challenges: ... It remains stifled by a culture of top-down bureaucracy …” “For too long, processes have come before outcomes, as NHS staff have had to contend with 100 targets and over 260,000 separate data returns to the Department each year.” “We will remove unjustified targets and the bureaucracy which sustains them.” “We will rebalance the NHS, reducing management costs by 45% over the next four years …: “The dismantling of this bureaucracy will help the NHS realise up to £20 billion of efficiency savings by 2014.” Sources: The King’s Fund, How Many Managers are there in the NHS? April 2010 Andrew Lansley, “Liberating the NHS” announcement July 2010 NHS Accountability http://www.kingsfund.org.uk/publications/nhs_accountability.html Accountability in the NHS: Implications of the government’s health reform programme Seeks to inform the debate around the nature of accountability relationships in the NHS and how these will change under the reforms. The authors identify five types of accountability most relevant to health care – by scrutiny, management, regulation, contract and election. Countries with Risk Adjustment in National Health System Developed Countries: Australia Canada Denmark Finland Ireland Italy New Zealand Norway Spain Sweden United Kingdom USA Source: Studies at UCT in 2010 Developing Countries: Republic of Korea Brazil Singapore Chile Sri Lanka Colombia Taiwan Costa Rica Tanzania Cuba Thailand Ghana Vietnam India Indonesia Malaysia Namibia Not an exhaustive list ! “Post-code Lottery” “The ‘postcode lottery’ means that waiting times can range from six months to three years depending on the health board area.” [ 2009] “…palliative care services had become a postcode lottery.” Two Health Boards had no palliative care strategy …. [Scotland, 2008] Best performing GPs “tend to cluster in the affluent areas of the city, which is reflective of the 'post code lottery' where those that reside in the affluent wards … are able to demand a better quality of NHS GP services than those that tend to reside in the deprived wards who tend to suffer in silence …” “Outgoing health watchdog Ron Paterson has lashed out at New Zealand's "post-code lottery" public health system, after finding a woman's access to diagnostic scanning was unfairly delayed.” “At the heart of the Gillard Government’s [Australian] health reform are an Independent Hospital Pricing Authority and a National Health Performance Authority”… “Fixing the hospital postcode lottery is a matter of life and death” [May 2011] Source: Press reports 2008 to 2010 King’s Fund on Variation 2011 “Variations in health care in the NHS are a persistent and ubiquitous problem. But which variations are acceptable or warranted – for example, variations driven by clinical need and informed patient choice – and which are not? The important question is how to promote ‘good’ variation and minimise ‘bad’ variation. Variations in health care: The good, the bad and the inexplicable explores the possible causes of variation, shows the different ways in which variations can be measured, and analyses variations by PCT. The data itself is not always easy to collect and analyse. The report outlines the different ways in which variations can be measured and how these measures can be adjusted for need – age and gender, economic and social characteristics.” Source: King’s Fund, 2011 http://www.kingsfund.org.uk/publications/healthcare_variation.html Decentralization in Healthcare “The logic of decentralization is an intrinsically powerful idea: that smaller organizations, properly structured and steered, are inherently more agile and accountable than larger organizations.” The recent upsurge in countries reversing the trend and beginning to recentralize key functions “raises new and fundamental questions about the overall strategy of decentralisation”. “Is the period of decentralization of health systems in Europe coming to an end?” Published European Observatory, 2007 www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/.../E89891.pdf Complexities of Decentralization in Europe “Many countries have decentralized, recentralized and then decentralized again in an on-going cycle, searching for the right balance of efficiency and responsiveness in their health care system.” “Looking at the arguments for and against, in many cases the same reasons are used to justify movement in opposite directions.” “These debates are still current and decentralization is a highly contested process across Europe.” “Whatever the nature of the decentralization, it is highly contextspecific …” “Comparison across Europe is difficult given the complex nature of the arrangements, the importance of the underlying historical context and the lack of strong evidence.” Source: Euro Observer Spring 2011 South African Challenges Governance in South Africa “The development of proposals for a District Health System (DHS) have engaged policy discussions within South Africa for around twenty years.” Defining Decentralization “Deconcentration is generally the most common and limited form of decentralization, and involves the transfer of functions and/or resources to the regional or local field offices of the central government agency in question. Within a deconcentrated system, authority remains within the same institution (e.g. MoH), but is spread out to the territorially decentralized instances of this institution.” “Delegation implies the transfer of authority, functions, and/or resources to an autonomous private, semi-public, or public institution. This institution then assumes responsibility for a range of activities or programs defined by the central government, often through the mechanism of contracting.” “Devolution is the cession of sectoral functions and resources to autonomous local governments that, in some measure, then take responsibility for service delivery, administration, and finance.” Source: Classification by Bossert in DBSA report on Governance, v.d. Heever, February 2011 Governance, Accountability and Decentralisation Source: DBSA report on Governance, v.d. Heever, February 2011 Financial Systems and Corruption “According to the Special Investigating Unit, it is estimated that 20-25 percent of state procurement expenditure, amounting to roughly R30 billion a year, is wasted through overpayment or corruption.” “Research done by Municipal IQ revealed serious problems with regard to municipal finance and intergovernmental fiscal issues.” “… financial auditing and the investigation of corruption have revealed that weak systems make it easier for corruption to occur.” “Improving the overall capacity and functioning of the public service, particularly in relation to financial systems and controls, information systems, and overall management capability might be the single most effective way of deterring corruption.” Source: National Planning Commission, Diagnostic Overview, 2011 Ghosts in the System Ghost workers (on PERSAL) Ghost social security beneficiaries (SASSA) Ghost doctors (no qualifications) Ghost procedures (medical schemes) Ghost taxpayers (SARS, March 2011) Ghost patients? Budgets and DMTs “All available resources need to be harnessed and focused on improving PHC. The budgets for Programme 2 (district level services) together with the relevant conditional grants and other sources of external funding need to be given to the DMT for their control and responsibility. In addition capital budgets need to be made available so that the necessary infrastructural improvements (clinic upgrades, water, electricity, sanitation) and equipment are made available. It is recommended that the budget for district level services be ringfenced based on a formula, largely based on a capitation fee per person living in the district.” Source: Re-engineering Primary Health Care in SA, Discussion document, Nov. 2010 Western Cape Health Districts Eden (S. Cape) Total 513,325 9.7% Cape Town: Northern 325,104 6.2% Central Karoo Total 56,222 1.1% Overberg Total 212,779 4.0% Cape Town: Western 393,534 7.5% Western Cape 2008 5.125 million population Cape Town: Southern 520,327 9.9% Cape Winelands Total 712,438 13.5% Cape Town: Klipf ontein 419,109 7.9% West Coast Total 286,748 5.4% Cape Town: Eastern 408,519 7.7% Cape Town: Khayelitsha 393,536 7.5% Cape Town: Mitchell's Plain 480,288 9.1% Cape Town: Tygerberg 556,685 10.5% Dominance of the City of Cape Town in the province. Additional districts (not in Census 2001) designated for City for planning. Source: WCDoH Facility Norms Model Western Cape Districts and Wards Number of Voting Rough Estimate Rough Ward District Municipality Wards Population Total Population Avergae 2011 City of Cape Town CPT - City of Cape Town [Cape Town] 111 1,745,853 3,449,593 31,077 WC011 - Matzikama [Vredendal] 8 26,630 52,618 6,577 WC012 - Cederberg [Citrusdal] 6 21,058 41,608 6,935 West Coast WC013 - Bergrivier [Velddrif] 7 23,213 45,866 6,552 WC014 - Saldanha Bay [West Coast Peninsula] 13 47,173 93,208 7,170 WC015 - Swartland [Malmesbury] 12 42,249 83,479 6,957 WC022 - Witzenberg [Ceres] 12 42,208 83,398 6,950 WC023 - Drakenstein [Paarl] 31 115,089 227,402 7,336 Cape Winelands WC024 - Stellenbosch [Stellenbosch] 22 79,551 157,183 7,145 WC025 - Breede Valley [Worcester] 21 71,849 141,965 6,760 WC026 - Langeberg [Robertson] 12 38,275 75,627 6,302 WC031 - Theewaterskloof [Caledon] 13 48,092 95,024 7,310 WC032 - Overstrand [Greater Hermanus] 13 45,298 89,503 6,885 Overberg WC033 - Cape Agulhas [Bredasdorp] 5 17,632 34,839 6,968 WC034 - Swellendam [Barrydale/Swellendam ] 5 15,909 31,434 6,287 WC041 - Kannaland [Ladismith] 4 13,088 25,860 6,465 WC042 - Hessequa [Heidelberg/Riversdale] 8 27,251 53,845 6,731 WC043 - Mossel Bay [Mossel Bay] 14 52,146 103,034 7,360 Eden WC044 - George [George] 25 90,601 179,017 7,161 WC045 - Oudtshoorn [Oudtshoorn] 13 47,736 94,321 7,255 WC047 - Bitou [Greater Plettenberg Bay] 7 24,975 49,348 7,050 WC048 - Knysna [Knysna] 10 36,332 71,788 7,179 WC051 - Laingsburg [Laingsburg] 4 4,150 8,200 2,050 Central Karoo WC052 - Prince Albert [Prins Albert] 4 6,566 12,974 3,243 WC053 - Beaufort West [Beaufort West] 7 23,812 47,050 6,721 Western Cape Total 387 2,706,736 5,348,182 13,820 Province Western Cape Sources: IEC, Census 2001, WC DoH, ASSA2008 District Numbers and Profile Census 2001 collected data at District and Sub-district level outside metropolitan areas. Metropolitan areas treated as one district. Sub-district populations too uncertain to be used: undercount of 1 in 6; “hot-decking”. Census 2011? Every ten years. Voting information – voluntary registration; no-one under voting age. Department of Home Affairs? Dorrington, 2005: “It is quite possible that clinics near the borders of the health districts also service people from neighbouring health districts.” Registration in each district (with payments for out-of-area use) would be a highly expensive administrative system. In Summary Tension between local responsiveness and “post-code lottery” of variable services and quality. How important is equity? Increased responsiveness AFTER consistent delivery. Need for managers and strong information systems. Size of risk pools is critical for financial viability. Contracting is not simple – can easily jeopardise financial soundness. No data at district level for capitation and risk-adjustment. Devolve fund holding when a province is well-functioning, not before. And then, only if it makes sense. Public Service Performance “Addressing the uneven performance of the public service will not be achieved through multiple new initiatives but rather through a focused and coordinated approach. This will require addressing a set of interrelated issues including instability resulting from repeated changes in policy, under-staffing and skills shortages, obstacles to building a sense of professional common purpose in the public service, political interference, lack of accountability, and insufficient clarity in the division of roles and responsibilities.” Source: National Planning Commission, Diagnostic Overview, 2011 Heather McLeod The New Zealand Centre for Evidence-based Research into Complementary and Alternative Medicine (ENZCAM), University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand. Extraordinary Professor, Department of Statistics and Actuarial Science, University of Stellenbosch hmcleod@integratedhealingmbs.com www.integratedhealingmbs.com