Today’s Lecture
• Preliminary comments about Feminist
Epistemology
• Lorraine Code
• Lori Gruen
Preliminary comments about Feminist
Epistemology
• Do beware here. I am not merely contending that women
were presumed not to have the cognitive skills they do have,
and so were excluded from the class of (mature) epistemic
subjects.
• The knowledge women did acquire relative to their social
stations was downgraded to intuition or non-inferential
perception and the like. This effectively excluded certain
kinds of epistemic practices from being seriously considered
by those male philosophers developing theories of
knowledge. Thus certain values or forms of knowing were
privileged over others in the development of theories of
knowledge.
Lorraine Code
• This is our first female philosopher. Contra Darwin, this is
by no means a reflection on the lack of worthy female
philosophers up to Code in the Western ‘tradition’.
• Born in 1937, Lorraine Code is another philosopher who
remains with us.
• She is a professor of philosophy at York University,
Toronto, Ontario.
• She specializes in epistemology and feminist epistemology.
• Your readings are the first chapter of her 1991 book What
Can She know? Feminist Theory and the Construction of
Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).
“The Question”
• Note that in the first paragraph of Code’s first section she
nicely captures some of the central features of traditional
epistemology, features that tie together the various
epistemologists we have hitherto examined.
• (i) So the knower assumed in the ‘S knows that p’
formulation that begins typical contemporary analyses of
knowledge treat S as an abstraction, or a generic epistemic
subject (because epistemic subjectivity does substantial
differ from one rational individual to another) (FP, p.899).
• (ii) Such analyses of knowledge seek to find necessary and
sufficient conditions of knowledge that will determine the
positive epistemic status of any belief held by any epistemic
subject (FP, p.899).
“The Question”
• (iii) Once a belief’s epistemic status is
determined by such conditions, it stands as
knowledge for time immemorial (FP,
p.899).
• She goes through these characteristics again
under the section “Knowers and the known”
(FP, pp.901-03).
“The Question”
• Questions about the characteristics of the epistemic
subject and whether these might be
epistemologically significant threatens to spoil the
universality and absolutism of traditional
epistemology.
• Code puts this is in terms of epistemological
relativism: the view that there is no one set of
standards for determining positive epistemic value
that all rational subjects (or all responsible epistemic
subjects) must hold (FP, p.900).
“The Question”
• Code considers three criticisms critics have directed
at epistemological relativism (see FP, p.900).
• (Criticism 1) A relativity of epistemological
standards entails a conceptual relativism. This seems
to fall out of epistemological relativism because
some, or most, of the basic terms or concepts
adopted in a belief community’s epistemic practices
will be thought to have idiosyncratic or
contextualized significance that is not transferable to
other communities. This will make discussion
between communities impossible.
“The Question”
• (Criticism 2) Knowledge is rendered
meaningless by epistemological relativism.
What is left are beliefs that are variously
valued across diverse belief communities.
Knowledge, for all intents and purposes,
drops out of the picture. In an important
sense, the skeptic wins.
“The Question”
• (Criticism 3) Epistemological relativism is
self-referentially incoherent. One the one
hand it claims that epistemic standards are
relative to specific belief communities or
forms of life, while on the other hand
treating this meta-claim about epistemic
standards as if it is true of all epistemic
standards. This seems to trap the relativist
in an intractable incoherence.
“The Question”
• After conceding that epistemological relativism can, in its
extreme forms, fall victim to the kinds of weaknesses
mentioned in the three criticisms already covered, Code
provides the following responses in the form of advantages
that follow from a non-extreme epistemological relativism
(see FP, pp.900-01).
• (Response 1) Non-extreme epistemological relativism frees
the philosopher from the constraints of seeking a monolithic
narrative from which to talk of knowledge or the other kinds
of positive epistemic value. This will free the philosopher
from the risk of merely privileging one set of epistemic
standards in the name of simplicity or theoretical
plausibility. It also allows the philosopher to see or
recognize alternative ways of knowing.
“The Question”
• (Response 2) The political considerations
that raise concerns about the relevant
characteristics of epistemic subjects
assumed in epistemology create “stringent
accountability requirements of which
knowers have to be cognizant. Thus it
introduces a moral-political component into
the heart of epistemological inquiry” (FP,
pp.900-01).
“The Question”
• (Response 3) Though a non-extreme
epistemological relativism denies that there are
universal epistemic standards to which all epistemic
subjects are accountable, this does not commit it to
an extreme subjectivism where anything goes, or
what’s true for me is true for me and what’s true for
you is true for you. A mind-independent world, a
social community with which one identifies, and
shared interests and goals in daily affairs, works
against any arbitrariness in a belief community’s
epistemic standards.
“The Question”
• “From the claim that no single scheme has
absolute explanatory power, it does not
follow that all schemes are equally valid.
Knowledge is qualitatively variable: some
knowledge is better than other knowledge”
(FP, p.901).
“The Question”
• Do note that Code does not think that the
relevant characteristics of epistemic
subjects will be the sole determinant of
what is known in a given belief context. It is
just that they may well have epistemic
import (FP, p.901).
“Knowers and the known”
• Cartesian epistemology, for Code, implies
some questionable things about the
Cartesian view of epistemic subjectivity.
• (1) It is individualistic. This means it tends
to down play the social components of
knowledge making. Knowers are seen as
basically self-sufficient. In principle each
one of us can take on Descartes’ method of
doubt and secure our respective belief
systems from doubt (FP, pp.901, 902).
“Knowers and the known”
• (2) It over emphasizes the role of abstract or
theoretical reason in knowledge making
Introspection and the imagination are
favored over the sense faculties in the
philosophical method commended in
Cartesian epistemology (FP, p.902). This is
the ‘armchair’ element of Cartesian
epistemology I spoke of yesterday.
“Knowers and the known”
• (3) Epistemic subjects are essentially the
same. In the so-called Rationalist Tradition
this primarily refers to a basic similarity in
our reason, while in the Empiricist Tradition
it is extended to include our noetic faculties
in general (FP, p.902). Remember Russell’s
talk of similar perceptual experiences being
shared by normal spectators finding
themselves adopting ordinary points of view
in usual environmental conditions (FP,
p.246).
“Knowers and the known”
• Cartesian epistemology also tends to favor the
privileging of certain simple beliefs as
paradigmatic of knowledge, and then
developing analyses of complex knowledge by
adding bells and whistles (i.e. various
amendments and addendums) to the analyses of
the simpler cases.
• This precludes significant variability in cases of
knowledge as we move from one type of belief
context to another (FP, p.902).
“Knowers and the known”
• It is important to note that Code does not
endorse the view that introducing considerations
about the characteristics of epistemic subjects
will solve traditional problems with skepticism,
will be included in the conditions of justification
or knowledge, or privilege one sub-set of
humanity as the best producers of certain kinds
of epistemically valuable beliefs (FP, p.903).
“The Sex of the Knower”
• In this section Code broadens the list of
male supremacists beyond the list I
provided yesterday. She mentions Aristotle
and Rousseau, but goes on to include
Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and von Humboldt
(FP, pp.904-05).
• Clearly these thinkers think that the sex of
the epistemic subject is important, and that
males are superior knowledge makers than
females (FP, p.905).
“The Sex of the Knower”
• Code cautions us not to go too far in thinking that sex
will have any great impact on knowledge making.
• (1) There is evidence that gender differences are
socially constructed rather than merely emerging from
human sexual ‘dimorphism’.
• (2) Sex or gender roles are not constant across cultures
or time (or even within complex societies such as our
own).
• (3) Sex or gender characteristics are not constant across
cultures or time (or even within complex societies such
as our own) (FP, p.906).
“Reclaiming the Feminine”
• Under this section Code notes how various
feminist theorists have tried to reclaim
characteristics that have be used to devalue
women’s knowing. This will include
maternal thinking, intuition, aesthetic
responses, and ‘right-brain’ dominance (FP,
pp.907-09).
• Code worries that such moves are
predicated on a poor understanding of the
“Reclaiming the Feminine”
• In passing over the rest of this section two
points stand out over the rest.
• (1) Even if Harding’s treatment of Hume and his
view of epistemic subjectivity is unfair, and I
think it is, she does make the good point that
one’s metaphysical view of the self, reason and
subjectivity can have significant import for
one’s epistemology. We have seen how this has
been the case for the likes of Descartes and even
Berkeley (FP, p.913).
“Reclaiming the Feminine”
• (2) The Adversary Method does indeed characterize the
philosophical approach adopted in mainstream Western
philosophy (particularly Anglo-American or Analytic
Philosophy). This method, though it has its place, has a
number of disadvantages.
• (i) It tends to encourage aggressive combative styles of
philosophy, where the main goal often becomes winning the
argument.
• (ii) It tends to treat issues or problems in isolation from ‘a
bigger picture’ or an appreciation of the greater
philosophical landscape.
“Reclaiming the Feminine”
• (iii) The emphasis shifts from understanding and
exploration to building defensible positions against
extreme opposing views.
• (iv) The method tends to exclude, or contribute to
the devaluing of, other ways of engaging in
philosophy (FP, p.914).
• The Adversary Method does seem plausibly tied to
the dominance of men in the field and the nature of
those qualities they are socialized to exhibit. Gender,
then, does seem to be relevant to metaepistemology
(FP, p.914).
“Knowledge, Methodology and Power”
• This section closes the paper. Code here merely
recapitulates her main points.
• Perhaps of most note in this section is the connection of
knowledge making and power. Indeed, as we may now
be on the verge another arms race, this is a point with
particular relevance and timeliness (FP, p.915).
• You need not leave the Twentieth Century to find
evidence of the correlation between knowledge making
and power.
• It is no mistake that in those countries where women
continue to have little or no rights, they also have little
or no education or literacy skills.
Lori Gruen
• Our second female philosopher is a
professor of philosophy at Wesleyan
University in Middletown, Connecticut.
• I don’t know when she was born.
• She specializes in feminism, ethics, and
political philosophy.
• Her selection in our course pack concerns
the biases that can affect scientific research.
“Introduction”
• In this introduction Gruen rightly points out that
it is a consequence of being embodied that
scientists are affected by the belief
communities, cultures, and sub-cultures with
which they identify. This is one of the reasons of
course for doubting the Cartesian view of
epistemic subjectivity.
• Their situatedness is reflected in the kinds of
questions that they consider, the paths they take
to answer them and the values they seek to
instantiate in their preferred theories (CP, p.17).
“Introduction”
• In Gruen’s view science is a social process.
• This means that it is an essentially cooperative
venture.
• It also means that the standards of what is good
or bad science, or not science at all, is created,
maintained and enforced within the various
scientific communities (CP, p.18).
• Some theorists think that accountability extends
beyond the scientific communities to the greater
society.
“How Gender Affects Category
Construction”
• Gruen suggests that in the feminist literature
that critiques the androcentricism of
science, or its male bias, you find three
general crtiques: Objectivity as male bias,
Investigative Bias and Interpretative Bias
(CP, p.18).
• The critique of objectivity has already been
discussed by Code in your readings, so I
will pass over that section here.
“Investigative Bias”
• The impact of the societal interests and values
on scientific investigation are not difficult to
find.
• Key advances in nuclear science in the
Twentieth Century were inspired, or
necessitated, by first the Second World War and
then the Cold War.
• The various Western space programs of the
Twentieth Century were themselves inspired, or
necessitated, by Cold War politics.
“Investigative Bias”
• The long term profitability of certain research
programs motivates medical research in the private
sector.
• Concerns to advance our current space
transportation technology partially arise from hopes
to exploit the resources of other planetary bodies in
our Solar System. This requires the continued
contribution of scientists as sites for resource
exploitation are sought, viable ways of getting there
are developed, and proper understanding of the
expected environmental conditions on the relevant
planetary bodies is obtained.
“Investigative Bias”
• Male bias appears in those areas that touch upon received
narratives of male supremacy in Western societies.
• We have seen this most clearly in the areas of primatology
and sociobiology.
• Social hierarchies based on male dominance were once
sought in the communities of various nonhuman primate
species. It was seen as a validation and explanation of the
various patriarchal hierarchies observed through human
history. It took some time for primatologists to recognize
the role played by nonhuman female primates in regulating
order or choosing mates, and to also recognize social
arrangements among nonhuman primates that did not
involve dominance.
“Investigative Bias”
• A useful book to look at would be Shirley Strum and
Linda Fedigan’s edited collection of papers entitled
Primate Encounters: Models of Science, Gender,
and Society. Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press published in 2000.
• Also check out: Strum, S.C. and L.M. Fedigan.
1999. “Theory, Method, Gender and Culture: What
Changed Our Views of Primate Society?” In The
New Physical Anthropology. Edited by Shirley
Strum, Donald Lindburg and David Hamburg.
“Interpretative Bias” and
“Androcentric Bias in Practice”
• Interpretative bias is an area of particular relevance to those
concerned about male bias.
• This will be found in those sciences that involve a great deal
of interpretation involving individuals or subjects that have
a particular connection to societal interests, dominant
ideologies, or dominant narratives concerning human
nature.
• Studies that have been adversely affected by societal or
male bias include studies of homosexuality in nonhumans,
competition within nonhuman primate communities, sexual
selection, and sexual behavior (CP, pp.19-20).
“Some Implications”
• The extent to which hidden cultural assumptions or
gendered bias can adversely affect science means that it is
not enough to merely insist that scientists ‘pull up their
socks’ when it comes to making their studies suitably
rigorous.
• What is required is a concerted effort to critically evaluate
the assumptions that inform how we approach various
phenomena in our environment. It is also important to
recognize that a science without bias is not possible. That is
to say, it is not possible to achieve a truly neutral
perspective from within which to engage in science, or any
other kind of knowledge gathering. This is the consequence
of scientists being embodied social animals from particular
cultures in particular periods of human history (CP, pp.2021).