To Beam or not to Beam?
A study in personal identity
Beaming:
Beaming:
Beaming:
Ways of Conceptualizing Beaming:
Same Matter,
“Matter Transport”
“Recruited” Matter,
“Information Transport”
Ways of Conceptualizing Beaming:
Delay
Instantaneous
Questions:
• Which forms of transport is it rational to
assume that you will survive?
1.
2.
3.
4.
Instantaneous Matter Transport
Delayed Matter Transport
Instantaneous Information Transport
Delayed Information Transport
The Closest Continuer Schema
• Proposed by Robert
Nozick (1938-2002)
• Identity is a relation
that moves from one
time-slice of an object
to another time-slice of
an object based on
overall similarity.
(easy) Closest Continuer Example:
Closest to T1
Not Even Close
T1
T2
Closest Continuer Rules:
1) Objects at T2 are compared only to other
objects at T2 to determine which is the
closest continuer to the object at T1
Closest Continuer Rules:
2) “Closest” must be clear. The Closest
Continuer must be closer than any other
claimant
Closest:
No CLOSEST Continuer
T1
T2
Closest Continuer Rules
3) The Closest Continuer must be close enough
(share enough qualitative similarity).
Continuer:
No Continuer
T1
T2
Do you survive transport?
What makes the person-slice at T2
the closest continuer of the
person-slice at T1?
T1
T2
Theories:
1. Matter Matters
a) Body Matters (body includes brain)
b) Brain Matters
Theories:
1. Matter Matters
a) Body Matters (body includes brain)
b) Brain Matters
- If one of these is your view, then you would
survive only instantaneous matter transport.
Consequences of Matter Matters Views:
• Body Matters:
Consequences of Matter Matters Views:
• Body Matters:
– You don’t know who you are until you examine
your body (thoroughly)
Consequences of Matter Matters Views:
• Body Matters:
– You don’t know who you are until you examine
your body (thoroughly)
– You would not survive a brain transplant into
another body (human or artificial)
Consequences of Matter Matters Views:
• Body Matters:
– You don’t know who you are until you examine
your body (thoroughly)
– You would not survive a brain transplant into
another body (human or artificial)
– You would survive gradual prosthetic
replacements, but not sudden ones.
Consequences of Matter Matters Views:
• Brain Matters:
Consequences of Matter Matters Views:
• Brain Matters:
– You don’t know who you are until you examine
your brain (thoroughly)
Consequences of Matter Matters Views:
• Brain Matters:
– You don’t know who you are until you examine
your brain (thoroughly)
– There is something important about your brain
aside from what it does. In order to endorse this
view you must have an account of what this is, or
else you don’t really have a Matter Matters view,
but instead…
Theories:
2. Mind Matters:
•
By ‘mind’ we mean psychology. A person’s
psychology survives if their personality,
memories, habits, beliefs, desires, etc. survive.
Consequences of Mind Matters View:
• Matter Matters views are incorrect.
Consequences of Mind Matters View:
• Matter Matters views are incorrect.
– You can survive prosthetic brain operations
Consequences of Mind Matters View:
• Matter Matters views are incorrect.
– You can survive prosthetic brain operations
– You can survive implantation into an android body,
or no body at all.
Consequences of Mind Matters View:
• Matter Matters views are incorrect.
– You can survive prosthetic brain operations
– You can survive implantation into an android body,
or no body at all.
– You can survive (at least instantaneous)
information transport.
Psychological Continuers
• When we apply the closest continuer schema
to changes in a person over time, we seem to
put more weight on psychological properties
than outward physical properties.
Psychological Continuers
• When we apply the closest continuer schema
to changes in a person over time, we seem to
put more weight on psychological properties
than outward physical properties.
• If this view is correct, then we ought to have
no objection to information transport.
Objections to Information Transport
• There are three major objections to the mindover-matter closest continuer view:
Objections to Information Transport
• There are three major objections to the mindover-matter closest continuer view:
1. The Principle of Independence
2. Phenomenology
3. The Exclusion Principle
The Principle of Independence
In this case, A is Kirk’s closest
continuer because it combines
Kirk’s psychological AND physical
properties, but if A did not
survive, then B would be the
closest continuer.
Kirk body
Kirk mind
T1
T2
Kirk body
Android body
Kirk mind
Kirk mind
A
B
The Principle of Independence
In this case, A is Kirk’s closest
continuer because it combines
Kirk’s psychological AND physical
properties, but if A did not
survive, then B would be the
closest continuer.
Kirk body
Kirk mind
T1
T2
Kirk body
Android body
Kirk mind
Kirk mind
A
B
The principle of independence
states that either A or B
should either be Kirk or not be
Kirk regardless of the
existence of the other entity.
The Principle of Independence
• The principle of independence only applies if
we have a concept of identity, rather than just
similarity.
The Principle of Independence
• The principle of independence only applies if
we have a concept of identity, rather than just
similarity.
• If the closest continuer schema is about
similarity rather than identity, one might
wonder if similarity after transport is enough
to mean survival.
Phenomenology
• Phenomenology refers to what it is like to
have your mental states.
Phenomenology
• Phenomenology refers to what it is like to
have your mental states.
• People commonly think that if they were
turned into a functionally identical android,
their mental states would feel different to
them.
Phenomenology
• Since information transport and
androidization are no different from the
perspective of the closest continuer theory,
then if you don’t survive androidization, you
wouldn’t survive information transport either.
Phenomenology
• This objection sounds plausible to many, but it
suffers from problems with its internal
consistency.
Phenomenology
• This objection sounds plausible to many, but it
suffers from problems with its internal
consistency.
• Namely, if all of your mental states felt
different, they wouldn’t BE your old mental
states.
The Exclusion Principle
• Since beaming looks like magic, we can accept
that the same person that disappears,
reappears.
• Since androidization looks like science, we
cannot accept that the same person that has
their parts replaced, persists.
The Exclusion Principle
• Since beaming looks like magic, we can accept
that the same person that disappears,
reappears.
• Since androidization looks like science, we
cannot accept that the same person that has
their parts replaced, persists.
• The Exclusion Principle states that we can
believe in the results of magical, but not of
man-made processes.
The Exclusion Principle
• Obviously, Hanley doesn’t think much of the
Exclusion Principle.
• There seems to be no rational basis for
accepting the Exclusion Principle.
Hanley’s conclusion
• Since psychological properties are evidently
preserved in matter transport, information
transport, and androidization, it is rational to
accept each procedure, and superstitious to
refuse.
Objection to Hanley
• If the mind-over-matter closest continuer
schema is correct, then any kind of delayed
transport poses a problem: For some length of
time, there is no continuer at all.
Objection to Hanley
• If the mind-over-matter closest continuer
schema is correct, then any kind of delayed
transport poses a problem: For some length of
time, there is no continuer at all.
• By analogy, this view would indicate that we
do not survive periods of coma, sleep, or
other unconsciousness.
Objection to Hanley
• So if we do indeed survive matter or
information transport, delayed or
instantaneous, then it is for reasons other
than psychological closest-continuation.
Objection to Hanley
• So if we do indeed survive matter or
information transport, delayed or
instantaneous, then it is for reasons other
than psychological closest-continuation.
• What could those reasons be?
Wrap-up on metaphysics
• The things we say, think, and base decisions
on in everyday life require metaphysical
assumptions.
Wrap-up on metaphysics
• The things we say, think, and base decisions
on in everyday life require metaphysical
assumptions.
• Metaphysical problems are not isolated to
philosophy class.
Wrap-up on metaphysics
• Not all metaphysical assumptions are equally
good.
Wrap-up on metaphysics
• Not all metaphysical assumptions are equally
good.
• There are many things we can’t be sure of, so
we must do the best we can to be creative and
critical so as to at least do the best we can.