Meta-Ethics Revision

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What is goodness?
G.E. Moore
How about getting a
top grade at A Level?
Meta-Ethics and
Ethical Language
Another laughably easy A2 topic
What is Meta-Ethics?
• From the Greek ‘meta’ (meaning ‘beyond’) and ‘ethikos’
(meaning ‘character’ or ‘custom’). Meta-ethics is the study
of underlying ethical ideas or ethical language.
• Meta-ethics can be contrasted with normative ethics (the
attempt to work out which actions are right/wrong) and
descriptive ethics (the attempt to compare and describe
moral behaviours). In simple terms, meta-ethics is
concerned with the question of what is the meaning (if
any) of ‘goodness’?
• The main parts of this A2 topic are the meaning of ethical
language (is it natural/non-natural?) and the explanation
of ethics in terms of Emotivism.
Naturalism/Non-Naturalism
Are our ethics a real part of our natural existence, or do they escape from
this kind of definition? Can we give a natural explanation of goodness?
Ethical Naturalism
Ethical Non-Naturalism
This is the view that morals can be
defined or explained in natural terms, or
supported through the observation of the
world in science.
A famous ethical naturalist F.H. Bradley
argued that goodness is a natural aspect
of society, as people reach “self
realisation within the community”. The
problem with this is that it gives a narrow
account of goodness and some might
disagree.
Naturalists develop their ideas with nonmoral evidence. If we define goodness as
pleasure, we may look at evidence of
pleasure and pain in actions. If we say
that goodness is whatever God desires,
we will look for evidence of God’s
purposes in the natural world.
Ethics: a natural
factor of the
world around us?
The philosopher G.E. Moore criticised
ethical naturalism for its tendency to
associate goodness with varying and
often
contradictory
properties.
He
believed that defining goodness in terms
of natural facts is mistaken, referring to
this as the ‘naturalistic fallacy’.
Moore:
Ethical naturalism = bad idea
The ‘is-ought’ gap
Moore’s idea that goodness is not a natural
property linked up with ideas which had been
current in ethics for some time. He argued that
our morals are non-natural (not apparent in the
world around us) and cannot be defined by the
world around us.
A similar idea had previously been put forward by
the 18th century Scottish philosopher David
Hume. Hume claimed that we cannot move
logically from a statement about the way the
world is to a statement about how we ought to
act. This view is known as the ‘is-ought gap’ or
Hume’s guillotine, because he made a clear cut
between facts and ethics. The radical conclusion
which this leads to is the idea that there is no
such thing as a moral fact. Could that really be
true?
Moore and Intuitionism
Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore: best
mates
Moore set out his ideas about ethics
in his book Principia Ethica (1903),
taking on the common naturalistic
ideas in moral philosophy.
His basic argument was that good
“cannot be defined” and that
philosophers have wasted their time
trying. His counter-suggestion was
what he called ‘moral intuitionism’.
Moore argues that “good is good, and that is
the end of the matter”. It is an indefinable and
completely simple idea. Moore compares this
to the colour yellow – ‘yellow’ can only be
known directly through intuition. Yellow is just
yellow, and that’s all there is to it. We don’t
explain it in terms of something else. Moore
claims that goodness is just the same; you
can’t explain it any further.
It then follows that we have an intuitive sense
of right or wrong: almost by instinct we know
what is valuable (relationships, beautiful
things). Moore did not think that we can prove
an intuition, and it may be that our intuitions
are wrong. This perhaps leaves ethical debate
in quite a weak position.
Other forms of Intuitionism: Pritchard and Ross
In a similar vein to Moore, the philosopher
H.A. Pritchard argued that moral
obligations
form
immediate
apprehensions, a bit like mathematics. We
can see directly that 1+1=2 for example,
without needing further explanation.
However, Pritchard thought that our
intuitions involve more than just goodness,
but also a sense of obligation. There is a
gap between saying that something is
good and saying that one ought to do it.
So, resolving a moral dilemma involves
weighing up contrasting obligations and
trying to work out which is most important.
The advantage of this is its positive view
of human nature – people have genuine
obligations and duties to fulfil. However,
Pritchard’s idea of duty is very subjective;
it’s not clear if there is a ‘right’ way to solve
dilemmas.
W.D. Ross held similar ideas to Pritchard
and Moore, agreeing that moral principles
are not absolute or defined in natural terms.
Ross developed the idea of prima facie
duties (meaning, the duties we have at first
sight). In any situation, we have duties which
are apparent. We are bound by an important
prima facie obligation unless there is some
other compelling reason.
Ross listed seven key prima facie duties:
promise keeping, reparation for harm done,
gratitude,
justice,
beneficence,
selfimprovement, and non-maleficence.
Ross thought that we would choose between
these on the basis of judgement; we do not
have a logical system for working it out. In
this sense, his theory is truly intuitive.
W.D. Ross, author of The Right and the
Good
Strengths of Intuitionism
• Intuition has given a clear account of the meaning
of ‘good’ in ethics – it is simple and known directly.
• Intuitionism does not prescribe a rigid morality,
since it allows that our intuitive judgements may be
wrong.
• Key ethicists Moore, Pritchard, and Ross are
broadly in agreement.
• Moore’s ‘naturalistic fallacy’ seems persuasive: we
can always criticise those who associate the good
with something else.
• Pritchard and Ross’ view that duties are selfevident gives a positive outlook on human nature.
Weaknesses of Intuitionism
• Intuitionists have failed to agree on what the moral good is
which supposedly is self-evident. Moore had a teleological
view, emphasising the promotion of happiness and the
appreciation of beauty. Ross, however, emphasised duty.
• It is a highly individualist approach to ethics does not give
us concrete justifications for ethical behaviour – all it
claims is that goodness is indefinable.
• Intuitionism does not help us to resolve moral disputes and
does not set out a clear decision making process. Contrast
this with Utilitarianism, for example, which gives us the
utility principle: the greatest good for the greatest number.
Introducing Emotivism
A.J. Ayer, author of Language, Truth and Logic (1936)
• A key form of ethical non-cognitivism is Emotivism – the view
that morals can be understood purely as emotional responses.
• The theory can be traced back to the Logical Positivists – a
group of philosophers who gave ethical language a scientific
definition, ignoring the idea of real or natural values.
• The 18th century Scottish philosopher David Hume had argued
that ethics amounts only to ‘sentiments’ (feelings), and this idea
was later taken up by the modern English philosopher, A.J.
Ayer.
• According to Ayer’s Verification Principle, language is only
meaningful if it can be verified (shown to be true) either
analytically or synthetically. Ayer did not think that this applied
to religious beliefs or moral ideas.
The nature of ethical language, according to Ayer
• Ayer argued that ethical language really
expresses our feelings about something
or somebody we do / do not like.
• We simply express our approval or
disapproval, so that to say ‘lying is
wrong’ is a bit like saying ‘boo to lying’.
• Ayer claimed, “in saying a certain type of
action is right or wrong, I am not making
any factual statement … I am merely
expressing certain moral sentiments.”
• So, ethics just amounts to our subjective
feelings. Often, Ayer’s theory is thus
called the ‘boo-hurrah’ theory of ethics.
Emotivism:
‘Stealing is wrong’ …
just means ‘boo to stealing!’
Strengths of command in Ayer’s Emotivism
However, in this theory it is not the
case that all emotive statements
are equal. Moral statements
arouse feelings, but with three
different strengths of command.
So, implying a duty is the
strongest form of statement.
Saying that one ‘ought’ to do
something is less strong. Finally,
merely stating that something is
good/bad is very weak.
This is all emotion, but it functions
with different intensity.
More Emotivism – C.L. Stevenson
• Another key Emotivist philosopher was C.L. Stevenson,
who developed similar ideas to Ayer.
• However, unlike Ayer, Stevenson claimed that there are
such things as real disagreements in attitudes, rather than
just differing emotions.
• Stevenson did not just emphasise the persuasive side of
ethics, but also the view that attitudes are based on beliefs.
• So, if I say that ‘capital punishment is wrong’, I have an
attitude which is shaped by my prior beliefs. Disagreements
are not just different emotions, but also issues of different
underlying convictions – what life is, its value, etc.
• Stevenson’s views thus give more meaning to moral
disagreement, whereas Ayer only sees these as conflicts of
feelings.
Strengths of Emotivism
• Ayer’s approach to ethics lacks the problem of speculative
and metaphysical ideas – it is based on the observation of
behaviour, rather than God or timeless forms.
• It is easy to think of ideas which link with Emotivism –
people making moral claims with great emotional
conviction and less ‘proof’.
• Stevenson is able to explain the complex meaning of
ethical terms and gives some hope for resolving ethical
disputes, because he emphasises underlying beliefs and
definitions.
Weaknesses of Emotivism
• James Rachels criticises Emotivism for removing reason
from moral judgements; in our morality we appeal to
reason, as in any other aspect of life.
• In the case of terrible crimes, it seems inadequate to say
that condemnation of these is ‘just emotion’. Surely
something like genocide is intrinsically wrong.
• Peter Vardy criticises Ayer’s Emotivism for being an
‘ethical non-theory’ because it only discusses emotion and
does not really deal with the idea of actions being ethical
at all.
The idea that ethical language is
non-factual is extremely radical.
Are there no moral truths? Your
view counts.
Intuitionism and Emotivism are both very
different from the normative ethical
theories we’ve looked at: Kant, Natural
Law, etc. Which do you think is best?
Ideas to Evaluate
The idea that we ‘just know’ right or
wrong intuitively is really intriguing,
but can we agree? Do we have to
learn our morals through discussion
and reason instead?
Criticisms of religious language are
a bit like criticisms of some ethical
theories, because both can be
‘metaphysical’. Could it be that
claims about God or what is
ultimate are all meaningless?
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