ADI - Drone Strikes Affirmative
ADI - DRONE STRIKES AFFIRMATIVE
1AC
HEGEMONY ADVANTAGE
INTERNATIONAL LAW ADVANTAGE
PAKISTAN ADVANTAGE
TERRORISM ADVANTAGE
PLAN TEXT
SOLVENCY
HEGEMONY
UQ: HEG SUSTAINABLE
LINK: DRONES HURT ALLIANCES
LINK: DRONES HURT CREDIBILITY
LINK: DRONES HURT FOREIGN AID
INTERNAL LINK: ALLIANCES KEY TO HEG
INTERNAL LINK: CREDIBILITY KEY TO HEGEMONY
INTERNAL LINK: FOREIGN AID
INTERNAL LINK: SOFT POWER KEY TO HEGEMONY
IMPACT: HEGEMONY
IMPACT: SOFT POWER
A2: DRONE TECH GOOD
A2: HARD POWER
A2: HEG BAD
A2: SOFT POWER FAILS
INTERNATIONAL LAW
UQ: DRONE PROLIFERATION COMING NOW – GENERIC
LINK: US PRECEDENT ENSURES DRONE PROLIF
LINK: DRONES WILL BE USED TO STRIKE DIMONA
LINK: US DRONE POLICY ENSURES CHINA PROLIF
INTERNAL LINK: DIMONA STRIKE ENSURES MELTDOWN
INTERNAL LINK: CHINA DRONES DESTABLIZE SENKAKU/SE ASIA
IMPACT: MELTDOWNS CAUSE EXTINCTION
IMPACT: SENKAKU CONFLICT CAUSES EXTINCTION
SOLVENCY: RESTRICTIONS/OVERSIGHT SOLVES THE ADVANTAGE
NEW SCENARIO: HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
PAKISTAN
UQ: DRONE STRIKES INCREASING
UQ: PAKISTANI STABILITY ON THE BRINK
LINK: DRONES RADICALIZE THE POPULACE
LINK: DRONES UNDERMINE THE GOVERNMENT
LINK: DRONES LEAD TO PAKISTANI TERRORISM
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NEW LINK: DRONES LEAD TO MILITARY COUP
INTERNAL LINK: PAKISTANI INSTABILITY LEADS TO CONFLICT
IMPACT: INDO-PAK NUKE WAR
IMPACT: PAKISTANI TERRORISM
A2: ALT CAUSE TO PAK INSTABILITY
A2: INDO-PAK RELATIONS RESILIENT
A2: NEW PAKISTANI GOV’T CHANGES STATUS QUO
A2: REFORM EDUCATION CP
TERRORISM
UQ: AQAP DANGEROUS/COMPETENT
LINK: DRONES LEAD TO BACKLASH AND RETALIATION
LINK: DRONES HURT INTEL - ALIENATES ALLIES
LINK: DRONES HURT INTEL - HOST STATES
LINK: DRONES HURT INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
LINK: DRONES INCREASE RECRUITMENT
INTERNAL LINK: RELATIONS WITH TARGET STATES KEY TO SOLVE TERRORISM
INTERNAL LINK: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION SOLVES
NEW IMPACT SCENARIO: CHEM ATTACKS/FOOD SUPPLY
A2: AQAP CAN’T ATTACK US
A2: AQAP HAS NO LEADERSHIP
A2: DECAPITATION
SOLVENCY
INTERNATIONAL SOLVENCY
TRANSPARENCY SOLVENCY
SOLVENCY EXTENSION
A2 JUDGES AREN’T CAPABLE
A2 FLEXIBILITY
A2 TOP SECRET INFO
A2 NORMALIZES TARGETED KILLING
OFF CASE ANSWERS
EXECUTIVE RESTRAINT CP
CMR DA
POLITICS DA
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1AC
Hegemony Advantage
Status quo drone policy undermines U.S. soft power
Zenko 13
(Douglas, Fellow at the Douglas Dillon institute, “US Drone Strike Policies,” Council on Foreign
Relation, January 22, 2013, http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/us-drone-strikepolicies/p29849 accessed 8/1)
MICAH ZENKO: Well, thank you so much for the opportunity and for the privilege of speaking with you all and for speaking alongside
Admiral Blair, who has had a long, distinguished career of actual operational and command responsibilities, versus myself, who has
the privilege of just essentially thinking and writing for a living, with no consequences of what I say.¶ What I try to do in this report is
look at the -- to try to articulate the scope and intensity of U.S. nonbattlefield targeted killings since September 11th. You know, if you
had told anybody, even soon after 9/11, that the U.S. would be -- have conducted something like 425 targeted killings in at least three
countries, killing over 3,000 people, nobody who -- nobody would have believed you, even after 9/11.¶ And the
United States
has sort of merged into this policy of drones being the pre-eminent counterinsurgency tactic
against a range of threats that its intended to face.¶ One of the biggest problems which Admiral Blair gets to is
that the Obama administration's strategy for how it uses drones is poorly articulated and not very transparent. But for example, the
United States and the Obama administration makes the claim that every individual targeted -- and they do this for legal purposes -- is
a senior al-Qaida leader who poses a significant and imminent threat of attack to the United States homeland. Now, that's not who
the United States actually targets -- and this gets to the issue of signature strikes, which the Obama administration has never, on the
record, acknowledged that it conducts. So there's poor -- there's poor articulation of it.¶
It's also poorly coordinated
with other elements of national power in the countries where it's being -- where it's being used, and
you can talk to the U.S. ambassadors to Pakistan or Yemen and you can talk to the USAID
contractors who are trying to do sort of soft power efforts there, and they will tell you that
when you go to the tribal areas of Pakistan or you go to southern Yemen, drones are the face
of U.S. foreign policy. Because we don't articulate and describe our vision for how these are
used very well, we essentially -- again, to echo Admiral Blair -- we allow the Taliban and the ISI and the
Pakistani government to tell our story about drones, which is a -- which is a tremendous strategic
communications lapse.¶ And then finally, I'll just say that I slightly disagree with Admiral Blair about whether or not
international norms matter. If that's true, then the administration should do -- shouldn't lay out its policies at all.¶ It should, you
know, close down its websites, close down its spokespersons, not address people in press conferences if you don't think how you
articulate these policies matter. It
is the position of the Obama administration, and President Obama has said this
on the record several times, that how the United States is using drones will have some normative
impact on others, and they could emulate how we use them, not just emulate how we use
them in the field, but the justifications we provide. So though there are plenty of potential near-term threats, or - either to the U.S. homeland or to the governments where these strikes occur, and the United States, I think correctly, in some
instances is using lethal force to deal with those threats, there is not the longer-term discussion about what impact U.S. drone use
today will have on emerging drone powers once they have the technology.
Multiple warrants –
First, current drone policy risks U.S. alliances key to foreign and military policies
– unresolved legitimacy issues
Kennedy 13 (Greg, a Professor ¶ of Strategic Foreign Policy ¶ at the Defence Studies ¶
Department, King's College ¶ London, based at the Joint ¶ Services Command and Staff ¶ College,
Defence Academy ¶ of the United Kingdom, in ¶ Shrivenham, “Drones: Legitimacy and AntiAmericanism,” Parameters 42(4)/43(1) Winter-Spring 2013, Strategic Studies Institute at the
United States Army War College
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Issues/WinterSpring_2013/3_A
rticle_Kennedy.pdf
p. 26)
The current debate over the legitimacy of America’s use of drones to ¶ deliver deadly force is
taking place in both public and official domains ¶ in the United States and many other
countries.5¶ The four key features at ¶ the heart of the debate revolve around: who is controlling the weapon ¶
system; does the system of control and oversight violate international ¶ law governing the use
of force; are the drone strikes proportionate acts ¶ that provide military effectiveness given the
circumstances of the conflict they are being used in; and does their use violate the sovereignty
of ¶ other nations and allow the United States to disregard formal national ¶ boundaries? Unless
these four questions are dealt with in the near future ¶ the impact of the unresolved legitimacy
issues will have a number of ¶ repercussions for American foreign and military policies: “Without a
¶ new doctrine for the use of drones that is understandable to friends ¶ and foes, the United States risks achieving
near-term tactical benefits ¶ in killing terrorists while incurring potentially significant longerterm ¶ costs to its alliances, global public opinion, the war on terrorism and ¶ international
stability.”6¶ This article will address only the first three critical questions.5
AND alliances key to soft power problem solving
Kreisher 12 (Otto Kreisher, Former Naval Officer/veteran Washington correspondent and
defense journalist, “Chuck Hagel, Touted As Next SecDef, Argues For Soft Power, Allies”,
December 10 2012, Breaking Defense, http://breakingdefense.com/2012/12/10/chuck-hageltouted-as-next-secdef-argues-for-soft-power-allie/ )
Perhaps with an eye toward America losing its preeminent military position, Hagel argued that “engagement”
is the key to
address many international problems. In the national security world, engagement generally encompasses
negotiations or multinational efforts. It has never been a popular tactic among most Republicans and some promilitary Democrats. However, Hagel insisted that “engagement is not surrender, it’s not appeasement,” clearly taking on some of his
GOP colleagues, who have slung around appeasement — associated with the foolish actions of British Prime Minister Neville
Chamberlain as he tried to avert war with Germany — to describe some of President Barack Obama’s efforts to prevent international
Engagement is “an opportunity to better understand” others, Hagel said,
and to bring “mutual self respect” among contesting parties. As the U.S. faces a litany of problems
and potential crises in the future, he said, “we will need to turn our receivers on and our transmitters off.” The
emerging issues, Hagel said, “are beyond the control of any great power” and the U.S. “cannot solve
them alone.” Instead, they must be addressed through alliances, through “joint thinking,” he said.
tensions from flaring into conflict.
Second, drone strikes as is hurt U.S. credibility – lack of transparency, oversight
and restrictions allow any bombing to be blamed on the U.S.
Zenko 13, (Micah, fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, with expertise in Conflict
Prevention; US national security policy, military planning and operations and nuclear weapons
policy. “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies”, Council on Foerign Relations Special Report no. 65,
January 2013 http://www.cfr.org/wars-and-warfare/reforming-us-drone-strike-policies/p29736,
pg15)
The problem with maintaining that drone strikes are covert is that both the
American and international publics
often misunderstand how drones are used. And in affected states, citizens often blame the
United States for collateral damage that could have been caused by the host states’ own weapon
systems. According to a recent report from Yemen: It’s extremely difficult to figure out who is responsible for
any given strike. . . . It could be a manned plane from the Yemeni Air Force or the U.S. military. Or it could be an unmanned
drone flown by the U.S. military or the CIA. . . . But no matter who launches a particular strike, Yemenis are
likely to blame it on the Americans. What’s more, we found that many more civilians are being killed than officials
acknowledge.37 Congressional oversight of drone strikes varies depending on whether the CIA or the U.S. military is the lead
executive authority. The CIA, according to the chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senator Dianne Feinstein, meets
its “fully and currently informed” legal obligations through “monthly in-depth oversight meetings to review strike records and
question every aspect of the program.” 38 Individual JSOC strikes are not reported to the relevant armed services committees, but are
covered under the broad special access program biannual reporting to Congress. According to senior staff members
on the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee, many of their peers have
little understanding of how drone strikes are conducted within the countries for which they are
responsible for exercising oversight. Even serving White House officials and members of Congress
repeatedly make inaccurate statements about U.S. targeted killings and appear to be unaware
of how policies have changed over the past decade.39 At the same time, the judiciary committees have been
repeatedly denied access to the June 2010 Office of Legal Counsel memorandum that presented the legal basis for the drone strike
that killed U.S. citizen and alleged leader of AQAP Anwar al-Awlaki in September 2011.40 Finally, despite nearly
ten years
of nonbattlefield targeted killings, no congressional committee has conducted a hearing on any
aspect of them.
AND credibility will make the difference in maintaining hegemonic standing
APSA 9 (American Political Science Association, The American Political Science Association is the leading
professional organization for the study of political science and serves more than 15,000 members in over 80 countries. With a range
of programs and services for individuals, departments and institutions, APSA brings together political scientists from all fields of
inquiry, regions, and occupational endeavors within and outside academe in order to expand awareness and understanding of
politics, “ U.S.
Standing in the World: ¶ Causes, Consequences, ¶ and the Future,” Task Force Report,
October 2009,
http://www.apsanet.org/media/PDFs/APSAUSStandingShortFinal.pdf
p. 3-4)
U¶ nlike something a nation possesses and can easily measure, like wealth or military ¶ might,
standing is an attribute assigned to the United States by actors beyond its ¶ borders—such as foreign
leaders and peoples, international organizations, and transnational ¶ groups—and assessed by citizens within them. U.S.
standing has both an absolute and a ¶ relative quality. It is absolute in the sense that it can be
high or low and can vary over time. It ¶ is relative in that U.S. standing could be better or worse
than that of other countries or actors, ¶ such as China or the European Union.¶ Standing has two major
facets: credibility and esteem. Credibility refers to the U.S. ¶ government’s ability to do what it
says it is going to do—to “stand up” for what it believes, ¶ and to “stand against” threats to its
interests and ideals. Esteem refers to America’s stature, ¶ or what America is perceived to
“stand for” in the hearts and minds of foreign publics and policymakers. Credibility and esteem can be
mutually reinforcing, but they can also be ¶ difficult to pursue in tandem—a trade-off implied by Machiavelli’s famous dictum: “it is
much ¶ safer to be feared than loved.” ¶ Standing is densely interwoven with U.S. “hard power”—the nation’s material military ¶ and
economic capabilities. U.S. capabilities help the nation realize its interests, and a modern ¶ military and robust economy breed appeal
and respect. Power and standing, however, are not ¶ the same thing. U.S. standing may vary even if U.S. hard power does not, as we
have seen since ¶ 2000: standing has declined (see Figure 3), but relative American power has been steady (see ¶ Figure 5 below)..
Likewise with “soft power”: a country’s standing can rise and fall even as the ¶ attractiveness of its system remains relatively constant.
And unlike pro- or anti-Americanism, ¶ standing
is not about whether others are ¶ for or against the United States, but instead
¶ whether they view the United States as a ¶ credible actor with traits that should be ¶ admired
or emulated. ¶ Why should policymakers—or political scientists—care about standing at all?¶ First, recent history suggests that
standing can play a fundamental role in the shaping ¶ of strategy. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, President
George W. Bush initiated a new ¶ national strategy for the United States that favored the
credibility dimension of standing—¶ emphasizing a policy package of assertive unilateralism,
preventive use of force, and aggressive ¶ democratization. The administration achieved some
initial successes, swiftly toppling the ¶ Taliban in Afghanistan, securing dismantlement of
Libya’s nuclear program, and encouraging ¶ an apparent halt or slow-down in Iran’s nuclear
program. ¶ Yet, over time, despite the lack of further terrorist attacks on U.S. soil, American ¶
standing declined. The Bush administration’s single-minded approach lost significant ¶ support at home and abroad, as the
United States grew mired in Iraq, was accused of ¶ violations of international law, and drew
international criticism and resentment—even as ¶ Osama bin Laden remained at large. This decline in
standing only made it harder for the ¶ United States to be effective in foreign affairs—
prompting the Bush administration to take ¶ what some saw as a reverse course after 2005 and
return to the typical pattern of American ¶ internationalism since World War II. ¶ More distant history speaks
to the significance of standing as well. In the long ¶ competition with the Soviet Union, the United States was anxious that its
reputation to ¶ protect its allies, especially those in Europe, be seen as credible by both Soviet leaders and ¶ Europeans. U.S.
participation in the Korean and Viet Nam wars was spurred by the fear that a ¶ perception of diminished U.S. credibility would lead
others to join a rising Communist tide. ¶ As Lyndon Johnson explained to Martin Luther King, Jr. in early 1965, “If I pulled out [of ¶
Vietnam] ... I think the Germans would be scared to death that our commitment to them was ¶ no good, and God knows what we’d
have in other places in the world....Ӧ Standing
is the everyday currency of America’s existence in the
world. Political standing ¶ is akin to long-term political capital (or “goodwill” in accounting). It has
intrinsic value, ¶ including in the self-understanding of Americans, even when it has no readily
observable ¶ behavioral implications.
Third, these drone strikes overshadow effectiveness of foreign aid programs
Zenko 13, (Micah, fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, with expertise in Conflict
Prevention; US national security policy, military planning and operations and nuclear weapons
policy. “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies”, Council on Foerign Relations Special Report no. 65,
January 2013 http://www.cfr.org/wars-and-warfare/reforming-us-drone-strike-policies/p29736,
pg11)
At the same time, some drone strikes contradict stated nonmilitary foreign policy objectives. In February
2012, at a press conference for the International Contact Group on Somalia, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton remarked: “I know
enough to say airstrikes would not be a good idea. And we have absolutely no reason to believe anyone—certainly not the United
States—is considering that.”25 Within hours, a convoy was attacked in the Shabelle region of Somalia, killing between four and seven
suspected Islamic militants.26 An anonymous U.S. official confirmed that a JSOC drone killed the militants.27 Even
where
military commands are responsible for advancing U.S. interests within a region, coordination
with other military branches and the CIA or JSOC is negligible, according to current and former intelligence
and military officials. Lieutenant General Sam Helland, who led Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa from 2004 to 2005,
described the division as such: “[It was like] the separation of church and state—they were state, I was church. [The CIA and JSOC] did
what they did. . . . We stayed on the civil affairs side, drilling wells, building roads, schoolhouses, churches.”28 In
countries
where drone strikes have occurred, some State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
officials strongly believe that the broadly unpopular attacks overshadow and diminish the
effectiveness of civilian assistance programs. One former senior military official closely involved in U.S. targeted
killings argued that “drone strikes are just a signal of arrogance that will boomerang against
America,” while former U.S. ambassador to Pakistan Cameron Munter explained, “The problem is the political fallout. . . . Do you
want to win a few battles and lose the war?”29 In Pakistan, the continuation of drone strikes has exposed fault lines between the
army and the democratically elected parliament, which in April 2012 demanded “an immediate cessation of drone attacks inside the
territorial borders of Pakistan.”30 However, the central governments of Yemen and Somalia (as represented by the Transitional
Federal Government) have provided either public or private consent for U.S. drone strikes
within their territories.
AND foreign aid sustains US Hegemony – past proves
Ehrenfeld 04, (Daniel, University of Maryland professor posting in a peer reviewed journal
analyzing humanitarian intervention, “Foreign Aid Effectiveness, Political Rights and Bilateral
Distribution”, The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, February 1st,
http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/75)
Despite the existence of multilateral programs, bilateral technical assistance to independent countries and even the emergence of the
Soviet Aid program in 1956, the
1950s may be described as a decade of US hegemony in aid
distribution, as it alone accounted for two-thirds of total aid in that decade. Although the program
was subject to continued commercial pressures (especially in the use of food aid), the intensification of the
Cold War gave US aid a strongly strategic orientation, which it has retained to this day. Aid was
quite consciously used to stop countries ‘going communist’, and development aid and military aid
mixed as necessary. In the 1960s, the second wave of independence and the troubled financial state of some already
independent countries (notably India) prompted the emergence of greater amounts of bilateral programs.
Ultimately, soft power is key to US hegemony
Nye 2004 (Joseph S. Nye, political scientist and former Harvard school of government dean,
“Soft Power and American Foreign Policy” Vol. 119, No. 2, Summer 2004 ,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/20202345.pdf,p. 260-261)
In the global information age, the attractiveness of the United States will be crucial to our
ability to achieve the outcomes we want. Rather than having to put together pick-up coalitions of the willing for each new
game, we will benefit if we are able to attract others into institutional alliances and eschew
weakening those we have already created. NATO, for example, not only aggregates the
capabilities of advanced nations, but its interminable committees, procedures, and exercises
also allow these nations to train together and quickly be come interoperable when a crisis
occurs. As for alliances, if the United States is an attractive source of security and reassurance, other
countries will set their expectations in directions that are conducive to our interests. Initially, for ex
ample, the U.S.-Japan security treaty was not very popular in Japan, but polls show that over the decades, it became more attractive to the Japanese
public. Once that happened, Japanese politicians began to build it into their approaches to foreign policy. The United States benefits when it is regarded
as a constant and trusted source of attraction so that other countries are not obliged continually to re-examine their options in an atmosphere of
uncertain coalitions. In the Japan case, broad acceptance of the United States by the Japanese public "contributed to the maintenance of US hegemony"
and "served as political constraints compelling the ruling elites to continue cooperation with the United States."18 Popularity can contribute to stability.
Finally, as the RAND Corporation's John Arquila and David Ronfeldt argue, power in an information age will come not only from strong defenses but also
from strong sharing. A traditional realpolitik mind-set makes it difficult to share with others. But in an information age, such sharing not only enhances
the ability of others to cooperate with us but also increases their inclination to do so.19 As we share intelligence and capabilities with others, we develop
common outlooks and approaches that improve our ability to deal with the new challenges. Power
flows from that attraction.
Dismissing the importance of at traction as merely ephemeral popularity ignores key insights
from new theories of leadership as well as the new realities of the information age. We cannot afford
that.
U.S. hegemony prevents extinction – laundry list of reasons
Thayer 6 (Bradley A. is an associate professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic
Studies, Missouri State University, “In Defense of Primacy,” November/December 2006, Issue 86,
National Interest, p.32, EBSCOHost, Accessed Date: 5-7-13 y2k)
A grand strategy based on American primacy means ensuring the United States stays the world's number one power--the diplomatic,
economic and military leader. Those arguing against primacy claim that the United States should retrench, either because the United
States lacks the power to maintain its primacy and should withdraw from its global commitments, or because the maintenance of
primacy will lead the United States into the trap of "imperial overstretch." In the previous issue of The National Interest, Christopher
Layne warned of these dangers of primacy and called for retrenchment.(FN1)¶ Those arguing for a grand strategy of retrenchment
are a diverse lot. They include isolationists, who want no foreign military commitments; selective engagers, who want U.S. military
commitments to centers of economic might; and offshore balancers, who want a modified form of selective engagement that would
have the United States abandon its landpower presence abroad in favor of relying on airpower and seapower to defend its interests.¶
But retrenchment, in any of its guises, must
be avoided. If the United States adopted such a strategy, it
would be a profound strategic mistake that would lead to far greater instability and war in the
world, imperil American security and deny the United States and its allies the benefits of
primacy.¶ There are two critical issues in any discussion of America's grand strategy: Can America remain the dominant state?
Should it strive to do this? America can remain dominant due to its prodigious military, economic and
soft power capabilities. The totality of that equation of power answers the first issue. The United States has
overwhelming military capabilities and wealth in comparison to other states or likely potential
alliances. Barring some disaster or tremendous folly, that will remain the case for the foreseeable future. With few exceptions, even
those who advocate retrenchment acknowledge this.¶ So the debate revolves around the desirability of maintaining American
primacy. Proponents of retrenchment focus a great deal on the costs of U.S. action--but they fail to realize what is good about
American primacy. The price and risks of primacy are reported in newspapers every day; the benefits that stem from it are not.¶ A
GRAND strategy of ensuring
American primacy takes as its starting point the protection of the U.S.
interests. These interests include ensuring that critical resources like oil
flow around the world, that the global trade and monetary regimes flourish and that
Washington's worldwide network of allies is reassured and protected. Allies are a great asset to the
homeland and American global
United States, in part because they shoulder some of its burdens. Thus, it is no surprise to see NATO in Afghanistan or the Australians
in East Timor.¶ In contrast, a strategy based on retrenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives of the United
States. Indeed, retrenchment
will make the United States less secure than the present grand
strategy of primacy. This is because threats will exist no matter what role America chooses to play in
international politics. Washington cannot call a "time out", and it cannot hide from threats. Whether they are
terrorists, rogue states or rising powers, history shows that threats must be confronted. Simply by
declaring that the United States is "going home", thus abandoning its commitments or making unconvincing half-pledges to defend its
interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect American wishes to retreat. To make such a declaration implies weakness
and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the
strong. The same is true of the anarchic world of international politics. If
there is no diplomatic solution to the
threats that confront the United States, then the conventional and strategic military power of
the United States is what protects the country from such threats.¶ And when enemies must be confronted,
a strategy based on primacy focuses on engaging enemies overseas, away from American soil. Indeed, a key tenet of the Bush
Doctrine is to attack terrorists far from America's shores and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for
attacks against the United States itself. This requires a physical, on-the-ground presence that cannot be achieved by offshore
balancing.¶ Indeed, as Barry Posen has noted, U.S.
primacy is secured because America, at present,
commands the "global commons"--the oceans, the world's airspace and outer space--allowing
the United States to project its power far from its borders, while denying those common
avenues to its enemies. As a consequence, the costs of power projection for the United States and its
allies are reduced, and the robustness of the United States' conventional and strategic
deterrent capabilities is increased.(FN2) This is not an advantage that should be relinquished lightly.¶ A remarkable fact
about international politics today--in a world where American primacy is clearly and unambiguously on
display--is that countries want to align themselves with the United States. Of course, this is not out of any
sense of altruism, in most cases, but because doing so allows them to use the power of the United States
for their own purposes--their own protection, or to gain greater influence.¶ Of 192 countries, 84 are
allied with America--their security is tied to the United States through treaties and other informal arrangements--and they include
almost all of the major economic and military powers. That is a ratio of almost 17 to one (85 to five), and a big change from the Cold
War when the ratio was about 1.8 to one of states aligned with the United States versus the Soviet Union. Never
before in its
history has this country, or any country, had so many allies.¶ U.S. primacy--and the bandwagoning
effect--has also given us extensive influence in international politics, allowing the United States
to shape the behavior of states and international institutions. Such influence comes in many forms, one of
which is America's ability to create coalitions of like-minded states to free Kosovo, stabilize Afghanistan, invade Iraq or to stop
proliferation through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Doing so allows the United States to operate with allies outside of the
UN, where it can be stymied by opponents. American-led
wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq stand in
contrast to the UN's inability to save the people of Darfur or even to conduct any military
campaign to realize the goals of its charter. The quiet effectiveness of the PSI in dismantling Libya's WMD programs
and unraveling the A. Q. Khan proliferation network are in sharp relief to the typically toothless attempts by the UN to halt
proliferation.¶ You can count with one hand countries opposed to the United States. They are the "Gang of Five": China, Cuba, Iran,
North Korea and Venezuela. Of course, countries like India, for example, do not agree with all policy choices made by the United
States, such as toward Iran, but New Delhi is friendly to Washington.¶ Only the "Gang of Five" may be expected to consistently resist
the agenda and actions of the United States.¶ China is clearly the most important of these states because it is a rising great power.
But even Beijing is intimidated by the United States and refrains from openly challenging U.S. power. China proclaims that it will, if
necessary, resort to other mechanisms of challenging the United States, including asymmetric strategies such as targeting
communication and intelligence satellites upon which the United States depends. But China may not be confident those strategies
would work, and so it is likely to refrain from testing the United States directly for the foreseeable future because China's power
benefits, as we shall see, from the international order U.S. primacy creates.¶ The other states are far weaker than China. For three of
the "Gang of Five" cases--Venezuela, Iran, Cuba--it is an anti-U.S. regime that is the source of the problem; the country itself is not
intrinsically anti-American. Indeed, a change of regime in Caracas, Tehran or Havana could very well reorient relations.¶
THROUGHOUT HISTORY, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power--Rome, Britain or
the United States today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of
Everything we think of when we consider the current international order--free
trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing
democratization--is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system
international politics.¶
can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one
of history's most significant lessons: Appalling
things happen when international orders collapse. The
Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles.
Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States will end just as assuredly . As
country and western great Ral Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)."¶ Consequently, it is important to
note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American
primacy
within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world.
The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction
among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today,
American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned--between Greece and
Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow
Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars
still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously
threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly
war's worst form: great power wars.¶ Second, American power gives the United States the ability
to spread democracy and other elements of its ideology of liberalism. Doing so is a source of much good
for the countries concerned as well as the United States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal
democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview.(FN3) So, spreading
democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition, once
states are governed democratically, the likelihood of
any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests. Indeed
they do. Rather, it is because they are more open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve
things amicably in concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their
citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United States.¶ Critics have faulted the Bush Administration for attempting to
spread democracy in the Middle East, labeling such an effort a modern form of tilting at windmills. It is the obligation of Bush's critics
to explain why democracy is good enough for Western states but not for the rest, and, one gathers from the argument, should not
even be attempted.¶ Of course, whether democracy in the Middle East will have a peaceful or stabilizing influence on America's
interests in the short run is open to question. Perhaps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless,
their people would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Afghans, 40 percent of
them women, voted in a critical October 2004 election, even though remnant Taliban forces threatened them. The first free elections
were held in Iraq in January 2005. It was the military power of the United States that put Iraq on the path to democracy. Washington
fostered democratic governments in Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Caucasus. Now even the Middle East is increasingly
democratic. They may not yet look like Western-style democracies, but democratic progress has been made in Algeria, Morocco,
Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt. By all accounts, the march of democracy has been impressive.¶ Third,
along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the global economy. With its
allies, the
United States has labored to create an economically liberal worldwide network
characterized by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, and
mobility of capital and labor markets. The economic stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a
global public good from which all states benefit, particularly the poorest states in the Third World. The United States created
this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well-being of America.
This economic order forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and
growth, and benefits defense as well because the size of the economy makes the defense
burden manageable. Economic spin-offs foster the development of military technology, helping to ensure military
prowess.¶ Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the economic network comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian
foreign service diplomat and researcher at the World Bank, who started his career confident in the socialist ideology of postindependence India. Abandoning the positions of his youth, Lal now recognizes that the only way to bring relief to desperately poor
countries of the Third World is through the adoption of free market economic policies and globalization, which are facilitated through
American primacy.(FN4) As a witness to the failed alternative economic systems, Lal is one of the strongest academic proponents of
American primacy due to the economic prosperity it provides.¶ Fourth and finally, the
United States, in seeking primacy, has
been willing to use its power not only to advance its interests but to promote the welfare of people all
over the globe. The United States is the earth's leading source of positive externalities for the world. The U.S. military has
participated in over fifty operations since the end of the Cold War--and most of those missions have been humanitarian in nature.
Indeed, the
U.S. military is the earth's "911 force"--it serves, de facto, as the world's police, the global
paramedic and the planet's fire department. Whenever there is a natural disaster, earthquake,
flood, drought, volcanic eruption, typhoon or tsunami, the United States assists the countries
in need. On the day after Christmas in 2004, a tremendous earthquake and tsunami occurred in the Indian Ocean near Sumatra,
killing some 300,000 people. The United States was the first to respond with aid. Washington followed up with a large contribution of
aid and deployed the U.S. military to South and Southeast Asia for many months to help with the aftermath of the disaster. About
20,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines responded by providing water, food, medical aid, disease treatment and prevention
as well as forensic assistance to help identify the bodies of those killed. Only
the U.S. military could have
accomplished this Herculean effort. No other force possesses the communications capabilities
or global logistical reach of the U.S. military. In fact, UN peacekeeping operations depend on
the United States to supply UN forces.¶ American generosity has done more to help the United
States fight the War on Terror than almost any other measure. Before the tsunami, 80 percent
of Indonesian public opinion was opposed to the United States; after it, 80 percent had a
favorable opinion of America. Two years after the disaster, and in poll after poll, Indonesians still have overwhelmingly
positive views of the United States. In October 2005, an enormous earthquake struck Kashmir, killing about 74,000 people and leaving
three million homeless. The U.S. military responded immediately, diverting helicopters fighting the War on Terror in nearby
Afghanistan to bring relief as soon as possible. To help those in need, the United States also provided financial aid to Pakistan; and, as
one might expect from those witnessing the munificence of the United States, it left a lasting impression about America. For the first
time since 9/11, polls of Pakistani opinion have found that more people are favorable toward the United States than unfavorable,
while support for Al-Qaeda dropped to its lowest level. Whether in Indonesia or Kashmir, the money was well-spent because it helped
people in the wake of disasters, but it also had a real impact on the War on Terror. When people in the Muslim world witness the U.S.
military conducting a humanitarian mission, there is a clearly positive impact on Muslim opinion of the United States. As
the War
on Terror is a war of ideas and opinion as much as military action, for the United States
humanitarian missions are the equivalent of a blitzkrieg.¶ THERE IS no other state, group of
states or international organization that can provide these global benefits. None even comes
close. The United Nations cannot because it is riven with conflicts and major cleavages that divide the international body time and
again on matters great and trivial. Thus it lacks the ability to speak with one voice on salient issues and to act as a unified force once a
decision is reached. The EU has similar problems. Does anyone expect Russia or China to take up these responsibilities? They may
have the desire, but they do not have the capabilities. Let's face it: for
the time being, American primacy remains
humanity's only practical hope of solving the world's ills.¶ While the benefits of American primacy are
considerable, no country can ever escape from the iron law of Economics 101--there is no free lunch. American primacy is no
exception. Leadership requires that the United States incur costs and run risks not borne by other countries. These costs can be stark
and brutal, and they have to be faced directly by proponents of primacy. It means that some Americans will die in the service of their
country. These are the costs, and they are significant. Americans should be conscious of them and use them in their contemplation of
the value of primacy. Additionally, the costs of primacy must impose upon American policy-makers a sharp focus and prudence
concerning how they wield American power. Equally, all Americans should be aware of the benefits that flow from primacy and that
they enjoy.¶ While primacy's advantages and costs must be weighed objectively and solemnly, the scholars who are proclaiming that
the sky is falling, primacy is doomed and America must retrench have to confront the reality of U.S. power. The
world is a long
way from seeing the end of American primacy, and it is in America's interest--and the world's-to have it last as long as possible.¶
International Law Advantage
Scenario 1 is the Dimona Reactor
Hezbollah is gaining access to drones to threaten Israel’s nuclear facility at
Dimona – only restricting U.S. practices to create a new precedent can solve.
Knoll, freelance defense analyst and doctoral candidate in IR at the Fletcher School of Law &
Diplomacy at Tufts University, 12 (David L., Will America’s Addiction to Drone Strikes Backfire?, The Diplomat, 23
October 2012, http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2012/10/23/ok-drone-the-global-proliferation-of-uavs/?print=yes, da 8-3-13)
PC
The spread of UAVs has also reached America’s foes. Iran touts an indigenously developed UAV
program that includes unarmed reconnaissance drones and (purportedly) kamikaze attack drones.
More alarmingly, Iran has transferred UAVs to its non-state allies, such as Hezbollah. Just this month Israel shot
down a Hezbollah operated drone a mere 30km from the Dimona nuclear facility. The unit was a
rudimentary reconnaissance UAV, but just as armed drone development lagged behind non-armed drone development in the United
States, there
is no reason to believe that the proliferation of armed drones won’t soon follow. ¶ So
what sort of a threat does the proliferation of armed UAVs represent? The main threat is that future operators will
use them as frequently as the U nited S tates does. As the most visible user of armed UAVs,
American officials already realize that the U nited S tates is “establishing precedents that other
nations may follow.” As armed drones proliferate, UAV attacks could become commonplace as foreign
leaders will not face the same domestic restraints as they do when employing soldiers. With
fewer constraints on the use of force, decision-makers might use force more often. This is
destabilizing, as more frequent employment of armed drones will increase the chances of
miscalculation of what an opponent will tolerate before resorting to full-scale war.¶ This is not
to argue that the U nited S tates should halt armed UAV missions, but rather make them less
frequent. Drone strikes, combined with precise intelligence and targeting, are an important tactic in the U.S. counterterrorism
strategy. Yet, policymakers must not become overly reliant on UAV strikes; they are a tactic and cannot masquerade as a strategy.
By limiting the frequency of UAV strikes, the
U nited S tates will help set the precedent that drone strikes are just one more tool in the arsenal,
not a new type of unrestricted warfare.
Drone strikes should be reserved for high-level terrorist targets.
An attack against the Dimona reactor would cause a catastrophic meltdown –
poor infrastructure and nuclear weapon presence
Scoop 3 (Scoop News, Dimona Reactor… a Mystery Threatening the Middle East, 18 September 2003,
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO0309/S00228.htm, da 8-3-13) PC
Preface “The
Israeli nuclear reactor of Dimona is vulnerable to meltdown, like the Russian reactor of
Dimona melts down, it would
affect an area 500 aerial kilometers in radius, reaching Cyprus and the entire neighboring region”, warned Dr.
Yousef Abu Safiya, Head of the Palestinian Environment Quality Authority. A recent study
conducted by the Jordanian authorities after a request from the Palestinian Environment Quality Authority
revealed that the Israelis are aware of the possibility of a meltdown in Dimona reactor, which in
turn would affect the whole region, mainly the Jordanian southern city of Tafila. The study also showed that radioactive
Chernobyl two decades ago, which caused a humanitarian and ecological catastrophe. If
substances are leaking from the Dimona reactor in a way that has increased rates of cancer diseases among nearby populations,
particularly those of Tafila City. What
make these assumptions largely based on solid ground are the
latest satellite images of the Dimona reactor, which showed that its walls have cracks, which
cut its assumed age into half. With thorough investigation into Dimona Israel’s nuclear plant, one can observe the
following facts: Location: The location of Dimona's reactor in the Negev desert is a delicate one, situated between Egypt, Jordan and
the Palestinian Authority's territories. The reactor was built in 1963, as part of a deal with France, who pledged to build the reactor in
exchange for helping it and the United Kingdom in attacking Egypt in what was known as the 1956-tripartite. As for funding the
reactor's driving material, the United States took care of that, in addition to giving assistance with moving quantities of enriched
Uranium to Israel. The area on which the Dimona reactor is built on includes nine buildings, including the reactor building itself. Each
building is tasked with producing a certain type of materials used to produce weapons of mass destruction, such as Plutonium,
Lithium and Beryllium, used to manufacture nuclear bombs, in addition to producing radioactive Uranium and Triennium. The Dimona
reactor is considered to be the most mysterious secrets of the "nuclear world", as Israel categorically refused, since its establishment
in 1948 and after building the reactor, any routine inspection that other reactors around the world goes through, which "forcibly"
open their reactors' doors in fear of the American waving of the "club" of international resolutions. No Inspection Beyond this Point!
Israel might be considered the only state that opposes to the inspection visits conducted by the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) all over the world, added to its rejection, until this very day, to sign the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
which was signed by all Arab states. In spite of the complete American support for the Israeli policy, the Americans have expressed
their concern over the reactor, as news revealed an American attempt to send some of its nuclear-program officials to inspect Dimona
reactor apart from those working in the IAEA, but Israel refused to allow them in, continuing the reactor's legacy of being "visitationproof", as only Israelis are allowed in. The Fifth Nuclear Power Israel is considered the fifth nuclear power in the world. In addition to
owning nuclear bombs that can be dropped from the air, its nuclear arsenal includes also nuclear warheads that can reach a distance
of 1,500 kilometers, using the Israeli-made "Jericho" missiles. Estimations show that Israel is in possession of 200 nuclear bombs, but
Arab sources indicate that Israel own massive quantities of Uranium and Plutonium that enables it of producing an additional 100
bombs. Israel, in the meantime, seeks to increase the production efficiency of its reactor to about three times its current efficiency –
from 28 to 100 megawatts. According to recent reports, the Israeli nuclear reactor consumed 1,400 tons of Uranium last year, which
indicates that its efficiency might have reached 150 megawatts. Dimona's Hazards In a study requested by the Palestinian Ministry of
Environment Quality from the Jordanian authorities, it was revealed that the average manifestation of cancer in the Al Tafila
governorate, south of Jordan, is higher than the other Jordanian governorates and surrounding Arab countries. According to Dr. Abu
Safiya, high cancer rates were recorded in all the southern Jordanian governorates, which confirmed the possible direction of nuclear
dust that might be leaking from Dimona. It was recently revealed that five Israeli families lost their sons who worked in Dimona
reactor, and they filed charges in the Central Court in Tel Aviv against the Israeli government and the reactor's administration,
demanding compensations for the cancer that killed those workers due to radiation exposure. According to the lawsuit, the
prosecutors are relatives to five Israelis who worked for a long time in the nuclear "village": Ze'eiv Schforn, born in 1931 and started
working in Dimona in 1962 as the head of the supply crew. He was diagnosed with abdominal caner in 1966 and died in 1967. The
second employee was Simon Dray, born in 1942 and worked in Dimona from 1966 until 1992 in the cleaning and decontamination
unit. In 1996 he was diagnosed with pharyngeal cancer, and died in 1998. The third was Moshe Zegori, born in 1947, and worked in
the reactor from 1965 until 1985, also in cleaning and decontamination. Before he left his job he found out that he had a malignant
tumor in his head, and died in 1987. The fourth employee was Yousif Cohen, born in 1938, and worked in the reactor from 1970 until
1995, in maintenance. In 1997 he was diagnosed with several malignant tumors, and died in 1998. The fifth employee is still suffering
from cancer in his body, and is constantly under treatment. He worked in the reactor from 1969 until 1996, in maintenance and
mechanical engineering. The prosecutors of those victims are demanding the Israeli government to take responsibility for their
deaths, due to the radiation exposure they suffered inside the reactor, which caused fatal malignant tumors. At the same time, they
claim that the reactor's administration didn't take enough precaution measures and never warned the employees about the radiation
hazard. Worn-out Reactor As
reports indicate, the reactor has become old now, as its isolation walls
have worn-out, which might cause the leakage of some radiation from the reactor, a thing that will lead to
devastating health and ecological damages to the surrounding area. According to the reports also, the reactor suffers from
a dangerous crack caused by "neutron" radiation, which caused structural damage, as neutrons
cause small gas bubbles inside the concrete support, making it fragile and susceptible to cracking . The United Arab
Emirates-based "Al Bayan" newspaper revealed recently that a serious debate was going on now about whether to stop working in
the reactor before the catastrophe occurs or not. Additionally, a report made the by Israeli second TV channel mentioned that dozens
of the reactor's employees died of cancer, and that the reactor's administration refuses to reveal the true number of casualties and
fatalities. The Dimona reactor wasn't also immune to many working accidents that happened inside it, including the burning of
hazardous and poisonous materials without providing the employees with suitable protective equipment, as many of them died
because of that. As well, quantities of radioactive heavy water and nuclear waste leaked into a natural geographical hill extending
along the reactor. Expired! By continuing to maintain and operate Dimona reactor, Israel is committing a crime against humanity that
will be added to the atrocities it perpetrated along its history. Since 1971, the reactor has never been provided with new cooling
towers, even though the reactor's efficiency has increased since then. Dr. Abu Safiya pointed out that the most dangerous hazards of
Dimona reactor is in the element producing Plutonium, which is used to make nuclear bombs. It's one of the resultant elements of
Uranium DK dissipation, and it can be used to synthesize enriched Uranium. It contains 20% out of the 0.05% Uranium, which is the
highly radioactive substance that can be used in nuclear fission to manufacture either nuclear bombs or atomic fuel. Abu Safiya
warned that there's a regional and long-term threat in Dimona reactor, represented in the
presence of these nuclear bombs in the possession of a country such as Israel, a thing that raises
questions about the inspection visits in Iraq and demanding Iran to be inspected too, as well as surprise inspections by the IAEA
officials, while Israel publicly admit to possessing nuclear weapons. In response to that, Shimon Peres, temporary chairman of the
Israeli Labor party, claimed that there's no comparison between Iraq and Israel, because, according to his claims, Iraq is ruled by a
"dictator", while Israel is a "democratic" state! Right after this statement, Israel used poisonous gases in the city of Khan Younis,
which caused dozens of Palestinian citizens to suffer from unconsciousness and severe illnesses, added to the spasms and hysterical
conditions some of them suffered from after inhaling such internationally-banned gases. Commenting on this incident, Dr. Abu Safiya
said that "we ascertained that these are nerve gases, by analyzing a specimen of the Israeli bombs that didn't burn completely.
Through analysis, we revealed that it is composed of a group of nerve gases, due to which affected citizens suffered from spasms…
this is an evidence against the state that Peres say it's "democratic", which used internationally-banned weapons against the
Palestinian people." Noteworthy that exposure to small amounts of radiation on the long run might pose a serious threat to embryos
and children, as well as causing cancer. Israel Least Damaged Dr. Abu Safiya demanded the IAEA "if they truly seek integrity" to run
checks in order to discover the level of radiation in the region around the Dimona reactor. "If we conduct, for example, a Contour
Survey for all directions to see the level of radiation and who's affected the most, we would find that Israel is the safest, having its
population localities in the north far from the reactor. In addition, 95% of the wind direction in Palestine is northwestern, which is
opposite to the Israeli population localities," Dr. Abu Safiya said. The simplest radiation leak resulting from Dimona reactor is that of
the depleted Uranium, which is of catastrophic implications, as it is considered one of the heavy elements that ruin kidney, liver and
respiratory system functions, leading to death. Only one atom of radioactive Uranium is enough to cause fatal cancer. What About the
Reactor's Waste? As for the waste products resulting from nuclear enrichment operations in Dimona reactor, Dr. Abu Safiya said that
it's buried in areas near the Palestinian Authority controlled territories, as well as Jordanian and Egyptian ones, especially in those
areas where the flow of aquifer water and direction of the wind is not in Israel's favor. A report by Israel's second TV channel revealed
that Dimona reactor's waste products are buried in the areas east of the Al Bureij refugee camp and the town of Deir El Balah.
Currently, the Palestinian Authority for Environment Quality is trying to get a permission to get water analysis equipment inside Gaza
Strip to check these areas, but Israel is refusing. "During the current Intifada, Israelis have buried nearly 50,000 tons of industrial
chemical waste in Gaza Strip, only 30 meters deep, on an area of 5,000 square meters, as they stole the arable soil and moved it
inside Israel and buried industrial waste in its place. This means that there's 150,000 cubic meters of poisonous waste buried in Gaza,
which is a catastrophe. Moreover, Israel isn't affected by this waste because it was buried opposite to the flow of aquifer water," Abu
Safiya narrated. In the West Bank, most of what's buried is in the direction of the eastern hills, because it's not included in the Israelicontrolled lands, unlike the western hills. Now, the eastern hills are polluted with chemical waster and pesticides. Covering Up for
Their Crimes In Ramallah and Hebron, the Palestinian Authority had some basic equipment to measure radiation and environmental
pollution. These equipment didn't only check radiation, but pollution in general, such as soil, water, air and chemical pollution. In this
subject, Dr. Abu Safiya said that small devices were discovered inside helicopters, which is used to regulate the fan's rotation, as well
as providing the pilot with some technical data. These devices, if exposed to a person or played with by children, might lead to death
or blood and gene mutations, as it contains radioactive materials. The Minister added that "after these devices wore out, the Israelis
dump them in the Palestinian controlled lands, and we found three of these devices in Ramallah, one of which was in President Yasser
Arafat's office 'Al Moqata'a'." Such devices were also found during the Israeli invasion of Ramallah City on March 29, 2002, after the
Authority received warnings of suspicious radioactive materials. When specialists from the Authority of Environment Quality reached
the area and checked these parts, they found out that it contained glowing radioactive materials. The instruments those specialists
had indicated that radiation levels exceeded the maximum limit. When the manufacturing company was contacted concerning that,
the company replied that these parts were sold to the Israeli Air Force, and that it's used in helicopters of the type CH53. As soon as
the Israeli occupying forces invaded Ramallah, the radiation checking equipment were destroyed, including those equipment used to
check the radioactive parts. Additionally, IOF blew up the environment laboratory in Hebron and Ramallah, and destroyed all the
equipment by throwing them from the fifth floor. Lately, a cargo of Israeli waste was uncovered in the city of Hebron, which was
composed of 80 barrels, in addition to 120 others in the town of Al Ezareya, Jerusalem district. Furthermore, IOF moved in a cargo of
2,500 tons of radioactive base coarse, and the radiation was further confirmed when it was checked. The shipment was coming from
Italy, and when the Israeli Ministry of Environment discovered that the radiation level of the base coarse was four times higher than
that internationally allowed, the shipment was illegitimately diverted to Gaza City. Unveiling the Hidden The Israeli government has
recently decided to boycott the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) after the latter made a documentary film about the Israeli
nuclear weapons. Sources in the Israeli Foreign Ministry explained that the film is Anti-Semitic –an accusation used by Israel to anyone
or anything that they don't like. The BBC had broadcasted previews of the documentary film, in which the narrator's voice is heard on
the background of the Israeli reactor core in Dimona and the photo of Mordechai Vanunu, who revealed the Israeli nuclear secrets,
and the narrator asks: Which country in the Middle East possesses nuclear weapons without declaring that? Which country in the
Middle East possesses the chemical and biological ability without declaring that? Which country in the world throws away the
revealer of its nuclear secrets in jail for 18 years? As for the producer of the documentary, he interviewed several senior Israeli
officials, including that chairman of the Israeli Labor party, Shimon Peres, who is also considered the godfather of the Israeli nuclear
program, and the man who created the nuclear reactor in Dimona. The producer asked Peres why Iraq aren't allowed to possess
nuclear weapons while Israeli can, and the answer was clearly not satisfactory, and Peres found a claim to justify this question. As for
Mordechai Vanunu, who is staying in Israeli jails since 1986, as the Israeli court indicted him of espionage, treason and selling Israeli
nuclear secrets to the "Sunday Times" British newspaper, and was sentenced to 18 years in prison. Now, he spent 16 years of it.
Vanunu said that the Israeli authorities prevented him from meeting his British lawyers. "Now, Peres won't be able to lie to [Ronald]
Reagan about not owning nuclear weapons. Now everybody knows that," Vanunu said. Israel Protecting Itself Israel surrounds itself
with all means of protection. For example, every Israeli citizen has a pill of "stable Iodine", and can be taken anytime, as it gives
radiation protection. It was revealed that Israeli provided all its citizens with such a pill, under the pretext of fearing an Iraqi nuclear
strike, but the truth confirmed that they dispensed it because of fearing the meltdown of their own reactor, not only Dimona, but the
other research facilities around Israel. On the Palestinian level, the Authority of Environment Quality has tried to take some kind of
protection, and sent a letter to the IAEA and Arab Ministers of Health, considering that the Palestinians are the weakest point and
closest to the reactor, as Palestinian controlled lands are only 50 aerial kilometers away from Dimona reactor, but all these letters
were rejected! Among the examples that might be shown to indicate the amount of damage caused to the Palestinians due to any
nuclear meltdown, the explosion that occurred in the pesticide factory in the city of Al Majdal (Ashkelon), where the stench of the
pesticides reached Palestinian cities and towns due to thermal turnover and wind. Here, Dr. Abu Safiya
pointed out to the
danger that might happen in case an amount of radiation leaks from Dimona reactor, which
will jeopardize the entire surrounding region and on a large geographical scale.
Nuclear meltdown causes extinction – has the force of 100 Hiroshima bombs
Lendman 7 (Stephen, Nuclear Meltdown in Japan, The People’s Voice, 13 March 2011,
http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/TPV3/Voices.php/2011/03/13/nuclear-meltdown-in-japan, da 8-3-13) PC
Reuters said the 1995 Kobe quake caused $100 billion in damage, up to then the most costly ever natural disaster. This time, from
quake and tsunami damage alone, that figure will be dwarfed. Moreover, under
a worst case core meltdown, all bets
are off as the entire region and beyond will be threatened with permanent contamination,
making the most affected areas unsafe to live in. On March 12, Stratfor Global Intelligence issued a "Red Alert:
Nuclear Meltdown at Quake-Damaged Japanese Plant," saying: Fukushima Daiichi "nuclear power plant in Okuma, Japan, appears to
have caused a reactor meltdown." Stratfor downplayed its seriousness, adding that such an event "does not necessarily mean a
nuclear disaster," that already may have happened - the ultimate nightmare short of nuclear winter. According to Stratfor, "(A)s long
as the reactor core, which is specifically designed to contain high levels of heat, pressure and radiation, remains intact, the melted
fuel can be dealt with. If the (core's) breached but the containment facility built around (it) remains intact, the melted fuel can
be....entombed within specialized concrete" as at Chernobyl in 1986. In fact, that disaster killed nearly one million people worldwide
from nuclear radiation exposure. In their book titled, "Chernobyl: Consequences of the Catastrophe for People and the Environment,"
Alexey Yablokov, Vassily Nesterenko and Alexey Nesterenko said: "For the past 23 years, it has been clear that there is a danger
Emissions from this one reactor exceeded a
hundred-fold the radioactive contamination of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki." "No citizen of any country can be assured that he or she can be protected from
radioactive contamination. One nuclear reactor can pollute half the globe. Chernobyl fallout covers the
greater than nuclear weapons concealed within nuclear power.
entire Northern Hemisphere." Stratfor explained that if Fukushima's floor cracked, "it is highly likely that the melting fuel will burn
through (its) containment system and enter the ground. This has never happened before," at least not reported. If now occurring,
"containment goes from being merely dangerous, time consuming and expensive to nearly impossible," making the quake,
aftershocks, and tsunamis seem mild by comparison. Potentially, millions of lives will be jeopardized. Japanese officials said
Fukushima's reactor container wasn't breached. Stratfor and others said it was, making the potential calamity far worse than
reported. Japan's Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) said the explosion at Fukushima's Saiichi No. 1 facility could only have
been caused by a core meltdown. In fact, 3 or more reactors are affected or at risk. Events are fluid and developing, but remain very
serious. The possibility of an extreme catastrophe can't be discounted. Moreover, independent nuclear safety analyst John Large told
Al Jazeera that by venting radioactive steam from the inner reactor to the outer dome, a reaction may have occurred, causing the
explosion. "When I look at the size of the explosion," he said, "it is my opinion that there could be a very large leak (because) fuel
continues to generate heat." Already, Fukushima way exceeds Three Mile Island that experienced a partial core meltdown in Unit 2.
Finally it was brought under control, but coverup and denial concealed full details until much later. According
to anti-nuclear
the
cooling system fails (apparently it has at two or more plants), the super-heated radioactive fuel rods will
melt, and (if so) you could conceivably have an explosion," that, in fact, occurred. As a result, massive
radiation releases may follow, impacting the entire region. "It could be, literally, an apocalyptic
event. The reactor could blow." If so, Russia, China, Korea and most parts of Western Asia will be affected. Many
activist Harvey Wasserman, Japan's quake fallout may cause nuclear disaster, saying: "This is a very serious situation. If
thousands will die, potentially millions under a worse case scenario, including far outside East Asia. Moreover, at least five reactors
are at risk. Already, a 20-mile wide radius was evacuated. What happened in Japan can occur anywhere. Yet Obama's proposed
budget includes $36 billion for new reactors, a shocking disregard for global safety. Calling Fukushima an "apocalyptic event,"
Wasserman said "(t)hese nuclear plants have to be shut," let alone budget billions for new ones. It's unthinkable, he said. If a similar
disaster struck California, nuclear fallout would affect all America, Canada, Mexico, Central America, and parts of South America.
Nuclear Power: A Technology from Hell Nuclear expert Helen Caldicott agrees, telling this writer by phone that a potential regional
catastrophe is unfolding. Over 30 years ago, she warned of its inevitability. Her 2006 book titled, "Nuclear Power is Not the Answer"
explained that contrary to government and industry propaganda, even during normal operations, nuclear power generation causes
significant discharges of greenhouse gas emissions, as well as hundreds of thousands of curies of deadly radioactive gases and other
radioactive elements into the environment every year. Moreover, nuclear
plants are atom bomb factories. A 1000
megawatt reactor produces 500 pounds of plutonium annually. Only 10 are needed for a bomb
able to devastate a large city, besides causing permanent radiation contamination. Nuclear Power
not Cleaner and Greener Just the opposite, in fact. Although a nuclear power plant releases no carbon dioxide (CO2), the primary
greenhouse gas, a vast infrastructure is required. Called the nuclear fuel cycle, it uses large amounts of fossil fuels. Each cycle stage
exacerbates the problem, starting with the enormous cost of mining and milling uranium, needing fossil fuel to do it. How then to
dispose of mill tailings, produced in the extraction process. It requires great amounts of greenhouse emitting fuels to remediate.
Moreover, other nuclear cycle steps also use fossil fuels, including converting uranium to hexafluoride gas prior to enrichment, the
enrichment process itself, and conversion of enriched uranium hexafluoride gas to fuel pellets. In addition, nuclear power plant
construction, dismantling and cleanup at the end of their useful life require large amounts of energy. There's more, including
contaminated cooling water, nuclear waste, its handling, transportation and disposal/storage, problems so far unresolved. Moreover,
nuclear power costs and risks are so enormous that the industry couldn't exist without billions of government subsidized funding
annually. The Unaddressed Human Toll from Normal Operations Affected are uranium miners, industry workers, and potentially
everyone living close to nuclear reactors that routinely emit harmful radioactive releases daily, harming human health over time,
causing illness and early death. The link between radiation exposure and disease is irrefutable, depending only on the amount of
cumulative exposure over time, Caldicott saying: "If a regulatory gene is biochemically altered by radiation exposure, the cell will
begin to incubate cancer, during a 'latent period of carcinogenesis,' lasting from two to sixty years." In fact, a single gene mutation can
prove fatal. No amount of radiation exposure is safe. Moreover, when combined with about 80,000 commonly used toxic chemicals
and contaminated GMO foods and ingredients, it causes 80% of known cancers, putting everyone at risk everywhere. Further, the
combined effects of allowable radiation exposure, uranium mining, milling operations, enrichment, and fuel fabrication can be
devastating to those exposed. Besides the insoluble waste storage/disposal problem, nuclear accidents happen and catastrophic ones
are inevitable. Inevitable Meltdowns Caldicott and other experts agree they're certain in one or more of the hundreds of reactors
operating globally, many years after their scheduled shutdown dates unsafely. Combined with human error, imprudently minimizing
operating costs, internal sabotage, or the effects of a high-magnitude quake and/or tsunami, an eventual catastrophe is certain. Aging
plants alone, like Japan's Fukushima facility, pose unacceptable risks based on their record of near-misses and meltdowns, resulting
from human error, old equipment, shoddy maintenance, and poor regulatory oversight. However, under optimum operating
conditions, all nuclear plants are unsafe. Like any machine or facility, they're vulnerable to breakdowns, that if serious enough can
cause enormous, possibly catastrophic, harm. Add nuclear war to the mix, also potentially inevitable according to some experts, by
accident or intent, including Steven Starr saying: "Only a single failure of nuclear deterrence is required to start a nuclear war," the
consequences of which "would be profound, potentially killing "tens of millions of people, and caus(ing) long-term, catastrophic
disruptions of the global climate and massive destruction of Earth's protective ozone layer. The result would be a global nuclear
famine that could kill up to one billion people." Worse still is nuclear winter, the ultimate nightmare, able to end all life if it happens.
It's nuclear proliferation's unacceptable risk, a clear and present danger as long as nuclear weapons and commercial dependency
exist. In 1946, Enstein knew it, saying: "Our world faces a crisis as yet unperceived by those possessing the power to make great
decisions for good and evil. The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and thus we drift
toward unparalleled catastrophe." He envisioned two choices - abolish all forms of nuclear power or face extinction. No one listened.
The Doomsday Clock keeps ticking.
Scenario 2 is the Senkaku Islands
China is acquiring drones to confront Japan over territorial disputes in the
Senkaku islands – guarantees war.
CBS 5-3 (China emerges as new force in drone warfare, Associated Press, 3 May 2013, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_16257582699/china-emerges-as-new-force-in-drone-warfare/, da 8-3-13) PC
Though China claims its military posture is entirely defensive, its navy and civilian maritime services
have engaged in repeated standoffs with ships from other nations in the South China and East
China seas. India, meanwhile, says Chinese troops have set up camp almost 20 kilometers (12 miles)
into Indian-claimed territory.¶ It isn't yet known exactly what China's latest drones are capable of, because, like most
Chinese equipment, they remain untested in battle.¶ The military and associated aerospace firms have offered little information,
although in an interview last month with the official Xinhua News Agency, Yang Baikui, chief designer at plane maker COSIC, said
Chinese drones were closing the gap but still needed to progress in half a dozen major areas, from airframe design to digital linkups.¶
Executives at COSIC and drone makers ASN, Avic, and the 611 Institute declined to be interviewed by The Associated Press, citing their
military links. The Defense Ministry's latest report on the status of the military released in mid-April made no mention of drones, and
spokesman Yang Yujun made only the barest acknowledgement of their existence in response to a question.¶ "Drones are a new hightech form of weaponry employed and used by many militaries around the world," Yang said. "China's armed forces are developing
weaponry and equipment for the purpose of upholding territorial integrity, national security and world peace. It will pose no threat to
any country."¶ Drones are already patrolling China's borders, and a navy drone was deployed to the western province of Sichuan to
provide aerial surveillance following last month's deadly earthquake there.¶ They may also soon
be appearing over
China's maritime claims, including Japanese-controlled East China Sea islands that China
considers its own. That could sharpen tensions in an area where Chinese and Japanese patrol
boats already confront each other on a regular basis and Japan frequently scrambles fighters to
tail Chinese manned aircraft.¶ Retired Maj. Gen. Peng Guoqian told state media in January that drones
were already being used to photograph and conduct surveillance over the islands, called Diaoyu by China
and Senkaku by Japan.¶ The Pentagon says Chinese drones could boost the effectiveness of long-range radar in monitoring activity
and locating targets in the western Pacific far from the Chinese coast. Their missions could include guiding home an anti-ship ballistic
missile known in military circles as a "carrier killer," the Pentagon said in its 2012 report on China's military.
Senkaku disputes go nuclear.
Emmot, 6/4/2008 (Bill – editor of the Economist, Power rises in the east, The Australian, p.
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/arts/power-rises-in-the-east/story-e6frg8px1111116460128)
As well as knitting them, however, this drama is also grinding together Asian powers that had previously kept a strict economic and political separation from one another.
China, India and Japan are bumping against each other because their national interests are
overlapping and in part competing. Each is suspicious of the others' motives and intentions and all three hope to get
their own way in Asia and further afield. To have three great powers at the same time may be unprecedented for Asia but it is not for the world. There was a similar situation in
Europe during the 19th century, when Britain, France, Russia, Austria and, until German unification, Prussia, existed in an uneasy balance in which none was dominant and none
was entirely comfortable, but which nevertheless coincided with a period during which Europe prospered and became firmly established as the world's dominant region. Whether
you consider Europe's 19th-century experience with balance-of-power politics as a good or bad omen for Asia depends on how long a sweep of history you consider and on what
you think are the most crucial differences between modern times and the world of 150 years ago. If you take a long sweep, then the precedent is bad, since Europe's power
balance ended in two devastating world wars. On the other hand, it kept the peace on the continent for about half a century, which would count as an optimistic prospect today.
nuclear weapons, public opinion, international law, instant communication and
do not rule it out altogether. The barriers against colonial or quasi-colonial ambitions are higher still.
China and India may battle for influence over Burma, but neither is likely to invade it and turn it into a colony. Nevertheless, Asia is piled high with
historical bitterness , unresolved territorial disputes , potential flashpoints and strategic
competition that could readily ignite. There are at least five known flashpoints where it is
already clear that any could involve the major powers : the Sino-Indian border and Tibet, North and South
Korea, the East China Sea and the Senkaku-Diaoyutai islands, Taiwan and Pakistan.
Today the barriers against the use of war as a tool of national policy are far higher:
transparency all militate against conflict, though they
Introducing restrictions is the only way to stop drone proliferation that prevents
instability.
Roberts 13 (Kristin, When the Whole World Has Drones, National Journal, 21 March 2013,
http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/when-the-whole-world-has-drones-20130321, da 8-1-13) PC
The proliferation of drone technology has moved well beyond the control of the U nited S tates
government and its closest allies. The aircraft are too easy to obtain, with barriers to entry on the
production side crumbling too quickly to place limits on the spread of a technology that
promises to transform warfare on a global scale. Already, more than 75 countries have remote piloted aircraft.
More than 50 nations are building a total of nearly a thousand types. At its last display at a trade show in Beijing, China showed off 25
different unmanned aerial vehicles. Not toys or models, but real flying machines.¶ It’s a classic and common phase in the life cycle of a
military innovation: An
advanced country and its weapons developers create a tool, and then others
learn how to make their own. But what makes this case rare, and dangerous, is the powerful combination of
efficiency and lethality spreading in an environment lacking internationally accepted guidelines on
legitimate use. This technology is snowballing through a global arena where the main
precedent for its application is the one set by the U nited S tates; it’s a precedent Washington does not want
anyone following.¶ America, the world’s leading democracy and a country built on a legal and moral framework unlike any other, has
adopted a war-making process that too often bypasses its traditional, regimented, and rigorously overseen military in favor of a secret
program never publicly discussed, based on legal advice never properly vetted. The Obama administration has
used its
executive power to refuse or outright ignore requests by congressional overseers, and it has
resisted monitoring by federal courts.¶ To implement this covert program, the administration has adopted a tool that
lowers the threshold for lethal force by reducing the cost and risk of combat. This still-expanding counterterrorism
use of drones to kill people, including its own citizens, outside of traditionally defined battlefields and
established protocols for warfare, has given friends and foes a green light to employ these
aircraft in extraterritorial operations that could not only affect relations between the nationstates involved but also destabilize entire regions and potentially upset geopolitical order .¶ “I
don’t think there is enough transparency and justification so that we remove not the secrecy, but the mystery of these things.”—
Dennis Blair, former director of national intelligence¶ Hyperbole? Consider
this: Iran, with the approval of Damascus, carries
out a lethal strike on anti-Syrian forces inside Syria; Russia picks off militants tampering with oil
and gas lines in Ukraine or Georgia; Turkey arms a U.S.-provided Predator to kill Kurdish militants in
northern Iraq who it believes are planning attacks along the border. Label the targets as terrorists, and in each
case, Tehran, Moscow, and Ankara may point toward Washington and say, we learned it by
watching you. In Pakistan, Yemen, and Afghanistan.¶ This is the unintended consequence of American drone warfare. For all of
the attention paid to the drone program in recent weeks—about Americans on the target list (there are none at this writing) and the
executive branch’s legal authority to kill by drone outside war zones (thin, by officials’ own private admission)—what
goes
undiscussed is Washington’s deliberate failure to establish clear and demonstrable rules for
itself that would at minimum create a globally relevant standard for delineating between
legitimate and rogue uses of one of the most awesome military robotics capabilities of this generation.
Pakistan Advantage
Drone strikes are increasing in the status quo
Silverstein 2013 (Andrew, Undergraduate Political Science Major at the University of
Pennsylvania, Flying Combat Drones, Within the Bounds of International Humanitarian Law, May
2013, Sound Politicks, official Undergraduate Journal of Political Science at the University of
Pennsylvania, Volume 19, Spring 2013,
https://www.sas.upenn.edu/polisci/sites/www.sas.upenn.edu.polisci/files/Sound%20PoliticksVolume%20XIX-Spring%202013-Final.pdf#page=10, page 14 )
These are standards that can be applied not only to drones in Pakistan but also in Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, and Somalia, bringing
UCAVs within the confines of the law. By
all indications, the United States drone program will continue on
a course of growth. They are here to stay. CIA Director, Leon Panetta answered the
dubiousness surrounding the drone program saying, “Very frankly, it’s the only game in town.”
Their popularity is growing, especially as domestic American support for foreign military
influence deteriorates. The argument presented may beg the question of whether, if kept at the status quo, the program
ought to end in Pakistan
Continuation of drone strikes radicalize the populace and weaken an already
unstable Pakistani government
Innocent 9 (Malou, foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute ,“The US Must Reassess Its Drone
Policy” Brookings Institution, August 25, 2009,
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/us-must-reassess-its-drone-policy?print NB)
America’s interests lie in ensuring the virus of anti-American radicalism does not infect the rest of the region. Yet Washington’s
attempts
to stabilize Afghanistan help destabilize Pakistan , because its actions serve as a recruiting tool
for Pakistani Taliban militants. Just as one would not kill a fly with a sledgehammer, using
overwhelming firepower to kill a single insurgent creates collateral damage that can recruit 50
more. Military force against insurgents must be applied precisely and discriminately. On the ground, Pakistani security forces lack training,
equipment, and communication gear to carry out a low-intensity counterinsurgency. But drones provide a poor substitute if the
goal is to engage rather than alienate the other side.¶ A better strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan is for the United
States to focus on limiting cross-border movement by supporting local Pakistani security forces with a small number of US Special Forces personnel. To
improve fighting capabilities and enhance cooperation, Washington and Islamabad must increase the number of military-to-military training programs to
help hone Pakistan’s counterterrorism capabilities and serve as a confidence-building measure to lessen the Pakistan Army’s tilt toward radicalism. ¶
Ending drone strikes is no panacea for Pakistan’s array of problems. But continuing those strikes
will certainly deepen the
multiple challenges the country faces. Most Pakistanis do not passively accept American
actions, and officials in Islamabad cannot afford to be perceived as putting Washington’s
interests above those of their own people. Long-term success in both Afghanistan and Pakistan depends on
the people’s repudiation of extremism. Continued US actions add more fuel to violent religious
radicalism; it is time to reassess both US tactics and objectives in the region.
Radical control of Pakistan ensures Indo-Pak war
Markey 10 (Daniel, Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan and South Asia at CFR, “Terrorism and
Indo-Pakistani Escalation” Council on Foreign Relations, CONTINGENCY PLANNING
MEMORANDUM NO. 6, January 2010,
http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/27251/1/Terrorism%20and%20IndoPakistani%20escalation.pdf?1. NB)
The threat of another Mumbai-type attack is undeniable ; numerous Pakistan-based groups
remain ¶ motivated and able to strike Indian targets. Many of these groups have incentives to
act as spoilers, ¶ whether to disrupt efforts to improve Indo-Pakistani relations or to distract Islamabad from counterterror
crackdowns at home. Thus the immediate risk of terrorism may actually increase if New Delhi ¶ and Islamabad
make progress on resolving their differences or if Pakistan-based terrorists are effectively backed into a
corner. ¶ Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed are the two terrorists groups that ¶ have
proven themselves the most capable and motivated to carry out attacks in India. Al-Qaeda has ¶
historically focused its efforts outside India, but if the group’s leadership feels threatened in the Pakistan/Afghanistan border areas, it
might direct and assist regional proxies to attack India as a way to ¶ ignite a distracting IndoPakistani confrontation. Other regional terrorist groups, including those ¶ based in India, are
improving their capacity to inflict mass-casualty violence, but because these ¶ groups lack clear-cut
connections to Pakistan-based organizations, their attacks are far less likely to ¶ spark another crisis between India and Pakistan. ¶
The
more clearly a terrorist attack can be identified as having originated in Pakistan, the more ¶
likely India is to retaliate militarily. Groups that India perceives to have closer links with Pakistan’s ¶ military and
intelligence establishment—especially LeT—are more likely to inspire retaliation against ¶ official Pakistani state targets than those
that are perceived as more autonomous, such as al-Qaeda.
Indo-Pak war guarantees extinction.
Hundley 12 (Tom Hundley is senior editor at the Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting. This article
for Foreign Policy is part of the Pulitzer Center's Gateway project on nuclear security. Race to the
End http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/05/race_to_the_end?page=0,3)
The arms race could make a loose nuke more likely . After all, Pakistan's assurances that its
nuclear arsenal is safe and secure rest heavily on the argument that its warheads and their
delivery systems have been uncoupled and stored separately in heavily guarded facilities. It
would be very difficult for a group of mutinous officers to assemble the necessary protocols for a launch
and well nigh impossible for a band of terrorists to do so. But that calculus changes with the
deployment of mobile battlefield weapons . The weapons themselves, no longer stored in heavily guarded bunkers,
would be far more exposed. Nevertheless, military analysts from both countries still say that a nuclear exchange triggered
by miscalculation, miscommunication, or panic is far more likely than terrorists stealing a weapon -- and,
significantly, that the odds of such an exchange increase with the deployment of battlefield
nukes. As these ready-to-use weapons are maneuvered closer to enemy lines, the chain of command and control
would be stretched and more authority necessarily delegated to field officers. And, if they have
weapons designed to repel a conventional attack, there is obviously a reasonable chance they will use them for that purpose. " It
lowers the threshold ," said Hoodbhoy. "The idea that tactical nukes could be used against Indian tanks on Pakistan's
territory creates the kind of atmosphere that greatly shortens the distance to apocalypse." Both sides speak of the
possibility of a limited nuclear war. But even those who speak in these terms seem to understand that this is
fantasy
once started, a nuclear exchange would be almost impossible to limit or contain. "The
only move that you have control over is your first move; you have no control over the nth move in a nuclear
exchange," said Carnegie's Tellis. The first launch would create hysteria; communication lines would
break down, and events would rapidly cascade out of control. Some of the world's most
densely populated cities could find themselves under nuclear attack, and an estimated 20
-- that
million people could die almost immediately . What's more, the resulting firestorms would put 5
million to 7 million metric tons of smoke into the upper atmosphere , according to a new model
developed by climate scientists at Rutgers University and the University of Colorado. Within weeks, skies around the
world would be permanently overcast, and the condition vividly described by Carl Sagan as " nuclear winter"
would be upon us . The darkness would likely last about a decade. The Earth's temperature
would drop, agriculture around the globe would collapse, and a billion or more humans who
already live on the margins of subsistence could starve. This is the real nuclear threat that is
festering in South Asia . It is a threat to all countries, including the United States, not just India
and Pakistan. Both sides acknowledge it, but neither seems able to slow their dangerous race
to annihilation .
Drone Strikes lead to increased Pakistani terrorism and instability
Boyle 10 (Michael J, Professor of Political Science at La Salle University, “Do Counterterrorism
and Counterinsurgency Go Together?” International Affairs 86:2 March 2010,
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2010.00885.x/pdf pp. 349-50 NB)
The indirect costs are numerous. It is hard to measure what the US loses from¶ the strikes, but it is obvious that it gains
no intelligence from dead (as opposed to¶ captured) operatives. It also loses the moral high ground if the strikes accidentally¶ kill high
numbers of civilians. But perhaps
the greatest indirect cost is its¶ contribution to instability in
Pakistan . The pressure placed on Al-Qaeda and its¶ affiliates has accelerated the crisis facing
the Pakistani government and encouraged¶ local militant networks (including ethnic separatist
and tribal groups) to form¶ tactical and ideological alliances with Al-Qaeda, thus magnifying the
threat they¶ pose. As a result, the US is now stumbling into a war across South Asia with¶ a growing
number of militant Islamist networks, many of whom have strong¶ familial and tribal ties with the local
population and stronger regenerative capabilities¶ than Al-Qaeda. The creeping expansion of the target set
has transformed a¶ set of tactics originally reserved for counterterrorism operations into a tool for¶ fighting an ever-widening circle of
insurgents in Pakistan. The dilemma is that,¶ while the counterterrorism benefits of these operations are clear, in adding to¶ the ranks
of its enemies the
US now faces a more durable network of militants that will fuel the Taleban’s
insurgency against the United States, Pakistan and the¶ Karzai government.
Spreading Pakistani Insurgency Risks Nuclear Terrorism and War
Pitt 09 (William, NYT bestselling author of War on Iraq: What Team Bush Doesn’t Want you to
Know, Editor and columnist at truthout.org, May 8, “Unstable Pakistan Threatens The World,”
http://www.arabamericannews.com/news/?mod=article&cat=commentary&article=2183)
The United States, already embroiled in a war against Taliban forces in Afghanistan, must now face the possibility that
Pakistan could collapse under the mounting threat of Taliban forces there. Military and diplomatic advisers
to President Obama, uncertain how best to proceed, now face one of the great nightmare scenarios of our time. "Recent militant gains in Pakistan,"
reported The New York Times on Monday, "have so alarmed the White House that the national security adviser, Gen. James L. Jones, described the
situation as 'one of the very most serious problems we face.'" "Security
was deteriorating rapidly," reported The Washington Post on
Monday, "particularly in the mountains along the Afghan border that harbor al-Qaeda and the Taliban, intelligence
chiefs reported, and there were signs that those groups were working with indigenous extremists in Pakistan's populous Punjabi heartland. The Pakistani
government was mired in political bickering. The army, still fixated on its historical adversary India, remained ill-equipped and unwilling to throw its full
weight into the counterinsurgency fight. But despite the threat the intelligence conveyed, Obama has only limited options for dealing with it. Anti-
American feeling in Pakistan is high, and a U.S. combat presence is prohibited. The United States is fighting Pakistan-based
extremists by proxy, through an army over which it has little control, in alliance with a government in which it has little confidence." ¶ It is believed
Pakistan is currently in possession of between 60 and 100 nuclear weapons. Because Pakistan's
stability is threatened by the wide swath of its population that shares ethnic, cultural and religious
connections to the fundamentalist Islamic populace of Afghanistan, fears over what could
happen to those nuclear weapons if the Pakistani government collapses are very real.¶ " As the
insurgency
of the Taliban and Al Qaeda
spreads in Pakistan ," reported the Times last week, "senior American officials
say
are increasingly concerned about new vulnerabilities for Pakistan's nuclear arsenal ,
including the potential for militants to snatch a weapon in transport or to insert sympathizers
into laboratories or fuel-production facilities. In public, the administration has only hinted at those concerns, repeating the
they
formulation that the Bush administration used: that it has faith in the Pakistani Army. But that cooperation, according to officials who would not speak
for attribution because of the sensitivity surrounding the exchanges between Washington and Islamabad, has been sharply limited when the subject has
turned to the vulnerabilities in the Pakistani nuclear infrastructure."¶ "The prospect of turmoil in Pakistan sends shivers up the spines of those U.S.
officials charged with keeping tabs on foreign nuclear weapons," reported Time Magazine last month. "Pakistan is thought to possess about 100 — the
U.S. isn't sure of the total, and may not know where all of them are. Still, if Pakistan collapses, the U.S. military is primed to enter the country and secure
as many of those weapons as it can, according to U.S. officials. Pakistani officials insist their personnel safeguards are stringent, but a sleeper cell could
cause big trouble, U.S. officials say."¶ In other words, a
shaky Pakistan spells trouble for everyone, especially if America loses
the footrace to secure those weapons in the event of the worst-case scenario . If Pakistani militants ever succeed in toppling
the government , several very dangerous events could happen at once. Nuclear-armed India could be galvanized
into military action
as could nuclear-armed China or nuclear-armed Russia . If the Pakistani
specter (or reality) of loose
nukes falling into the hands of terrorist organizations could place the entire world on a collision
course with unimaginable disaster.¶ We have all been paying a great deal of attention to Iraq and Afghanistan, and rightly so. The
of some kind,
government does fall, and all those Pakistani nukes are not immediately accounted for and secured, the
developing situation in Pakistan, however, needs to be placed immediately on the front burner. The Obama administration appears to be gravely serious
about addressing the situation. So should we all.
Terrorism Advantage
Drone strikes fuel terrorism: revenge, recruitment and civilian backlash--outweighs any benefit
Boyle 2013 (Michael J., PhD and asst professor of political science @ La Salle University, “The
Costs and Consequences of Drone Warfare”, International Affairs, Volume 89, Number 1, January
2013,
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2013/89_1/89
_1Boyle.pdf, p. 9-10)
The second major claim for the effectiveness of drone strikes is based on ¶ their ability to kill
HVTs, defined as key operational and political leaders of ¶ Al-Qaeda and related groups. From the
campaign trail to his time in office, President Obama has consistently maintained that he would not
hesitate to use lethal ¶ force to remove leading figures in Al-Qaeda.44 Yet the actual record of
drone ¶ strikes suggests that forces under his command have killed far more lower-ranked ¶
operatives associated with other Islamist movements and civilians than HVTs ¶ from Al-Qaeda. Peter
Bergen has estimated that the drone strikes have killed 49 ¶ high-ranking ‘militant’ leaders
since 2004, only 2 per cent of the total number ¶ of deaths from drone strikes.45 The remaining
98 per cent of drone strikes have ¶ been directed against lower-ranking operatives, only some
of whom are engaged ¶ in direct hostilities against the United States, and civilians. Many of
these actors ¶ pose no direct or imminent threats, but rather speculative ones, such as
individuals who might some day attack the US or its interests abroad.46 Even as President
Obama has increased the number of drone strikes, the number of HVTs ¶ killed has ‘slipped or
barely increased’.47 In 2010, a mid-ranking Haqqani network ¶ fighter concluded that ‘it seems they really want to kill
everyone, not just the ¶ leaders’.48 The decision to expand targeted killing to this scale and take aim at ¶
even low-ranking ‘foot soldiers’ is unprecedented and sets the Obama administration’s drone
programme apart in both scale and character from targeted killing ¶ operations elsewhere.49The
extent to which the Obama administration has targeted lower-ranked ¶ operatives is not without consequences. Many of these
lower-ranked operatives ¶ are densely connected to local tribal and clan structures. Their
deaths in drone ¶ strikes may lead those connected to them by family and tribal ties to seek
revenge, ¶ thus swelling the ranks of Al-Qaeda and its affiliate groups. As David Kilcullen ¶ and Andrew
Exum have argued, ‘every one of these dead noncombatants represents an alienated family, a new
desire for revenge, and more recruits for a militant ¶ movement that has grown exponentially
even as drone strikes have increased’.50¶ Moreover, the vast increase in the number of deaths
of low-ranking operatives ¶ has deepened political resistance to the US programme in Pakistan,
Yemen and ¶ other countries. For example, while Pakistani officials have supported and even ¶
celebrated drone strikes against high-ranking operatives such as Baitullah Mehsud, ¶ they have
taken a dimmer view of CIA attempts to kill mere foot soldiers with ¶ similar strikes.51 Such strikes
tend to generate more political pressure on the ¶ Pakistani government to oppose the US than strikes against well-known figures ¶
whose leadership in militant networks was indisputable.
Pakistani opposition ¶ leader Imran Khan has pointed
directly to the deaths of civilians and low-level ¶ operatives as the reason why, if elected to
office, he would order the air force to ¶ shoot down US drones.52 A similar dynamic has occurred in Yemen,
where US ¶ drone strikes have driven more civilians into the ranks of Al-Qaeda and strengthened local insurgent forces challenging
the Yemeni government.53
Empirics prove--- drone strikes increase the number AND lethality of attacks
Morehouse 11, (Matthew A. Morehouse, University of Nebraska – Lincoln, Department of
Political Science—Thesis, Hellfire and Grey Drones: An Empirical Examination of the Effectiveness
of Targeted Killings, May 1, 2011, http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/poliscitheses/8/)
The first regression ran measured the influence of targeted killings (lagged by one week) upon the
number of terrorist attacks (in the week following the targeted killing) (See Tables 14-16). The variables
for Ramadan, US president, and season were added as controls in the regression. The R-square value of the model was .464, meaning
that 46.4% of the variation in the number of terrorist attacks per week is explained by the variables entered into this model. The B
coefficients for this regression found several interesting results. For
the lagged targeted killing variable, it was
found that for every one-unit increase in targeted killings per week, there was an increase of
over 5 terrorist attacks in the following week. This result was statistically significant, with the pvalue being .000. However, the scatter plot for this model shows that there is an outlier, which was the 51st week of 2009, in which
11 targeted killings occurred. In regards to the seasonal variable, it appears that the further into the year the season under
observation is, there are approximately 3 less targeted killings per week. This variable is statistically significant, with the p-value being
.003. The results for the Ramadan were statistically insignificant, with the p-value equaling .586. Finally,
the presidential
variable suggests that, under the Obama administration, it was likely that there would be an
increase of 43 terrorist attacks per week compared to the Bush administration. This variable was statistically
significant, with the p-value being .000. A second regression was run, in which the sole change from the previous
model was in the dependent variable. In this model, the number of fatalities in terrorist attacks served as the
dependent variable (See Tables 17-19). In this case, the R-square for the model was .326, meaning that 32.6% of the variation
of the dependent variable was explained by changes in the independent variables under observation. Several interesting observations
can be made from these data. For example, the
lagged targeted killing model found that for every one-unit
increase in targeted killings in a week resulted in approximately 8 more fatalities from terrorist
attacks in the following week. This variable was statistically significant, with a p-value of .000. However, as in the previous
model, the incident in which there were 11 targeted killings in the 51st week of 2009 serves as an outlier once more. Again, the
seasonal variable was statistically significant, with every increase in the season of the year correlating with a decrease of
approximately 3 fatalities in terrorist attacks per week. This variable was statistically significant, with a p-value of .044. The Ramadan
variable was again statistically insignificant, with a p-value of .122. The presidential variable found that, under
the Obama
administration, there was likely to be approximately 58 more fatalities from terrorist attacks
per week, than under the Bush administration. This variable was statistically significant, with a p-value of .000.
No turns, decapitation is a failing strategy--- other groups fill in and the original
ones just go elsewhere
Boyle 2013 (Michael J., PhD and asst professor of political science @ La Salle University, “The
Costs and Consequences of Drone Warfare”, International Affairs, Volume 89, Number 1, January
2013,
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2013/89_1/89
_1Boyle.pdf, p. 11-12)
Yet the
evidence that drones inhibit the operational latitude of terrorist groups ¶ and push them
towards collapse is more ambiguous than these accounts suggest.57¶ In Pakistan, the ranks of
Al-Qaeda have been weakened significantly by drone ¶ strikes, but its members have hardly
given up the fight. Hundreds of Al-Qaeda ¶ members have fled to battlefields in Yemen,
Somalia, Iraq, Syria and elsewhere.58¶ These operatives bring with them the skills, experience
and weapons needed to ¶ turn these wars into fiercer, and perhaps longer-lasting, conflicts.59 In
other words, ¶ pressure from drone strikes may have scattered Al-Qaeda militants, but it does not ¶
neutralize them. Many Al-Qaeda members have joined forces with local insurgent groups in
Syria, Mali and elsewhere, thus deepening the conflicts in these ¶ states.60 In other cases, drones
have fuelled militant movements and reordered ¶ the alliances and positions of local
combatants. Following the escalation of drone ¶ strikes in Yemen, the desire for revenge drove
hundreds, if not thousands, of ¶ Yemeni tribesmen to join Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP), as well ¶ as smaller, indigenous militant networks.61 Even in Pakistan, where the drone
¶ strikes have weakened Al-Qaeda and some of its affiliated movements, they have ¶ not
cleared the battlefield. In Pakistan, other Islamist groups have moved into the ¶ vacuum left by the
absence of Al-Qaeda, and some of these groups, particularly ¶ the cluster of groups arrayed
under the name Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), ¶ now pose a greater threat to the Pakistani
government than Al-Qaeda ever did.62¶ Drone strikes have distinct political effects on the
ecology of militant networks ¶ in these countries, leaving some armed groups in a better
position while crippling ¶ others. It is this dynamic that has accounted for the US decision gradually to ¶ expand the list of
groups targeted by drone strikes, often at the behest of Pakistan. ¶ Far from concentrating exclusively on Al-Qaeda, the US has begun
to use drone ¶ strikes against Pakistan’s enemies, including the TTP, the Mullah Nazir group, ¶ the Haqqani network and other smaller
Islamist groups.63 The
result is that the ¶ US has weakened its principal enemy, Al-Qaeda, but only at
the cost of earning a ¶ new set of enemies, some of whom may find a way to strike back.64 The
cost of ¶ this expansion of targets came into view when the TTP inspired and trained Faisal ¶
Shahzad to launch his attack on Times Square.65 Similarly, the TTP claimed to be ¶ involved, possibly with AlQaeda, in attacking a CIA outpost at Camp Chapman ¶ in the Khost region of Afghanistan on 30 December 2009.66
Independently, targeted killing destroys intelligence gathering--- alienates our
allies
Anderson 9, (Kenneth Anderson, Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American
University, and Research Fellow, The Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Targeted Killing in
U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law, SSRN, May 11, 2009,
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1415070)
The elephant in the room, so to speak, however, is the standard by which American forces select targets in the first place. This is the
core objection to the whole practice, for example, raised by UN special rapporteurs and many others—on what basis does the U.S.
conclude that this person is a terrorist? While the substantive standard governing conduct to evaluate a potential targeted killing in
relation to innocent third party collateral damage is best drawn from standards in the law of IHL armed conflict, target selection
in targeted killing is an intelligence matter. And although military intelligence has much to offer in the way of
methodology, military law has much less so. Yet the intelligence community, for many reasons, has had only
limited success in picking targets since 9/11—although the quality of target selection in the current campaign of
Predator strikes by the CIA in Pakistan has clearly gone up. Congress can impose more demands for information to the intelligence
committees and greater monitoring of target selection either before or after an attack, but it faces great limits in doing more than
that. Congress cannot make the intelligence judgments.¶ The concerns over targeted killings are not, of course, limited to targeting
and collateral damage questions. Other states, particularly friendly
and allied states, have excellent reason to
view these policies with political alarm—quite apart from their abstract legal assessments of them. Britain, for
example, has a certain number of radical imams who appear directly to influence their followers, among other things, to take up jihad
in Pakistan and Afghanistan against the U.S. and NATO allies.97 In purely hypothetical terms, the U.S. might do well to target and kill
them in Britain. While the U.S. is obviously not going to do that, it will target al Qaeda with Yemen’s consent in Yemen, and there are
circumstances in which it will target terrorist suspects without territorial state consent.¶ What we seek, that being the case, are policy
standards that distinguish between two distinct, prototypical situations. On the one hand, policy should unashamedly permit the use
of Predators and Hellfire missiles against the leadership of a terrorist organization under, for example, the following conditions: The
group poses a grave threat to the United States; its leadership is safely ensconced in a failed state somewhere; a state of armed
conflict within the meaning of IHL may or may not exist; seeking to obtain custody or extradition or other “ordinary” measures will
not only be unavailing, it will tip off the targets; the administration has concluded that it cannot undertake another full scale military
assault, least of all for the purpose of killing a discrete, small group of terrorists. This describes Afghanistan under the Taliban, of
course, but it captures (as the Obama campaign correctly recognized) even more accurately Pakistan and its trajectory today, with all
the policy unpleasantness that it implies.¶ On the other hand, we certainly want a rule that prohibits the 1978 “poisoned-tip
umbrella” killing of Bulgarian defector Georgi Markov by Bulgarian State Security agents on the streets of London98 or the stilldisputed account of the 2006 poisoning of former Russian FSB agent Alexander Litvinenko, also in London, by alleged Russian
government agents.99 These latter cases would surely be covered by the assassination ban were they hypothetical U.S. operations,
not to mention not remotely cases of “self- defense”—though the cases of radical imams who are operationally part of al Qaeda
conceivably might be. The distinction has to be more meaningful, obviously, than the mere assertion that it’s different when our guys
do it. The
United States, moreover, presumably wants it known that its agents will not undertake targeted
killings in the United Kingdom under any circumstances, even if they might in Somalia; there will also be a category of
states where strategic ambiguity is preferred. Here a rule of international law will necessarily not avail us; because
of the formal equality of states, international law rules will have great trouble separating the Britains from the Somalias. Yet that is
precisely what policy as a practical, substantive matter requires.¶ But what, then, does separate them—besides, that is, the not
irrelevant factors of power, friendship and alliance with the United States and its community of allies? The most obvious factor is that
a failed state creates ungoverned territory in which terrorists can find haven. While that is the most obvious case, however, the truly
ungoverned territory of a truly failed state is probably not the most dangerous with respect to the harboring of terrorist
organizations; precisely because it is obviously ungoverned, objections to intervening there are fewer even by those who would
ordinarily object. The most dangerous safe havens, rather, are not entirely failed states, but states which are functioning sufficiently
to provide the levers of a state to terrorist organizations, either because the state is a fully functioning one that shares, ideologically
or tactically, aims with the terrorists, or because the state is functioning sufficiently to provide both a buffer against outside pressure
and a launching pad, but not sufficiently to prevent the disaggregation of important powers in favor of the terrorists. This latter
description captures at least part of the complex situation of al Qaeda and the Taliban in Pakistan. These situations mark out the most
important category of places in which the United States might see the value of targeted killing.¶ At the other extreme are liberal
democracies functioning under the rule of law that permits the adjudication of legal claims such as the question of Russian agent
involvement in the London incident. It is sometimes suggested that the genuinely “neutral” way of dividing places in which some form
of forcible covert activity (usually speaking of abduction of an alleged terrorist) is acceptable from where it is not is the presence, first,
of a functioning state. The difficulty with stopping there is that Iran is a functioning state, and for that very reason a successful
sponsor of terrorist groups. Next, then, it is suggested that it must be a functioning state combined with the rule of law, by which
extradition and other such claims can be openly and neutrally adjudicated. The difficulty is that it is possible to have a state with a
reasonably neutral rule of law that is part of a system that is neither liberal nor democratic, and which is entirely sympathetic to the
aims and open to the means of terrorism—not frequently, but certainly possible.¶ At some point, in other words, however much one
might point to neutral criteria such as the rule of law, or quasi-universal criteria such as “liberal democracy,” in the end they do not
quite describe the dispositive factors. When
it comes to the specific issue of terrorism, it comes down to
whether a state (or a sufficiently powerful and independent part of it) is willing to give haven to enemies of the
United States. That and the costs and risks of using covert force, including the risk of its
becoming known, versus the benefits.100¶ There are indeed overwhelmingly principled reasons
why the United States would not do such in London, but those principles are not completely neutral; they
have also very much to do with the fact of the ideals and interests that the United States and the
United Kingdom share.¶ Comity, therefore, is a powerful—if non-legal, non-law-based—argument against
violent covert action, targeted killing, abduction, and similar acts. Indeed, it might well be the most powerful, or at least the
most accurate, argument in assigning policy responses. But it is a calibrated argument, not a categorical one—an argument that
operates on a sliding scale with respect to the community of nations: friends, allies, those who might cooperate under a carrot or
stick, enemies, and territory only nominally governed. We should note as well that this
is a matter that implicates not
only state sovereignty—which we directly challenge when we engage in a targeted killing
without the host state’s consent—but also human rights. All things equal, the best and proper
way to proceed is through mechanisms of the rule of law: presentation of evidence to a neutral tribunal and
transparent mechanisms of justice. We prefer this both for principled reasons and for practical ones : intelligence methods
are very far from infallible. But things are not always equal when it comes to preventing
terrorism, and in that regard not all states are equal, either.
Also literally incinerates vital intelligence by discouraging capture and
interrogation
Thiessen 2011 (Marc A. Thiessen, visiting fellow at AEI, November 18, 2011, “We need a
terrorist detention and interrogation policy,” American Enterprise Institute,
http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/terrorism/we-need-a-terrorist-detentionand-interrogation-policy/)
The problem with this approach is: dead
terrorists cannot tell you their plans for new attacks. When we
kill high-value terrorists instead of taking them in alive, we vaporize all the intelligence they
possess—invaluable information we cannot get anywhere else about al Qaeda’s operations, recruits,
safe houses, communications, and plans for new attacks. We need this intelligence to save lives.¶ The Obama
administration inherited a treasure trove intelligence that had been gathered by the Bush administration from KSM and other CIA
detainees. That information was critical to the administration’s greatest counterterrorism success: the operation that killed Osama bin
Laden.¶ But with
each passing year, that intelligence becomes increasingly dated. New leaders rise
through the ranks. New terrorists operatives are recruited. New plots are conceived. New
methods are developed to communicate, move money, recruit operatives, and carry out attacks. And new networks—like al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and al-Shabab—emerge about which we know little. We are no longer replenishing the
information we have about al Qaeda’s inner workings because we are no longer capturing and
detaining the terrorist leaders who could refresh our knowledge about al Qaeda’s operations—which means the
next administration will not enjoy the same intelligence inheritance its predecessor did. ¶ Worse,
the head of U.S. Special Operations command recently told Congress that because the Obama administration has no clear plan for
handling suspected terrorist leaders if they are caught alive outside a war zone, it is U.S. policy that if such a captured terrorist cannot
be tried in a U.S. court or transferred to the custody of an allied country, the prisoner is ultimately “let go.” In other words, America
has a policy of terrorist catch and release.
Effective joint intelligence efforts are key to stop terrorism.
Cristian and Andreea 13, (Mărcău Flavius-Cristian, PhD Candidate, Babes-Bolyai University,
Ciorei Mihaela Andreea, MA, Constantin Brâncuși University from Targu-Jiu, THE ROLE OF
INTELLIGENCE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERROR, European Scientific Journal, vol.9, No.2, January
2013, http://eujournal.org/index.php/esj/article/download/708/792)
Terrorist threats are highly topical and won’t disappear in the next decade. Most likely they will undergo changes so that
diversification will be unstoppable. The terrorist
attacks have been, are and will be irregular, and will track the
vulnerabilities of states and will act to spread terror. Thus, the fight against terrorism is not, and can not be easy. And this is
not necessarily because terrorists would be very powerful, but because they are devoid of any logic and any philosophy.
Combating terrorism cannot come out of the laws and customs of war and the armed struggle and,
therefore, the difficulties of such confrontations will always be very high”28.¶ The informational
field, by definition is a closed one which must find ways to integrate into the system, connection
and operation, which should sufficiently facilitate the visibility on disruptive factors of regional and global balances, to provide
the state administrations and transnational organizational possibility of an action conceptually unique and with joint efforts
to prevent, stop and reduce the harmful effects of the evolution of human civilization and the
individual29.¶ After 11 September, the vast majority of information agencies have reorganized
their defense systems and contraterrorist fight, began to exchange information about terrorist organizations
(share intelligence) and work together to foil terrorist plans. So, the global antiterrorist fight
must include joint strategic cooperation, common and pragmatic and sincere cooperation.¶ Through patience and
vigilance, terrorists continue their cause through an understanding of our society. Thus, it becomes imperative to do the same and to
obtain information about those who choose to attack our freedoms and our way of life. The
information collection will
prove invaluable in this case, but this tool must be used as well as possible at strategic, operational and tactical
level.
AQAP has the intent to attack the US homeland
Bengyak, Emker 2013(Kevin, Stacey, M.A.candadite at the John C. Whitehead Journal of
Diplomacy and International Relations, “Analyzing the US Countertterrorism Strategy in Yemen”,
January 14, 2013, http://blogs.shu.edu/diplomacy/2013/01/analyzing-the-us-counterterrorismstrategy-in-yemen/)
The United States has placed great emphasis on fighting the militant Islamic group based in
Yemen, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) because it has been characterized as one of
the most dangerous Al-Qaeda affiliates worldwide. AQAP has demonstrated its intent to carry
out attacks within U.S. borders, and against U.S. interests in Yemen. Replacing the long
established Al-Qaeda threats emanating from South Asia and North Africa, the Obama
Administration has identified AQAP as the most immediate threat to the U.S. homeland. Since the
ouster of President Ali Abdullah Saleh in February 2012, the transitional government of President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi remains
weak outside the capital of Sana’a. Overall,
Yemen is on the verge of becoming a failed state with
economic, social, and political challenges that AQAP is attempting to exploit in order to
consolidate its power within the country.
And they have the capability
O’Hanlan 2013 (Micheal, senior fellow with the Center for 21st Century Security and
Intelligence and director of research for the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution
where he specializes in U.S. defense strategy, the use of military force, and American foreign
policy, “ How US Cities Can Protect Themselves Against Terrorist Attacks”, April 17, 2013,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/04/17-us-cities-protect-bombing-attacksohanlon)
Roughly a decade ago, in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, FBI director Robert
Mueller predicted that the United States would soon face the kinds of frequent small-scale
bombings perpetrated frequently abroad by Hamas and Hezbollah. He considered the attacks
nearly certain.¶ For a decade, Mueller was wrong--and I’m sure he was more than happy about it. Boston, however, has
sadly and belatedly proven him right, at least to a degree. But how can we lower the odds of similar attacks in the
future?¶ Of course, other attacks big and small have occurred in the western world during the
past 10 years—above and beyond the very frequent ones in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and
now Syria. There was the train attack in Spain in 2003, and then the London subway bombings
in 2005. There have been various attempted attacks in the United States, particularly during
the past five years, most of them thwarted—the Zazi New York subway attempt of 2009, and
the “underwear” bomber" later that year on a plane approaching Detroit; the 2010 Times
Square bombing; the printer-cartridge attempted bombing on cargo aircraft. And of course we
have had numerous mass shootings, America’s own form of large-scale terroristic violence. Of
these, the Ft. Hood shootings in 2009 were linked to al Qaeda but others generally were not.¶ So terrorism and large-scale
violence have never really gone away. But the Boston bombings are still somewhat unusual for
their lethality and success in America. In scale they are nothing like Oklahoma City, of course, but they were worse
¶
than the infamous 1996 Atlanta Olympics bombing. And it has been quite a while since those two tragedies, as well as the first World
Trade Center attacks of the same time period and of the 9/11 attacks themselves. So there is a certain surprise in a successful
bombing on U.S. soil, even though after we think about it for a while, most of us are probably not that shocked that it could happen
again.¶ Despite
all the efforts since 9/11 and before on the intelligence and homeland security
fronts, some attacks will get through (even if we also stop a lot of them before they happen).
This is not because anyone has let down their guard; it is because the materials needed to
make bombs (or shoot up public places) are not that hard to access.
Terrorism causes miscalculation that draws in Russia and China and culminates
in extinction- also causes rising alert levels
Ayson 2010 (Robert Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for
Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear
Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July,
Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)
A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not
necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there
are reasons to wonder whether
nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can
be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign
states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would
fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it
must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their
disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors
themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not
necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an
act of nuclear terrorism,
could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between
two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place
allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a
catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s
as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to
depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For
example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could
plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or
encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that
could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the
United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian
stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material
to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris
resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable,
identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the
materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if
the act of
nuclear terrorism came
as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully
would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out
Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in
Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program
continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game
of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in
Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between
these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of
responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion
course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited
armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these
developments may seem at the present time. The
reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack
occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could
Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a
possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear
attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with
Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the
terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed
forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment,
when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or
China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force)
against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it
must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act
of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington
might decide to order a significant conventional (or
nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or
states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia
and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an
infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not
impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action
resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing
interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that
might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is
also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club.
It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend
immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just
a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example,
what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some
reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also
suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange.
If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and
China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what
conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear
weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might
surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response
simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo,
but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China
felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the
United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear
weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive
to contemplate, it may be informative to reverse the tables. Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and
that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In
response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear
retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen
to support Russia’s use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russia’s traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite
plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of the nuclear
terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur? In
the
charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack, how would the attacked
country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The
phrase “how dare they tell us what to do” immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far
as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for the terrorists. This might not
help the chances of nuclear restraint.
Rapid escalation in alert levels causes decentralized command authority – makes
uncontrollable escalation inevitable
Sagan 1990 (Scott Sagan, professor of political science and co-director of Stanford's Center for
International Security and Cooperation, 1990 “Nuclear Alerts and Crisis Management” in
“Nuclear diplomacy and crisis management: an International security reader” p. 191-3)
A “NO-ALERTS” POLICY? It would be equally in error, however, to believe that because the nuclear alerts and accompanying
conventional force operations taken in past crises were difficult to control, they must never be used again under any circumstances.
Any suggestion for a “no-alerts” policy would ignore the fact that the purposes that nuclear alerts were meant to serve in the past are
likely to remain important in future crises and are unlikely to be met, in all scenarios, other means. Any
decision to place
nuclear forces on alert in the future will be an extremely dangerous step, but it is by no means clear that
the inherent risks involved with an alert will always be greater than the dangers produced by refraining from alerting forces. Even if
the United States could threaten a devastating retaliatory response without generating its forces, the failure to alert nuclear forces in
a severe crisis, especially one in which Soviet strategic forces were moving to a higher state of readiness, might tempt the leadership
in Moscow to continue escalating the crisis in the belief that the United States was willing to back down.89 difficult judgments would
have to be made, weighing the risks of alerting versus not alerting strategic forces, in numerous unlikely but possible scenarios: if the
Soviets threaten to attack NATO’s Central Front in the chaotic situation produced by a disintegration of the Eastern European bloc; if
the Soviets threatened a nuclear strike against China; if an invasion of Saudi Arabia appeared imminent; or if there was a replay of the
Cuban missile crisis with the Soviets placing missiles in Nicaragua or Cuba. In each of these cases, the risks of escalation and war are
present whether or not nuclear forces are put on alert. The 1973 case illustrates the point. Putting
forces on alert was not
a risk-free option; neither, however, was allowing the Soviets to put forces into Egypt. Not only would such an action have
set erous precedent for future crises, but Soviet intervention might have led to direct combat with the Israelis, increasing the risk of
American involve- ment. Indeed, the risk of escalation was inherent in the situation. The alert certainly highlighted this fact, but it did
not create it. In short, wisdom begins in this area with an awareness that one can err either on the side of being excess cautious or
excessively provocative. The following observations on what can go wrong when nuclear and con- ventional forces are put on a
higher state of readiness in a crisis do not, therefore, mean that such steps must never be taken in the future. They do suggest,
however, that if military alerts are deemed necessary in a crisis, it will be essential that they be controlled with the utmost prudence
and discipline. What can go Wrong? Much of the recent public concern about nuclear war has focused on the frightening “Dr.
Strangelove” scenario: the danger of an unauthorized use of nuclear weapons Of nuclear weapons by a military commander leading
to nuclear war. In normal peacetime circumstances, however, the numerous mechanical devices and organizational “checks and
balances” that have been developed to prevent unauthorized use of weaponry make this path of accidental nuclear war highly
unlikely. In a severe crisis, with nuclear forces placed on extremely high levels of alert, some of these
restriction are lifted, however, in order to reduce the probability of a Soviet first-strike successfully “decapitating” the American
arsenal. For other obvious reasons, the precise details of the process by which the devolution of command authrotiy takes place and
the extent of predelegation of authority to use nuclear weapons, if any in fact exists, are kept highly classified. Although layers of
secrecy surround this issue, it is unlikely that predelegation extends to the first-use of offensive strategic nuclear weapons against the
Soviet Union under any circumstances. Still, any predelegation authority to launch nuclear forces in retaliation after a Soviet attack
upon the United States would produce serious problems with respect to controlling or terminating a nuclear exchange once begun
and at least would raise the possibility of accidental war occurring through a warning or assessment failure during a superpower crisis.
It would be a mistake, however, to focus exclusively on the danger of an accidental or unauthorized use
of nuclear weapons. As the Cuban missile crisis demonstrated, a variety of incidents can occur during a
crisis which are neither purely accidental nor unauthorized, but which nonetheless raise the
danger of inadvertent escalation. In many of the cases, actions that may have been judged
inappropriate by higher political or military authorities were taken by local military
commanders who have both good military reasons for taking the action and ample
discretionary authority to do so. Such incidents are likely to be a permanent danger in severe
crises. Crises are unique and unpredictable. Military rules of engagement and delegations of authority must be preplanned,
however, and in crises there is often insufficient time to review such procedures and tailor them to
the specific confrontation at hand. These resulting dangers are further compounded when
conventional and nuclear forces are placed at higher conditions of alert because rules of
engagement and delegations of authority can change in ways that may be inadequately
understood by central authorities. In addition, there is a danger that a movement toward a mutual high
level alert in a serious crisis could put central authorities under severe pressure to take
conventional escalatory steps that they would otherwise prefer to avoid. For example, in a severe crisis,
in which both superpowers have alerted their nuclear forces to unprecedented levels, the
national command authorities might feel extreme pressure to relieve the strategic arsenal from
the danger of quick strike decapitation. One possible conventional option would be to attack the enemy’s most
threatening forces such as submarines patrolling off one’s coasts. Moreover, in any convetional war between the Soviet Union and
the United States, during which nuclear forces would be at an extremely high state of alert, American leaders could authorize what it
viewed as conventional attacks against Soviet conventional forces, which mostcow might view as attacks against its strategic forces.
For example, an American ASW campaign against Soviet attack submarines in “forward areas” might bee seen in Moscow, correctly or
incorrectly, as an attack on Soveit strategic submarines.
lead to uncontrolled escalation.
Any one of these authorized escalatory steps might
Plan Text
Plan: The United States Congress should establish a federal court with
jurisdiction over targeted killing authorization.
Solvency
Congressional establishment of courts for drones creates clear guidelines and
transparency, which combats rights abuses- federal courts cannot enforce their
decisions without those things
McKelvey 2011 (Benjamin, Executive Development Editor on the Editorial Board of the
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, “Due Process Rights and the Targeted Killing of
Suspected Terrorists: The Unconstitutional Scope of Executive Killing Power,” Vanderbilt Journal
of Transnational Law, Volume 44, Number 5,
November,http://www.vanderbilt.edu/jotl/manage/wp-content/uploads/mckelvey-pdf.pdf, p.
1377-1378)
The targeted killing of Americans, as demonstrated by the ¶ Aulaqi case, presents complex questions of
constitutional law that are ¶ not easily answered or resolved.199 This is more than an academic ¶
debate; the stakes are high, as targeted killing in its current form ¶ provides the Executive
Branch with a power over American lives that ¶ is chillingly broad in scope.200 It is concerning that the
President’s ¶ grounds for claiming this extraordinary authority are tenuous and ¶ subject to compelling challenges.201 Furthermore,
the absence of basic ¶ due process protection in Aulaqi appears unconstitutional after ¶ Hamdi.¶ 202 But the Aulaqi
case
shows that the constitutional ¶ objections to targeted killing cannot be resolved in federal
court.203¶ For these reasons, Congress should intervene by passing legislation ¶ with the goal of
establishing clear principles that safeguard ¶ fundamental due process liberties from potential
executive overreach.¶ A. Option One: Congress Could Pass Legislation to ¶ Establish Screening and Oversight of ¶ Targeted
Killing ¶ As the Aulaqi case demonstrates, any resolution to the problem ¶ of targeted killing would require a delicate balance
between due ¶ process protections and executive power.204 In order to accomplish ¶ this delicate balance, Congress can pass
legislation modeled on the ¶ Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) that establishes a ¶
federal court with jurisdiction over targeted killing orders, similar to ¶ the wiretapping court
established by FISA.205 There are several ¶ advantages to a legislative solution. First, FISA
provides a working ¶ model for the judicial oversight of real-time intelligence and national ¶
security decisions that have the potential to violate civil liberties.206¶ FISA also effectively
balances the legitimate but competing claims at ¶ issue in Aulaqi: the sensitive nature of
classified intelligence and ¶ national security decisions versus the civil liberties protections of
the ¶ Constitution.207 A legislative solution can provide judicial ¶ enforcement of due process
while also respecting the seriousness and ¶ sensitivity of executive counterterrorism duties.208 In
this way, ¶ congress can alleviate fears over the abuse of targeted killing without ¶ interfering with
executive duties and authority. ¶ Perhaps most importantly, a legislative solution would provide ¶ the
branches of government and the American public with a clear ¶ articulation of the law of
targeted killing.209 The court in Aulaqi¶ began its opinion by explaining that the existence of a targeted killing ¶ program is no
more than media speculation, as the government has ¶ neither confirmed nor denied the existence of the program.210¶ Congress can
acknowledge targeted killing in the light of day while ¶ ensuring that it is only used against Americans out of absolute ¶ necessity.211
Independent oversight would promote the use of all ¶ peaceful measures before lethal force is
pursued.212
Drone court solves legal criteria
Harman 2013 (Jane Harman, director, president and chief executive officer of the Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars, February 19, 2013, “Harman: Drone courts can work,”
Security Clearance, CNN, http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2013/02/19/harman-drone-courts-canwork/)
September 11, 2001, was a game changer, forcing the United States to rethink the existing security paradigms. In
response to the graveness of the terrorist threat, the Bush administration decided that the existing FISA framework
was antiquated and inadequate, and began warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance outside the FISA structure. The
president claimed this extra-legal action was justified under his "commander in chief" powers in Article II of the Constitution.¶
Congress rightly pushed back. As one of the members of Congress who led the charge, I insisted that the program be
brought under FISA and helped write amendments in 2008 to modernize it.¶ These amendments - which then-Sen. Barack Obama
supported, and which were passed by an overwhelming bipartisan vote and renewed twice – created the legal structure that could
serve as a model for overseeing drone strikes and offensive cyberattacks. A FISA-like process for governing so-called "remote-control
warfare" would protect individual liberties enshrined in the Constitution while confronting a supercharged threat environment.¶
FISA-like procedures can help with critical determinations of how imminent a threat is,
whether capture is feasible and if potential action is consistent with laws of war, the three criteria
laid out in the recently leaked Department of Justice's "white paper" on drone strikes.¶ The FISA court, renamed the CT Court,
could also oversee drones and cyber. A FISA court application must show that specific individuals
are connected to a foreign power – which is defined, in part, as a group engaged in
international terrorism. Drone and cyber applications could (1) list the individual/cyber target
against whom the lethal operation is directed and (2) submit a finding of probable cause that
the individual/cyber target is connected to a foreign power, is in a senior operational capacity
and poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States.¶ Approved applications for drone
strikes and cyberattacks would need to be renewed after a certain period, and discontinued if
evidence is presented that the targets no longer meet the criteria. FISA provisions for emergency
authorization in time-sensitive situations should also apply.
Establishment of transparent drone procedures key to international perception
of legitimacy
Machon 2006 (Maj. Matthew J., US Army Major and investigor for the School of Advanced
Military Studies, “Targeted Killing as an Element of U.S. Foreign Policy in the War on Terror”,
5/25/06, http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/machon.pdf, p. 57)
To maintain international legitimacy and retain the moral high ground within the war on ¶
terror, the U.S. should clarify its policy regarding the specific targeting of suspected terrorists ¶
outside the ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. The current policy remains shrouded ¶
underneath a veil of secrecy, its full extent unknown to the general public and mostly a subject
of ¶ outright speculation. To allay the fears of human rights advocates who fear the policy may ¶ constitute an abuse of
power and constitute an arbitrary deprivation of an individual’s right to life, ¶ the policy must be made public, which can be done
without revealing classified information. ¶ The U.S. should make it abundantly clear that apprehension of the suspect is the primary ¶
objective. The intelligence value of detained terrorist suspects and the potential information they ¶ possess makes their capture and
detention far preferable to outright elimination. The use of ¶ targeted killing should be a policy of last resort intended to eliminate a
direct threat to the security ¶ of the United States when other means are unavailable or the risk of inaction is too great to await ¶ or
attempt other methods. A
clear review process needs to be established and publicized to ¶ provide a
sense of transparency, and show these targeted killings are not randomly selected ¶ actions.
While the details of each case should remain classified to prevent compromise of sources ¶ or
sensitive information, awareness of a codified procedure for review prior to execution of any ¶
targeted killing would mollify some of the disparagement from critics of the policy. The policy
should be used sparingly and selectively, which appears to be the case thus far in the war on ¶
terror.
Reforming the drone program is key to solve for Pakistani instability/terrorism.
Markey 13 (Daniel, Senior Fellow on India, Pakistan and South Africa at the CFR, “A New Drone
Deal For Pakistan” Foreign Affairs. July 16, 2013.
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139584/daniel-markey/a-new-drone-deal-for-pakistan
NB)
For all its successes, the U.S. drone program in Pakistan is unlikely to survive much longer in its
current form. Less than a week after his election on May 11, Pakistan’s new prime minister, Nawaz Sharif,
reportedly declared to his cabinet that “the policy of protesting against drone strikes for public
consumption, while working behind the scenes to make them happen, is not on.” This fall,
Pakistan’s national and provincial assemblies will elect a new president, likely a Sharif loyalist, and the prime minister
will also select a new army chief. It is safe to say that these men are unlikely to follow their predecessors
in offering tacit endorsements of the United States' expansive counterterrorism efforts. ¶ In other
words, the United States is going to have to hammer out a new drone deal with Pakistan in the years
ahead, one that is sensitive to Pakistan's own concerns and objectives. This will likely mean that Washington will face new constraints
in its counterterrorism operations. But managed with care, a new agreement could put the targeted killing campaign against al Qaeda
on firmer political footing without entirely eliminating its effectiveness.
Hegemony
UQ: Heg Sustainable
We’re leading in every sector---proves resiliency of U.S. heg
Robert J. Lieber 12 is Professor of Government and International Affairs, Georgetown
University, “Leader of the Pack,” November 2012,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138348/robert-j-lieber/leader-of-the-pack?page=show,
Accessed Date: 4-18-13 y2k
Then, after criticizing both Kagan and me for our “failure to distinguish between what is known and what is unknowable,”
Keohane sets out what he terms “half a dozen things relevant to the future of the U.S. global role that can now be said with
confidence.” Many of these observations are unexceptionable, but Keohane misses a key point captured in my book’s subtitle:
Why
the United States Is Not Destined to Decline.
Had I wanted to make an unqualified assertion about the
United States’ future, it would have been Why the United States Will Not Decline. Finally, Keohane’s concluding words about the
strengths and weaknesses of the position of the United States and the need to “summon the political coherence and willpower to
devise and implement a sustainable leadership strategy for the twenty-first century” are so close to my own thinking that they
could virtually have been taken from the pages of Power and Willpower. I
about the future of the U nited
plead guilty to cautious optimism
S tates, finding evidence for that position in many of the very
factors Keohane mentions: its size, material capacity, ability to rebound from difficulties,
demographics, openness, and innovativeness . In addition, I cite the country’s lead in science
and technology , its unique research universities , its entrepreneurial immigrants , the depth
and breadth of its markets , its military strength , and its immense natural resources . Since
the founding of the U nited S tates, the country’s experience has been one of unusual
flexibility and adaptability : it has had a raucous but robust political system
rule of law,
with both liberty and the
a record of overcoming repeated foreign and domestic crises , a slow but ultimately
successful policymaking process , and a capacity for responding to grave threats with great
vigor and even ferocity. These traits, observed by Alexis de Tocqueville in the 1830s and Winston Churchill in the midtwentieth century, among others, are unique to the history and character of the United States. They do not guarantee that the
country will once again overcome its considerable problems, but together
with the material evidence , they
provide a reasoned basis for the concluding words of Power and Willpower: “Much remains to be
done in domestic as well as foreign policy, but
the robustness of American society coupled with
unique capacities for adaptation and adjustment are likely
once again
its
to prove decisive .”
Link: Drones Hurt Alliances
U.S drone policy hurts soft power by creating international backlash from allies
Bowcott 12
(Owen, Correspondent for the Guardian, “Drone strikes threaten 50 years of international law,
say U.N rapporteur,” The Guardian, June 21, 2012,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jun/21/drone-strikes-international-law-un accessed
7/30) ZLH
The US policy of using aerial drones to carry out targeted killings presents a major challenge to the
system of international law that has endured since the second world war, a United Nations investigator has said.¶
Christof Heyns, the UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial killings, summary or arbitrary executions, told
a conference in Geneva that President Obama's attacks in Pakistan, Yemen and elsewhere, carried out by the
CIA, would encourage other states to flout long-established human rights standards.¶ In his strongest
critique so far of drone strikes, Heyns suggested some may even constitute "war crimes". His comments come amid rising
international unease over the surge in killings by remotely piloted unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).¶ Addressing the conference,
which was organised by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), a
second UN rapporteur, Ben Emmerson QC, who
monitors counter-terrorism, announced he would be prioritising inquiries into drone strikes.¶
The London-based barrister said the issue was moving rapidly up the international agenda after
China and Russia this week jointly issued a statement at the UN Human Rights Council, backed
by other countries, condemning drone attacks.¶ If the US or any other states responsible for attacks outside
recognised war zones did not establish independent investigations into each killing, Emmerson emphasised, then "the UN itself should
consider establishing an investigatory body".¶ Also present was Pakistan's ambassador to the UN in Geneva, Zamir Akram, who called
for international legal action to halt the "totally counterproductive attacks" by the US in his country.¶ Heyns, a South African law
professor, told the meeting: "Are we to accept major changes to the international legal system which has been in existence since
world war two and survived nuclear threats?"¶ Some
states, he added, "find targeted killings immensely
attractive. Others may do so in future … Current targeting practices weaken the rule of law.
Killings may be lawful in an armed conflict [such as Afghanistan] but many targeted killings take place
far from areas where it's recognised as being an armed conflict."¶ If it is true, he said, that "there have been
secondary drone strikes on rescuers who are helping (the injured) after an initial drone attack, those further attacks are a war
crime".¶ Heyns ridiculed the US suggestion that targeted UAV strikes on al-Qaida or allied groups were a legitimate response to the
9/11 attacks. "It's difficult to see how any killings carried out in 2012 can be justified as in response to [events] in 2001," he said.
"Some states seem to want to invent new laws to justify new practices.¶ "The
targeting is often operated by
intelligence agencies which fall outside the scope of accountability. The term 'targeted killing'
is wrong because it suggests little violence has occurred. The collateral damage may be less than aerial
bombardment, but because they eliminate the risk to soldiers they can be used more often."¶ Heyns told the Guardian later that his
future inquiries are likely to include the question of whether other countries, such as the UK, share intelligence with the US that could
be used for selecting individuals as targets. A legal case has already been lodged in London over the UK's alleged role in the deaths of
British citizens and others as a consequence of US drone strikes in Pakistan.¶ Emmerson said that protection of the right to life
required countries to establish independent inquiries into each drone killing. "That needs to be applied in the context of targeted
killings," he said. "It's possible for a state to establish an independent ombudsman to inquire into every attack and there needs to be a
report to justify [the killing]."¶ Alternatively, he said, it was "for the UN itself to consider establishing an investigatory body. Drones
attacks by the US raise fundamental questions which are a direct consequence of my mandate… If they don't [investigate] themselves,
we will do it for them."¶ It is time, he added, to end the "conspiracy of silence" over drone attacks and "shine the light of independent
investigation" into the process. The attacks, he noted, were not only on those who had been killed but on the system of "international
law itself".¶ The Pakistani ambassador declared that more than a thousand civilians had been killed in his country by US drone strikes.
"We find the
use of drones to be totally counterproductive in terms of succeeding in the war against terror. It leads to
greater levels of terror rather than reducing them," he said.¶ Claims made by the US about the accuracy of drone
strikes were "totally incorrect", he added. Victims who had tried to bring compensation claims through the Pakistani courts had been
blocked by US refusals to respond to legal actions.¶ The US has defended drone attacks as self-defence against al-Qaida and has
refused to allow judicial scrutiny of the UAV programme. On Wednesday, the Obama administration issued a fresh rebuff through the
US courts to an ACLU request for information about targeting policies. Such details, it insisted, must remain "classified".¶ Hina Shamsi,
director of the ACLU's national security project, said: "Something that is being debated in UN hallways and committee rooms cannot
apparently be talked about in US courtrooms, according to the government. Whether the CIA is involved in targeted lethal operation
is now classified. It's an absurd fiction."¶ The ACLU estimates that as many as 4,000 people have been killed in US drone strikes since
2002 in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. Of those, a significant proportion were civilians. The numbers killed have escalated significantly
since Obama became president.¶ The USA is not a signatory to the International Criminal Court (ICC) or many other international legal
forums where legal action might be started. It is, however, part of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) where cases can be initiated
by one state against another.¶ Ian Seiderman, director of the International Commission of Jurists, told the conference that "immense
damage was being done to the fabric of international law".¶ One
of the latest UAV developments that concerns
human rights groups is the way in which attacks, they allege, have moved towards targeting
groups based on perceived patterns of behaviour that look suspicious from aerial surveillance,
rather than relying on intelligence about specific al-Qaida activists.¶ In response to a report by Heyns to
the UN Human Rights Council this week, the US put out a statement in Geneva saying there was "unequivocal US commitment to
conducting such operations with extraordinary care and in accordance with all applicable law, including the law of war".¶ It added
that there was "continuing commitment to greater transparency and a sincere effort to address some of the important questions that
have been raised".
Drone strikes are damaging our international soft power and foreign relations.
Laney 13 (Brock, International Relations department BYU, “Drone strikes and the War Powers
Resolution,” BYU Prelaw Review, Vol 7, 2013, Page 18-19)
Defenders of drone strikes argue that drones number among the¶ United States’ last few viable
options for combating terrorists and¶ militants.¶ Even proponents of drone strikes, however, recognize the¶ ar
ray of flaws associat ed wit h t hei r use.¶ 12¶ To begin, finding and monitoring¶ suspected¶ terrorists¶
requires¶ highly¶ accurate¶ intelligence¶ 13¶ and isolating potential targets to avoid civilian
casualties has proven¶ nearly impossible.¶ One scholar pointed out that “the Taliban don’t¶ go to a military base to
build bombs or do training, [so] there are¶ families and neighbors around,”¶ 15¶ which results in inadvertent civilian¶
deaths¶ from¶ drone¶ strikes.¶ 17¶ 16¶ Next, the strikes are “poor second[s]¶ to arrest”¶ because US intelligence personnel
cannot collect information¶ from¶ victims.¶ 18¶ Illustrating another drawback, drone strikes in Pakistan have ¶ 19¶
exacerbated already tense US-Pakistan relations. Although this has¶ not resulted in formal
military repercussions, Pakistani officials¶ have condemned drone activity in Pakistan because
it violates their ¶ 14¶ sovereignty and harms their citizens.¶ Similarly, the strikes can decrease¶
US¶ soft¶ power¶ abroad¶ by¶ disrupting¶ diplomatic¶ relations¶ in¶ the¶ Middle East and
provoking victims to join terrorist groups in¶ the place of lost family members or friends.¶ 20¶ In
response to a 2012¶ drone strike, for example, a member of the Yemeni Defense Ministry¶ said that he “would not be surprised if a
These problems and the
disputed efficacy of drone strikes¶ make drones very costly and controversial weapons. The
high costs¶ and dubious benefits create a set of decisions that democratic instincts¶ suggest¶
should¶ not¶ fall¶ to¶ only¶ a¶ few¶ government¶ officials.¶ In¶ response¶ to¶ these¶ concerns,¶
some¶ have¶ called¶ for¶ a greater¶ degree¶ of¶ transparency¶ along¶ with¶ the¶ introduction¶ of¶
accountability¶ to¶ Congress¶ for¶ drone¶ activity.¶ This transparency and accountability acts¶ as
an important step towards making the usage of drone strikes subject¶ to¶ public¶ scrutiny.¶
hundred tribesmen joined¶ the lines of al-Qaeda as a result of the latest drone mistake.”¶ 21¶
Global alliances risked with hypocrisy of drone usage – look at Britain
Kennedy 13 (Greg, a Professor ¶ of Strategic Foreign Policy ¶ at the Defence Studies ¶
Department, King's College ¶ London, based at the Joint ¶ Services Command and Staff ¶ College,
Defence Academy ¶ of the United Kingdom, in ¶ Shrivenham, “Drones: Legitimacy and AntiAmericanism,” Parameters 42(4)/43(1) Winter-Spring 2013, Strategic Studies Institute at the
United States Army War College
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Issues/WinterSpring_2013/3_A
rticle_Kennedy.pdf
p. 27-28)
In addition, as with any use of force, drone strikes in overseas ¶ contingency operations can lead to increased attacks on already weak
¶ governments partnered with the United States. They can lead to retaliatory attacks on local governments and may contribute to
local instability. ¶ Those actions occur as a result of desires for revenge and frustrations ¶ caused by the strikes. Feelings of hostility
are often visited on the most ¶ immediate structures of authority—local government officials, government buildings, police, and the
military.12 It can thus be argued that, at ¶ the strategic level, drone strikes are fuelling anti-American resentment ¶ among enemies
and allies alike. Those reactions are often based on ¶ questions regarding the legality, ethicality, and operational legitimacy ¶ of those
acts to deter opponents. Therefore, specifically related to the ¶ reaction of allies, the military legitimacy question arises if the use of ¶
drones endangers vital strategic relationships.13 One
of the strategic ¶ relationships being affected by the
drone legitimacy issue is that of the ¶ United States and the United Kingdom.¶ Targeted killing,
by drone strike or otherwise, is not the sole preserve of the United States. Those actions, however, attract more
negative ¶ attention to the United States due to its prominence on the world’s stage, ¶ its
declarations of support for human rights and democratic freedoms, ¶ and rule-of-law issues, all
which appear violated by such strikes. This ¶ complexity and visibility make such targeted
killings important for ¶ Anglo-American strategic relations because of the closeness of that ¶ relationship
and the perception that Great Britain, therefore, condones ¶ such American activities. Because the intelligence
used in such operations is seen by other nations as a shared Anglo-American asset, the use ¶ of such intelligence to identify and
conduct such killings, in the opinion ¶ of many, makes Great Britain culpable in the illegality and
immorality of40 those operations.14 Finally, the apparent gap between stated core policies ¶ and
values and the ability to practice targeted killings appears to be a ¶ starkly hypocritical and
deceitful position internationally, a condition ¶ that once again makes British policymakers
uncomfortable with being ¶ tarred by such a brush.15
Drones hurt tribal cooperation by being seen as cowardly and untrustworthy,
damaging US influence
Schirch 12, (Dr. Lisa, authored the brief drawing on research in Afghanistan and Pakistan from
2009-2011 in which she interviewed dozens of Pakistani and Afghan lawyers, civil society leaders
and citizens. “9 Costs of Drone Strikes”, Partners for Peace building Policy, Policy Brief June 1st
2012, http://3phumansecurity.org/site/images/stories/PolicyBriefs/122.pdf pg4)
9. Drones Communicate Cowardice, Undermining Ability to Form Tribal Alliances: According to counterinsurgency expert David
Kilcullen, “using
robots from the air ... looks both cowardly and weak” to local populations.15 Anti‐American cartoons and jokes feature the drones as symbols of American impotence or
cowardice. Given the importance of bravery and courage in tribal cultures, the use of drone
strikes signals untrustworthiness, making it more difficult for the U.S. to form agreements or
even get information from key tribal leaders. The drone strikes undermine even basic
cooperation and information sharing by local populations.
Drones undermine US credibility by threatening international law and encourage
human rights violations internationally
Schirch 12, (Dr. Lisa, authored the brief drawing on research in Afghanistan and Pakistan from
2009-2011 in which she interviewed dozens of Pakistani and Afghan lawyers, civil society leaders
and citizens. “9 Costs of Drone Strikes”, Partners for Peace building Policy, Policy Brief June 1st
2012, http://3phumansecurity.org/site/images/stories/PolicyBriefs/122.pdf pg2-4)
4. Drones Commit Human Rights Violations: Advocates of drones compare them with other bombs and note that they cause fewer
civilian casualties than the “shock and awe” U.S. bombing in Iraq and Afghanistan that killed tens of thousands of civilians. U.S.
officials waver on how many civilians have been killed in the drone program. Some say no civilians have been killed or reports of
civilian deaths are only insurgent propaganda. The Obama Administration’s low drone casualty rates rely on its own assumption that
“all military-‐age males in a strike zone are combatants” and are guilty unless proven innocent, even if there is no proof linking young
men to any type of militant activity.6 U.S. denial that significant numbers of civilians are being killed contradicts significant and
diverse journalist and research reports on the ground. At a June 2012 conference on drones, United Nations Special Rapporteur cited
the Pakistan Human Rights Commission’s estimates that U.S. drone strikes killed at least 957 people in Pakistan in 2010 and that on
average 20% of drone victims are civilians, not militants. He concludes that perhaps thousands of civilians have been killed in 300
drone strikes there since 2004.7 5. Drones Risk “50 Years of International Law”: A variety of actors challenge the legality of drone
strikes. Former President Jimmy Carter claims drones
violate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
noting this violation “abets our enemies and alienates our friends.”8 In July 2009, U.N. Human Rights
Council Special Investigator Philip Alston chastised the U.S. for failing to track, investigate, and
punish low ranking soldiers for drone strikes that kill civilians and for failing to tell the public
the extent of civilian deaths. Alston also critiqued the U.S. military justice system for “failing to provide ordinary people…
basic information on the status of investigations into civilian casualties or prosecutions resulting therefrom."9 Human rights
experts point to the illegality of unacceptably high collateral damage to civilians, facilities,
equipment, and property while resulting in the deaths of a disproportionately low number of
lawful military targets.10 Repeating the 2009 calls from the United Nations for the United States to account for its use of
drone warfare and its denial that drones are killing civilians despite widespread evidence to the contrary, UN Special Rapporteur
noted U.S. use of drones
threatens to undermine “50 years of international law” and encourages
other countries to ignore or redefine international law.11 Drones undermine U.S. credibility on
human rights. As an example, Russia and China have called for investigations in U.S. drone in the U.N. Human Rights Council
while the U.S. is pushing both of those countries to stop their support for the Syrian government. U.S. drone policy thereby
undermines U.S. stated policy supporting human rights in Syria and elsewhere. In Pakistan, repeated
reports document that drones fire first on the target, and then on the mourners and humanitarian responders seeking to help the
wounded or attend their funerals, as these people are deemed sympathizers and thus also counted as “combatants” rather than
civilians, even though they include women and children.12 If this can be documented, the U.S. would be in direct violation of
International Humanitarian Law. The
U.S. lacks credibility to advocate for human rights and rule of law
when it does not seem to apply equal standards to its own policies and citizens.
Link: Drones Hurt Credibility
Drone Strikes undermining credibility, creating political blowback against the US
for drones fueling terrorist recruitment
Zenko 13, (Micah, fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, with expertise in Conflict
Prevention; US national security policy, military planning and operations and nuclear weapons
policy. “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies”, Council on Foerign Relations Special Report no. 65,
January 2013 http://www.cfr.org/wars-and-warfare/reforming-us-drone-strike-policies/p29736,
pg10-11)
From a strategic perspective, however, it remains unclear if drone strikes are successful or sustainable. There is a clear
disconnect between whom the Obama administration claims to target with drones and who
has actually been killed. According to U.S. officials, individuals targeted by drones are limited to “high-level al-Qaeda leaders
who are planning attacks”; “individuals who are a threat to the United States”; individuals involved in “some sort of operational plot
against the United States”; and “specific senior operational leaders of al-Qaeda and associated forces.”20 Of the estimated three
thousand people killed by drones, however, the vast majority were neither al-Qaeda nor Taliban leaders. Instead, most were
low-level, anonymous suspected militants who were predominantly engaged in insurgent or
terrorist operations against their governments, rather than in active international terrorist
plots.21 By targeting individuals who are not terrorist leaders and who do not pose a direct
threat to the United States or its allies—but are predominantly fighting insurgent operations—the United
States risks being dragged further into internal armed struggles, because it is explicitly
intervening on behalf of the government. Some former and current U.S. officials maintain that the United
States relies too much on drone strikes at the expense of longer-term strategies to prevent
conditions that foster international terrorism.22 At best, targeted killings appear to be a stalemate. By some
accounts, however, drone strikes may be indirectly increasing the number of militants . In Yemen, for
example, in 2010 the Obama administration described al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) as encompassing “several hundred
al-Qaeda members”; two years later, it increased to “more than a thousand members.” By July 2012, AQAP had “a few thousand
members.”23 The evidence that U.S. drone strikes create “blowback”— whereby killing suspected militants or civilians leads to the
marked radicalization of local populations that join or sympathize with al-Qaeda or affiliated organizations—varies widely within the
affected states, and it is difficult to determine motivations for joining domestic insurgencies and groups dedicated primarily to
international terrorism like AQAP, which has made several attempts to attack the United States. Nevertheless, there
appears to
be a strong correlation in Yemen between increased targeted killings since December 2009 and
heightened anger toward the United States and sympathy with or allegiance to AQAP.24
Hostility felt from drone strikes overseas produces anti-American sentiment
Kennedy 13 (Greg, a Professor ¶ of Strategic Foreign Policy ¶ at the Defence Studies ¶
Department, King's College ¶ London, based at the Joint ¶ Services Command and Staff ¶ College,
Defence Academy ¶ of the United Kingdom, in ¶ Shrivenham, “Drones: Legitimacy and AntiAmericanism,” Parameters 42(4)/43(1) Winter-Spring 2013, Strategic Studies Institute at the
United States Army War College
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Issues/WinterSpring_2013/3_A
rticle_Kennedy.pdf
p. 27)
In addition, as with any use of force, drone strikes in overseas ¶ contingency operations can lead to
increased attacks on already weak ¶ governments partnered with the United States. They can
lead to retaliatory attacks on local governments and may contribute to local instability. ¶ Those
actions occur as a result of desires for revenge and frustrations ¶ caused by the strikes. Feelings
of hostility are often visited on the most ¶ immediate structures of authority—local government
officials, government buildings, police, and the military.12 It can thus be argued that, at ¶ the strategic level,
drone strikes are fuelling anti-American resentment ¶ among enemies and allies alike. Those
reactions are often based on ¶ questions regarding the legality, ethicality, and operational
legitimacy ¶ of those acts to deter opponents. Therefore, specifically related to the ¶ reaction of
allies, the military legitimacy question arises if the use of ¶ drones endangers vital strategic
relationships.13 One of the strategic ¶ relationships being affected by the drone legitimacy issue
is that of the ¶ United States and the United Kingdom.43
Drone usage poses threat to U.S. legitimacy in democracy and foreign relations
Kennedy 13 (Greg, a Professor ¶ of Strategic Foreign Policy ¶ at the Defence Studies ¶
Department, King's College ¶ London, based at the Joint ¶ Services Command and Staff ¶ College,
Defence Academy ¶ of the United Kingdom, in ¶ Shrivenham, “Drones: Legitimacy and AntiAmericanism,” Parameters 42(4)/43(1) Winter-Spring 2013, Strategic Studies Institute at the
United States Army War College
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Issues/WinterSpring_2013/3_A
rticle_Kennedy.pdf
p. 28)
The divide between US policy and action is exacerbated by drone ¶ technology, which makes the once
covert practice of targeted killing ¶ commonplace and undeniable. It may also cause deep-rooted distrust ¶ due to a
spectrum of legitimacy issues. Such questions will, therefore, ¶ undermine the US desire to
export liberal democratic principles. Indeed, ¶ it may be beneficial for Western democracies to
achieve adequate rather ¶ than decisive victories, thereby setting an example of restraint for
the ¶ international order.16 The United States must be willing to engage and ¶ deal with dronelegitimacy issues across the entire spectrum of tactical, ¶ operational, strategic, and political
levels to ensure its strategic aims are ¶ not derailed by operational and tactical expediency.
Drones destabilize sovereignty of allied nations, destroying US credibility and
influence.
Schirch 12, (Dr. Lisa, authored the brief drawing on research in Afghanistan and Pakistan from
2009-2011 in which she interviewed dozens of Pakistani and Afghan lawyers, civil society leaders
and citizens. “9 Costs of Drone Strikes”, Partners for Peace building Policy, Policy Brief June 1st
2012, http://3phumansecurity.org/site/images/stories/PolicyBriefs/122.pdf pg4)
7. Drones Undermine Government Authority and Legitimacy, Cause State Fragility: Unilateral U.S. use of drones is seen
to undermine state sovereignty and legitimacy, stir political unrest, and challenge alliances.
The governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan publically denounced drone strikes to distance
themselves from public anger. Rumors posit that the government’s privately consented to the strikes. The expanding
use of drone strikes gives the impression to an increasingly media-savvy public that these governments
have little ability to influence or control external military forces. The public’s already tenuous relationship
with their governments suffer as the public critiques drones strikes as merely furthering U.S. interests
and undermining their own interests and sovereignty. 8. Drones Draw Attention Away from Greater Nuclear
Security Threats in Pakistan: Supporting the legitimacy and authority of democratic governments is critical. The threat of anti-‐
government militants overthrowing the government of Pakistan and gaining control of its nuclear capability is a far greater danger
than threats from drone targets. Some argue the unpopular Pakistan government, accused of nodding consent to the U.S. drone
bombings, prevents the growing number of anti-‐American militants from gaining access to a functioning nuclear missile arsenal.14 9.
Drones Communicate Cowardice, Undermining Ability to Form Tribal Alliances: According to counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen,
“using robots from the air ... looks both cowardly and weak” to local populations.15 Anti-‐American cartoons and jokes feature the
drones as symbols of American impotence or cowardice. Given the importance of bravery and courage in tribal cultures, the use of
drone strikes signals untrustworthiness, making it more difficult for the U.S. to form agreements or even get information from key
tribal leaders. The drone strikes undermine even basic cooperation and information sharing by local populations.
Reliance on drone strikes undermines the legitimacy and morality of the
administration
McCrisken 11 (Trevor, Associate Professor in Politics and International Studies at the
University of Warwick, “Ten years on: Obama’s war on terrorism in rhetoric and practice,”
International Affairs Vol. 87: Issue 4, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, July 2011
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/87_4mcCrisken.pdf
p. 793-794)
Despite the success of the bin Laden campaign, Obama’s stated opposition to maintaining Guantánamo indefinitely, the difficulties of
relocating those held there, ¶ and the more general problems associated with the seizure of terrorist suspects ¶ and their
incarceration either in the US or in other territories have nonetheless ¶ had consequences for policy and practice that raise further
questions about the ¶ President’s commitment to combating terrorism in more morally principled ways ¶ than his predecessor.
Rather than resolving the complex issues of what to do ¶ with captured suspects, where to hold them, how to interrogate them
humanely, ¶ how to try them and where to incarcerate them, the
administration has come ¶ to rely more and
more on a rather more immediate and permanent solution to ¶ combating the threat posed by
individual terrorists. During the first year of the ¶ Obama administration there were 51
reported uses of unmanned Predator drones ¶ against targets housing alleged terrorists in
Pakistan alone, more than the 45 used ¶ during the entire presidency of George W. Bush. In
2010 this number more than ¶ doubled to 118, and by the middle of May 2011 there had
already been 27 such ¶ attacks in Pakistan.38 Further counterterrorism drone attacks have also
occurred ¶ in Yemen, Somalia and Afghanistan. Technological advances can partially explain the growth in usage
from Bush to Obama, but there is more going on here. While ¶ the CIA under Obama has reportedly dropped out of the ‘detention
and interrogation business’,39 it has considerably stepped up the business of killing suspected ¶ terrorists in these targeted drone
attacks, signaling that Obama prefers a kill-not-capture policy.¶ The
heavy reliance on drone attacks raises all
sorts of questions relating ¶ to legitimacy, morality, proportionality and accountability. How
can these ¶ unmanned, remotely targeted strikes be justified as legitimate policy by a
constitutional, democratic state? How accountable are the CIA and private company ¶ officers
tasked with supplying target information and deploying the weapons? ¶ Who gives authority
for the hit lists and what is their legality? Who is responsible ¶ for the decisions on whether or
not to strike a target? Can civilian casualties be ¶ justified in order to kill terrorist suspects? What
impact do these attacks have on ¶ relations with Pakistan? And is the killing of terrorists, particularly their ‘leaders’, ¶ actually
effective?4444
Drones undermine credibility, the justification of misusing drones represents
U.S. as an exception and U.S. values are compromised
Sadat 12 (Leila Nadya, Henry H. Oberschelp Professor of Law and Director of the Whitney R.
Harris World Law Institute, Washington University in St. Louis, “America’s Drone Wars,” Case
Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Vol. 45, 2012
http://law.case.edu/journals/JIL/Documents/45CaseWResJIntlL1%262.12.Article.Sadat.pdf
p. 231-233)
This essay has argued that the legal framework within which U.S. ¶ drone strikes are carried out as part of the “war on terror” is
shaky, ¶ especially outside of active war zones. Indeed, it rests upon ¶ assumptions about international humanitarian law that are
highly ¶ contested. At the same time, it is certainly correct that some drone
strikes are legal under more
traditional notions of international ¶ humanitarian law than those the U.S. government
currently seems to ¶ employ. Yet, as this essay has already noted, international ¶ humanitarian law rules
do not address the question whether the use of ¶ drones by the United States is effective, nor
whether it is morally ¶ justified or represents U.S. values. ¶ As Whitney R. Harris wrote, some years before his
¶
death, ¶ [T]he rule of law of Nuremberg, and of modern Rome [meaning ¶ the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court] is ¶
universal, binding large states and small, victor and vanquished ¶ in any future war. The principle was most forcefully expressed ¶ by
Mr. Justice Jackson when he declared that international
law condemned aggression by every nation, “including
those which ¶ sit here now in judgment.”¶ 70¶ This idea has been captured by Jeremy Waldron’s work
requiring ¶ legal norms to be neutral in their application and has particular ¶ salience for the use
of drones and targeted killing as tactics of war.¶ The United States now conducts its targeted
killing campaign as if ¶ only states with “good” purposes (like us) will have access to or ¶ deploy
these weapons. Waldron notes that if we defend as legal (and ¶ appropriate) a norm (N1) such as,
“named civilians may be targeted ¶ with deadly force if they are presently involved in planning
terrorist ¶ atrocities or are likely to be involved in carrying them out in the ¶ future,”¶ 71 because
international humanitarian law applies to all states ¶ alike, we must expect N1 to be used by
other states, including ¶ enemies of the United States. Moreover, given American disinclination ¶ to permit
international, or even domestic scrutiny, of its targeted ¶ killing operations, the United States cannot expect other countries to ¶ do
much better, especially countries we might expect to use targeted ¶ killing, and drones if they had them, unscrupulously. The
notion that ¶ the “good guys” get to use different rules than the “bad guys” has ¶ periodically
surfaced in both moral analysis72 and at the international ¶ criminal tribunals. Recall the arguments made and initially
accepted ¶ in the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) case at the Special Court for Sierra ¶ Leone that, as the opponents of the Revolutionary
United Front, the ¶ CDF were operating under different principles.73 Yet those arguments ¶ have been overwhelmingly rejected by
the nations of the world in the ¶ Statute of the International Criminal Court. By its terms, Rome Law ¶ applies to all nations, small or
large, rich or poor;74 with, ¶ unfortunately a possible escape hatch for the Permanent Members of ¶ the Security Council and
countries under their protection. It is ¶ estimated that over seventy other countries, including China, Russia, ¶ Pakistan, and Iran, now
possess drone technology.75 Current U.S. ¶ policy on drones appears to be providing other countries with ¶ unintended incentives to
both develop and use these weapons.¶ Finally, as Peter Singer recently noted, specific uses of drones in ¶ war may not only violate
international humanitarian law, but they ¶ represent a technology that appears to remove the last political ¶ barrier to war. The drone
campaign involves hundreds of strikes and ¶ thousands of deaths, and yet it has never been seriously debated or ¶ authorized by
Congress. Moreover, it has spread to additional ¶ countries and campaigns: nearly 150 American unmanned systems ¶ were deployed
over Libya, without approval by Congress.76 When ¶ asked why there was no need to comply with the War Powers ¶ Resolution to
obtain additional authorization for the use of force, the ¶ White House argued that the operations did not “involve the presence ¶ of
U.S. ground troops, U.S. casualties or a serious threat thereof.”¶ 77 As ¶ Singer notes, however, “they did involve something we used
to think ¶ of as war: blowing up stuff, lots of it.”¶ 78¶ Drones are fired from thousands of miles away, using technology ¶ that
resembles a video game. After the killing is over, the drone ¶ operator returns home to a “normal” life—perhaps grabbing a bite to ¶
eat, hugging his kids, or enjoying time with friends. Some uses
of ¶ drones may be clearly legal under the
principles of the laws of war; ¶ but their misuse and overuse as counterterrorism tools raise
real legal ¶ and moral problems. While the occasional or exceptional use of drone ¶ strikes to target very dangerous
individuals that cannot be captured ¶ might be tolerable, the widespread use of these controversial weapons ¶
by the United States is deeply problematic. As we saw with the ¶ practice of torture by the
United States following the 9/11 attacks, ¶ the exception easily becomes the rule, and those
opposing the use of ¶ targeted killing find themselves trying to justify why a particular ¶
individual should not be killed, rather than the government being ¶ required to show not only why it is legal for the killing
to take place, ¶ but that capture is impossible. Existing practices carry two major risks for U.S. interests that are likely to grow over
time. The first comes from operational restrictions on drones due to domestic and international pressure. In the United States, the
public and policymakers are increasingly uneasy with lim- ited transparency for targeted killings.3 If the present trajectory con- tinues,
drones may share the fate of Bush-era enhanced interrogation techniques and warrantless wiretapping—the unpopularity and illegality of which eventually caused the policy’s demise. Internationally, objections from host states and other counterterrorism partners
could also severely circumscribe drones’ effectiveness. Host states have grown frustrated with U.S. drone policy, while opposition by
nonhost partners could impose additional restrictions on the use of drones. Reforming U.S. drone strike policies can do much to allay
concerns internationally by ensuring that targeted killings are defensible under international legal regimes that the United States itself
helped estab- lish, and by allowing U.S. officials to openly address concerns and counter misinformation. The second major risk is that
of proliferation. Over the next decade, the U.S. near-monopoly on drone strikes will erode as more countries develop and hone this
capability. The advantages and effectiveness of drones in attacking hard-to-reach and time-sensitive targets are com- pelling many
countries to indigenously develop or explore purchasing unmanned aerial systems. In this uncharted territory, U.S. policy pro- vides a
powerful precedent for other states and nonstate actors that will increasingly deploy drones with potentially dangerous ramifications.
Reforming its practices could allow the United States to regain moral authority in dealings with other states and credibly engage with
the international community to shape norms for responsible drone use.
Link: Drones Hurt Foreign Aid
Drone strike is undermining U.S. Foreign Aid
AC 2013 (Atlantic Council, non partisan think tank, “YEMEN POLICY INITIATIVE”, Hariri Center
for the Middle East, March 26 2013,
http://www.acus.org/files/uploads/ypi130326obamaletter.pdf, p. 1-2)
We congratulate your a dministration, the US Embassy in Sana’a, the Department of State and the US Agency for International
Development (USAID) on efforts to focus on long - term development and humanitarian needs and to shift funding allocations acc
ordingly. Despite fiscal constraints, the US government has leveraged significant resources to support the implementation of the
transition agreement and the National Dialogue process. USAID
and other agencies are helping internally
displaced persons and the country’s most vulnerable populations. We can be proud that the United
States is the single largest contributor of humanitarian aid to Yemen. We also recognize and appreciate
the efforts of many US officials to address the recommendations that many in this group advanced in a Ju ne 2012 letter.
These positive developments , however, are considerably hampered by the chronic and
pervasive perception both here and in Yemen that the United States pursues its security interests
with little regard to the stra tegy’s impact on Yemen itself. The perception that the United States is singularly
focused on al - Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is a symptom of this problem . Yemenis understand that AQAP is a threat
to both Yemenis and Americans, and most recognize the need to confront those who plan and pledge to attack the United States.
However,
the current approach to combating these threats is proving itself counterproductive
and in need of urgent reevaluation. The United States is right to invest in enhancing the capacity and operational
effectiveness of Yemen ’s armed forces. We have worked to provide training and technical assistance to Yemeni security forces for
the purpose of combating extremism. President Hadi’s decision to rest ructure the security forces will help the government
respond to domestic threats , and US support for a Yemeni - led process to implement this reorganization with a unified, centralized
command structure will enhance the effectiveness of security forces . This will ul timately enhance their capability to provide
security to Yemeni citizens and disrupt terrorist networks throughout the country. However,
the increased reliance on
drone s undermines our long - term interest in a stable, secure, and
s us tainable partner in Yemen. A growing
body of research indicates that civilian casualties and material damage from drone strikes discredit the central government and
engender resentment towards the U nited States . Where drone strikes have hit civilians , news reports and first - hand accounts
increasingly indicate that affected families and villages are demonstrating and chanting against the Yemeni and US government.
This creates fertile ground for new recruits and sympathizers who might provide safe haven or direct support to AQAP and its
the political cost of
alienating Yemeni s, reduces the political space within which we can cooperate with and
help strengthen the Yemeni government. B y embracing the expansive use of US drone s , President Hadi risks
local affiliate , Ansar al - Sharia. The collateral damage produced by drone strikes, along with
undermin ing the legitimacy of his government . The vast majority of Yemenis likely accept that the Yemeni government must
combat violent extremists that have found safe haven in Yemen, but reject US control of this campaign . The US strategy in
Yemen is based on the core assumption that a strong and legitimate government is essential to overcome the myriad of challenges
the country faces. B y associating itself with drone strikes, the Yemeni government unwittingly undercuts its credibility among st
the population . Opposition to drone strikes is becoming a national rallying cry for those distrust ful of the central government —
from Ansar al - Sharia , to Houthis , to Southerners. Ultimately, the United States will not be able to overcome the threat of AQAP
we cannot simply kill our way out of this problem. The only effective long term strategy will prioritize helping the Yemeni government address the very factors that allow extremist
ideology to spread: the absence of basic social services, a worsening food shortage, and
chronic unemployment . The US government has made some positive changes over the past four years in terms of its
by military means alone –
policy toward Yemen, but more can and must be done to set our policy on the right course. Senior administration officials already
Yemen’s economic development and political transition, but actions
speak louder than words. This is the moment to strengthen this commitment with concrete
action . With the development of a new national security team, your administration is well positioned to make the following
emphasize our commitment to
changes in US policy
Drones destroy US aid credibility through double standards of how the US views
the rights of its own citizens versus those of other countries
Schirch 12, (Dr. Lisa, authored the brief drawing on research in Afghanistan and Pakistan from
2009-2011 in which she interviewed dozens of Pakistani and Afghan lawyers, civil society leaders
and citizens. “9 Costs of Drone Strikes”, Partners for Peace building Policy, Policy Brief June 1st
2012, http://3phumansecurity.org/site/images/stories/PolicyBriefs/122.pdf pg4)
6. Drones Contribute to Perceptions of U.S. Double Standards: The U.S. has blocked efforts for
drone victims to pursue their claims in Pakistani courts.13 Meanwhile USAID fosters “rule of
law” programs in Pakistan. But Pakistani’s note these USAID efforts are undermined by the
continuing series of events in Pakistan that grant Americans immunity for their crimes, such as
civilian drone victims, the saga of Raymond Davis, the CIA’s use of immunization campaigns to identify
bin Laden, and accidental deaths of Pakistani forces. Furthermore, citizens of countries where the U.S. uses
drones ask whether American citizens would accept the use of drones on an American religious center or school if insurgents were
hiding there alongside civilians. In
local perspectives, drone attacks are undemocratic and illustrate that
the U.S. devalues the lives of people in other countries, putting U.S. interests above the lives of
Pakistanis, Somalis, and Yemenis.
Internal Link: Alliances Key to Heg
Alliances are key to hegemony
Joseph S. Nye 13 Jr. is a professor at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, “American
power in the 21st century will be defined by the ‘rise of the rest’” 6-28-13,
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-06-28/opinions/40255646_1_american-power-u-seconomy-united-states, DOA: 7-23-13, y2k
In the last century, the United States rose from the status of second-tier power to being
the world’s sole superpower. Some worry that the United States will be eclipsed in this
century by China, but that is not the problem. There is never just one possible outcome.
Instead, there are always a range of possibilities , particularly regarding political change in China. Aside from the political uncertainties,
China’s size and high rate of economic growth will almost certainly increase its strength in relation to the United
States. But even when China becomes the world’s largest economy , it will lag decades behind
the United States in per-capita income, which is a better measure of an economy’s sophistication. Moreover, given our energy
resources, the U.S. economy will be less vulnerable than the Chinese economy to external shocks. Growth will bring
China closer to the United States in power resources, but as Singapore’s former prime minister Lee Kwan Yew has noted, that does not necessarily mean that China will
Even if China suffers no major domestic political
setbacks, projections based on growth in gross domestic product alone ignore U.S. military
and “soft power” advantages as well as China’s geopolitical disadvantages in the Asian balance of power. The U.S. culture of
openness and innovation will keep this country central in an information age in which
networks supplement, if not fully replace, hierarchical power. The United States is well
surpass the United States as the world’s most powerful country.
positioned to benefit from such networks and alliances if our leaders follow smart
strategies . In structural terms, it matters that the two entities with per-capita income and
sophisticated economies similar to that of the United States — Europe and Japan — are both
allied with the United States. In terms of balances-of-power resources, that makes a large
difference for the net position of American power , but only if U.S. leaders maintain the
alliances and institutional cooperation. In addition, in a more positive sum view of power with, rather than over, other countries, Europe
and Japan provide the largest pools of resources for dealing with common transnational problems. On the question of absolute — rather than relative — American
decline, the United States faces serious domestic problems in debt, secondary education and political gridlock. But these issues are only part of the picture. Of the many
possible futures, stronger cases can be made for the positive over the negative. Among the negative futures, the most plausible is one in which the United States
But barring such mistaken
strategies, there are, over a longer term, solutions to the major problems that preoccupy us. Of course, for
overreacts to terrorist attacks by turning inward and closing itself off to the strength it obtains from openness.
political or other reasons, such solutions may remain forever out of reach. But it is important to distinguish between situations that have no solutions and those that, at
Decline is a misleading metapho
least in principle, can be solved.
r and, fortunately, President Obama has rejected the suggested strategy of
“managing decline.” As a leader in research and development, higher education and entrepreneurial activity, the United States is not in absolute decline, as happened in
ancient Rome. In relative terms,
there is a reasonable probability that the United States is likely to
remain more powerful than any single state in the coming decades.
We do not live in a “post-American
world,” but neither do we live any longer in the “American era” of the late 20th century. In terms of primacy, the United States will be “first” but not “sole.” No one has a
crystal ball, but the National Intelligence Council (which I once chaired) may be correct in its 2012 projection that although the unipolar moment is over, the United States
The
power resources of many states and non-state actors will rise in the coming years. U.S.
presidents will face an increasing number of issues in which obtaining our preferred
outcomes will require power with others as much as power over others. Our leaders’
probably will remain first among equals among the other great powers in 2030 because of the multifaceted nature of its power and legacies of its leadership.
capacity to maintain alliances and create networks will be an important dimension of our
hard and soft power.
Simply put, the problem of American power in the 21st century is not one of a poorly specified “decline” or being eclipsed by
China but, rather, the “rise of the rest.”
The paradox of American power is that even the largest country will
not be able to achieve the outcomes it wants without the help of others.
Internal Link: Credibility Key to Hegemony
Credibility key to foster foreign cooperation and hegemony
John Ikenberry 4 Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton, “Liberal Realism:
The Foundations of a Democratic Foreign Policy”, The National Interest, Fall
The Bush Administration's disregard for legitimacy has had devastating consequences for
America's standing in the world, particularly among Europeans. The country that for decades was seen to be
at the forefront of progressive change is now regarded as a threat to the international system.
During the heyday of American legitimacy amid the Cold War, it would have been unthinkable for a German chancellor to rescue his bid for re-election by insisting that Berlin
stand up to Washington. Not only did Gerhard Schroder do so in 2002, but candidates in other countries--Spain, Brazil and South Korea--have thrived by distancing themselves
a world of degraded American legitimacy, other countries are more reluctant to
cooperate with the United States. Over the longer term--and in a thousand different ways-countries will take steps to separate themselves from the United States, to resist its leadership
and to organize their regions of the world in opposition to Washington. From the perspective of liberal realism,
legitimacy is an intrinsic aspect of power. To care about legitimacy is not to cede American
power to the UN or any other party. Instead, it is to exercise American power in a manner that
continues to attract the support of others. Successive American presidents have found ways to do so because they realized that to legitimate
from the United States. In
American power was to turn coercion and domination into authority and consent. In Jean-Jacques Rousseau's famous formulation from The Social Contract: "The strongest is
never strong enough to be always master, unless he transforms strength into right and obedience into duty."
Legitimacy is key to band-wagon
Lavina Rajendram Lee 10 is a lecturer in the Department of Modern History, Politics and
International Relations at Macquarie University, Australia, and has a PhD in International
Relations from the University of Sydney. “US Hegemony and International Legitimacy,” 1-25-10,
http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415552363/, Accessed date: 11-7-12 y2k
This book examines US hegemony and international legitimacy in the post-Cold War era, focusing on its leadership in the two wars on
Iraq. The
preference for unilateral action
force against Iraq in 2003, has
in foreign policy under the Bush Administration, culminating in the use of
unquestionably created a crisis in the legitimacy of US global
leadership . Of central concern is the ability of the U nited S tates to act without regard for the
values and interests of
its
allies or for international law on the use of force, raising the
question : does international legitimacy truly matter in an international system dominated by
a lone superpower?
US Hegemony and International Legitimacy explores the relationship between international legitimacy
and hegemonic power through an in depth examination of two case studies – the Gulf Crisis of 1990-91 and the Iraq Crisis of 2002-03
– and examines the extent to which
normative beliefs about legitimate behaviour influenced the
decisions of states to follow or reject US leadership . The findings of the book demonstrate that
subordinate states play a crucial role in consenting to US leadership and endorsing it as
legitimate and have a significant impact on the ability of a hegemonic state to maintain order
with least cost. Understanding of the importance of legitimacy will be vital to any attempt to
rehabilitate the global leadership credentials of the United States under the Obama Administration.
Internal Link: Foreign Aid
Aid programs create hegemonic influence internationally- numerous empirics
prove
Ehrenfeld 04, (Daniel, University of Maryland professor posting in a peer reviewed journal
analyzing humanitarian intervention, “Foreign Aid Effectiveness, Political Rights and Bilateral
Distribution”, The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, February 1st,
http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/75)
For some donors, notably the Nordic countries, developmental and humanitarian motives have figured prominently in the allocation
of aid. [12] Even though altruistic behaviour may be part of the motivation in both types of aid, bilateral aid is more likely to be
oriented toward the donor’s economic and strategic interests. States
are able to take advantage of their direct
control of the funds they bestow by requiring, requesting or expecting certain gains (in various
forms) in return. For example, “Japan concentrates its aid in the Asian region; Britain and France give much of their aid to
former colonies; political and cultural relations are evident in OPEC’s aid allocations; and strategic motives dominate the bilateral aid
programs of the United States.” [13] In all these cases, national
interest shapes the style of aid in the hopes
that it may allow them to strengthen ties with recipients for economic, political, strategic or
cultural reasons. [14]¶ In the economic sphere, the use of tied aid has consistently featured
appreciably in foreign aid. Tied aid is the practice of requiring the recipient “to spend a proportion of the aid given on goods
and services produced by the donor nation,” specifically with reference to bilateral aid, on which the donor has greater control. [15]
This strategy is intended to create job opportunities and promote export industry domestically by securing increased sales to the
recipient country, and allowing domestic firms to penetrate these new markets. Tied aid also avoids the prospect of subsidizing future
competitors in other countries with one’s own tax dollars. The United States, Canada and Spain have been the greatest tiers of aid.
[16] A total of about 30% of foreign aid is tied. [17]¶ Political
and strategic motivations such as security goals,
access to military bases and strategic natural resources, diplomatic ties and prestige have been
prominent features of aid policy for the governments of states. They link aid to ‘exchange conditions’, or
quid pro quos, either expressly or implicitly. Studies have proven the link between US and Soviet foreign aid
and international political support, especially, during the Cold War period, where aid given by the United
States and the Soviet Union was meant to solidify their respective alliances and allow them access
to territory from which to involve themselves in proxy wars and political currency in order to contain
the enemy. [18] Such politically motivated aid can be observed with respect to American aid to its
biggest recipients, Israel and Egypt, since 1977 and Soviet assistance to Cuba and Syria. [19]¶ Also in such countries as
Japan, Italy and Britain governments have devised aid and trade packages specifically in response to domestic pressures such as
political lobbying by local business and commercial interests, and public opinion. [20] Public outcry could result more generally in
cases of humanitarian disasters, [21] and more specifically by ethnic groups who are asymmetrically altruistic to specific recipient
countries. The government accepts contributions from the lobbyists and the level of contribution depends on the policy that the
government pursues. For example, the African lobbies in France, the Indian lobby in the United Kingdom and the Turkish lobby in
Germany are well known for their activities in these multi-cultural donor countries. [22]¶
Foreign aid programs enhance hegemony better than hard power
APSA 9 (American Political Science Association, The American Political Science Association is the leading
professional organization for the study of political science and serves more than 15,000 members in over 80 countries. With a range
of programs and services for individuals, departments and institutions, APSA brings together political scientists from all fields of
inquiry, regions, and occupational endeavors within and outside academe in order to expand awareness and understanding of
politics, “ U.S.
Standing in the World: ¶ Causes, Consequences, ¶ and the Future,” Task Force Report,
October 2009,
http://www.apsanet.org/media/PDFs/APSAUSStandingShortFinal.pdf
p. 17)
While public diplomacy can be improved, it should not be the only approach to standing. ¶
During the Cold War, U.S. public diplomacy organizations like USIA worked best when ¶ they
disseminated factual information and objective news. Deliberate spinning of the news, ¶ of the
kind now perfected in electoral campaigns and in recent years imitated by the U.S. ¶
government, is received with suspicion or outright disbelief in many countries where U.S. ¶
standing has plummeted. ¶ At the same time, more resources should be devoted to a broader
definition of public ¶ diplomacy, one that considers the public goods that matter most to most
of humanity. ¶ The United States spent more than 600 billion dollars for defense in 2010-11, ten
times the ¶ amount for diplomacy and foreign assistance—and this even after the Obama
administration ¶ had sharply reversed the budgetary priorities of the U.S. government. While
the U.S. military’s ¶ strength and presence is key to U.S. standing in the world, greater funding
for other types ¶ of diplomacy—e.g., humanitarian aid, social services in fractured nations—
could enhance ¶ credibility and esteem as well, and perhaps at better value. ¶ Going beyond the world of
states, we are also seeing a shift to a more pluralist, complex ¶ global network of intersecting exchanges. This shift provides
opportunities to enhance ¶ America’s standing. Global chat rooms, business organizations eager to rebrand themselves, ¶ thousands
of NGOs, private diplomacy (conducted by rock stars, corporate executives, ¶ foundation heads, and ex-presidents) now rival in size
the foreign aid expenditures of major ¶ states. Furthermore, innumerable electronic, audio, and print media outlets, hundreds of ¶
thousands of foreign students, the dreamscapes of Hollywood movies, and American Idols all ¶ have an effect on standing that is
significant even though it cannot be measured readily. The ¶ United States needs to consider how it nurtures these efforts without
dictating their content. ¶ One idea would be to rework the tax code so that it enhances and encourages international ¶ activity that
earns good will.
Internal Link: Soft Power Key to Hegemony
Soft power is key to leadership
Sankar Sen 5 is Former Director of Indian National Police Academy, The Statesman, 4-5-5, L/N
anti-American sentiment is sweeping the world after the Iraq war. It has, of course, been aggravated
by the aggressive style of the present American President. Under George Bush, anti-Americanism is widely thought to have reached new
heights. In the coming years the USA will lose more of its ability to lead others if it decides to act
Indeed
unilaterally . If other states step aside and question the USA's policies and objectives and
seek to de-legitimise them, the problems of the USA will increase manifold. American
success will lie in melding power and cooperation and generating a belief
in other countries
that
their interests will be served by working with instead of opposing the United States . It is
aptly said that use of power without cooperation becomes dictatorial and breeds
resistance and resentment. But cooperation without power produces posturing and no concrete progress. There is also another
disquieting development. It seems American soft power is waning and it is losing its allure as
a model society . Much of the rest of the world is no longer looking up to the USA as a
beacon. Rising religiosity, rank hostility to the UN, Bush's doctrine of preventive war, Guantanamo Bay etc are creating disquiet in the minds of many and turning them
off America. This diminution of America's soft power will also create disenchantment and may
gradually affect American pre-eminence.
Impact: Hegemony
Hegemony prevents great power war and key to successful transition to
multilateralism
Barnett 11 (Thomas, Former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis
& Research Department, worked as the Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force
Transformation in the Department of Defense, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and
Globalization, at Crossroads,” The World Politics Review, March 7, 2011,
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-sand-globalization-at-crossroads)
Events in Libya are a further reminder for Americans that we stand at a crossroads in our continuing evolution as the world's sole fullservice superpower. Unfortunately, we are increasingly seeking change without cost, and shirking from risk because we are tired of
the responsibility. We don't know who we are anymore, and our president is a big part of that problem. Instead of leading us, he
explains to us. Barack Obama would have us believe that he is practicing strategic patience. But many experts and ordinary citizens
alike have concluded that he is actually beset by strategic incoherence -- in effect, a man overmatched by the job. It is worth first
examining the larger picture: We
live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global
order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and
absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya,
because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some
fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be
engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order
since World War II. Let me be more blunt: As
the guardian of globalization, the U.S. military has been the
greatest force for peace the world has ever known. Had America been removed from the global
dynamics that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended. Indeed, it's
entirely conceivable there would now be no identifiable human civilization left, once nuclear weapons
entered the killing equation. But the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war.
Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our now-perpetual great-power peace. We
introduced the international liberal trade order known as globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What resulted
was the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights,
the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, and a roughly 10-fold increase in
adjusted global GDP and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based
conflicts. That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the
image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on
self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook
revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most
vigorously revisionist force. As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked
like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The
last great period of global structural change was the
first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars.
That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive
worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion
people. Though admittedly crude, these calculations
suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a 99 percent relative drop
in deaths due to war. We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the Americanbirthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively
faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the
geometry to come. To continue the historical survey, after salvaging Western Europe from its half-century of civil war, the U.S.
emerged as the progenitor of a new, far more just form of globalization -- one based on actual free trade rather than colonialism.
America then successfully replicated globalization further in East Asia over the second half of the 20th century, setting the stage for
the Pacific Century now unfolding. As a result, the vector of structure-building connectivity shifted from trans-Atlantic to trans-Pacific.
But if the connectivity push of the past several decades has been from West to East, with little connectivity extended to the South
outside of the narrow trade of energy and raw materials, the current connectivity dynamic is dramatically different. Now, the
dominant trends are: first, the East cross-connecting back to the West via financial and investment flows as well as Asian companies
"going global"; and second, the East creating vast new connectivity networks with the South through South-South trade and
investment. The
challenge here is how to adjust great-power politics to these profound forces of structural
change. Because of the West's connectivity to the East, we are by extension becoming more deeply connected to the unstable
South, with China as the primary conduit. Meanwhile, America's self-exhausting post-Sept. 11 unilateralist bender triggered the
illusion -- all the rage these days -- of a G-Zero, post-American world. The result, predictably enough for manic-depressive America, is
that we've sworn off any overall responsibility for the South, even as we retain the right to go anywhere and kill any individuals -preferably with flying robots -- that we deem immediately threatening to our narrowly defined national security interests. The
problem with this approach is that China has neither the intention nor the ability to step up and play anything resembling a
responsible Leviathan over the restive South, where globalization's advance -- again, with a Chinese face -- produces a lot of nearterm instability even as it builds the basis for longer-term stability. Libya is a perfect example of where the world is now stuck:
America is very reticent to get involved militarily, while China, for the first time in its history, engages in long-range military operations
to evacuate its workforce there. Meanwhile, the expanding civil war rages on, to everyone's moral and economic distress. The point is
not that America must invade Libya pronto to keep the world as we know it from coming to an end. But
if the United States
and the West sit by while the Rest, risers that they are, manage nothing more than pious warnings
about needlessly butting in, then we all run the risk of collectively making the post-American, G-Zero, do-nothing storyline
a self-fulfilling prophecy. While that alone won't stop the world from spinning, if it persists as a pattern, globalization will
slide down another path: one of regionalism, spheres of influence and neocolonial burdens that
are intuitively hoarded by great powers grown increasingly suspicious of one another. And if you
know your history, that should make you nervous.
US hegemony prevents nuclear war and extinction
Kagan 2007 (Robert Kagan, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, “End of Dreams, Return of History”, Real Clear Politics, July 19th 2007,
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/07/end_of_dreams_return_of_histor.html)
Finally, there is the
United States itself. As a matter of national policy stretching back across numerous administrations,
Democratic and Republican, liberal and conservative, Americans have insisted on preserving regional
predominance in East Asia; the Middle East; the Western Hemisphere; until recently, Europe; and now,
increasingly, Central Asia. This was its goal after the Second World War, and since the end of the Cold War, beginning with the first
Bush administration and continuing through the Clinton years, the United States did not retract but expanded its influence eastward
across Europe and into the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Even as
it maintains its position as the
predominant global power, it is also engaged in hegemonic competitions in these regions with
China in East and Central Asia, with Iran in the Middle East and Central Asia, and with Russia in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the
Caucasus. The United States, too, is more of a traditional than a postmodern power, and though Americans are loath to acknowledge
it, they generally prefer their global place as "No. 1" and are equally loath to relinquish it. Once having entered a region, whether for
practical or idealistic reasons, they are remarkably slow to withdraw from it until they believe they have substantially transformed it
in their own image. They profess indifference to the world and claim they just want to be left alone even as they seek daily to shape
the behavior of billions of people around the globe. The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and wouldbe nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism
in all its forms is
back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status.
American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying -- its regional as well as its global
predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently
the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have
done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars
of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of
these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it
could simply make them more catastrophic. It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the
United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability
Impact: Soft Power
Soft power is key to solve multiple extinction scenarios
Nye 8 (Joseph, professor of International Relations at Harvard University, “American Power After
the Financial Crises,” Foresight Project, 2008,
http://www.foresightproject.net/publications/articles/article.asp?p=3533)
Power always depends on context, and in today's world, it is distributed in a pattern that resembles a complex three-dimensional
chess game. On the top chessboard, military power is largely unipolar and likely to remain so for some time. But on the middle
chessboard, economic
power is already multi-polar, with the US, Europe, Japan and China as the
major players, and others gaining in importance. The bottom chessboard is the realm of transnational relations that
cross borders outside of government control, and it includes actors as diverse as bankers electronically transferring sums larger than
most national budgets at one extreme, and terrorists transferring weapons or hackers disrupting Internet operations at the other. It
also includes new challenges like pandemics and climate change. On this bottom board, power
is widely dispersed, and
it makes no sense to speak of unipolarity, multi-polarity or hegemony. Even in the aftermath of the financial
crisis, the giddy pace of technological change is likely to continue to drive globalisation,
but the political effects will be quite different for the world of nation states and the world of non-state actors.
In inter-state politics, the most important factor will be the continuing "return of Asia". In 1750, Asia had three-fifths of the world
population and three-fifths of the world's product. By 1900, after the industrial revolution in Europe and America, Asia's share shrank
to one-fifth of the world product. By 2040, Asia will be well on its way back to its historical share. The
"rise" in the power
of China and India may create instability, but it is a problem with precedents, and we
can learn from history about how our policies can affect the outcome. A century ago,
Britain managed the rise of American power without conflict, but the world's failure to
manage the rise of German power led to two devastating world wars. In transnational politics,
the information revolution is dramatically reducing the costs of computing and communication. Forty years ago, instantaneous global
communication was possible but costly, and restricted to governments and corporations. Today it is virtually free to anyone with the
means to enter an internet café. The barriers to entry into world politics have been lowered, and non-state actors now crowd the
stage. In 2001, a non-state group killed more Americans than the government of Japan killed at Pearl Harbor. A pandemic spread by
birds or travelers on jet aircraft could kill more people than perished in the first or second world wars. This is a new world politics with
which we have less experience. The problems of power diffusion (away from states) may turn out to be more difficult than power
transition among states. The
problem for American power in the 21st century is that there are
more and more things outside the control of even the most powerful state. Although
the United States does well on the traditional measures, there is increasingly more
going on in the world that those measures fail to capture. Under the influence of the information
revolution and globalisation, world politics is changing in a way that means Americans cannot
achieve all their international goals acting alone. For example, international financial
stability is vital to the prosperity of Americans, but the United States needs the
cooperation of others to ensure it. Global climate change too will affect the quality of
life, but the United States cannot manage the problem alone. And in a world where borders are
becoming more porous than ever to everything from drugs to infectious diseases to terrorism, America must mobilise
international coalitions to address shared threats and challenges. As the largest
country, American leadership will remain crucial. The problem of American power after this crisis is not one
of decline, but realisation that even the largest country cannot achieve its aims without the help
of others
A2: Drone Tech Good
Drone strikes risk too much civilian error – GITMO proves
McKelvey 11 (Benjamin, Benjamin McKelvey serves as Executive Development Editor on the
Editorial ¶ Board of the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law. He is a member of the Class of ¶
2012 at Vanderbilt University Law School, Due Process Rights and the ¶ Targeted Killing of
Suspected ¶ Terrorists: The Unconstitutional ¶ Scope of Executive Killing Power, Vanderbilt Journal
of Transnational Law, Vol. 44, 2011
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/jotl/manage/wp-content/uploads/mckelvey-pdf.pdf
p. 1375)
B. A Record of Error and Abuse of Authority¶ Currently, there is no specific evidence that the targeted killing program has been used
the Executive’s exercise of authority in
identifying and pursuing threats of terror has produced a worrisome error rate.175 According to an
for illegitimate purposes other than national defense and security. However,
analysis of Predator drone strikes in Pakistan conducted by the New America Foundation, since 2004, the non-militant fatality rate has
been roughly 20 percent.176 In other words, about one-fifth of those killed by Predator drone strikes have been non-military targets,
including innocent civilians.177 In
June of 2010, it was reported that the government lost nearly 75
percent of the cases involving habeas petitions filed by detainees at Guantanamo Bay.178 This
suggests that for the majority of detained enemy combatants, the government has had
insufficient evidence for the assertion that the detained individuals were involved in hostilities
against the United States.179 The rate of error in these instances only adds to the concern over
the procedural guarantees of the targeted killing process and the need for a more standardized
process with a robust system of screening and oversight.¶ There is also historical precedent for cautiously
evaluating the legitimacy and constitutionality of unreviewable executive authority in matters of espionage and national security. In
1976, President Ford issued an executive order outlawing political assassination.180 The order was a response to revelations after the
Watergate scandal that the CIA had attempted to assassinate Cuban President Fidel Castro multiple times.181 Every U.S. president
since Ford has upheld the ban on political assassinations in subsequent executive orders.182 This is an example of classified CIA
activity that, once publicly known, was deemed unacceptable as a matter of law and policy.183 The current targeted killing program
conducted in executive secrecy raises concerns similar to those of political assassination.
A2: Hard Power
Soft Power is key to hard power
Nye 06 (Joseph S. Nye, political scientist and former Harvard school of government dean, “Soft
Power, Hard Power and Leadership”, Harvard, October 27th 2006,
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/netgov/files/talks/docs/11_06_06_seminar_Nye_HP_SP_Leadershi
p.pdf,p.5)
Hard and soft power are related because they are both aspects of the ability to achieve one’s
purpose by affecting the behavior of others. Sometimes people are attracted to others with command power by myths of
invincibility. In some extreme cases known as “the Stockholm syndrome,” fearful hostages become attracted to their captors as a
means to reduce painful stress. As Osama bin Laden put it in one of his videos, “when people see a strong horse and a weak horse,
by nature, they will like the strong horse.” Sometimes great intimidators have a vision and reputation for success that attracts others
despite their bullying behavior --witness the examples of Steve Jobs, Martha Stewar t and Hyman Rickover, the father of the nuclear
navy. Among the great industrial titans, Andrew Carnegie and Thomas J. Watson of IB M led primarily by intimidation; George
Hard and soft power sometimes reinforce and
sometimes interfere with each other. Almost every leader needs a certain degree of soft power . As David Hume
pointed out more than two centuries ago, no individual is alone strong enough to coerce everyone else. A dictator must
Eastman and Robert Noyce led primarily through inspiration.
attract or induce an inner circle of henchmen to impose his coercion. Even Hitler, Stalin and Mao had such a circle of acolytes. But except for some
religious leaders such as the Dalai Lama, soft power is rarely sufficient. And a leader who only courts popularity may be reluctant to exercise hard power
when he should. Alternatively, leaders
who throw their weight around without regard to the effects on
their soft power may find others placing obstacles in the way of their hard power. Machiavelli may be
correct that it is better for a prince to be feared than to be love d, but we sometimes forget that the opposite of love is not fear, but
When the exercise of
hard power undercuts soft power, it makes leadership more difficult – as the United States is finding out in its
hatred. And Machiavelli made it clear that hatred is something a prince should carefully avoid.
struggle against jihadist terrorism. The ability to combine hard and soft power fruitfully is “smart power.” Soft power is not good per
se, and it is not always better than hard power. Nobody likes to feel manipul ated, even by soft power. Like any form of power, it
can be wielded for good or bad purposes, and these often vary with the eye of the beholder. Bi n Laden possesses a great deal of soft
power in the eyes of his acolytes, but that does not make his actions good from an American point of view. It is not necessarily
better to twist minds 5 than to twist arms. If I want to steal your money, I can threaten you with a gun, or I can persuade you with a
false claim that I will save the world. The second means depends upon attraction or soft power, but the result remains theft in both
instances
Soft power of national value portrayal outweighs drones “hard power” – more
sustainable
Harman 2012
(Jane, former U.S. Representative for California's 36th congressional district reporting from the
Aspen Security Forum, “Fighting terrorism softly,” CNN, July 10, 2012,
http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/07/10/fighting-terrorism-softly-opinion/ accessed 8/1)
Unfortunately, one of the greatest security threats to this country continues to be the hijacking not only of
our airplanes, but also of our national narrative .Many Americans think that the United States' primary role in the world is
the projection of military might. And while the "hard power" represented by drone strikes and aircraft
carriers is essential to our security, living and portraying our values is as - if not more - important
in the long run.¶ The terrorists on the so-called "baseball cards" that the president and his advisers review before authorizing
drone strikes are already beyond the point of no return -responsible either for directly killing Americans or inciting others to do so.¶
But what about
the young people who perhaps see the aftermath of a drone strike and are still
trying to decide whether or not to strap on that suicide vest? Whose story do we want them to hear? Ours or
that of the extremists?¶ While the drone program is an effective tool to combat al Qaeda, "whack-a-mole"
alone won't keep us safe. We need to win the argument.¶ Unfortunately, showcasing our values to the
world has become increasingly difficult given Congress's lack of cohesiveness and eroding support for
foreign aid. Blame-game politics has shifted the emphasis from creative ideas to crippling ideology, making it nearly impossible to
raise and debate some of the toughest issues facing this country today.¶ As a result, we
are perilously close to losing
control of our own narrative, allowing extremists to slip in and define what we believe in and
what we stand for in the post-9/11 world. Foggy laws and a lack of information surrounding
targeted killings, preventive detention, and interrogation techniques have made it far too easy
for terrorists to shape and spread their own story. And they will continue to use any stains on our record (think:
Abu Ghraib) as ammunition.¶
A2: Heg Bad
No impact turns---hegemonic decline emboldens rising power and challengers--US intervention is inevitable, only a question of effectiveness.
Stuart Gottlieb 12 is an Adjunct Professor of International Affairs and Public Policy at Columbia
University's School of International and Public Affairs, where he is also an affiliate of the Saltzman
Institute of War and Peace Studies. He worked as a foreign policy adviser and speechwriter to
two senior Democratic senators and has worked on presidential campaigns for both Democratic
and Republican candidates. “What if U.S. stops policing the world?” September 19, 2012,
http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/18/opinion/gottlieb-us-retrenchment/index.html, Accessed Date:
4-19-13 y2k
But the question is not whether promises to bring home troops and reduce military spending can be sold in an election year -- the
question is what impact would retrenchment have on future U.S. and global security. If history is
any guide, the answer is troubling : Over the past century, each of America's attempts to reduce its
role in the world was met by rising global threats , eventually requiring a major U.S. reengagement.
This is not to argue that the U.S. should sustain its muscular post-9/11 global posture or continue its land war in
Afghanistan. It is to urge caution against a growing belief that scaling back American power in the world will be without risks or costs.
History shows that in
the aftermath of America's major wars of the 20th century -- World War I, World
War II and Vietnam -- the American public and powerful leaders in Washington demanded strict new
limits in foreign policy. After World War I, that meant rejecting participation in the League of Nations and receding into
isolation. After World War II, it meant embarking on one of the largest voluntary military demobilizations in world history. And after
Vietnam, it meant placing new restrictions on a president's ability to conduct overseas operations.
But in each case , hopes
were soon dashed by global challengers who took advantage of America's effort to draw back
from the world stage -- Germany and Japan in the 1930s, the Soviet Union in the immediate
post-World War II period and the Soviet Union again after Vietnam. In each case, the United States was
forced back into a paramount global leadership role
and proxy wars of the 1980s. Similar
-- in World War II, the Cold War and the military build-up
effects have also followed the withdrawal of U.S. troops from global
hot spots , as in Somalia in 1993. America's need to extricate itself from that calamitous humanitarian mission, in which 18 U.S.
soldiers were killed, was clear. But the withdrawal came at a huge strategic cost: It emboldened the
narrative of the emerging al Qaeda network that America was a "paper tiger ," setting the stage
for the escalating
terrorist
attacks
of the 1990s and September 11, 2001. The Afghan war: When friends are enemies U.S.
steps up Mideast military presence Military option for Pres. Obama in Libya Obama's desire to withdraw from costly and unpopular
foreign conflicts and refocus on domestic issues is understandable. And he is by no means an isolationist, as his intensified war on al
Qaeda can attest. But Obama's assertion
that his recalibration of U.S. foreign policy -- centered on
withdrawing U.S. troops from Mideast wars and leaning more on allies and the United Nations -- has awakened "a new
confidence in our leadership" is without foundation . Like Great Britain in the 19th century,
America since the turn of the 20th century has been the world's pivotal global power . Fair or
not, in moments when America seemed unsure of its role
in the world,
the world noticed and
reacted . There is no reason to believe now is different. Indeed, in many ways looming
opportunists are more obvious today
than the 1930s, 1970s and 1990s. These include
al Qaeda and other
Islamist movements spinning U.S. troop withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan as strategic defeats; an emboldened
Iran on the cusp of attaining nuclear weapons; and a rising China flexing its muscles in the South China Sea. To
his credit, Romney has strongly warned against a world with more limited American leadership. He has also promised to reverse
Obama's defense cuts and offer his own increases. But while Obama's approach may be shortsighted, Romney's would face an uphill
battle against fiscal and popular sentiment. These issues must certainly be raised in the upcoming presidential debates. Whoever wins
in November will confront not just an increasingly dangerous world, but also an increasingly isolationist public. The great challenge
will be to convince the American people that
security
robust U.S. leadership in the world remains vital to
their
and prosperity and convince the world it remains unwavering. History shows that doing otherwise only raises the stakes
down the line.
Even if they win their offense, legitimacy smooths the transition – key to global
stability
Kevin Fujimoto 12, Lt. Colonel, U.S. Army, January 11, 2012, “Preserving U.S. National Security
Interests Through a Liberal World Construct,” online:
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Preserving-US-NationalSecurity-Interests-Liberal-World-Construct/2012/1/11
The emergence of peer competitors, not terrorism, presents the greatest long-term threat to our
national security. Over the past decade, while the United States concentrated its geopolitical focus on fighting two land wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, China
has quietly begun implementing a strategy to emerge as the dominant imperial power within
Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. Within the next 2 decades, China will likely replace the United States as the Asia-Pacific regional hegemonic
power, if not replace us as the global superpower.1 Although China presents its rise as peaceful and non-hegemonic, its construction of naval bases in neighboring countries and
military expansion in the region contradict that argument.
With a credible threat to its leading position in a unipolar
global order , the U nited S tates should adopt a grand strategy of “investment,” building legitimacy
and capacity in the very institutions that will protect our interests in a liberal global construct of
the future when we are no longer the dominant imperial power . Similar to the Clinton era's grand strategy of
“enlargement,”2 investment supports a world order predicated upon a system of basic rules and
principles, however, it differs in that the United States should concentrate on the institutions (i.e., United Nations, World Trade Organization, ASEAN, alliances, etc.) that
support a world order, as opposed to expanding democracy as a system of governance for other sovereign nations. Despite its claims of a benevolent expansion, China is
already executing a strategy of expansion similar to that of Imperial Japan's Manchukuo policy during the 1930s.3 This three-part strategy
involves: “(i) (providing) significant investments in economic infrastructure for extracting natural resources; (ii) (conducting) military interventions (to) protect economic interests;
and, (iii) . . . (annexing) via installation of puppet governments.”4 China has already solidified its control over neighboring North Korea and Burma, and has similarly begun more
ambitious engagements in Africa and Central Asia where it seeks to expand its frontier.5 Noted political scientist Samuel P. Huntington provides further analysis of the motives
behind China's imperial aspirations. He contends that “China (has) historically conceived itself as encompassing a “‘Sinic Zone'. . . (with) two goals: to become the champion of
Chinese culture . . . and to resume its historical position, which it lost in the nineteenth century, as the hegemonic power in East Asia.”6 Furthermore, China holds one quarter of
the world's population, and rapid economic growth will increase its demand for natural resources from outside its borders as its people seek a standard of living comparable to
The rise of peer competitors has historically resulted in regional instability and one
should compare “the emergence of China to the rise of. . . Germany as the dominant power in Europe in the late nineteenth century.”7 Furthermore, the rise of
another peer competitor on the level of the Soviet Union of the Cold War ultimately threatens U.S. global influence , challenging
its concepts of human rights, liberalism, and democracy; as well as its ability to co-opt other nations to accept them.8 This decline in influence, while initially
limited to the Asia-Pacific region, threatens to result in significant conflict if it ultimately leads to a paradigm
shift in the ideas and principles that govern the existing world order. A grand strategy of
investment to address the threat of China requires investing in institutions, addressing ungoverned states, and building
legitimacy through multilateralism. The United States must build capacity in the existing institutions and
alliances accepted globally as legitimate representative bodies of the world's governments. For true legitimacy, the United States must support these institutions, not only
that of Western civilization.
when convenient, in order to avoid the appearance of unilateralism, which would ultimately undermine the very organizations upon whom it will rely when it is no longer the
global hegemon. The United States must also address ungoverned states, not only as breeding grounds for terrorism, but as conflicts that threaten to spread into regional
instability, thereby drawing in superpowers with competing interests. Huntington proposes that the greatest source of conflict will come from what he defines as one “core”
nation's involvement in a conflict between another core nation and a minor state within its immediate sphere of influence.9 For example, regional instability in South Asia10
the United States, as a global power,
must apply all elements of its national power now to address the problem of weak and failing states, which
threaten to k,l as the principal catalysts of future global conflicts. 11 Admittedly, the application of American power in
threatens to involve combatants from the United States, India, China, and the surrounding nations. Appropriately,
the internal affairs of a sovereign nation raises issues. Experts have posed the question of whether the United States should act as the world's enforcer of stability, imposing its
concepts of human rights on other states. In response to this concern, The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty authored a study titled, The
Responsibility to Protect,12 calling for revisions to the understanding of sovereignty within the United Nations (UN) charter. This commission places the responsibility to protect
peoples of sovereign nations on both the state itself and, more importantly, on the international community.13 If approved, this revision will establish a precedent whereby the
United States has not only the authority and responsibility to act within the internal affairs of a repressive government, but does so with global legitimacy if done under the
auspices of a UN mandate.
Any effort to legitimize and support a liberal world construct requires the United
States to adopt a multilateral doctrine which avoids the precepts of the previous administration:
“preemptive war, democratization, and U.S. primacy of unilateralism ,”14 which have resulted in the alienation of former
allies worldwide . Predominantly Muslim nations, whose citizens had previously looked to the United States as an example of representative governance, viewed
the Iraq invasion as the seminal dividing action between the Western and the Islamic world. Appropriately, any future American interventions into the internal affairs of another
sovereign nation must first seek to establish consensus by gaining the approval of a body representing global opinion,
and must reject military
unilateralism as a threat to that governing body's legitimacy . Despite the long-standing U.S. tradition of a liberal foreign policy since the start of
the post-9/11 doctrine of national security strategy . . .
has been based on . . . American global dominance, the preventative use of force, coalitions of the willing, and the struggle
the Cold War, the famous liberal leviathan, John Ikenberry, argues that “
between liberty and evil .”15 American foreign policy has misguidedly focused on spreading democracy, as opposed to building a liberal international order
based on universally accepted principles that actually set the conditions for individual nation states to select their own system of governance. Anne-Marie Slaughter, the former
true Wilsonian idealists “support liberal
democracy, but reject the possibility of democratizing peoples . . .”16 and reject military primacy in
Dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, argues that
favor of supporting a rules-based system of order . Investment in a liberal world order would also
set the conditions for the United States to garner support from noncommitted regional powers (i.e.,
Russia, India, Japan, etc.), or “ swing civilizations ,” in countering China's increasing hegemonic
influence .17 These states reside within close proximity to the Indian Ocean, which will likely emerge as the geopolitical focus of the American foreign policy
during the 21st century, and appropriately
have the ability to offset China's imperial dominance
in the region.18 Critics of a liberal
world construct argue that idealism is not necessary, based on the assumption that nations that trade together will not go to war with each other.19 In response, foreign affairs
columnist Thomas L. Friedman rebukes their arguments, acknowledging the predicate of commercial interdependence as a factor only in the decision to go to war, and argues that
while globalization is creating a new international order, differences between civilizations still
create friction that may overcome all other factors and lead to conflict .20 Detractors also warn that as China grows
in power, it will no longer observe “the basic rules and principles of a liberal international order,” which largely result from Western concepts of foreign relations. Ikenberry
addresses this risk, citing that China's leaders already recognize that they will gain more authority within the existing liberal order, as opposed to contesting it. China's leaders
“want the protection and rights that come from the international order's . . . defense of sovereignty,”21 from which they have benefitted during their recent history of economic
Even if China executes a peaceful rise and the United States overestimates a Sinic threat to its national
the emergence of a new imperial power will challenge American leadership in the Indian
Ocean and Asia-Pacific region. That being said, it is more likely that China, as evidenced by its military and economic expansion, will displace the United States as the
regional hegemonic power. Recognizing this threat now, the United States must prepare for the eventual transition and
immediately begin building the legitimacy and support of a system of rules that will protect its
interests later when we are no longer the world's only superpower
growth and international expansion.
security interest,
A2: Soft Power Fails
Soft power creates cooperation
Nye 1990 (Joseph S. Nye, political scientist and former Harvard school of government dean,
“soft power”, Foreign Policy, No. 80, Autumn 1990,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1148580.pdf, p. 166-167)
These trends suggest a second, more attrac- tive way of exercising power than traditional means.
A state may achieve the
outcomes it prefers in world politics because other states want to follow it or have agreed to a situation
that produces such effects. In this sense, it is just as important to set the agenda and structure the situations
in world politics as to get others to change in particular cases. This second aspect of power-which occurs when one
country gets other countries to want what it wants-might be called co-optive or soft power in contrast with the hard
or com- mand power of ordering others to do what it wants. Parents of teenagers have long known that if they have shaped their
child's beliefs and pref- erences, their power will be greater and more enduring than if they rely only on active con- trol. Similarly,
political leaders and philosophizers have long understood the power of attractive ideas or the
ability to set the political agenda and determine the framework of debate in a way that shapes
others' preferences. The ability to affect what other countries want tends to be associated with intangible power resources
such as culture, ideology, and insti- tutions. Soft co-optive power is just as important as hard command power.
If a state can make its power seem legitimate in the eyes of others, it will encounter less
resistance to its wishes. If its culture and ideology are attractive, others will more willingly
follow. If it can establish international norms consistent with its society, it is less likely to have
to change. If it can support institutions that make other states wish to channel or limit their activities in ways the dominant state
prefers, it may be spared the costly exercise of coercive or hard power
International Law
UQ: Drone Proliferation Coming Now – Generic
Drones are rapidly proliferating and becoming weaponized
Wood 12 (David, American Drones Ignite New Arms Race From Gaza To Iran To China, Huffington Post, 27 November 2012,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/27/american-drones_n_2199193.html, da 8-2-13) PC
The drone wars are here.¶ While President Obama ponders new legal and moral guidelines to govern America's growing use
of armed robot aircraft, the world outside the White House is engaged in a revolutionary frenzy of building,
arming and flying killer drones.¶ Small, inexpensive and lethal, drones enable everyone from
terrorists to the Chinese People's Liberation Army to engage in what the Pentagon acknowledges is a new
arms race with "alarming" consequences. More than 50 countries operate surveillance drones
and, increasingly, are fitting them with weapons.¶ The U.S. covertly uses armed drones to assassinate alleged
terrorists or insurgents in Pakistan, Sudan and Somalia. In Pakistan alone, some 2,341 people identified as Taliban and al Qaeda
leaders have been killed, according to one authoritative account. Armed drones are increasingly active in Afghanistan as well, where
they've completed 1,160 strike missions since 2009, according to the latest Air Force data. American spy drones operate globally,
from the Western Pacific to Iran, where a secret U.S. spy drone was shot down last December.¶ But American
drones are
not alone in the sky. Spy drones routinely shadow U.S. aircraft carrier strike groups and other military exercises. Drones
crisscross the Persian Gulf. Israeli drones have circled over Gaza during the recent fighting there. Experts say
it's a rare conflict that doesn't attract spy drones; even the U nited N ations has considered using drones to
monitor the fighting in Congo.
New technology makes drone proliferation by state and non-state actors
inevitable
Wood 12 (David, American Drones Ignite New Arms Race From Gaza To Iran To China, Huffington Post, 27 November 2012,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/27/american-drones_n_2199193.html, da 8-2-13) PC
Obama administration officials have said they are weighing various options to codify the use of
armed U.S. drones, because the increased use of drones has been driven more by perceived
necessity than by deliberative policy. But that effort is complicated by the wildfire spread of drone technology: how
could the U.S. restrict its use of armed drones if others do not?¶ Already, the Pentagon is worried that China not
only is engaged in an "alarming" effort to develop and field high-tech drones, but it intends to
sell drone technology abroad, according to the Pentagon report.¶ Indeed, the momentum of the drone wars
seems irresistible. "The increasing worldwide focus on unmanned systems highlights how U.S.
military success has changed global strategic thinking and spurred a race for unmanned
aircraft," the Pentagon study reported.¶ Modern drones were first perfected by Israel, but the U.S. Air Force took the
first steps in 2001 to mount sophisticated drones with precision weapons. Today the U.S. fields some 8,000 drones and plans to invest
$36.9 billion to boost its fleet by 35 percent over the next eight years.¶ Current
research on next-generation drones
seems certain to exacerbate the drone arms race. The U.S. and other countries are developing "nano" drones, tiny
weapons designed to attack in swarms. Both the U.S. and China are working to incorporate "stealth" technology into micro drones.
The Pentagon is fielding a new weapon called the Switchblade, a 5.5-pound precision-attack drone
that can be carried and fired by one person -- a capability sure to be envied by terrorists.¶ "This
is a robotics revolution, but it's not just an American revolution -- everyone's involved, from Hezbollah to
paparazzi," Singer, the Brookings Institution expert, told The Huffington Post. "This is a revolution in which
billions and trillions of dollars will be made. To stop it you'd have to first stop science, and then business, and then war."
Link: US Precedent Ensures Drone Prolif
Current U.S. drone precedent encourages targeted killing that causes
international tension
Roberts 13 (Kristin, When the Whole World Has Drones, National Journal, 21 March 2013,
http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/when-the-whole-world-has-drones-20130321, da 8-1-13) PC
That’s true, at least today. It’s also irrelevant. Others
who employ drones are likely to carry a different
agenda, one more concerned with employing a relatively inexpensive and ruthlessly efficient tool to
dispatch an enemy close at hand.¶ “It would be very difficult for them to create the global-strike architecture we have, to
have a control cell in Nevada flying a plane over Afghanistan. The reality is that most nations don’t want or need that,” said Peter
Singer, director of the Brookings Institution’s Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and one of the foremost experts in
advanced military technology. “Turkey’s not looking to conduct strikes into the Philippines.... But Turkey is looking to be able to carry
out long-duration surveillance and potentially strike inside and right on its border.”¶ And that’s a NATO ally seeking the capability to
conduct missions that would run afoul of U.S. interests in Iraq and the broader Middle East. Already, Beijing
says it
considered a strike in Myanmar to kill a drug lord wanted in the deaths of Chinese sailors. What happens if
China arms one of its remote-piloted planes and strikes Philippine or Indian trawlers in the
South China Sea? Or if India uses the aircraft to strike Lashkar-e-Taiba militants near Kashmir?¶
“We don’t like other states using lethal force outside their borders. It’s destabilizing. It can lead
to a sort of wider escalation of violence between two states,” said Micah Zenko, a security policy
and drone expert at the Council on Foreign Relations. “So the proliferation of drones is not just
about the protection of the United States. It’s primarily about the likelihood that other states will increasingly
use lethal force outside of their borders.”
Dozens of actors are on the verge of acquiring drone technology, and they’re
following the U.S. example
Shane, national security correspondent, 11 (Scott, Coming Soon: The Drone Arms Race, New York Times, 8 October
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/sunday-review/coming-soon-the-drone-arms-race.html?_r=2&pagewanted=all, da 7-3113) PC
Eventually, the
U nited S tates will face a military adversary or terrorist group armed with drones,
military analysts say. But what the short-run hazard experts foresee is not an attack on the United States,
which faces no enemies with significant combat drone capabilities, but the political and legal challenges posed
when another country follows the American example. The Bush administration, and even more aggressively the
Obama administration, embraced an extraordinary principle: that the United States can send this robotic weapon over borders to kill
perceived enemies, even American citizens, who are viewed as a threat.¶ “Is this the world we want to live in?” asks Micah Zenko, a
fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. “Because we’re creating it.”¶ What was a science-fiction scenario not much more than a
decade ago has become today’s news. In Iraq and Afghanistan, military drones have become a routine part of the arsenal. In Pakistan,
according to American officials, strikes from Predators and Reapers operated by the C.I.A. have killed more than 2,000 militants; the
number of civilian casualties is hotly debated. In Yemen last month, an American citizen was, for the first time, the intended target of
a drone strike, as Anwar al-Awlaki, the Qaeda propagandist and plotter, was killed along with a second American, Samir Khan.¶ If
China, for instance, sends killer drones into Kazakhstan to hunt minority Uighur Muslims it accuses of plotting terrorism, what will the
United States say? What if India uses remotely controlled craft to hit terrorism suspects in Kashmir, or Russia sends drones after
militants in the Caucasus? American officials who protest will likely find their own example thrown back at them.¶ “The problem is
that we’re
creating an international norm” — asserting the right to strike preemptively against
those we suspect of planning attacks, argues Dennis M. Gormley, a senior research fellow at the
University of Pittsburgh and author of “Missile Contagion,” who has called for tougher export controls on American drone
technology. “The copycatting is what I worry about most.”¶ The qualities that have made lethal drones so attractive to the Obama
administration for counterterrorism appeal to many countries and, conceivably, to terrorist groups: a capacity for leisurely
surveillance and precise strikes, modest cost, and most important, no danger to the operator, who may sit in safety thousands of
miles from the target.¶ To date, only the United States, Israel (against Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza) and Britain (in
Afghanistan) are known to have used drones for strikes. But American
defense analysts count more than 50
countries that have built or bought unmanned aerial vehicles, or U.A.V.’s, and the number is rising every month.
Most are designed for surveillance, but as the United States has found, adding missiles or bombs is hardly a
technical challenge.¶ “The virtue of most U.A.V.’s is that they have long wings and you can strap anything to them,” Mr.
Gormley says. That includes video cameras, eavesdropping equipment and munitions, he says. “It’s spreading like wildfire.”¶ So far,
the United States has a huge lead in the number and sophistication of unmanned aerial vehicles (about 7,000, by one official’s
estimate, mostly unarmed). The Air Force prefers to call them not U.A.V.’s but R.P.A.’s, or remotely piloted aircraft, in
acknowledgment of the human role; Air Force officials should know, since their service is now training more pilots to operate drones
than fighters and bombers.¶ Philip Finnegan, director of corporate analysis for the Teal Group, a company that tracks defense and
aerospace markets, says global spending on research and procurement of drones over the next decade is expected to total more than
$94 billion, including $9 billion on remotely piloted combat aircraft. ¶ Israel
and China are aggressively developing
and marketing drones, and Russia, Iran, India, Pakistan and several other countries are not far
behind. The Defense Security Service, which protects the Pentagon and its contractors from espionage, warned in a
report last year that American drone technology had become a prime target for foreign spies .
US drone policy sets bad international precedent – drone proliferation inevitable
Benjamin 2012 (Medea, political activist and cofounder of Global Exchange, “Drones Create
Enemies – Tesimony by Medea Benjamin”, 11-16, PinkTank,
http://codepink.org/blog/2012/11/drones-create-enemies-testimony-by-medea-benjamin/) PY
I recently returned from leading a US delegation of 34 Americans to Pakistan, looking at the
results of US drone attacks. We found that drones are actually jeopardizing our security by
spreading hatred of Americans and sowing the seeds of violence for decades to come. Drones
help extremists recruit more discontented youth. In the tribal society of Waziristan where the
drones are attacking, we learned that people who have lost their family members in these
deadly attacks are bound by the Pashtun honor code — Pashtunwali — to retaliate and seek
revenge.¶ While for the most part we were received with great hospitality, we found intense
anger over the violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty and what people perceived as a cavalier
attitude towards their lives. “To Americans, we are disposable people; our lives are worth
nothing” an angry young man told me. At a meeting with the Islamabad Bar Association, we were
confronted by a group of lawyers yelling, “Americans, go home. You are all a bunch of
terrorists.Ӧ A June 2012 Pew Research poll found that 3 out of 4 Pakistanis considered the US
their enemy. With a population of over 180 million, that means 133 million people! Surely that
cannot be good for our national security. When Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar was asked
why there was so animosity towards the United States, she gave a one word answer: drones.¶
Suspending drone strikes won’t automatically make us loved or stop Islamic radicals, but
continuing the strikes only exacerbates the problem. Whether in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen
or Somalia—Al Qaeda, the Taliban or Al Shabab may be callously killing innocent people, local
police and armed forces, but b y capitalizing on the fear of drones and the intrusion of
Westerners, they cast themselves as defenders of the people.¶ The US Use of Drones Is Setting a
Dangerous Precedent¶ The US is using drones as if it were the only country to possess them. But
the overwhelming US dominance is coming to an end , with the technology falling into the
hands of other nations, friends and foes alike.¶ According to a GAO report, by 2012 more than
75 countries have acquired drones. Most of these are for surveillance and reconnaissance
missions but many countries—including Israel, Britain, France, Russia, Turkey, China, India and
Iran—either have or are seeking weaponized drones.¶ Israel is the world’s leading exporter of
drones, with more than 1,000 sold in 42 countries. China is producing some 25 different types of
drones. Iran has already begun deploying its own reconnaissance drones and weapons-ready
models are in the works. In October the Iranian government announced a new long-range drone
that can fly 2,000 kilometers; just weeks ago, an Iranian drone launched by Hezbollah flew in
Israeli airspace for three hours, beaming back live images of secret Israeli military bases before
being shot down by the Israeli military.¶ A 2012 GAO study reported that “certain terrorist
organizations” have acquired small, more rudimentary drones, such as radio-controlled aircraft
that are available through the Internet. But if terrorists were able to equip these drones with
even a small quantity of chemical or biological weapons, it could produce lethal results.¶ The
proliferation of drones should evoke reflection on the precedent that the US is setting by
killing anyone it wants, anywhere it wants, on the basis of secret information. Other nations
and non-state entities are watching—and are bound to start acting in a similar fashion.
U.S. targeted killing policies are vague and there is serious danger of other
countries modeling policies after the U.S.
Human Rights First 13 [an independent advocacy and action organization that challenges
America to live up to its ideals, “How to Ensure that the U.S. Drone Program does not Undermine
Human Rights”, Blueprint for the next administration, December 2013, updated April 2013,
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wpcontent/uploads/pdf/blueprints2012/HRF_Targeted_Killing_blueprint.pdf]AM
The manufacture and sale of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) is an increasingly global industry and drone technology is not
prohibitively complicated. Some
70 countries already possess UAVs3 —including Russia, Syria and
Libya4 —and others are in the process of acquiring them. As White House counterterrorism chief John
Brennan stated: the United States is "establishing precedents that other nations may follow, and
not all of them will be nations that share our interests or the premium we put on protecting
human life, including innocent civilians."5 By declaring that it is in an armed conflict with al
Qaeda’s “associated forces” (a term it has not defined) without articulating limits to that
armed conflict, the United States is inviting other countries to similarly declare armed
conflicts against groups they consider to be security threats for purposes of assuming lethal
targeting authority. Moreover, by announcing that all “members” of such groups are legally
targetable, the United States is establishing exceedingly broad precedent for who can be
targeted, even if it is not utilizing the full scope of this claimed authority.6 As an alternative to armed conflict-based targeting,
U.S. officials have claimed targeted killings are justified as self-defense responding to an
imminent threat, but have referred to a “flexible” or “elongated” concept of imminence,7
without adequately explaining what that means or how that complies with the requirements
of international law. In a white paper leaked to NBC news in February 2013, for example, the
Department of Justice adopts what it calls a “broader concept of imminence” that has no basis in law. According to the white paper,
an imminent threat need be neither immediate nor specific. This is a dangerous,
unprecedented and unwarranted expansion of widely-accepted understandings of
international law.
Link: Drones Will Be Used to Strike Dimona
Iran is supplying Hezbollah with drones to strike the Dimona nuclear reactor
Wood 12 (David, American Drones Ignite New Arms Race From Gaza To Iran To China, Huffington Post, 27 November 2012,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/27/american-drones_n_2199193.html, da 8-2-13) PC
An incident early last month dispelled any doubts about the spread of drone technology. On Oct. 6, a
small unmanned
aircraft flew high over Israel's Mediterranean coast, headed for its nuclear reactor at Dimona.
Soaring for 35 miles through heavily guarded Israeli airspace, the intruder was eventually shot down by an Israeli F16.¶ Against such small and maneuverable threats, Israel's missile defenses -- including its Arrow
and Iron Dome missile defense systems, so effective against rockets fired from Gaza this month -- are less effective.¶
Israeli officials speculated the drone in October was on a reconnaissance mission or possibly a
practice run for a later suicide attack on the nuclear site. Hezbollah, the radical Islamic militia and political
party based in Lebanon, later claimed that it had assembled and launched the drone. Experts said the
aircraft was in all likelihood provided by Iran, which already has operational drones and claims its
newest drone, the Shahed-129, has a range of 1,250 miles. The distance from Tehran to Tel Aviv: 988
miles.¶ A day after Israel shot down the Hezbollah drone, an armed Israeli drone fired a missile that wounded two activists and
eight passers-by in Gaza.¶ On Nov. 1, two Iranian jet fighters fired multiple rounds at an American Predator drone over the Persian
Gulf; the spy drone was conducting "routine surveillance," Pentagon spokesman George Little explained. The drone got away
unharmed.
Link: US Drone Policy Ensures China Prolif
Current U.S. practices erode international targeted killing norms, leading to
drone wars and state-sponsored terrorism
Whibley, received a M.A. in International Relations from Victoria University of Wellington and
his research is soon to be published in Intelligence and National Security, 13 (James, The Proliferation of
Drone Warfare: The Weakening of Norms and International Precedent, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 6 February 2013,
http://journal.georgetown.edu/2013/02/06/the-proliferation-of-drone-warfare-the-weakening-of-norms-and-internationalprecedent-by-james-whibley/, da 8-1-13) PC
In a recent article, David Wood
expresses concern over the start of a drone arms race, with China’s
beginning to adopt drone technology and Iran possibly supplying drones to
Hezbollah in Lebanon. Other reports show that Pakistan has also developed its own set of drones,
with offers of assistance from China to help improve their technological sophistication. The proliferation of drone
People’s Liberation Army
technology is in many ways unsurprising, as technology always spreads across the globe. Yet, the economic and organizational
peculiarities of drones may mean their adoption is more likely than other high-tech weapons.¶ Michael C. Horowitz, in his widely
praised book The Diffusion of Military Power, notes that states and non-state actors face a number of possible strategic choices when
considering military innovations, with the adoption of innovative technology not a foregone conclusion. States will consider both the
financial cost of adopting new technology and the organizational capacity required to adopt new technologies — that is, the need to
make large-scale changes to recruitment, training, or strategic doctrine. From a financial perspective, drones are an attractive option
for state and non-state actors alike, as they are vastly cheaper to build and operate than other forms of aerial technology, with the
high level of commercial applications for drone technology helping drive down their cost. Organizationally, drones still require a
significant level of training to operate in a combat setting, inhibiting their immediate adoption. Yet, as
strategic doctrine in
nearly every state prioritizes combating terrorism, drone programs will be easier to integrate
into military structures as Horowitz notes that how a military organization defines its critical
tasks determines the ease of adopting innovations. Even if the level of organizational capacity
needed to operate drones eludes most terrorist organizations, the apparent willingness of states
such as Iran to supply militant groups with drones raises the possibility of terrorist groups
acquiring tacit knowledge about operating them by networking with sympathising states .¶ If
drones are destined to proliferate, the more important issue may become whether American
drone doctrine is setting a precedent for other states over how drones are used, and if so, is American drone use
weakening the long-standing international norm against assassination? Current US practices include the use of
drones in countries without a declaration of war, the routine targeting of rescuers at the scene
of drone attacks and the funerals of victims, and the killing of US citizens. The existence of such
practices lends legitimacy to illiberal actions and significantly diminishes the moral authority of the US to
condemn similar tactics used by other states, whether against rebellious populations in their own territory or
enemies abroad.¶ While drone advocates such as Max Boot argue that other countries are unlikely to follow any precedents about
drone use established by America, power
has an undeniable effect in establishing which norms are
respected or enforced. America used its power in the international system after World War 2 to embed norms about human
rights and liberal political organization, not only in allies, but in former adversaries and the international system as a whole. Likewise,
the literature on rule-oriented constructivism presents a powerful case that norms have set
precedents on the appropriate war-fighting and deterrence policies when using weapons of
mass destruction and the practices of colonialism and human intervention. Therefore, drones
advocates must consider the possible unintended consequences of lending legitimacy to the
unrestricted use of drones. However, with the Obama administration only now beginning to formulate rules about
using drones and seemingly uninterested in restraining its current practices, the US may miss an
opportunity to entrench international norms about drone operations.¶ If countries begin to follow the
precedent set by the US, there is also the risk of weakening pre-existing international norms about the use of violence. In the summer
2000 issue of International Security, Ward Thomas warned that, while the long-standing norm against assassination has always been
less applicable to terrorist groups, the
targeting of terrorists is, “likely to undermine the norm as a whole
and erode the barriers to the use of assassination in other circumstances.” Such an occurrence would
represent a deleterious unintended consequence to an already inhumane international system, justifying greater scrutiny of the
drone program.
Internal Link: Dimona Strike Ensures Meltdown
An attack against Dimona ensures a catastrophic meltdown.
IPC 3
[International Press Center, “Dimona Reactor… a Mystery Threatening the Middle East”, 9-18,
http://stgvisie.home.xs4all.nl/VISIE/dimona.html]
Preface “The Israeli nuclear reactor of Dimona is vulnerable to meltdown, like the Russian reactor of
Chernobyl two decades ago, which caused a humanitarian and ecological catastrophe. If Dimona melts down, it would
affect an area 500 aerial kilometers in radius, reaching Cyprus and the entire neighboring region”, warned Dr.
Yousef Abu Safiya, Head of the Palestinian Environment Quality Authority. A recent study conducted by the Jordanian authorities after
a request from the Palestinian Environment Quality Authority revealed that the
Israelis are aware of the possibility of
a meltdown in Dimona reactor, which in turn would affect the whole region, mainly the Jordanian southern city of
Tafila. The study also showed that radioactive substances are leaking from the Dimona reactor in a way that has increased rates of
cancer diseases among nearby populations, particularly those of Tafila City. What make these assumptions largely based on solid
ground are the
latest satellite images of the Dimona reactor, which showed that its walls have
cracks, which cut its assumed age into half. With thorough investigation into Dimona Israel’s nuclear plant, one can observe the
following facts: Location: The location of Dimona's reactor in the Negev desert is a delicate one, situated between
Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority's territories. The reactor was built in 1963, as part of a deal with France, who pledged to
build the reactor in exchange for helping it and the United Kingdom in attacking Egypt in what was known as the 1956-tripartite. As
for funding the reactor's driving material, the United States took care of that, in addition to giving assistance with moving quantities
of enriched Uranium to Israel. The
area on which the Dimona reactor is built on includes nine buildings,
including the reactor building itself. Each building is tasked with producing a certain type of materials used to produce
weapons of mass destruction, such as Plutonium, Lithium and Beryllium, used to manufacture nuclear bombs, in addition to
producing radioactive Uranium and Triennium. The
Dimona reactor is considered to be the most mysterious
secrets of the "nuclear world", as Israel categorically refused, since its establishment in 1948 and after building the
reactor, any routine inspection that other reactors around the world goes through, which "forcibly" open their reactors' doors in fear
of the American waving of the "club" of international resolutions. No Inspection Beyond this Point! Israel might be considered the
only state that opposes to the inspection visits conducted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) all over the world, added
to its rejection, until this very day, to sign the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which was signed by all Arab
states. In spite of the complete American support for the Israeli policy, the
Americans have expressed their concern
over the reactor, as news revealed an American attempt to send some of its nuclear-program officials to inspect Dimona
reactor apart from those working in the IAEA, but Israel refused to allow them in, continuing the reactor's legacy of being "visitationproof", as only Israelis are allowed in. The Fifth Nuclear Power Israel is considered the fifth nuclear power in the world. In addition to
owning nuclear bombs that can be dropped from the air, its nuclear arsenal includes also nuclear warheads that can reach a distance
of 1,500 kilometers, using the Israeli-made "Jericho" missiles. Estimations show that Israel is in possession of 200 nuclear bombs, but
Arab sources indicate that Israel own massive quantities of Uranium and Plutonium that enables it of producing an additional 100
bombs. Israel, in the meantime, seeks to increase the production efficiency of its reactor to about three times its current efficiency –
from 28 to 100 megawatts. According to recent reports, the
Israeli nuclear reactor consumed 1,400 tons of
Uranium last year, which indicates that its efficiency might have reached 150 megawatts.
Dimona's Hazards In a study requested by the Palestinian Ministry of Environment Quality from the Jordanian authorities, it was
revealed that the average manifestation of cancer in the Al Tafila governorate, south of Jordan, is higher than the other Jordanian
governorates and surrounding Arab countries. According to Dr. Abu Safiya, high cancer rates were recorded in all the southern
Jordanian governorates, which confirmed the possible direction of nuclear dust that might be leaking from Dimona. It was
recently revealed that five Israeli families lost their sons who worked in Dimona reactor, and they
filed charges in the Central Court in Tel Aviv against the Israeli government and the reactor's administration, demanding
compensations for the cancer that killed those workers due to radiation exposure. According to the
lawsuit, the prosecutors are relatives to five Israelis who worked for a long time in the nuclear "village": Ze'eiv Schforn, born in 1931
and started working in Dimona in 1962 as the head of the supply crew. He was diagnosed with abdominal caner in 1966 and died in
1967. The second employee was Simon Dray, born in 1942 and worked in Dimona from 1966 until 1992 in the cleaning and
decontamination unit. In 1996 he was diagnosed with pharyngeal cancer, and died in 1998. The third was Moshe Zegori, born in 1947,
and worked in the reactor from 1965 until 1985, also in cleaning and decontamination. Before he left his job he found out that he had
a malignant tumor in his head, and died in 1987. The fourth employee was Yousif Cohen, born in 1938, and worked in the reactor
from 1970 until 1995, in maintenance. In 1997 he was diagnosed with several malignant tumors, and died in 1998. The fifth employee
is still suffering from cancer in his body, and is constantly under treatment. He worked in the reactor from 1969 until 1996, in
maintenance and mechanical engineering. The prosecutors of those victims are demanding the Israeli government to take
responsibility for their deaths, due to the radiation exposure they suffered inside the reactor, which caused fatal malignant tumors. At
the same time, they
claim that the reactor's administration didn't take enough precaution
measures and never warned the employees about the radiation hazard. Worn-out Reactor As reports
indicate, the reactor has become old now, as its isolation walls have worn-out, which might cause
the leakage of some radiation from the reactor, a thing that will lead to devastating health and ecological damages
to the surrounding area. According to the reports also, the reactor suffers from a dangerous crack caused by "neutron" radiation,
which caused structural damage, as neutrons cause small gas bubbles inside the concrete support, making it fragile and susceptible to
cracking. The United Arab Emirates-based "Al Bayan" newspaper revealed recently that a serious debate was going on now about
whether to stop working in the reactor before the catastrophe occurs or not. Additionally, a report made the by Israeli second TV
channel mentioned that dozens of the reactor's employees died of cancer, and that the reactor's administration refuses to reveal the
true number of casualties and fatalities. The
Dimona reactor wasn't also immune to many working
accidents that happened inside it, including the burning of hazardous and poisonous materials
without providing the employees with suitable protective equipment, as many of them died because of that. As well, quantities of
radioactive heavy water and nuclear waste leaked into a natural geographical hill extending along the reactor. Expired! By continuing
to maintain and operate Dimona reactor, Israel is committing a crime against humanity that will be added to the atrocities it
perpetrated along its history. Since
1971, the reactor has never been provided with new cooling towers,
even though the reactor's efficiency has increased since then. Dr. Abu Safiya pointed out that the most
dangerous hazards of Dimona reactor is in the element producing Plutonium, which is used to make nuclear bombs. It's one of the
resultant elements of Uranium DK dissipation, and it can be used to synthesize enriched Uranium. It contains 20% out of the 0.05%
Uranium, which is the highly radioactive substance that can be used in nuclear fission to manufacture either nuclear bombs or atomic
fuel. Abu Safiya warned that there's
a regional and long-term threat in Dimona reactor, represented in
the presence of these nuclear bombs in the possession of a country such as Israel, a thing that raises questions about
the inspection visits in Iraq and demanding Iran to be inspected too, as well as surprise inspections by the IAEA officials, while Israel
publicly admit to possessing nuclear weapons. In response to that, Shimon Peres, temporary chairman of the Israeli Labor party,
claimed that there's no comparison between Iraq and Israel, because, according to his claims, Iraq is ruled by a "dictator", while Israel
is a "democratic" state! Right after this statement, Israel used poisonous gases in the city of Khan Younis, which caused dozens of
Palestinian citizens to suffer from unconsciousness and severe illnesses, added to the spasms and hysterical conditions some of them
suffered from after inhaling such internationally-banned gases. Commenting on this incident, Dr. Abu Safiya said that "we ascertained
that these are nerve gases, by analyzing a specimen of the Israeli bombs that didn't burn completely. Through analysis, we revealed
that it is composed of a group of nerve gases, due to which affected citizens suffered from spasms… this is an evidence against the
state that Peres say it's "democratic", which used internationally-banned weapons against the Palestinian people." Noteworthy that
exposure to small amounts of radiation on the long run might pose a serious threat to embryos and children, as well as causing
cancer. Israel Least Damaged Dr. Abu Safiya demanded the IAEA "if they truly seek integrity" to run checks in order to discover the
level of radiation in the region around the Dimona reactor. "If we conduct, for example, a Contour Survey for all directions to see the
level of radiation and who's affected the most, we would find that Israel is the safest, having its population localities in the north far
from the reactor. In addition, 95% of the wind direction in Palestine is northwestern, which is opposite to the Israeli population
localities," Dr. Abu Safiya said. The simplest radiation leak resulting from Dimona reactor is that of the depleted Uranium, which is of
catastrophic implications, as it is considered one of the heavy elements that ruin kidney, liver and respiratory system functions,
leading to death. Only one atom of radioactive Uranium is enough to cause fatal cancer. What About the Reactor's Waste? As for the
waste products resulting from nuclear enrichment operations in Dimona reactor, Dr. Abu Safiya said that it's buried in areas near the
Palestinian Authority controlled territories, as well as Jordanian and Egyptian ones, especially in those areas where the flow of aquifer
water and direction of the wind is not in Israel's favor. A report by Israel's second TV channel revealed that Dimona reactor's waste
products are buried in the areas east of the Al Bureij refugee camp and the town of Deir El Balah. Currently, the Palestinian Authority
for Environment Quality is trying to get a permission to get water analysis equipment inside Gaza Strip to check these areas, but Israel
is refusing. "During the current Intifada, Israelis have buried nearly 50,000 tons of industrial chemical waste in Gaza Strip, only 30
meters deep, on an area of 5,000 square meters, as they stole the arable soil and moved it inside Israel and buried industrial waste in
its place. This means that there's 150,000 cubic meters of poisonous waste buried in Gaza, which is a
catastrophe. Moreover, Israel isn't affected by this waste because it was buried opposite to the flow of aquifer water," Abu Safiya
narrated. In the West Bank, most of what's buried is in the direction of the eastern hills, because it's not included in the Israelicontrolled lands, unlike the western hills. Now, the
eastern hills are polluted with chemical waster and
pesticides. Covering Up for Their Crimes In Ramallah and Hebron, the Palestinian Authority had some basic equipment to measure
radiation and environmental pollution. These equipment didn't only check radiation, but pollution in general, such as soil, water, air
and chemical pollution. In this subject, Dr. Abu Safiya said that small devices were discovered inside helicopters, which is used to
regulate the fan's rotation, as well as providing the pilot with some technical data. These devices, if exposed to a person or played
with by children, might lead to death or blood and gene mutations, as it contains radioactive materials. The Minister added that "after
these devices wore out, the Israelis dump them in the Palestinian controlled lands, and we found three of these devices in Ramallah,
one of which was in President Yasser Arafat's office 'Al Moqata'a'." Such devices were also found during the Israeli invasion of
Ramallah City on March 29, 2002, after the Authority received warnings of suspicious radioactive materials. When specialists from the
Authority of Environment Quality reached the area and checked these parts, they found out that it contained glowing radioactive
materials. The instruments those specialists had indicated that radiation levels exceeded the maximum limit. When the
manufacturing company was contacted concerning that, the company replied that these parts were sold to the Israeli Air Force, and
that it's used in helicopters of the type CH53. As soon as the Israeli occupying forces invaded Ramallah, the radiation checking
equipment were destroyed, including those equipment used to check the radioactive parts. Additionally, IOF blew up the
environment laboratory in Hebron and Ramallah, and destroyed all the equipment by throwing them from the fifth floor. Lately, a
cargo of Israeli waste was uncovered in the city of Hebron, which was composed of 80 barrels, in addition to 120 others in the town of
Al Ezareya, Jerusalem district. Furthermore, IOF moved in a cargo of 2,500 tons of radioactive base coarse, and the radiation was
further confirmed when it was checked. The shipment was coming from Italy, and when the Israeli Ministry of Environment
discovered that the radiation level of the base coarse was four times higher than that internationally allowed, the shipment was
illegitimately diverted to Gaza City. Unveiling the Hidden The Israeli government has recently decided to boycott the British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) after the latter made a documentary film about the Israeli nuclear weapons. Sources in the Israeli
Foreign Ministry explained that the film is Anti-Semitic –an accusation used by Israel to anyone or anything that they don't like. The
BBC had broadcasted previews of the documentary film, in which the narrator's voice is heard on the background of the Israeli reactor
core in Dimona and the photo of Mordechai Vanunu, who revealed the Israeli nuclear secrets, and the narrator asks: Which country in
the Middle East possesses nuclear weapons without declaring that? Which country in the Middle East possesses the chemical and
biological ability without declaring that? Which country in the world throws away the revealer of its nuclear secrets in jail for 18
years? As for the producer of the documentary, he interviewed several senior Israeli officials, including that chairman of the Israeli
Labor party, Shimon Peres, who is also considered the godfather of the Israeli nuclear program, and the man who created the nuclear
reactor in Dimona. The producer asked Peres why Iraq aren't allowed to possess nuclear weapons while Israeli can, and the answer
was clearly not satisfactory, and Peres found a claim to justify this question. As for Mordechai Vanunu, who is staying in Israeli jails
since 1986, as the Israeli court indicted him of espionage, treason and selling Israeli nuclear secrets to the "Sunday Times" British
newspaper, and was sentenced to 18 years in prison. Now, he spent 16 years of it. Vanunu said that the Israeli authorities prevented
him from meeting his British lawyers. "Now, Peres won't be able to lie to [Ronald] Reagan about not owning nuclear weapons. Now
everybody knows that," Vanunu said. Israel Protecting Itself Israel surrounds itself with all means of protection. For example, every
Israeli citizen has a pill of "stable Iodine", and can be taken anytime, as it gives radiation protection. It was revealed that Israeli
provided all its citizens with such a pill, under the pretext of fearing an Iraqi nuclear strike, but the truth confirmed that they
dispensed it because of fearing the meltdown of their own reactor, not only Dimona, but the other research facilities around Israel.
On the Palestinian level, the Authority of Environment Quality has tried to take some kind of protection, and sent a letter to the IAEA
and Arab Ministers of Health, considering that the
Palestinians are the weakest point and closest to the
reactor, as Palestinian controlled lands are only 50 aerial kilometers away from Dimona reactor, but all these letters were rejected!
Among the examples that might be shown to indicate the amount of damage caused to the Palestinians due to any nuclear meltdown,
the explosion that occurred in the pesticide factory in the city of Al Majdal (Ashkelon), where the stench of the pesticides reached
Palestinian cities and towns due to thermal turnover and wind. Here, Dr. Abu Safiya pointed out to the
danger that might
happen in case an amount of radiation leaks from Dimona reactor, which will jeopardize the
entire surrounding region and on a large geographical scale.
Internal Link: China Drones Destablize Senkaku/SE Asia
Chinese drone acquisition threatens U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific and causes
aggression – only reforming our drone policy checks them
CBS 5-3 (China emerges as new force in drone warfare, Associated Press, 3 May 2013, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_16257582699/china-emerges-as-new-force-in-drone-warfare/, da 8-3-13) PC
China's move into large-scale drone deployment displays its military's growing sophistication
and could challenge U.S. military dominance in the Asia-Pacific. It also could elevate the threat
to neighbors with territorial disputes with Beijing, including Vietnam, Japan, India and the
Philippines. China says its drones are capable of carrying bombs and missiles as well as conducting reconnaissance, potentially
turning them into offensive weapons in a border conflict.¶ China's increased use of drones also adds to concerns
about the lack of internationally recognized standards for drone attacks. The U nited S tates has
widely employed drones as a means of eliminating terror suspects in Pakistan and the Arabian Peninsula.¶ "China is
following the precedent set by the U.S. The thinking is that, `If the U.S. can do it, so can we. They're
a big country with security interests and so are we'," said Siemon Wezeman, a senior fellow at the arms transfers
program at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in Sweden, or SIPRI.¶ "The justification for an
attack would be that Beijing too has a responsibility for the safety of its citizens. There needs to
be agreement on what the limits are," he said.
China will use drones in foreign countries – it follows the U.S. precedent of
prioritizing counterterrorism over international backlash
Erickson, associate professor at the Naval War College and Associate in Research at Harvard
University's Fairbank Centre, and Strange, researcher at the Naval War College's China
Maritime Studies Institute and graduate student at Zhejiang University, 5-29-13 (Andrew and Austin,
China has drones. Now how will it use them? Foreign Affairs, McClatchy-Tribune, 29 May 2013,
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/China-has-drones-Now-how-will-it-use-them-30207095.html, da 8-3-13) PC
Yet there
is a reason why the U nited S tates has employed drones extensively despite domestic and
international criticism: it is much easier and cheaper to kill terrorists from above than to try to root
them out through long and expensive counterinsurgency campaigns. Some similar challenges loom on China's
horizon. Within China, Beijing often considers protests and violence in the restive border regions,
such as Xinjiang and Tibet, to constitute terrorism. It would presumably consider ordering precision strikes to suppress any
future violence there. Even if such strikes are operationally prudent, China's leaders understand that they would
damage the country's image abroad, but they prioritise internal stability above all else. Domestic
surveillance by drones is a different issue; there should be few barriers to its application in what is already one of the world's most
heavily policed societies. China might also be willing to use stealth drones in foreign airspace without authorisation if the risk of
detection were low enough; it already deploys intelligence-gathering ships in the exclusive economic zones of Japan and the United
States, as well as in the Indian Ocean.
Impact: Meltdowns Cause Extinction
Meltdowns would cause extinction.
Earth Island Journal, ‘2
[“America's Terrorist Nuclear Threat to Itself”, October 2002]
The intense radioactive heat within today's operating reactors is the hottest anywhere on the planet.
Because Indian Point has operated so long, its accumulated radioactive burden far exceeds that
of Chernobyl. The safety systems are extremely complex and virtually indefensible. One or more could be wiped out with a small
aircraft, ground-based weapons, truck bombs or even chemical/biological assaults aimed at the work force. A terrorist assault
at Indian Point could yield three infernal fireballs of molten radioactive lava burning through
the earth and into the aquifer and the river. Striking water, they would blast gigantic billows of horribly radioactive
steam into the atmosphere. Thousands of square miles would be saturated with the most lethal clouds
ever created, depositing relentless genetic poisons that would kill forever. Infants and small
children would quickly die en masse. Pregnant women would spontaneously abort or give birth to horribly deformed
offspring. Ghastly sores, rashes, ulcerations and burns would afflict the skin of millions. Heart
attacks, stroke and multiple organ failure would kill thousands on the spot. Emphysema, hair
loss, nausea, inability to eat or drink or swallow, diarrhea and incontinence, sterility and
impotence, asthma and blindness would afflict hundreds of thousands, if not millions. Then
comes the wave of cancers, leukemias, lymphomas, tumors and hellish diseases for which new
names will have to be invented. Evacuation would be impossible, but thousands would die trying. Attempts to quench
the fires would be futile. More than 800,000 Soviet draftees forced through Chernobyl's seething remains in a futile attempt to clean
it up are still dying from their exposure. At Indian Point, the molten cores would burn uncontrolled for days, weeks and years. Who
would volunteer for such an American task force? The immediate damage from an Indian Point attack (or a domestic accident) would
render all five boroughs of New York City an apocalyptic wasteland. As at Three Mile Island, where thousands of farm and wild
animals died in heaps, natural
ecosystems would be permanently and irrevocably destroyed . Spiritually,
psychologically, financially and ecologically, our nation would never recover. This is what we missed by a mere 40 miles
on September 11. Now that we are at war, this is what could be happening as you read this. There are 103 of these potential Bombs
of the Apocalypse operating in the US. They generate a mere 8 percent of our total energy. Since its deregulation crisis, California cut
its electric consumption by some 15 percent. Within a year, the US could cheaply replace virtually all the reactors with increased
efficiency. Yet, as the terror escalates, Congress is fast-tracking the extension of the Price-Anderson Act, a form of legal immunity that
protects reactor operators from liability in case of a meltdown or terrorist attack. Do we take this war seriously? Are we
committed to the survival of our nation? If so, the ticking reactor bombs that could obliterate the very
core of our life and of all future generations must be shut down.
Impact: Senkaku Conflict Causes Extinction
Senkaku conflict will escalate --- accidents, unwillingness to back down, 2
biggest armies --- destabilizes the whole region
Michael Auslin 13, scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, “The Sino–Japanese Standoff”,
1-28, http://www.nationalreview.com/blogs/print/338852
What was more dangerous, however, was a game of chicken that began in the waters off the
Senkakus. Beijing dispatched private fishing boats and maritime patrol vessels on a near-daily basis to the islands, and Japan
responded with its coast guard. The two countries have now faced off regularly in the waters around the
Senkakus, sometimes with a dozen ships or more.¶ Beijing’s goal seems to be to undercut
Tokyo’s claim of administrative control over the islands. That would then invalidate Japan’s
right to expel ships from the exclusive economic zone around the Senkakus. In recent weeks, though,
the Chinese have become more aggressive , and very visibly escalated tensions . For the first
time ever, they have flown maritime patrol planes into Japanese airspace around the islands. A
predictable cycle thus emerged: The Japanese responded by scrambling F-15s, and last week, the
Chinese sent two J-10 fighter jets to “monitor” Japanese military aircraft, according to the South China Morning Post.
Now, the new Japanese government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is preparing to go one step further: giving Japanese
pilots the authority to fire warning shots with tracer bullets across the nose of any Chinese aircraft that doesn’t
heed warnings to leave Japanese-controlled airspace.¶ It was barely a dozen years ago that the U.S. and China faced a crisis when a
hotshot Chinese pilot collided with a U.S. electronic-surveillance plane over the South China Sea, crashing both aircraft. Japan
and
China are now on a metaphorical collision course, too, and any accident when tensions are so
high could be the spark in a tinderbox. It’s not difficult to see Beijing issuing orders for Chinese
fighters to fire their own warning shots if Japanese jets start doing so. Even though leaders
from both countries promise to meet and keep things cool, a faceoff at 20,000 feet is much
harder to control than one done more slowly and clearly on the ocean’s surface.¶ This Sino–
Japanese standoff also is a problem for the United States, which has a defense treaty with Tokyo
and is pledged to come to the aid of Japanese forces under attack. There are also mechanisms
for U.S.–Japanese consultations during a crisis, and if Tokyo requests such military talks,
Washington would be forced into a difficult spot, since Beijing would undoubtedly perceive the
holding of such talks as a serious provocation. The Obama administration has so far taken pains to stay neutral in
the dispute; despite its rhetoric of “pivoting” to the Pacific, it has urged both sides to resolve the issue peacefully. Washington also
has avoided any stance on the sovereignty of the Senkakus, supporting instead the status quo of Japanese administration of the
islands. That may no longer suffice for Japan, however, since its government saw
China’s taking to the air over the
Senkakus as a significant escalation and proof that Beijing is in no mind to back down from its
claims.¶ One does not have to be an alarmist to see real dangers in play here. As Barbara Tuchman
showed in her classic The Guns of August, events have a way of taking on a life of their own (and one doesn’t
need a Schlieffen Plan to feel trapped into acting). The enmity between Japan and China is deep and
pervasive; there is little good will to try and avert conflict . Indeed, the people of both countries
have abysmally low perceptions of the other . Since they are the two most advanced militaries
in Asia , any tension-driven military jockeying between them is inherently destabilizing to
the entire region. ¶ Perhaps of even greater concern, neither government has shied away from its
hardline tactics over the Senkakus, despite the fact that trade between the two has dropped
nearly 4 percent since the crisis began in September. Most worrying, if the two sides don’t agree to
return to the status quo ante, there are only one or two more rungs on the ladder of military
escalation before someone has to back down or decide to initiate hostilities when challenged.
Whoever does back down will lose an enormous amount of credibility in Asia, and the
possibility of major domestic demonstrations in response.¶ The prospect of an armed clash
between Asia’s two largest countries is one that should bring both sides to their senses, but
instead the two seem to be maneuvering themselves into a corner from which it will be
difficult to escape. One trigger-happy or nervous pilot, and Asia could face its gravest crisis
perhaps since World War II.
It will draw in the US and go nuclear.
John Blaxland 13, Senior Fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, the Australian
National University, and Rikki Kersten, Professor of modern Japanese political history in the
School of International, Political and Strategic Studies at the College of Asia and the Pacific, the
Australian National University, 2/13/13, “Escalating territorial tension in East Asia echoes
Europe’s descent into world war,” http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/02/13/escalatingterritorial-tension-in-east-asia-echoes-europes-descent-into-world-war/
The recent activation of Chinese weapons radars aimed at Japanese military platforms around the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is the latest in a series of incidents in which China has asserted its power and authority at
the expense of its neighbours.¶ The radars cue supersonic missile systems and give those on the receiving end only a
split second to respond . With Japanese law empowering local military commanders with increased
discretion to respond (thanks to North Korea’s earlier provocations), such
incidents could easily escalate . In an era of
well-established UN-related adjudication bodies like the International Court of Justice (ICJ), how has it come to this? These incidents
disconcertingly echo past events. ¶ In
the early years of the 20th century, most pundits considered a major
war between the great powers a remote possibility . Several incidents prior to 1914 were handled locally or
successfully defused by diplomats from countries with alliances that appeared to guarantee the peace. After all, never before had the
world been so interconnected — thanks to advanced communications technology and burgeoning trade. But
alliance ties and
perceived national interests meant that once a major war was triggered there was little hope of
avoiding the conflict . Germany’s dissatisfaction with the constraints under which it operated arguably was a principal cause
of war in 1914. Similarly, Japan’s dissatisfaction helped trigger massive conflict a generation later. ¶ A century on, many of the
same observations can be made in East Asia. China’s rise is coupled with a disturbing surge in jingoism across East
and Southeast Asia. China resents the territorial resolution of World War II, in which the United States handed responsibility for the
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands to Japan while large chunks of the South China Sea were claimed and occupied by countries that emerged in
Southeast Asia’s post-colonial order. Oil and gas reserves are attractive reasons for China to assert itself, but challenging the US place
in East Asian waters is the main objective. China resents American ‘re-balancing ‘as an attempt at ‘containment’, even though US
dependence on Chinese trade and finance makes that notion implausible. China is pushing the boundaries of the accepted postSecond World War order championed by the United States and embodied by the UN. ¶ China’s rapid rise and long-held grievances
mean its powerbrokers are reluctant to use institutions like the ICJ. But China’s
assertiveness is driving regional
states closer into the arms of the United States. Intimidation and assertive maritime acts have been
carried out, ostensibly by elements not linked to China’s armed forces. China’s white-painted Chinese Maritime Services and
Fisheries Law Enforcement Command vessels operating in the South China Sea and around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands have evoked
strong reactions. ¶ But Japan’s recent allegation
that China used active radars is a significant escalation. Assuming
it happened, this latest move could trigger a stronger reaction from Japan . China looks increasingly as if it is
not prepared to abide by UN-related conventions. International law has been established mostly by powers China
sees as having exploited it during its ‘century of humiliation’. Yet arguably, it is in the defence of these international institutions that
the peaceful rise of China is most likely to be assured. China’s
refusal to submit to such mechanisms as the ICJ increases
the prospect of conflict. ¶ For the moment, Japan’s conservative prime minister will need to exercise
great skill and restraint
defence powers. A
in managing domestic fear and resentment over China’s assertiveness and the military’s hair-trigger
near-term escalation cannot be ruled out . After all, Japan recognises that China is not yet
ready to inflict a major military defeat on Japan without resorting to nuclear weapons and
without triggering a damaging response from the U nited S tates. And Japan does not want to enter into such a
conflict without strong US support, at least akin to the discreet support given to Britain in the Falklands War in 1982. Consequently,
Japan may see an escalation sooner rather than later as being in its interests, particularly if China appears the aggressor. ¶ China’s
domestic environment has nurtured jingoism. The Chinese state has built up the public’s appetite for vengeance
against Japan by manipulating films and history textbooks. On the other hand, Chinese authorities recognise that the peaceful rise
advocated by Deng Xiaoping is not yet complete (militarily at least). In the meantime it is prudent
to exercise
some
restraint to avoid an overwhelming and catastrophic response . If the 1914–18 war taught us anything, it is
that the outcome of wars is rarely as proponents conceived at the outset.
Solvency: Restrictions/Oversight Solves the Advantage
Restrictions are key to transparency, which sets international norms
Roberts 13 (Kristin, When the Whole World Has Drones, National Journal, 21 March 2013,
http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/when-the-whole-world-has-drones-20130321, da 8-1-13) PC
Already, what’s become apparent is that the
White House is not interested in changing much about the
way it communicates strike policy. (It took Sen. Rand Paul’s 13-hour filibuster of CIA Director John Brennan’s
nomination to force the administration to concede that it doesn’t have the right to use drones to kill noncombatant Americans on U.S.
soil.) And government
officials, as well as their surrogates on security issues, are actively trying to squash
expectations that the administration would agree to bring the judicial branch into the oversight
mix. Indeed, judicial review of any piece of the program is largely off the table now, according to
intelligence officials and committee members.¶ Under discussion within the administration and on Capitol Hill is a
potential program takeover by the Pentagon, removing the CIA from its post-9/11 role of executing military-like
strikes. Ostensibly, that shift could help lift the secret-by-association-with-CIA attribute of the program that some officials say has
kept them from more freely talking about the legitimate military use of drones for counterterrorism operations. But such
a fix
would provide no guarantee of greater transparency for the public, or even Congress.¶ And if the
administration is not willing to share with lawmakers who are security-cleared to know, it
certainly is not prepared to engage in a sensitive discussion, even among allies, that might begin to
set the rules on use for a technology that could upend stability in already fragile and
strategically significant places around the globe. Time is running out to do so.¶ “They’re not drawing names out of
a hat here.”—Mike Rogers, chairman, House Intelligence Committee¶ “The history of technology development like this is, you never
maintain your lead very long. Somebody always gets it,” said David Berteau, director of the International Security Program at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies. “They’re going to become cheaper. They’re going to become easier. They’re going to
become interoperable,” he said. “The destabilizing effects are very, very serious.”¶ Berteau is not alone. Zenko,
of the Council
on Foreign Relations, has urged officials to quickly establish norms. Singer, at Brookings, argues
that the window of opportunity for the U nited S tates to create stability-supporting precedent is
quickly closing. The problem is, the administration is not thinking far enough down the line, according to a Senate Intelligence
aide. Administration officials “are thinking about the next four years, and we’re thinking about the next 40 years. And those two
different angles on this question are why you see them in conflict right now.”¶ That’s in part a symptom of the “technological
optimism” that often plagues the U.S. security community when it establishes a lead over its competitors, noted Georgetown
University’s Kai-Henrik Barth. After the 1945 bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the United States was sure it would be decades
before the Soviets developed a nuclear-weapon capability. It took four years.¶ With drones, the question is how long before the
dozens of states with the aircraft can arm and then operate a weaponized version. “Pretty much every nation has gone down the
pathway of, ‘This is science fiction; we don’t want this stuff,’ to, ‘OK, we want them, but we’ll just use them for surveillance,’ to,
‘Hmm, they’re really useful when you see the bad guy and can do something about it, so we’ll arm them,’ ” Singer said. He listed the
countries that have gone that route: the United States, Britain, Italy, Germany, China. “Consistently, nations have gone down the
pathway of first only surveillance and then arming.Ӧ The
opportunity to write rules that might at least guide,
if not restrain, the world’s view of acceptable drone use remains, not least because this is in essence a
conventional arms-control issue. The international Missile Technology Control Regime attempts to restrict exports of unmanned
vehicles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction, but it is voluntary and nonbinding, and it’s under attack by the drone
industry as a drag on business. Further, the technology itself, especially when coupled with data and real-time analytics, offers the
luxury of time and distance that could allow officials to raise the evidentiary bar for strikes—to be closer to certain that their target is
the right one.
Drone proliferation and civilian strikes are inevitable – restricting the president
to comply with international norms about the use of force is the only way to
spur international modeling and halt drone proliferation – history proves
Zenko, Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action, 13 (Micah, Reforming U.S. Drone Strike
Policies, Council on Foreign Relations Center for Preventative Action, January 2013, da 7-29-13) PC
Beyond the United States, drones
are proliferating even as they are becoming increasingly sophisticated, lethal, stealthy,
least a dozen other states and nonstate actors could possess armed
drones within the next ten years and leverage the tech- nology in unforeseen and harmful
ways. It is the stated position of the Obama administration that its strategy toward drones will be emulated by other states and
resilient, and autonomous. At
nonstate actors. In an interview, President Obama revealed, “I think creating a legal structure, processes, with oversight checks on
how we use unmanned weapons is going to be a challenge for me and for my successors for some time to come—partly because technology may evolve fairly rapidly for other countries as well.”71¶ History
shows that how states adopt and use new
military capabilities is often influenced by how other states have—or have not—used them in
the past. Furthermore, norms can deter states from acquiring new technologies.72 Norms—sometimes
but not always codified as legal regimes—have dissuaded states from deploying blinding lasers and
landmines, as well as chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. A well-articulated and
internationally supported normative framework, bolstered by a strong U.S. example, can shape
armed drone prolifera- tion and employment in the coming decades. Such norms would not hinder U.S.
freedom of action; rather, they would internationalize already-necessary domestic policy reforms
and, of course, they would be acceptable only insofar as the limitations placed reciprocally on U.S.
drones furthered U.S. objectives. And even if hostile states do not accept norms regulating drone
use, the existence of an international norma- tive framework, and U.S. compliance with that
framework, would pre- serve Washington’s ability to apply diplomatic pressure. Models for
developing such a framework would be based in existing international laws that emphasize the
principles of necessity, proportionality, and distinction—to which the U nited S tates claims to
adhere for its drone strikes—and should be informed by comparable efforts in the realms of cyber and space.¶ In short, a
world characterized by the proliferation of armed drones—used with little transparency or constraint—
would under- mine core U.S. interests, such as preventing armed conflict, promoting human
rights, and strengthening international legal regimes. It would be a world in which targeted
killings occur with impunity against anyone deemed an “enemy” by states or nonstate actors,
without accountability for legal justification, civilian casualties, and proportionality. Perhaps more
troubling, it would be a world where such lethal force no longer heeds the borders of sovereign
states. Because of drones’ inherent advantages over other weapons platforms, states and
nonstate actors would be much more likely to use lethal force against the U nited S tates and its
allies.
U.S. transparency is key – failure to shape international law risks increased
tensions with Russia and China
Alston 2011 (Philip, professor of law at NYU School of Law and former UN Special Rapporteur
on extrajudicial executions, “The CIA and Targeted Killings Beyond Borders”, Harvard National
Security Journal, Vol. 2) PY
Because the United States inevitably contributes disproportionately to the shaping of global
regime rules , and because it is making more extensive overt use of targeted killings than other
states, its approach will heavily influence emerging global norms . This is of particular relevance in relation
to the use of drones. There are strong reasons to believe that a permissive policy on drone-fired
targeted killings will come back to haunt the United States in a wide range of potential
situations in the not too distant future.¶ In 2011, a senior official noted that while for the past two
decades the United States and its allies had enjoyed "relatively exclusive access to
sophisticated precision-strike technologies," that monopoly will soon come to an end . n605 In
fact, in the case of drones, some 40 countries already possess the basic technology. Many of them, including Israel, Russia, Turkey,
China, India, Iran, the United Kingdom, and France either have or are seeking drones that also have the capability to shoot laser-
guided missiles. Overall, the
United States accounts for less than one-third of worldwide investment in
UAVs. n606 On "Defense Industry Day," August 22, 2010, the Iranian President unveiled a new drone with a range
of 1,000 kilometers (620 miles) and capable of carrying four cruise missiles. n607 He referred to the drones as a
"messenger of honor and human generosity and a saviour of mankind," but warned ominously
that it can also be "a messenger of death for enemies of mankind." n608¶ To date, the United
States has opted to maintain a relatively flexible and open-ended legal regime in relation to
drones, in large part to [*442] avoid setting precedents and restricting its own freedom of action.
n609 But this policy seems to assume that other states will not acquire lethal drone technology,
will not use it, or will not be able to rely upon the justifications invoked by the United States.
These assumptions seem questionable. American commentators favoring a permissive approach to targeted killings
abroad are generally very careful to add that such killings would under no circumstances be permitted within the United States. n610¶
Thus when
the United States argues that targeted killings are legitimate when used in response
to a transnational campaign of terror directed at it, it needs to bear in mind that other states can also claim
to be so afflicted, even if the breadth of the respective terrorist threats is not comparable. Take
Russia, for example, in relation to terrorists from the Caucasus. It has characterized its military operations in
Chechnya since 1999 as a counter-terrorism operation and has deployed "seek and destroy" groups of army
commandoes to "hunt down groups of insurgents." n611 It has been argued that the targeted killings that have resulted are justified
because they are necessary to Russia's fight against terrorism. n612 Although [*443] there
are credible reports of
targeted killings conducted outside of Chechnya, Russia has refused to acknowledge
responsibility for, or otherwise justify, such killings. It has also refused to cooperate with any investigation or prosecution.
n613¶ In 2006, the Russian Parliament passed a law permitting the Federal Security Service (FSB) to kill
alleged terrorists overseas, if authorized to do so by the President. n614 The law defines terrorism and
terrorist activity extremely broadly, including "practices of influencing the decisions of government, local selfgovernment or international organizations by terrorizing the population or through other forms of illegal violent action," and also any
"ideology of violence." n615¶ Under the law, there
appears to be no restriction on the use of military force
"to suppress international terrorist activity outside the Russian Federation." n616 The law requires the
President to seek the endorsement of the Federation Council to use regular armed forces outside Russia, but the President may
deploy FSB security forces at his own discretion. According to press accounts, at the time of the law's passage, "Russian legislators
stressed that the law was designed to target terrorists hiding in failed States and that in other situations the security services would
work with foreign intelligence services to pursue their goals." n617 There
is no publicly available information about
any procedural safeguards to ensure Russian targeted killings are lawful, the criteria for those who may
be targeted, or accountability mechanisms for review of targeting operations. In adopting the legislation, Russian
parliamentarians claimed that, "they were emulating
US actions in adopting a law
[*444] allowing the use of military and special forces outside the country's borders against external threats." n618¶ China is
another case in point. It has consistently characterized unrest among its Uighur population as
being driven by terrorist separatists. But Uighur activists living outside China are not so
classified by other states. That means that China could invoke American policies on targeted killing
Israeli and
to carry out a lethal attack against a Uighur activist living in Europe or the United States . The
Chinese Foreign Ministry welcomed the killing of Osama bin Laden as "a milestone and a positive development for the international
anti-terrorism efforts," adding ominously in reference to the Uighur situation that, "China has also been a victim of terrorism." n619
When a journalist asked how American practice in Pakistan compared to possible Chinese
external action against a Uighur to a senior United States counter-terrorism official, the latter distinguished the
situations from one another on the unconvincing grounds of Pakistan's special relationship
with the United States. n620¶ A more realistic note was struck by Anne-Marie Slaughter after bin
Laden's killing when she observed that "having a list of leaders that you are going to take out is
very troubling morally, legally and in terms of precedent. If other countries decide to apply
that principle to us, we're in trouble ." n621 The conclusion to be drawn is that the United States might, in
the not too distant future, need to rely on international legal norms to delegitimize the
behavior of other states using lethal drone strikes . For that reason alone, it would seem prudent
today to be contributing to the construction of a regime that strictly limits the circumstances
in which one state can seek to kill an individual in another state without the latter's consent
and without complying with the applicable rules of international
[*445] law. To the extent that the United
States genuinely believes it is currently acting within the scope of those rules it needs to provide the evidence.
New Scenario: Human Rights Law
US drone policy erodes international human rights law and accelerates
proliferation of indiscriminate killing
McDonnell 2012 (Thomas M., Professor of Law at Pace Law and an expert in international law,
“Sow What Your Reap: Using Predator and Reaper Drones to Carry out Assassinations or Targeted
Killings of Suspected Islamic Terrorists”, George Washington International Law Review, no. 44,
pgs 315-316) PY
The major industrial states are racing to produce robotic weap-¶ ons; at least fifty-six nations
are developing them.311 Furthermore,¶ there now is "massive spending" to develop completely autono-¶ mous weapons
that take "humans out of the loop."312 The combi-¶ nation of advances in robotic weaponry and threats
from terrorist¶ non-state actors is incendiary. It enables government officials to¶ call the
Geneva Conventions quaint and obsolete and even more¶ liberal governmental officials to
offer far-reaching legal interpreta-¶ tions justifying targeted killing with remotely operated
weapon¶ systems.¶ Drones raise the ante. The ease of using drones and the lack of¶ danger to
the attackers increase the likelihood of using attack¶ drones more than ever before and in areas
far from armed conflict,¶ thereby eroding humanitarian law and human rights law . For the¶ attacked
people-generally technologically limited, but united by¶ an extreme fundamentalist religious ethos-targeted killing by¶ such means
must be particularly infuriating.¶ At the very least, there
is a reasonable doubt that using drones¶ for targeted
killing operations of suspected Islamic terrorists will,¶ in the long run, seriously disable the terrorist
organizations they¶ lead. Despite the decapitation of numerous Taliban and al Qaeda¶ leaders and the Obama administration's
belief that the strikes have¶ effectively paralyzed al Qaeda in the Pakistan tribal areas, there is¶ some evidence to suggest that such
operations might actually¶ strengthen such organizations both internally and externally.¶ Employed against these targets, the
unchivalrous, seemingly cow-¶ ardly, method of warfare might result in greater support for ter-¶ rorists and more terrorist recruits in
the Islamic world.¶ Perhaps even more important, compiling hit lists and then using¶ a machine remotely operated from a distant
land, to take the life of¶ listed suspected terrorists appears much more like murder than¶ honorable combat and, thereby,
undermines world public order.¶ Furthermore despite their precision, drone missile attacks often¶ endanger non-combatants. The
United States and its allies should¶ restrict the targeted killing of suspected Islamic terrorists to
the¶ exceptional case where a militant poses an imminent threat to the¶ United States, allied
troops or civilians, and, as a matter of policy, if¶ not crystallized, international law, ensure that
innocent civilians be¶ spared.¶ The West and the United States should learn from their own¶
experience in Afghanistan resulting in the Tactical Directive and¶ from the history of air warfare in Vietnam, and
World War II that¶ interpreting combat immunities strictly and human rights and¶
humanitarian law protections broadly is our best hope for uphold-¶ ing the U nited S tates'
moral authority and for lessening rather¶ than inflaming conflict , especially with religiously motivated
terror-¶ ist movements in repressed societies largely colonized by Western¶ hands.
Human rights protection prevents extinction
Annas et al 2 Edward R. Utley Prof. and Chair Health Law @ Boston U. School of Public Health
and Prof. SocioMedical Sciences and Community Science @ Boston U. School of Medicine and
Prof. Law @ Boston U. School of Law [George, Lori Andrews, (Distinguished Prof. Law @ ChicagoKent College of Law and Dir. Institute for Science, Law, and Technology @ Illinois Institute Tech),
and Rosario M. Isasa, (Health Law and Biotethics Fellow @ Health Law Dept. of Boston U. School
of Public Health), American Journal of Law & Medicine, “THE GENETICS REVOLUTION: CONFLICTS,
CHALLENGES AND CONUNDRA: ARTICLE: Protecting the Endangered Human: Toward an
International Treaty Prohibiting Cloning and Inheritable Alterations”, 28 Am. J. L. and Med. 151,
L/N]
The development of the atomic bomb not only presented to the world for the first time the prospect of
total annihilation , but also, paradoxically, led to a renewed emphasis on the "nuclear family," complete with its personal
bomb shelter. The conclusion of World War II (with the dropping of the only two atomic bombs ever used in war)
led to the recognition that world wars were now suicidal to the entire species and to the
formation of the United Nations with the primary goal of preventing such wars . n2
Prevention , of course, must be based on the recognition that all humans are fundamentally
the same , rather than on an emphasis on our differences. In the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis,
the closest the world has ever come to nuclear war , President John F. Kennedy, in an address to the
former Soviet Union, underscored
the necessity for recognizing similarities for our survival: ¶ [L]et
us not be blind to our differences, but let us also direct attention to our common interests
and the means by which those differences can be resolved . . . . For, in the final analysis, our most
basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet . We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our
children's future. And we are all mortal. n3 ¶ That we are all fundamentally the same, all human, all with the same dignity and
rights, is at the core of the most important document to come out of World War II, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
and the two treaties that followed it (together known as the "International Bill of Rights"). n4
The recognition of
universal human rights, based on human dignity and equality as well as the principle of
nondiscrimination, is fundamental to the development of a species consciousness . As Daniel
Lev of Human Rights Watch/Asia said in 1993, shortly before the Vienna Human Rights Conference: ¶ Whatever else may
separate them, human beings belong to a single biological species, the simplest and most
fundamental commonality before which the significance of human differences quickly fades.
. . . We are all capable, in exactly the same ways, of feeling pain, hunger, [*153] and a hundred kinds of deprivation.
Consequently, people nowhere routinely concede that those with enough power to do so ought to be able to kill, torture,
imprison, and generally abuse others. . . .
The idea of universal human rights shares the recognition of
one common humanity, and provides a
minimum
solution to deal with its miseries . n5 ¶
Membership in the human species is central to the meaning and enforcement of human
rights, and respect for basic human rights is essential for the survival of the human species .
The development of the concept of "crimes against humanity" was a milestone for universalizing human rights in that it
recognized that there were certain actions, such as slavery and genocide, that implicated the welfare of the entire species and
therefore merited universal condemnation. n6 Nuclear weapons were immediately seen as a technology that required
international control, as extreme genetic manipulations like cloning and inheritable genetic alterations have come to be seen
today. In fact, cloning and inheritable genetic alterations can be seen as crimes against humanity of a unique sort: they are
techniques that can alter the essence of humanity itself (and thus threaten to change the foundation of human rights) by taking
human evolution into our own hands and directing it toward the development of a new species, sometimes termed the
"posthuman." n7 It may be that species-altering techniques, like cloning and inheritable genetic modifications, could provide
benefits to the human species in extraordinary circumstances. For example, asexual genetic replication could potentially save
humans from extinction if all humans were rendered sterile by some catastrophic event. But no such necessity currently exists or
is on the horizon.
Pakistan
UQ: Drone Strikes Increasing
Obama is increasing his reliance on drones in the status quo in Pakistan
Brooks 13 (Rosa, professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center, a Bernard L. Schwartz
Senior Fellow at the New America Foundation, writer for Foreign Policy magazine, 2009-11
Counselor to the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy at the Department of Defense, The
Constitutional and Counterterrorism Implications of Targeted Killing, Testimony Before the
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights, April 23 2013
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1114&context=cong, page 7)
As the Obama administration increases its reliance on drone strikes as the counterterrorism tool of choice,
it is hard not to wonder whether we have begun to trade tactical gains for strategic losses. What impact will US
drone strikes ultimately have on the stability of Pakistan, Yemen, or Somalia? To what degree -especially as we reach further and further down the terrorist food chain, killing small fish who may be motivated less by ideology than
economic desperation -- are
we actually creating new grievances within the local population – or even
within diaspora populations here in the United States?
No plans to decrease drone use in SQUO- Panetta set dangerous precedent
Russia Today 13 (“US will not scale back drone warfare – Panetta,” Russia Today. February 2,
2013. http://rt.com/usa/drone-war-continue-panetta-290/ NB)
The US will not curtail its extrajudicial assassinations in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, Panetta said in a
farewell interview: “We are in a war. We're in a war on terrorism and we've been in that war since
9/11.Ӧ "The whole purpose of our operations were aimed at those who attacked this country and killed 3,000 innocent people in
New York [on 9/11] as well as 200 people here at the Pentagon," he said.¶ Over a decade has passed since the beginning of the global
war on terror; in that time, two countries were occupied by the US, and the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, Osama Bin Ladenm was
shot dead by American marines. Still, the war on terror must continue, Panetta said.¶ "I think it depends on the nature of the threat
that we're confronting,” he explained.¶ Since terror threats continue to originate in Muslim countries – from Afghanistan in 2001 to
Yemen in 2013 – it is unlikely the US will scale back its drone program in the foreseeable future. ¶
Though US drones assassinate Al-Qaeda operatives in these countries without a court verdict or any form of due process, Panetta said
that those governments are “pursuing the same goal” as the US. He said that the Yemeni government, for example, is strongly in favor
of the US drone program.¶ But in October 2012, Pakistani Interior Minister Rehman Malik claimed that the majority of the people
killed by American drones in Pakistan are civilians.¶ A US study in September 2012 revealed that only 2 percent of those killed in
drone strike in Pakistan are actually top militants.¶ "I think we had a responsibility to use whatever technology we could to be able to
go after those who not only conducted that attack but were planning to continue to attack this country," Panetta said.¶ The departing
US Secretary of Defense also rejected the idea that overseas drone operations should be turned over from CIA control to the US
military, which would require open reporting on every operation: “When you got those kind of operations where, because of the
nature of the country you're in or the nature of the situation you're dealing with, it's got to be covert.Ӧ An avid supporter of drone
warfare, Panetta was largely responsible for the dramatic increase in drone attacks in Pakistan when he served as head of the CIA
from 2009 to 2011. As the CIA director, he likely knew that the Hellfire missiles shot from drones have killed hundreds – if not
thousands – of civilians, including children.¶ But the
drone program has only expanded in recent years. At the
start of 2013, the CIA escalated its use of drones in Pakistan, launching seven deadly strikes
during the first 10 days of 2013 and killing at least 40 people, 11 of whom may have been civilians.
Drone strike policy is “business as usual”, will increase
Russia Today 7/30 (“Myth broken that drones strike at the heart of terrorists in Pakistan”,
Russia Today, July 30, 2013, http://rt.com/op-edge/drones-strike-terrorists-pakistan-799/ NB)
RT: Drone strikes have increased six fold under US President Obama. The new Prime Minister has called for
an end to these attacks, your high court even declared them illegal. Why hasn’t anything changed? We are still seeing drone
strikes carried out on Pakistani soil since the elections.¶ Sultan Hali: Unfortunately, it seems that the new
government which had resorted to a lot of rhetoric, especially during the electoral campaign, had promised that it will bring to an end
the controversial drone attacks, but it seems there has been a reality check given to the new government by the Americans that the
aid which comes through the IMF, through loans and other things will be stopped unless the government of Pakistan toes the line.
Therefore it
appears to be business as usual. Although the number of drone attacks have increased with the new
has been no severe stands taken by
the US government that the drone strikes must stop. John Kerry is likely to visit this week, and maybe it is taking
up his time, but I personally have very little hope for that because if something had to be done in a concrete
government coming in there have been only a number of protests, but there
manner, it would have been done. The worst thing is, the new government taking over has been only 50 days but the terrorist strikes
have increased. The myth is broken that the drone strikes actually strike at the heart of the terrorists, but the amount of collateral
damage that takes place has not only multiplied but it has resorted into many more human lives being lost because of terrorist strikes.
And if you notice, the other day a major jail break took place in the city of Dera Ismail Khan and a number of terrorist have escaped. A
similar jail break had occurred in the city of Bannu last year out of which there were very harden criminals and terrorists went on and
attacked air force and air bases. Therefore, I personally think, if the drone attacks have to come to an end Pakistan will have to take a
unilateral stand with the United States for its sovereignty. Until that happens it will be business as usual.
UQ: Pakistani Stability on the Brink
Pakistan stability on the brink now
Markey 10 (Daniel, Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan and South Asia at CFR, “Terrorism and¶
Indo-Pakistani Escalation” Council on Foreign Relations, CONTINGENCY PLANNING
MEMORANDUM NO. 6, January 2010,
http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/27251/1/Terrorism%20and%20IndoPakistani%20escalation.pdf?1. NB)
More broadly, the United States would also suffer if an Indo-Pakistani crisis weakens the stability ¶ and
capacity of Pakistan’s government or creates new, long-lasting tensions between U.S. partners in ¶ New
Delhi and Islamabad. The frailty of Pakistan’s governing institutions already offers a permissive ¶
environment to antistate militants and extremists. A failed military exchange with India could
deliver ¶ a body blow to the legitimacy and authority of Pakistani state institutions, opening
even more space ¶ for extreme alternatives. And although the United States has lived through periods of intense
IndoPakistani hostility in the past, there has never been a time when bilateral relations with the two countries were simultaneously
considered as strategically prized as they are today. Washington’s interest ¶ in Indo-Pakistani détente also grows the more the United
States invests in Afghanistan’s stability; ¶ heightened
violence between warring Afghan proxies supported
by India and Pakistan would be an ¶ almost certain consequence of new hostilities between
New Delhi and Islamabad.
Pakistan’s greatest internal threat to stability is the danger of insurgents
Dalrymple 13 (William, Fellow of the Royal Society of Literature, the Royal Geographical
Society and of the Royal Asiatic Society, Whitney J. Oates Fellow in Humanities at Princeton
University, “A Deadly Triangle: Afghanistan, Pakistan and India”, Brookings Institution, 6/25/13,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/essays/2013/deadly-triangle-afghanistan-pakistan-india-c
NB)
The danger posed by the jihadis—not just to India, but to Pakistan as well—is increasingly clear to all. In the
late spring, when I tried to have breakfast with a Pakistani friend who lives near the military’s main primary school in Lahore, I was
unable to get to him because all the roads through the Lahore Cantonment area were blocked by checkpoints. According to the
soldiers manning the roadblocks, so fearful have the generals become of the Pakistani Taliban that they lock down much of Lahore
every day in order to insure that their kids can get safely to school and back. They have also abandoned the use of military number
plates on their cars, aware that these might attract the attention of Taliban suicide bombers.¶ British diplomats in Islamabad take the
view that because the
Pakistani army now fears jihadi-generated instability more than it fears India it
General Kayani himself stated in a major speech in April on the eve
of the elections: “The menace of terrorism and extremism has claimed thousands of lives, including
those of the Army, Rangers, FC, Police, Frontier Constabulary… and the innocent people of
Pakistan… [A] small faction wants to enforce its distorted ideology over the entire nation by
taking up arms and for this purpose defies the Constitution of Pakistan and the democratic
process,” he said. He went on to call on militants to lay down their arms and accept the country’s constitution unconditionally.
really has changed its attitude toward the jihadis. As
SQUO policies are close to destroying tribal communities. This escalates to
global violence.
Ahmed 13 (Akbar, Chair of Islamic Studies at American University in Washington, D.C. and
Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, “The Thistle and The Drone”, Book, p. 4.
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/press/books/2013/thethistleandthedrone/samplechapter_t
histleanddrone.pdf NB)
These societies live in areas administered by central governments whose ability ¶ to bomb,
kidnap, humiliate, and rape tribal members at will has been enhanced ¶ by U.S. financial and military
backing in the war on terror. For the tribes, this has ¶ been the worst of fates, leaving them emasculated and
helpless, with every moral ¶ boundary crossed, every social structure attacked. The wholesale
breakdown of ¶ their tribal system is not unlike the implosion of a galaxy, with fragments
shooting off in unpredictable directions.¶ With their ancient practices, these tribal communities represent the very
foundations of human history. In the most profound sense, they allow all societies a glimpse ¶ of their origins. The disruption of
these fragile societies is a high-stakes gamble for ¶ civilization. Unless urgent and radical steps
are taken to prevent this process and ¶ ensure a modicum of stability, the future for these
communities looks grim; their ¶ codes of honor and revenge will lead to escalating global
violence that, in the end, ¶ may well bring about the destruction of one of the oldest forms of human society.
Link: Drones Radicalize the Populace
US drone strikes eliminate civilian support for regional governments
Boyle 13 (Michael, Assistant professor of political science at La Salle University, lectured at the
Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St Andrews, Scotland,
adviser on Obama's counterterrorism expert group in 07-08, The costs and consequences of
drone warfare, International Affairs, Volume 89 Issue 1, January 15th 2013,
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-2346.12002/pdf, pages 1-29)
drone strikes are often employed against local enemies of the governments in Pakistan
serve as powerful signals of these governments’ helplessness and subservience to
the United States and undermine the claim that these governments can be credible
competitors for the loyalties of the population. This dynamic makes the establishment of a stable set of
partnerships for counterterrorism cooperation difficult, if not impossible, because these partnerships depend
upon the presence of capable and legitimate governments that can police their territory and efficiently
cooperate with the United States. In this respect, American counterterrorism policy operates at crosspurposes: it provides a steady flow of arms and financial resources to governments whose legitimacy it
systematically undermines by conducting unilateral drone strikes on their territory.
Despite the fact that
and Yemen, they
Drone strikes destabilize Pakistan- create divide between populace and
government
Hudson et Al. 11, (Leila, associate professor of anthropology and history in school of Middle
Eastern and North African Studies at U. Arizona and directory of SISMEC, Colin Owens and Matt
Flames are graduate student of Middle Eastern and North African studies and the School of
Government and Public Policy at University of Arizona, “Drone Warfare: Blowback From the New
American Way of War,” Middle Eastern Policy, Vol. 18, No. 3,
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10.1111/j.14754967.2011.00502.x/asset/j.14754967.2011.0
0502.x.pdf?v=1&t=hjrti6kz&s=5ad7dcf8c376d81283eb2b1d801f4ff9aefec0a4, Page 128)
Loss of life from drone strikes is an emotional and enormously volatile public issue in Pakistan.
Drone attacks on Pakistani territory killing Pakistani citizens every two to three days are a
constant challenge to established ideas of sovereignty by a putative ally and patron. The notion of
attack from the skies, without direct agency or accountability, may in theory be an attractive vehicle for U.S. counterterrorism, but it
comes at a high price. Drone attacks compound the feeling of those on the ground in the target area of their asymmetrical
vulnerability and the necessity of fighting back smartly.25¶ In
a country whose political structure is ambiguous,
Pakistanis who hope to petition their government with grievances regarding the drone
program, or report critically on Islamabad's relationship with the United States and militants, are met with stiff
resistance and sometimes violence. A recent attack resulted in the death of the prominent Pakistani journalist Syed
Saleem Shahzad, bureau chief for The Asia Times. Shahzad was reporting on links between al-Qaeda and the Pakistani security
apparatus, which may have facilitated the attack on Pakistan's Mehran Naval Base late in May 2011. Internal reporting on the
Pakistani military and Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) is often self-censored because of its inherent dangers; those bold enough to
report on it often face physical danger. Shahzad's body was found in a ditch south of Islamabad two days after he missed a scheduled
television appearance. The ISI claims no knowledge of, and takes no responsibility for, the abduction and death of Shahzad, but other
journalists reject that claim.26 In sum, the
drone program serves to further destabilize an already fragile
system by deepening divides between a citizenry that abhors the attacks and government
institutions that tolerate or facilitate them and brook no critical oversight.
US Drone strike policy destabilizes Pakistan through the public
Markey 10 (Daniel, Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan and South Asia at CFR, “Terrorism and
Indo-Pakistani Escalation” Council on Foreign Relations, CONTINGENCY PLANNING
MEMORANDUM NO. 6, January 2010,
http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/27251/1/Terrorism%20and%20IndoPakistani%20escalation.pdf?1. NB)
If the United States is willing to accept greater risk to ongoing cooperative ventures with Pakistan, it might seek to infiltrate LeT and
affiliated groups to collect intelligence, foil plots, spread disinformation, and locate specific members for arrest or elimination. Recent
allegations that U.S. citizens ¶ have independently sought training from LeT suggest that infiltration is a realistic proposition. Absent
successful infiltration, Washington could use a range of other standard intelligence tools to track ¶ and weaken LeT and could
consider attacking terrorist bases inside Pakistan. U.S.
unmanned aerial ¶ vehicles already target militant
groups based along the Afghan border, and, on at least one reported ¶ occasion in September 2008, U.S. helicopter-borne
commandos raided a militant compound inside ¶ Pakistan. That attack spurred a particularly sharp, negative
reaction from Pakistan’s army, punctuated by a threat to shoot down U.S. aircraft should they
again stray into Pakistani airspace. Efforts ¶ to extend drone attacks or commando raids farther from the
Afghan border and/or into Pakistan’s ¶ urban centers would be more technically challenging and would also
increase the possibility that the ¶ Pakistani military, or public, will react harshly.
Drone strikes alienate the population, leading to country-wide destabilization
Kaltenthaler et Al. 12 (Karl, University of Akron; professor, Director of Research Projects, Ray
C. Bliss Institute of Applied Politics, Director of Graduate Studies Research Director¶, William
Miller, South E. Missouri State; assistant professor of political science at Southeast Missouri State
University.¶ , Christine Fair , Georgetown University, Security Studies Program (SSP) within
Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Services,” “The Drone War:
Pakistani Public Attitudes toward American Drone Strikes in Pakistan;
http://www.uakron.edu/dotAsset/4823799c-34eb-4b4f-992e-ac4a2261e0c4.pdf)
The numbers of who is being killed in the drone strikes has raised two major issues among those ¶
observing the drone strike issue: the efficacy of drone strikes and their legality . According to Bergen and ¶
Tiedemann (2011) only one in seven of US drone strikes kills a militant leader and less than two
percent of ¶ the attacks have resulted in the deaths of Al Qaeda or other militant group leaders.
As the number of strikes ¶ increased under Obama, the number of low-ranking militants being
killed, as well as civilians, increased. ¶ Thus, Bergen and Tiedemann (2011) argue that the drone strikes are not
damaging the insurgencies in ¶ Pakistan or Afghanistan. In fact, they assert, the strikes are counterproductive. The strikes
alienate the local ¶ population and encourage recruitment into the ranks of the militants.
Hudson, Owens, and Flannes (2011) ¶ echo the view that the drone strikes are alienating the
Pakistani population and therefore destabilizing ¶ Pakistan . Khan (2011) points to the drone strikes as
serving as an impetus for revenge on the part of those ¶ who have been hurt by the attacks. The strikes have encouraged attempts at
terrorist attacks within the ¶ United States. A prominent example of this is the attempted attack on Times Square by PakistaniAmerican ¶ Shahzad. Others, such as O’Loughlin, Witmer, and Linke (2010) have argued that the drone strikes are ¶ driving militants
out of the tribal areas and into major cities, which is causing a concomitant rise in violence ¶ with the interior of Pakistan. Bergen and
Tiedemann (2011) pointed out, in a similar fashion, that as drone ¶ strikes have risen, so has militant violence. There were 150
terrorist incidents in 2004 and 1,916 in 2009.
Drone strikes cause anti-American sentiments –leads to destabilized Pakistan.
Kronstadt & Katzman, 8 (Alan, Specialist in South Asia, Kenneth Specialist in Middle Eastern
Affairs, “Islamist Militantancy in the Pakistan –Afghanistan Border Region and U.S. Policy ,
Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34763.pdf, Pg. 12)
A flurry of suspected Predator drone attacks on Pakistani territory in the latter months of 2008
¶ suggests a shift in tactics in the effort to neutralize Al Qaeda and other Islamist militants in
the ¶ border region. As of later November, at least 20 suspected Predator attacks had been made on ¶ Pakistani territory since
July, compared with only three reported during all of 2007. Such strikes ¶ have killed more than 100 people, including numerous
suspected foreign and indigenous fighters, ¶ but also women and children. The new Commander of the U.S. Central Command, Gen.
David ¶ Petraeus, claims that such attacks in western Pakistan are “extremely important” and have killed ¶ three top extremist leaders
in that region.38¶ Officially,
Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry calls Predator attacks “ destabilizing ”
developments that ¶ are “helping the terrorists.” Strident Pakistani government reaction has
included summoning the ¶ U.S. Ambassador to lodge strong protest, and condemnation of
missile attacks that Islamabad ¶ believes “undermine public support for the government’s
counterterrorism efforts” and should be ¶ “stopped immediately.” During his first visit to Pakistan as
Centcom chief in early November, ¶ Gen. Petraeus reportedly was met with a single overriding message from Pakistani interlocutors: ¶
cross-border U.S. military strikes in the FATA are counterproductive. Pakistan’s
defense minister ¶ warned Gen.
Petraeus that the strikes were creating “bad blood” and contribute to anti-American ¶ outrage
among ordinary Pakistanis. In November 2008, Pakistan’s Army Chief, Gen. Ashfaq ¶ Pervez
Kayani, called for a full halt to Predator strikes, and President Zardari has called on ¶ Presidentelect Obama to re-assess the Bush Administration policy of employing aerial attacks on ¶
Pakistani territory.
Drone strikes radicalize the FATA public
Rakisits 12 ( Claude Georges Pierre, Professor in Strategic Studies at Deakin University,
“Pakistan's twin interrelated challenges: economic development and security”, Australian Journal
of International Affairs, 66:2, 139-154.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10357718.2011.646482, Claude Rakisits was a
visiting professor in international relations at Webster University, Geneva and at the Geneva School of
Diplomacy and International Relations in 2006- 2009. Prior to leaving the Australian Public Service in 2005,
he had had almost 20 years of experience in the public sector NB)
Because of Pakistan’s reluctance to go into North Waziristan, the
Obama¶ administration has stepped up its use
of unmanned drone attacks against the insurgents’safe havens. Of the 279 attacks that have been executed
since 2004,¶ 269 have been conducted under President Obama*i.e. 96 percent of all attacks¶ (Roggio and Mayer 2011). And while
there is a tacit understanding between the¶ United States and Pakistan governments about the execution of these drone¶ attacks,
these air strikes have fuelled an already very strong anti-US mood in¶ Pakistan.11 Moreover,
because these drones take off from Pakistan, these¶ attacks, especially when they cause civilian
casualties, reinforce the public¶ perception that the Pakistan government is fighting the United
States’ war at the¶ expense of the Pakistan people. This further weakens a president whose
standing¶ in the polls is already very low. Nevertheless, these attacks have been highly¶ successful in eliminating
about 100 Al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban leaders, as¶ well as hundreds of middle-ranking fighters. And, of course, Pakistan has also¶
gained from these drone strikes, with high-value TTP leaders having been¶ eliminated.
A radicalized Pakistani population opens the door for radical control
Afzal 13 (Madiha, Nonresident Fellow, Global Economy and Development at Brookings
Institution, “Drone Strikes and Anti-Americanism in Pakistan” Brookings Institution, February 7,
2013, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/02/07-drones-anti-americanismpakistan-afzal NB)
What is getting overlooked in the debate is that drone strikes are infuriating the more moderate and liberal
segments of Pakistani society, those who have traditionally been more sympathetic toward the
United States. Imagine a group of well-educated people, many of whom attended English-language schools, are widely exposed
to American and Western media, and like and embrace many aspects of American culture. These people have probably had some sort
of personal interaction with the West, through tourism, attending college abroad, or through family members or friends who live in
the U.S. What
bothers this group about U.S. drone strikes, more than the attack on Pakistan’s sovereignty, is the
perceived American hypocrisy toward the importance of Pakistani lives and deaths. Following the
horrific school shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary in December, a piece in the U.K. newspaper The Guardian titled “In the U.S., mass
child killings are tragedies. In Pakistan, mere bug splats” went viral among educated Pakistanis.¶ In addition, coverage of a recent
report on drone strikes in Pakistan by researchers at NYU and Stanford law schools, which recounts the daily terror facing those who
live in areas where drones strike, gained wide circulation in Pakistan. Few cared to note that this report had been written by an
advocacy group and that some of its statistics were suspect. While the New America Foundation, the Long War Journal, and the
London Bureau of Investigative Journalism all compile statistics on drone strikes, the numbers differ, and it bothers this liberal,
educated group of Pakistanis that the U.S. government does not release its own data on drone strikes. One
of the only public
acknowledgments on this issue was in a 2012 speech by John Brennan when he stated that
there were barely any civilian deaths as a consequence of these strikes. This struck many as implausible,
further angering Pakistanis.¶ Why does anger against America from this group of liberal, educated Pakistanis matter? After
all, it is highly unlikely that any of these people will turn radical.¶ These people matter because they form the
heart of an active civil society in Pakistan, which the U.S. counts on to serve as a
counterweight to the radical segments of Pakistani society . They work in the Pakistani
government, media and business sectors, and drone strikes are driving these people toward a
constant distrust of the U.S. and hardening their attitudes against America. It undermines all
the positive work the United States is doing in Pakistan, all the aid dollars it spends there, and
drastically undercuts U.S. soft power in the region. If America loses these hearts and minds, it
will lose the battle for Pakistan.
Link: Drones Undermine the Government
US drone strikes have made the collapse of the Pakistani government inevitable.
Boyle 13 (Michael, Assistant professor of political science at La Salle University, lectured at the
Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St Andrews, Scotland,
adviser on Obama's counterterrorism expert group in 07-08, The costs and consequences of
drone warfare, International Affairs, Volume 89 Issue 1, January 15th 2013,
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-2346.12002/pdf, pages 1-29)
The escalation of drone strikes in Pakistan to its current tempo—one every few days—directly contradicts
the long-term American strategic goal of boosting the capacity and legitimacy of the government in
Islamabad. Drone attacks are more than just temporary incidents that erase all traces of an enemy. They have lasting
political effects that can weaken existing governments, undermine their legitimacy and add to the ranks
of their enemies. These political effects come about because drones provide a powerful signal to the population
of a targeted state that the perpetrator considers the sovereignty of their government to be
negligible. The popular perception that a government is powerless to stop drone attacks on its
territory can be crippling to the incumbent regime, and can embolden its domestic rivals to
challenge it through violence. Such continual violations of the territorial integrity of a state also
have direct consequences for the legitimacy of its government. Following a meeting with General David
Petraeus, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari described the political costs of drones succinctly,
saying that ‘continuing drone attacks on our country, which result in loss of precious lives or property, are
counterproductive and difficult to explain by a democratically elected government. It is creating a credibility gap.’75
Similarly, the Pakistani High Commissioner to London Wajid Shamsul Hasan said in August 2012
that what has been the whole outcome of these drone attacks is that you have directly or indirectly contributed to
destabilizing or undermining the democratic government. Because people really make fun of the democratic
government—when you pass a resolution against drone attacks in the parliament and nothing happens. The Americans don’t listen to
you, and they continue to violate your territory.76 The appearance of powerlessness in the face of drones is corrosive to the
appearance of competence and legitimacy of the Pakistani government. The
growing perception that the Pakistani
civilian government is unable to stop drone attacks is particularly dangerous in a context
where 87 per cent of all Pakistanis are dissatisfied with the direction of the country and where
the military, which has launched coups before, remains a popular force
The Pakistani government is at risk of collapse due to drone strikes
Boyle 13 (Michael, Assistant professor of political science at La Salle University, lectured at the
Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St Andrews, Scotland,
adviser on Obama's counterterrorism expert group in 07-08, The costs and consequences of
drone warfare, International Affairs, Volume 89 Issue 1, January 15th 2013,
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-2346.12002/pdf, pages 1-29)
The extent to which the United States has assumed the role of a direct combatant and
marginalized the Pakistani government through drone strikes has systematically undermined
the claim that the central government in Islamabad could be a credible competitor for the
loyalties of the tribal population. Second, drone strikes have also multiplied the ranks of the
enemies of the Pakistani government and deepened its growing sense of crisis.
Pakistan's government is being forced to radicalize to show their anger towards
drones
Boyle 13 (Michael, Assistant professor of political science at La Salle University, lectured at the
Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St Andrews, Scotland,
adviser on Obama's counterterrorism expert group in 07-08, The costs and consequences of
drone warfare, International Affairs, Volume 89 Issue 1, January 15th 2013,
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-2346.12002/pdf, pages 1-29)
First, the
Pakistani government is under intense pressure from growing popular hostility to the
drone strikes. The drone policy carries a number of serious dangers for the regime, not the least of which is that it is seen as
complicit in a policy where the US bombs its territory every few days. A Pew Research Center poll in
June 2012 revealed that 74 per cent of Pakistanis now consider the United States an enemy.
Only 17 per cent support drone strikes against extremist groups, even if they are conducted
with the support of the Pakistani government.83 The drones programme has had a spillover effect for other areas of
cooperation, as only 50 per cent of respondents still wish the US to continue to provide financial and humanitarian assistance to the country.84 The
drone strikes have carried clear strategic costs in making the US widely hated within Pakistan and in jeopardizing support for US programmes designed to
build the capacity of the Pakistani state. In this combustible environment, high-profile events such as the release of CIA
contractor Raymond Davis after the deaths by shooting of two Pakistani citizens, the killing of 24 Pakistani soldiers in NATO strikes in November 2011
and the protests over the film Innocence of Muslims in September 2012 have
exploded into waves of antiAmerican
protest. These events, and the latent anger they release, have made it more costly for the
government to comply with US demands to counter militant activity in the border regions. This
growing anti-US sentiment culminated in the protest march led by Imran Khan in October 2012,
where thousands of demonstrators tried to enter South Waziristan in a protest over drone
strikes. Khan has tapped into growing anti-American sentiment and anger over drones to become a
leading opposition figure for the next election. His actions, which have pushed the controversy
over drones to the forefront of Pakistani politics, have made it more difficult for the Zardari
government to support drone strikes that advertise both its complicity and its powerlessness. Sensing the dangers
associated with a close relationship with the US, a number of other Pakistani leaders have
moved to put some distance between themselves and the American drone policy. Even while he has
secretly supported some of the drone strikes, President Asif Ali Zardari has called for an end to them, though his
position was undermined when his associates called for more Pakistani control over the targets of strikes.86 Similarly, Prime Minister Raza
Gilani has regularly excoriated the US for its ‘illegal and counterproductive’ use of drones, and has argued that it
fuels the insurgencies against the central government.87 After a review of the country’s relationship with the United States, the Pakistani parliament
called for an end to drone strikes and to any other operations on its territory.88 Across the political spectrum, positioning
oneself as a
critic of the drone programme and expressing hostility to the United States is increasingly
becoming the default position of the Pakistani political class.
Drones strikes undermine the legitimacy of the Pakistani government.
Boyle 13, (Micheal J, Assistant Professor of Political Science at La Salle University,
“The Costs and Consequences of Drone Warfare,” The Royal Institute of
International Affairs, Vol. 89, Issue 1, Pg. 14)
The escalation of drone strikes in Pakistan to its current tempo—one every few ¶ days—directly
contradicts the long-term American strategic goal of boosting the ¶ capacity and legitimacy of
the government in Islamabad. Drone attacks are more ¶ than just temporary incidents that erase all traces of an enemy.
They have lasting ¶ political effects that can weaken existing governments, undermine their
legitimacy and add to the ranks of their enemies. These political effects come about ¶ because
drones provide a powerful signal to the population of a targeted state that ¶ the perpetrator
considers the sovereignty of their government to be negligible. The popular perception that a
government is powerless to stop drone attacks on its ¶ territory can be crippling to the
incumbent regime, and can embolden its domestic ¶ rivals to challenge it through violence.
Such continual violations of the territorial integrity of a state also have direct consequences for
the legitimacy of its ¶ government. Following a meeting with General David Petraeus, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari
described the political costs of drones succinctly, saying that ¶ ‘continuing drone attacks on our country, which result in loss of
precious lives ¶ or property, are counterproductive and difficult to explain by a democratically ¶ elected government. It is creating a
credibility gap.’75 Similarly, the Pakistani High ¶ Commissioner to London Wajid Shamsul Hasan said in August 2012 that¶ what has
been the whole outcome of these drone attacks is that you have directly or ¶ indirectly contributed to destabilizing or undermining
the democratic government. ¶ Because people really make fun of the democratic government—when
you pass a
resolution against drone attacks in the parliament and nothing happens. The Americans don’t ¶
listen to you, and they continue to violate your territory.76¶ The appearance of powerlessness
in the face of drones is corrosive to the appearance of competence and legitimacy of the
Pakistani government. The growing ¶ perception that the Pakistani civilian government is unable to stop drone attacks is ¶
particularly dangerous in a context where 87 per cent of all Pakistanis are dissatisfied with the direction of the country and where the
military, which has launched ¶ coups before, remains a popular force.77¶ The political effects of this signal are powerful and lasting
even when the ¶ reality of the relationship between the perpetrator and the targeted state is more ¶ complex. For
example,
the government of Pakistan has been ambivalent about ¶ drone strikes, condemning them in
some cases but applauding their results in ¶ others.78 Much has been made of the extent to
which the Pakistani government ¶ has offered its ‘tacit consent’ for the US drone strikes on its
territory.79 The US ¶ has been willing to provide details on drone strikes after the fact, but has refrained ¶ from providing advance
warning of an attack to the Pakistani government for fear ¶ that the information might leak. Pakistan has been operationally
compliant with ¶ drone strikes and has not ordered its air force to shoot down drones in Pakistani ¶ airspace. Despite official denials, it
has been revealed that the Pakistani government has permitted the US to launch drones from at least one of its own airbases.80¶
Whatever the complexity of its position and the source of its ambivalence over ¶ drone strikes, the political effects of allowing them
to escalate to current levels ¶ are increasingly clear. The vast expansion of drone warfare under the Obama ¶ administration has
placed enormous pressure on Pakistan for its complicity with ¶ airs. ¶ the US, multiplied the enemies that its government faces and
undermined parts of ¶ the social fabric of the country. By most measures, Pakistan is more divided and ¶ unstable after the Obama
administration’s decision to ramp up the tempo and scale ¶ of drone attacks than it was during the Bush administration.81
US drone policy in Pakistan creates an Anti-American government in Pakistan,
which makes nuclear conflict more likely
Deri 12 (Aliya, "Costless" War: American and Pakistani Reactions to the U.S. Drone War,
Intersect: The Stanford Journal of Science, Technology, and Society, Volume 5,
http://ojs.stanford.edu/ojs/index.php/intersect/article/view/367/167, page 13)
Pakistanis’ lack of faith in their government has serious implications. The debate over drones
has become a central issue in Pakistani politics; sooner or later, Pakistanis’ negative opinion of
the U.S. will reflect itself in its national government. Since the U.S. relies on the Pakistani government for
support with many of its counterterrorism operations, an anti-American and increasingly fundamentalist
administration could seriously hamper the United States’ efforts to quell global terrorism. Even
more alarming is Pakistan’s possession of dozens of nuclear weapons (Bergen & Tiedemann, 2010) and
shaky political relationship with neighboring India. Dramatic changes in Pakistan’s government could
create dramatic changes in global nuclear politics as well. Conclusion Armed drones have a
profound psychological impact on both the nation that employs them and the nation that suffers from
their attacks. In America, remote-controlled UAV technology is not only inexpensive and effective for counterterrorism
operations, it does away with the greatest emotional burden of being at war: the condolence letter. The U.S. drone policy in Pakistan
has been shaped predominantly by the American reaction to drones, taking advantage of post-September 11th comfort with UAVs to
conduct a covert drone campaign in Pakistan’s northwest regions. Yet in Pakistan, where America has conducted hundreds of strikes,
drones impose a psychological burden.
Civilian casualties from drone strikes have sparked fear, suspicion,
and most of all hatred of America in a culture where honorable warfare is paramount. As a
result, the very groups that America is trying to eliminate are attracting more recruits, challenging
the belief that drone warfare is “costless.” Like beheading a hydra, a drone strike that successfully kills a
militant leader only galvanizes dozens more to take his place.
US Drone Strikes destabilized a well-functioning Pakistan
Ahmed 9 (Manan, Professor of South Asian History at Columbia University, “Paranoia over
Pakistan”, The Nation, November 9, 2009. No URL. NB)
Similarly, the history of Pakistan was given short shrift in the rush to declare it a faltering state about to become ¶ a radicalized, failed
state. Even
cursory analysis would show that the citizens of Pakistan, given the few ¶
opportunities, have kept conservative Islamic parties to less than 10 percent of the seats in any
election. This ¶ even though Pakistan endured a decade of the Islamization policies of Gen. Zia ul-Haq, who did his best to ¶
radicalize and militarize his citizenry in an effort to wage jihad in Afghanistan and India. Yet Pakistan emerged ¶ from that
dark era and embraced the largely secular policies of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto and
Nawaz ¶ Sharif. ¶ But perhaps the most egregious oversight was that the Obama administration
ignored Pakistan’s recent past. It ¶ has once again become a democratic nation. Since 2007 a
vibrant and peaceful movement for the rule of law ¶ has fought the autocracy of Gen. Pervez
Musharraf – the military man Washington supported. In the 2008 ¶ elections, Pakistanis rejected religious parties in all provinces and
propelled the party of the assassinated ¶ Page 3 of 4Benazir Bhutto to power. This
was the beating heart of
democracy in the Muslim world. While America once ¶ stood next to the dictators of Pakistan, it now had a
chance to stand next to the people of Pakistan – to support ¶ them in their fight against the
horrifying terrorism on their soil, to support them in building up their judicial and ¶ civilian
infrastructure and transforming a militarized economy into a twenty-first-century global
economy. ¶ Instead, we turned again to the military and demanded that it wage a domestically
destabilizing war. We ¶ increased our reliance on drone attacks. We failed to include significant powers in
the region – India, China, ¶ Iran, Saudi Arabia – in the discussions on Afghanistan. Predictably, the results undermined
our aims. The ¶ civilian government has no viable domestic agenda to fight the many challenges it faces. It offers no
solution, ¶ political or civil, to the grievances of the people in Swat, nor any plans to address that existing humanitarian ¶ crisis. It is
increasingly seen as weak and under American influence. ¶ The military, after declaring “success” in Swat, has
now launched an offensive in Waziristan – Operation Rah-e ¶ Nijat (Path to Salvation) – to combat the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. The
operation comes after eleven days of ¶ terrorist attacks across Pakistan, including on the military headquarters, by the TTP. Once
again,
there are no ¶ indications of what will constitute success, how the state will cope with the
civilian exodus from the region or, ¶ most important, what will happen when the TTP flee into
the neighboring and highly volatile province of ¶ Baluchistan. Surely the military will have no choice but to
declare Waziristan a “success” and move into ¶ Baluchistan, where a separatist movement has waged its own war since 2004.
Link: Drones Lead to Pakistani Terrorism
Status quo drone strike policies ensure terrorism will never be solved
Kilcullen and Exum 9(David Kilcullen, a counterinsurgency adviser to Gen. David Petraeus
from 2006 to 2008. Andrew Exum, a fellow at the Center for a New American Security was an
Army officer in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2002 to 2004, “Death From Above, Outrage Down
Below” New York Times.
5/17/2009vhttp://www.agriculturedefensecoalition.org/sites/default/files/file/drones_517/517V
_4_2009_Pakistan_Drones_Death_From_Above_Pakistan_Outrage_Down_Below_Kilcullen_May
_19_2009_NYTimes.pdf NB)
Imagine, for example, that burglars move into a neighborhood. If the police were to start¶ blowing up people’s houses from the air,
would this convince homeowners to rise up against¶ the burglars? Wouldn’t it be more likely to turn the whole population against the
police? And¶ if their neighbors wanted to turn the burglars in, how would they do that, exactly? Yet this is ¶ the same basic logic
underlying the drone war.¶ The drone strategy is similar to French aerial bombardment in rural Algeria in the 1950s,¶ and to the “air
control” methods employed by the British in what are now the Pakistani tribal¶ areas in the 1920s. The
historical resonance
people in the¶ tribal areas to see the drone attacks as a continuation
of colonial-era policies.¶ The drone campaign is in fact part of a larger strategic error — our
of the British effort encourages
insistence on¶ personalizing this conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Devoting time and resources¶ toward killing or capturing
“high-value” targets — not to mention the bounties placed on¶ their heads — distracts us from larger problems, while turning figures
like Baitullah Mehsud,¶ leader of the Pakistani Taliban umbrella group, into Robin Hoods. Our
experience in Iraq¶
suggests that the capture or killing of high-value targets — Saddam Hussein or Abu Musab¶ al-Zarqawi — has
only a slight and fleeting effect on levels of violence. Killing Mr. Zarqawi¶ bought only 18 days of quiet before Al
Qaeda returned to operations under new leadership.¶ This is not to suggest that killing terrorists is a bad thing — on the contrary. But
it’s not the¶ only thing that matters, and over-emphasizing it wastes resources. The operation that killed¶ Mr. Zarqawi, for example,
was not a one-day event. Thousands of hours of intelligence,¶ surveillance and reconnaissance were devoted to the elimination of
one man, when units on¶ the ground could have used this time to protect the people from the insurgency that was¶ tearing Iraq
apart.¶ Having Osama bin Laden in one’s sights is one thing. Devoting precious resources to his¶ capture or death, rather than
focusing on protecting the Afghan and Pakistani populations, is¶ another. The goal should be to isolate extremists from the
communities in which they live.¶ The best way to do this is to adopt policies that build local partnerships. Al
Qaeda and its¶
Taliban allies must be defeated by indigenous forces — not from the United States, and not¶
even from Punjab, but from the parts of Pakistan in which they now hide. Drone strikes¶ make
this harder, not easier.
A weak Pakistani government alongside continuation of policies opens the door
for militant control
Olney 11 (Luke A., M.A. in Security Studies at Georgetown University, “LETHAL TARGETING
ABROAD: EXPLORING LONG-TERM EFFECTIVENESS OF ARMED DRONE STRIKES IN OVERSEAS
CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS” Georgetown.edu, April 14, 2011, p. 37-38
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/553552/olneyLuke.pdf?sequ
ence=1 NB)
However, this research suggests that U.S. drone strikes can lead to increased attacks on ¶ already
weak governments partnered with the U.S. in overseas contingency operations. Such ¶ strikes can
cause retaliatory attacks on local governments and may contribute to local instability. ¶ This is likely
because of feelings of revenge and frustration that are caused by U.S. drone strikes ¶ and those feelings of hostility are then taken
out on the most immediate structure of authority –¶ local government officials, government
buildings, police, and military. Simply put, because ¶ militants are largely limited to their
geographical regions, they conduct more attacks on local ¶ governments instead of attacks
against the U.S. These findings support, but not necessarily prove, Kilcullen‘s assertion that drone strikes have
― unarguably and entirely negative‖ effects on ¶ local stability.71¶ Furthermore, and more worrisome, drone
strikes might be an impetus for ¶ increased radicalization of enemy networks in the long term,
as demonstrated by AQAP. This is ¶ hard to prove empirically, but nonetheless a logical argument that needs further exploration. ¶ In
Yemen and Pakistan, drone strikes appear to have increased the number of militant ¶ attacks on local government-related targets after isolated strikes.
However, in Pakistan where ¶ drone strikes have been sustained over a period of time, militant attacks against the GoP leveled ¶ off with approximately
30 attacks per month in 2010. Additionally, strikes in Pakistan have ¶ continued to strain U.S.-Pakistan relations,
as evidenced by the Davis case, which was finally ¶ resolved on March 16, 2011. However, tensions over drone strikes remain high. Such secondorder
effects might be the types of non-quantifiable measures that Roche and Watts had in mind ¶ when evaluating military affairs.
US drone strikes increase political and violent resistance to the US
Boyle 13 (Michael, Assistant professor of political science at La Salle University, lectured at the
Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St Andrews, Scotland,
adviser on Obama's counterterrorism expert group in 07-08, The costs and consequences of
drone warfare, International Affairs, Volume 89 Issue 1, January 15th 2013,
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-2346.12002/pdf, pages 1-29)
The extent to which the Obama administration has targeted lower-ranked operatives is not
without consequences. Many of these lower-ranked operatives are densely connected to local
tribal and clan structures. Their deaths in drone strikes may lead those connected to them by
family and tribal ties to seek revenge, thus swelling the ranks of Al-Qaeda and its affiliate
groups. As David Kilcullen and Andrew Exum have argued, ‘every one of these dead noncombatants
represents an alienated family, a new desire for revenge, and more recruits for a militant
movement that has grown exponentially even as drone strikes have increased’.50 Moreover, the
vast increase in the number of deaths of low-ranking operatives has deepened political
resistance to the US programme in Pakistan, Yemen and other countries.
Drones strikes stir more support for militant group.
Boyle 2013, (Micheal J, Assistant Professor of Political Science at La Salle
University, “The Costs and Consequences of Drone Warfare,” The Royal Institute
of International Affairs, Vol. 89, Issue 1, Pg. 18)
Second, drone
strikes have also multiplied the ranks of the enemies of the ¶ Pakistani government and deepened
its growing sense of crisis. Pakistan has never had full control over all parts of its territory,
especially in the FATA and ¶ the Northwest Frontier province. The problem of Islamist militant
networks in ¶ these regions is an old one, but the scope of their threat expanded dramatically ¶
when a number of competing groups coalesced under the banner of the TTP in ¶ 2007.93 At this point,
the Musharraf government’s policy of conciliation with the ¶ various militant groups began to show its adverse effects. As the military
tried to ¶ regain control over these regions, the militants fought back and extended their ¶ reach deeper into previously untouched
urban areas. By 2008, the TTP and other ¶ groups were launching suicide attacks in cities and capturing territory in Swat ¶ and Buner,
only 70 miles from Islamabad.94 While the Pakistani army managed ¶ to roll back their territorial advances in 2009, most of these
militant groups were ¶ not fully defeated. While weakened, many of these Islamist networks redoubled ¶ their efforts to challenge the
authority of central government and have increasingly resorted to terrorism to do so.95 While
the sources of
mobilization and recruitment to militant networks are numerous, the drones have given them
a recruiting boost as the carnage has encouraged relatives and friends of the victims of strikes
to join the ranks of the TTP or other militant groups to fight the US or the Pakistani
government, holding the latter complicit in their deaths.96 Their ¶ wrath at American drones is directed first
and foremost at the Pakistani government rather than at the United States or its direct interests abroad. While some ¶ recruits have
joined Al-Qaeda and tried to bring the fight to the United States, the ¶ majority of these new recruits have joined local militant
networks whose primary ¶ targets will be within the country.97 The previously existing militant networks in ¶ these regions serve as
ready receptacles for the radicalized and angry after drone100¶ strikes; arguably, the biggest danger of these fresh recruits is not to
the United ¶ States, but to the government of the country where the strikes take place, as the ¶ ranks of its enemies swell after drone
attacks. The
membership of the TTP, for example, has increased to approximately 35,000 through
both existing groups pledging their allegiance to its leadership and the infusion of new recruits,
some (but not all) of whom were motivated by revulsion over drone strikes.98
Militant groups cause turmoil in Pakistan.
Javaid 11, (Umbreen, Director Centre for South Asian Studies, & Chairperson
Department of Political Science at the University of Punjab, “Partnership in War
on Terror and Mounting Militant Extremism in Pakistan,” South Asian Studies,
Vol.26, Page 236-237)
Since 2001, militancy and terrorism have penetrated into Pakistan as the ¶ Taliban and Al-Qaida
outfits found shelter in the tribal areas to establish, launch ¶ and plan their activities. Very soon
these militant groups spread out to the major ¶ cities of Pakistan bringing disaster and terror
everywhere. Their agenda included ¶ suicide bombing, target killing, kidnapping, threats and talibanization of
the ¶ Pakistani society. After sometime it was realized that the US war had become a ¶ war of Pakistan. Since 2004, the
military has launched various operations against ¶ the militants and in retaliation has lost a large number of its personal. ‘The insane ¶
‘war on terror’ has decimated two countries, Iraq and Afghanistan, and brought a ¶ third one, Pakistan, almost to the verge of
collapse.’ (Khan, 2011: 235). ‘Closely ¶ allied with al-Qaeda, the TTP is the main Taliban militant umbrella group in ¶ Pakistan, and is
responsible for most of the suicide bombing and fidayeen attacks ¶ carried out in almost every nook and corner of Pakistan in recent
years. Among the ¶ TTP’s stated objectives are resistance against the Pakistani army, enforcement of ¶ the Shariah, and the targeting
of American and NATO forces in Afghanistan.’ ¶ (Mir, 2010: 13). ¶ No doubt, Pakistan
now a days is passing through
the toughest era of its ¶ history because of the on going militant extremism and terrorism.
Religious ¶ intolerance has become a dominant feature of the society, there is religious ¶ exploitation and radical
sectarian religious groups are rapidly growing and ¶ becoming more militant. ‘The use of
military force alone cannot win the war ¶ against rising militancy, which poses the biggest
internal security threat to the ¶ country. To reverse the ride of militancy there is a need to take a holistic approach ¶
which also includes the political mobilization of the people to combat terrorism.’ ¶ (Lodhi, 2011: 147-148). Amir Mir explains as: ¶
‘The
¶
meteoric rise of the Taliban militia in ¶ Pakistan since the 11th September 2001 attacks has
literally pushed the Pakistani state to the brink of ¶ civil war. Since the US-led Allied forces launched ¶ their
offensive against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in ¶ Afghanistan in the aftermath of the 9/11 episode, ¶ the leadership of the two “nonstate actors” in the ¶ war-torn Afghanistan has been systematically ¶ moving fighters across their eastern border into ¶ Pakistan,
where they have taken over the rugged ¶ mountainous regions of the North West Frontier ¶ Province (NWFP) and the Federally
Administrative ¶ Tribal
Areas (FATA) after joining hands with the ¶ local Taliban militia.’ (Mir, 2009:
1). ¶ ‘The challenges from Taliban and its presented and future allies is not ¶ irreversible. But
Pakistan cannot face this challenge unless it returns to the ¶ precepts and advice of the father of the nation, Mohammad Ali Jinnah. If
Pakistan 101South Asian Studies 26 (2) ¶ 238¶ does not find modernity, it will sink into medievalism. There is no third path.’ ¶ (Akbar,
2011:312). Post 9/11 period has brought about dire consequences to ¶ Pakistan’s internal as well as external security, only a politically
and economically ¶ strong Pakistan with a dedicated leadership and a moderate educated and tolerant ¶ society can shun off the
threats being faced by Pakistan. The terrorized society of ¶ Pakistan calls for uprooting militant extremism for a more tolerant society.
US drone strikes increase militant recruitment and creates stronger opponents
that threaten to overthrow the Pakistani government
Boyle 13 (Michael, Assistant professor of political science at La Salle University, lectured at the
Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St Andrews, Scotland,
adviser on Obama's counterterrorism expert group in 07-08, The costs and consequences of
drone warfare, International Affairs, Volume 89 Issue 1, January 15th 2013,
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-2346.12002/pdf, pages 1-29)
In other cases, drones
have fuelled militant movements and reordered the alliances and positions of
local combatants. Following the escalation of drone strikes in Yemen, the desire for revenge drove hundreds, if not thousands, of Yemeni
tribesmen to join Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), as well as smaller, indigenous militant networks. Even in Pakistan, where the drone strikes
have weakened Al-Qaeda and some of its affiliated movements, they have not cleared the battlefield. In
Pakistan, other Islamist
groups have moved into the vacuum left by the absence of Al-Qaeda, and some of these
groups, particularly the cluster of groups arrayed under the name Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP),
now pose a greater threat to the Pakistani government than Al-Qaeda ever did.
Drone trikes destroy tribal areas and increase Taliban recruits
Innocent 9 (Malou, foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute ,“The US Must Reassess Its Drone
Policy” Brookings Institution, August 25, 2009,
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/us-must-reassess-its-drone-policy?print NB)
The targeting of tribal safe havens by CIA-operated drone strikes strengthens the very jihadist
forces that America seeks to defeat, by alienating hearts and minds in a fragile, nuclear-armed,
Muslim-majority Pakistani state.¶ During a recent visit to the frontier region, I spoke with several South Waziri tribesmen about
the impact of US missile strikes. They recounted how militants exploit the popular resentment felt from the
accidental killing of innocents from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and defined themselves as a force against the
injustice of a hostile foreign occupation.¶ “¶ The ability to keep militant groups off balance must be weighed against
the cost of facilitating the rise of more insurgents.Ӧ Missile strikes alienate thousands of clans, sub-clans and
extended families within a tribal society that places high social value on honor and revenge. To
the Pashtun tribes straddling the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, personal and collective vendettas have been
known to last for generations, and are invoked irrespective of time and cost involved. Successive
waves of Persian, Greek, Arab, Turk, Mughal, British and Soviet invaders have never successfully subdued this thin slice of rugged
terrain.¶ On August 12, the US
special envoy for the region, Richard Holbrooke, told an audience at the
Center for American Progress that the porous border and its surrounding areas served as a
fertile recruiting ground for Al-Qaeda. One US military official, speaking on the condition of
anonymity, called drone operations “a recruiting windfall for the Pakistani Taliban.”
New Link: Drones Lead to Military Coup
Greatest threat to Pakistan’s security is from its army
Hersh 9 (Seymore, Journalist with a Pulitzer Prize, five George Polk Awards, two National
Magazine Awards, and more than a dozen other prizes for investigative reporting, exposed Abu
Ghraib scandal, November 16, “Defending the Arsenal”
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/11/16/091116fa_fact_hersh)
In the tumultuous days leading up to the Pakistan Army’s ground offensive in the tribal area of South Waziristan, which began on October 17th, the
Pakistani Taliban attacked what should have been some of the country’s best-guarded targets. In the most brazen strike, ten gunmen penetrated the
Army’s main headquarters, in Rawalpindi, instigating a twenty-two-hour standoff that left twenty-three dead and the military thoroughly embarrassed.
The terrorists had been dressed in Army uniforms. There were also attacks on police installations in Peshawar and Lahore, and, once the offensive began,
an Army general was shot dead by gunmen on motorcycles on the streets of Islamabad, the capital. The assassins clearly had advance knowledge of the
general’s route, indicating that they had contacts and allies inside the security forces. ¶ Pakistan has been a nuclear power for two decades, and
has an estimated eighty to a hundred warheads, scattered in facilities around the country. The success of the latest attacks
raised an obvious question: Are the bombs safe? Asked this question the day after the Rawalpindi raid, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said,
“We have confidence in the Pakistani government and the military’s control over nuclear
weapons.” Clinton—whose own visit to Pakistan, two weeks later, would be disrupted by more terrorist bombs—added that, despite the attacks by
the Taliban, “we see no evidence that they are going to take over the state.”¶ Clinton’s words sounded reassuring,
and several current and former officials also said in interviews that the Pakistan Army was in full
control of the nuclear arsenal. But the Taliban overrunning Islamabad is not the only, or even the greatest, concern. The
principal fear is mutiny —that extremists inside the Pakistani military might stage a coup, take
control of some nuclear assets, or even divert a warhead.¶ On April 29th, President Obama was asked at a news
conference whether he could reassure the American people that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal could be kept away from terrorists. Obama’s answer
remains the clearest delineation of the Administration’s public posture. He was, he said, “gravely concerned” about the
fragility of the civilian government of President Asif Ali Zardari. “Their biggest threat right now
comes internally,” Obama said. “We have huge . . . national-security interests in making sure that Pakistan is stable and that you don’t end up
having a nuclear-armed militant state.” The United States, he said, could “make sure that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is secure—primarily, initially,
because the Pakistan Army, I think, recognizes the hazards of those weapons’ falling into the wrong hands.” ¶ The questioner, Chuck Todd, of NBC, began
asking whether the American military could, if necessary, move in and secure Pakistan’s bombs. Obama did not let Todd finish. “I’m not going to engage
in hypotheticals of that sort,” he said. “I feel confident that the nuclear arsenal will remain out of militant hands. O.K.?”
Drone Strikes prompt military coup
Branfman 12 (Fred, wrote about the U.S. bombing in Indochina. He also worked as a policy
advisor for former California governors Jerry Brown, Gary Hart and Tom Hayden. His work has
appeared in the New York Times, the Washington Post, Harper's and the New Republic, February
6, “US Drone Strikes Destabilize Pakistan”
http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumi
val=7855)
BRANFMAN: Well, the fundamental problem is that these drone strikes have alienated the population of
Pakistan, as I said. And according to the Long War Journal, which is a right-wing operation very close to the Pentagon, we've
only killed 68 al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders who we can name out of the 2,400 people we've
killed there through our drone strikes, which means that only 97 percent of the people we've killed with the drone strikes we
cannot name. The drone operators refer to them as squirters. In return for killing only 68 senior al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders, who of
course can be easily replaced out of a population of 27 million Pashtuns in Pakistan alone, often with more competent leaders, we've
managed to alienate the population of Pakistan, as I mentioned, which ambassador Anne Patterson, our former U.S. ambassador,
gave as the main reason why the Pakistani government is refusing to cooperate with us on either nuclear proliferation or safeguarding
their nuclear materials. Their nuclear stockpile is the world's fastest-growing and the least secure, according to the Harvard Belfer
Center and former U.S. Senators Sam Nunn's nuclear threat initiative. And Patterson specifically said that she's very worried that
nuclear materials could fall into the hands of terrorists. But because of the drone strikes, because of our killing Pakistani citizens, the
government is refusing to cooperate with us. Not only that, but as
a result of our drone strikes, we are
destabilizing the government of Pakistan to the point where The New York Times has
speculated that it could be a military coup by anti-U.S. junior military officers in Pakistan, which,
as I mentioned, has nuclear weapons. We're so worried about Iran someday requiring nuclear weapons, but in Pakistan we're running
the risk that people who hate us could take over the government there. Thirdly, as a result of our drone strikes, our enemies are
actually increasing in number. The
Pakistan Taliban is not only four to five times larger, but the Pakistani
intelligence agency about a year ago issued a report saying that there were a bigger threat to
Pakistan than ever. And, of course, as a result of our alienating the people of Pakistan, they are slowing down our ability to
supply our troops in Afghanistan. This is a major strategic catastrophe on the order of our support of the Shah of Iran. So to sum it up,
on the one hand, we justify killing several thousand people in Pakistan with our drones, with our ground assassinations, with our
troops, on the grounds of national security. But the truth is that the people running our foreign-policy--I would include president
Obama, Hillary Clinton, our Secretary of State--have no idea what they are doing. They are actually harming U.S. national security.
They are exponentially increasing the numbers of people who want to kill Americans. They're destabilizing the critical country
Pakistan. And they're making cooperation on Afghanistan or securing nuclear weapons or anything else impossible.
Drone strikes risk military mutiny and destabilize region
Larison 11 (Daniel, has a Ph.D. in history and is a contributing editor at The American
Conservative. He also writes on the blog Eunomia, April 22, “How America is destabilizing
Pakistan,” http://theweek.com/article/index/214578/how-america-is-destabilizing-pakistan)
U.S.-Pakistan relations have reached a new low this year, and Washington bears a significant amount of the blame. The American
use of drone strikes in western Pakistan has always been unpopular with the Pakistani public,
but these strikes are now being done in defiance of the formal demands of the Pakistani
government. While effective in taking out targeted individuals, drone strikes are the embodiment of the
short-sighted nature of U.S. policy toward Pakistan, which privileges short-term gains and assistance in the
Afghanistan war over the strategic relationship with and internal stability of Pakistan.¶ On April 12, Pakistani officials
confirmed that they had demanded an end to all drone strikes, many of which had been operated from
Pakistani airfields in the past. But in the last two weeks the U.S. has nonetheless proceeded to launch at
least two attacks on targets inside Pakistan. As has so often happened before, there were civilians
reported killed along with the intended targets in the second strike. In addition to the public anger and political backlash that
civilian casualties create against the Pakistani government and the U.S., the drone strikes represent the arrogance of the U.S. in
Pakistan, as the U.S. is now attacking Pakistani territory without any official connivance or approval from Islamabad. As David Ignatius
says of the decision to use drones in the Libyan war, this tactic “projects American power in the most negative possible way.” The
negative effects aren't limited to public hostility, but also include increasing pressures on key Pakistani institutions.¶ The pressure that
U.S. actions put on the Pakistani military is particularly worrisome. And the danger this poses to the U.S. is much greater than it may
seem. Anatol Lieven, author of the new book Pakistan: A Hard Country, described the potential for disaster in The National Interest
earlier this year: “The
greatest potential catalyst for a collapse of the Pakistani state is not the
Islamist militants themselves… it is that actions by the United States will provoke a mutiny of
parts of the military. Should that happen, the Pakistani state would collapse very quickly
indeed, with all the disasters that this would entail.” One of the stated goals of U.S. “Af-Pak” policy is to secure
Pakistani stability, but in practice, the U.S. is undermining its own ally, and the situation is reaching a point
where Pakistani authorities can no longer tolerate our behavior.¶ Relieving this pressure is the
first thing that the U.S. can do, and one practical step is to halt drone strikes in Pakistan. This
can actually serve U.S. goals in Afghanistan by making it easier for Pakistan to help facilitate a
political settlement with the Afghan Taliban, and finally allow U.S. forces to withdraw entirely
from Afghanistan in the near future. There is no question that withdrawing all American forces is ultimately in the best
interests of both the United States and Pakistan. But it will become more difficult if Pakistan is alienated from the U.S. by actions that
are radicalizing the population and the military rank and file. Whatever
immediate value the U.S. derives from
killing individual al Qaeda members, it is risking far more by jeopardizing the sustained,
significant security cooperation that Pakistan still provides.¶ The fraught U.S.-Pakistan relationship is only the
most recent example of how Washington often mismanages its alliances and expects allies to act more as subordinates than partners.
Given the patron-client relationship that the U.S. has with many allies, it is understandable that this might happen, but it is an impulse
that needs to be resisted as often as possible. We have seen this in the administration’s heavy-handed dealing with Japan over
Okinawa basing rights, and the dismissive attitude taken toward Turkish mediation efforts related to Iran. Most recently, the
administration used American diplomatic and military resources to facilitate military intervention in Libya over the strong objections
of many of the most significant NATO allies, and it has now potentially put the future of the military alliance on the line, all for a war
that doesn’t seem to be in the security interests of any U.S. ally.¶ The more strategically significant the ally, the more that Washington
needs to take its perceived national interests and grievances seriously. In Pakistan’s case, this doesn’t mean that the U.S. should
embrace antagonism toward India, but simply that it should stop imposing intolerable pressures on an ally that, while far from
perfect, is more supportive of U.S. security interests than we have any right to expect.
Internal Link: Pakistani Instability Leads to Conflict
Radicalization of Pakistan makes the country more supportive of terrorists,
which leads to war
Krepon 05 (Michael, co founder and senior associate of Stimson, THE STABILITY-INSTABILITY
PARADOX,MISPERCEPTION, AND ESCALATION CONTROL IN SOUTH ASIA, SITREP Jan/Feb 2005,
Vol. 65, No. 1, www.stimson.org/essays/the-stability-instability-paradox-in-south-asia/)
Renewed brinksmanship could come in the form of more extensive support for jihadi groups by
Pakistan’s national security establishment, and more aggressive tactics to punish jihadis and their sponsors by Indian leaders.
This juxtaposition could lead to misestimates and intelligence failures. The initiation of war could again come as a
surprise to Pakistan, particularly when India’s vibrant democracy will broadcast mixed messages about the wisdom of engaging in more adventurous
military tactics to counter terrorism. Since both military establishments express confidence in achieving their objectives in the event of another war
relating to Kashmir, one will be proven wrong in the event of another war. In
this sense, Kashmir can again become a
“nuclear flashpoint,” if Pakistan’s national security establishment turns the heat up on Kashmir to punish India and to leverage a favorable
outcome to this longstanding dispute.
Effects of drone strikes on stability are always negative- creates self-defeating
cycle
Olney 11 (Luke A., M.A. in Security Studies at Georgetown University, “LETHAL TARGETING
ABROAD: EXPLORING LONG-TERM EFFECTIVENESS OF ARMED DRONE STRIKES IN OVERSEAS
CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS” Georgetown.edu, April 14, 2011, p. 16-17
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/553552/olneyLuke.pdf?sequ
ence=1 NB)
Even though there are some short-term military advantages to be gained by armed drone ¶ strikes, there are long-term
strategic disadvantages that must be considered as well. Dr. David ¶ Kilcullen, president and chief executive officer of Caerus
Associates and former Australian ¶ Army infantry officer, argues that drone strikes may be justified in certain circumstances, but the
¶ effects of drone strikes on local stability are always negative. 31 Kilcullen says that extremism and ¶
punitive attacks are mutually reinforcing acts; drone strikes are conducted to get rid of ¶
extremism, while extremism is created in response to drone strikes. This starts to hint at the ¶
possible second-order effects that might result from a drone strike, or what Garrett might call a ¶ ―military disadvantage‖
that should weigh into a commander‘s decision when authorizing a ¶ strike. ¶ Kilcullen and Andrew Exum, a fellow at the Center for a
New American Security and ¶ former U.S. Army officer, argue that drone
strikes isolate the local populace, instead of
forces them to join or at least sympathize with extremists.32 This happens because
U.S. ¶ forces are not physically present to mitigate any ―blowback‖ and because of civilian
casualties¶ that drone strikes cause. Drone strikes have also become widely unpopular among the Pakistani ¶ public
the HVI,¶ and
because of constant media coverage that tends to exaggerate civilian deaths. Kilcullen and Exum also claim that drone strikes have
been conducted outside a coherent information ¶ campaign and that no
real effort has been made to understand
the ―tribal dynamics of the local ¶ population‖ where these strikes take place. Both authors seem to
suggest that drone strikes ¶ should be limited to the most prominent HVIs, such as Osama bin Laden, and that the primary ¶
focus should instead be on protecting the local population and isolating extremists by building ¶
local partnerships.
Breakdown of Pakistan’s government risks nuclear war with India
NTI 11 (Nuclear Threat Initiative, nonpartisan organization with a mission to strengthen global
security by reducing the risk of nuclear weapons and providing transparency on the world’s
nuclear weapons, July 29, “Pakistani Govt. Collapse Chief Threat to Nuke Security: Report,”
http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/pakistani-govt-collapse-chief-threat-to-nuke-security-report/)
Extremists would have the best chance to take possession of Pakistani nuclear weapons
following the breakdown of the South Asian state's government, the U.S. Congressional
Research Service concluded in a report this month (see GSN, July 17).¶ The research arm of Congress noted that
Islamabad in the last decade has made considerable improvements to the security surrounding its growing nuclear arsenal, which the
report estimates at today encompassing 90 to 110 warheads. Safeguards include more rigorous vetting of nuclear-weapon personnel,
an updated command and control system, and legislation to augment export restrictions and head off development of a proliferation
operation akin to the Abdul Qadeer Khan ring.¶ "However, instability
in Pakistan has called the extent and
durability of these reforms into question. Some observers fear radical takeover of a
government that possesses a nuclear bomb, or proliferation by radical sympathizers within
Pakistan’s nuclear complex in case of a breakdown of controls," the analysis reads. "While U.S. and Pakistani
officials continue to express confidence in controls over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, continued instability in the country
could impact these safeguards."¶ "The collapse or near-collapse of the Pakistani government is
probably the most likely scenario in which militants or terrorists could acquire Pakistani
nuclear weapons," according to CRS nonproliferation experts Paul Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin.¶ Incoming CIA head David
Petraeus, while commander of U.S. Central Command in March 2009, told Congress that "Pakistani state failure would
provide transnational terrorist groups and other extremist organizations an opportunity to
acquire nuclear weapons and a safe haven from which to plan and launch attacks."¶ White House
point man for arms control and nonproliferation Gary Samore in May told Arms Control Today that "what I worry about is that, in
the context of broader tensions and problems within Pakistani society and polity .... even the
best nuclear security measures might break down. ...They have good programs in place; the question is whether
those good programs work in the context where these broader tensions and conflicts are present."¶ "Pakistani officials have stated
that the government may need to increase significantly its nuclear arsenal in response to possible Indian plans to do the same," the
researchers wrote.¶ Additionally,
India's significant investment in new military hardware and its focus on
reaching "technical superiority" in its reconnaissance, monitoring and ability to precisely strike key targets inside Pakistan could
cause the Pakistani government to "respond by lowering the threshold for using nuclear
weapons," according to nuclear weapons expert Peter Lavoy.¶ The CRS analysis notes that "Pakistan has pledged nofirst-use against non-nuclear-weapon states, but has not ruled out first use against a nucleararmed aggressor, such as India" (Congressional Research Service report, July 20).
Impact: Indo-Pak Nuke War
Indo-Pak war will be catastrophic
Helfand 12 (Ira, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
Physicians for Social Responsibility, “NUCLEAR FAMINE: A BILLION PEOPLE AT RISK” IPPNW, April
2012, p. 2 http://www.psr.org/nuclear-weapons/nuclear-famine-report.pdf NB)
Over the last several years, a number of¶ studies have shown that a limited, regional¶ nuclear war
between India and Pakistan would¶ cause significant climate disruption worldwide.¶ Two studies
published this year examine the¶ impact on agricultural output that would result¶ from this climate disruption.¶ In the US, corn
production would decline by an¶ average of 10% for an entire decade, with the¶ most severe decline, about 20% in year 5. There¶
would be a similar decline in soybean production,¶ with, again, the most severe loss, about 20%, in¶ year 5.¶ A second study found a
significant decline in¶ Chinese middle season rice production. During¶ the first 4 years, rice production would decline by¶ an average
of 21%; over the next 6 years the¶ decline would average 10%. ¶ The
decline in available food would be
exacerbated by increases in food prices which would¶ make food inaccessible to hundreds of
millions of¶ the world’s poorest. Even if agricultural markets¶ continued to function normally, 215 million people¶
would be added to the rolls of the malnourished¶ over the course of a decade. However, markets would
not function normally.¶ Significant, sustained agricultural shortfalls over¶ an extended period would almost certainly lead¶ to
panic and hoarding on an international scale¶ as food exporting nations suspended exports in¶ order to assure adequate food supplies
for their¶ own populations. This turmoil in the agricultural¶ markets would further reduce accessible food. ¶ The 925
million
people in the world who are¶ chronically malnourished have a baseline consumption of 1,750 calories or less
per day. Even¶ a 10% decline in their food consumption would¶ put this entire group at risk. In addition, the anticipated
suspension of exports from grain growing¶ countries would threaten the food supplies of several hundred
million additional people who have¶ adequate nutrition today, but who live in countries¶ that are highly dependent on food
imports.¶ The number of people threatened by nuclear-war¶ induced famine would be well over
one billion.
Even a minor nuclear war would trigger massive warming and extinction.
Robock 09 – Professor of climatology @ Rutgers University [Alan Robock (Associate director of
Rutger’s Center for Environmental Prediction. 30 year researcher in the area of climate change.
Holds a doctorate in meteorology from MIT. Published over 150 peer-reviewed papers on climate
change), “Nuclear winter” The Encyclopedia of Earth, January 6, 2009, Pg.
http://www.eoearth.org/article/Nuclear_winter]
Nuclear winter is a term that describes the climatic effects of nuclear war. In the 1980's, work conducted jointly by Western and
Soviet scientists showed that for a full-scale nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union the climatic consequences,
and indirect effects of the collapse of society, would be so severe that the ensuing nuclear winter would produce famine for billions of
people far from the target zones. There are several wrong impressions that people have about nuclear winter. One is that there was a
flaw in the theory and that the large climatic effects were disproven. Another is that the problem, even if it existed, has been solved
by the end of the nuclear arms race. But these are both wrong. Furthermore, new nuclear states threaten global climate change even
with arsenals that are much less than 1% of the current global arsenal. What's New Based on new work published in 2007 and 2008 by
some of the pioneers of nuclear winter research who worked on the original studies, we now can say several things about this topic.
New Science: A
minor nuclear war (such as between India and Pakistan or in the Middle East), with each country using 50
Hiroshima-sized atom bombs as airbursts on urban areas, could produce climate change unprecedented in
recorded human history. This is only 0.03% of the explosive power of the current global arsenal. This same scenario
would produce global ozone depletion , because the heating of the stratosphere would
enhance the chemical reactions that destroy ozone. A nuclear war between the United States and Russia today
could produce nuclear winter, with temperatures plunging below freezing in the summer in major agricultural regions, threatening
the food supply for most of the planet. The
climatic effects of the smoke from burning cities and industrial
areas would last for several years, much longer than we previously thought. New climate model
simulations, that have the capability of including the entire atmosphere and oceans, show that
the smoke would be lofted by solar heating to the upper stratosphere, where it would remain for years.
New Policy Implications: The only way to eliminate the possibility of this climatic catastrophe is to eliminate the nuclear weapons. If
they exist, they can be used. The
spread of nuclear weapons to new emerging states threatens not only
the people of those countries, but the entire planet. Rapid reduction of the American and Russian nuclear
arsenals will set an example for the rest of the world that nuclear weapons cannot be used and are not needed. How Does Nuclear
Winter Work? A nuclear explosion is like bringing a piece of the Sun to the Earth's surface for a fraction of a second. Like a giant
match, it causes cities and industrial areas to burn. Megacities have developed in India and Pakistan and other developing countries,
providing tremendous amounts of fuel for potential fires. The direct effects of the nuclear weapons, blast, radioactivity, fires, and
extensive pollution, would kill millions of people, but only those near the targets. However, the fires would have another effect. The
massive amounts of dark smoke from the fires would be lofted into the upper troposphere, 10-15 kilometers (6-9 miles) above the
Earth's surface, and then absorption of sunlight would further heat the smoke, lifting it into the stratosphere, a layer where the
smoke would persist for years, with no rain to wash it out. The climatic effects of smoke from fires started by nuclear war depend on
the amount of smoke. Our new calculations show that for 50 nuclear weapons dropped on two countries, on the targets that would
produce the maximum amount of smoke, about 5 megatons (Tg) of black smoke would be produced, accounting for the amount
emitted from the fires and the amount immediately washed out in rain. As the smoke is lofted into the stratosphere, it would be
transported around the world by the prevailing winds. We also did calculations for two scenarios of war between the two
superpowers who still maintain large nuclear arsenals, the United States and Russia. In one scenario, 50 Tg of black smoke would be
produced and in another, 150 Tg of black smoke would be produced. How many nuclear weapons would be required to produce this
much smoke? It depends on the targets, but there are enough weapons in the current arsenals to produce either amount. In fact,
there are only so many targets. Once they are all hit by weapons, additional weapons would not produce much more smoke at all.
Even after the current nuclear weapons reduction treaty between these superpowers is played out in 2012, with each having about
2,000 weapons, 150 Tg of smoke could still be produced. Here are movies of the smoke transport from three different scenarios:
These new results were made possible by the use of a state-of-the-art general circulation
model of the climate. For the first time a complete calculation of not only atmospheric but also oceanic circulation was
conducted, including the entire atmosphere from the surface up through the troposphere, stratosphere, and mesosphere, to an
elevation of 80 kilometers (50 miles). Previous calculations had not been run for the 10 year simulations here, and had not allowed
the smoke to be lofted into the upper stratosphere, where it would persist for many years. We calculated the climate response to the
three scenarios illustrated above. Compared to the global warming observed for the past century, all three scenarios show massive
cooling. Compared to the climate change for the Northern Hemisphere for the past 1,000 years, the famous hockey stick diagram, the
climate change from any of these scenarios is unprecedented. Compared to climate change for the past millenium, even the 5 Tg case
( a war between India and Pakistan) would plunge the planet into temperatures colder than the Little Ice Age (approximately16001850 ). This would be essentially instantly , and agriculture would be severely threatened . Larger amounts of smoke would produce
larger climate changes, and for the 150 Tg case produce a true nuclear winter, making agriculture impossible for years. In both cases,
new climate model simulations show that the effects would last for more than a decade. Analogs Support the Theory Nuclear winter
is a theory based on computer model calculations. Normally, scientists test theories by doing experiments, but we never want to do
this experiment in the real world. Thus we look for analogs that can inform us of parts of the theory. And there are many such analogs
that convince us that the theory is correct: Cities burning. Unfortunately, we have several examples of cities burning, firestorms
created by the intense release of energy, and smoke being pumped into the upper atmosphere. These include San Francisco as a
result of the earthquake in 1906, and cities bombed in World War II, including Tokyo, Dresden, Hamburg, Darmstadt, Hiroshima, and
Nagasaki. The seasonal cycle. In the winter, the climate is cooler, because the days are shorter and sunlight is less intense. Again, this
helps us quantify the effects of reduction of solar radiation. The diurnal cycle. At night the Sun sets and it gets cold at the surface. If
the Sun did not rise tomorrow, we already have an intuitive feel for how much cooling would take place and how fast it would cool.
Volcanic eruptions. Explosive volcanic eruptions, such as those of Tambora in 1815, Krakatau in 1883 and Pinatubo in 1991, provide
several lessons. The resulting sulfate aerosol cloud in the stratosphere is transported around the world by winds, thus supporting the
results from the animations above. The surface temperature plummets after each large eruption, in proportion to the thickness of the
stratospheric cloud. In fact 1816, following Tambora, is known as the "Year Without a Summer," with global cooling and famine.
Following the Pinatubo eruption, global precipitation, river flow, and soil moisture all reduced, since cooling the planet by blocking
sunlight has a strong effect on reducing evaporation and weakening the hydrologic cycle. This is also what the nuclear winter
simulations show. Forest fires. Smoke from large forest fires sometimes is injected into the lower stratosphere. And the smoke is
transported around the world, also producing cooling under the smoke. Dust storms on Mars. Occasionally, dust storms start in one
region of Mars, but the dust is heated by the Sun, lofted into the upper atmosphere, and transported around the planet to completely
enshroud it in a dust blanket. This process takes a couple weeks, just like our computer simulations for the nuclear winter smoke.
Extinction of the dinosaurs. 65,000,000 years ago an asteroid or comet smashed into the Earth in southern Mexico. The resulting dust
cloud, mixed with smoke from fires, blocked out the Sun, killing the dinosaurs, and starting the age of mammals. This CretaceousTertiary (K-T) extinction may have been exacerbated by massive volcanism in India at the same time. This teaches us that large
amounts of aerosols in Earth's atmosphere have caused massive climate change and extinction of species . The difference with
nuclear winter is that the K-T extinction could not have been prevented. Policy Implications The work on nuclear winter in the 1980's,
and the realization that both direct and indirect effects of nuclear war would be a global catastrophe, led to the end of arms race and
the end of the Cold War. In response to the comment "In the 1980s, you warned about the unprecedented dangers of nuclear
weapons and took very daring steps to reverse the arms race," in an interview in 2000, Mikhail Gorbachev said "Models made by
Russian and American scientists showed that a nuclear war would result in a nuclear winter that would be extremely destructive to all
life on Earth; the knowledge of that was a great stimulus to us, to people of honor and morality, to act in that situation."[1] Since the
1980's, the number of nuclear weapons in the world has decreased to 1/3 of the peak number of more than 70,000. The
consequences of regional-scale nuclear conflicts are unexpectedly large, with the potential to become global catastrophes. The
combination of nuclear proliferation, political instability, and urban demographics may
constitute one of the greatest dangers to the stability of society since the dawn of humans. The
current and projected American and Russian nuclear arsenals can still produce nuclear winter. Only nuclear disarmament will prevent
the possibility of a nuclear environmental catastrophe.
Indo-Pak war could kill hundreds of millions
Symonds 13 (Peter, describing report by Anthony Cordesman, recipient of Department of
Defense Distinguished Service Medal, studies energy, US strategy, modern war,
counterterrorism, security in the middle east at center for strategic and international studies, 1
May “US think tank report weighs up “grim future” of nuclear war,”
https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/05/01/csis-m01.html)
A paper published in mid-April by the Washington-based think tank, Centre for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS), is a chilling indication of the discussions underway and the preparations being made within the US defence
establishment for nuclear war.¶ CSIS strategic analyst Anthony Cordesman is dismissive of nuclear arms control treaties and
negotiations, declaring that developing arms races in Asia and the Middle East “demand a strategy that looks beyond arms control
and considers a much grimmer future.”¶ Cordesman leaves no doubt as to what that future might be. The title of his paper, “Red
Lines, Deadlines, and Thinking the Unthinkable: India, Pakistan, Iran, North Korea and China”, is a direct reference to the Cold War
strategist Herman Kahn who coldly calculated a strategy for fighting and “winning” a nuclear war.¶ As Cordesman notes: “Early in the
thermonuclear age, Herman Kahn warned the world that it had to ‘think about the unthinkable’: The consequences of an actual
nuclear war, and consider which side—if any—might ‘win’.” He continued: “The end of the Cold War seemed to put an end to the
need for such thinking, but recent developments in North Korea and Iran make it all too clear that there is still a need for such
horrifying yet ‘realist’ analysis.”¶ On South Asia, the paper warns
that the arms build-up could lead to nuclear
war, as both India and Pakistan have “a history of overreaction, nationalism, and failure to
demonstrate stability and restraint in arms control.” It expresses concern that neither “has
really thought out the consequences of a nuclear exchange beyond the ‘Duke Nukem’ school of planning: who
can kill more of the enemy.”¶ But Cordesman’s ghoulish conclusion is that a South Asian nuclear war—a
conflict that would bring death and suffering to tens if not hundreds of millions—would not affect the
US and its allies. “The good news, from a ruthlessly ‘realist’ viewpoint,” he states, “is that such a human tragedy does not necessarily
have serious grand strategic consequences for other states, and might well have benefits... Some fallout perhaps, but not that much
in terms of serious radiation exposure measured in rads. The loss of India and Pakistan might create some short term economic issues
for importers of goods and services. However, the net effect would shift benefits to other suppliers without any clear problems in
substitutions or costs.Ӧ
Indo-Pak war ends modern civilization
PR Newswire 12 (Press Release from World Summit of Nobel Laureates, April 24, 2012,
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/nuclear-famine-report-limited-nuclear-exchange-inone-of-worlds-regions-would-trigger-mass-global-starvation-after-slashing-chinese-us-foodproduction-148677085.html NB)
Amidst Growing Tensions in Asia, India-Pakistan Confrontation Used to Show Dire Consequences Around the Globe; More Than A
Billion People Would be at Risk Under “Nuclear Famine” Scenario.¶ ¶ CHICAGO, IL.///April 25, 2012///More than
a billion
people around the world would face starvation following a limited regional nuclear weapons
exchange (such as a clash between India and Pakistan) that would cause major worldwide
climate disruption driving down food production in China, the U.S. and other nations, according to
a major new report released today by International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) and its US affiliate,
Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR).¶ Dr. Ira Helfand, the author of “Nuclear Famine: A Billion People at Risk—Global Impacts of
Limited Nuclear War on Agriculture, Food Supplies, and Human Nutrition,” said: “The grim prospect of nuclear famine requires a
fundamental change in our thinking about nuclear weapons. The new evidence that even
the relatively small nuclear
arsenals of countries such as India and Pakistan could cause long lasting, global damage to the
Earth’s ecosystems and threaten hundreds of millions of already malnourished people demands
that action be taken. The needless and preventable deaths of one billion people over a decade would be
a disaster unprecedented in human history. It would not cause the extinction of the human
race, but it would bring an end to modern civilization as we know it. Ӧ The findings and the methodology
on which the study is based will be published in a forthcoming issue of the peer-reviewed journal Climatic Change. Released during
the World Summit of Nobel Laureates in Chicago April 23-25, 2012, the Helfand report was made possible with the financial support
of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs.
Impact: Pakistani Terrorism
Terror in Pakistan would go nuclear
Jaspal 08 (Zafar, Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relation, Quaid-I-Azam
University, Islamabad, Pakistan, Defence Against Terrorism Review, Volume 1 Number 2,
http://www.coedat.nato.int/publications/datr2/06_ZafarJaspal.pdf, pages 103-118)
There is every reason to believe that the core of al-Qaeda or its affiliated operatives in Pakistan
could use WMD in their terrorist activities in Pakistan. Concern that terrorist organizations may use WMD in Pakistan has been
further intensified by a series of suicidal attacks in that country. Suicide attacks are defined as attacks whose success is contingent upon the death of the
perpetrator. The perpetrator’s death is a precondition for the success of his mission. The attacker is fully aware that if he does not accept to kill himself,
the planned attack will not be implemented. Suicide attackers can direct their attacks more clearly on the target than competing means; even armies or
paramilitary forces with the most advanced military technology find it difficult to deter an indoctrinated fanatical attacker with the purpose of getting
into a crowd and blowing himself up. WMD
terrorism is a perfect choice for a terrorist campaign not only in terms of
is a non-signatory NPT
nuclear weapon state. Pakistani scantiest A. Q Khan involvement in the nuclear trafficking negatively
impacts perceptions about its efforts to improve its nuclear command and control and security of nuclear management.
the damage WDMs can inflict, but also in terms of the sheer terror these weapons create in society. Pakistan
Washington and likeminded states, however, are more concerned about proliferation prospects and Pakistan’s nuclear management and security.
Though Pakistan is not manufacturing chemical and biological weapons, it has a nuclear infrastructure for making nuclear weapons and for power
generation. Therefore, the possibility, even though remote, of nuclear
terrorism in Pakistan cannot be ruled out. Many
facilities—power stations, research reactors and laboratories—are vulnerable to acts of sabotage and
blatant terrorist attacks that could cause the release of dangerous amounts of radioactive
materials.
analysts believe that nuclear
Terrorist activity in Pakistan risks nuclear war with India, US key to preventing
escalation
Vira 12 (Varun, writes on Middle Eastern and South Asian security affairs for Small Wars
Journal, coauthored Pakistan: Violence vs. Stability with Dr. Anthony Cordesman of the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), degree in International Relations, April 26, “Escalating
from Terrorism to Nuclear War on the Asian Subcontinent”
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/escalating-from-terrorism-to-nuclear-war-on-the-asiansubcontinent)
KEY JUDGMENTS¶ Within the next decade, there is a high probability of a high-profile terrorist
attack against India traced back to Pakistan. The attack is likely to rapidly escalate tensions
between the two countries to the brink of war.¶ India and Pakistan maintain the world’s most militarized border
and are the only two countries to have ever fought a hot war while fielding nuclear weapons against each other¶ A fifth Indo-Pakistani
War would take place in almost entirely unfamiliar settings¶ Frustration in India at the seeming impunity with which Pakistani-backed
terrorists are able to strike has led to a watershed in Indian strategic thinking and growing favor for retaliatory cross-border strikes,
despite the risk of nuclear escalation.¶ Pakistani
instability is at an all-time high and its relationship with
the US at an all-time low . This instability is likely to render Pakistan even more unpredictable
in crisis situations than normal, while limiting the US leverage to help de-escalate the situation.
¶ The US
has core interests in preventing war on the subcontinent, and will be central to de-escalation efforts in this period of crisis¶
US interests in South Asia are at an all-time high. Short-term imperatives include keeping Pakistan focused on confronting al-Qaeda
and Taliban militants and allowing the US to disengage from Afghanistan, while US grand strategy is trending towards a wide-ranging
strategic partnership with India, to expand trade and to hedge China¶ Since nuclearization in each crisis India and Pakistan have
depended on outsiders – and only
really the US has the leverage – to provide communication channels
and a restraining influence to keep tensions from escalating out of control.¶ Scenario Three: Indian
retaliation or escalation threatens Pakistan’s territorial integrity and utilizes its large offensive formations. Nuclear weapons would go
on ready alert and the potential for escalation to nuclear war would become a real possibility. Historically over the past two decades,
terrorism and militancy have been the primary sources of escalation. The 1999 Kargil War began when thousands of militants and
Pakistani soldiers out of uniform infiltrated across the LoC and occupied several strategic mountain peaks. In 2001, after Pakistani
terrorists attacked the Indian Parliament building in New Delhi the two countries mobilized and almost went to war, while after the
2008 Mumbai attacks, it is believed US diplomatic intervention was the primary restraining influence preventing Indian retaliation and
broader war. These three attacks are only some in a much-longer list that in past years averaged at least one major terrorist attack a
year. While this has slowed, India remains a ‘soft target’ and the probability of future attacks is near inevitable. The size of India’s
population and the sheer chaos of its urban centers makes adequate policing and counter-terrorism coverage difficult in perfect
circumstances, and virtually impossible when factoring in the systemic dysfunction in India’s police and internal security forces.
Moreover, despite all the changes in the regional strategic architecture, Pakistani militant groups remain highly motivated and able to
strike Indian targets, both as agents of the Pakistani military and as independent agents seeking to disrupt peace efforts, distract from
internal crackdowns or advance their fundamentalist objectives. This scenario is unlikely but war
has an escalation
potential of its own, and in the charged atmosphere of Indo-Pak hostility, one side could quite easily choose the next step up
the escalation ladder instead of accept defeat. If at any stage of the conflict, India chooses (or is perceived)
to aggress on Pakistan’s territorial integrity, the conflict is likely to escalate to a new level. Pakistan’s
depends on being able to deter an Indian invasion; its asymmetric escalation posture forward deploys its nuclear forces and credibly
threatens first use on Indian troop formations, or even Indian strategic or civilian centers. Irrationality in this sense is rational; the
more Pakistan can convey that it is a ‘mad-dog adversary’ whose reactions cannot be predicted, the more it is able to constrain Indian
reaction. India on the other hand appears to be tired of being constrained. Its desire for cross-border strikes has been detailed above,
but India has also unveiled aspirational doctrines it believes will break the status quo. The most notable example is “Cold Start,” a
complete inversion of strategic restraint that envisions the capability to rapidly mobilize “division-sized… integrated battle groups”
from a ‘cold start’ to “advance into Pakistan and hold territory to use as leverage.” As yet, India lacks the capability for such action; in
India’s three strike corps took over three months to assemble and travel to the border from their staging locations in Central India,
but even just the philosophy is a watershed in Indian strategic thinking. In wartime, nuclear
weapons will play a key
role at all phases of conflict, to threaten and in the worst case to use. If Indian forces cross the border in
force, they do so without precedent, and there is no guarantee on how Pakistan will react. If
Pakistan reacts as it has sometimes stated, it could launch preemptive nuclear strikes on Indian troops,
but even if does not immediately act, miscalculations can easily lead to inadvertent
uncontrolled escalation . Clausewitz is worth quoting; “The commander of an immense whole finds himself in a maelstrom
of false and true information, of mistakes made through fear, negligence, pre-occupation, contravention of his authority, from either
mistakes or correct motives, from ill-will, true or false sense of duty, indolence or exhaustion, of accident which no Man could have
forseen.” Put more plainly, in the “fog of war” reactions cannot easily be predicted, and the
Indian assumption that a
war can be fought and won without crossing the nuclear threshold cannot be taken for granted.
Neither can it guarantee that China will not mount an intervention of its own – there is a reason why
Cold Start is a component of India’s ‘two-front war’ strategy. Pakistan’s need to react to Cold Start has already increased the risks of
miscalculation or mistake. This is by far the worst option for US interests. If
hostilities advance to this stage, both
sides are almost totally reliant on outside forces to prevent uncontrolled escalation.
Historically the two sides have used the US as a balancer and a face-saving channel rather than
communicate bilaterally, but with declining US leverage, its ability to manage tensions at this level is in
question. Its relationship with Pakistan is at its worst point ever, and its warming ties with India have
eroded its impartial image and raised Indian expectations that the US will take a pro-India stance on the terrorism issue. This
severely complicates diplomacy from the start, and could have very dangerous implications . One
hopes by the time this conflict materializes, bilateral Indo-Pakistani communication and conflict management mechanisms have
improved dramatically, for the level of external intervention they expect quite simply may not exist.
A2: Alt Cause to Pak instability
Terrorism in is Pakistan the cause of their economic problems
Hameed et. al. 12 (Irfan, Ph.D scholar at Iqra University, Drones Further Drowning Down Real
Issues from Pakistan Economy and Business Sector European Journal of Scienctific Research,
Volume 87 Issue 3, September 15th 2012,
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2170519, page 381-382)
Islamist extremism and militancy has been a menace to Pakistani society throughout the post2001 period, becoming especially prevalent since 2007. Only two suicide bombings were recorded in Pakistan in
2002; that number grew to 59 in 2008 and 84 in 2009. Pakistan suffered 29 major attacks in the final three months of 2009, or an
average of about one every three days. Among the most gruesome were an October 28 car bombing at a market in Peshawar that
killed some 114 people, most of them women, on the same day as Secretary of State Clinton’s arrival in the country; and a December
31 suicide truck bombing at a playground in the village of Shah Hassan Khel, near South Waziristan, that killed up to 100 people
watching a soccer match, many of them women and children. In
Peshawar, a city hit by some 20 bombings during
this period, the economy came to a near halt as businesses closed or moved to safer areas. A
particularly alarming development in recent years is the significantly increased incidence of militants making direct attacks on
Pakistani security institutions. Extremists also appear to be moving from the FATA to the Sindh province capital of Karachi in large
numbers in recent months, exacerbating preexisting ethnic tensions and perhaps forming a new Taliban safe haven in Pakistan’s
largest city. The megacity’s sprawling ethnic Pashtun neighborhoods provide ideal hideouts for both Afghan and Pakistani Taliban
fighters. Such
militants are said to have established “mafia-like” criminal syndicates in Karachi to
raise millions of dollars to sustain their insurgencies through kidnaping, bank robberies, and
extortions. Hence, this scenario is creating a problematic situation for smooth conduct of
businesses and their operations.
A2: Indo-Pak relations resilient
Resilience won’t shield Indo-Pak relations when terror attacks are involved
Tripathi 12 (Dhananjay, Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations,
South Asian University, New Delhi, “Energy Security : The Functional Area of Regional
Cooperation for South Asia”, Hokkaido University Collection of Scholarly and Academic Papers,
page 94. http://133.87.26.249/dspace/bitstream/2115/50918/1/EBR3-2_006.pdf)
The problem does not lie on the effort side or with the number of formal processes for ¶ thriving regional integration in South Asia but
the root of trouble is deep-seated suspicion between ¶ India and Pakistan. India and Pakistan
are even struggling to overcome their subjective age-old ¶ mistrust and discontents. Unfortunately a
number of elements incessantly play a disruptive role in the ¶ relationship of two nuclear
neighbours like the fundamentalist groups who have their own agenda to ¶ pursue. Sour relations
between India and Pakistan suit the interest of troublemakers and this is the ¶ reason why a period of thaw between
the two always faced severe attacks. The last was the Mumbai ¶ terrorist attacks in 2008, when the smooth
sailing peace process got derailed after terrorists from ¶ Pakistan indulged in a deadly assault
on the economic capital of India. The terrorist groups in ¶ Pakistan are inherently anti-India and
are opposed to Indo-Pak peace. They have a wide network in ¶ Pakistan and also have factions
to carry out terrorist activities inside India. After the Mumbai terrorist ¶ attacks it took almost three years
for both Islamabad and New Delhi to restart their derailed dialogue ¶ process and there is no guarantee
that this process will remain shielded from another such ¶ unprovoked incident. Similarly, in India
there is a hawkish section that keeps on feeding anti-Pakistan ¶ sentiments. War rather than peace is their
preference and for them any argument in favour of ¶ cooperation with Pakistan is not just irrational but anti-national. In brief, if
not impossible, it is a ¶ herculean task to ensure a better, peaceful and stable relationship between
the two nuclear neighbours ¶ only through peace treaties, and there is a need for better cooperation in some functional
area.
A2: New Pakistani gov’t changes status quo
New elections don’t matter- it’s business as usual
Russia Today 8/30 (“Myth broken that drones strike at the heart of terrorists in Pakistan”,
Russia Today, July 30, 2013, http://rt.com/op-edge/drones-strike-terrorists-pakistan-799/ NB)
RT: Drone strikes have increased six fold under US President Obama. The new Prime Minister has called for an end to these attacks,
your high court even declared them illegal. Why hasn’t anything changed? We
are still seeing drone strikes carried
out on Pakistani soil since the elections.¶ Sultan Hali: Unfortunately, it seems that the new government which
had resorted to a lot of rhetoric, especially during the electoral campaign, had promised that it will bring to an end
the controversial drone attacks, but it seems there has been a reality check given to the new government by
the Americans that the aid which comes through the IMF, through loans and other things will be stopped unless the government of
Pakistan toes the line. Therefore it
appears to be business as usual. Although the number of drone attacks
have increased with the new government coming in there have been only a number of protests, but there has
been no severe stands taken by the US government that the drone strikes must stop. John Kerry is likely to visit this week, and maybe
it is taking up his time, but I personally have very little hope for that because if something had to be done in a concrete manner, it
would have been done. The worst thing is, the
new government taking over has been only 50 days but the
terrorist strikes have increased. The myth is broken that the drone strikes actually strike at the heart of the terrorists, but
the amount of collateral damage that takes place has not only multiplied but it has resorted into many more human lives being lost
because of terrorist strikes. And if you notice, the other day a major jail break took place in the city of Dera Ismail Khan and a number
of terrorist have escaped. A similar jail break had occurred in the city of Bannu last year out of which there were very harden criminals
and terrorists went on and attacked air force and air bases. Therefore, I personally think, if the drone attacks have to come to an end
Pakistan will have to take a unilateral stand with the United States for its sovereignty. Until that happens it will be business as usual.¶
RT: There is ample evidence showing tacit Pakistani
consent, even active cooperation in the drone
program that contradicts the official posture that violates the country’s sovereignty. What do you make of that? Is
the government itself not serious about ending these strikes?¶ SH: My personal view as a military analyst and as neutral citizen of
Pakistan I think the government is at a total loss. It has no clear control of what is going on . Of course it
has inherited the problem but during the previous two governments there was definitely tacit approval provided to the United States
of America. It was a “wink and scream” policy that they even provided them with intelligence. Once the drones strikes took place
publicly they said that we are going to make a UN cry, this was revealed to WikiLeaks, this was revealed by a number of US senators
who went on the record. It
was hoped that the new government would probably change this, but it
has not only failed to change, it is yet to draft a formal national security policy which includes the drone attacks. Unless it does
that, I am afraid that it is at sixes and sevens.
A2: Reform education CP
Madrassahs not the main problem, won’t solve
Winthrom and Graff 10 (Rebecca and Corinne, Fellow and Co-Director of the Center for
Universal Education at Brookings and Fellow in the Center for Universal Education at Brookings,
“BEYOND MADRASAS ASSESSING THE LINKS BETWEEN EDUCATION AND MILITANCY IN
PAKISTAN”, Center for Universal Education at Brookings, June 2010, page 19-20
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/6/pakistan%20education%20wi
nthrop/06_pakistan_education_winthrop.pdf)
The bottom line is that madrasas are not nearly as ¶ prominent on Pakistan’s educational landscape
as was ¶ previously thought. Though a small number of militant ¶ madrasas aid in recruiting militants and
indoctrinating students, making them more prone to engage in ¶ suicide terrorist attacks and more supportive of violence, these
schools are
too few to have a major impact on militancy across the country. Far from rushing to send their
Pakistani families are actually ¶ turning mainly
to private schools. First on the minds ¶ of these parents appears to be the quality of schooling ¶ available to their children,
children to religious seminaries because ¶ of a lack of alternatives,
which is judged to be poor ¶ in government schools. This fact draws attention to ¶ an important feature of Pakistani schooling:
Generally ¶ speaking, neither the public schools nor Pakistan’s ¶ madrasas have delivered the caliber of education ¶ that parents are
looking for and expect. Given the ¶ far greater number of public schools than madrasas ¶ in Pakistan, this raises an important
question: Could ¶ Pakistan’s low attainment ratios and poor quality of ¶ schooling in and of themselves be an important contributor to
militancy across the country?
Both global ¶ econometric research on education and confl ict and ¶
Pakistani scholarship call attention to the role of limited access to and quality of schooling in
fueling largescale violence
Terrorism
UQ: AQAP Dangerous/Competent
The United States must stay watchful against terrorists because they try to come
up with worse ways to kill innocent people.
Pellerin 2012 (Cheryl, American Forces Press Service , “Defense Secretary Panetta: US Must
Stay Vigilant Against Terrorist Attacks”, 08 May 2012,
http://london.usembassy.gov/terror034.html)
A recent attempt by Yemeni-based terrorists to plant an explosive device on an airliner bound for
the United States shows the nation needs to remain vigilant against new acts of terrorism,
Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta said.¶ In a plot whose details may never be fully known, U.S. and Yemeni
operatives last month disrupted the plans of a bomber affiliated with al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP, to detonate a plastic
“What this incident makes clear is that this country has to
continue to remain vigilant against those who would seek to attack this country,” Panetta said
explosive device aboard a commercial aircraft.¶
during a news conference yesterday. “And we will do everything necessary to keep America safe.”¶ On Air Force One today, White
House spokesman Jay Carney said President Barack Obama, who was briefed on the operation in early April, is pleased with the
success of intelligence and counterterrorism officials in foiling the attempt by al-Qaida to use the explosive device.¶ “It is indicative of
the kind of work that our intelligence and counterterrorism services are performing regularly to counter the threat posed by al-Qaida
in general, and AQAP in particular,” Carney said. “At no time were Americans in danger as a result of this.”¶ During an interview this
morning on NBC’s “Today,” John Brennan, chief White House counterterrorism advisor, said
international cooperation
was key to the operation’s success.¶ “It took very close cooperation with our international
partners,” Brennan said. “This is something that we have really emphasized over the past many
years -- working very closely with our Yemeni partners -- because al-Qaida in the Arabian
Peninsula poses a serious threat to us.Ӧ Having the intelligence and being able to take action before any IEDs can
reach an airplane or an airport, he added, is instrumental in disrupting such attacks.¶ According to news reports, the IED was plastic,
similar to the one Nigerian Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab tried to use on Christmas Day 2009 on Northwest Airlines flight 253, en route
from Amsterdam to Detroit. AQAP claimed credit for that attempted attack.¶ “AQAP's bomb
maker, Ibrahim al-Asiri,
has demonstrated real proficiency as far as concealment methods as well as the materials that
are used in these IEDs,” Brennan said.¶ The FBI is examining the IED to see what kind of modifications or refinements
may have been made, he added.¶ The United States also adapts its countermeasures, Brennan said.¶ “Whatever we learn from this
IED, we're going to ensure that it's going to be incorporated into the measures that we take at airports, as well as any other avenues
of approach that the would-be terrorists would take,” the president’s counterterrorism advisor said.¶ Brennan said no one has to
worry about the IED or the would-be bomber.¶ “This is still in a sensitive stage,” he added. “We're working very closely with those
partners. We want to protect sources and methods, as well as operational equities. But neither the device nor the would-be bomber
poses a threat.”¶ Now, Brennan added, “we’re taking additional measures in the event that there are other efforts out there on the
part of al-Qaida to try to evade security.Ӧ In New Delhi, today, on the last segment of her trip to Asia, Secretary of State Hillary
Rodham Clinton said the thwarted terrorist attack is on the minds of U.S. and Indian officials.¶ Both governments “know the tragedies
and losses that come with terrorism on our soil,” she told reporters.¶ “We have increased our cooperation between India and the
United States,” she added, and we’re going to continue to do everything we can not only to prevent terrorists from carrying out their
evil acts of violence, but also to try to convince people not to be recruited into terrorism, which is very much of a dead end, literally
and figuratively, when it comes to pursuing any kind of political or ideological aims.Ӧ The plot itself indicates that the terrorists will
keep trying, she said.¶
“They keep trying to devise more and more perverse and terrible ways to kill
innocent people,” the secretary of state added. “And it’s a reminder as to why we have to
remain vigilant at home and abroad in protecting our nation and in protecting friendly nations
and peoples like India and others.”
AQAP has the capability and intent--- attack in Saudi Arabia proves they’re
competent
Stewart 2009 (Scott, VP of Analysis for Stratfor and was special agent for US State Department
for 10 years, “AQAP: Paradigm Shifts and Lessons Learned”, 2 September 2009,
http://faculty.uml.edu/jyurcak/44.248/ADMIN/Articles/AQAP.pdf, Page 1-2)
In February, a
man who appeared with al-Asiri on Saudi Arabia’s list of most-wanted militants —
former Guantanamo Bay inmate Mohammed al-Awfi — surrendered in Yemen and was
transported to Saudi Arabia where he renounced terrorism and entered into the kingdom’s
amnesty program. Al-Awfi, who had appeared in a January 2009 video issued by the newly
created AQAP after the merger of the Saudi and Yemeni nodes of the global jihadist network,
was a senior AQAP leader, and his renouncement was a major blow against AQAP. ¶ But the al-Asiri
case ended very differently from the al-Awfi case. Unlike al-Awfi, al-Asiri was not a genuine repentant — he was a human Trojan
horse. After
al-Asiri entered a small room to speak with Prince Mohammed, he activated a small
improvised explosive device (IED) he had been carrying inside his anal cavity. The resulting
explosion ripped al-Asiri to shreds but only lightly injured the shocked prince — the target of al-Asiri’s
unsuccessful assassination attempt. ¶ While the assassination proved unsuccessful, AQAP had been able to shift the
operational paradigm in a manner that allowed them to achieve tactical surprise. The surprise
was complete and the Saudis did not see the attack coming — the operation could have
succeeded had it been better executed. ¶ The kind of paradigm shift evident in this attack has
far-reaching implications from a protective-intelligence standpoint, and security services will
have to adapt in order to counter the new tactics employed. The attack also allows some important
conclusions to be drawn about AQAP’s ability to operate inside Saudi Arabia. Militants conducting terrorist attacks
and the security services attempting to guard against such attacks have long engaged in a
tactical game of cat and mouse. As militants adopt new tactics, security measures are then
implemented to counter those tactics. The security changes then cause the militants to change
in response and the cycle begins again. These changes can include using different weapons,
employing weapons in a new way or changing the type of targets selected. ¶ Sometimes,
militants will implement a new tactic or series of tactics that is so revolutionary that it
completely changes the framework of assumptions — or the paradigm — under which the
security forces operate. Historically, al Qaeda and its jihadist progeny have proved to be very
good at understanding the security paradigm and then developing tactics intended to exploit
vulnerabilities in that paradigm in order to launch surprise attacks. For example: ¶
the
9/11 attacks, it was inconceivable that a large passenger aircraft would be used as a manually
operated cruise missile. Hence, security screeners allowed box cutters to be carried onto
aircraft, which were then used by the hijackers to take over the planes. ¶
journalists to assassinate Ahmed Shah Masood with suicide IEDs hidden in their camera gear
was also quite inventive. ¶
might still be wondering what happened to American Airlines Flight 63. ¶
employed against the USS Cole in October 2000 was another example of a paradigm shift that
resulted in tactical surprise.
AQAP is dangerous and is planning to attack Westerners.
Anti-Defamation League 2013(aims to stop defamation of the Jewish people, and secure
justice and fair treatment to all peoples, “Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula”,
http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/combating-hate/al-qaeda-in-the-arabian-peninsula-2013-1-11v1.pdf, Pages 1-3)
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), described by the U.S. government as "the most active and
dangerous" branch of Al Qaeda, is the terrorist organization's wing in Yemen and Saudi Arabia.
The growth of AQAP has led American officials to indicate that Yemen could become Al
Qaeda's next operational and training hub for the group's militants from around the world. ¶
Formed in early 2009, AQAP has attempted to carry out multiple attacks against the United States,
including at least three failed attacks involving U.S.-bound aviation, most recently in 2012. Not
limited to foreign targets, AQAP has also plotted attacks against regional leadership, including
a failed assassination attempt on a Saudi prince serving as Deputy Minister of the Interior.
These plots, though unsuccessful, have garnered the group substantial media attention and a
reputation as one of the gravest terrorist threats. ¶ A key component of AQAP's operational strategy entails
reaching out to English-speaking audiences with its messages and propaganda in order to recruit new members. This material
encourages Western audiences to adopt its ideology and carry out attacks against Western interests in the Arabian Peninsula and
abroad. ¶ The driving forces behind AQAP's English-language propaganda machine were Anwar al-Awlaki, an American-born cleric,
and Samir Khan, an American blogger and propagandist, both of whom were killed in a September 30, 2011 drone strike.
The Department of State has issued a worldwide caution to update the public of
the continuous threats of the AQAP.
Department of State 2012 ( “Worldwide Caution”, July 19, 2012,
http://matamoros.usconsulate.gov/caution_071912.html)
The Department of State has issued this Worldwide Caution to update information on the
continuing threat of terrorist actions and violence against U.S. citizens and interests
throughout the world. U.S. citizens are reminded to maintain a high level of vigilance and to
take appropriate steps to increase their security awareness. This replaces the Worldwide Caution dated
January 24, 2012, to provide updated information on security threats and terrorist activities worldwide. ¶ The Department of
State remains concerned about the continued threat of terrorist attacks, demonstrations, and
other violent actions against U.S. citizens and interests overseas. Current information suggests
that al-Qaida, its affiliated organizations, and other terrorist organizations continue to plan
terrorist attacks against U.S. interests in multiple regions, including Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.
These attacks may employ a wide variety of tactics including suicide operations, assassinations,
kidnappings, hijackings, and bombings. ¶ Extremists may elect to use conventional or nonconventional weapons, and target both official and private interests. Examples of such targets include
high-profile sporting events, residential areas, business offices, hotels, clubs, restaurants, places of worship, schools, public areas, and
other tourist destinations both in the United States and abroad where U.S. citizens gather in large numbers, including during
U.S. citizens are reminded of the potential for terrorists to attack public transportation
systems and other tourist infrastructure. Extremists have targeted and attempted attacks on
subway and rail systems, aviation, and maritime services. In the past, these types of attacks have occurred in
holidays.¶
cities such as Moscow, London, Madrid, Glasgow, and New York City.
Link: Drones Lead to Backlash and Retaliation
Drone strikes fuel terrorism--- laundry list
Blum and Heyman 10, (Gabriella Blum, Assistant Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, and
Philip Heymann, James Barr Ames Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, Law and Policy of
Targeted Killing, Harvard National Security Journal, Vol. 1, June 27, 2010,
https://www.law.upenn.edu/institutes/cerl/conferences/targetedkilling/papers/BlumHeymannL
awPolicy.pdf)
An immediate consequence of eliminating leaders of terrorist organizations will sometimes be what may be
called the Hydra effect, the rise of more—and more resolute—leaders to replace them. The
decapitating of the organization may also invite retaliation by the other members and
followers of the organization. Thus, when Israel assassinated Abbas Mussawi, Hezbollah‘s leader in Lebanon,
in 1992, a more charismatic and successful leader, Hassan Nassrallah, succeeded Mussawi. The armed
group then avenged the assassination of its former leader in two separate attacks, blowing up Israeli
and Jewish targets in Buenos Aires, killing over a hundred people and injuring hundreds more.¶ Targeted killing
may also interfere with important gathering of critical intelligence. The threat of being targeted
will drive current leaders into hiding, making the monitoring of their movements and activities
by the counterterrorist forces more difficult. Moreover, if these leaders are found and killed, instead of
captured, the counterterrorism forces lose the ability to interrogate them to obtain potentially
valuable information about plans, capabilities, or organizational structure.¶ The political message flowing from
the use of targeted killings may be harmful to the attacking country’s interest, as it emphasizes the disparity in
power between the parties and reinforces popular support for the terrorists, who are seen as a
David fighting Goliath. Moreover, by resorting to military force rather than to law enforcement, targeted killings
might strengthen the sense of legitimacy of terrorist operations, which are sometimes viewed
as the only viable option for the weak to fight against a powerful empire. If collateral damage to
civilians accompanies targeted killings, this, too, may bolster support for what seems like the just cause of
the terrorists, at the same time as it weakens domestic support for fighting the terrorists.
Drone strikes increase recruitment and destabilize the Pak-Afghan region—leads
to retaliation and terrorism.
Shah 10, (SIKANDER AHMED SHAH, J.D. Cum Laude, University of Michigan Ann Arbor; Assistant
Professor of Law and Policy, LUMS University, Lahore, Pakistan, WAR ON TERRORISM: SELF
DEFENSE, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, AND THE LEGALITY OF U.S. DRONE ATTACKS IN
PAKISTAN, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW, VOL. 9:77, 2010,
http://law.wustl.edu/WUGSLR/Issues/Volume9_1/Shah.pdf)
The use of force is unnecessary in self defense when, rather than diminishing the dangers involved, the gravity of the threat posed is
augmented by the use of force. U.S.
drone attacks exacerbate the threat of terrorism, both from a regional and
global perspective, and intensely strengthen militancy and insurgency in the troubled Pak-Afghan
region. The War on Terror that prompted U.S. military adventurism in the region has proven to be a blessing in disguise for
extremist and militants groups. U.S. attacks have given birth to an unprecedented level of resentment and
anger among the tribal populace, which has been craftily exploited by fanatical factions through
organized propaganda to successfully recruit thousands of disillusioned and impressionable young
fighters for their causes. Consequently, these burgeoning violent movements embedded in religious fanaticism
have dangerously engulfed many parts of Pakistan propagating insurgency, civil unrest, and
terrorism.¶ U.S. drone attacks are no different in causing this level of resentment and anger, and they have provided
impetus to extremist recruitment and bolstered the resolve of militants. The resulting aggressiveness is
apparent from recent terrorist attacks conducted by extremists in secure metropolises of Pakistan distant from the tribal areas, as
retribution for the drone attacks.329 For instance, Baitullah Mehsud, the
deceased leader of Tehrik-e-Taliban,330 the
that his fighters would continue to
undertake terrorist attacks in secure parts of Pakistan on a weekly basis as reprisal for the
continuing drone attacks.331 This proxy fight between the United States and the militants
within Pakistan is dangerously destabilizing the country and increasing the dangers of
international terrorism to all nations, including the United States. Therefore, the necessity of the drone
umbrella organization of all Pakistani Taliban outfits, had threatened
attacks for eliminating the threat of terrorism emanating out of the tribal areas of Pakistan is highly questionable.
Drone strikes increase support for extremist groups—increases terrorism.
O’Connell 10, (Mary Ellen O’Connell, Robert and Marion Short Chair in Law, University of Notre
Dame, Lawful Use of Combat Drones, House of Representatives Subcommittee on National
Security and Foreign Affairs, Hearing: Rise of the Drones II: Examining the Legality of Unmanned
Targeting, April 28, 2010, https://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2010_hr/042810oconnell.pdf)
The use of military force in counter-terrorism operations has been counter-productive. Military
force is a blunt
instrument. Inevitably unintended victims are the result of almost any military action. Drone attacks in Pakistan have
resulted in large numbers of deaths and are generally seen as fueling terrorism, not abating it.
In Congressional testimony in March 2009, counter-terrorism expert, David Kilcullen, said drones in Pakistan are giving
“rise to a feeling of anger that coalesces the population around the extremists and leads to
spikes of extremism well outside the parts of the country where we are mounting those
attacks.”18 Another expert told the New York Times, ‘’The more the drone campaign works, the more it
fails—as increased attacks only make the Pakistanis angrier at the collateral damage and
sustained violation of their sovereignty.’”19 A National Public Radio Report on April 26, 2010, pointed out that al
Qaeda is losing support in the Muslim world because of its violent, lawless tactics.20 We can help eliminate the last of that support by
distinguishing ourselves through commitment to the rule of law, especially by strict compliance with the rules governing lethal force.
Drone strikes radicalize populations and kill peace efforts.
Gazit and Byrm 11, (Nir Gazit, Ruppin Academic Center, Israel, Robert J Brym, University of
Toronto, Canada, State-directed political assassination in Israel: A political hypothesis,
International Sociology Vol. 26:6, Oct 21, 2011, iss.sagepub.com/content/26/6/862.abstract)
Political assassination is costly also because it enrages the Palestinians, increases their
motivation to retaliate violently and makes them more intransigent in the long run (Brym and Araj,
2006b; Löwenheim and Heimann, 2008; Zussman and Zussman, 2006). This is so, first, because political leaders enjoy
higher status than do military leaders and are typically better known to the Palestinian public;
and, second, because most Palestinians seem to view the targeting of political leaders as beyond the
rules of the game. As a result, killing political leaders radicalizes Palestinians and undermines
ceasefires. For example, the assassination in 2001 of Abu Ali Mustafa, Secretary-General of the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine, sparked the revenge killing of Israeli Minister of Tourism Rehavam Ze’evi two months later. Similarly, the
assassination of Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s Muhammad Seeder and Hamas’s Ismail Abu Shanab in 2003 led Hamas to
rescind a ceasefire with Israel. International criticism heightened as Israel was widely held to
be unwilling to respect the truce, and the cycle of violence between Israel and the Palestinians
resumed (Honig, 2007: 566).
Targeted killing creates retaliation, unites terrorists in opposition, and sacrifices
intelligence.
Fisher 7, (W. JASON FISHER, Judicial Clerk to the Honorable James O. Browning, United States
District Court for the District of New Mexico; J.D./M.A. University of California, Berkeley,
Targeted Killing, Norms, and International Law, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 45,
2007, http://heinonlinebackup.com/hol-cgibin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/cjtl45&section=25)
Arguments concerning the disadvantages of targeted killing must be weighed against these benefits. Primary among the drawbacks
are that targeted
killing may provoke retaliation in the form of increased attacks and that
targeted killing may spur the recruitment of new terrorists by making martyrs of those killed
and highlighting the terrorist organizations to which they belonged.145 The unprecedented wave of
suicide bombings that followed the January 2002 targeted killing of Tanzim leader Raed al-Karmi in the West Bank has been cited to
support the retaliation concern. 146 Targeted
killing may also promote cooperation among historically
adversarial terrorist groups against a common enemy.147 For example, at the 2001 funeral of Mustafa
Zibri, a high-ranking member of the People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) killed in a targeted killing strike
in the' West Bank, leaders of the PFLP, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad came together in a show of antiIsraeli solidarity despite traditional animosity amongst these groups. 148 Additionally, targeted
killing may hurt the longer-term interests of States pursuing the tactic by removing potential
future negotiating partners. 14 9 Further, insofar as pursuing the intelligence needed to conduct
targeted killings effectively diverts re- sources away from gathering and analyzing more existential
threats, such as threats from other States or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, employing targeted
killing as a counter-terrorism tactic may be detrimental to longer-term interests. 150
Link: Drones Hurt Intel - Alienates Allies
Continued drone strikes break up intelligence networks—allied states won’t be
complicit in international law violations by sharing information with the US.
Aldrich 10, (Richard J. Aldrich, Professor of International Security at the University of Warwick,
International intelligence cooperation in practice, International Intelligence Cooperation and
Accountability, October 25, 2010,
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/people/aldrich/vigilant/861_02_international_xml.pdf
On 10 March 2009, a new thematic report on intelligence was discussed at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva. Martin Scheinin,
the UN Special Rapporteur on the protection of Human Rights while countering terrorism,
presented his report and, importantly, he focused on the role of intelligence agencies in the fight against
terrorism and the accountability problems that arise from the cooperation between these
agencies. Scheinin did not mince his words and emphasised that he was ‘gravely concerned’ that intelligence
cooperation might lead to international crimes. He argued that the concepts that underpinned
many intelligence- sharing agreements meant that even liberal democracies that were opposed to
torture might become complicit in serious abuses. Martin Scheinin, a professor of international law at the European
University Institute in Florence, Italy, argued both for a strengthening of national regulation and also a system of ‘joint oversight’,
although there was little 2 detail on how this might be operationalised.62¶ 3 Arguably, this
problem has been building
for some time. In the 1990s, 4 the European intelligence services went through a regulatory
revolution 5 during which many services were given a legal identity and in some cases 6 the
European Convention on Human Rights was written into their core 7 guidance. Although
implementation across Europe was uneven, govern- 8 ments asserted that this was a major step forward and that intelligence 9
services would increasingly be audited and called to account. However,¶ 10 these new
parliamentary oversight
committees were always weak and now 11 stand on the sidelines, relatively powerless in the
face of what appear to be 12 complex distributed networks that consist of the agencies of many
coun- 13 tries working together with private entities. Not only are traditional mech- 14 anisms of intelligence
oversight weak in the face of new patterns of 15 international intelligence cooperation, they also face intelligence services 16 that are
larger, more vigorous and have less time for auditors. In October 17 2006, Ronnie Kasrils, the South African Minister for Intelligence
Services, 18 cautioned against a recent trend, ‘where oversight bodies appear to be 19 “missing in action”, more especially in critical
discussions about the 20 manner in which the “war on terrorism” is being waged, which has largely 21 become the preserve of the
executive’.63¶ 22 A major constraint is the nature of multinational operations, which by 23 definition are rather opaque to national
committees. When
national com- 24 mittees seek to look at issues of international cooperation the
results can 25 be disappointing. This is illustrated by the recent UK examination of ren- 26 ditions undertaken by its
Intelligence and Security Committee. Much of 27 this consisted of intelligence chiefs proclaiming that international intelli- 28 gence
cooperation is important and offers us a fascinating example of the 29 constrained national investigation of an international issue.
However, 30 regional and international committees of inquiry have not faired much 31 better. The
inquiries into secret
prisons and rendition by the Council of 32 Europe, the European Parliament and then the European Commissions
33 were able to take evidence across all of Europe. However they lacked the 34 ability to secure
a response from the various executives of EU member 35 states. It is not only a question of jurisdiction, but also of
power.64
Drone strikes hinder information-gathering efforts to stop terrorism—Israel
proves.
David 2, (Steven R. David, Associate Dean at Johns Hopkins University, Fatal Choices: Israel's
Policy of Targeted Killing, Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 51, September 2002,
http://biu.ac.il/Besa/david.pdf)
The policy of targeted
killing also hurts Israel's security by damaging the effectiveness of its intelligence
organizations. By diverting scarce resources away from the collection and analysis of
intelligence on the threat posed by adversarial states, Israel runs the risk of paying less
attention to existential threats in order to combat critical but less than vital challenges to its
security. Following the Munich Olympics massacre, Israel focused much of the attention of its intelligence services on tracking
down and killing the perpetrators. This effort may have led, in part, to diverting Israel's attention away from the growing threat posed
by Egypt and Syria, which led to Israel being caught by surprise at the outbreak of the October 1973 War.25 Even where the effect is
not so dramatic, targeted
killing can hurt Israel's ability to gather critical intelligence. Locating and
killing key Palestinian terrorists requires timely intelligence, much of which can only be
supplied by informers. Given that a limited number of people will know the whereabouts of the targets, it will not be difficult
to isolate those who have collaborated with Israel. Increasing reports of informers being killed during the second
intifada, with their bodies publicly displayed, may partly be a result of their identities becoming known as a
result of the targeted killing policy.26¶ Israel's policy of targeted killing has produced worldwide
condemnation. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan repeatedly urged Israel to end targeted killings, saying it
violates international law and undermines efforts at achieving a Middle East peace. In the United
States, Secretary of State Colin Powell has also condemned the policy, declaring at one point, "We continue to express our distress
and opposition to these kinds of targeted killings and we will continue to do so."27 While serving as American Ambassador to Israel,
Martin Indyk provided a harsh criticism of targeted killing on Israeli television saying, "The United States government is very clearly on
the record as against targeted assassinations." They are extrajudicial killings, and we do not support that."28 The European Union
and, of course, the Arab states, have also been vocal in their condemnation of Israel for killing Palestinian militants. Although the
criticism from the United States abated some in the aftermath of the September 11th terror attacks, Israel nonetheless faces
continuing international disapproval as a result of following this policy. This is especially the case when, as often happens, innocent
Palestinians are killed in the course of Israeli operations. The July 2002 slaying of Hamas leader Shehada provoked especially harsh
criticism— including from the United States—since 14 innocent bystanders (nine of whom were children) also died in the bombing
attack.
In its struggle for worldwide support, there is little question that the policy of targeted
killing hurts Israel's standing.
Link: Drones Hurt Intel - Host States
Drone strikes kill relations—delegitimizes target nations and creates political
backlash.
Blum and Heyman 10, (Gabriella Blum, Assistant Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, and
Philip Heymann, James Barr Ames Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, Law and Policy of
Targeted Killing, Harvard National Security Journal, Vol. 1, June 27, 2010,
https://www.law.upenn.edu/institutes/cerl/conferences/targetedkilling/papers/BlumHeymannL
awPolicy.pdf)
When targeted
killing operations are conducted on foreign territory, they run the risk of heightening
international tensions between the targeting government and the government in whose
territory the operation is conducted. Israel’s relations with Jordan became dangerously strained following the failed
attempt in September 1997 in Jordan to assassinate Khaled Mashaal, the leader of Hamas. Indeed, international relations
may suffer even where the local government acquiesces in the operation, but the operation
fails or harms innocent civilians, bringing the local government under political attack from domestic
constituencies (recall the failed attack in Pakistan on Al-Zawahiri that left eighteen civilians dead).¶ Even if there is no
collateral damage, targeted killings in another country’s territory threatens to draw criticism
from local domestic constituencies against the government, which either acquiesced or was
too weak to stop the operation in its territory. Such is the case now in both Pakistan and Yemen, where opposition
forces criticize the governments for permitting American armed intervention in their countries.¶ The aggression of targeted
killings also runs the risk of spiraling hatred and violence, numbing both sides to the effects of
killing and thus continuing the cycle of violence. Each attack invites revenge, each revenge
invites further retaliation. Innocent civilians suffer whether they are the intended target of attack or its unintentional
collateral consequences.¶ Last but not least, exceptional measures tend to exceed their logic. As in the case of extraordinary
detention or interrogation methods, there
is a danger of over-using targeted killings, both within and outside of
the killing of a terrorist often proves a simpler
operation than protracted legal battles over detention, trial, extradition, and release.
the war on terrorism. A particular danger in this context arises as
Drone strikes destroy relations with the target state—Pakistan proves.
Zenko 13, (Micah Zenko is the Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at
the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously, he worked for five years at the Harvard
Kennedy School and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research
Service, and State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,
Council on Foreign Relations Special Report No. 65, January 2013,
http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Drones_CSR65.pdf)
In countries where drone strikes have occurred, some State Department and U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) officials strongly believe that the broadly unpopular attacks overshadow and
diminish the effectiveness of civilian assistance programs. One former senior military official closely involved in
U.S. targeted killings argued that “drone strikes are just a signal of arrogance that will boomerang against
America,” while former U.S. ambassador to Pakistan Cameron Munter explained, “The problem is the political
fallout. . . . Do you want to win a few battles and lose the war?”29 In Pakistan, the continuation of drone strikes
has exposed fault lines between the army and the democratically elected parliament, which in
April 2012 demanded “an immediate cessation of drone attacks inside the territorial borders of
Pakistan.”30
Link: Drones Hurt International Cooperation
US drone policies alienate the cooperation of the international community—
only restrictions on targeted killing solve.
Elliot 9, (Michael Elliot, Georgetown University Law Center, International School of Islamabad,
Pakistan, Where Precision Is the Aim: Locating the Targeted Killing Policies of the United States
and Israel within International Humanitarian Law, The Canadian Yearbook of International Law,
Vol. 47, 2009,
http://books.google.com/books/about/Canadian_Yearbook_of_International_Law.html?id=s2HRl
Vwkfc8C)
Where that general compliance is no longer certain, there is something to be said for reconsidering the current legal framework. This
is particularly true when it is states such as the United States¶ that are refusing compliance. While sovereign equality may be one¶ of
the fundamental principles of international law, it cannot be said¶ to constitute an accurate description of the factual distribution of¶
power."*5 Although
the standing of the United States within the¶ international community may
be waning, few question that it maintains a dominant position, and Israel is more than a mere makeweight.
In a context that lacks an ultimate enforcement mechanism for its¶ legal rules, the persistent practices of those—or, in this situation,¶
at least one of them—in whom much of the power resides present¶ a significant impediment to the imposition of compliance.¶ The
unique characteristics of international law as law do not make¶ the answer to the legality of targeted killing any easier. They do,
however,¶ condition the context in which that answer is developed.¶ The determined pursuit by Israel and the United States of
targeted¶ killing as a policy in itself provides some basis for recognizing it as¶ lawful. At the very least, it raises doubts as to the
effectiveness of¶ declaring it unlawful.¶ Given the
limitations of international law, it would seem better¶ to
recognize targeted killing as lawful and then regulate its employment¶ rather than to deny its
legality' and allow it to continue unregulated.¶ Given that there is no indication that either the United¶ States or
Israel is decreasing its resort to targeted killing, recognizing¶ its lawfulness would allow international humanitarian law to¶ define it
and to delineate the context in which it may be practiced. The importance of defining the boundaries of targeted killing in this context
is underlined by the fact that the United States and Israel are not the only actors who are collecting drones.¶ Targeted killing by any
state poses “frightening risks of error and¶ abuse." This is particularly so when pursued in the clandestine¶ manner of the CIA
Predator drone program. As mentioned, this¶ program is not limited to war zones but could operate anywhere.¶ Moreover, so long as
it remains covert, there will, quite rightly, be¶ concerns over accountability respecting its employment. The¶ distinction between
targeted killing and extra-judicial killing may¶ be fairly clear within war zones, but it is not so clear when the operations are conducted
beyond what may be clearly seen to be such.¶ While recognizing and more carefully defining targeted killing¶ will not necessarily
prevent abuse of its potential, not doing so will¶ almost certainly lead to its being continued. Insisting on a legal¶ framework that
makes any action unlawful will lead states to reject¶ the framework as a whole.19‘" This is particularly so when the action¶ is an
effective means of combating what has been identified by¶ United States security strategies as the defining threat to the country.¶
Even for a country as powerful as the United States, there are¶ interests served by submitting
to the legal constraints of international law, provided that those constraints do not entirely
deny¶ to it actions that it considers necessary. On a broad level, the United¶ States may regard the
increased likelihood that future adversaries¶ will be bound by international law as valuable.
Moreover, the¶ legal rules of international law can provide a consistent resolution¶ of the issues it raises that would otherwise be
unavailable to the¶ United States,“‘5*¶ In this particular context, there
is an added advantage to the¶ United
States and Israel in being seen to comply with the law: maintaining the moral high ground in
countering terrorism is an integral¶ factor in recruiting allies. With the terrorist threat dispersed
into many non-hostile states, international cooperation is a key requirement if the response is
to be effective. At the moment, the United States, at least, has alienated the international
community by pursuing Al-Qaeda without due regard for the applicable legal framework or, for
that matter, international opinion. Legal compliance is a way in which the “just party” status may be
reclaimed, and the United States can thereby achieve the international cooperation that is so
important.¶ So long as the US policy of targeted killing is condemned as a¶ whole, there is no
incentive for it to restrict the policy’s use. If its¶ actions are criticized irrespective of the context in which the targeted
killing is practised, the choice becomes either to cease the¶ practice altogether or pursue it unfettered despite concerns as to¶ its
legality. The United States has clearly chosen the latter. It can¶ therefore perceive little difference between having an open policy¶
conducted by its military and having the CIA, which is not a part of¶ its armed forces and therefore without the right to use force
during¶ armed combat, operate a targeted killing policy that is pursued¶ regardless of the consent of the state in which the targeted
killing¶ strikes are employed or of the occurrence of armed conflict.¶ Explicitly
recognizing that targeted killing may
be lawful in certain¶ circumstances and within certain legal confines would alter the¶ choice to he
made. Adding the ability to abide by the law while¶ pursuing a targeted killing policy would not
only provide a means¶ by which the United States could achieve at least some of its objectives
lawfully, it would also give meaning to the condemnation of¶ those actions that stray outside of
the legal confines. The difference¶ between an open military targeted killing policy and a covert CIA¶ targeted killing policy
would no longer be perceived by the US¶ government as irrelevant: it would take on genuine significance¶ because only the latter
would he unlawful.¶ Legal rules do not always precede factual developments. Even if the status of targeted killing under international
humanitarian law is unclear, it need not remain so. Recognizing targeted killing as lawful would allow its scope to be confined and
would encourage states’ compliance. Denying its legality, in contrast, risks allowing it to continue unconstrained and achieving in time
the status of a custom, but as a result not of principled legal rules but, rather, of unrestrained state practice.¶
Experience from indefinite detention proves—continuing to violate international
law with drones will kill cooperation in the fight against terrorism.
Anderson 9, (Kenneth Anderson, Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American
University, and Research Fellow, The Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Targeted Killing in
U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law, Brookings, May 11, 2009,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2009/05/11-counterterrorism-anderson)
To all of this, the Obama Administration might ask a resounding “So what?” These human rights and
other issues might exist in some hypothetical counterterrorism campaign far in the future if some administration were prepared to
sign on to readings of international law the United States has always rejected. But for now, in the fight against al Qaeda, we have the
AUMF, and we don’t accede to the more extravagant arguments of the international human rights community. The result is that
targeted killings are governed by IHL. We are only using them when the conditions of selfdefense have all been met. And those facts also conveniently get us around the assassination
ban. Perhaps someone might raise some legal difficulty over operating in parts of Pakistan and over targeting parties not clearly
related to al Qaeda. But practically, it all seems like the same “armed conflict.” So whatever the problems that might
exist legally tomorrow, we do not have a legal difficulty today. That even the Bush Administration always
treated its targeted killings as the targeting of combatants covered by the AUMF in a war covered by IHL says something about the
pressures the American legal structure faces from actors in the international legal community. Those pressures are unlikely to abate.
For the current American view of its authority to conduct targeted killings, as described above, is barely more palatable to key
elements of the international community than the one I advocate. What’s more, seemingly innocuous changes in and acquiescence to
various legal regimes and rules could end up undermining the American legal rationale for targeted killings. The United States, to cite
only one example, would like to have a more productive engagement with the International Criminal Court; this would put a
considerable premium on the definition of the crime of “aggression” in that tribunal.¶ Some of the long term international legal
pressure turns on a fundamental difference in understanding concerning how international law works—a difference that sometimes
has a strong effect on interpretive outcome. In the long-held American view, international law classically binds sovereign states
through their consent, either contractually through explicit treaties or implicitly through their assent to gradually evolving customary
law. By contrast, those seeking to constrain states or alter their behavior beyond their consent have an incentive to expand the canon
of what is implicitly agreed to by states, and generally binding on all of them, in the form of this body of customary international
law.95 Since custom is not limited to the explicit terms of a ratified treaty, it is open to expansive restatement, interpretation, and
invention by a wide variety of actors, both governmental and non-governmental. Classically, customary law has been evidenced
principally by the actual behavior of states—functioning to ensure that international law does not over time become a purely paper
enterprise with terms departing further and further from what states actually do. What is not prohibited to states, however, is
generally permissible for them. So on this view, the question of targeted killing is not whether it is affirmatively allowed, but instead
whether some treaty provision, or some genuinely accepted customary rule, prohibits it.¶ These traditional underpinnings of
international law are, however, contested in the contemporary world as the “ownership” of international law—who sets its terms,
interprets its rules, determines its content and meaning—is no longer entirely in the hands of sovereign states. Other
actors—
international advocacy organizations, international tribunals, international organizations and
their functionaries, professors and academics, middle-weight states that see international law
as a means to constrain more powerful sovereign states—play a significant role in setting the
terms of the meaning and interpretation of international law. And while it’s easy now for the American
administration to pretend these currents don’t exist, they have a way of seeping in as real constraints on American practice. ¶ The
stakes are higher than American policymakers appear to realize—as even a cursory look back over the past
few years should make plain. At the most overt level, there is the possibility of prosecution abroad
based on a consensus view of international law that the United States rejects. No one who has
watched the European eagerness to initiate criminal and civil proceedings against Israeli and American officials in ever-proliferating
judicial forums can be entirely sanguine about a giant gulf between American and international understanding of a practice that the
international law community regards as murder.96 The
more aggressively the United States uses this
instrument, the more glaring the gulf will become—until, in some jurisdiction, someone decides to
assert the consensus view as operative law. Absent some aggressive effort to defend the American position, that
magistrate or prosecutor will have the overwhelming weight of international legal opinion behind him.¶ But the problem for the
United States is not limited to the possibility of criminal proceedings abroad. American courts
themselves are far
from immune to the influence of soft law development. Consider only the manner in which American detention
policy has been affected by parallel currents of international law opinion imported into American law through Supreme Court
opinions. Only
seven years ago, an American administration took a “so what” attitude toward
international law ferment over detention that was rather similar to the current consensus on
targeted killings. International legal scholars, NGOs, international organizations, and most countries took
a far more restrictive view of the detention authority residing in IHL—specifically with respect to the protections
due to unlawful enemy combatants—than did the United States, which had quietly preserved but not fought aggressively for a
different approach over the preceding decades.
The Supreme Court, however, has now gone a considerable
distance to bridge the gulf by insisting that at least a portion of the Geneva Conventions covers
all detainees. Whatever one thinks of that judgment, it is a striking example of the capacity to impact American law of the sort of
international legal developments we are now seeing with respect to targeted killing.¶ More broadly, there are hidden but important
when the United States is perceived by the rest of the world to be acting illegally. For one
the willingness and capacity of other countries to assist American efforts.
Detention here again offers a striking example; virtually no other country has assisted in American
detention operations since September 11 in large part because of concerns over its legality. The more
heavily and aggressively the United States banks on a policy that a strong consensus regards as
per se criminal, the more tension it can expect in efforts to garner other countries’ and organizations’
cooperation in counterterrorism efforts. Absent a strong effort to establish the legitimacy of
current American practice, this too, over time, will push the United States away from it.
costs
thing, it limits
US drone strikes hurt cooperation and intelligence sharing—the targeted nations
need to take the lead.
Cullen 8, (Colonel Peter M. Cullen, USA, is the Staff Judge Advocate, 101st Airborne Division,
The Role of Targeted Killing in the Campaign Against Terror, Joint Force Quarterly
Issue 48, 1st Quarter 2008,
http://www.army.mil/professionalWriting/volumes/volume6/march_2008/3_08_1.html)
Who Conducts Operations. The analysis supporting the
legality of targeted killings was premised on the fact
that these operations are conducted by U.S. military personnel who qualify as combatants under the law of
war. It is clear, however, that many U.S. targeted killing operations have been conducted by the CIA,
whose personnel are noncombatants. Apart from the legal issues this creates, the use of CIA paramilitary
personnel is troublesome because of the agency's past association with illegal assassinations. 44
Such involvement produces skepticism in the international arena and makes it more difficult to
prevail in the information war. The CIA has an important role in developing the actionable intelligence that is key to
success. The operations themselves, however, should be executed solely by military personnel.45 Another option is to encourage
the governments within whose territory the terrorists are located [need] to take the lead in
conducting these operations, with appropriate assistance from the United States.46
The unilateral nature of targeted killings stops cooperation—studies prove other
nations overwhelmingly disapprove of US policies.
Dowd 12, (Alan W. Dowd, Alan W. Dowd writes on defense and security issues. His work has
appeared in Policy Review, Parameters, Military Officer, The American Legion, World Politics
Review and other leading publications, The Brewing Backlash against the Drone War, June 19,
2012, http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1278) [NOTE: 20 countries
surveyed include US, Britain, Germany, Poland, France, India, Italy, Czech Rep., China, Lebanon,
Mexico, Spain, Japan, Brazil, Russia, Tunisia, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Greece; see
http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/06/13/global-opinion-of-obama-slips-international-policiesfaulted/]
But what
looks like a successful counterterrorism campaign to Americans, looks very different to
international observers. “In 17 of 20 countries,” a recent Pew survey found, “more than half
disapprove of U.S. drone attacks targeting extremist leaders and groups in nations such as Pakistan,
Yemen and Somalia.” According to Pew, the ongoing drone war feeds “a widespread perception that
the U.S. acts unilaterally and does not consider the interests of other countries.Ӧ The simple reason
for this is that the drone war is completely unilateral and wholly focused on U.S. interests. After all,
there’s no UN resolution blessing Washington’s war by remote, and nobody in Pakistan or
Yemen is clamoring for Reaper-launched hellfire missiles.¶ Thus, the drone war has reinforced the
very image of American unilateralism that Obama once promised to erase, which must come as a shock
to the president’s supporters overseas. What many international observers didn’t realize is that historically there has been a
remarkable amount of continuity and confluence across administrations in defending the national interest. The Bush-Obama handoff
was no exception.¶ Even so, the
drone war re-reminds us that, while unilateral action is sometimes necessary, it
usually isn’t the most effective way to serve U.S. interests over the long haul. To this point, UN
officials have begun to suggest that aspects of the drone war may not conform to international
law. “Drone attacks do raise serious questions about compliance with international law,” according to UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights Navi Pillay, who worries about “indiscriminate killings and injuries of civilians.”¶ “Targeted killing is only lawful when
the target is a ‘combatant’ or ‘fighter,’” according to a report issued by the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC). “Everything feasible
must be done to prevent mistakes and minimize harm to civilians.”¶ Setting aside the UNHRC’s internal legitimacy problems, critics of
the drone war would argue that the U.S. has not always met these standards in Yemen and Pakistan. The use of drones to cripple
Anwar al-Awlaki’s branch of al Qaeda, for instance, killed dozens of other people, many of them apparently not affiliated with al
Qaeda, including a 16-year-old relative of al-Awlaki born in Denver. The Brookings Institution estimates that, along with the 2,000-plus
militants killed by drones in Pakistan, perhaps more than 470 non-militants have been killed.¶ This raises a number of concerns. First,
according to The New York Times’ portrait of the inner workings of the drone war, the
Obama administration has
embraced a controversial method for counting civilian casualties that “in effect counts all
military-age males in a strike zone as combatants…unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously proving them
innocent.” Equally worrisome, the president is described as “at the helm of a top secret
‘nominations’ process to designate terrorists for kill or capture.” He attends regular “Terror Tuesday”
gatherings, where he studies “mug shots and brief biographies” of people nominated for execution, insists on “approving every new
name on an expanding ‘kill list,’” “signs off on every strike in Yemen and Somalia and also on the more complex and risky strikes in
Pakistan,” and
often decides “personally whether to go ahead” with a drone strike.
Targeted killing divides nations—the action by its nature is unilateral and
hinders cooperation.
Gosztola 13, (Kevin Gosztola, How is Obama’s Targeted Killing Program Permissible Under
International Law?, February 6, 2013, http://dissenter.firedoglake.com/2013/02/06/how-isobamas-targeted-killing-program-permissible-under-international-law/)
Also, as
the targeted killing program is a mostly unilateral program in the sense that it is the
United States primarily determining who is ultimately killed, it would seem this is an affront to all
the values the United Nations attempts to promote. The targeted killing program does not
unite countries in efforts to “maintain international peace and security.” It does not help to affirm
the “fundamental human rights” of anyone in the world to go around assassinating individuals without
giving them notice by convicting or charging them for committing a crime. It has more potential to divide
the world than bring countries together in cooperation because it endorses a future where
countries deploy robots to go take out “enemies” in any country whenever they want without
notifying countries before they launch attacks.
Violation of human rights norms in international law kills cooperation.
Hoffman 4, (Paul Hoffman, Chair of the International Executive Committee of Amnesty
International, teaches international human rights law at USC Law School and Oxford University,
Human Rights and Terrorism, Human Rights Quarterly, Volume 26, Number 4, November 2004,
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hrq/summary/v026/26.4hoffman.html)
Also, a
state’s failure to adhere to fundamental human rights norms makes it more likely that
terrorist organizations will find it easier to recruit adherents among the discontented and disenfranchised and
among the family and friends of those whose human rights have been violated. Human rights violations in the name
of fighting terrorism undermine efforts to respond to the threats of terrorism, making us less rather
than more secure in both the short and long run.¶ Failure to respect universal human rights norms
not only undermines our shared values, it undermines the international cooperation and public support so
crucial to developing effective antiterrorism efforts. No nation, no matter how powerful, can solve the
problem of terrorism on its own. All governments need the voluntary cooperation of every
segment of its society to be effective in preventing acts of terrorism. Without adherence to
international human rights standards, such cooperation will be more difficult, if not impossible,
to obtain at the international, national, and local levels.
Link: Drones Increase Recruitment
Drones increase terrorist recruitment and generates more dangerous
organizations
Boyle 13 (Michael J. Boyle. Assistant Professor of Political Science at La Salle University. Former
research fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence. “The Costs and
Consequences of Drone Warfare”. 2013. International Affairs 89:1.
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2013/89_1/89
_1Boyle.pdf Pg. 11-12)
the evidence that drones inhibit the operational latitude of terrorist groups and push them
towards collapse is ambiguous
In Pakistan, the ranks of Al-Qaeda have been
weakened significantly by drone strikes, but its members have hardly given up the fight
Hundreds of Al-Qaeda members have fled to battlefields in Yemen, Somalia, Iraq, Syria and
elsewhere. These operatives bring with them the skills, experience and weapons needed to
turn these wars into fiercer,
longer-lasting, conflicts
pressure from drone strikes
does not neutralize them Many Al-Qaeda members have joined forces with local
insurgent groups in Syria, Mali and elsewhere, thus deepening the conflicts in these states In
other cases, drones have fuelled militant movements and reordered the alliances and positions
of local combatants. Following the escalation of drone strikes in Yemen, the desire for revenge
drove hundreds, if not thousands, of Yemeni tribesmen to join Al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula as well as smaller, indigenous militant networks
other Islamist groups have moved into the vacuum left by the absence of
Al-Qaeda, and
pose a greater threat
than
Al-Qaeda ever did
Yet
more
than these accounts suggest.57
.
58
and perhaps
scattered Al-Qaeda militants, but it
.59 In other words,
may have
.
.60
(AQAP),
.61 Even in Pakistan, where the drone strikes have weakened Al-Qaeda and some of its affiliated
movements, they have not cleared the battlefield. In Pakistan,
some of these groups, particularly the cluster of groups arrayed under the name Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), now
to the Pakistani government
.62 Drone strikes have distinct political effects on the ecology of militant networks in these countries, leaving some armed groups in a better position while crippling others. It is this dynamic that has accounted for the
US decision gradually to expand the list of groups targeted by drone strikes, often at the behest of Pakistan. Far from concentrating exclusively on Al-Qaeda, the US has begun to use drone strikes against Pakistan’s enemies, including the TTP, the Mullah Nazir group,
The result is that the US has weakened its principal enemy, Al-Qaeda, but
only at the cost of earning a new set of enemies, some of whom may find a way to strike back
the Haqqani network and other smaller Islamist grJjjoups.63
.64
The cost of this expansion of targets came into view when the TTP inspired and trained Faisal Shahzad to launch his attack on Times Square.65 Similarly, the TTP claimed to b e involved, possibly with Al-Qaeda, in attacking a CIA outpost at Camp Chapman in the Khost
region of Afghanistan on 30 December 2009.66
Drones strengthen support for Al Qaeda
Al-Haj and Batrawy 13 (AHMED AL-HAJ. Journalist. AYA BATRAWY, Adjuct Journalism
Professor American Universtiy in Cairo. “U.S. Drone Strikes In Yemen Spur Growing AntiAmerican Sentiment”. Huffington Post. May 2nd, 2013.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/02/us-drone-strikes-in-yemen_n_3203108.html).
Mohammed Ahmed Bijash told the gathering that his 10-year-old daughter was killed in the
southern city of Jaar when a missile hit her school during fighting last year to drive out al-Qaida
militants. "What is the crime we committed for U.S. bombs to hit our homes?" he said at the
meeting. "They have turned our lives into hell." Hussein Saeed Dahman's 16 year-old son was
knocked unconscious from a drone strike in December while playing soccer with friends in in the
city of Shar Hadramawt. "The sky rained down U.S. missiles and then the kids found body parts
in the soccer field," the father told AP. His son, Hamza, remains bedridden and unable to speak.
U.S. lawyer Cori Crider, who works with Reprieve, said tribal leaders she has spoken to warn the
strikes only strengthen support for al-Qaida. "There is a definitely a branch of al-Qaida here.
They are real," she told AP. "The question is, What is the appropriate response to this?" "You
can't bomb you way out of an insurgency."
Drones undermine US counter-terror efforts and breed resentment
Al-Haj and Batrawy 13 (AHMED AL-HAJ. Journalist. AYA BATRAWY, Adjuct Journalism
Professor American Universtiy in Cairo. “U.S. Drone Strikes In Yemen Spur Growing AntiAmerican Sentiment”. Huffington Post. May 2nd, 2013.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/02/us-drone-strikes-in-yemen_n_3203108.html).
Civilian deaths are breeding resentments
undermining U.S. efforts to turn the public
against militants.
The drone program is terrorizing our people, activists wrote in an
open letter to President Barack Obama One never knows where the next drone will strike nor
how many innocent victims will die
drones are "harming efforts to win hearts and minds drones are now "the face of
America" to many Yemenis What violent militants had previously failed to achieve, one drone
strike achieved in an instant,"
everyone who saw that there is no differentiating between us and alQaida are asking why don't we just join al-Qaida since it makes no difference
on a local level, sometimes
The backlash is still not as large as in Pakistan, where there is heavy pressure on the government to force limits on strikes – but public calls for a halt to strikes are starting to emerge. Several dozen activists protested on
Monday near the U.S. Embassy in Sanaa, denouncing the strikes. "
" the
."
." At a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing in Washington last week on the drone program, Farea al-Muslimi, a Yemeni whose village had been struck only days earlier,
told the senators that
," saying
."
he said. Faysal bin Jaber said the strike had deepened the fear in Khashamir. Sheik Salem had spoken in his sermon "about how killing people and labeling people who work with the
West as infidels is wrong," Faysal said. But after the strike, "
?" he said. The cleric's widow – Faysal's sister _now
relies on relatives and neighbors for support for herself and her seven children. While the United States acknowledges its drone program in Yemen, it does not confirm individual strikes or release information on how many have been carried out. Three prominent
groups have been compiling data on strikes, mainly from news reports, including the AP's, based on reports by Yemeni security officials: the London-based Bureau for Investigative Journalism and the U.S.-based Long War Journal and the New America Foundation. Their
estimates on the number of U.S. airstrikes vary – from 44 to 67 since 2002, the majority of them by drones. Compiling accurate data has been even more difficult because until recently, the Yemeni military took responsibility for many strikes apparently carried out by
the United States. All three groups mark a dramatic escalation last year. The Long War Journal, for example, recorded 42 strikes in 2012, up from 10 the year before. The Associated Press has reported on nine strikes so far in 2013. By comparison, the U.S. has carried
out more than 330 airstrikes in Pakistan since 2004, though there the rate has been falling – from a peak of 117 strikes in 2010 to 46 in 2012, according to the Long War Journal's count. Determining civilian deaths is even more difficult. The Long War Journal says it has
confirmed 35 civilians and 193 militants killed by American strikes in 2012, up from six civilians and 10 militants the year before. This year, 31 militants and no civilians have been killed, according to its count. AP has reported 33 militants killed this year, with no
confirmed civilian deaths. C.I.A. director John Brennan says the strikes are only used as a last resort against suspects believed to be plotting against America. "In short, targeted strikes against the most senior and most dangerous AQAP terrorists are not the problem,
The U S says al-Qaida's branch
in Yemen is among the group's most dangerous and active offshoots. It has been linked to
several attempted attacks on U.S. targets, including a botched Christmas Day 2009 bombing of
an airliner over Detroit and explosives-laden parcels intercepted aboard cargo flights a year
later.
The drone strikes have taken out high-level targets in Yemen
Most, however, appear to target midlevel operatives
they are part of the solution," he said in remarks at the Council on Foreign Relations in August, using the initials of the group's full name, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula.
nited
tates
The spike in strikes in 2012 came as the U.S. was backing a Yemeni military campaign to uproot al-Qaida militants and their radical allies who had taken over a string of southern cities and towns. The campaign, including heavy ground fighting by Yemeni
troops, largely drove the militants into the mountains and countryside.
cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, believed to have been a powerful tool for al-Qaida's recruiting in the West.
such as American-born
. Still on the loose is
AQAP's leader, Nasser al-Wahishi.
Drone attacks motivate retaliation from domestic terrorists.
Williams 13 (Carol J. Williams. Journalist with the LA Times. Over 600 articles published. Focus
on International topics.
Torture, drones, indefinite detention breeding home-grown terror? May 24th, 2013. LA Times.
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/24/world/la-fg-wn-boston-london-counterterror20130523)
The broad-daylight hacking death of a soldier in London this week was Britain’s Marathon Moment. Like the twin bombings
at the race finish line in Boston last month, Wednesday’s attack by two machete-wielding men spouting
venomous threats to avenge Muslim deaths in faraway wars was a sobering reminder that
terror now lurks in the hearts of local youth and on ordinary streets and sidewalks. The suspects in both cases are
young men accorded the benefits of education and personal freedoms, raising perplexing questions of how seemingly integrated
immigrants come to be radicalized to act in the name of a remote, embattled homeland. While authorities were investigating the
scene of the London slaying of Lee Rigby, a British veteran of the NATO mission to defeat Islamic extremism in Afghanistan, President
Obama was oratorically wrangling with the unanswerable questions in a speech at the National Defense University at Ft. McNair. It
was a fine line to walk for Obama. He denounced any resort to violence by those aggrieved by Western actions in the war against
terror. But he also conceded
that U.S. security policies that have “compromised our basic values” -such as torture and indefinite detention of terror suspects -- are also partly to blame for feeding extremist
hatred of the West. Obama’s pledge to renew efforts to close the Guantanamo Bay prison and war crimes tribunal
encouraged those who have criticized his administration and the one before it for violating terrorism suspects’ constitutional and
human rights. They also hailed his promise to limit the use of drone strikes to kill militants to circumstances where there is an
imminent threat to American lives and no possibility of capturing the perpetrator. But the recent terrorist attacks by apparently
home-grown extremists suggest the anger stirred worldwide by extraordinary rendition, torture,
imprisonment without charges and civilian casualties of war has burrowed deeply into the psyches of
young men with roots in the conflict-torn corners of the world. The death of Rigby, from the Royal Regiment
of Fusiliers, was the first in Britain in to be attributed to Islamic extremism since the July 2005 coordinated London transit bombings
that killed more than 50 commuters. Two blood-drenched men shot and captured at the scene of Wednesday’s slaying in the
Woolwich area of London were recorded on cellphones clutching bloody knives. One, identified by a Lebanon-based militant group as
28-year-old Michael Adebolajo, claimed in the video that their attack was “payback” for Muslims killed in countries where British
troops are engaged in counter-terrorism operations. The BBC and other London media said Adebolajo was a British citizen from a
devoutly Christian Nigerian family who had converted to Islam a decade ago. The Boston bombing suspects, 19-year-old Dzhokhar
Tsarnaev and his late brother Tamerlan, had also spent much of their lives in Western suburbia, far from the Russian military
oppression of their ancestral homeland of Chechnya. Friends
of the brothers have reportedly told investigators that
Tamerlan Tsarnaev, 26, had become increasingly agitated by U.S. military operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan, where thousands of Muslim civilians have died as “collateral damage” during
invasions, raids and airstrikes. Investigation of the Boston Marathon attack continued to unveil hidden discontent among
U.S. Muslim immigrants. On Wednesday, an FBI agent interviewing a friend of Tamerlan Tsarnaev in Florida shot and killed the man
being questioned after he allegedly attacked the agent. Ibragim Todashev, 27, and another Tsarnaev friend in Orlando came to
authorities’ attention in the sweeping investigation of the marathon bombings as possible suspects in an unsolved 2011 triple murder
in Waltham, Mass., near the Tsarnaev brothers’ apartments in the Boston suburb of Watertown. U.S. forces have had no overt
involvement in Chechnya, where two wars were fought in futile efforts to secede from Russia in the 1990s. In fact, then-President
Clinton was often critical of Moscow for its deadly aggressiveness in putting down the Chechen insurrections. That the brothers
apparently conflated the grievances of their homeland with those of Muslims under U.S. fire in Afghanistan could be testimony to the
power and success of Islamic extremist propaganda. Images of U.S. soldiers abusing captives at Iraq’s Abu Ghraib prison, photos
of
Muslim women and children inadvertently killed in drone strikes in Afghanistan and Pakistan,
and scenes of hooded, orange-jumpsuit-clad captives behind razor-wire fences at Guantanamo have been used by Al
Qaeda as veritable recruiting posters. Obama’s pledge Thursday to recover the moral high ground in the war on
terrorism was met with criticism from the right and skepticism from the left. Obama’s promised policy reviews “are all positive
developments, but they need to be followed up by concrete action,” said Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch.
Dixon Osburn, legal director of Human Rights First, welcomed the assurances of more “transparency” in the use of drones but
remained “deeply concerned that the administration appears to be institutionalizing a problematic targeted killing policy.” The only
announcement of the president to draw even moderate acclaim was his plan to lift a moratorium on Guantanamo detainee
repatriations imposed after the failed Christmas Day 2009 plot to blow up a Detroit-bound airliner. The would-be bomber had been
trained and equipped by radicals in Yemen. Of the 166 prisoners still at Guantanamo, more than half are Yemenis, including 59 long
ago cleared for transfer to their home country. “Yemen welcomes the administration's decision to lift the moratorium on detainee
transfers to Yemen,” said Mohammed Albasha, spokesman for the Yemeni Embassy in Washington. He pledged the Sana
government’s cooperation to ensure any returning detainees’ “gradual rehabilitation and integration back into society.”
Drone Strikes terrify people, pushes them toward Al Qaeda
Ali & Muslimi 13 (Wajahat Ali is an investigative journalist for the Center for American
Progress, a playwright, an attorney, and a consultant. Faea Al-Muslimi is a journalist and
ambassador to Yemen. “Drone victim: U.S. strikes boost al-Qaida recruitment”. May 2nd, 2013.
Salon.
http://www.salon.com/2013/05/02/drone_victim_u_s_strikes_boost_al_qaeda_recruitment/).
A lot of people after 9/11, all around the world, hated al-Qaida, because they did a terrorist
attack and killed innocent people. Nobody expected that. In my village, and other areas of
Yemen, people were living peacefully and not even in a state of war. And now the U.S. comes
and bombs them and most of the time the U.S. doesn’t even kill its intended targets. Why wouldn’t
people be angry at that? It’s equally the same as what people experienced in Boston. But the U.S. helps al-Qaida [by
engaging in drone strikes] in recruitment. The U.S. relieves itself of capturing, questioning, and
convicting these suspects. In the meantime, the U.S. has terrified thousands of Yemeni people.
Most of these people are farmers, and the U.S. is bombing them. The farmer is not expecting
that. When he goes out, he is expecting more rain, and more wheat, and more food for his children.
US Milit. Intervention increases recruitment rate. Drones drive extremists
together.
Cortright 13 (David Cortright. Director of Policy Studies at the Kroc Institute for International
Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame and Chair of the Board of the Fourth Freedom
Forum. “Counterterrorism Strategy and Drone Warfare”. Peace Policy. Mar. 23rd, 2013.
http://peacepolicy.nd.edu/2013/03/28/counterterrorism-strategy-drone-warfare/
The most important metric in assessing the threat from extremist groups is the rate of militant
recruitment. The primary strategic objective is to diminish public acquiescence or support for Al
Qaeda and related militant groups and to drive down the recruitment rate. There is no
evidence that drone strikes are achieving that goal. On the contrary, U.S. military intervention
and drone warfare may be compounding the factors that increase support for terrorism and
insurgency. As Audrey Kurth Cronin (George Mason University) observed, there is no firm
evidence that drone strikes are capable of ending violent extremist groups. They have the
effect of driving enemies together rather than dividing or weakening their ranks. It is a mistake
to suggest that drones are the only available option or that it is ‘drones or nothing’ in
countering terrorism. Panelists at the conference emphasized the need for a greater focus on
law enforcement methods as an alternative to drones strikes and the use of military force. The
UN Strategy Against Terrorism, unanimously adopted by the General Assembly in September
2006, calls for a greater focus on addressing conditions conducive to violent extremism, as well as
greater efforts to protect human rights and build state and international governance capacity.
Targeted drone strikes increase suicide bombing rates
Kaplan, et.al. 05 (EDWARD H. KAPLAN, Yale School of Management and Yale School of
Medicine. Alex Mintz, Department of Political Science, Texas A&M University College Station.
Shaul MISHAL, United Nations Studies Yale University. Claudio Samban, Department of Political
Science, Tel Aviv University. “What Happened to Suicide Bombings in Israel? Insights from a
Terror Stock Model”. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 2005. 28:3
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10576100590928115#preview PG 232)
preventive arrests, as opposed to the targeted killings of suspected terrorists, are
responsible for the dramatic reduction in suicide bombings
Although on-target hits
might remove an immediate terrorist threat, the present analysis suggests that such actions
actually increase the terror stock via hit-dependent recruitment
because ground
operations leading to preventive arrests place soldiers at great risk, missile strikes against
terrorists are a safer tactic, but again the analysis suggests a flaw in this reasoning: even if hits
reduce risks
hits increase the expected suicide bombing rate due to the impact of hitdependent recruiting on the terror stock, in turn increasing suicide bombing risks to the
public
This analysis suggests that
inside Israel since March 2002.
. It might be argued that
Israeli
to Israeli soldiers,
Israeli
at large.
Successful drone strikes prevent effective evidence collection and increase
recruitment rates.
Kaplan, et.al. 05 (EDWARD H. KAPLAN, Yale School of Management and Yale School of
Medicine. Alex Mintz, Department of Political Science, Texas A&M University College Station.
Shaul MISHAL, United Nations Studies Yale University. Claudio Samban, Department of Political
Science, Tel Aviv University. “What Happened to Suicide Bombings in Israel? Insights from a
Terror Stock Model”. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 2005. 28:3.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10576100590928115#preview PG 232-234)
targeted killings serve only to knock out
individual nodes
. It is difficult to interrogate
the target of a successful missile strike.
it is the killing of terror suspects, and not Palestinian civilians,
that appears to spark estimated recruitment to the terror stock.
terror
organizations do not care about civilian lives, and are only motivated to recruit and retaliate
when their organizations are threatened.
when Israeli-targeted hits go awry and
many civilians are killed, terror organizations strategically choose to cease operations for a
short time period, granting Palestinian leaders sympathetic attention from the media, world
governments, and international bodies such as the U N
offensive military measures are unlikely to prove effective against suicide bombings
Preventive arrests hold a further advantage over targeted hits. Thinking of terror organizations as networks (Krebs, 2001; Farley, 2003),
(terrorists). Arrests enable the interrogation of terror suspects, which could lead to the discovery of links to more nodes in the terror network
That the B’tselem data suggest that hits targeting terrorists have killed two civilians for every three suspected terrorist deaths (Table 1) further adds to the
arguments against the use of targeted hits. The authors also discovered that, surprisingly,
One interpretation of this result is that the
An alternative interpretation is that
nited
that
ations. To the authors’ knowledge, this study provides the first empirical support for previous suggestions
(Atran, 2003; Pape, 2003). To the
extent that the Israeli experience generalizes to other countries facing suicide bombing threats such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Russia, or Sri Lanka, investing in intelligence that leads to preventive arrests stands a better chance of success. The key tactical question in preventing suicide bombings is how to reduce the terror stock without inadvertently replenishing
it and unduly harming civilians. Israel continues to rely on targeted killings, but this analysis suggests such hits are counterproductive. Arresting suspected terrorists appears to reduce suicide bombings without inducing the recruitment of additional terrorists, and likely delivers intelligence information leading to further life-saving reductions in the terror
stock.
Drones are the top recruiting tool for Al Qaeda, increase terrorism. Signals US
weakness.
Volo 13 (Lorraine Bayard de Volo. Associate Prof. at University of Colorado Boulder. Focuses on
Political Science and Women’s Studies. “Unmanned?: Drones and the Revolution in GenderMilitary Affairs”. 2013. European Conference on Politics and Gender. http://www.ecpgbarcelona.com/ PG 7)
Finally, drone strikes and the attendant civilian casualties are also critiqued as counterproductive.
Independent journalists and researchers maintain UAV civilian casualties to be central to Al
Qaeda’s rapid expansion, replacing Guantánamo as “ the recruiting tool of choice for militants ”
( Becker and Shane 2012; see also Johnsen 2012) . As one Yemeni told CNN , “I would not be surprised if a hundred
tribesmen joined Al Qaeda as a result of the lat est drone mistake ” (Johnsen 20 12). Thus, while drone
strikes do kill Al Qaeda militants and leaders, they exacerbate the problem of terrorism (Volker
2012) . Conservative columnist Mark Steyn wrote that for many in the regions targeted, drone warfare
confirms Al Qaeda’s charges agains t the U.S., “[that] we have the best technology and the worst will; we choose
aerial assassination and its attendant collateral damage because we are risk averse, and so remote, antiseptic, long distance,
computer programmed warfare is all that we can bear .... The
guys with drones are losing to the guys with
fertilizer — bec ause they mean it, and we don’t” (Steyn 2013). Drones, then, are an indication of weakness in
the superpower.
Drone strikes in one nation causes increased militant recruitment in other
nations.
Innocent 09 (Malou Innocent. MA in IR from U of Chicago. Adjunct scholar at Cato Institute.
Member of International Institute for Strategic Studies. Focus on Middle East and Persian Gulf
security and US foreign Policy w/Pakistan, Afghanistan, and China. Published widely. “The US
Must Reassess its Drone Policy”. Aug, 25, 2009.
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/us-must-reassess-its-drone-policy?print)
On August 12, the US special envoy for the region, Richard Holbrooke, told an audience at the Center for
American Progress that the porous border and its surrounding areas served as a fertile recruiting ground for Al-Qaeda. One US
military official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, called
drone operations “a recruiting windfall for the
Pakistani Taliban.”¶ Military strikes appear to be the only viable recourse against the tribal region’s shadowy insurgents, with
US officials pointing to the successful killing of high-value Al-Qaeda militants like Abu Laith al-Libi in January 2008 and chemical
weapons expert Abu Khabab al-Masri in July 2008. However, even if tomorrow Osama bin Laden were killed by a UAV, the jihadist
insurgency would not melt away.
The ability to keep militant groups off balance must be weighed
against the cost of facilitating the rise of more insurgents.¶ Citizens living outside the ungoverned
tribal areas also detest drones. “Anti-US sentiment has already been increasing in Pakistan … especially
in regard to cross-border and reported drone strikes, which Pakistanis perceive to cause
unacceptable civilian casualties,” conceded US Central Command chief General David Petraeus in a
declassified statement written on May 27, 2009.
Internal Link: Relations with Target States Key to Solve Terrorism
Relations with the target state are key to intelligence and the larger fight against
terrorism.
Zenko 13, (Micah Zenko is the Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at
the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously, he worked for five years at the Harvard
Kennedy School and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research
Service, and State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,
Council on Foreign Relations Special Report No. 65, January 2013,
http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Drones_CSR65.pdf)
Altogether, such advantages result in far less collateral damage from drones than other weapons platforms or special operations
raids, according to U.S. military officials.8 However, drones suffer two limita- tions. First,
the precision and
discrimination of drones are only as good as the supporting intelligence, which is derived from multiple
sources. In the tribal areas along the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan, for instance, the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) reportedly maintains a paramilitary force of three thousand ethnic Pashtuns to
capture, kill, and collect intelligence.9 The CIA and U.S. military also cooperate with their
Pakistani counterparts to collect human and signals intelligence to identify and track suspected
militants.10 In addition, the Pakistani army clears the airspace for U.S. drones, and when they
inadvertently crash, Pakistani troops have repeatedly fought the Taliban to recover the
wreckage.11 In states without a vast network of enabling intelligence, the CIA or Joint Special Operations
Command (JSOC) have significantly less situational awareness and precise targeting information for drones.
Empirically proven—drone strikes have led to disputes with other nations that
hinder counterterrorism operations.
Zenko 13, (Micah Zenko is the Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at
the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously, he worked for five years at the Harvard
Kennedy School and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research
Service, and State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,
Council on Foreign Relations Special Report No. 65, January 2013,
http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Drones_CSR65.pdf)
Finally, U.S.
drone strikes are also widely opposed by the citizens of important allies, emerging
powers, and the local populations in states where strikes occur.66 States polled reveal
overwhelming opposition to U.S. drone strikes: Greece (90 percent), Egypt (89 percent), Turkey (81 percent),
Spain (76 percent), Brazil (76 percent), Japan (75 percent), and Pakistan (83 percent).67 This is significant because
the United States cannot conduct drone strikes in the most critical corners of the world by
itself. Drone strikes require the tacit or overt support of host states or neighbors. If such states
decided not to cooperate—or to actively resist—U.S. drone strikes, their effectiveness would
be immediately and sharply reduced, and the likelihood of civilian casualties would increase. This danger is not
hypothetical. In 2007, the Ethiopian government terminated its U.S. military presence after public
revelations that U.S. AC-130 gun- ships were launching attacks from Ethiopia into Somalia. Similarly, in
late 2011, Pakistan evicted all U.S. military and intelligence drones, forc- ing the United States
to completely rely on Afghanistan to serve as a staging ground for drone strikes in Pakistan.
Local allies are the first line of defense—cooperation with Middle Eastern States
is key to fighting terrorism.
Cordesman 10, (Anthony H. Cordesman, Center for Strategic and International Studies Arleigh
A. Burke Chair in Strategy, The True Lessons of Yemen and Detroit: How the US Must Expand and
Redefine International Cooperation in Fighting Terrorism, February 15, 2010,
http://csis.org/files/publication/10315_Terrorism-USRoleIntCoop.pdf)
Our first line of defense lies in the capabilities and actions of other states – particularly our friends and
allies in Muslim states and states with large Muslim populations. Defeating terrorism locally -- before it can
establish major sanctuaries, create international networks, escalate to insurgency, take control
of governments – is critical to any broad success. The US must continue to work with other
states, and strengthen formal international efforts in counterterrorism – in spite of their limits – but that
much more is required. Informal efforts will be as important. One has only to consider what would have
happened if we had not steadily improved counterterrorism cooperation and support from
countries like Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia to realize how much more often the US would be
under direct threat; how much more often our other allies would be attacked, and how many
of our global economic and strategic interests would face far more serious threats.
Internal Link: International Cooperation Solves
International cooperation is key to solve terrorism.
MGI 8, (Managing Global Insecurity, In collaboration with the Brookings Institution, New York
University Center on International Cooperation, and Stanford University Center for International
Security and Cooperation, Combatting International Terrorism: A Managing Global Insecurity
Brief, May 2008, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2008/5/05terrorism-mgi/05_terrorism_mgi.pdf)
No State Can Address Terrorism Alone. No state, however powerful, can defend itself unilaterally against
transnational terrorism. Terrorist networks move operatives, money and material across borders and through the crevices of the
global economy. Only
through extensive cooperation on financial flows, intelligence, and police
action can the risk of terrorism be reduced. The most dangerous form of terrorism, involving
nuclear and biological weapons, requires the most extensive cooperation. As a major threat to security
and order in the 21st century, terrorism demands a more deliberative and effective response. Extremists
will use religion and any other means to attract the disaffected. Countering extremism requires people and
nations to buy into a rule-based order with law enforcement structures and intelligence
capacity to protect societal interests. The challenge to the next US administration is to harness a
vision for international cooperation on counter-terrorism and construct a roadmap for its
strategic implementation.
Globalization means only cooperation can solve terrorism—the world is too
interconnected for local efforts to solve.
Cordesman 10, (Anthony H. Cordesman, Center for Strategic and International Studies Arleigh
A. Burke Chair in Strategy, International Cooperation in Counterterrorism: Redefining the Threat
and the Requirement, March 11, 2010,
http://csis.org/files/publication/100315_IntCoopinfightterror.pdf)
The first lesson in improving such cooperation is the most obvious and the most important. Nations
cannot deal with
international terrorism of any type unless they actually do cooperate – rather than simply sign
agreements, issue new declarations, and meet in what amount to little more than “conference
building measures.” Terrorist groups have long shown that they can easily move across national lines.
They have long shown that they can find sanctuaries in the nation that is the weakest link, and exploit the differences
between nations and cultures. What is changing is their ability to exploit the scale of international economic
interdependence, global communications and transportation networks, international financial and trade systems, and network their
operations and ideology.¶ As the previous analysis has shown, no
country can seal its own borders or rely on selfdefense, and participate in today’s global economy. No nation can fight terrorism throughout
the world on its own. National defense and response capabilities are critical to
counterterrorism but they cannot be enough. Every modern state is now too dependent upon
international trade and shipping, border and port access, energy import dependence,
migration, tourism, dissemination of weapons and critical technologies, real time global
communication through satellite TV and the Internet, and countering the flow of disease.¶ More
than that, the world has already seen how dangerous it is to let ideological extremists like Bin
Laden try to provoke a clash between the Islamic world and the rest of the world. The one real
victory that such extremist movements have won is the tension, anger, and mistrust that have followed 9/11 and terrorist attacks.
The key fault line, the
key vulnerability, is the tension between Jew, Christian, and Muslim compounded by the ability
to exploit cultural and political differences. At every other level, the threat of violence might remain, but its impact
would generally be local and its broader international impact would be acts that do nothing more than create hollow, pointless
tragedies.
New Impact Scenario: Chem Attacks/Food Supply
The AQAP is threatening to poison the US food supply with an easily made toxin,
ricin.
Kindbergh 2011(Kaitlin, Intelligence Analyst at MSA Security, “AQAP Seeking to Use Ricin in
Attacks Against the United States”, August 15, 2011, http://www.msasecurity.net/security-andcounterterrorism-blog/bid/63853/AQAP-Seeking-to-Use-Ricin-in-Attacks-Against-the-UnitedStates)
According to US counterterrorism officials, a new threat has emerged from the Yemen-based al
Qaeda in thericin around small explosives. These devices would be detonated in enclosed
spaces – such as subway stations, airports or shopping malls – to allow for the dispersal of the
white, powdery toxin. Some terror experts say that if the toxins are released in an enclosed
area, it could cause extreme harm. If even just a small speck is inhaled, the result could be
deadly. Though deadly, ricin is not believed to be suitable for a mass casualty attack.
Al Qaeda documents prove
Kindbergh 2011(Kaitlin, Intelligence Analyst at MSA Security, “AQAP Seeking to Use Ricin in
Attacks Against the United States”, August 15, 2011, http://www.msasecurity.net/security-andcounterterrorism-blog/bid/63853/AQAP-Seeking-to-Use-Ricin-in-Attacks-Against-the-UnitedStates)
Two al Qaeda manuals found after the September 11th attacks contained information on how
to make and use the ricin toxin. One was found by British journalists in Kabul, Afghanistan in
November 2001. The other, titled “The Encyclopedia of Jihad,” was retrieved in the London
residence of terrorist operative Abu Hamza al-Masri in May 2004. An excerpt from the manual
described ricin as one of the “poisons that the holy warrior can prepare and use without
endandering his health.Ӧ 2003: Officials in Great Britain and France broke up al Qaeda cells
found in possession of components and manuals for creating ricin bombs as well as maps of the
London transit system. In late 2002, Menad Benchallali (also known as “the Chemist”) was arrested by authorities in France
after being found with jars of ricin in a lab he set up in his parents’ house. Prompted by the Benchallali case, British police arrested 13
Castor beans and traces of ricin were found in
one of the raided London apartments.¶ October 2010: In the second edition of AQAP’s Englishlanguage Inspire magazine, Yahya Ibrahim made mention of the use of ricin as a potential
method for carrying out future attacks against the US. This is the only time it has been
mentioned in the magazine. In the “Tips for Our Brothers in the United States of America”
segment, Ibrahim stated, "Brothers with less experience in the fields of microbiology or
chemistry, as long as they posses basic scientific knowledge, would be able to develop other
poisons such as Ricin or Cyanide.Ӧ Inspire December 2010: Authorities revealed that possible
associates of AQAP had potentially been plotting to poison the food supply in US hotels and
restaurants during the 2010-2011 holiday season. The group was purportedly seeking to slip
cyanide or ricin into salad bars or buffets in hotels and restaurants. No specific time frame or target was
North Africans suspected of having ties to al Qaeda in January 2003.
mentioned.
The agriculture industry is highly vulnerable and an attack would cause
economic crises.
FBI, 12 (The Federal Bureau of Investigation, February 2012, U.S. Department of Justice, “Agroterrorism,”
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/february-2012/february-2012-leb, accessed 7-12-12, AS).
Terrorists consider America’s agriculture and food production tempting targets. They have
noticed that its food supply is among the most vulnerable and least protected of all potential
targets of attack. When American and allied forces overran al Qaeda sanctuaries in the caves of
eastern Afghanistan in 2002, among the thousands of documents they discovered were U.S. agricultural
documents and al Qaeda training manuals targeting agriculture. A subset of bioterrorism, agroterrorism is
defined as “the deliberate introduction of an animal or plant disease for the purpose of generating fear, causing economic losses, or
undermining social stability.” 3 It
represents a tactic to attack the economic stability of the United
States. Killing livestock and plants or contaminating food can help terrorists cause economic
crises in the agriculture and food industries. Secondary goals include social unrest and loss of
confidence in government.
Economic collapse triggers nuclear great power wars
Burrows and Harris ‘09
(Mathew J. Burrows is a counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC), the principal drafter of Global Trends 2025: A
Transformed World, Jennifer Harris is a member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit, “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of
the Financial Crisis”, The Washington Quarterly, April,http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf)
Increased Potential for Global Conflict Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is
likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with
ample opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than
the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to
bedrawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies
andmultiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and onthe
sustainability ofmultilateral institutions (think League of Nationsin thesame
period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that
reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt
in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In
ever. While we continue to believe that
surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource
Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth
continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced . For those terrorist
groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion oftechnologies and scientific knowledge
will place some of the world’s mostdangerous capabilities within their reach.
issues move up on the international agenda.
Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups inheriting organizational structures,
newly
emergentcollections of the angry and disenfranchised that become selfradicalized,particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become
narrowerin an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any
economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost
certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries
about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new
security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and
consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of
stable deterrent relationshipthat existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would
emergenaturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and
terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended
escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of
command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attack and
potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also
. Thelack of
strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missileflight
times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus
onpreemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises.
Types of conflict that the world continuesto experience, such as over resources,
could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neomercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive
countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the
worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if governmentleaders deem
assured access to energy resources,for example, to be essential for maintaining
domestic stability and the survival oftheir regime. Even actions short of war,
however, will have important geopoliticalimplications. Maritime security
concerns are providing a rationale for navalbuildups and modernization efforts,
such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these
countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup ofregional naval
capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, andcounterbalancing
moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water
also becoming scarcer inAsia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage
changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states
in amoredog-eat-dog world.What Kind of World will 2025 Be? Perhaps more than lessons, history loves patterns.
will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack
Despite widespread changes in the world today, there is little to suggest that the future will not resemble the past in several respects.
the trendtoward greater diffusion of authority and
power that has been ongoing for acouple of decades is likely to accelerate
because of the emergence of new globalplayers, the worsening institutional
deficit, potential growth in regional blocs,and enhanced strength of non-state actors and networks. The
The report asserts that, under most scenarios,
multiplicity of actors on the international scene could either strengthen the international system, by filling gaps left by aging postWorld War II institutions, or could further fragment it and incapacitate international cooperation. The diversity in both type and kind
of actor raises the likelihood of fragmentation occurring over the next two decades, particularly given the wide array of transnational
challenges facing the international community. Because of their growing geopolitical and economic clout, the rising powers will enjoy
a high degree of freedom to customize their political and economic policies rather than fully adopting Western norms. They are also
likely to cherish their policy freedom to maneuver, allowing others to carry the primary burden for dealing with terrorism, climate
change, proliferation, energy security, and other system maintenance issues. Existing multilateral institutions, designed for a different
geopolitical order, appear too rigid and cumbersome to undertake new missions, accommodate changing memberships, and augment
their resources. Nongovernmental organizations and philanthropic foundations, concentrating on specific issues, increasingly will
populate the landscape but are unlikely to affect change in the absence of concerted efforts by multilateral institutions or
governments. Efforts at greater inclusiveness, to reflect the emergence of the newer powers, may make it harder for international
organizations to tackle transnational challenges. Respect for the dissenting views of member nations will continue to shape the
An ongoing financial crisis and
prolonged recession would tilt the scales even further in the direction of a
fragmented and dysfunctional international system with a heightened risk of
conflict. The report concluded that the rising BRIC powers (Brazil, Russia, India,
and China) seem averse to challenging the international system, as Germany and
Japan did in the nineteenth and twentiethcenturies, but this of course could
change if their widespread hopes for greater prosperity become frustrated and
the current benefits they derive from a globalizing world turn negative.
agenda of organizations and limit the kinds of solutions that can be attempted.
A2: AQAP Can’t Attack US
AQAP has the ability to conduct homeland attacks
Clapper 2013,(James, Director of National intelligence, “Statement for the Record, Worldwide
Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community”, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence”,
March 12 2013, http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/130312/clapper.pdf, pages 7-8)
Terrorist threats are in a transition period as the global jihadist movement becomes
increasingly¶ decentralized. In addition, the Arab Spring has generated a spike in threats to US interests in the region¶ that
likely will endure until political upheaval stabilizes and security forces regain their capabilities. We¶ also face uncertainty about
Attacks on
US soil will remain part of AQAP’s¶ transnational strategy; the group continues to adjust its
tactics, techniques and procedures for targeting¶ the West. AQAP leaders will have to weigh the priority they
potential threats from Iran and Lebanese Hizballah, which see the United¶ States and Israel as their principal enemies.
give to US plotting against other internal and regional objectives, as well as the extent to which they have individuals who can
manage, train, and¶ deploy operatives for US operations.
A2: AQAP Has No Leadership
Despite counter-terrorism strategies, the AQAP is still a threat especially to
Western countries.
The Soufan Group 2012(international strategic consultancy that works with
governments, companies and institutions, “IntelBrief”, November 28, 2012,
http://soufangroup.com/briefs/details/?Article_Id=437)
From an operational perspective,
in spite of the constant pressure of these ongoing counterterrorism
operations, AQAP continues to pose a significant threat both within Yemen and abroad,
specifically to Western countries. According to local media accounts, AQAP has tactically withdrawn from key cities and
returned to areas that are less at risk from military action. By doing so, it has protected many of its key leaders who continue to direct
operations and training. Indeed,
AQAP has demonstrated the capability to conduct regular terrorist
attacks. The group's leadership, however, has shifted its attack pattern in Yemen to specifically
target those involved in the counterterrorism operations. According to Yemeni newspapers
reports, there have been more than 60 such assassinations in Sana'a since the start of 2012,
including the assassination of the chief of security at the U.S. Embassy in the capital. There is
increasing concern that this threat will extend to foreigners, particularly Western diplomats.
AQAP has also exhibited a consistent pattern of conducting attacks against Yemeni military
troops in the south and in Sana'a; in early November, for example, there were reports of a foiled attack against
military and government targets in the capital. AQAP's ability to conduct international operations also
appears to remain viable. In late April, the combined efforts of Saudi Arabia, the United
Kingdom, and the U.S. disrupted an AQAP plot to blow up a U.S.-bound commercial aircraft.
More generally, U.S. intelligence officials have been quoted in the media as stating that Hassan Tali al-Asiri, a Saudi Arabian- born
bomb-maker, is the key operative in terms of designing and manufacturing innovative explosive devices that can bypass security.
While this may be true, there seems little doubt that a valuable skill set like this will have been shared with more of the group's
members.
Given AQAP's stated threats and a recent history of plotting further attacks, the threat
of additional international attacks remains a realistic scenario over the coming months.
Terrorists are going to rise again and although there is pressure for its end. It will
be easy for the terrorist organizations due to the United States’ unpopularity in
the third world, the AQAP’s freedom of action, and the opening of jails,
releasing many jihadists. The fall of the terrorist organizations will not come
easy.
Byman 2011(Daniel, Professor at Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program, “Al
Qaeda’s Future: How Likely is Another Attack?”, September 01, 2011,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/09/01-al-qaeda-byman)
Ayman Zawahiri, the new leader of al Qaeda after the killing of Osama bin Laden, inherits an
organization beset on many fronts. He and his fellow al Qaeda leaders must fear meeting bin Laden's fate. Even worse,
al Qaeda is excoriated in Islamist circles for its excesses, and risks irrelevance as the Arab Spring unfolds. Yet al Qaeda is also
the most famous terrorist group in the world, and its affiliates remain strong. What are its prospects
for the future?¶ Zawahiri's most immediate challenge is internal. Although he was long groomed as Bin Laden's successor, and al
Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula has pledged its loyalty to him, it is hard to unite the fissiparous jihadist community. Zawahiri lacks Bin
Laden's charisma and is a divisive figure. Togetherness and cooperation are particularly difficult to achieve when the rain of missiles
from U.S. drones makes it difficult for terrorist leaders to gather or even communicate. Zawahiri also must confront the political
earthquakes shaking the Middle East. Events in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya and other countries pose a challenge to al Qaeda's
message that only anti-U.S. violence can bring change to the region.
Fortunately for Zawahiri, the operating
environment in much of the Arab world is freer than it has been in decades. The Libyan uprising
and Egyptian revolution resulted in the opening of jails, releasing many jihadists. Some have
laid down arms, but others may rejoin the struggle. In Yemen, the collapse of the Saleh regime
has increased AQAP's freedom of action, enabling it to expand operations in many parts of the
country. Even in countries where the regimes remain intact, their security services will now
focus on student demonstrators and intellectuals, not jihadists—because democratic activists,
not terrorists, are the biggest threat to their hold on power. Fortunately for Zawahiri, it will be
easy to keep lambasting the United States. Although the Obama administration played an important role in helping
ease out Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and U.S. forces were integral to ending Moammar Qaddafi's rule in Libya, the United
States remains deeply unpopular in the Arab world. Even though U.S. forces are officially
supposed to end their presence in Iraq at the end of the year, significant numbers are likely to
remain in Iraq in some capacity. Although these forces will play a lesser role in safeguarding the
country, and U.S. officials hope they will stay off the front pages, their presence still angers
many in the region. And of course the United States will stay in Afghanistan for years to come.
Nor will the United States end its cozy relationship with the region's dictators anytime soon.
Already, the United States has turned a blind eye as Saudi Arabia has tried to stop
demonstrators from toppling Bahrain's al-Khalifa family. In addition, Washington will be caught
between its desire to maintain good relationships with other friendly dictators like Jordan's
King Abdullah and its need to work with new democrats. This balancing act will leave everyone
dissatisfied and give al Qaeda fodder for a public relations offensive. And of course the United
States and Israel will remain close friends. The inevitable disappointments of Arab-world
Islamists will also provide al Qaeda with a fertile atmosphere for recruitment. In Egypt, Islamists are
expected to do well in coming elections. But they are not expected to abrogate the peace treaty with Israel or forcibly Islamicize
society. Such pragmatism meets with applause internationally, but it may anger the more radical and idealistic members of these
groups. Eventually there will be charges that moderate Islamist leaders are selling out, charges that Zawahiri has already made and
will make again. It will be tricky for al Qaeda to navigate Pakistan. In Iraq, when al Qaeda tried to seize power in parts of the country,
it alienated locals. In Pakistan, al Qaeda has done a better job of helping Pakistani jihadists in their fight and steadily swaying them
toward its more radical and international agenda rather than taking the lead itself. And the Pakistani government weakly lurches from
crisis to crisis. Yet al Qaeda's position in Pakistan is delicate. The Pakistani government is fickle—cooperating with, tolerating, and
battling jihadists, often simultaneously. Similarly, too much chaos in the country risks forcing al Qaeda to devote itself to protecting its
position in Pakistan to the exclusion of other goals. Nevertheless, al
Qaeda must strive for relevance—a
particularly hard task for Zawahiri, whose lack of charisma makes it hard for him to reach out
beyond the narrow ranks of jihadists. This desire may push al Qaeda to launch attacks
prematurely or on unguarded and purely civilian targets. Such attacks will generate the news
coverage al Qaeda wants, but generate less admiration than terrorist "spectaculars" such as
9/11, even among those who see the United States as the enemy of Muslims around the world.
The al Qaeda core must also prove its relevance to Muslims in Europe and the United States—and make sure affiliates like AQAP don't
eclipse the core organization. In part, Zawahiri can take comfort in that al Qaeda 's ideas and goals are now at least part of the debate
in Islamist circles, even if they are not widely accepted. Even more important, Muslims in Europe and the United States have shown
up to fight in jihadist hotbeds like Yemen and Somalia, as well as Pakistan. Turning these foreign fighters into international terrorists is
an al Qaeda specialty, and these Westerners' familiarity with the United States and Europe makes them especially dangerous. ¶
Turning these foreign fighters into international terrorists is an al Qaeda specialty, and these
Westerners' familiarity with the United States and Europe makes them especially dangerous. It
would be a mistake to count Zawahiri and al Qaeda out. Al Qaeda has been declared dead repeatedly, only to
rise again, while Zawahiri's long militant record deserves respect. Constant pressure can bring
al Qaeda closer to collapse, and prevent it from exploiting any future opportunities. But such a
campaign will not result in immediate victory.
A2: Decapitation
Decapitation fails – no discernable effects.
Arquilla 13 (John, received a PhD in International Relations from Stanford in 1991. He worked
at RAND for several years, before joining the faculty of the US Naval Postgraduate School in 1993,
March 25, “Use an Axe not a Scalpel”
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/25/use_an_axe_not_a_scalpel)
Remote-controlled weapons, the hot new tools of war, have had the perverse effect of shoring up an old pattern of strategic thought
about going after enemy leaders. Wildly popular with the Air Force, there are now more pilots in cubicles than there are in cockpits.
Their primary purpose: act swiftly and on the basis of good, timely intelligence to strike with great precision at terrorist leaders.
Thus the longstanding strategic concept of counter-leadership targeting — “decapitation” was the
less euphemistic term of an earlier era — has been revivified. The problem, though, is that when the
principal foe is a network, the importance of any individual leader is low because these
organizations are capable of a high degree of self-direction. Drones have played key roles in the killing of
about 20 of al Qaeda’s “No. 3s” over the past decade, but in a network everybody is No. 3.¶ This focus on taking out the
leaders of essentially leaderless networks (that is, interconnected cells that are highly selforganizing and at least semi-autonomous) has led to serious difficulties in the field. For example,
many intelligence operatives and military servicemembers who plan and conduct drone
operations have found that, all too often, the occasional strike from the sky inflicts damage
that the networks can work around and quickly repair. In the meantime, the connections that
the killed “leader” had are no longer discernible. Which means, in practical terms, that the slow attrition
of drone campaigns, though it may hurt the enemy, does even more harm to the counterterrorists’ store of knowledge about these networks. The more damage done in this slow-paced
manner — there have been just over 400 drone strikes over the past decade, an average of 3-4 per month — the less is known.
This phenomenon is a curious aspect of “netwar” — the term that my longtime research partner David Ronfeldt and I use to describe
how networks fight, and how to fight networks.¶ [...]¶ Shortly before leaving office, Leon Panetta reaffirmed the traditional view when
he said that loss of leaders had put al Qaeda “on the verge of strategic defeat.” This is outmoded thinking. One
need only look
to the many fronts on which al Qaeda is operating today — even in Iraq, where we are gone, the
terrorists are back, and the country is burning — to see that the global war on terror has morphed into
terror’s war on the world. If one side is closer to “strategic defeat” after a decade of this first
great war between nations and networks, it is the nations. Networks are simply not dependent
on a few key leaders — as even the death of Osama bin Laden has shown.¶ So, what’s his alternative?¶
For David Ronfeldt and me, this means operating in concentrated bursts of action, striking networks not at a single “decisive point” —
they don’t have such — but rather at several points at once — what we call “swarming.” Far better to go after al Qaeda by doing a lot
more surveillance, for longer periods, prior to attacking. Then, when the network node or cell has been sufficiently illuminated, it can
be eliminated in a series of simultaneous strikes that give the enemy little or no chance to hide or flee.¶ This makes sound strategic
sense. Interestingly, given the longstanding “war” vs. “law enforcement” debate on counterterrorism, it’s pretty much the approach
the FBI takes to organized crime.¶ Politically, however, this is easier said than done. We’ve been at war a long time and being able to
announce “progress” in the form of killed or captured senior leaders is excellent for maintaining troop morale and public support.
Ironically, it may contribute to needing to sustain those much longer than would otherwise have been necessary.
Decapitation is counter-productive for religious and terrorist groups—studies
prove
Mannes 08 (Aaron, author of Profiles in Terror: A Guide to Middle East Terrorist Organizations
(2004), has written for Policy Review, The Wall Street Journal Europe, The Jerusalem Post,
National Review Online, The Forward, Middle East Insight, and The Journal of International
Security Affairs, former Director of Research at the Middle East Media Research Institute, The
Journal of International Policy Solutions, Spring “Testing the Snake Head Strategy: Does Killing or
Capturing its Leaders Reduce a Terrorist Group’s Activity?”
http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/017/7167.pdf)
Based on this preliminary survey, it is difficult to assess the utility of decapitation strategies. The general decline in incidents when
groups are subject to decapitation strikes indicates that this strategy may be useful in certain circumstances. However, the
limited effect of the decapitation strategy, particularly on fatal attacks by terrorist groups,
raises doubts about its overall efficacy. It is interesting to note that the communist/socialist groups, which other
surveys have identified as vulnerable t o decapitation strategies, do not show strong indicat ions of vulnerability to decapitation in
this study. This may be due to the relatively small dataset or to the declines of smaller ideological terrorist groups being offset by
The result that consistently stood out from this research
was the propensity of decapitation strikes to cause religious organizations to become
substantially more deadly. There are several possible reasons to explain this outcome. Many religious organizations are
larger and more robust ideological terrorist groups.
robust, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, which is an important criterion for surviving the loss of a leader as well as having the resources
to strike back. By contrast, some of the nationalist-separatist groups, such as the IRA and ETA, restricted their violence when
subjected to the decapitation strategy. Revenge
plays a role in the upsurge in deadly violence after a
decapitation strike. Another reason might be that the organizations that become more deadly are often in the midst of
large-scale insurgencies; the death of the leader is therefore a component in causing the insurgency to
enter a more deadly phase. Another explanation might be that during periods of extreme violence in
which leaders are likely to be removed, the most violent elements within a religious terrorist
group will also rise to the fore. The indication that killing religious organization’s leaders rather than arresting them is
more likely to lead to a surge of deadly violence may be worth further exploration . An imprisoned religious leader
may continue to be a source of authority that prevents a new leader from taking charge. In
addition, some imprisoned leaders, either in the hopes of gaining clemency or due to true
changes of heart, have renounced violence. Based on this data, decapitation strikes are not a
silver bullet against terrorist organizations. In the case of religious groups, they may even be
counter-productive. However, since the most violent religious organizations operate on a large-scale and have extensive
bases of support among the population, comparing these organizations to the relatively small terrorist radicals in Europe during the
Cold War may not be appropriate. Different organizations may have different vulnerabilities to decapitation. Small self-starting
Islamist terror cells may be more akin to the European radical groups and more vulnerable to decapitations and crackdowns.
Another question to explore is how decapitation strikes work in conjunction with other counter-terror strategies, such as fomenting
internal dissent, addressing terrorist gr oup grievances, and attacking the terrorist group’s support base. Several of the examples of
killed terrorist group leaders included in this study were actually killed by other terrorists. If more data were present, this would be
an interesting direction in which to conduct further research.
Terrorist Network Decapitation is Counterproductive
Cockburn 11 (Andrew, investigative journalist and author, writer for Harper magazine, 10
November, “The Hydra Effect: Assassination Blowback,”
http://www.councilforthenationalinterest.org/news/opinion-a-analysis/item/1167-the-hydraeffect-assassination-blowback)
2011 has been a banner year for taxpayer-funded assassinations — Osama bin Laden, Anwar Awlaki, five senior Pakistani Taliban
commanders in October and many more. Given the crucial U.S. backup role in Libya, and the ringing exhortation for the Libyan
leader’s death issued by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton just before the event itself, Uncle Sam can probably take a lot of
credit for Moammar Gaddafi ‘s messy end too.¶ Once upon a time, U.S. officials used to claim that they were merely targeting
“command and control centers,” rather than specific individuals, as in the hunt for Saddam Hussein during the 1991 Persian Gulf War
or the raid on Gaddafi in 1986. Nowadays no one bothers to pretend. Successful assassination missions, whether by elite special
forces or remote-controlled drones, are openly celebrated.¶ Clearly, the
sentiment prevalent among our leaders is
that eliminating particular enemy leaders is bound to have a beneficial effect. Thus in recent wars, the
U.S. has made the pursuit of “high-value targets,” the principal objective of so-called human network attacks, a priority. “The
platoon’s mission is to kill or capture HVTs,” recalled Matt Cook, a sergeant in the 101st Airborne based in northern Iraq in 2005.
“That is all we do.”¶ By 2008, according to a U.S. Strategic Command study, the U.S. military was simultaneously engaged in no fewer
than 285 human network attack programs.¶ So, now
that assassination is an official tool of U.S. foreign
policy, along with trade embargoes and overseas aid, it is surely time for an open debate on
whether it is indeed effective. Surprisingly for some, evidence based on hard numbers
demonstrates unequivocally that the answer is No.¶ The numbers are derived from a study
conducted in Iraq during the “surge” campaign of 2007-08 that enabled the U.S. to declare victory and wind down the
war. Key to the surge was an intensive and ruthless hunt for key individuals in the “IED networks” that were organizing homemade
bomb attacks against U.S. troops. Cause and effect — more dead network leaders leading to fewer bombs — seemed so self-evidently
obvious that nobody bothered to check.¶ Early in 2008, however, Rex Rivolo, an analyst at the Counter-IED Operations/Intelligence
Center attached to U.S. headquarters in Baghdad, briefed his superiors on some hard realities of the campaign. With access to any
and all information relating to U.S. military operations in Iraq, he had identified about 200 successful missions in which key IED
network individuals had been eliminated. Then he looked at the reports of subsequent bomb attacks in the late insurgent leader’s
area of operation. The results were clear: IED attacks went up, immediately and sharply. One week after the hit, on average, incidents
within about three miles of the dead leader’s home base had risen 20 per cent.¶ Why, with the commander dead, did the enemy fight
with such reinforced vigor? Eliminated
enemy commanders, intelligence revealed, were almost always
replaced at once, usually within 24 hours. “The new guy is going to work harder,” Rivolo told
me. “He has to prove himself, assert his authority. Maybe the old guy had been getting lazy,
not working so hard to plant those IEDs. Fresh blood makes a difference.Ӧ Once posited, this consequence may
appear obvious, but Rivolo’s study, so far as I am aware, was the only time that anyone with access to relevant data had looked at the
consequences of our principal national security strategy in a systematic way. However, even as he submitted his conclusions, the
same strategy was being exported to Afghanistan on a major scale. Ever-increasing special forces “night raids” have indeed
subsequently succeeded in killing large numbers of insurgent commanders (along with many civilians), but the consequences have
been depressingly predictable.¶ “I used to be able to go talk to local Taliban commanders,” a journalist long resident in Afghanistan
told me, “but they are all dead. The ones who replaced them are much more dangerous. They don’t want to talk to anyone at all.”¶
Nongovernmental groups similarly report that the new breed of Taliban leadership is unwilling to allow the free passage of aid
workers permitted by their assassinated predecessors. Neither
in Afghanistan nor Pakistan, where high-value
targets are the responsibility of the CIA‘s burgeoning killer-drone bureaucracy, is there any
indication that the enemy’s military capability has been diminished.¶ As Matthew Hoh, the foreign service
officer who quit in protest at the futility of the Afghan war, told me recently, “War is a breeding ground for unintended
consequences.Ӧ President Obama should think about that.
Killing leaders of terrorist organizations actually strengthens them—statistically
proven
Wright 10 (Robert, senior fellow at the New America Foundation, author of NYT bestseller The
Evolution of God, has taught at Princeton and UPenn, April 13, “The Price of Assassination,”
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/13/title-2/?_r=0)
So maybe the question to ask is whether Americans should be convinced of that — whether
assassinating terrorists really helps keep us safe.¶ There’s no way of answering this question with complete
confidence, but it turns out there are some relevant and little-known data. They were compiled by
Jenna Jordan of the University of Chicago, who published her findings last year in the journal Security
Studies. She studied 298 attempts, from 1945 through 2004, to weaken or eliminate terrorist groups through “leadership
decapitation” — eliminating people in senior positions.¶ Her work suggests that
decapitation doesn’t lower the life
expectancy of the decapitated groups — and, if anything, may have the opposite effect.¶
Particularly ominous are Jordan’s findings about groups that, like Al Qaeda and the Taliban, are
religious. The chances that a religious terrorist group will collapse in the wake of a decapitation
strategy are 17 percent. Of course, that’s better than zero, but it turns out that the chances of
such a group fading away when there’s no decapitation are 33 percent. In other words, killing
leaders of a religious terrorist group seems to increase the group’s chances of survival from 67
percent to 83 percent.¶ Of course the usual caveat applies: It’s hard to disentangle cause and effect. Maybe it’s the more
formidable terrorist groups that invite decapitation in the first place — and, needless to say, formidable groups are good at survival.
Still, the other interpretation of Jordan’s findings — that decapitation just doesn’t work, and in some cases is counterproductive —
does make sense when you think about it.¶ For starters, reflect on your personal workplace experience. When
an executive
leaves a company — whether through retirement, relocation or death — what happens?
Exactly: He or she gets replaced. And about half the time (in my experience, at least) the
successor is more capable than the predecessor. There’s no reason to think things would work
differently in a terrorist organization.¶ Maybe that’s why newspapers keep reporting the death
of a “high ranking Al Qaeda lieutenant”; it isn’t that we keep killing the same guy, but rather
that there’s an endless stream of replacements. You’re not going to end the terrorism business
by putting individual terrorists out of business.¶ You might as well try to end the personal
computer business by killing executives at Apple and Dell. Capitalism being the stubborn thing it is, new
executives would fill the void, so long as there was a demand for computers.¶ Of course, if you did enough killing, you might make the
job of computer executive so unattractive that companies had to pay more and more for ever-less-capable executives. But that’s one
difference between the computer business and the terrorism business.
Terrorists aren’t in it for the money to begin with. They
have less tangible incentives — and some of these may be strengthened by targeted killings.¶
One of the main incentives is a kind of local prestige grounded in grievance. When people feel
aggrieved — feel that foreigners have wronged them or exploited them or disrespected them
— they may admire and appreciate those who fight on their behalf. Terrorists are nourished
ultimately by a grass-roots sense of injustice.¶ And one good way to stoke a sense of injustice is
to fire missiles into cars, homes and offices in hopes of killing terrorists, while in fact killing no
few innocent civilians. Estimates of the ratio of civilians to militants killed are all over the map — 50 to 1 or 10 to 1 or 1 to 2 or
1 to 10 — but the estimate of the Pakistani people, which is all that matters, tends toward the higher end. And the notion that these
strikes are a kind of national humiliation long ago entered Pakistani culture. A popular song from a couple of years ago says Americans
“kill people like insects.”¶ You can imagine why, as Jordan’s data suggest, this
counterproductive effect of
decapitation might be stronger for religious groups than for groups driven by a secular
ideology. To the intensely religious even the harshest adversity can seem like a test
administered by a God who will reward faithful perseverance. And the belief that death in a
holy war gets you to heaven can’t hurt when you’re looking for someone to replace an
assassinated leader.¶ Obviously, drone strikes must do some short-term good by disrupting the operations of Al Qaeda or the
Taliban. And there’s no way of knowing for sure that this short-term good is outweighed by a long-term recruiting boost. But
Jordan’s data, combined with common-sense analysis, make the merits of our current strategy
far from clear.¶ By itself that wouldn’t be a damning indictment. You have to choose some strategy in the face of uncertainty,
and if this turns out to be the wrong one — well, that’s life; strategic failure happens.¶ But in this case the price we pay
goes far beyond failure. If Harold Koh — the state department lawyer assigned the job of justifying Obama’s strategy —
carries the day, America will be telling the world that it’s O.K. to lob missiles into countries that
haven’t attacked you, as long as you think a terrorist may live there. Do we really want to send
that message to, for example, Russia and China, both of which have terrorism problems? Or
India or Pakistan?¶ And are we sure we want to say that, actually, due process of law isn’t really guaranteed all American
citizens so long as there’s a war on terrorism — which, remember, is a war that may continue for eternity?¶ I’m not sure I’d want to
pay these prices even for a strategy that helped us in the war against terrorism. To pay them for a strategy that may be hurting us is
even less appetizing.
Drone strikes will have minimal effect due to safe havens and recruitment in
FATA
International Crisis Group 2013 (research NGO committed to preventing and resolving
deadly conflict, “Asia Report N°247: Drones: Myths and Reality in Pakistan”, May 21 2013,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/247-drones-myths-andreality-in-pakistan.pdf, p. i)
Nine years after the first U.S. drone strike in Pakistan’s Federally Administered ¶ Tribal Areas
(FATA) in 2004, the U.S. refuses to officially acknowledge the CIA-run ¶ program, while Pakistan denies
consenting to it. This secrecy undermines efforts to ¶ assess the program’s legality or its full impact
on FATA’s population. It also diverts ¶ attention from a candid examination of the roots of
militancy in the poorly governed ¶ tribal belt bordering southern and eastern Afghanistan and
how best to address ¶ them. Drone strikes may disrupt FATA-based militant groups’ capacity to
plan and ¶ execute cross-border attacks on NATO troops and to plot attacks against the U.S. ¶
homeland, but they cannot solve the fundamental problem. The ability of those groups ¶ to
regroup, rearm and recruit will remain intact so long as they enjoy safe havens on ¶ Pakistani
territory and efforts to incorporate FATA into the constitutional mainstream are stifled.
Drone strike’s methods of eliminating terrorist leaders is statistically
counterproductive, increases violence and group survival
Jordan 2009 (Jenna, PhD candidate @ U of Chicago, “When Heads Roll: Assessing the
Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation”, Security Studies, Voalume 18, Issue 4, December 2009,
http://cpost.uchicago.edu/pdf/Jordan.pdf, p. 753-754)
The data presented in this paper show that decapitation is not an effective¶ counterterrorism
strategy. While decapitation is effective in 17 percent of all¶ cases, when compared to the
overall rate of organizational decline, decapitated groups have a lower rate of decline than
groups that have not had¶ their leaders removed. The findings show that decapitation is more
likely¶ to have counterproductive effects in larger, older, religious, and separatist¶
organizations. In these cases decapitation not only has a much lower rate of¶ success, the
marginal value is, in fact, negative. The data provide an essential¶ test of decapitation’s value as a counterterrorism
policy.¶ There are important policy implications that can be derived from this¶ study of leadership decapitation. Leadership
decapitation seems to be a¶ misguided strategy, particularly given the nature of organizations
being currently targeted. The rise of religious and separatist organizations indicates ¶ that
decapitation will continue to be an ineffective means of reducing terrorist activity . It is essential that
policy makers understand when decapitation¶ is unlikely to be successful. Given these conditions, targeting bin Laden and¶
other senior members of al Qaeda, independent of other measures, is not¶ likely to result in
organizational collapse. Finally, it is essential that policy¶ makers look at trends in organizational decline. Understanding
whether certain types of organizations are more prone to destabilization is an important¶ first step in formulating successful
counterterrorism policies.
Strikes spread terrorist out, but do not prevent operations and encourage
recruitment
Landay 2009 (Jonathan S., writer for McClatchy Newspapers, “Do U.S. drones kill kill Pakistani
extremist or recruit them?”, April 7 2009, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2009/04/07/65682/dous-drones-kill-pakistani-extremists.html#.Ufh9YI3VD-Y)
WASHINGTON — Even
as the Obama administration launches new drone attacks into Pakistan's
remote tribal areas, concerns are growing among U.S. intelligence and military officials that the
strikes are bolstering the Islamic insurgency by prompting Islamist radicals to disperse into the
country's heartland.¶ Al Qaida, Taliban and other militants who've been relocating to Pakistan's
overcrowded and impoverished cities may be harder to find and stop from staging terrorist
attacks, the officials said.¶ Moreover, they said, the strikes by the missile-firing drones are a recruiting
boon for extremists because of the unintended civilian casualties that have prompted
widespread anger against the U.S.¶ "Putting these guys on the run forces a lot of good things to happen," said a senior
U.S. defense official who requested anonymity because the drone operations, run by the CIA and the Air Force, are top-secret. "It
gives you more targeting opportunities. The
downside is that you get a much more dispersed target set
and they go to places where we are not operating."¶ U.S. drone attacks "may have hurt more
than they have helped," said a U.S. military official who's been deeply involved in
counterterrorism operations. The official, who requested anonymity because he wasn't authorized to speak publicly,
called the drone operations a "recruiting windfall for the Pakistani Taliban."¶ "A significant
number of bad actors aren't where they used to be," but have moved to "places where we
can't get at them the way we could," he added.
Drones do not produce results, inhibit negotiation, and drive terrorist
recruitment
Malik 2012 (Brig. Imran, former defense advisor to Australia and New Zealand and secretary
general of Pakistan Forum for Security and Development, “U.S. Drone Warfare: Reinforcing
Failure”, http://www.globalresearch.ca/u-s-drone-warfare-reinforcing-failure/5310622, 11/5/12)
The US is relying very heavily on the drones. It intends to defeat its adversaries without putting too many Americans at risk. But then a constant fixation
The incessant employment of
drones is a clear case of diminishing returns as well as colossal human sufferings. ¶ It is endlessly
repeating what is continuously failing to make any tangible impact on the Taliban or militants
or bringing its strategic objectives any nearer. It has neither been able to pacify the Taliban, nor
defeat them or force them to negotiate from a position of weakness. It is a classic case of
adamantly and stubbornly reinforcing failure.¶ The US needs to change tack. And if media reports are to be
on a single technology or methodology indicates a paucity of other viable strategic or diplomatic options.
believed, the US may even pre-pone its departure from the APR, then it would add to the urgency of finding an alternative methodology to deal with this
situation. (Assuming that the Pakistanis will not venture into the NWA unless solely dictated by their national interests.)¶ The
current US
policy enunciates that every male of weapon carrying age in Fata/NWA could possibly be a
terrorist and thus can be a legitimate target. This is an unjustifiable policy. It does not meet the
strict canons of international law and justice. It needs to be re-scrutinised and reviewed. The drones are killing
scores of innocent men, women and children for the reported scalp of an odd low-to-middle
ranking terrorist. Do the costs (in innocent human lives) and the effects (militant scalps)
achieved, genuinely balance each other out? Can they ever? Is the cost worth the effect?¶ Such atrocities, in
turn, traditionally motivate the relatives and friends of the innocent victims to seek revenge –
and they join the militant groups in droves. So, instead of decimating the forces that oppose it,
the US is, in effect, increasing their ranks and their motivation for vengeance. Can they not grasp this
simple logic? Why do they not change their tunnel vision? Or do they deliberately ignore it? Or does the strong and influential military-industrial complex
dictate policy and not allow them to think and act professionally and independently? Howsoever, is
it not limiting the space for
moderate discourse with the Taliban or militants, and foreclosing the chances of a peaceful
settlement of the issue?
Violence has increased during the use of drone strikes and there is a positive
statistical correlation between them
Hudson, Owens and Flannes 2010 (Leila, associate professor of anthropology and history
in the School of Middle Eastern & North African Studies @ the University of Arizona and director
of the Southwest Initiative for the Study of Middle East Conflicts, Colin S., research associate @
SISMEC, Matt, research associate @ SISMEC, Drone Warfare: Blowback from the New American
Way of War, http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/drone-warfareblowback-new-american-way-war, Fall 2010, p. 4)
Between 2004 and 2009, our research and databases compiled by others document a dramatic
spike in deaths by suicide bombings in Afghanistan and Pakistan.18 While it is impossible to prove direct
causality from data analysis alone, it is probable that drone strikes provide motivation for retaliation, and
that there is a substantive relationship between the increasing number of drone strikes and the
increasing number of retaliation attacks.¶ For every high-profile, purposeful attack like the Khost bombing, many
more low-profile attacks take place. These types of attacks can be explained by what military strategist
David Kilcullen calls the accidental-guerrilla phenomenon, a local rejection of external forces.19
By using drone warfare as the only policy tool in the FATA without any local political engagement, the United States is almost certainly
creating accidental guerrillas. These
new combatants, unable to retaliate against the United States
within FATA, will likely cross the border into Afghanistan, where U.S. troops and NATO and
Afghan security forces are concentrated and present easily identifiable targets. Or they may
join the ranks of groups like the Pakistani Taliban, whose attacks within Pakistan destabilize the U.S.-Pakistani
alliance. The last days of June 2011 illustrated the worst extremes of this phenomenon: a married couple carrying out a suicide attack
in Pakistan, and an eight-year-old duped (not recruited) into an Afghan suicide attack.20
Drones cannot be used effectively to fight dispersed enemies like modern
terrorism and alienates needed public support in affected areas
Byman 2006 (Daniel, Director of the Center for Peace and Security Studies and of the Security
Studies Program at Georgetown University, “Do Targeted Killings Work?”, Foreign Affairs, Volume
85, Number 2, http://www12.georgetown.edu/sfs/cpass/articles/bymantargetedkillings.pdf,
March/April 2006, p. 106-108)
Since
9/11, moreover, the U.S. government has killed several ¶ al Qaeda leaders. The highest profile
the United States succeeded in eliminating Muhammad
Atef, al Qaeda’s military chief, with a Predator¶ drone in Afghanistan in October 2001. In
November 2002, another¶ U.S. drone took out Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi, the al Qaeda¶
leader in Yemen who was implicated in the bombing of the¶ U.S.S.Cole. And, as noted earlier, the United
States killed Rabia¶ last December.¶ Yet because targeted killings are not widely accepted as a legitimate
instrument of state, the United States risks diminishing its¶ status as an upholder of the rule of
law if it embraces them. The¶ killings also raise normative problems. There is a general rule in foreign policy
against the elimination of world leaders, and this¶ norm has served the United States well.
Neither the U.S. government nor the Israeli one, for that matter, would want targeted¶ killings
to become a widely used instrument, since this would make¶ its own citizens and officials more
vulnerable. Cuba, for example,¶ could define exiles living in Miami as terrorists, as could Syria¶
Lebanese leaders calling for an end to Syrian dominance of their¶ country. The idea that such
figures could be eliminated as terrorists¶ may seem absurd on its face. But one need only remember the¶
targets, such as Osama bin¶ Laden, have escaped. But
Chilean government’s killing of Orlando Letelier, a former o⁄cial ¶ in Salvador Allende’s government, with a car bomb in Washington,¶ D.C., in 1976 to
realize that the policy could pose a real danger. ¶ That no commonly accepted international definition of terrorism ¶ exists makes it even harder to
establish generally accepted rules¶ about when targeted killings are permissible.¶ There
are also more practical reasons why
the United States should¶ be wary of targeted killings. Because of profound differences
between¶ the Israeli and U.S. cases, were Washington to broadly adopt this¶ particular Israeli
policy, it would find it ineffective and ultimately¶ unsustainable. One crucial distinction between the two
countries lies¶ in the nature and the location of their enemies. Israel faces Palestinian ¶ terrorists operating from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip—
The United States, in contrast, faces
a far more¶ diffuse and global threat. Al Qaeda and affiliated jihadists now operate¶ throughout
the Middle East, Central Asia, and Europe. It would¶ be impossible for the United States to
maintain a vast intelligence¶ presence, not to mention a rapid-strike capability, in all or even a¶
few of these places.¶ Unlike the paunder Arafat, moreover, most of the governments in¶ whose territories al
Qaeda is active are friendly to the United States¶ and actively oppose the terrorists. Because
arrest is always a better¶ option than killing, it usually makes much more sense for the United¶
States simply to arrange for local security services to apprehend the¶ terrorists than to
antagonize locals with extrajudicial killings.¶ It is true that the governments of some countries, such as¶ Afghanistan, Iraq,
mere¶ miles from Israel proper and territory that Israel has controlled off ¶ and on since 1967.
Pakistan, and Yemen, do not exercise full control over their territory or lack the capacity or the will to arrest important¶ suspects. In such areas, targeted
killings should be an option since¶ there is no “sovereignty” to violate. But
even there the United¶ States must consider
the goodwill of its allies more than Israel does.¶ International condemnation of U.S. actions
directly affects U.S.¶ counterterrorism efforts, since much of Washington’s “war on terrorism”
is waged with or in cooperation with other countries’ police and¶ security services. The capture of
Khalid Sheik Mohammad (one of the¶ masterminds of the 9/11 attacks) involved the intense cooperation of ¶ the security services of Germany, Pakistan,
and Switzerland. A
decision¶ by Germany, Malaysia, Morocco, or other states with a major jihadist¶
presence to stop actively cooperating with Washington could be devastating. Israel may not
care what other countries think; in this effort, at¶ least, the United States has to.
Drones do not produce results against terrorism- outweighed by driving
recruitment and generally insufficient in scope
McCrisken 2013 (Trevor, Associate Professor in Politics and International Studies at the
University of Warwick and Chair of the British American Security Information Council, “Obama's
Drone War”, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00396338.2013.784469, 4/3/13, p.
109-110)
There is some debate, however, over whether the drone attacks are fulfilling Obama’s counterterrorism objectives effectively. David Kilcullen, ¶ the counter-insurgency adviser to General David Petraeus at the time
of the ¶ Iraq surge, told a congressional hearing in May 2009 that ‘we need to call ¶ off the drones’. Kilcullen argued that
drones’ operational effectiveness was ¶ outweighed by their negative effects on Pakistani
public opinion and resulting help to terrorist’s recruitment efforts.50 Jeffrey Addicott, a former
legal ¶ adviser to US Army Special Operations Forces, had similar concerns: Are we creating
more enemies than we’re killing or capturing by our ¶ activities? Unfortunately, I think the
answer is yes. These families have ¶ 10 sons each. You kill one son and you create 9 more
enemies. You’re not ¶ winning over the population … Drones don’t impress them. In the mind ¶ of the radicals,
we’re cowards: we won’t fight face-to-face. This is what ¶ they teach in the madrassas.51¶ Ikram Sehgal, chairman of
Pathfinder G4S, Pakistan’s largest private ¶ security firm, estimates that 7,000–15,000 extremist
students pass through pro-Taliban religious schools every year: many of them becoming
soldiers ¶ in the war against the United States and its allies. These numbers far outweigh those killed by drone
attacks or Coalition forces in Afghanistan.52¶ Becker and Shane contended that ‘drones have replaced Guantanamo as the ¶ recruiting
tool of choice for the militants’.53 ¶
Targeted killing encourages increased violence, prevents critical information
gathering needed for effective counter-terrorism, and historically fails to be
predictably effective
Carvin 2012 (Stephanie, PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics
and lecturer in International Relations@ LSE, “The Trouble with targeted Killing”, Security
Studies, Volume 21, Issue 3, 8/22/12,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09636412.2012.706513, p. 536-537)
But more empirical studies looking at effectiveness also suggest that¶ there are serious
difficulties with a policy of targeted killing. First, there is¶ the issue of blowback: a policy of
targeted killing may backfire with very¶ negative consequences for democratic states. Enraged
at the killing of their¶ leaders, terrorist groups may choose to strike at the leaders of
democratic¶ societies. As Cronin notes:¶ Governments are at a serious disadvantage, especially in
democratic¶ states: public figures cannot be perfectly protected; indeed, a major aspect of
most elected politicians’ jobs is to be visible and available, making¶ them more vulnerable to
assassination than the leaders of clandestine organizations.30¶ In other words, targeting leaders may
create a perverse yet pervasive belief¶ that it is okay for terrorist organizations to target the
leadership or institutions¶ of democratic societies. Brian Michael Jenkins comes to a similar conclusion,¶ noting
that democracies “are particularly vulnerable to the risk that our own¶ leaders may be assassinated. . . . In a war of assassination,
clearly we would¶ be at a disadvantage.”31¶ Secondly,
although targeted killing may actually remove
terrorist leaders,¶ their replacements may in fact be worse. “The original charismatic leader
may¶ indeed be irreplaceable, or he may not: the old cliche about the devil you ´¶ know applies
here. It is not at all guaranteed that the successor will be an¶ improvement, from a counter-terrorism perspective.”32 Again, this
view is¶ supported by Jenkins who argues that “we cannot assume that new leaders¶ will act
differently from their predecessors.”33¶ Third, as Cronin argues, arresting a leader is more
effective than killing¶ him or her:¶ Capturing a leader, putting him or her on trial and then
presumably¶ behind bars, emphasizes the rule of law, profiles leaders as criminals¶ and
demonstrates the appropriate application of justice. All else being¶ equal, it is much better to arrest and jail a
terrorist leader so that his fate¶ will be demonstrated to the public. There is nothing glamorous about¶ languishing in jail.34¶ The
saying “dead men tell no tales” is appropriate here. When the purpose¶ of counterterrorism is
to gather further intelligence on other activities, a¶ live terrorist is far more useful than a dead
one. Arrested terrorists may be¶ interrogated for information on future plots and, as Edward
Kaplan et al.¶ argue, the discovery of links to more nodes in terrorist networks.35¶ Finally,
targeted killing detractors argue that although targeted killing¶ has benefits in theory, in the
end it is an entirely unpredictable exercise. As¶ Jenkins succinctly phrases it, “In real life, we can
seldom predict the effects¶ that an assassination might have.”36 Cronin argues that unlike
terrorists,¶ those who advocate state assassination policies must think not only tactically but
strategically, analyzing the second- and third-order effects of¶ the removal of terrorist leaders. .
. . Removing the leader may reduce a¶ group’s operational efficiency in the short term, or it
may raise the stakes¶ for members of a group to “prove” their mettle by carrying out dramatic¶
attacks.37¶ Some of these arguments become clear in the literature against the use¶ of targeting terrorists with drone strikes in
Afghanistan/Pakistan. Andrew¶ Exum et al. argue that the campaign “has created a siege mentality among¶ the Pashtun population of
northwest Pakistan” and suggest that it has the¶ same hallmarks as failed campaigns in Algeria in the 1950s and Somalia in¶ 2005–
2006.38 They
suggest that the heavy reliance on drones mistakes the use¶ of a tactic for a
strategy. Further, the strikes have infuriated the population to¶ the extent that it undermines
broader strategic goals in the region. Using an¶ oft-quoted (but heavily disputed) statistic, they
claim that between 2006–2009¶ there were fourteen terrorists and seven hundred civilians
killed in drone¶ strikes in Pakistan, representing over fifty civilians for every terrorist killed¶ or a
“hit rate of less than 2 percent.”39
Propaganda analysis shows that drone strikes have no effect on Al Qaeda
Smith and Walsh 2013 (Megan, graduate of the University of North Carolina and Charlotte,
James Igoe, professor of political science @ same, “Do Drones Degrade Al Qaeda? Evidence From
Propaganda Output”, Terrorism and Political Violence, Volume 25, Number 2, April 1 2013,
http://www.jamesigoewalsh.com/tpv.pdf, p. 324-325)
Do drone strikes hinder Al Qaeda’s ability to engage in sophisticated political and miliatary
operations? We adress this question by investigating the relatioships between drone strikes
and Al Qaida propoganda outpute. Propaganda outpit is an important measure of
organizational resliance and activity. Creating sophisticated proaganda requires a cadre of
experienced producers, media workers, and “stars” who are all vulnerable to drone strikes.
Thus if drone strikes hinder Al Qaeda’s ability to operate effectively, this should be reflected in
changes in the organization’s proaganda. WE find little evidence that this is the case. Plots of the time sereis for drone
striekes and Al Qaida media output show no clear relationships. Regresion analysis finds that drone strikes may
be associated with more, not less, propagana output. The relationship is not suffciently clearbut that we are willing to conclude that there has been a postive relatioship between drone
striesk and prpaganda. However, in none of the regression models was the realtioship clearly or strongly negative. This
suggests that, at best, drone striesk have little or no effect on Al Qaeda’s ability to create and issue propaganda. Al Qaeda’s
propaganda output apreas to be quite resiliant in the face od drone strikes.
The drones decapitation strategies are not effective- the targets are
decentralized, were two far away, and there is insufficient ground support
Frankel 2010 (Matthew, executive fellow with the 21st Century Defense Initiative at The
Brookings Institution, “Why Killing Enemy Leaders Rarely Works, June 1 2010,
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2010/06/01/the-death-of-al-qaedas-no-3-guy-wontmatter.html)
The recent killing of two top leaders of al Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Ayub al-Masri and Abu Umar alBaghdadi, is a perfect example. "The death of these terrorists is potentially the most significant blow to al Qaeda in Iraq
since the beginning of the insurgency," said General Ray Odierno, commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, after the operation, which took
place late last month.¶ Now that the number of U.S. troops in Iraq has dropped below the number in Afghanistan, it’s important to
think about the implications of Iraq for other combat zones.¶ The
good feeling lasted less than three weeks,
however. A series of devastating jihadist-led coordinated attacks across Iraq, killing over 100
people, soon reduced Odierno’s comments to mere hyperbole. And the fact that Masri’s death
didn’t mean the end of al Qaeda in Iraq shouldn’t be a surprise to anyone who has followed
Iraq closely since 2003. In the past, whenever officials have pronounced upon the significance
of an enemy killing, it has always proven premature.¶ So why hasn’t the removal of insurgent and terrorist
leadership yielded more successful outcomes in Iraq? My research of 20 different high-value targeting
campaigns from Algeria to Chechnya to Japan suggests that such operations have the greatest
chance of success when conducted by local forces against a centralized opponent in
conjunction with larger counterinsurgency operations. Until recently, American targeting
efforts in Iraq failed to meet any of these criteria.¶ One needs to go back in time only four years to understand
this dynamic firsthand. In June 2006, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was finally killed after a months-long manhunt. “Zarqawi's death is
a severe blow to al Qaeda. It's a victory in the global war on terror,” President Bush said at the
time. But the “victory”—such as it was—proved to be short-lived. Weekly attacks against
coalition forces climbed from 950 in the week before Zarqawi’s death to 1,400 just three
months later. High-profile attacks nearly doubled over the next nine months, according to U.S.
military data.¶ And our struggles with high-value targeting operations in Iraq have hardly been limited to Sunni jihadist groups.
Overemphasis on targeting operations plagued our efforts in the early years of the war. In the months following the fall
of Saddam Hussein’s regime, U.S. forces made finding the fugitive leader, his sons, and other
holdouts from the infamous “deck of cards” their top priority, ignoring the fact that antioccupation sentiment had spread to tribal and non-Baathist Sunni figures and spawned a broad
decentralized insurgency.¶ Poorly conceived and poorly managed targeting efforts added fuel to
the fire. Brazen midnight U.S. military raids sometimes led to the capture of an insurgent, but often created a new generation of
enemies as a result of rough tactics and lack of sensitivity toward local customs.¶ Furthermore, since the Sunni
insurgency was decentralized, with local commanders holding large amounts of autonomy, the
targeting campaign did little to stem the levels of violence. The eventual capture of Saddam, and the deaths of
his sons, had no effect on the growing insurgency. Instead, it took a combination of persistent attacks by Shia
militias and the rise of the Anbar Awakening to defeat the bulk of the Sunni insurgency. ¶
History has shown that a military force that fights insurgents far from its home turf, like
American soldiers have done in Iraq, will have a severe disadvantage because troops don’t
understand the local cultural dynamics and networks. Despite our technological superiority,
the United States often falls short in the area of local intelligence collection, leading to poor
target selection and unnecessary collateral damage as we have seen in both Iraq and
Afghanistan.¶ In these cases, it is essential that the goals and strategies of the occupying force
and the host government are aligned. A U.S.-led targeting campaign against Shia militants
didn’t succeed in reducing violence until the Iraqi government finally decided to turn its
attention against the Sadrists after months of blocking U.S. efforts. This also gets to the larger point that
targeting operations can’t succeed in a vacuum. The Sadrists weren’t defeated until the Iraqi government conducted large-scale
operations—backed by U.S. forces—in Al Basrah, Al Amarah and Sadr City in 2008.
Diverse estimates show that militant deaths are massively outweighed by
civilian casualties
Kantar 2009 (Max, foreign policy writer for Global Research, “International Law: The First
Casualty of America’s Drone War”, 12 December 2009,
http://www.globalresearch.ca/international-law-the-first-casualty-of-america-s-dronewar/16539)
The most cited and controversial report to date on the casualty results of U.S. drone strikes is
the April 2009 report published by Pakistan’s leading English daily, The News. [2] The report was
authored by Amir Mir who is known by leading American strategic analysts as “a well-regarded
Pakistani terrorism expert.” [3] The report, relying on internal Pakistani government sources,
alleges that from January 14, 2006 to April 8, 2009, U.S. drone bombings killed 687 civilians and
14 al-Qaeda operatives, amounting to a ratio of nearly 50 civilians killed for every al-Qaeda
operative killed, or a 94% civilian death rate. Out of 60 total strikes, only 10 hit any al-Qaeda
targets. The sources attributed the failed drone attacks to “faulty intelligence information”
which resulted in the “killing [of] hundreds of innocent civilians, including women and
children.” It goes on to detail the numbers of deaths, the statuses of the victims, and the dates of specific attacks, all within annual
and monthly time frames.¶ This report has since been cited and endorsed by several relevant and
mainstream commentators, despite the fact that it has been largely ignored, or at best,
marginalized and down-played, by the mainstream media in the United States. Most notably, in a
meeting with Congress this past May, former senior counterinsurgency advisor to the U.S. Army, David Kilcullen, told
the U.S. government to “call off the drones” noting that “since 2006, we’ve killed 14 senior Al
Qaeda leaders using drone strikes; in the same time period, we’ve killed 700 Pakistani civilians
in the same area.” In a New York Times article [4] just weeks later, Kilcullen co-authored an editorial with Andrew Exum—a
Fellow at the Center for a New American Security and a former Army officer who served in both Iraq and Afghanistan—in which they
cited the casualty ratio and figures from The News’ April 2009 report as evidence of the lack of precision in the drone policy. [5]¶ The
Brookings Institution published an analysis of the U.S. drone policy in Pakistan last July.[6] The
analysis, written by Senior Fellow, Daniel Byman, concluded that despite the difficulty in
determining exact numbers of civilian casualties, it was likely that “more than 600 civilians”
have been killed by U.S. attacks at the time of writing. “That number suggests,” the report
continued, “that for every militant killed, 10 or so civilians also died.” This assessment is highly significant
for multiple reasons. The centrist Brookings Institution is arguably the most powerful and influential think tank in the United States, as
noted by the authoritative Think Tank Index magazine. Brookings also routinely garners by far the most media citations annually.[7]
To say the least, it is quite noteworthy that the most mainstream and establishment think tank
in the United States has gone on record saying that 90% of those killed in U.S. drone attacks in
Pakistan have been innocent civilians.
Solvency
International Solvency
Reforming U.S. drone policies is the only way to spur international targeted
killing regulations
Farley, assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at
the University of Kentucky, 11 (Robert, Over the Horizon: U.S. Drone Use Sets Global Precedent, World Politics Review, 12
Oct 2011, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/10311/over-the-horizon-u-s-drone-use-sets-global-precedent, da 7-31-13) PC
Improvements in technology do not make the procurement of any given weapon necessary; rather, geostrategic interest creates the
need for a system. So while there's
a degree of truth to Anderson's argument about the availability of
drone technology, he ignores the degree to which dramatic precedent can affect state policy.
The technologies that made HMS Dreadnought such a revolutionary warship in 1906 were available before it was built; its dramatic
appearance nevertheless transformed the major naval powers' procurement plans. Similarly, the Soviet Union and the United States
accelerated nuclear arms procurement following the Cuban Missile Crisis, with the USSR in particular increasing its missile forces by
nearly 20 times, partially in response to perceptions of vulnerability. So while
a drone "race" may have taken place
even without the large-scale Predator and Reaper campaign in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia,
the extent and character of the race now on display has been driven by U.S. behavior. Other
states, observing the effectiveness -- or at least the capabilities -- of U.S. drones will work to create their
own counterparts with an enthusiasm that they would not have had in absence of the U.S.
example.¶ What is undeniable, however, is that we face a drone race, which inevitably evokes the question of arms control.
Because they vary widely in technical characteristics, appearance and even definition, drones are poor candidates for "traditional"
arms control of the variety that places strict limits on number of vehicles constructed, fielded and so forth. Rather, to the extent that
any regulation of drone warfare is likely, it will come through treaties limiting how drones are used. ¶ Such a treaty would require
either deep concern on the part of the major powers that advances in drone capabilities threatened their interests and survival, or
widespread revulsion among the global public against the practice of drone warfare. The latter is somewhat more likely than the
former, as drone construction at this point seems unlikely to dominate state defense budgets to the same degree as battleships in the
1920s or nuclear weapons in the 1970s. However, for now, drones are used mainly to kill unpleasant people in places distant from
media attention. So creating the public outrage necessary to force global elites to limit drone usage may also prove difficult, although
the specter of "out of control robots" killing humans with impunity might change that. P.W. Singer, author of "Wired for War," argues
that new robot technologies will require a new approach to the legal regulation of war. Robots, both in the sky and on the ground, not
to mention in the sea, already have killing capabilities that rival those of humans. Any approach to legally managing drone warfare will
likely come as part of a more general effort to regulate the operation of robots in war.¶ However, even in the unlikely event of global
public outrage, any
serious effort at regulating the use of drones will require U.S. acquiescence.
Landmines are a remarkably unpopular form of weapon, but the United States continues to
resist the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. If the U nited S tates sees unrestricted drone
warfare as being to its advantage -- and it is likely to do so even if China, Russia and India develop similar drone
capabilities -- then even global outrage may not be sufficient to make the U.S. budge on its position.
This simply reaffirms the original point: Arms races don't just "happen," but rather are a direct, if unexpected outcome
of state policy. Like it or not, the behavior of the U nited S tates right now is structuring how the world
will think about, build and use drones for the foreseeable future. Given this, U.S. policymakers should
perhaps devote a touch more attention to the precedent they're setting.
US needs to alter law to be a first mover – international responses to drone
proliferation crumble without domestic accountability
Alston 2011 (Philip, professor of law at NYU School of Law and former UN Special Rapporteur
on extrajudicial executions, “The CIA and Targeted Killings Beyond Borders”, Harvard National
Security Journal, Vol. 2) PY
It might be argued in response by the United States that the standard of accountability
required is lower in relation to non-international armed conflicts, which is how the conflicts in
Afghanistan and Pakistan would be categorized by most observers. This lower standard might be said to be
evidenced by the fact that states are not obligated to give full access to the International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC") in such
conflicts. But
the ICRC's review of customary law makes it abundantly clear that the obligation to
ensure accountability applies fully in both international and non-international armed conflicts.
This is based on military manuals, including that of the United States, explicit state practice, requirements imposed by the Security
Council, and norms endorsed by a range of other international bodies. n88¶ For
its part, IHRL, developed by a wide
range of international and regional institutions, and reflected in customary law principles,
places a particular emphasis on the obligation of states to investigate, prosecute, and punish
any alleged violation of the norms banning extrajudicial executions. United States officials, as well as some
American commentators, have tended to assume that the duty to investigate alleged violations of the right to life, a duty that has
been elaborated upon at length in the jurisprudence of bodies such as the Human Rights Committee n89 and the European Court
[*313] of Human Rights, flows only from specific treaty obligations. n90 By noting that the United States is not a party to the
European Convention, and by arguing that the ICCPR does not obligate the United States extraterritorially, n91 they assume that the
well-developed jurisprudence emanating from these two bodies has no relevance in determining the United States' obligations in
relation to a practice such as extraterritorial targeted killings. Leaving aside the contentious debates over the extraterritorial nature of
ICCPR obligations, this approach incorrectly assumes that the duty to investigate killings has no existence in customary international
law, independent of treaty obligations. The
right to life has long been acknowledged as part of custom, n92
and a duty to investigate has long been assumed to be a central part of that norm, n93 not
least by the United States when it consistently calls upon other governments to investigate
killings without invoking any specific treaty-based obligations binding upon the governments
concerned. n94¶ [*314] Customary and treaty-based obligations to investigate alleged
violations of the right to life can only be met if states accept the need for a degree of
transparency which makes it possible to satisfy the obligations to ensure accountability . In
explaining what human rights law requires, the European Court of Human Rights has long insisted that "[t]here must be a
sufficient element of public scrutiny of the investigation or its results to secure accountability
in practice as well as in theory, maintain public confidence in the authorities' adherence to the
rule of law and prevent any appearance of collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts." n95 In the
same context, the Court has made it clear that there is no single formula by which this is to be achieved, by acknowledging that "[t]he
degree of public scrutiny required may well vary from case to case." n96¶ There
is thus compelling evidence that
both applicable bodies of law require transparency and accountability. Nevertheless, in view of the
tendency of those advocating the use of targeted killings to suggest that counter-terrorism requires different rules or that intelligence
agencies must operate on a different basis, it is appropriate to consider whether there are circumstances that would warrant the
adoption of significantly less demanding standards of accountability. In
relation to terrorism, it is often argued that
there are unavoidable tradeoffs between security and respect for human rights as well as
between security and transparency. In other words, secrecy and limits on rights are part of the price that must be paid
for security in a world subject to terrorist threats. While these claims have been thoroughly canvassed in other contexts n97 they call
for two particular responses in the present setting. The first is to acknowledge that, in relation [*315] to targeted killing operations,
there are major security and effectiveness concerns that require a strong element of secrecy, rather than disclosure. For example,
disclosing the identity of an intelligence source or putting an informant at risk of retaliation will limit the extent to which the
information justifying a given targeting decision can be publicly divulged. Similarly, it might be argued that significant disclosure would
eliminate the fear or uncertainty factor that is designed to constrain the activities of groups who might conclude from published
criteria that they were unlikely to be subject to drone attacks. n98 There
will thus be certain limits as to how much
transparency can be required.¶ The second response to the argument about necessary tradeoffs is that "security" in this
context must be interpreted not only as a goal in itself, but also as a means by which to protect the fundamental values of human
rights and democracy. n99 There can thus be no question of simply trading off one value against the other, or of assuming that
constraining freedoms increases security. In rejecting what he evocatively describes as the "hydraulic liberty-security metaphor,"
n100 Stephen Holmes argues that there are in fact many ways in which respect for liberty contributes to enhanced security. While
others have also stressed the importance of empirical justifications favoring a degree of
transparency on the part of the CIA and other intelligence actors, n101 Holmes invokes what
are essentially prudential and efficiency based reasons in support of what he terms "rulegoverned counterterrorism." They include the efficiency-enhancing effect of being forced to
give reasons for decisions, the greater likelihood that visceral and punitive reactions--which
can generally be assumed to be inefficient--will be constrained by following accepted
guidelines, the need [*316] to expose groups of like-minded decision-makers to counterarguments coming from other perspectives, and the need to deter official reliance on claims of
an emergency in order to avoid scrutiny. n102¶ The other argument that suggests the appropriateness of less
demanding standards of accountability relates to the special situation of intelligence agencies. In response, it is appropriate to
acknowledge the deep tensions between the need for accountability and the inherent bias of such agencies towards unaccountability.
It is clearly paradoxical to be seeking transparency and encouraging information sharing from agents whose very existence is
premised on secrecy and absolute discretion. The
need for intelligence services to be accountable has
always been strong simply because of the power that they exercise and the otherwise
unlimited potential for abuse of that power. But over the past decade the importance of
accountability has grown dramatically for various reasons. Reaction to the events of 9/11 placed intelligence
agencies at the forefront of efforts to combat terrorism and put a premium on rapid action, efficiency, and the exercise of only very
loosely constrained agency discretion, often at the expense of transparency, respect for human rights, and meaningful congressional
consultation. Agency personnel numbers and budgets increased greatly, special operations became far more common, and double-
joint operations as well as intelligence-sharing with
foreign counterpart agencies, often working for authoritarian regimes, became widespread and
increased the likelihood of human rights abuses occurring. n103¶ But the challenges to accountability have
hatting served to make scrutiny more difficult. In addition,
also multiplied since 9/11. In an age of enhanced global terror operations the structural predisposition to secrecy on the part of
intelligence officials has only been strengthened. The heterogeneity and geographical spread of actual and potential terrorist groups,
the reality of homegrown terror, and the potential for large-scale acts of terrorism, have all contributed to support for secrecy. This
goes beyond the mere need to ensure operational secrecy. Intelligence agencies cannot operate in a traditional hierarchical fashion
for fear that a leak at one point in the chain of command will undermine the entire operation. Individual officers are thus given
considerable discretion and even relative [*317] autonomy according to the circumstances. Moreover, the centrality of the notion of
"plausible deniability" means that such agencies are often required to act in ways that not only leave no fingerprints, but also leave
(almost) no internal paper trail. These factors in turn make the agency less disposed towards, and less accessible to, either internal or
external oversight. But the
response is not to reinforce these pathological tendencies, but rather to
reassert the primacy of IHRL and IHL standards and thus the need for appropriate levels of
transparency and accountability, albeit tailored to reflect the legitimate exigencies faced by
such actors.¶ Before moving to consider the Obama administration's approach to these issues, it is important to
underscore the fact that we are talking about two different levels of accountability. The first is
that national procedures must meet certain standards of transparency and accountability in
order to meet existing international obligations . The second is that the national procedures
must themselves be sufficiently transparent to international bodies as to permit the latter to
make their own assessment of the extent to which the state concerned is in compliance with
its obligations. In other words, even in situations in which states argue that they put in place highly
impartial and reliable accountability mechanisms, the international community cannot be
expected to take such assurances on the basis of faith rather than of convincing information.
Assurances offered by other states accused of transgressing international standards would not
be accepted by the United States in the absence of sufficient information upon the basis of
which some form of verification is feasible. Since the 1980s, the phrase "trust but verify" n104 has been something
of a mantra in the arms control field, but it is equally applicable in relation to IHL and IHRL. The United States has
consistently demanded of other states that they demonstrate to the international community
the extent of their compliance with international standards. A great many examples could be cited, not only
from the annual State Department reports on the human rights practices of other states, but also from a range of statements by the
President and the Secretary of State in relation to countries like Egypt, Libya, and Syria in the context of the Arab Spring of 2011.
The US has an extremely high influence on growing global drone use
Alston 11 [Philip, John Norton Pomeroy Professor of Law at NYU School of Law and UN Special
Rapporteur on extrajudicial summary or arbitrary executions from 2004-2010, “The CIA and
Targeted Killings Beyond Borders”, New York University School of Law Public Law & Legal Theory
Research Paper Series, Working Paper no. 11-64,
https://www.law.upenn.edu/institutes/cerl/conferences/targetedkilling/papers/AlstonCIABeyon
dBorders.pdf, p.113-115]AM
Because the United States inevitably contributes disproportionately to the shaping of global
regime rules, and because it is making more extensive overt use of targeted killings than other
states, its approach will heavily influence emerging global norms. This is of particular
relevance in relation to the use of drones. There are strong reasons to believe that a permissive policy on dronefired targeted killings will come back to haunt the United States in a wide range of potential situations in the not too distant future.
In 2011 a senior official noted that while
for the past two decades the United States and its allies had
enjoyed “relatively exclusive access to sophisticated precision-strike technologies,” that
monopoly will soon be ended.574 In fact, in the case of drones, some 40 countries already
possess the basic technology. Many of them, including Israel, Russia, Turkey, China, India, Iran, the United Kingdom
and France either have or are seeking drones that also have the capability to shoot laser-guided
missiles. Overall, the United States accounts for less than one-third of worldwide investment in
UAVs.575 On ‘Defense Industry Day’, August 22, 2010, the Iranian President unveiled a new drone with a range of 1,000
kilometers (620 miles) and capable of carrying four cruise missiles.576 He referred to the drones as a ‘messenger of honour and
human generosity and a saviour of mankind’, but warned ominously that it can also be ‘a messenger of death for enemies of
To date, the United States has opted to maintain a relatively flexible and openended legal regime in relation to drones, in large part to avoid setting precedents and
restricting its own freedom of action.578 But this policy seems to assume that other states
will not acquire lethal drone technology, will not use it, or will not be able to rely upon the
justifications invoked by the United States. These assumptions seem questionable. American
mankind’.577
commentators favoring a permissive approach to targeted killings abroad are generally very careful to add that such killings would
under no circumstances be permitted within the United States.579 Thus when
the United States argues that
targeted killings are legitimate when used in response to a transnational campaign of terror
directed at it, it needs to bear in mind that other states can also claim to be so afflicted, even if
the breadth of the respective terrorist threats is not comparable. Take Russia, for example, in relation to terrorists from the
Caucasus. It has characterized its military operations in Chechnya since 1999 as a counter-terrorism operation and has deployed
‘seek and destroy’ groups of army commandoes to “hunt down groups of insurgents”.580 It has been argued that the targeted
killings that have resulted are justified because they are necessary to Russia’s fight against terrorism.581 Although there are credible
reports of targeted killings conducted outside of Chechnya, Russia has refused to acknowledge responsibility for, or otherwise justify,
such killings. It has also refused to cooperate with any investigation or prosecution.582 In 2006 the Russian Parliament passed a law
permitting the Federal Security Service (FSB) to kill alleged terrorists overseas, if authorized to do so by the President.583 The law
defines terrorism and terrorist activity extremely broadly, including “practices of influencing the decisions of government, local selfgovernment or international organizations by terrorizing the population or through other forms of illegal violent action,” and also
any “ideology of violence.”584
More transparency and oversight will give the US more international credibility
and strengthen domestic support of government policies
GSS 12 [Global Security Studies, academic and professional journal for strategic issues involving
international security affairs, “Targeted Killings: Justified Acts of War or Too Much Power for One
Government?”, Global Security Studies journal Volume 3 Issue 3, Summer 2012,
http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Clark%20Targeted.pdf p.32-33]AM
The most important change that the United States’ government needs to apply in its
implementation of the targeted killings policy is greater transparency. First, in a liberal
democracy, such as the United States, the government is accountable to the people. Yet the
lines of accountability to citizens in the United States have continued to blur as states are
granted more unquestionable authority under the State Secrets doctrine. As a key element of selfdefense, killing is sometimes necessary. However, the aim should always be to minimize this necessity. In order to make sure that
this has been minimized, people
must hold their governments accountable. However, people cannot
hold their government accountable to policies of which they are unaware. Abraham Lincoln called the
United States a “government of the people, by the people, and for the people.”78 If this is the case, then it is hard to argue that the
The issue of transparency goes
beyond the theory of liberal democracy; it also has very practical applications. The lack of transparency
creates a credibility gap between what the United States is doing and how other countries
perceive its actions. This gap strains diplomatic relations and will have both short-term and
long-term effects. For example, if a country refuses to share critical intelligence with the United States because it does not
understand its policy of targeted killing, this lack of cooperation could allow terrorists to continue to cause
harm. To improve the transparency, the government should give a detailed account of who
actually places people on the list. They need to explain the process and inform the public of
what type of failsafe instruments are implemented to prevent casual use of this power. The
United States can use Israel as an example. Israel’s targeted-killing policy… is surprisingly transparent. Shin Bet has
worked with the Israeli media to ensure public awareness of what the operations involve. Several nongovernmental
organizations track the number of targeted killings and the policy is challenged in the media
and the courts. As a result, mistakes in implementation have not shaken the Israeli public’s
support for the policy. Indeed, if anything, they have strengthened it—by highlighting the policy’s
risks and difficulties and educating the public about its practical and moral tradeoffs. By making the
policy more transparent, the United States would strengthen the legitimacy of targeted
killings. Although Eric Holder was right when he distinguished between judicial process and due process, there is more than
legality to this question. If the United States continues to ignore judicial oversight, this could also
cause a loss of credibility and create a legitimacy problem. To prevent this, the United States
needs to include judicial oversight while still maintaining national security and not revealing
specific intelligence to the public. This could be done with a special court, similar to the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.79 A court like this would also be able to act quickly in
situations requiring immediate action. Lastly, if the United States wants to claim that targeted killings are just acts of
war, it should stop criticizing other countries, especially Israel, for using similar tactics. When other countries rightly
point out the hypocrisy and double standards of the United States, it weakens the program
and subjects it to ignominy. In 2001, the State Department released their annual Country Reports on Human Rights
people do not deserve to know what is required to put them on a list for execution.
Practices. In it they stated: Israeli security forces committed numerous serious human rights abuses during the year. Security forces
killed 307 Palestinians and four foreign nationals and injured at least 11,300 Palestinians and other persons during the year. Israeli
security forces targeted for killing a number of Palestinians whom the Israeli Government stated had attacked or were planning
future attacks on Israeli settlements or military targets; a number of bystanders reportedly also were killed during these
incidents.80 The day after the May 2, 2011 raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound, the Israeli newspaper Israel Today ran a story
satirically headlined, “Israel to US: Congrats on bin Laden Kill, Now Stop Criticizing Us!”81 They are right. The
cannot continue to criticize other countries while using the same policies.
United States
Transparency Solvency
Increasing transparency in the drone program is necessary for its successrequired for intel sharing and legitimacy
Cullen 2007 (Colonel Peter M., Staff Judge Advocate at Fort Campbell, “THE ROLE OF
TARGETED KILLING IN THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST TERROR”, 3/30/07, http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA471529, p. 11)
The long-term success or failure of targeted killing as a component of the campaign ¶ against
terror will depend on two capabilities in which the U.S. has been deficient to date: first, ¶
obtaining actionable intelligence to identify and locate targets and second, winning the ¶
information war to persuade the domestic and international communities of the legality,
morality, ¶ and effectiveness of such operations. The U.S. is expending considerable resources to improve ¶ its
intelligence systems, but much more needs to be done to enhance our information ¶ operations capabilities. ¶ The U.S. cannot afford
to take a passive posture citing operational security and allow ¶ critics to dominate the debate and characterize the tactic as
extrajudicial killings or ¶ assassinations. The
U.S. must aggressively explain the strong legal and moral
bases for the ¶ policy and assure the world community that the tactic is invoked sparingly and
only when no ¶ other reasonable alternatives are available to prevent the target from
threatening the U.S. and ¶ innocent civilians. It must be clearly demonstrated that all reasonable efforts are made to
¶ minimize collateral damage and, where it does occur, responsibility rests with the terrorists who ¶ operate out of civilian areas. All
of this requires a more transparent policy on targeted killing in ¶ which there is public
confidence in its checks and balances to ensure proper targeting decisions ¶ are being made. If
targeted killing operations are supported by a comprehensive information ¶ operations
strategy and are professionally executed using timely and accurate intelligence, they ¶ will
become an even more potent weapon against trans-national terrorism.
Drones court provides oversight and international perception of process
NYT 2010 (Editorial, 10-9, “Lethal Force Under Law”, New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/10/opinion/10sun1.html) PY
The Obama administration has sharply expanded the shadow war against terrorists, using both
the military and the C.I.A. to track down and kill hundreds of them, in a dozen countries, on
and off the battlefield.¶ The drone program has been effective, killing more than 400 Al Qaeda militants this year alone,
according to American officials, but fewer than 10 noncombatants. But assassinations are a grave act and subject to
abuse — and imitation by other countries. The government needs to do a better job of showing
the world that it is acting in strict compliance with international law.¶ The United States has the
right under international law to try to prevent attacks being planned by terrorists connected to
Al Qaeda, up to and including killing the plotters. But it is not within the power of a commander in chief to
simply declare anyone anywhere a combatant and kill them, without the slightest advance
independent oversight. The authorization for military force approved by Congress a week after 9/11
empowers the president to go after only those groups or countries that committed or aided the
9/11 attacks. The Bush administration’s distortion of that mandate led to abuses that harmed
the United States around the world.¶ The issue of who can be targeted applies directly to the case of Anwar al-Awlaki,
an American citizen hiding in Yemen, who officials have admitted is on an assassination list. Did he inspire through words the Army
psychiatrist who shot up Fort Hood, Tex., last November, and the Nigerian man who tried to blow up an airliner on Christmas? Or did
he actively participate in those plots, and others? The difference is crucial. If the United States starts killing every Islamic radical who
has called for jihad, there will be no end to the violence.¶ American officials insist that Mr. Awlaki is involved with actual terror plots.
But human rights lawyers working on his behalf say that is not the case, and have filed suit to get him off the target list. The
administration wants the case thrown out on state-secrets grounds.¶ The
Obama administration needs to go out of
its way to demonstrate that it is keeping its promise to do things differently than the Bush
administration did. It must explain how targets are chosen, demonstrate that attacks are
limited and are a last resort, and allow independent authorities to oversee the process. ¶ PUBLIC
GUIDELINES The administration keeps secret its standards for putting people on terrorist or assassination lists. In March, Harold Koh,
legal adviser to the State Department, said the government adheres to international law, attacking only military targets and keeping
civilian casualties to an absolute minimum. “Our procedures and practices for identifying lawful targets are extremely robust,” he said
in a speech, without describing them.¶ Privately, government officials say no C.I.A. drone strike takes place without the approval of
the United States ambassador to the target country, the chief of the C.I.A. station, a deputy at the agency, and the agency’s director.
So far, President
Obama’s system of command seems to have prevented any serious abuses, but
the approval process is entirely within the administration. After the abuses under President Bush, the
world is not going to accept a simple “trust us” from the White House .¶ There have been too
many innocent people rounded up for detention and subjected to torture, too many cases of
mistaken identity or trumped-up connections to terror. Unmanned drones eliminate the element of risk to
American forces and make it seductively easy to attack.¶ The government needs to make public its guidelines
for determining who is a terrorist and who can be targeted for death . It should clearly
describe how it follows international law in these cases and list the internal procedures and
checks it uses before a killing is approved. That can be done without formally acknowledging
the strikes are taking place in specific countries.¶ LIMIT TARGETS The administration should state that it is
following international law by acting strictly in self-defense, targeting only people who are actively planning or participating in terror,
or who are leaders of Al Qaeda or the Taliban — not those who raise funds for terror groups, or who exhort others to acts of terror.¶
Special measures are taken before an American citizen is added to the terrorist list, officials say, requiring the approval of lawyers
from the National Security Council and the Justice Department. But again, those measures have not been made public. Doing so
would help ensure that people like Mr. Awlaki are being targeted for terrorist actions, not their beliefs or associations. ¶ A LAST
RESORT Assassination should in every case be a last resort. Before a decision is made to kill, particularly in areas away from
recognized battlefields, the government needs to consider every other possibility for capturing the target short of lethal force.
Terrorists operating on American soil should be captured using police methods, and not subject to assassination.¶ If practical, the
United States should get permission from a foreign government before carrying out an attack on its soil. The government is reluctant
to discuss any of these issues publicly, in part to preserve the official fiction that the United States is not waging a formal war in
Pakistan and elsewhere, but it would not harm that effort to show the world how seriously it takes international law by making clear
its limits.¶ INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT Dealing
out death requires additional oversight outside the
administration. Particularly in the case of American citizens, like Mr. Awlaki, the government
needs to employ some due process before depriving someone of life. It would be logistically impossible to
conduct a full-blown trial in absentia of every assassination target, as the lawyers for Mr. Awlaki prefer. But judicial review
could still be employed.¶ The government could establish a court like the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court, which authorizes wiretaps on foreign agents inside the United States.
Before it adds people to its target list and begins tracking them, the government could take its
evidence to this court behind closed doors — along with proof of its compliance with
international law — and get the equivalent of a judicial warrant in a timely and efficient way.¶
Congressional leaders are secretly briefed on each C.I.A. attack, and say they are satisfied with the
information they get and with the process. Nonetheless, that process is informal and could be changed at any
time by this president or his successors . Formal oversight is a better way of demonstrating
confidence in American methods.¶
Self-defense under international law not only shows the nation’s resolve and
power, but sends a powerful message to other countries that the United States couples drastic action with careful judgment.
Drones court sets high standard for international law
Fisher 2007 (W. Jason, judicial clerk to the US District Court for the District of New Mexico,
“Targeted Killing, Norms, and International Law”, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 45)
PY
In constructing a place for the use of targeted killing as a counter-terrorism tactic in
international law apart from assassination and extrajudicial execution, the international legal community
might keep in mind, generally, the emphasis early international lawyers placed on consolidating
the State monopoly on the use of force as a means of increasing international stability and the
hard distinction they drew between State and non-State actors. n245 For example, Grotius, who pushed to ban international
assassination, n246 "carved out a clear exception for "pirates and brigands' whose actions threatened international order." n247
Perhaps similar reasoning could inform the contemporary international legal community's response to transnational terrorists, who
tend to be non-State actors. Today, transnational terrorists pose a unique threat to international order that is not dissimilar to that
pirates and brigands presented in Grotius's age. As such, perhaps
the international legal community might, like
Grotius did with assassination, interpret or reform legal rules to accommodate a tactic, targeted killing,
as a tool available only to counter a distinctive and specific threat to the international order,
transnational terrorism.¶ Additionally, as first steps in any effort it may take to distinguish targeted killing from extrajudicial execution
and assassination, the international legal community might consider establishing "bright-line" boundaries by defining the legitimate
scope of targeted killing so as to exclude categorically its domestic use, use against terrorists when they can be apprehended
employing reasonable means, including by a third party, and use against State political actors. ¶ Moreover, to ensure that targeted
killing is used only against [*754] those individuals planning, preparing, or conducting terrorist activities and not against those solely
involved in political endeavors, whether as State or non-State actors, the international legal community might limit the tactic's
legitimate use according to the functions played by persons within a terrorist organization. It could perhaps call for the application of
the basic military staff structure to non-State organizations and countenance the use of targeted killing against only those members
performing a militaristic function. n248 Under such a scheme, for example, individuals supplying weapons and carrying out
intelligence activities would be subject to targeted killing, but mere financial donors and political representatives without a planning
or operational role in hostilities, like Gerry Adams of Sinn Fein currently, n249 would not. Defining the legitimate scope of targeted
killing in such a manner may help discourage countries from using the tactic for purely political purposes.¶ Further, given
the
international legal community's unique knowledge of procedural mechanisms, it might specify
that any decision to use targeted killing must adhere to some set of procedural requirements in
order to be considered legitimate. Such rules could serve to prevent States from authorizing targeted killing actions too
quickly in a manner that bypasses appropriate deliberation and the careful examination of intelligence. That would go some way to
protect against the striking of illegitimate targets. At the low end of the procedural spectrum, the international legal community might
decide that the valid use of targeted killing requires that States follow the procedural process used to authorize targeted killings in
Israel. There, proposed targeted killing actions must go through several steps before being authorized: intelligence officials suggest
the targets; military officials review all relevant information concerning those targets; and senior military leaders, the minister of
the
international legal community might hinge the legitimacy of targeted killing on States' use of
independent review as an additional safeguard. Such review might entail a government official
insulated from the executive, like an inspector general in the United States, n251 or a small independent court, [*755] not
unlike the U.S. Foreign Intelligence and Surveillance Court, n252 evaluating the intelligence used
to select individuals for targeted killing to ensure that it meets some specified threshold
standard designed to minimize misidentification and ensure requisite involvement in terrorist
activities. n253
defense, and the prime minister must personally sign off on the action. n250 At the higher end of the procedural spectrum,
Judicial review of the legality of targeted killing effectively limits the scope of
Presidential drone strikes – executive officials agree
Jaffer, Director of the ACLU's Center for Democracy, 13 (Jameel, Judicial Review of Targeted Killings, Harvard
Law Review, 2013, http://www.harvardlawreview.org/issues/126/april13/forum_1002.php, da 7-29-13) PC
Since 9/11, the CIA and Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) have used armed drones to kill thousands of people in places far
removed from conventional battlefields. Legislators, legal scholars, and human rights advocates have raised concerns about civilian
casualties, the legal basis for the strikes, the process by which the executive selects its targets, and the actual or contemplated
deployment of armed drones into additional countries. Some have proposed that Congress establish a court to approve (or
disapprove) strikes before the government carries them out. While
judicial engagement with the targeted killing
program is long overdue, those aiming to bring the program in line with our legal traditions and moral intuitions should think
carefully before embracing this proposal. Creating
a new court to issue death warrants is more likely to
normalize the targeted killing program than to restrain it. The argument for some form of judicial review is compelling,
not least because such review would clarify the scope of the government’s authority to use lethal force. The targeted killing program
is predicated on sweeping constructions of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) and the President’s authority to
use military force in national self-defense. The government contends, for example, that the AUMF authorizes it to use lethal force
against groups that had nothing to do with the 9/11 attacks and that did not even exist when those attacks were carried out. It
contends that the AUMF gives it authority to use lethal force against individuals located far from conventional battlefields. As the
Justice Department’s recently leaked white paper makes clear, the
government also contends that the President
has authority to use lethal force against those deemed to present “continuing” rather than truly
imminent threats. These claims are controversial. They have been rejected or questioned by human rights groups, legal
scholars, federal judges, and U.N. special rapporteurs. Even enthusiasts of the drone program have become anxious about its legal
soundness. (“People in Washington need to wake up and realize the legal foundations are crumbling by the day,” Professor Bobby
Chesney, a supporter of the program, recently said.) Judicial
review could clarify the limits on the
government’s legal authority and supply a degree of legitimacy to actions taken within those
limits. It could also encourage executive officials to observe these limits. Executive officials
would be less likely to exceed or abuse their authority if they were required to defend their
conduct to federal judges. Even Jeh Johnson, the Defense Department’s former general counsel and
a vocal defender of the targeted killing program, acknowledged in a recent speech that judicial review could add
“rigor” to the executive’s decisionmaking process. In explaining the function of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court, which oversees government surveillance in certain national security investigations, executive officials
have often said that even the mere prospect of judicial review deters error and abuse.
Solvency Extension
Drone court solves – avoids collateral damage.
Harman 2013 (Jane Harman, director, president and chief executive officer of the Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars, February 19, 2013, “Harman: Drone courts can work,”
Security Clearance, CNN, http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2013/02/19/harman-drone-courts-canwork/)
The concern about avoiding collateral damage in drone strikes is echoed in the FISA
requirement to minimize exposure of U.S. persons and private information that may be incidentally
acquired in the course of a foreign intelligence operation.¶ FISA also explicitly provides for congressional
oversight by mandating that the intelligence and judiciary committees be kept fully informed.
As an independent branch of government, Congress must conduct robust oversight.¶ In addition to adopting a FISA-like framework,
one more major change should be made: All sustained drone and cyberattacks should be conducted by Department of Defense
agencies. The CIA could then return to its more traditional missions, something CIA director nominee John Brennan has said he
supports.¶ Vice President Biden likes to say that "our own strength lies not in the example of our power, but the power of our
example." Showing
the world that we run "remote-control warfare" consistent with our values
will vastly improve our standing in the world – and our ability to win the argument with those
who are considering whether to attack the United States. We can have liberty and security, or we can diminish
both.
Drone court solves – protects the public.
Opderbeck 2013 (David W. Opderbeck, Professor of Law, Seton Hall University Law School,
and Director, Gibbons Institute of Law, Science & Technology, August 2, 2013, “Drone Courts,”
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2305315)
The age of the drones has dawned. Rapid technological development will soon permit the government to deploy micro-scale selfsustaining drones with networked surveillance and precision kinetic capabilities. These drones will be, in the words of a U.S. Air Force
video, unobtrusive, pervasive, and lethal. Even
if moral and international law concerns about drones used
for targeted killings are set aside, current U.S. policy concerning drone use is inadequate to
protect the public from possible abuses of Executive power. In particular, the judicial branch should play a role
in evaluating targeted drone killings, at least outside an active war zone and at least to the extent U.S. citizens may be
killed directly or as collateral damage. Although the judicial branch has historically played only a limited
role with respect to national security and wartime Executive Branch decisions, there is valuable
precedent dating back to the very first Militia Act of 1792 for ex ante judicial review of the
President’s use of military force on U.S. soil. Current proposals for a drone court that would utilize a warrant process
similar to that employed by under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act are a good start, but the standards and procedures of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court are in important ways inadequate. Congress
should establish a judicial branch
tribunal, of very limited jurisdiction, that would nonetheless provide an important independent
measure of accountability over the use of killer drones.
A2 Judges Aren’t Capable
Judges have the skills to do this
Opderbeck 2013 (David W. Opderbeck, Professor of Law, Seton Hall University Law School,
and Director, Gibbons Institute of Law, Science & Technology, August 2, 2013, “Drone Courts,”
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2305315)
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, drones represent a new paradigm for both technological and geopolitical reasons.
Technologically, drones allow for great stealth and precision without putting human assets in harm’s way. Geopolitically, drones can
be dropped selectively into the sort of discrete tactical situations that may arise on an ad hoc basis in an interminable, global “war on
terror.” In many ways, drones have evolved as weapons of choice precisely because of the demands imposed by the
“war on
terror.”304¶ This geopolitical context complicates and often obscures the public conversation over
drone courts. The most substantial objection to a drone court is that courts do not possess the
expertise to judge the strategic merits of a military strike. Where the target is not a U.S. citizen, is located
inside a recognized battle zone in which U.S. forces have been committed pursuant to proper Congressional authorization, and is a
member of or actively assisting military forces engaged in or threatening combat with U.S. forces, the rationale for a judicial role
seems thin. These circumstances implicate the broad discretion traditionally entrusted to the Commander-in-Chief and to the military
officers in his or her chain of command, subject to the reporting requirements of the War Powers Act and the international laws of
war.305¶ But a global war on terror is not a circumstance of “ordinary” war. This is particularly clear when
U.S. military force is applied against U.S. citizens for actions that are also crimes. It is even more clear when the possibility of the
deployment of combat drones over U.S. soil is raised.¶ In
this regard, the 1792 Militia Act provides both an
important historical example and a useful model for a drone court. That statute required a
factual showing that the “laws of the United States” were being “opposed or the execution
thereof obstructed ... by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the
powers vested in the marshals by this act.”306 The substantive showing required by the 1792 Militia Act did
not require the court to make a strategic military judgment. Rather, it involved areas close to
the court’s ordinary experience: the content of the laws and the ability of the judicial system to
enforce the laws.
A2 Flexibility
Doesn’t hurt flexibility or take too long
Opderbeck 2013 (David W. Opderbeck, Professor of Law, Seton Hall University Law School,
and Director, Gibbons Institute of Law, Science & Technology, August 2, 2013, “Drone Courts,”
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2305315)
In addition to general separation of powers concerns, a number of practical objections have been lodged against the possibility of a
drone court. One such objection
is that the window of opportunity for a strike may open and close
unpredictably. Current U.S. policy, however, requires that “[a]n informed, high- level official of
the U.S. government has determined that the targeted individual poses an imminent threat of
violent attack against the United States.”307 If such a showing can be made by the relevant military
command to an “informed, high-level” civilian official before pulling the trigger (or joystick), it can also be made to a
judge, particularly if there are judges at the ready to hear emergent applications of this type.
Presumably such decisions are currently made well in advance of the actual strike. The same could
be true for a court.
Drones court provides key oversight and restores confidence, maintains
executive flexibility
NYT 2013 (Editorial, 2-13, “A Court for Targeted Killings, New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/14/opinion/a-special-court-is-needed-to-review-targetedkillings.html?adxnnl=1&ref=opinion&adxnnlx=1375211005-PwXpocA9mxNC9hvPb06ZJw) PY
No American prosecutor can imprison or execute someone except on the orders of a judge or
jury. That fundamental principle applies no less to the suspected terrorists that the executive
branch chooses to kill overseas, particularly in the case of American citizens .¶ A growing number of
lawmakers and experts are beginning to recognize that some form of judicial review is
necessary for these killings, usually by missiles fired from unmanned drones. Last week, at the confirmation hearing of
John Brennan to be the director of the C.I.A., several senators said they were considering the establishment
of a special court, similar to the one that now decides whether to approve wiretapping for
intelligence gathering.¶ Even President Obama, in his State of the Union address, said he wanted
counterterrorism to be more transparent and fully consistent with checks and balances.¶ A special court, which
we first proposed in a 2010 editorial, would be an analogue to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
that Congress set up in 1978. If the administration has evidence that a suspect is a terrorist
threat to the United States, it would have to present that evidence in secret to a court before
the suspect is placed on a kill list.¶ “Having the executive being the prosecutor, the judge, the
jury and the executioner, all in one, is very contrary to the traditions and the laws of this
country,” Senator Angus King Jr. of Maine said at the Brennan hearing. “If you’re planning a strike over a matter of days,
weeks or months, there is an opportunity to at least go to some outside-of-the-executive-branch
body, like the FISA Court, in a confidential and top-secret way, make the case that this American
citizen is an enemy combatant.Ӧ Mr. Brennan said the idea was worthy of discussion, adding that the Obama
administration had “wrestled with this.” Two other senators, Dianne Feinstein of California, the chairwoman of the
Intelligence Committee, and Ron Wyden of Oregon, also expressed interest. Even Robert Gates, a former C.I.A. director who was
defense secretary under President George W. Bush and President Obama, said on CNN that such
a judicial panel “would
give the American people confidence” that a proper case had been made against an American
citizen.¶ The establishment of a court would have to be accompanied by clear and public standards
for how a suspect can be named an enemy combatant and a detailed explanation of the
process now used by the White House. (An opportunity for the president to demonstrate the transparency that he
says he supports.) The
court’s work would, in turn, have to be overseen by Congress, as the surveillance
court is now. The court would not be expected to approve individual drone strikes, and the
executive branch would still be empowered to take emergency actions to prevent an
impending attack.¶ The surveillance court is often considered a rubber stamp; out of 32,000 wiretap
applications presented by the government from 1979 to 2011, it rejected only 11. But its presence has helped ensure
that the administration’s requests are serious. In 2002, it ruled that the Department of Justice had overstepped its
bounds, giving prosecutors too much authority. (That decision was later overturned by an appeals court.) Creating an even
stronger court to approve targeted killings is the first step Mr. Obama can take if he is serious
about bringing national security policy back under the rule of law.
A2 Top Secret Info
Top secret information is not an obstacle to the drones court
Opderbeck 2013 (David W. Opderbeck, Professor of Law, Seton Hall University Law School,
and Director, Gibbons Institute of Law, Science & Technology, August 2, 2013, “Drone Courts,”
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2305315)
A second practical objection is that drone strikes typically involve top secret and other sensitive
national security matters. One of the most important functions of a court is to provide some public documentation and
adversarial accountability over the use of combat drones. But at least a rough balance between accountability
and secrecy can be provided releasing redacted opinions within a short time after a decision is
rendered. The existence of a drone program, the use of drones for targeted killings, and the
general circumstances of particular killing should not be withheld from public scrutiny, even if
specific operational details must be redacted. A third practical objection is similar to that raised by Justice Thomas
in his Hamdi dissent. It seems counterintuitive that the target of a drone strike could be afforded notice and an opportunity to be
heard. One of the key operational benefits of drones, even with existing technology, is stealth and surprise. In
many cases,
however, targets are designated long in advance of a strike, as demonstrated by the “kill lists” maintained by the
White House.308 At least some of these targets, particularly to the extent they are senior al-Qaeda leaders, certainly would not be
surprised to find themselves on such a list and certainly are already taking precautions against drone and other military strikes.309
And there
is solid precedent for giving public notice of governmental efforts to capture or kill
individuals who are public threats, such as the FBI’s “Most Wanted” criminal list and its “Most
Wanted Terrorists” list.310
A2 Normalizes Targeted Killing
Drone court doesn’t normalize TK
Opderbeck 2013 (David W. Opderbeck, Professor of Law, Seton Hall University Law School,
and Director, Gibbons Institute of Law, Science & Technology, August 2, 2013, “Drone Courts,”
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2305315)
Another important objection to the sort of process outlined above is that it would “normalize”
the practice of targeted killing.313 The fact is, however, that the practice has already been
“normalized” through the executive branch’s internal interpretive processes, as evidenced in the Justice Department White
Paper. Absent an outright ban on the use of drones for targeted killings, which does not seem at all likely,
judicial review would go a long way towards clarifying and limiting the circumstances under
which such force could be used. Further, with the new micro-drone technologies that are on the near future horizon, a
judicial forum seems preferable to the existing practice of secret policies crafted solely by a
handful of high-level executive branch officials.
Off Case Answers
Executive Restraint CP
Transparency standards are key – executive restraint does not allow the US to
restore credibility
Alston 2011 (Philip, professor of law at NYU School of Law and former UN Special Rapporteur
on extrajudicial executions, “The CIA and Targeted Killings Beyond Borders”, Harvard National
Security Journal, Vol. 2) PY
This Article has not sought to spell out the options open to the United States in order to bring
its conduct within the law. The bottom line is that intelligence agencies--particularly those that
are effectively unaccountable--should not be conducting lethal operations abroad. Beyond that
proposition, there is a great deal that the CIA could do if it so wished, including making public its commitment to comply with both IHL
and IHRL, disclosing the legal basis on which it is operating in different situations involving potential killings, providing information on
when, where, and against whom drone strikes can be authorized, and publishing its estimates on the number and rate of civilian
casualties. Full
transparency is neither sought nor expected, but basic compliance with the
standards applied by the U.S. military, and both consistently and insistently demanded of other
countries by the United States, is indispensable.¶ Examining the CIA's transparency and
accountability in relation to targeted killings also sheds light on a range of other issues that
international human rights law needs to tackle in a more systematic and convincing manner .
They include the approach adopted by international law to the activities of intelligence agencies, the (in)effectiveness of existing
monitoring mechanisms in relation to killings governed by a mixed IHL/IHRL regime, and the techniques needed to monitor effectively
human rights violations associated with new technologies such as unmanned drones and robotics. International
human
rights institutions need to respond more robustly to the growing chorus of proposals that
targeted killings be liberated from the hard-fought legal restraints that apply to them. There is
a great deal at stake and these crucial issues have been avoided for too long.¶ The principal focus of
this Article has been on the question of CIA accountability for targeted killings, under both U.S. law and international law. As the
CIA, often in conjunction with DOD Special Operations Forces, becomes ever more deeply
involved in carrying out extraterritorial targeted killings both through kill/capture missions and drone-based
missile strikes in a range of countries, the question of its compliance with the relevant legal standards
becomes even more urgen t. Assertions by Obama administration officials , as well as by many scholars,
that these operations
[*446]
comply with international standards are undermined by the total
absence of any forms of credible transparency or verifiable accountability . The CIA's internal
control mechanisms, including its Inspector General, have had no discernible impact; executive control
mechanisms have either not been activated at all or have ignored the issue; congressional oversight has
given a "free pass" to the CIA in this area; judicial review has been effectively precluded; and external oversight has been reduced to
media coverage which is all too often dependent on information leaked by the CIA itself. As a result,
there is no meaningful
domestic accountability for a burgeoning program of international killing. This in turn means
that the United States cannot possibly satisfy its obligations under international law to ensure
accountability for its use of lethal force, either under IHRL or IHL. The result is the steady
undermining of the international rule of law, and the setting of legal precedents which will
inevitably come back to haunt the United States before long when invoked by other states
with highly problematic agendas.
Legislative Oversight would ensure more equal balance of power between the
three branches while upholding civil liberties
McKelvey 11 [Benjamin, Executive Development Editor on the Editorial Board of the Vanderbilt
Journal of Transnational Law, “Due Process Rights and the Targeted Killing of Suspected
Terrorists: The Unconstitutional Scope of Executive Killing Power”, Vanderbilt Journal of
Transnational Law, http://www.vanderbilt.edu/jotl/manage/wp-content/uploads/mckelveypdf.pdf, 1378-1379]AM
As the Aulaqi case demonstrates, any
resolution to the problem of targeted killing would require a
delicate balance between due process protections and executive power.204 In order to
accomplish this delicate balance, Congress can pass legislation modeled on the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) that establishes a federal court with jurisdiction over
targeted killing orders, similar to the wiretapping court established by FISA.205 There are several advantages
to a legislative solution. First, FISA provides a working model for the judicial oversight of realtime intelligence and national security decisions that have the potential to violate civil
liberties.206 FISA also effectively balances the legitimate but competing claims at issue in Aulaqi: the sensitive nature of
classified intelligence and national security decisions versus the civil liberties protections of the Constitution.207 A legislative
solution can provide judicial enforcement of due process while also respecting the seriousness
and sensitivity of executive counterterrorism duties.208 In this way, congress can alleviate
fears over the abuse of targeted killing without interfering with executive duties and
authority. Perhaps most importantly, a legislative solution would provide the branches of
government and the American public with a clear articulation of the law of targeted killing .209
The court in Aulaqi began its opinion by explaining that the existence of a targeted killing program is no more than media
Congress can
acknowledge targeted killing in the light of day while ensuring that it is only used against
Americans out of absolute necessity.211 Independent oversight would promote the use of all
peaceful measures before lethal force is pursued.212
speculation, as the government has neither confirmed nor denied the existence of the program.210
A multitude of voices is needed to create an effective framework
Radsan and Murphy 12 [Afsheen (Professor at William Mitchell College of Law and Assistant
General Counsel at the CIA from 2002-2004), and Richard (AT&T Professor of Law at Texas Tech
University School of Law), “The Evolution of Law and Policy for CIA Targeted Killing”, Journal of
National Security Law & Policy,
http://repository.law.ttu.edu/bitstream/handle/10601/1934/The%20Evolution%20of%20Law%2
0and%20Policy%20for%20CIA%20Targeted%20Killings.pdf?sequence=1, p. 461-462]AM
No one person or group can speak alone to create a
new, specific framework for the CIA's targeted killing by
drone. This framework, if it emerges at all, will depend on a conversation that includes all reasonable
voices from the human rights, international law, and national security communities . In particular,
the U.S. government, including policymakers and lawyers, should be a powerful voice in this
conversation. The U.S. government can and should take a leading role in developing and
publicizing standards that maximize accuracy and transparency, consistent with concerns
about national security. The government has already taken a few steps down this road. Although the CIA will neither
confirm nor deny a drone program, some information has leaked out concerning its procedures. Agency lawyers prepare detailed
cables to justify particular targets.3 The Agency's General Counsel signs off on these cables. (Former Acting General Counsel John
Rizzo stated that during his tenure the Agency generally had about thirty targets on the list.)5 And each strike requires the Director's
approval.96 Since military and intelligence functions have become increasingly intertwined, the CIA should learn from the military's
extensive experience, both practical and legal, in targeting.
Executive self-restraint is ineffective absent Congressional actions
Schwartz 13 (Yaron, Act Two of US Drone Policy Reform, Huffington Post, 4 June 2013,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/yaron-schwartz/act-two-of-us-drone-polic_b_3381280.html, da 7-31-13) PC
The Obama administration recently lifted its veil of secrecy about its drone usage by providing a substantial amount of information for
the first time to a public audience about the program. In a major national security speech on May 23, President Obama
outlined new counterterrorism policies with the hope of "redefining what has been a global
war into a more targeted assault on terrorist groups threatening the U nited S tates." Obama
presented a number of steps that his administration has already taken to realize this vision, including setting up
guidelines for drone strike usage, briefing appropriate Congressional committees about every
drone strike, lifting the moratorium on the transfer of Guantanamo detainees to Yemen, and appointing a new envoy to help
facilitate the transfer of detainees to third countries.¶ While Obama was able to take those actions using his
executive powers, the reality is that he needs Congressional support in order to achieve his broader
national security goals. Many of the more substantial initiatives that Obama presented in his
speech, including additional funding for embassy security and international development, a repeal of the Authorization for Use
of Military Force and the "establishment of a special court to evaluate and authorize lethal action,"
require Congressional legislation to be implemented.
CMR DA
Air force is planning a major scale back of drone program because of cost and
future needs.
BALDOR 13 (Lolita C. Baldor Journalist for AP. “Military Considering Scaling Back Drone
Program”. Huffington Post.
Feb. 11, 2013 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/11/military-droneprogram_n_2663670.html)
LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, Va. — The Pentagon
is considering scaling back the massive
buildup of drones it has overseen in the past few years, to save money and to adapt to
changing security threats
Air Force leaders are saying the military may
already have enough
systems
the Pentagon's shift to Asia will require a new mix
of drones and other aircraft because countries in that region are better able to detect
unmanned versions and shoot them down.¶
for the first time
both
and an increased focus on Asia as the Afghanistan war winds down.
unmanned aircraft
¶
to wage the wars of the future. And
If the Pentagon does slow the huge building and deployment program, which was ordered several years ago by then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates, it won't affect the CIA drone strikes in
Pakistan, Yemen and elsewhere against terror suspects. Those strikes were brought center stage last week during the confirmation hearing for White House counterterror chief John Brennan, President Barack Obama's pick to lead the CIA. Gen. Mike Hostage, commander of Air Combat Command, said senior leaders are analyzing the military's drone needs
and discussions are beginning. But he said the current number patrolling the skies overseas may already be more than the service can afford to maintain. Overall, Pentagon spending on unmanned aircraft has jumped from $284 million in 2000 to nearly $4 billion in the past fiscal year, while the number of drones owned by the Pentagon has rocketed from
less than 200 in 2002 to at least 7,500 now. The bulk of those drones are small, shoulder-launched Ravens owned by the Army. The discussions may trigger heated debate because drones have become so important to the military. They can provide 24-hour patrols over hotspots, gather intelligence by pulling in millions of terabytes of data and hours of video
feeds, and they can also launch precisely targeted airstrikes without putting a U.S. pilot at risk. The analysis began before Brennan's confirmation hearings, where he was questioned sharply about the CIA's use of drones to kill terror suspects, including American citizens overseas. The CIA has its own fleet of drones that it uses on its counterterror missions,
and any decision to stop building drones would be unlikely to have any effect on that program. The Air Force discussions are focused more on whether the military's drone fleet is the right size and composition for future conflicts. There has been a seemingly insatiable appetite within the military for the unmanned hunter/killers, particularly among top
combat commanders around the world who have been clamoring for the drones but have seen most resources go to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. "We are trying to do the analysis and engage in the discussion to say at some point the downturn in operations and the upsurge in capabilities has got to meet," Hostage said. Hostage, interviewed in his
office at Langley Air Force Base in Hampton, Va., amid the intermittent roar of fighter jets overhead, said the military's new focus on the Asia-Pacific region will require a different mix of drones and other aircraft. Unlike in Afghanistan, where the U.S. can operate largely without fear of the drones being shot down, there are a number of countries in the
¶
¶
¶
¶
¶
¶
¶
¶
Right now, Predator and Reaper drones that pilots fly remotely from
thousands of miles away are completing 59 24-hour combat air patrols a day,
The
standing order is for the Air Force to increase that number of air patrols to 65 a day by May
2014, although officials say that is an arbitrary number not based on an analysis of future
combat requirements.¶ The staffing demands for that increase have put a strain on the Air
Force, as they would require nearly 1,700 drone pilots and 1,200 sensor operators. Currently
there are fewer than 1,400 pilots and about 950 sensor operators.¶
Pacific that could face off against American aircraft – either manned or unmanned.
¶
mostly in Afghanistan, Pakistan and areas around Yemen and the Africa coast.
Lt. Gen. Larry D. James, the Air Force deputy chief of staff for intelligence, said
no recommendations for changes to the projected drone fleet have been sent yet to Pentagon leaders. A key part of the decision will involve what types of drones and other aircraft will be needed as the military focuses greater conc entration on the Pacific. While
Predators and Reapers have logged more than 1 million hours of combat patrols in the skies over Afghanistan and Iraq, where insurgents don't have the ability to shoot them down, they would be likely to face challenges in the more contested airspace over the Pacific.
Countries with significant air power or the ability to shoot down aircraft are scattered across the region, including China, Russia and North Korea – as well as key U.S. allies such as Japan and Australia. America's pivot to the Pacific reflects a growing strategic concern
¶
¶
the Predators and Reapers can be used in
the Pacific region "but not in a highly contested environment. We may be able to use them on
the fringes and on the edges and in small locales, but we're much more likely to lose them if
somebody decides to challenge us for that space."¶ James said the Air Force is evaluating how
much to continue to invest in drones like the Reapers that can be used for counterterrorism
missions in more so-called permissive environments, versus how much investment should be
shifted to other aircraft.
over China's rise as a military power, amid simmering disputes over Taiwan and contested islands in the south and east China seas. Hostage said
¶
The Air Force uses an array of aircraft, such as the U-2 spy plane, the high-altitude Global Hawk drone or satellites and systems that can gather intelligence from space. David Deptula, a retired Air
¶
Force three-star general who was deputy chief of staff for intelligence, said the military needs to measure its drone requirements by the amount of data and intelligence needed by troops to accomplish their mission. The focus should not be on the number of drone
patrols but on how well the information is being received and analyzed. As technologies advance, he said, the Pentagon can reduce the number of drones in orbit, while still increasing the video, data and other information being transmitted.
¶
Congress is cutting the drones budget significantly.
Ackerman, 13 (Spencer Ackerman. American national security reporter. Graduated from
Rutgers University. “Budget Cuts Are Set to Hit U.S. Military’s Drone Fleet”. Wired. Apr. 2nd, 2013.
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/04/drone-cuts/)
Pentagon officials anticipate spending significantly
less on surveillance and attack drones over the next several years, effectively ending the
drone boom of the previous decade ¶ The
budget cuts are expected to affect each major
funding source for the drones
¶
the Pentagon is signaling that the boom times for drones are coming to
an end
¶
R&D cash is expected to fall to $1.03 billion in fiscal 2017 nearly half of
the $1.99 billion the Pentagon requested in the 2013 budget
¶ Same goes
For all the ongoing hype about the U.S. military’s arsenal of flying robots, they’re anything but safe from budget cuts.
their
.
impending
: the research and development accounts that keep new models coming online; the operations and maintenance accounts that keep current ones in the air; and the procurement
accounts that keep the military purchasing them.
Already,
, even as the robots remain one of the U.S.’s signature counterterrorism weapons. An overview prepared in February by Dyke Weatherington, who oversees unmanned systems for the Pentagon’s acquisitions and technology directorate, outlined the
downturn.
Across all the various military drone programs,
,
fiscal
. Budget cuts caused the Pentagon to shrink its anticipated drone-research spending:
Weatherington’s presentation, delivered to the drone advocates at AUVSI and acquired by Danger Room, anticipates spending $1.3 billion in fiscal 2014, some $866 million less than the fiscal 2012 budget anticipated for that year.
for
“operations and maintenance
down $309 million
pattern for all drone accounts continues through 2017 ¶
procurement, and what’s known as
.” Weatherington anticipated that the Pentagon will spend $3 billion on drone purchases in 2014, some $814 less than the fiscal 2012
budget foresaw. And he expected that it’ll want $983 million in fiscal 2014 to keep its current fleet flying and tuned up,
.
from the expectation in the fiscal 2012 budget.
The downward
It’s possible that the fiscal 2014 budget, expected to be released on April 10, will revise those numbers further.
“We’re still looking at those numbers,” says Maureen Schumann, a spokeswoman for Weatherington. Pentagon officials have described the current budget process as chaotic, as it’s occurred against the backdrop of an ongoing White House-congressional feud over
drone manufacturers and their advocates have been bracing themselves for the
downturn for a while, even as the drones remain busy worldwide Last year, the Air Force cut its
drone purchases by half
¶ Every
defense account is feeling pressure under mandatory budget cuts enacted by Congress. But
some observers see the robots as being particularly vulnerable, as they don’t have the
traditional bureaucratic constituencies of other weapons systems.¶
spending cuts.¶ But
.
while actually upping the combat air patrols they fly. AUVSI has been pushing the utility of drones to farmers as the advocacy group sees the military market shrinking.
“As the Pentagon wrestles with declining overall budget numbers, this would be
the time to not let sunk costs drive us in the future. But the reality is that in tough budget times, the new becomes more directly threatening to the old,” says Peter Singer, a defense analyst at the Brookings Institution. (Where, full disclosure, Danger Room boss Noah
Shachtman has a non-resident fellowship.) “And in bureaucracies, the old is not only more established, but is often at an advantage. It is more likely to have existing internal constituencies and tribes, and stronger support from Congressional members protecting
Despite the anticipated budget cuts, there are still
new, experimental drone programs under way in the military.
existing factories and jobs in their district versus the potential of future program offices and future pork barrel spending.” ¶
The Navy is pushing forward with an effort to launch an armed drone from an aircraft carrier.
Darpa wants drones to operate from the decks of even smaller ships. In Afghanistan, Army units are using a six-pound lethal robot that bridges the gap between drone and missile. ¶ But the funding reductions are “all the more striking,” Singer says, because of the
enthusiasm that senior military leaders have mouthed for the drones. “In the next 20-30 years these things are going to explode,” Gen. Mark Welsh, the Air Force chief of staff, told an airpower conference in September. (He meant that colloquially.) “Who knows what
will happen next, but it’s going to be exciting to watch and our Air Force has to be in the lead because we’ll know the best way to use them. Innovation is what we’re all about.” ¶ Weatherington’s presentation pointed to a 33 percent reduction in drone funding in the
coming years inside the Air Force alone. ¶ “One is reminded a bit of that cavalry officer after World War I who is reputed to have said, ‘Thank goodness now the war is over, we can get back to real soldiering,” Singer says.
CIA is cutting back on its drone strike program and has dropped signature strike
practices.
Kopstein 13 (Joshua Kopstein. Cyberculture journalist. “CIA cutting down on drone strikes in
Pakistan, fearing public outrage”. The Verge. Jul. 25th, 2013.
http://www.theverge.com/2013/7/25/4557080/cia-cutting-down-drone-strikes-in-pakistanfearing-public-outrage)
The tempo of CIA drone strikes in Pakistan has slowed significantly in recent months
the reason has to do with the public's intensifying criticism of the program, which has
reportedly killed hundreds of civilians since 2004 ¶ While the attacks are by no means stopping
heir frequency has reached a low not seen since the secret program began
with 16 strikes
occurring so far this year
public scrutiny has led the program to be more focused on "high
value" targets
dropping the controversial practice of "signature strikes," which attack
anonymous individuals based solely on behavior observed in the field.¶
, and anonymous officials tell
The Associated Press that
.
,
t
in Pakistan,
. That's a far cry from the peak of 122 strikes in 2010, according to data from the New America Foundation, whose most recent estimates show those strikes killed 97 alleged "militants" and four
"others" in 2013. Current and former intelligence officials tell AP that
, supposedly
The statements seem to be in line with those from President
Obama, who said during a speech in May that he would roll back the CIA program and limit targets to those who constitute a "continuing, imminent threat." But a Justice Department legal memo leaked prior to the speech broadly defines "imminent" to include any plot
which "may or may not occur in the near future." The administration has also defended its demonstrated ability to execute — without charge or trial — American citizens who fit that criteria.¶ The decreased number of strikes comes after massive public outrage in
Pakistan, where the high court in Peshawar has ruled that US drone strikes constitute war crimes and violations of the country's sovereignty. Ben Emmerson, the UN's special rapporteur on civil rights, reached similar conclusions during his own investigation of the
In the past, Pakistani officials have publicly spoken out against drone strikes while
secretly consenting to them behind closed doors. But anonymous US officials told the AP that
the strikes decreased after Pakistani officials made it clear the attacks could not continue at the
current rate, citing concerns over the civilian death toll.
ongoing US drone campaign.
CIA drone program is already coming to an end, and is already undergoing
increased regulations.
Inquisitir 13 (The inquisitir. “Pakistan Drone Program Finally Ending? Kerry Says ‘Soon’”. Aug.
2nd, 2013.
http://www.inquisitr.com/884182/pakistan-drone-program-finally-ending-kerry-sayssoon/#MQYx86JLK8v5FtKV.99)
The US drone program in Pakistan may be coming to an end “very, very soon.” A promise to pull back the program was announced by
US Secretary of State John Kerry at the end of his diplomatic visit to Pakistan on Thursday. Speaking
on Pakistani
television, Kerry said that President Obama has a “very real timeline” on ending drone strikes
in the country. CNN reports that Kerry believes a drone program in Pakistan might not even been
needed any more. He says that the US has “eliminated most of the threat and [will] continue to
eliminate it.” Before this, President Obama had said in May that the drone strikes would decrease in
the “Afghan war theater” as part of US withdrawal. Many believed Obama was referring to drone use in Pakistan
as well. According to BBC News, the drone program in Pakistan has claimed as many as 3,460 lives since 2004. After President Obama
came into office in 2009, drone strikes in Pakistan increased sharply. In recent years, however, they have begun to decline rapidly
with only 17 strikes in 2013 so far. In 2012 there were 48 strikes and 73 the year before that. Secretary of State John Kerry’s recent
promise was made in the likely hopes that it would cool tensions between Pakistan and US leadership. Since winning elections earlier
in May, Pakistani
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has called for an end to all US drone strikes. Sharif
says that the US drone program violates the sovereignty of Pakistan. What separates the US drone program in
Pakistan from drone programs elsewhere is that it is directed by the CIA. Whereas the other
drone programs operate under military guidelines, drones in Pakistan fall under CIA control.
The CIA follows different rules for drones than the military. This includes the permission to
strike any and all suspected members of militant or terrorist groups. The military, instead, must
only use drone strikes against specific terrorists and groups. Some Pakistani officials hope that
Kerry’s new promise will mean the US plans to completely end all drone strikes in Pakistan and
“not just curtail them.”
Politics DA
Drone courts are popular – gaining currency with lawmakers.
Hosenball 13 (Mark, “Support grows for U.S. "drone court" to review lethal strikes”, Reuters, 28-13, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/09/us-usa-drones-idUSBRE91800B20130209,
RSR)
(Reuters) - During a fresh round of debate this week over President Barack Obama's claim that he can unilaterally order
lethal strikes by unmanned aircraft against U.S. citizens, some lawmakers proposed a middle ground: a special
federal "drone court" that would approve suspected militants for targeting.¶ While the idea of a judicial review
of such operations may be gaining political currency , multiple U.S. officials said on Friday that imminent action
The idea is being actively considered , however,
according to a White House official.¶ At Thursday's confirmation hearing for CIA director nominee John Brennan, senators
discussed establishing a secret court or tribunal to rule on the validity of cases that U.S.
intelligence agencies draw up for killing suspected militants using drones.¶ The court could be modeled
on an existing court which examines applications for electronic eavesdropping on suspected spies or terrorists.¶ Senator Dianne
Feinstein, Democratic chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said Thursday that she planned to "review
proposals for ... legislation to ensure that drone strikes are carried out in a manner consistent
with our values, and the proposal to create an analogue of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to review the conduct of
such strikes."¶ Senator Angus King, a Maine independent, said during the hearing that he envisioned a
scenario in which executive branch officials would go before a drone court "in a confidential and topsecret way, make the case that this American citizen is an enemy combatant, and at least that would be ... some
by the U.S. Congress or the White House to create one is unlikely.
check on the activities of the executive ."¶ King suggested that only drone attacks on U.S. citizens would need court
approval; other proposals leave open the possibility that such a court could also rule regarding drone strikes on non-Americans.
Drone court is popular – success of FISC ensures.
Calabresi 13 (Massimo, “Checking Obama’s Assassination Power: A Drone Court Is Just One
Way”, Time, 2-14-13, http://swampland.time.com/2013/02/14/checking-obamas-assasinationpower-a-drone-court-is-just-one-way/, RSR)
First, the idea of a new secret national security court is popular because one already exists : the
F oreign I ntelligence S urveillance C ourt, established in 1978 as a check on US spying on American citizens. A good review of the
origins of that court is at Lawfare today. The short version of the FISC court is that it is made up of respected judges
appointed by the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, and it approves a variety of wiretapping and other
investigative methods used by the executive branch against “American Persons” suspected of
working for foreign powers anywhere in the world, including in the U.S.