Value/Criteron
Consequentialism
Consequentialism key to examining real world social problems.
Robert Goodin a philosopher for ANDU, fellow in philosophy at Australian National Defense University, 1990 “The
Utilitarian Response”
Consequentialism is the idea that what matters most is the consequences of our actions. This de-emphasizes the
direct content of an action by replacing such emphasis with the actual outcome of an action.
There are many variations on this theme the most promising of which, I think, are the ones that take into count the actual
consequences of an agent throughout their entire life as opposed to just immediate consequences and deceptions. ac This view
looks at the overall success of protracted struggles above and beyond simply immediate victories that might eventually lead to the
success of the overall struggle. Also, emphasis
is placed on actual consequences instead of perceived
consequences in which an agent might be deceived. The consequences of an action are many times influenced by a great
number of outside forces or variables such as other agents in the world. Also, desired consequences
may involve
the conditions of others. In this way there is a social element implicit to
Consequentialism. “It is because Consequentialism attaches value ultimately to states
Upholding life is the ultimate moral standard.
Uyl and Douglas Rasmussen, Professors of Philosophy at Bellarmine and St. John's, 1981, Reading
Nozick, p.244
Rand has spoken of the ultimate end as the standard by which all other ends are evaluated. When the ends
to be evaluated are chosen ones the ultimate end is the standard for moral evaluation . Life as the sort of thing a living entity is,
then, is the ultimate standard of value, and since only human beings are capable of choosing
their ends, it is the life as a human being-man's life qua man-that is the standard for moral
evaluation.
Douglas Den
Utilitarianism is real world and non-utopian
Joseph Nye, prof. of IR at Harvard University, 1986 ( “Nuclear Ethics”, p. 24)
Whether one accepts the broad consequentialist approach or chooses some other, more
eclectic way to include and reconcile the three dimensions of complex moral issues, there will
often be a sense of uneasiness about the answers, not just because of the complexity of the
problems “but simply that there is no satisfactory solution to these issues – at least none that
appears to avoid in practice what most men would still regard as an intolerable sacrifice of
value.” When value is sacrificed, there is often the problem of “dirty hands.” Not all ethical
decisions are pure ones. The absolutist may avoid the problem of dirty hands, but often at the
cost of having no hands at all. Moral theory cannot be “rounded off and made complete and
tidy.” That is part of the modern human condition. But that does not exempt us from making
difficult moral choices.
Must Prevent Extinction
No natural good can come out of extinction of the human race. It is the ultimate
impact. You should prefer stopping it over all else.
Nick Bostrum 11 (Professor, Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School
EXISTENTIAL RISK PREVENTION AS THE MOST IMPORTANT TASK FOR HUMANITY “ 2011 ,
Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School http://www.existential-risk.org/concept.pdf
,DW)
But even this reflection fails to bring out the seriousness of existential risk. What makes
existential catastrophes especially bad is not that they would show up robustly on a plot like the
one in figure 3, causing a precipitous drop in world population or average quality of life. Instead,
their significance lies primarily in the fact that they would destroy the future. The philosopher
Derek Parfit made a similar point with the following thought experiment: ¶ I believe that if we
destroy [humankind] mankind, as we now can, this outcome will be much worse than most
people think. Compare three outcomes: ¶ (1) Peace. ¶ (2) A nuclear war that kills 99% of the
world’s existing population. ¶ (3) A nuclear war that kills 100%. (2) would be worse than (1),
and (3) would be worse than (2). Which is the greater of these two differences? Most people believe
that the greater difference is between (1) and (2). I believe that the difference between (2) and
(3) is very much greater. … The Earth will remain habitable for at least another billion year s.
Civilization began only a few thousand years ago. If we do not destroy [humankind] mankind,
these few thousand years may be only a tiny fraction of the whole of civilized human history.
The difference between (2) and (3) may thus be the difference between this tiny fraction and all of
the rest of this history. If we compare this possible history to a day, what has occurred so far is only a
fraction of a second. (10: 453-454) ¶ To calculate the loss associated with an existential catastrophe, we
must consider how much value would come to exist in its absence. It turns out that the ultimate
potential for Earth-originating intelligent life is literally astronomical. ¶ One gets a large number even
if one confines one’s consideration to the potential for biological human beings living on Earth. If we
suppose with Parfit that our planet will remain habitable for at least another billion years, and
we assume that at least one billion people could live on it sustainably, then the potential exist
for at least 1018 human lives. These lives could also be considerably better than the average
contemporary human life, which is so often marred by disease, poverty, injustice, and various
biological limitations that could be partly overcome through continuing technological and moral
progress.
Our strongest moral impulse ought to be prevention of human extinction.
Nick Bostrum ‘11 (Professor, Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School
EXISTENTIAL RISK PREVENTION AS THE MOST IMPORTANT TASK FOR HUMANITY “ 2011 ,
Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School http://www.existential-risk.org/concept.pdf
,DW)
We might also consider the issue from a less theoretical standpoint and try to form an
evaluation instead by considering analogous cases about which we have definite moral
intuitions. Thus, for example, if we feel confident that committing a small genocide is wrong, and
that committing a large genocide is no less wrong, we might conjecture that committing omnicide is
also wrong.25 And if we believe we have some moral reason to prevent natural catastrophes
that would kill a small number of people, and a stronger moral reason to prevent natural
catastrophes that would kill a larger number of people, we might conjecture that we have an even
stronger moral reason to prevent catastrophes that would kill the entire human population.
Deontology
Using people as a means goes against morality
Manuel Velasquez, Moral Philosopher, Mar. 6, 2007. Philosophy: A Text with Readings, pg.
460 “Ethics”.
Kant’s second version of the categorical imperative implies that we should not use people as objects, as things whose only function
is to satisfy our desires. Instead, he claims, morality
requires that we always give others the opportunity to
decide for themselves whether or not they will join us in our actions. This rules out all forms
of deception, force, coercion, and manipulation. It also rules out all the ways we have of
exploiting other people to satisfy our own desires without their free consent. Moreover, the second
version implies that we should promote people’s capacity to choose for themselves. It also implies that we should strive to develop
this capacity in ourselves and in those around us (for example, through education). Again, some examples may clarify what Kant has
in mind in this second version. For Kant, to respect a person as an end is to respect her capacity to freely and knowingly choose for
herself what she will do. To
treat a person as a means is to use the person to achieve my personal
interests. In effect, this second version says that we should treat people only as they freely and knowingly
consent to be treated, not merely as a means to my own goal. Kant would say that it is wrong to force or to
manipulate a person into doing something because in manipulating or forcing a person I am failing to treat the person as she has
freely and knowingly consented to be treated.
Morality precedes all decision making
Zygmunt Bauman, Professor Emeritus of Sociology, 1993. Postmodern Ethics pgs. 246-250.
http://docs.exdat.com/docs/index-149754.html?page=82 accessed 7/19/12
But the moral crisis of the postmodern habitat requires first and foremost that politics - whether the
politics of the politicians or the policentric, scattered politics which matters all the more for being so elusive and beyond control _
be an extension and institutionalization of moral responsibility. Genuine moral issues of the high-tech
world are by and large beyond the reach of individuals (who, at best, may singly or severally purchase the right not to worry about
them, or buy a temporary reprieve from suffering the effects of neglect). The effects of technology are long-distance, and so must be
the preventive and remedial action. Hans Jonas's 'long-range ethics' makes sense, if at all, only as a political programme - though
given the nature of the postmodern habitat, there is little hope that any political party competing for state power would be willing,
suicidally, to endorse this truth and act upon it. Commenting on Edgar Allan Poe's story of three fishermen caught in the maelstrom,
of whom two died paralysed with fear and doing nothing, but the third survived, having noticed that round objects are sucked into
the abyss less quickly, and promptly jumping into a barrel - Norbert Elias sketched the way in which the exit from a nonexit situation
may be plotted. The survivor, Elias suggests, “began to think more coolly; and by standing back, by controlling his own fear, by
seeing himself as it were from a distance, like a chessman forming a pattern with others -on a board, he managed to turn his
thoughts away from himself to the situation in which he found himself... Symbolically representing in his mind the structure and
direction of the flow of events, he discovered a way of escape. In that situation, the level of self-control and the level of processcontrol were ... interdependent and complemen tary.'s” Let us note that Poe's cool and clever fisherman escaped alone. We do not
know how many barrels there were left in the boat. And barrels, after all, have been known since Diogenes to be the ultimate
individual retreats. The question is - and to this question private cunning offers no answer -- to what extent the techniques of
individual survival (techniques by the way, amply provided for all present and future, genuine and putative maelstroms, by eagertooblige-and-profit merchants of goods and counsels) can be stretched to-embrace the-collective survival.--The-maelstrom-of the
kind we are in - all of us together, and most of us individually - is so frightening because of its tendency to break down the issue of
common survival into a sackful of individual survival issues, and then to take the issue so pulverized off the political agenda. Can the
process be retraced? Can that which has been broken be made whole again? And where to find an adhesive strong enough to keep it
whole? If the successive chapters of this book suggest anything, it is that moral issues cannot be 'resolved', nor the moral life of
humanity guaranteed, by the calculating and legislative efforts of reason. Morality
is not safe in the hands of
reason, though this is exactly what spokesmen of reason promise. Reason cannot help the moral self without
depriving the self of what makes the self moral: that unfounded, non-rational, un-arguable,
no-excuses-given and noncalculable urge to stretch towards the other, to caress, to be for, to live for,
happen what may. Reason is about making correct decisions, while moral responsibility precedes all thinking
about decisions as it does not, and cannot care about any logic which would allow the approval of an action as correct. Thus,
morality can be `rationalized' only at the cost of self-denial and self attrition.
Compassion/Ethic of Care
Compassion is the basis of all morality.
Schopenhauer, Arthur. On the Basis of Morality. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965. Print.
But if what I do is to take place solely on account of some one else ; then it follows that his weal and woe
must directly constitute my motive ; just as, ordinarily, my own weal and woe form it. This narrows the limits of our problem, which
may now be stated as follows : How is it possible that another's weal and woe should influence my will directly, that is, exactly in the
same way as otherwise my own move it ? How can that which affects another for good or bad become my immediate motive, and
actually sometimes assume such importance that it more or less supplants my own interests, which are, as a rule, the single source
of the incentives that appeal to me ? Obviously, only because that
other person becomes the ultimate object of
my will, precisely as usually I myself am that object ; in other words, because I directly desire weal, and not
woe, for him, just as habitually I do for myself. This, however, necessarily implies that I suffer with him, and feel his
woe, exactly as in most cases I feel only mine, and therefore desire his weal as immediately as at other
times I desire only my own. But, for this to be possible, I must in some way or other be identified with him ;
that is, the difference between myself and him, which is the precise raison d'etre of my Egoism, must be removed, at least to a
since I do not live in his skin, there remains only the knowledge, that is, the
mental picture, I have of him, as the possible means where- by I can so far identify myself with him, that my action
declares the difference to be practically effaced. The process here analyzed is not a dream, a fancy floating in the air ; it is
perfectly real, and by no means infrequent. It is, what we see every day, the phenomenon of
Compassion ; in other words, the direct participation, independent of all ulterior considerations, in the
sufferings of another, leading to sympathetic assistance in the effort to prevent or remove them ; whereon in
the last resort all satisfaction and all well-being and happiness depend. It is this Compassion alone which is the real
basis of all voluntary justice and all genuine loving-kindness. Only so far as an action springs
therefrom, has it moral value ; and all conduct that proceeds from any other motive whatever has none. When once
certain extent. Now,
compassion is stirred within me, by another's pain, then his weal and woe go straight to my heart, exactly in the same way, if not
always to the same degree, as otherwise I feel only my own. Consequently the difference between myself and him is no longer an
absolute one. No doubt this operation is astonishing, indeed hardly comprehensible. It is, in fact, the great mystery of Ethics, its
original phaenomenon, and the boundary stone, past which only transcendental speculation may dare to take a step. Herein we see
the wall of partition, which, according to the light of nature (as reason is called by old theologians), entirely separates being from
being, broken down, and the non-ego to a certain extent identified with the ego. I wish for the moment to leave the metaphysical
explanation of this enigma untouched, and first to inquire whether all acts of voluntary justice and true loving- kindness really arise
we shall have found the ultimate basis of morality, and shown
that it lies in human nature itself. This foundation, however, in its turn cannot form a problem of Ethics, but rather, like
from it. If so, our problem will be solved, for
every other ultimate fact as such, of Metaphysics. Only the solution, that the latter offers of the primary ethical phaenomenon, lies
outside the limits of the question put by the Danish Royal Society, which is concerned solely with the basis ; so that the
transcendental explanation can be given merely as a voluntary and unessential appendix.
States have a responsibility to practice compassion towards those in need; this
responsibility can be provoked by civic debate.
Elisabeth Porter, PhD, professor of social sciences at the University of South Australia, 2006, Hypatia, “Can Politics Practice
Compassion?”, pp. 97-12, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4640024, Access date: 7/17/12
Yet, as intimated earlier, in order to move beyond empathy, we must also address claims for justice and equality. Again, I suggest
that without the compassionate drive that is prompted by visualizing the pain of injustice, we will not feel peoples' anguish, or
bother to consider what they need. As individuals, we have responsibilities beyond our personal connections to assist whenever it is
within our capacities and resources to do so. I do not want to give the impression that our entire lives should be devoted to
attending to others' needs. To do so would return women to exclusive nurturance at the expense of self-development and public
citizenship. It
is, rather, a matter of acting with compassion when it is possible to do so, and the
possibility of course is debatable and requires priorities, which differ with us all. Politically,
this means that politicians, nations, and international organizations have a similar
responsibility to alleviate the suffering that results when peoples' basic needs are not met.
There is a heavy responsibility on wealthy nations where the extent of poverty and misery is not as conspicuous as elsewhere to
assist less wealthy nations.16 State
responsibility is acute when suffering is caused by harsh economic
policies, careless sales of arms and military weapons, severe immigration rules, and obscene responses to terrorism by further
acts of violence. With the majority of these massive global issues, most of us can only demonstrate the first stage of cosuffering, and perhaps move to the second and debate the merit of options that might meet peoples' needs,
and alleviate suffering. This vocal civic debate can provoke the third process of political
responses that actually lead to political compassion. Given nations' moral failures of compassion and such
conspicuous evidence of oppression, exploitation, brutality, and indifference, we need to be observant, and understand the
implications of a failure to practice compassion.
The responsibility of the state to those in need includes providing welfare
programs.
Elisabeth Porter, PhD, professor of social sciences at the University of South Australia, 2006, Hypatia, “Can Politics Practice
Compassion?”, pp. 97-12, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4640024, Access date: 7/17/12
I am defending the position that it is possible to be politically compassionate and just and that such a claim should be disentangled
from notions of gender. I dispute the essentialist claim that women are naturally compassionate. However, because of women's
traditional association with caring and their role as primary parent, many women are experienced in caring and tend to respond
readily with compassion. As others also argue (Philips 1993, 70; Sevenhuijsen 1998, 13), I
am emphasizing the interplay
between the particularity of compassion and the universality of justice. Undoubtedly, the dichotomy of
public justice associated with masculinity and private care associated with femininity narrowed moral parameters, harmfully
cementing restrictive gendered stereotypes. Rather, the
relationship between compassion and justice is rich.
Compassion "helps us recognize our justice obligations to those distant from us" (Clement 1996,
85). Examples of justice obligations include welfare programs; foreign aid; famine and disaster
relief; humane immigration policies; and relieving the suffering of families who are affected
by terrorism in Bali, Iraq, Israel, London, Morocco, Northern Ireland, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, the United
States, and elsewhere. A choice between justice and compassion is false; considerations of justice "arise in and about the practice of
care" (Bubeck 1995a, 189). Thus, a
defense of the need for compassion is as much a defense for the
rights of justice.
The obligation to care for others is delegated to whoever is best suited to
provide that care.
Rosemarie Tong, professor of health care ethics and women’s studies at the University of North Carolina, 2002, Hypatia,
“Love's Labor in the Health Care System: Working toward Gender Equity”, pg. 200-213, http://www.jstor.org/stable/info/3810802,
Date accessed: 7/18/12
Kittay's justification for the dependency worker's obligations to the dependent resembles the one Robert Goodin offers in his book,
"the moral basis of special
relations between individuals arises from the vulnerability of one party to the actions of
another" (55). For example, a mother has an obligation to care for her infant because she is
"the individual best situated, or exclusively situated to meet the needs of the dependent" (55).
The source of a mother's moral obligation to her infant is not in the rights of the dependent as
a person, but rather in the relationship that exists between one in need and one who is
situated to meet the need. The defining characteristic of this largely socially constructed relationship is that it is not
Protecting the Vulnerable (Goodin 1985). According to Kittay's interpretation of Goodin,
usually chosen but already given in the ties of family, the dynamics of friendship, or the obligations of employment. The fact that a
relationship is "given" to the dependency worker, however, does not mean that it is necessarily wrong for the dependency worker to
break the relationship. Kittay disagrees with Goodin when he refuses to absolve a slave from his "obligations" to a master who
becomes so ill that he cannot survive without the slave's help. The master's fragile condition is the slave's one chance for freedom. Is
the slave obligated to stay and take care of his master who will most likely die if left unattended? Goodin argues yes. As he sees it, if
vulnerability arises in a relationship, the moral worth of that relationship is not relevant to the existence of the obligation (Kittay
1999, 59). Kittay argues no. As she sees it, the relationship that was given to the slave was a "relationship" that society should not
have constructed. Its coerciveness cancels out the obligations that human vulnerability ordinarily creates. Here Kittay is supported
by many feminist ethicists, particularly Sarah Lucia Hoagland (1991). According to Hoagland, if a relationship is coercive, abusive, or
destructive, the aggrieved party has no obligation to remain in it. She comments: "I must be able to assess any relationship for
abuse/oppression and withdraw if I find it to be so. I feel no guilt, I have grown, I have learned something. I understand my part in
the relationship. I separate. I will not be there again. Far from diminishing my ethical self, I am enhancing it" (256). Interestingly
Kittay believes that others' obligations to dependency workers are no less weighty than
dependency workers' obligations to their dependents. In fact, she implies they are more
weighty. Even though Kittay believes, as we have just seen, that there are some dependency
relationships that dependency workers may rightfully break, she does not also believe that
society may break its obligations to dependency workers.
AT Ethics of Care
Ethics of care subjugates womyn. Further oppresses womyn by seeing them as
the “care takers.” and reinforces patriarchal binary.
Staudt, 2011 Maureen Sander-Staudt, Ph.D , feminist author, Peer reviewed philosophical data-base, March 18 2011
th
“Care Ethics” http://www.iep.utm.edu/care-eth/#SH1a DW)
One of the earliest objections was that care ethics is a kind of slave morality valorizing the
oppression of women (Puka, 1990; Card, 1990; Davion, 1993). The concept of slave morality comes
from the philosopher Frederick Nietzsche, who held that oppressed peoples tend to develop moral
theories that reaffirm subservient traits as virtues. Following this tradition, the charge that
care ethics is a slave morality interprets the different voice of care as emerging from
patriarchal traditions characterized by rigidly enforced sexual divisions of labor. This critique
issues caution against uncritically valorizing caring practices and inclinations because women
who predominantly perform the work of care often do so to their own economic and political
disadvantage. To the extent that care ethics encourages care without further inquiring as to
who is caring for whom, and whether these relationships are just, it provides an
unsatisfactory base for a fully libratory ethic. This objection further implies that the voice of
care may not be an authentic or empowering expression, but a product of false consciousness
that equates moral maturity with self-sacrifice and self-effacement.
Care Ethics are Empirically Flawed
Staudt 2011 (Maureen Sander-Staudt, Ph.D , feminist author, Peer reviewed philosophical data-base, March 18
th
2011
“Care Ethics” http://www.iep.utm.edu/care-eth/#SH1a DW)
Critics also question the empirical accuracy and validity of Gilligan’s studies. Gilligan
has been faulted for basing
her conclusions on too narrow a sample, and for drawing from overly homogenous groups
such as students at elite colleges and women considering abortion (thereby excluding women who would
not view abortion as morally permissible). It is argued that wider samples yield more diverse results and
complicate the picture of dual and gendered moral perspectives (Haan, 1976; Brabeck, 1983). For
instance, Vanessa Siddle Walker and John Snarey surmise that resolution of the Heinz dilemma shifts if
Heinz is identified as Black, because in the United States African-American males are disproportionately likely to be
arrested for crime, and less likely to have their cases dismissed without stringent penalties (Walker and Snarey, 2004). Sandra
Harding observes certain similarities between care ethics and African moralities, noting that
care ethics has affinities with many other moral traditions (Harding, 1987). Sarah Lucia Hoagland
identifies care as the heart of lesbian connection, but also cautions against the dangers of
assuming that all care relations are ideally maternalistic (Hoagland, 1988). Thus, even if some
women identify with care ethics, it is unclear whether this is a general quality of women,
whether moral development is distinctly and dualistically gendered, and whether the voice of
care is the only alternative moral voice.
Narratives
The only way to access the true moral and ethical questions of the resolution is
through a narrative that humanizes the “other”
Kapust Antje, Prof. of Philosophy at Ruhr-Universität Bochum. 2005: Addressing Levinas Ed.
Eric Sean Nelson, Antje Kapust, and Kent Still. Northwestern University Press. Pgs. 236-257
From antiquity to modern times-it was always the other as barbarian, as horrid animal, and as
uncivilized being, who was all too often decreed to be a legitimated target for extinction. This “labeling” coincided with an
ambivalent refusal of situating him or her in the reign of “ethical speech." Passing from the late concept of
polemos to the holy doctrine of sacred war, from conquest of civilizations to ideological legitimations of persecutions of others, rationally developed many ways of interrupting
Levinas advances -that of preferring to talk to the so-called barbarian instead of killing
him. Even the calling into memory of this orientation does not take place; violence is enacted in the sphere of mute acts of brutality such as took place in the mass execution
the orientation that
of Jews, a mass murder which was set forth in the final solution of National Socialism: "We have drunk a lot of alcohol during this time in order to stimulate our verve and
Victims are deprived of any possibility of speech, since any request for
deliverance, rescue, or survival has to be immediately denied and repressed: “The Jews who were still living
exhilaration for work."
after mass execution as well as those who were only shot and still wounded in the lower layers were suffocated by the upper layers or were drowned by the blood of the upper
layers." The force of violence replaces the creative function that Hannah Arendt attributed to the political word. An agonistic productivity of political speech shifts all too quickly
to a dysfunctional and destructive force. Ricoeur describes the logic of this collision in a metaphor which dismisses Levinas’s ethical point, since violence is described as the
mechanical action and reaction of two forces-an image that applied to illustrate the phenomena of battle and combat from modern philosophy to the military discourses of the
the
ontological dilemma of this violence: it consists in the dominance of the blind spot in which “two
powers of command confront each other at the same point of pretension where they cannot sustain both at the same time." In this blind spot of collision, speech gets
destroyed and is replaced by a myth that imposes a stigma upon the target of extinction.
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. But it is important that he links this collision of forces with a degradation of language. Ricoeur describes precisely
Storytelling is necessary for the development of moral agency.
Tirrell, Lynne, Prof. Philosophy at U. Mass Boston, Storytelling and Moral agency, The Journal
of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring, 1990), pp. 115-126
It is through the articulation of events, motives and characters that we become moral agents.
This is the sense in which storytelling is necessary for moral agency. In telling stories one
develops a sense of self, a sense of self in relation to others, and a capacity to justify one's
decisions. These features are necessary for being a moral agent in the categorical sense. Telling stories may also increase
our sophistication as agents. We may begin with rudimentary stories that show a basic grasp of the moral, and sometimes we may eventually develop the
thickened judgment that enables one to take control of oneself, one's place in one's
community and to have a directed impact on that community.
Levinas
We must always interrupt the political with the ethical. Exposition to the
suffering of the other is necessary for all ethical evaluations.
Jordaan, Eduard. Professor of Political Science at Stellenbosch, 2006, “Responsibility,
Indifference, and Global Poverty: A Levinasian Perspective”
For Levinas, it is imperative that the political be forever interrupted by the ethical; the question is
how? Awakening us to our responsibility for the other is the second function of the proposed strategy, which is
intended to describe and emphasize human complexity to the greatest extent possible.
Throughout this study, authors in the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate have been criticized for suppressing various aspects of
the ethical relation with the other, which has resulted in us being left in good conscience, despite having failed the global other. At
the start of this chapter it was argued that the cosmopolitan strategy to convince us of our guilt and responsibility for the global
poor is counterproductive given that its emphasis on human equality numbs that which incites us to responsibility for the other,
namely glimpses of him as inexpressibly different from everyone else, unique. So, it seems as though our
task is to confront
the world with the ‘face’ of the other, to accuse the world of having left the other to quite
literally ‘die alone’. It is imperative that we “expose” the ‘skins’ of complacent selves to
“wounds and outrage,” that we elicit a “suffering for the suffering of the other” (CPP 146). In order
to bring the world into proximity to the other, to expose third parties to his ‘face,’ it is claimed that actions aimed at conveying the
other in as great a complexity as possible can help us do this. Human complexity/difference/dissimilarity is therefore not important
for its own sake (and therefore to be maintained at all costs), but insofar as it insinuates the uniqueness of the other. Of course, this
‘strategy’ immediately has to confront the objection that all representations of the other betray his alterity and suppress his
otherness (see Broody, 2001). Granting this, the claim made here is that there are representations (and positionings) of the other
and articulations of his situation that are more suggestive of his otherness and therefore of my ethical responsibility for him. That
this is so is suggested by the opposite, namely an extreme form of negating the other’s alterity, his de-humanisation through racist
and stereotyped representations whereby the way is paved for social and political disregard, maltreatment, or ‘disciplining’. Though
one cannot be sure of the direction of causality, there
seems to be a direct correlation between the fullness
with which people are viewed and the extent of the concern we have for them. Is it not generally the
case that the people we are most indifferent towards are also those most absent from our imaginations, those persons/groups we
know least about? Returning to the group of people I am most concerned with in this study, the global poor, is it not the case that
we generally know very little about tem, compared to say, Americans? And, for example, is this not part of the reason that while the
world reacted with great sympathy for the victims of the September 11th attacks in which approximately three thousand people
died, we do not pay much attention to the fact that every day approximately 30,000 children die from preventable illnesses, which
translates into more than 10 million deaths per year (UNDP 2003: 5; World Bank, 2004)? It is my contention that there is a
relationship between the fullness with which we view people and the concern we have for them, and
a large part of the
reason is that a fuller conception of the other person is a stronger suggestion of his altery and
the ethical command that issues from the fact of his otherness.
The State is the beginning of all violence-not helping those who aren’t “its own”
ignores responsibility for the other and is the root cause of all violence. ¶
Aronowicz, prof Judaism Franklin and Marshall, 2006¶ Annette Aronowicz, professor of Judaic studies at Franklin and
Marshall College, Summer 2006, “Levinas and Politics”
http://66.102.1.104/scholar?q=cache:5L5lnjhcUSgJ:scholar.google.com/+levinas%2Bholocaust%2Bpolitics&hl=en ¶ ¶ What remains
after so much bloodshed and tears shed in the name of immortal principles is individual sacrifice, which, amidst the dialectical
rebounds of justice and all its contradictory aboutfaces, without any hesitation finds a straight and sure way (1990: 29). Once again,
we have a very violent reality, “the cruelty inherent in rational order (and¶ perhaps simply in Order)”
says Levinas (1990: 29). Countering this is the act of protection and mercy extended from one to the
other. This is not to suggest that Levinas’ solution to the problem of violence lies simply in the
individual’s act of responsibility. It is neither that simple nor that simplistic. In ‘Judaism and revolution’, a very complex
commentary dealing with the relationship of the Jewish tradition and the State, Levinas makes clear that the State
itself is responsible for guaranteeing conditions that permit for the fulfillment of the human
(Levinas 1990: 99). Yet the State claims a universalism that is deceptive, for while it attempts to
protect the individual person, it limits that protection to its own and thus divides the world
into an ‘us and them’, quelling the responsibility of one to the other, beyond any distinctions whatsoever.
The Jewish tradition’s universalism, on the other hand, does not recognize limits to responsibility for the other person. It thus
introduces a wedge between the Jewish people and the State, for the latter cannot limit the responsibility of the former. As such, the
Jewish tradition always signals a loyalty beyond the State, and propels political activity in two directions. The first is in the direction
of care for the most vulnerable members within it, setting the standard by which the State offers guarantees against dehumanization
(Levinas 1990: 99-100). The second is in refusing to identify the good with a particular State, thus preventing the State from turning
into an object of idolatry. Levinas
warns, however, that even a¶ revolutionary movement whose aim is to
overthrow a hopelessly corrupt government can turn into a mirror image of the violence it
contests, dividing the world into us and them just as much. A revolution always risks the very
thing it is opposing. This does not mean that revolution is never justified but once again, we
are left, as our only recourse, vigilance against abuses, rather than a once and for all
transformation: Revolutionary action is first of all the action of the isolated man who plans revolution not only in danger but
also in the agony of conscience. In the agony of conscience that risks making revolution impossible: for
it is not only a question of seizing the evil-doer but also of not making the innocent suffer
(Levinas 1990:¶ 110).
We should reject the state-rather that it’s in a permanent revolution to always
become more ethical. We must help by taking individual responsibility to check
its instituions -without ethics we all face unlimited violence.¶
Simmons, associate prof social sciences ASU, 2003¶ William Paul Simmons, associate professor of social sciences at Arizona
State University, 2003, “An-Archy and Justice: An Introduction to Emmanuel Levinas’s Political Thought” ¶
According to Levinas, the move from the Other to the Third is the beginning of all violence. In the realm
of the said, the ego must necessarily weigh others in the name of justice, but this process reduces the Other to a cipher. Strangely
enough, justice is un-ethical. When justice is universalized into laws and institutions it moves yet another step away from the anarchical responsibility for the Other. The necessary universalization of ethical responsibility into the state is inherently un-ethical and
violent. In
the state, the ego is unable to respond directly to the face of the Other. Further, the
institutions of the state treat the Other as an interchangeable cog in its machinery, thereby
denying the transcendent element in man. Even when the state functions perfectly it is, by its
very nature, opposed to ethics. "For me, the negative element, the element of violence in the state, in the hierarchy,
appears even when the hierarchy functions perfectly, when everyone submits to universal ideas. There are cruelties which are terrible
because they proceed from the necessity of the reasonable order. There are, if you like, the tears that a civil servant cannot see: the
tears of the Other.'45¶ Vigilance
against violence in the state is essential. Institutions need to be
constantly checked by the ethical relationship with the Other. "In order for things to work and in order for
things to develop an equilibrium, it is absolutely necessary to affirm the infinite responsibility of each,
for each, before each . .. . As I see it, subjective protest is not received favorably on the
pretext that its egoism is sacred, but because the 1 alone can perceive the 'secret tears' of the
Other which are caused by the functioning-albeit reasonable-of the hierarchy."4'¶ The state
must be constantly reminded of its inherent violence. Levinas finds just such a self-critical
state in the modem liberal state. The liberal state "always asks itself whether its own justice
really is justice. "17¶ What qualities does the liberal state possess that makes it self-critical? First, there is the freedom of the
press, the freedom to criticize the government, to speak out against injustice. "You know the prophets of the bible, they come and say
to the king that his method of dispensing justice is wrong. The prophet doesn't do this in a clandestine way: he comes before the king
and he tells him. In the liberal state, it's the press, the poets, the writers who fulfill this role."48 ¶ Second, in the liberal state, the leader
is not above the people, but is chosen from among the people. A ruler who is in an ethical relationship sees humanity through the
Other's eyes. Against the Platonic formulation that the best ruler is the one who is best in control of himself, Levinas argues that the
best ruler is the one who is in an ethical relationship with the Other. "The State, in accordance with its pure essence, is possible only if
the divine word enters into it; the prince¶ is educated in this knowledge."9¶ However,
for Levinas, the most important
component of the liberal state is its call for a "permanent revolution."50 The Levinasian liberal
state is always trying to improve itself, trying to be more just. It is "a rebellion that begins
where the other society is satisfied to leave off, a rebellion against injustice that begins once
order begins."5' Although no state can be purely ethical, the liberal state at least strives for
ethics. Such a state is the desideratum if politics cannot be ethical. There is no politics for
accomplishing the moral, but there are certainly some politics which are further from it or
closer to it. For example, I've mentioned Stalinism to you. I've told you that justice is always a justice which desires a better
justice. This is the way that I will characterize the liberal state. The liberal
state is a state which holds justice as
the absolutely desirable end and hence as a perfection. Concretely, the liberal state has
always admitted ¶ alongside the written law-human rights as a parallel institution. It continues
to preach that within its justice there are always improvements to be made in human rights.
Human rights are the reminder that there is no justice yet. And consequently, I believe that it
is absolutely obvious that the liberal state is more moral than the fascist state, and closer to
the morally ideal state.32¶
The ethical and the political are not separated-politics is the ethical relationship
between more than one Other. Infusing Levinasian ethics into politics will
create a more ethical, less violent state.
Simmons, associate prof social sciences ASU, 2003
William Paul Simmons, associate professor of social sciences at Arizona State University, 2003,
“An-Archy and Justice: An Introduction to Emmanuel Levinas’s Political Thought”
Therefore, Levinas distinguishes the ethical relationship with the Other from justice which
involves three or more people.2° The an-archical relationship with the Other is the pre-linguistic world of the saying.
Language is unnecessary to respond to the Other. The Third, however, demands an explanation. "In its frankness it [language]
refuses the clandestinity of love, where it loses its frankness and meaning and turns into laughter or cooing. The third party looks at
me in the eyes of the Other-.language is justice."2' In order to judge between Others, they must be co-present, or synchronous.
Thus, the Third also opens up the world of knowledge and consciousness. "Here is the hour and birthplace of the question: a
demand for justice! Here is the obligation to compare unique and incomparable others; here is the hour of knowledge and, then, of
the objectivity beyond or on the hither side of the nudity of the face; here is the hour of consciousness and intentionality."22¶
Finally, the
Third introduces the realm of politics. The ego's infinite respon-¶ sibility must be
extended to all humanity, no matter how far off. Ethics must be universalized and
institutionalized to affect the others. "To the extent that someone else's Face brings us in
relation with a third party, My metaphysical relation to the Other is transformed into a We,
and works toward a State, institutions and laws which form the source of universality."¶ Before
delving into the relationship between ethics and politics, several implications of Levinas's move from the Other to the Third need to
be addressed. First, does the ego still have an infinite responsibility for the Other? In Otherwise than Being, Levinas defines justice as
"the limit of responsibility and the birth of the question?'24 However, in the same work, he also claims that "in no way is justice a
degradation of obsession, a degeneration of the for-the-other, a diminution, a limitation of anarchic responsibility.us How can these
conflicting statements be resolved? Either
justice limits the responsibility for the Other or it does not.
The contradiction is resolved by considering, once again, Levinas's theoretical emphasis on the
separation between the saying and the said. Ethics is found in the an-archical realm of the
saying, while justice is a part of the totalizing realm of the said. Ethics and justice exist in both relation and
separation. Neither can be reduced to the other. Thus, justice cannot diminish the infinite responsibility for the Other the ego
remains infinitely, asymmetrically, and concretely responsible for the Other. This responsibility always maintains its potency.
However, the ego is also invariably transported by the Third into the realm of the said. The ego must weigh its obligations. It is not
possible to respond infinitely to all Others. The original demand for an infinite responsibility remains, but it cannot be fulfilled. Ethics
must be universalized, but in attempting to do so, the ego has already reneged on its responsibility for the Other. Thus, Levinas's
peculiar formulation; justice is un-ethical and violent "Only justice can wipe it [ethical responsibility] away by bringing this givingoneself to my neighbor under measure, or moderating it by thinking in relation to the third and the fourth, who are also my 'others,'
but justice is already the first violence."¶
The State is the beginning of all violence-not helping those who aren’t “its own”
ignores responsibility for the other and is the root cause of all violence. ¶
Aronowicz, prof Judaism Franklin and Marshall, 2006¶ Annette Aronowicz, professor of Judaic studies at Franklin and
Marshall College, Summer 2006, “Levinas and Politics”
http://66.102.1.104/scholar?q=cache:5L5lnjhcUSgJ:scholar.google.com/+levinas%2Bholocaust%2Bpolitics&hl=en ¶ ¶ What remains
after so much bloodshed and tears shed in the name of immortal principles is individual sacrifice, which, amidst the dialectical
rebounds of justice and all its contradictory aboutfaces, without any hesitation finds a straight and sure way (1990: 29). Once again,
we have a very violent reality, “the cruelty inherent in rational order (and¶ perhaps simply in Order)”
says Levinas (1990: 29). Countering this is the act of protection and mercy extended from one to the
other. This is not to suggest that Levinas’ solution to the problem of violence lies simply in the
individual’s act of responsibility. It is neither that simple nor that simplistic. In ‘Judaism and revolution’, a very complex
commentary dealing with the relationship of the Jewish tradition and the State, Levinas makes clear that the State
itself is responsible for guaranteeing conditions that permit for the fulfillment of the human
(Levinas 1990: 99). Yet the State claims a universalism that is deceptive, for while it attempts to
protect the individual person, it limits that protection to its own and thus divides the world
into an ‘us and them’, quelling the responsibility of one to the other, beyond any distinctions whatsoever.
The Jewish tradition’s universalism, on the other hand, does not recognize limits to responsibility for the other person. It thus
introduces a wedge between the Jewish people and the State, for the latter cannot limit the responsibility of the former. As such, the
Jewish tradition always signals a loyalty beyond the State, and propels political activity in two directions. The first is in the direction
of care for the most vulnerable members within it, setting the standard by which the State offers guarantees against dehumanization
(Levinas 1990: 99-100). The second is in refusing to identify the good with a particular State, thus preventing the State from turning
into an object of idolatry. Levinas
warns, however, that even a¶ revolutionary movement whose aim is to
overthrow a hopelessly corrupt government can turn into a mirror image of the violence it
contests, dividing the world into us and them just as much. A revolution always risks the very
thing it is opposing. This does not mean that revolution is never justified but once again, we
are left, as our only recourse, vigilance against abuses, rather than a once and for all
transformation: Revolutionary action is first of all the action of the isolated man who plans revolution not only in danger but
also in the agony of conscience. In the agony of conscience that risks making revolution impossible: for
it is not only a question of seizing the evil-doer but also of not making the innocent suffer
(Levinas 1990:¶ 110).
This isn’t to say we should reject the state-rather that it’s in a permanent
revolution to always become more ethical. We must help by taking individual
responsibility to check its instituions -without ethics we all face unlimited
violence.¶
Simmons, associate prof social sciences ASU, 2003¶ William Paul Simmons, associate
professor of social sciences at Arizona State University, 2003, “An-Archy and Justice: An
Introduction to Emmanuel Levinas’s Political Thought”¶
According to Levinas, the move from the Other to the Third is the beginning of all violence. In the realm
of the said, the ego must necessarily weigh others in the name of justice, but this process reduces the Other to a cipher. Strangely
enough, justice is un-ethical. When justice is universalized into laws and institutions it moves yet another step away from the anarchical responsibility for the Other. The necessary universalization of ethical responsibility into the state is inherently un-ethical and
violent. In
the state, the ego is unable to respond directly to the face of the Other. Further, the
institutions of the state treat the Other as an interchangeable cog in its machinery, thereby
denying the transcendent element in man. Even when the state functions perfectly it is, by its
very nature, opposed to ethics. "For me, the negative element, the element of violence in the state, in the hierarchy,
appears even when the hierarchy functions perfectly, when everyone submits to universal ideas. There are cruelties which are terrible
because they proceed from the necessity of the reasonable order. There are, if you like, the tears that a civil servant cannot see: the
tears of the Other.'45¶ Vigilance
against violence in the state is essential. Institutions need to be
constantly checked by the ethical relationship with the Other. "In order for things to work and in order for
things to develop an equilibrium, it is absolutely necessary to affirm the infinite responsibility of each,
for each, before each . .. . As I see it, subjective protest is not received favorably on the
pretext that its egoism is sacred, but because the 1 alone can perceive the 'secret tears' of the
Other which are caused by the functioning-albeit reasonable-of the hierarchy."4'¶ The state
must be constantly reminded of its inherent violence. Levinas finds just such a self-critical
state in the modem liberal state. The liberal state "always asks itself whether its own justice
really is justice. "17¶ What qualities does the liberal state possess that makes it self-critical? First, there is the freedom of the
press, the freedom to criticize the government, to speak out against injustice. "You know the prophets of the bible, they come and say
to the king that his method of dispensing justice is wrong. The prophet doesn't do this in a clandestine way: he comes before the king
and he tells him. In the liberal state, it's the press, the poets, the writers who fulfill this role."48 ¶ Second, in the liberal state, the leader
is not above the people, but is chosen from among the people. A ruler who is in an ethical relationship sees humanity through the
Other's eyes. Against the Platonic formulation that the best ruler is the one who is best in control of himself, Levinas argues that the
best ruler is the one who is in an ethical relationship with the Other. "The State, in accordance with its pure essence, is possible only if
the divine word enters into it; the prince¶ is educated in this knowledge."9¶ However,
for Levinas, the most important
component of the liberal state is its call for a "permanent revolution."50 The Levinasian liberal
state is always trying to improve itself, trying to be more just. It is "a rebellion that begins
where the other society is satisfied to leave off, a rebellion against injustice that begins once
order begins."5' Although no state can be purely ethical, the liberal state at least strives for
ethics. Such a state is the desideratum if politics cannot be ethical. There is no politics for
accomplishing the moral, but there are certainly some politics which are further from it or
closer to it. For example, I've mentioned Stalinism to you. I've told you that justice is always a justice which desires a better
justice. This is the way that I will characterize the liberal state. The liberal state is a state which holds justice as
the absolutely desirable end and hence as a perfection. Concretely, the liberal state has
always admitted ¶ alongside the written law-human rights as a parallel institution. It continues
to preach that within its justice there are always improvements to be made in human rights.
Human rights are the reminder that there is no justice yet. And consequently, I believe that it
is absolutely obvious that the liberal state is more moral than the fascist state, and closer to
the morally ideal state.32¶
The ethical and the political are not separated-politics is the ethical relationship
between more than one Other. Infusing Levinasian ethics into politics will
create a more ethical, less violent state.
Simmons, associate prof social sciences ASU, 2003
William Paul Simmons, associate professor of social sciences at Arizona State University, 2003,
“An-Archy and Justice: An Introduction to Emmanuel Levinas’s Political Thought”
Therefore, Levinas distinguishes the ethical relationship with the Other from justice which
involves three or more people.2° The an-archical relationship with the Other is the pre-linguistic world of the saying.
Language is unnecessary to respond to the Other. The Third, however, demands an explanation. "In its frankness it [language]
refuses the clandestinity of love, where it loses its frankness and meaning and turns into laughter or cooing. The third party looks at
me in the eyes of the Other-.language is justice."2' In order to judge between Others, they must be co-present, or synchronous.
Thus, the Third also opens up the world of knowledge and consciousness. "Here is the hour and birthplace of the question: a
demand for justice! Here is the obligation to compare unique and incomparable others; here is the hour of knowledge and, then, of
the objectivity beyond or on the hither side of the nudity of the face; here is the hour of consciousness and intentionality."22¶
Finally, the
Third introduces the realm of politics. The ego's infinite respon-¶ sibility must be
extended to all humanity, no matter how far off. Ethics must be universalized and
institutionalized to affect the others. "To the extent that someone else's Face brings us in
relation with a third party, My metaphysical relation to the Other is transformed into a We,
and works toward a State, institutions and laws which form the source of universality."¶ Before
delving into the relationship between ethics and politics, several implications of Levinas's move from the Other to the Third need to
be addressed. First, does the ego still have an infinite responsibility for the Other? In Otherwise than Being, Levinas defines justice as
"the limit of responsibility and the birth of the question?'24 However, in the same work, he also claims that "in no way is justice a
degradation of obsession, a degeneration of the for-the-other, a diminution, a limitation of anarchic responsibility.us How can these
conflicting statements be resolved? Either
justice limits the responsibility for the Other or it does not.
The contradiction is resolved by considering, once again, Levinas's theoretical emphasis on the
separation between the saying and the said. Ethics is found in the an-archical realm of the
saying, while justice is a part of the totalizing realm of the said. Ethics and justice exist in both relation and
separation. Neither can be reduced to the other. Thus, justice cannot diminish the infinite responsibility for the Other the ego
remains infinitely, asymmetrically, and concretely responsible for the Other. This responsibility always maintains its potency.
However, the ego is also invariably transported by the Third into the realm of the said. The ego must weigh its obligations. It is not
possible to respond infinitely to all Others. The original demand for an infinite responsibility remains, but it cannot be fulfilled. Ethics
must be universalized, but in attempting to do so, the ego has already reneged on its responsibility for the Other. Thus, Levinas's
peculiar formulation; justice is un-ethical and violent "Only justice can wipe it [ethical responsibility] away by bringing this giving-
oneself to my neighbor under measure, or moderating it by thinking in relation to the third and the fourth, who are also my 'others,'
but justice is already the first violence."¶
Responsibility towards the other is the basis for all ethical relations .¶
Peter Jowers Senior Lecturer in Politics at the University of the West of England. 2005 Trust, Risk, and Uncertainty. “Risk,
Sensibility, Ethics and Justice in the Later Levinas” Pgs. 47-73¶¶ \
The psyche senses a 'call' from outside, stemming from the proximate expressivity of the
Other. The psyche as incarnation senses another body in proximity; the Other as expressive
subjectivity. She, neighbour, makes demands on me, or in Levinasian terms - derived and profoundly reordered
from Heidegger -'calls' me, placing me under an injunction or command. The Other 'solicits", 'institutes', 'accuses' or 'elects' me to
cite some of the terms Levinas uses in this connection.
I am incarnate, I feel and, above all, am both an
enjoying and suffering sensate creature who involuntarily responds to and for the Other who
suffers and, at this very root or on this ground, can do no other but passively place myself at
their service, in their 'hour of need'. There is no choice. I am not a slave. In this involuntary
response to the Other, I found my human self in responsibility. Levinas repeatedly cites the
phrase 'Yes, I am here' as the psyche's response to the Other prior to any cognition as the
founding moment of sociality which is always laced within the said!¶ The psyche, as being-for-the-other,
needs incarnation and proximity. The self involuntarily responds to the Other's vulnerability via
sensibility, prior to any conscious sense of compassion, sympathy or empathy. I do not place
myself consciously in another's 'shoes' by first imagining my way into their suffering. I respond
affectively. The Other takes me hostage in the sense that I, as minimal sensate self, cannot
bear them suffering. I involuntarily respond to suffering because pain has happened to me
and their worse pain must be alleviated. My capacity for pain meets the vulnerability 1 being for the other. Such
affective truth' underpins our capacity for compassion. Otherwise we would remain coldly distance, dispassionate and uninvolved in
the late of the Other. Levinas writes:¶ It
is through the condition of being hostage that there can be in the
world, pity, compassion, pardon, proximity ... Being hostage is ... the condition for all
solidarity. (OR. 117)¶ Taking responsibility for the outrages suffered by the Other 'is the source of
all compassion' (OR: 116).¶ The psyche is the point at which the minimal sensate self and Other interlink to the point of
substitution, and the sense of being taken hostage occurs. Responsibility is placed on us. It informs our consciousness. Its flickering
traces haunt us as guilt, conscience, remorse, expiation) atonement. Is this capacity for guilt universal or merely linked to the
sacrificial structures of Abrahamic lineage (Derrida, 1992; 199S: 108-15)? Levinas writes:¶ The animation, the very pneuma of the
psyche, alterity in identity, is the identity of the body exposed to the other, becoming 'for the other', the possibility of giving. (0B:
69)¶ This pneuma, or breath, is literally and spiritually inspiration. It is a different type of 'breathing in', as involuntary as the air the
the approach of the other gives the self
ethical meaning, makes us human, takes us from the pure fatality and meaningless of a merely
material universe where the conscious ego locked up in its self-absorption merely finds
monotony, the horror of the monochrome materiality that Levinas always characterised as the 'there is' or 'it y
lungs take in. Just as air facilitates life prior to any intentionality, so too
a' and which always emerges from ontology and is assuaged by ethics. The Other in proximity as node brings out this new identity,
but is one at the service of the other'. Strangely, the Other brings a certain type of contradictory stabilisation to the self always in
danger of slipping back towards mere responsiveness to stimuli signaling either enjoyment or danger.
responsibility.
Response becomes
Rejection of Racism
Racism is the ultimate moral evil and must be rejected at all costs
Albert Memmi, Essayist qualified to write about the colonizer and the colonized, 2000.
RACISM, pg. 165.
http://books.google.com/books?id=lP8kKUKmOwAC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=fals
e accessed 7/20/12
Of course, this is debatable. There are those who think that if one is strong enough, the assault on and oppression of others is
permissible. But no one is ever sure of remaining the strongest. One day, per-haps, the roles will be reversed. All
unjust
society contains within itself the seeds of its own death. It is probably smarter to treat others with respect so
that they treat you with respect. "Recall," says the Bible, "that you were once a stranger in Egypt," which means both that you
ought to respect the stranger because you were a stranger yourself and that you risk
becoming one again someday. It is an ethical and a practical appeal—indeed, it is a contract, however implicit it might
be. In short, the refusal of racism is the condition for all theoretical and practical morality. Because,
in the end, the ethical choice commands the political choice, a just society must be a society
accepted by all. If this contractual principle is not accepted, then only conflict, violence, and
destruction will be our lot. If it is accepted, we can hope someday to live in peace. True, it is a
wager, but the stakes are irresistible.
Rejecting racism is a pre-requisite to founding a moral order. Utilitarian
considerations are irrelevant when racism runs rampant.
Albert Memmi, Essayist qualified to write about the colonizer and the colonized, 2000.
RACISM, pg. 165.
However, it remains true that one's moral
conduct only emerges from a choice; one has to want it. It is a choice
among other choices, and always debatable in its foundations and its consequences. Let us say, broadly speaking, that the
choice to conduct one-self morally is the condition for the establishment of a human order,
for which racism is the very negation. This is almost a redundancy. One cannot found a moral order, let
alone a legislative order, on racism, because racism signifies the exclusion of the other, and his or her
subjection to violence and domination. From an ethical point of view, if one can deploy a lit-tle religious language,
racism is "the truly capital sin."22 It is not an accident that almost all of humani-ty's spiritual traditions counsel respect
for the weak, for orphans, widows, or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical morality and disinterested
commandments. Such unanimity in the safeguarding of the other suggests the real utility of such
sentiments. All things considered, we have an interest in banishing injustice, because injustice
engenders violence and death. Of course, this is debatable. There are those who think that if one is strong enough, the
assault on and oppression of others is permissible. But no one is ever sure of remaining the strongest. One day,
per-haps, the roles will be reversed. All unjust society
Human worth and morality cannot exist with racism.
Albert Memmi, Essayist qualified to write about the colonizer and the colonized, 2000.
RACISM, pg. 165.
The struggle against racism will be long, difficult, without intermission, without remission, probably
never achieved, yet for this very reason, it is a struggle to be undertaken without surcease and without
concessions. One cannot be indulgent toward racism. One cannot even let the monster in the house,
especially not in a mask. To give it merely a foothold means to augment the bestial part in us and in other people which is
to diminish what is human. To accept the racist universe to the slightest degree is to endorse fear, injustice,
and violence. It is to accept the persistence of the dark history in which we still largely live. It is to agree that the outsider will
always be a possible victim (and which [person] man is not [themself] himself an outsider relative to someone else?).Racism
illustrates in sum, the inevitable negativity of the condition of the dominated; that is it illuminates
in a certain sense the entire human condition. The anti-racist struggle, difficult though it is, and always in question,
is nevertheless one of the prologues to the ultimate passage from animality to humanity. In that
sense, we cannot fail to rise to the racist challenge.
We have a moral obligation to reject racism even if we do not succeed, the less
racist choice is always the most moral choice. The Aff does not have to solve all
racism to garner offense.
Michael K. Brown et al, Department of Politics at the University of California. 2003
Whitewashing Race: the myth of a color-blind society, “Conclusion: Facing up to Race” pg. 229.
http://www.jonescollegeprep.org/ourpages/auto/2007/11/26/1196104740124/Facing%20Up%
20To%20Race.pdf accessed 7/20/12
Even if Derrick Bell is correct in his prognosis that durable racial inequality is permanent, it must be
challenged. It cannot be ignored. And while we celebrate diversity and applaud cultural pluralism, we do not think that
changing identities will eliminate or minimize the harsh reali-ties of the durable racial inequality we
have described in this book. Nor do we think that remedies for class inequality by themselves will over-come
persistent racial stratification. In fact, if our analysis of U.S. social policies since the New Deal reveals anything, it is the
folly of assuming class-specific policies will benefit all racial groups equally.
Objectivism
Humans are not entitled to rewards, only actions.
LEONARD PEIKOFF 09, Professor of Philosophy at Hunter College, Long Island University, and New York University,
Health Care is Not a Right, http://www.aynrand.org/site/DocServer/ARC_Health_Care_Is_Not_A_Right_2009.pdf?docID=2161, July
17, 2012
Now our only rights, the American viewpoint continues, are the rights to life, liberty, property, and the
pursuit of happiness. That’s all. According to the Founding Fathers, we are not born with a right to a trip to Disneyland,
or a meal at McDonald’s, or a kidney dialysis (nor with the 18th-century equivalent of these things). We have certain
specific rights—and only these. Why only these? Observe that all legitimate rights have one thing in
common: they are rights to action, not rewards from other people. The American rights
impose no obligations on other people, merely the negative obligation to leave you alone. The
system guarantees you the chance to work for what you want—not to be given it without
effort by somebody else. The right to life, e.g., does not mean that your neighbors have to feed and clothe you; it means
you have the right to earn your food and clothes yourself, if necessary by a hard struggle, and that no one can forcibly stop your
you have the right to
act, and to keep the results of your actions, the products you make, to keep them or to trade them with others, if you
struggle for these things or steal them from you if and when you have achieved them. In other words:
wish. But you have no right to the actions or products of others, except on terms to which they voluntarily agree.
Egoism allows you to help people – It is just done out of self interest
Michael J. Hurd, psychotherapist, life coach and author of Effective Therapy, 1999, “What's So
Bad About Being Selfish?, Capitalism Magazine”, http://capmag.com/article.asp?ID=145
Selfishness means acting in one’s rational self-interest. Contrary to popular opinion, all healthy individuals are
selfish. Choosing to pursue the career of your choice is selfish. Choosing to have children–or not
to have children–is selfish. Insisting on freedom and individual rights, rather than living under a
dictatorship, is selfish. Indeed, even ordinary behaviors such as breathing, eating and avoiding an
oncoming car when crossing the street are selfish acts. Without selfishness, none of us would
survive the day–much less a lifetime.
Individual Autonomy is Paramount.
David Kelley, Ph. D and Professor of Philosophy, 1993, Is There A Right to Health Care?,
http://www.atlassociety.org/is_health_care_a_right_obamacare, July 17, 2012
The rights of liberty are paramount because individuals are ends in themselves. We are not
instruments of society, or possessions of society. And if we are ends in ourselves, we have the right to
be ends for ourselves: to hold our own lives and happiness as our highest values, not to be
sacrificed for anything else. I think many people are afraid to assert their rights and interests as individuals, afraid to assert
these rights and interests as moral absolutes, because they are afraid of being labeled selfish. So it is vital that we draw certain
distinctions.
What I am advocating is not selfishness in the conventional sense: the vain, selfcentered, grasping pursuit of pleasure, riches, prestige, or power. Genuine happiness results
from a life of productive achievement, of stable relationships with friends and family, of peaceful exchange with
others. The pursuit of our self-interest in this sense requires that we act in accordance with
moral standards of rationality, responsibility, honesty, and fairness. If we understand the self and its
interests in terms of these values, then I am happy to acknowledge that I am advocating selfishness.
Citizens do not have a right to Healthcare; ergo the government is not obligated
to guarantee it.
John David Lewis, PhD, Visiting Associate Professor of Philosophy, Politics and Economics at Duke University, wrote in his Aug.
12, 2009 Huffington Post article "Health Care, Why Call It a 'Right'?
http://healthcare.procon.org/view.answers.php?questionID=001602, July 17, 2012
"[T]he very idea that health care -- or any good provided by others -- is a 'right' is a contradiction. The
rights enshrined in the Declaration of Independence were to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness. Each of these is a right to act, not a right to things... To reform our health care
industry we should challenge the premises that invited government intervention in the first
place. The moral premise is that medical care is a right. It is not. There was no 'right' to such care before
doctors, hospitals, and pharmaceutical companies produced it. There is no 'right' to anything that others must
produce, because no one may claim a 'right' to force others to provide it. Health care is a
service, and we all depend upon thinking professionals for it. To place doctors under hamstringing
bureaucratic control is to invite poor results."
The Affordable Care Act is Coercive
Peter Lindsay. June 2005. Polity Volume 37, Number 3. “Exposing the Invisible Hand: The Roots of Laissez-Faire's
Hidden Influence.” Pages 299-300. 7/18/12.
Economic liberalism regards market competition as superior not only because it is in most
circumstances the most efficient method known but even more because it is the only method
by which our activities can be adjusted to each other without coercive or arbitrary
intervention of authority. Indeed, one of the main arguments in favor of competition is that it
dispenses with the need for “conscious social control” and that it gives the individuals a chance to decide
whether the prospects of a particular occupation are sufficient to compensate for the
disadvantages and risks connected with it.
This use of coercion is shown in various ways in the Affordable Care Act (ACA), by penalizing
employers for not providing healthcare insurance so that employer provided healthcare is no
longer “voluntary,” by penalizing individuals who do not obtain healthcare insurance, and by
requiring the expansion by the states of the State Medicaid programs to cover a larger portion
of the population.¶ Coercion is not new to the healthcare field. The federal government has
long used its power of coercion to compel individuals and employers to pay the Medicare tax,
and while Medicare Part B is voluntary, higher income individuals who select Part B are required to pay a higher premium than the
vast majority of individuals participating in Part B. The Medicare and Medicaid programs, while “voluntary” for physicians but not for
hospitals in New Jersey, sets the rates they pay. What is missing so far in the discussion of ACOs and in the Massachusetts debate, is
a general obligation on the part of the beneficiaries as to their compliance with medical instructions, as well as their election to live a
healthy lifestyle. The
government has exercised some coercion in this area, for instance, with significantly
higher taxes on cigarettes as well as the numerous bans on smoking in various places.
Society’s experience with Prohibition has made it clear that that is not the approach to take
again, in the area of cigarettes, or quite frankly, in any other area. It should be noted that we are seeing
calls for the legalization of marijuana and the taxation of marijuana rather than continuation of the current prohibition against the
use of marijuana. A
similar approach is being taken in the area of alcohol with higher taxes on alcohol.¶
Whether or not this coercive tool, taxation or in the case of smoking, prohibition in certain
areas, will be extended to other activities or circumstances, such as obesity, which result in
additional healthcare costs is yet to be seen.
Citizens do not have a right to Healthcare; ergo the government is not obligated
to guarantee it.
John David Lewis, PhD, Visiting Associate Professor of Philosophy, Politics and Economics at Duke University, wrote in his Aug.
12, 2009 Huffington Post article "Health Care, Why Call It a 'Right'?
http://healthcare.procon.org/view.answers.php?questionID=001602, July 17, 2012
"[T]he very idea that health care -- or any good provided by others -- is a 'right' is a contradiction. The
rights enshrined in the Declaration of Independence were to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness. Each of these is a right to act, not a right to things... To reform our health care
industry we should challenge the premises that invited government intervention in the first
place. The moral premise is that medical care is a right. It is not. There was no 'right' to such care before
doctors, hospitals, and pharmaceutical companies produced it. There is no 'right' to anything that others must
produce, because no one may claim a 'right' to force others to provide it. Health care is a
service, and we all depend upon thinking professionals for it. To place doctors under hamstringing
bureaucratic control is to invite poor results."
Nozick
A government’s role is only that of a minimalist state.
Robert Nozick, Former Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University, 1974, Anarchy, State and Utopia,
Preface, pg ix,
http://books.google.com/books?id=hAi3CdjXlQsC&printsec=frontcover&dq=anarchy,+state+and+utopia&
hl=en&src=bmrr&sa=X&ei=a8wFULCLLIWHrgG_9IneCA&ved=0CDcQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=anarc
hy%2C%20state%20and%20utopia&f=false, Date accessed: 7/17/2012
Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them (without
violating their rights). So strong and far-reaching are these rights that they raise the question of what, if anything, the state and its officials
may do. How much room do individual rights leave for the state? The nature of the state, its legitimate functions and its justifications, if any, is the
central concern of this book; a wide and diverse variety of topics intertwine in the course of our investigation. Our main conclusions about the state are
a minimal state, limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud,
enforcement of contracts, and so on, is justified; that any more extensive state will violate
persons’ rights no to be forced to do certain things, and is unjustified; and that the minimal state is
inspiring as well as right. Two noteworthy implications are that the state may not use its coercive apparatus for the
purpose of getting some citizens to aid others, or in order to prohibit activities to people for
their own good or protection. Despite the fact that is only coercive routes toward these goals that are excluded, while voluntary ones
that
remain, many persons will reject our conclusions instantly, knowing they don’t want to believe anything so apparently callous toward the needs and
sufferings of others.
Dehum Bad
Dehumanization is the root of all evil.
Katheryn D. Katz, Professor of Law at Albany Law School, 1997, Albany Law Journal
It is undeniable that throughout human history dominant
and oppressive groups have committed unspeakable
wrongs against those viewed as inferior. Once a person (or a people) has been characterized as
sub-human, there appears to be no limit to the cruelty that was or will be visited upon him. For example, in
almost all wars, hatred towards the enemy was inspired to justify the killing and
wounding by separating the enemy from the human race, by casting them as unworthy
of human status. This same rationalization has supported: genocide, chattel slavery, racial
segregation, economic exploitation, caste and class systems, coerced sterilization of social
misfits and undesirables, unprincipled medical experimentation, the subjugation of women, and the
social Darwinists' theory justifying indifference to the poverty and misery of others.
have
en
Human Dignity
Respecting Human Dignity
Alison Barnes and Michael McChrystal Professors at Marquette University Law School JSTOR
The Various Human Rights in Healthcare Human Rights , Vol. 25, No. 4 (Fall 1998), pp. 12-14
http://www.jstor.org/stable/27880119 July 18 2012
One of the most important issues at stake in the contemporary health care debate is the claim
that the intrinsic value of persons requires a right to a basic level of health care. The argument
is simple but powerful. Respect for the incalculably great value of each person creates a duty
not only to refrain from destroying health a negative right but also a duty to take reasonable
steps to preserve and restore health by ensuring access to basic health care. Failing to act on
this duty, by allowing lives to be shortened or diminished in quality because of lack of access
to basic health care, expresses callous disregard for the dignity of human life.
DA
Econ DA
Shell
A. Uniqueness United States Hiring On The Rise
Dennis Cauchon USA today reporter and Correspondent. 6/27/12 Hiring rebounds for state, local governments.
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-06-27/state-local-hiring/55868796/1 Access date- 7/21/12
a rare bright sign for the job market, state and local governments are hiring at the fastest
pace in four years.States, cities, counties and school districts hired 828,000 workers in the first four months of the year, up
20% from a year earlier, and the most since 2008, according to a USA TODAY analysis of the government's Job
Openings and Labor Turnover Survey. The number of job openings at state and local governments also
hit a four-year high. This lift in government hiring shows how state budget problems have eased in recent months as tax
collections have improved. Total revenue is flat because extra federal aid is drying up. But tax money revenue generally
is spent on workers, especially at the local level, while federal aid is often dedicated to outside
vendors, such as health care providers in the Medicaid program and highway contractors. "We're
hiring as many as we can," says Tucson police recruitment officer Liz Skeenes. "In the last few years, we
haven't hired as many officers as we needed because of financial problems. Now we're going
back to full force, and we're happy about that." Tucson — like other state and local governments — still
expects to live with a smaller workforce than the 2008 peak. What's happening: Governments are filling jobs that had
been left vacant to save money. State and local governments employ 19.6 million, down 3% from the peak. The
recent jump in hiring is an early signal that job growth may be on the way, at least in government. It
In
takes six months to a year for a boost in hiring to create a bigger workforce. Reason for the lag: Government workers are quitting for
new jobs and retiring in greater numbers. Voluntary departures are another sign of an improving job market. When times are tough,
workers hang on to their jobs. The "don't-leave" phenomenon — not more hiring — is what caused government payrolls to swell to
record numbers during the recession while private employment collapsed. Private
companies are hiring a little more,
too, up 4% in the first four months of 2012 from a year earlier. That's a weak rebound when measured
against hiring declines every year from 2006 to 2009, including a 20% hiring drop in 2009. The hiring turnaround has been most
dramatic, starting last August, in the nation's state and local governments. These 89,500 cities, park districts, sewer systems and
other governments are a backbone of working-class America, employing millions of low-profile truck drivers, health care aides and
motor vehicle clerks with decent pay, good benefits and exceptional job security
B. Link: Economy Doing Well According to Fed
Reuters News 7/18/12 U.S. Economy Expanding Modestly, Fed Says.
http://www.foxbusiness.com/economy/2012/07/18/us-economy-expanding-modestly-fed-says/ Access date- 7/20/12
and hiring grew at a tepid pace in much of the
country, the Federal Reserve said on Wednesday. "Reports from most of the twelve Federal
Reserve districts indicated that overall economic activity continued to expand at a modest to
moderate pace in June and early July," the central bank said in its latest "Beige Book" summary of
Economic growth in the United States cooled in June and early July
national activity. The Fed's previous Beige Book assessment of the economy, released on June 6, had painted growth in slightly more
upbeat light, describing it as "moderate." The Beige Book, prepared this time by the Atlanta Fed based on information collected
through July 9, has market interest because it is based on anecdotal reports from business people from coast to coast and will be
"Employment levels improved at a tepid pace
for most districts," the Fed said. In its previous assessment, the Fed said hiring was steady or
increasing moderately. Many economists now think economic growth slowed in the second quarter, perhaps sharply. The
used by Fed policymakers at their next meeting on July 31-Aug. 1.
pace of hiring in the United States slowed sharply during the period, as did growth in factory output. Retail sales have also flagged in
The Fed found businesses were still optimistic about the economy, but some companies
"Overall,
districts reported that their contacts remained cautiously optimistic," the Fed said. The central
bank said inflation pressures appeared to be modest, in part because of modest wage
pressures.
recent months.
were holding back on hiring because they were unsure about the future of government policies on taxes and spending.
Pharmaceutical DA 1NC
Link UHC
Free health care kills pharmacy innovation through a loss of profit.
Brown ‘04, Staff Writer, 04
(John Brown, Staff Writer, The Daily Beacon, Senior in Political Science, 9/28/04, http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/fnews/1229567/posts,dw)
Let's pretend, for a moment, that the left gets its way, and the United States adopts a universal health care
system. This profit motive will effectively be removed. Doctors will then be government employees, and, as
such, have far less accountability, as well as lower pay. Could we still expect the best and brightest
to strive to be doctors? Probably not. More than likely, they will pursue other careers where they can make more
money. Some love to bemoan the fact that the United States is one of the few industrialized nations without a government health
care system. Yet they rarely note that the
United States produces disproportional amounts of the new,
life-saving drugs, largely because of the profits drug companies make. Will we continue to produce
these drugs if we abolish the profit motive? Not likely. Chances are, they will not be produced at all, and more
people will needlessly suffer and die as a result. When we examine countries that have embraced socialized
medicine, we find long waiting lists, expansive red tape and little concern for the individual. Do you really want to be told which
doctor to go to? Do you want to wait years to have necessary medical procedures performed? If so, then socialized medicine is for
you. But if you believe in individual rights, competent healthcare and sound economic policies, we must get the government out of
the doctor's office.
Free health care kills because it creates long waiting lists for life saving
surgeries
Schwartz ‘08 (Brian Schwartz, Staff analyst for ppn,““Universal” Health Care Kills”,2008 March
25,http://www.patientpowernow.org/2008/03/universal-health-care-kills/)
¶ What good is having
medical insurance if you cannot get medical care? Peddlers of “universal health care” — from Hillary, Obama,
to Colorado congressional candidate Jared Polis — don’t get this.¶ ¶ “Universal
health care” is false advertising for
politically-controlled medicine, with government as the “single-payer” monopolistic insurer. But having coverage does
not guarantee getting medical care.¶ ¶ Since patients prepay through taxes, medical care
appears “free.” Hence, they have strong incentive to over-consume and providers need not
compete on price. To contain costs, governments restrict your access to life-saving treatment.
In countries with such “universal coverage,” patients die waiting for treatment.¶ ¶ The Canadian
Medical Association Journal reports that in one year, 71 Ontario patients died while waiting for coronary
bypass surgery and over one hundred more became “medically unfit for surgery.” The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
reports that “109 people had a heart attack or suffered heart failure while on the waiting list. Fifty of those patients died.”¶ ¶ This
week the Globe and Mail reported that¶ ¶ Inside Sylvia de Vries lurked an enormous tumour and fluid totalling 18 kilograms. But not
even that massive weight gain and a diagnosis of ovarian cancer could assure her timely treatment in Canada.¶ ¶ She sought
treatment in the United States, as do Canadians in need of intensive care and emergency cardiac care.¶ ¶ “Physicians
across
Canada are in an advanced stage of burnout due to work conditions” which “causes them to
retire early…or simply leave,” a former Canadian Medical Association president told the New York Times. He “attributed
much of the problem to technological shortages and the powerlessness doctors feel when patients complain about long waits for
treatment.”¶ ¶ “Access to a waiting list is not access to healthcare ,” wrote Canadian Chief Justice McLachlin
when striking down legislation banning private insurance in 2005. Last year a New York Times headline read: “As Canada’s SlowMotion Public Health System Falters, Private Medical Care Is Surging.”¶ ¶ And England? The BBC reports that “up
to 500 heart
patients die each year while they wait for potentially life-saving surgery.” The Times reports that a
British woman “will be denied free National Health Service treatment for breast cancer if she seeks to improve her chances by
paying privately for an additional drug.” A Daily Telegraph headline reads: “Sufferers pull out teeth due to lack of dentists.” “Doctors
are calling for NHS treatment to be withheld from patients who are too old or who lead unhealthy lives,” reports another article.¶ ¶
Consider politically-controlled health care in America: Medicaid and Medicare. Doctors are five times more likely to refuse seeing
new Medicaid patients than privately-insured patients. Increasing reimbursement rates won’t help much; more than two-thirds of
doctors reported being overwhelmed by Medicaid’s billing requirements, paperwork, and delays in payment.¶ ¶ ABC News reports
that “Medicare rules bar cancer drugs for patients,” including the privately-insured. As the population ages and Medicare costs
continue to increase, Medicare may further restrict patients and doctors.¶ ¶ “Single payer” advocates cite international comparisons
of life expectancy to support their cause. But life expectancy depends on factors unrelated to healthcare, such as unintentional
injury and homicide. Health economist Robert Ohsfeldt found that when accounting for these two factors, life expectancy in America
is comparable to that of Canada and England.¶ ¶ What really matters is your chance of surviving a serious illness. The American
Cancer Society reported that “U.S. patients have better survival rates than European patients for most types of cancer.” Last August
the Telegraph reported that the “UK cancer survival rate lowest in Europe,” and that it’s highest in the United States.¶ ¶ So if
politically-controlled medicine isn’t the solution, what is?¶ ¶ Not a Massachusetts-style “individual mandate,” which forces everyone
to buy insurance. This is essentially single-payer in disguise. Insurance regulations severely limit competition, so insurance
companies are effectively government contractors for politically-defined insurance.¶ ¶ The Boston Globe reports that to contain
costs, Massachusetts authorities will “probably cut payments to doctors and hospitals” and “reduce choices for patients.” Sound
familiar?¶ ¶ Instead, we must recognize how government policies have crippled free markets.¶ ¶ Because the tax code deeply
discounts employer-provided insurance, you’re essentially stuck with your employer’s non-portable plans. Hence, insurance
companies can afford to be stingy and deny you care; they know that losing you as a customer requires that you change jobs. With
government as “single-payer” it’s even worse: to change insurance providers you must move
to a different state or country.¶ ¶ Our current system also encourages thoughtless overconsumption and skyrocketing costs. The tax code punishes paying for medical care out-of-pocket and rewards buying
insurance. So “insurance” has become prepaid medicine, and patients over-consume like business travelers dining on their
company’s expense account.¶ ¶ Further, legislation mandating minimum benefits makes insurance unaffordable for many. Consider:
Colorado law compels widowed wives to pay higher premiums for prostate screening, maternity, and marital therapy. Sponsors of
Colorado House Bill 08-1327 recognize this injustice. Just as businesses incorporated in other states can operate in Colorado,
Coloradans should be able to buy affordable policies from insurance companies that meet less damaging regulations of another
state.¶ ¶ So remember, the uninsured aren’t the problem, but a symptom of political meddling in our most important personal
choices.
Heg
Heg Stable
Hegemony High – General
US primacy unmatched
Flourney, Co-Founder Center for a New American Security, and Davidson, Professor Public
Policy George Mason, ’12 (Michele- Former US Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and JanineFormer US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans, July/August, “Obama’s New Global
Posture” Foreign Affairs, Vol 91 Issue 4, EbscoHost)
TOUGH ECONOMIC times have often been met in the United States by calls for a more modest foreign policy. But despite the
global economic downturn, in today's interdependent world, retrenchment would be misguided. The United
States' ability to lead the international community is still invaluable and unmatched. Its
economy is still by far the largest, most developed, and most dynamic in the world. Its military
remains much more capable than any other. The United States' network of alliances and
partnerships ensures that the country rarely has to act alone. And its soft power reflects the
sustained appeal of American values. The United States should not reduce its overseas engagement when it is in a
position to actively shape the global environment to secure its interests.
US primacy unmatched – military and relative economic clout
Dorfman, Editor of Ethics and International Affairs, 5-22-’12 (Zach, “What We Talk About
When We Talk About Isolationism” Dissent Magazine,
http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/articles_papers_reports/0127.html)
The rise of China notwithstanding, the United States remains the world's sole superpower. Its military
(and to a considerable extent, political) hegemony extends not just over North America or even the
Western hemisphere, but also Europe, large swaths of Asia, and Africa. Its interests are global;
nothing is outside its potential sphere of influence. There are an estimated 660 to 900 American military bases
in roughly 40 countries worldwide, although figures on the matter are notoriously difficult to ascertain, largely because of
subterfuge on the part of the military. According to official data there
are active-duty U.S. military personnel in
75 percent of the world's states. The United States checks Russian power in
Europe and Chinese power in South Korea and Japan and Iranian power in Iraq, Afghanistan,
and Turkey. In order to maintain a frigid peace between Israel and Egypt, the American government hands the former $2.7
148 countries, or over
billion in military aid every year, and the latter $1.3 billion. It also gives Pakistan more than $400 million dollars in military aid
annually (not including counterinsurgency operations, which would drive the total far higher), Jordan roughly $200 million, and
Colombia over $55 million. U.S.
long-term military commitments are also manifold. It is one of the five
permanent members of the UN Security Council, the only institution legally permitted to
sanction the use of force to combat "threats to international peace and security." In 1949, the
United States helped found NATO, the first peacetime military alliance extending beyond North and South America in U.S. history,
which now has 28 member states. The United States also has a trilateral defense treaty with Australia and New Zealand, and
bilateral mutual defense treaties with Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and South Korea. It is this
Madeleine Albright to
sort of reach that led
call the United States the sole "indispensable power" on the world stage.
Hegemony High – Military
US military primacy unmatched
Kagan, Foreign Policy at Carnegie, 1-17-’12 (Robert, “Not Fade Away: Against the Myth of
American Decline” http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2012/0117_us_power_kagan.aspx)
Military capacity matters, too, as early nineteenth-century China learned and Chinese leaders know today. As Yan Xuetong recently noted, “military
strength underpins hegemony.” Here the United States remains unmatched. It is far and away
the most powerful nation the world has ever known, and there has been no decline in
America’s relative military capacity—at least not yet. Americans currently spend less than $600 billion
a year on defense, more than the rest of the other great powers combined. (This figure does not include the
deployment in Iraq, which is ending, or the combat forces in Afghanistan, which are likely to diminish steadily over the next couple of years.) They do so, moreover, while
consuming a little less than 4 percent of GDP annually—a higher percentage than the other great powers, but in historical terms
lower than the 10 percent of GDP that the United States spent on defense in the mid-1950s and the 7 percent it spent in the late 1980s. The superior
expenditures underestimate America’s actual superiority in military capability. American land
and air forces are equipped with the most advanced weaponry, and are the most experienced
in actual combat. They would defeat any competitor in a head-to-head battle. American naval power remains predominant
in every region of the world.
Rising powers don’t reduce US power projection capabilities
Kagan, Foreign Policy at Carnegie, 1-17-’12 (Robert, “Not Fade Away: Against the Myth of
American Decline” http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2012/0117_us_power_kagan.aspx)
But what about the “rise of the rest”—the increasing economic clout of nations like China, India,
Brazil, and Turkey? Doesn’t that cut into American power and influence? The answer is, it depends. The fact that other nations in the world
are enjoying periods of high growth does not mean that America’s position as the
predominant power is declining, or even that “the rest” are catching up in terms of overall power and influence. Brazil’s share of
global GDP was a little over 2 percent in 1990 and remains a little over 2 percent today. Turkey’s share was under 1 percent in 1990 and
is still under 1 percent today. People, and especially businesspeople, are naturally excited about these emerging markets,
but just because a nation is an attractive investment opportunity does not mean it is a rising
great power. Wealth matters in international politics, but there is no simple correlation between economic growth and international influence. It is not
clear that a richer India today wields greater influence on the global stage than a poorer India
did in the 1950s under Nehru, when it was the leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, or that Turkey, for all the independence and flash of Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, really wields more influence than it did a decade ago. As for the effect of these growing economies on the position of the United States, it all
depends on who is doing the growing. The problem for the British Empire at the beginning of the twentieth century was not its substantial decline relative to the United States, a
generally friendly power whose interests did not fundamentally conflict with Britain’s. Even in the Western hemisphere, British trade increased as it ceded dominance to the
United States. The problem was Britain’s decline relative to Germany, which aimed for supremacy on the European continent, and sought to compete with Britain on the high
seas, and in both respects posed a threat to Britain’s core security. In the case of the United States, the dramatic and rapid rise of the German and Japanese economies during
the Cold War reduced American primacy in the world much more than the more recent “rise of the rest.” America’s share of the world’s GDP, nearly 50 percent after World War
II, fell to roughly 25 percent by the early 1970s, where it has remained ever since. But that “rise of the rest” did not weaken the United States. If anything, it strengthened it.
Germany and Japan were and are close democratic allies, key pillars of the American world order. The growth of their economies actually shifted the balance irretrievably
against the Soviet bloc and helped bring about its demise. When gauging the impact of the growing economies of other countries today, one has to make the same kinds of
Does the growth of the Brazilian economy, or of the Indian economy, diminish
American global power? Both nations are friendly, and India is increasingly a strategic partner of the United States. If
America’s future competitor in the world is likely to be China, then a richer and more
powerful India will be an asset, not a liability, to the United States. Overall, the fact that Brazil, India, Turkey, and South Africa are
calculations.
enjoying a period of economic growth—which may or may not last indefinitely—is either irrelevant to America’s strategic position or of benefit to it. At present, only the growth
of China’s economy can be said to have implications for American power in the future, and only insofar as the Chinese translate enough of their growing economic strength into
military strength.
No Challengers
US primacy unmatched – no nation is a real threat
Friedman, Defense Fellow at Cato, and Logan, Director of Foreign Policy at Cato, ’12
(Benjamin- PhD Candidate PolSci at MIT, and Justin; Spring, “Why the U.S. Military Budget is
‘Foolish and Sustainable’” Orbis)
The dirty little secret of U.S. defense politics is that the United States is safe—probably the
most secure great power in modern history. Weak neighbors, vast ocean barriers, nuclear
weapons and the wealth to build up forces make almost nonexistent the threats that
militaries traditionally existed to thwart. Americans cannot seriously fear territorial conquest,
civil war, annexation of peripheral territories, or blockade. What passes for enemies here are
small potatoes compared with what worried most states at most times. 4 Most U.S. military
interventions affect U.S. security at best marginally. We have hopes and sometimes interests in
the places where we send troops, but no matter how much we repeat it to honor the troops, it
is untrue that they are fighting to protect our freedom.
No challengers to US primacy
Blumenthal, Fellow at AEI, 3-22-’11 (Dan, “Why it’s Still a Unipolar Era”
http://www.american.com/archive/2011/march/why-its-still-a-unipolar-era/article_print)
Sometimes it takes a crisis to dispense with intellectual fads. The world’s response to Libya has made clear that currently fashionable arguments
about the “rise of the Rest” and the world’s new “nonpolarity” are simply untrue. Charles Krauthammer
was wrong about one thing in his description of the “unipolar moment” at the end of the Cold War: We are not living in a unipolar moment,
we are witnessing a unipolar era. Why? Because the “rest”—China and India—are unable and unwilling to
lead. The current fashion in foreign policy argumentation is to explain that America is in decline, particularly relative to
Asia. The new declinists usually line up an impressive array of statistics that tell a story of India and China’s high rates of economic growth, military spending, energy
consumption, and so on. The new declinists have a point—the raw numbers are impressive. But
power is about much more than raw
numbers. It is the most elusive concept in politics. It usually cannot be measured accurately until it is used. The recent example of the West’s decision to use force
against Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi is a case in point. The United States was supposed to be entering a
new era of constraints, perhaps even decline, bound by a severe financial debt crisis and an unwillingness to properly fund our military forces. Moreover, we
have a president as ambivalent about exercising American power as we have seen in a generation. President Obama did all he could to dither and procrastinate while Qaddafi
Obama understood two things: the world order Washington needs
demands that Qaddafi be stopped, and only America could stop him. Obama’s rhetoric about the United States not
butchered his people. After all the hand-wringing, President
being in the lead against Qaddafi is just that: rhetoric meant to further a bizarre public relations agenda (Does anyone in the Middle East really believe we are not leading the
effort in Libya? What purpose does pretending to take a back seat serve except to satisfy the Western left-wing intelligentsia?). Until President Obama directed his staff to
secure a UN Security Council resolution and commit the U.S. military to stopping Qaddafi, the “international community” was paralyzed by inaction. The United Kingdom and
France admirably made a strong moral and strategic case for intervention, but could not act without U.S. leadership. What about China and India, countries that the new
declinists identify as the future guardians of world order? The best that could be said is they did not get in the way. Of the two, India is the greater disappointment. Washington
applauds the potential of the relationship based in part on India’s impressive democracy. India’s democratic character is supposed to bind it with the West to keep strong the
liberal order that characterizes international politics. But with its decision to abstain from a resolution that would end Qaddafi’s treachery, Delhi demonstrated that shared
values do not extend to preventing a dictator from butchering his people. Delhi’s multicultural democracy is impressive and there may be great potential for cooperation with
Washington. But until Delhi sheds the vestiges of its self-indulgent and sentimental non-alignment policies, the chances that it will exercise power on the world stage in a
positive and meaningful way remain low. For the foreseeable future, Washington and Delhi are fated to cooperate on a narrow set of issues much closer to India’s borders. Then
the idea
that China will rise to world leadership presupposes that Beijing has some vision of world
order beyond protecting its material interests. But so long as a committee of nine dictators rule China, this idea is a fantasy. In a country
there is China. Who knows why China decided to abstain rather than threaten a veto. Perhaps Beijing did not want another confrontation with Washington. But
in which citizens are blocked from Internet searches of the words “Arab” and “democracy,” it is farfetched to expect any help in felling extremists. Even closer to China’s
borders, in Afghanistan—a country whose failure can have serious deleterious consequences for China—Beijing has not seen fit to shed a drop of its blood or spend a yuan of its
treasure. Instead, while NATO and the United States fight and die for stability in South Asia, China has been building a military that can challenge the United States in the Pacific.
The net effect is a less peaceful world. Instead of contributing to the stability from which it benefits, China has made it more costly for the United States to provide the public
while measures of power such as gross domestic product
growth, numbers of scientists and engineers, and shares of decision-making in international
bodies may tell us something about a country’s power, they do not tell us enough. These
crude calculations of power miss the intangibles of leadership: political culture, values, and
purpose. The West has a set of ideas about how the world should run. This vision includes the sometime necessity of
goods upon which Asia’s prosperity depends. In turns out that
deposing a brutal dictator. India and China do not see a purpose for international politics beyond advancing narrow self-interest. The fact that India is
democratic means that it may one day decide to join the ideological West and exercise international power for grander purposes. China is run by dictators. Until that changes,
the most Washington should expect is for Beijing not to make problems worse. Forget about China
becoming a responsible stakeholder in the international system. Our diplomacy should encourage China to become a less irresponsible power. What the new declinists miss is
while the United States is not as far ahead of India and China in material strength as it used
to be, the vision of world order it shares with its NATO allies provides it with a moral strength
and legitimacy impossible to measure. The new declinists point to the ways in which the “Rest” can make life marginally more difficult for the
West. But while the “Rest” may carp from the sidelines and gum up the works on international
trade and financial agreements, when it comes to upholding international order, Delhi and
Beijing will take a pass. We may be tiring of it, but the Unipolar Era is alive and well.
that
An economic crisis would collapse heg
Joshua Zoffer July 7, 2012 3:11 PM Harvard International Review The United States’
Undoing? http://hir.harvard.edu/crafting-the-city/future-of-dollar-hegemony?page=0,2
Page 3 Access Date: 7/18/12
Despite the dollar’s long history as the international reserve currency, the past
few years have seen a growing number of calls for the end of dollar hegemony.
Countries as diverse as France, Russia, and China have decried the dollar’s
monopoly in foreign exchange markets, while in 2009 reports of a shift away
from dollar-based oil trading surfaced in the Middle East. Reported plans to
move away from the dollar reflected international frustration at a system
fueling the United States’ “exorbitant privilege,” as the French have called it, one that
rests its stability on the financial conditions of a country mired in debt and
facing a financial meltdown. The implications of a true end to dollar hegemony,
a shift away from the dollar as a reserve currency and pricing standard for oil
transactions, could be catastrophic for the United States. In the worst case
scenario, a drastic drop in demand for dollar-denominated assets would cause
the interest rates on Treasury Securities to skyrocket, sending ripples through
the US economy as the value of the dollar plummets. What is certain, however, is
that whatever decrease in demand for US debt occurs will constrain the federal
government’s ability to spend and the ability of the United States to defend
itself. The United States has built its foreign policy around its vast military
capability; a sudden budgetary shock and drop in military spending would leave
the United States vulnerable as it scrambles to regroup in a new security
environment. The ability of the United States to respond to threats across the
globe would be diminished, and enemies would be incentivized to take
aggressive action to take advantage of this new weakness. In particular, a
rapidly militarizing China might be emboldened by its partial decoupling from
US economic fortunes to adopt a bolder stance in the South China Sea,
threatening US allies and heightening tensions with the United States. While war
with China is all but off the table in the status quo, an international system devoid of both US military might and Chinese
dependence on US debt as a place to park excess liquidity might lead to the conflict feared on both sides of the Pacific
Heg Good-Stability
US hegemony key to maintain world stability and check back major wars
Thayer 2007 (Bradley. A is an Associate Professor in the Dept. of Defense and Strategic
Studies at Missouri State University, “American Empire: A Debate”, Taylor and Francis Group,
2007, MJB) Stability –
Peace, like good health, is not often noticed, but certainly is missed when absent. Throughout
history, peace and stability have been a major benefit of empires. In fact, pax Romana in Latin
means the Roman peace, or the stability brought about by the Roman Empire. Rome’s power
was so overwhelming that no one could challenge it successfully for hundreds of years. The result
was stability within the Roman Empire. Where Rome conquered, peace, law, order, education, a common language, and much else
followed. That was true of the British Empire (pax Britannica) too.
So it is with the United States today. Peace
and stability are major benefits of the American Empire. The fact that America is so powerful
actually reduces the likelihood of major war. Scholars of international politics have found that
the presence of a dominant state in international politics actually reduces the likelihood of
war because weaker states, including even great powers, know that it is unlikely that they
could challenge the dominant state and win. They may resort to other mechanisms or tactics
to challenge the dominant country, but are unlikely to do so directly. This means that there
will be no wars between great powers. At least, not until a challenger (certainly China) thinks
it can overthrow the dominant state (the United States). But there will be intense security
competition—both China and the United States will watch each other closely, with their
intelligence communities increasingly focused on each other, their diplomats striving to
ensure that countries around the world do not align with the other, and their militaries seeing
the other as their principal threat. his is not unusual in international politics but, in fact, is its
“normal” condition. Americans may not pay much attention to it until a crisis occurs. But right
now states are competing with one another. This is because international politics does not
sleep; it never takes a rest.
US hegemony prevents war.
Robert Kagan 2007: (Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace [Robert “End of Dreams, Return of History” Policy Review
(http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html#n10)] )
Finally, there is the United States itself. … as it maintains its position as the predominant global power, it is also
engaged in hegemonic competitions in these regions with China in East and Central Asia, with Iran in the Middle East
and Central Asia, and with Russia…. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying — its
regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it
is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in
the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope,
intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would
possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more
catastrophic…. Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they are more
likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. This is
especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific
effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of China’s neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant
the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious,
independent, nationalist Japan…... It is also optimistic to imagine that a retrenchment of the American position in the Middle East
and the assumption of a more passive, “offshore” role would lead to greater stability there…. The subtraction of American
power from any region would not end conflict but would simply change the equation. In the Middle East, competition for
influence among powers both inside and outside the region has raged for at least two centuries. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism
doesn’t change this. It only adds a new and more threatening dimension to the competition , which neither a
sudden end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians nor an immediate American withdrawal from Iraq would change. The
alternative to American predominance in the region is not balance and peace. It is further competition. The region and the states
within it remain relatively weak. A diminution of American influence would not be followed by a diminution of other external
influences. .American withdrawal from Iraq will not return things to “normal” or to a new kind of stability in the region. It will
produce a new instability, one likely to draw the United States back in again. The alternative to American regional predominance in
the Middle East and elsewhere is not a new regional stability. In an era of burgeoning nationalism, the future is likely to be one of
intensified competition among nations and nationalist movements. Difficult as it may be to extend American predominance into the
future, no one should imagine that a reduction of American power or a retraction of American influence
and global involvement will provide an easier path.
UHC Protects us
UHC insures common defense
David R. Remer, July 24, 2009, poliwatch.org, Constitution And Universal Health Insurance pg
1http://poliwatch.org/2009/07/24/constitution_and_univeral_heal.php July 19, 2012
That leaves one ideal outlined in the Constitution's preamble left, the common defense; or,
what we often refer to today as national security. A healthy population is clearly in the
national security interest. It doesn't take any intellectual prowess to ask if our nation would
be safer with an unfit and unhealthy population and grasp the correct answer? The Swine Flu
threatens Americans this Fall along with the seasonal flu variants of different strains. Would it
be in the national security interest of this nation to have a quarter or third of its population
culled over the course of several years by a multi-strained flu pandemic? Of course not. The
economic consequences alone would undermine our national defense and security.
Heg Bad
Uniqueness
Hegemony Low – Military Tech
US no longer has dominant lead in military technology
Krepinevich, President of Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, ’11 (Andrew,
September/October, “Get Ready for the Democratization of Destruction” Foreign Policy,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/get_ready_for_the_democratization_of_de
struction)
As Niels Bohr famously observed, "Prediction is very difficult, especially if it's about the future."
But we need not be caught entirely unaware by future events. The rapid pace of technological
progression, as well as its ongoing diffusion, offer clues as to some of the likely next big things
in warfare. Indeed, important military shifts have already been set in motion that will be
difficult if not impossible to reverse. Sadly, these developments, combined with others in the
economic, geopolitical, and demographic realms, seem likely to make the world a less stable and
more dangerous place.
Consider, to start, the U.S. military's loss of its near monopoly in precision-guided munitions
warfare, which it has enjoyed since the Gulf War two decades ago. Today China is fielding precision-guided
ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as other "smart" munitions, in ever greater numbers. They can be used
to threaten the few major U.S. bases remaining in the Western Pacific and, increasingly, to target American warships. Like Beijing,
Iran is buying into the precision-guided weapons revolution, but at the low end, producing a poor
man's version of China's capabilities, to include anti-ship cruise missiles and smart anti-ship mines. As these trends play out we
could find that by the beginning of the next decade, major parts of the Western Pacific, as well
as the Persian Gulf, become no-go zones for the U.S. military: areas where the risks of operating are
prohibitively high.
Even nonstate groups are getting into the game. During its war with Israel in 2006, Hezbollah
fired more than 4,000 relatively inaccurate RAMM projectiles -- rockets, artillery, mortars, and
missiles -- into Israel, leading to the evacuation of at least 300,000 Israelis from their homes and
causing significant disruption to that country's economy. Out of these thousands of munitions,
only a few drones and anti-ship cruise missiles were guided. But as the proliferation of guided
munitions -- G-RAMM weapons -- continues, irregular warfare will be transformed to the point
that the roadside bomb threats that the United States has spent tens of billions of dollars
defending against in Iraq and Afghanistan may seem trivial by comparison.
The spread of nuclear weapons to the developing world is equally alarming. If Iran becomes a
nuclear power, the pressure on the leading Arab states as well as Turkey to follow suit is likely to
prove irresistible. With ballistic-missile flight times between states in the region measured in singledigit minutes, the stability of the global economy's energy core would be exceedingly fragile.
But the greatest danger of a catastrophic attack on the U.S. homeland will likely come not from
nuclear-armed missiles, but from cyberattacks conducted at the speed of light. The United
States, which has an advanced civilian cyberinfrastructure but prohibits its military from
defending it, will prove a highly attractive target, particularly given that the processes for
attributing attacks to their perpetrators are neither swift nor foolproof. Foreign powers may
already have prepositioned "logic bombs" -- computer code inserted surreptitiously to trigger
a future malicious effect -- in the U.S. power grid, potentially enabling them to trigger a
prolonged and massive future blackout.
As in the cyber realm, the very advances in biotechnology that appear to offer such promise for
improving the human condition have the potential to inflict incalculable suffering. For example,
"designer" pathogens targeting specific human subgroups or designed to overcome
conventional antibiotics and antiviral countermeasures now appear increasingly plausible, giving
scientists a power once thought to be the province of science fiction. As in the cyber realm, such
advances will rapidly increase the potential destructive power of small groups, a phenomenon
that might be characterized as the "democratization of destruction."
International stability is also increasingly at risk owing to structural weaknesses in the global
economic system. Commercial man-made satellites, for instance, offer little, if any, protection
against the growing threat of anti-satellite systems, whether ground-based lasers or directascent kinetic-kill vehicles. The Internet was similarly constructed with a benign environment in
mind, and the progression toward potential sources of single-point system failure, in the forms
of both common software and data repositories like the "cloud," cannot be discounted.
Then there is the undersea economic infrastructure, primarily located on the world's continental
shelves. It provides a substantial portion of the world's oil and natural gas, while also hosting a
web of cables connecting the global fiber-optic grid. The value of the capital assets on the U.S.
continental shelves alone runs into the trillions of dollars. These assets -- wellheads, pumping
stations, cables, floating platforms -- are effectively undefended.
As challenges to the global order increase in scale and shift in form, the means for addressing
them are actually declining. The age of austerity is upon us, and it seems likely if not certain that the U.S.
military will confront these growing challenges with relatively diminished resources. The
Pentagon's budget is scheduled for $400 billion or more in cuts over the next decade. Europe
certainly cannot be counted on to pick up the slack. Nor is it clear whether rising great powers such as Brazil and India will try to fill
the void.
With technology advancing so rapidly, might the United States attempt to preserve its military
dominance, and international stability, by developing new sources of military advantage?
Recently, there have been dramatic innovations in directed energy -- lasers and particle beams -that could enable major advances in key mission areas. But there are indications that
competitors, China in particular, are keeping pace and may even enjoy an advantage.
The United States has the lead in robotics -- for now. While many are aware of the Predator
drones used in the war against radical Islamist groups, robots are also appearing in the form of
undersea craft and terrestrial mechanical "mules" used to move equipment. But the Pentagon
will need to prove better than its rivals at exploiting advances in artificial intelligence to
enhance the performance of its unmanned systems. The U.S. military will also need to make its
robot crafts stealthier, reduce their vulnerability to more sophisticated rivals than the Taliban,
and make their data links more robust in order to fend off efforts to disable them.
The bottom line is that the United States and its allies risk losing their military edge, and new threats
to global security are arising faster than they can counter them. Think the current world order is fragile? In
the words of the great Al Jolson, "You ain't seen nothin' yet."
Unsustainable – General
Decline now—rising challengers and erosion in political, military and economic
cred
Layne ’12 Christopher Layne, Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the
George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, noted
neorealist, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana,” International
Studies Quarterly (2012) 56, 203-213
Some twenty years after the Cold War’s end, it now is evident that both the 1980s declinists and the unipolar pessimists were right
after all. The
Unipolar Era has ended and the Unipolar Exit has begun. The Great Recession has
underscored the reality of US decline, and only ‘‘denialists’’ can now bury their heads in the
sand and maintain otherwise. To be sure, the Great Recession itself is not the cause either of American decline or the
shift in global power, both of which are the culmination of decades-long processes driven by the big, impersonal forces of history.
However, it is fair to say the
Great Recession has both accelerated the causal forces driving these
trends and magnified their impact. There are two drivers of American decline, one external and one domestic. The
external driver of US decline is the emergence of new great powers in world politics and the
unprecedented shift in the center of global economic power from the EuroAtlantic area to
Asia. In this respect, the relative decline of the United States and the end of unipolarity are linked
inextricably: the rise of new great powers—especially China—is in itself the most tangible
evidence of the erosion of the United States’ power. China’s rise signals unipolarity’s end.
Domestically, the driver of change is the relative—and in some ways absolute—decline in
America’s economic power, the looming fiscal crisis confronting the United States, and
increasing doubts about the dollar’s long-term hold on reserve currency status. Unipolarity’s demise
marks the end of era of the post-World War II Pax Americana. When World War II ended, the United States, by virtue of its
overwhelming military and economic supremacy, was incontestably the most powerful actor in the international system. Indeed,
1945 was the United States’ first unipolar moment. The United States used its commanding, hegemonic position to construct the
postwar international order—the Pax Americana— which endured for more than six decades. During the Cold War, the Pax
Americana reflected the fact that outside the Soviet sphere, the United States was the preponderant power in the three regions of
the world it cared most about: Western Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf. The Pax Americana rested on the foundational
pillars of US military dominance and economic leadership and was buttressed by two supporting pillars: America’s ideological appeal
(‘‘soft power’’) and the framework of international institutions that the United States built after 1945. Following the Cold War’s end,
the United States used its second unipolar moment to consolidate the Pax Americana by expanding both its geopolitical and
ideological ambitions. In
the Great Recession’s aftermath, however, the economic foundation of the
Pax Americana has crumbled, and its ideational and institutional pillars have been weakened.
Although the United States remains preeminent militarily, the rise of new great powers like
China, coupled with US fiscal and economic constraints, means that over the next decade or
two the United States’ military dominance will be challenged. The decline of American power
means the end of US dominance in world politics and a transition to a new constellation of
world power. Without the ‘‘hard’’ power (military and economic) upon which it was built, the
Pax Americana is doomed to wither in the early twenty-first century. Indeed, because of China’s
great-power emergence, and the United States’ own domestic economic weaknesses, it
already is withering.
Unsustainable – Economics
Structural economic weaknesses make heg collapse inevitable
Layne ’12 Christopher Layne, Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the
George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, noted
neorealist, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana,” International
Studies Quarterly (2012) 56, 203-213
Contrary to the way their argument was portrayed by many of their critics, the 1980s declinists did not claim either that the
United States already had declined steeply, or that it soon would undergo a rapid, catastrophic decline. Rather, they pointed to
domestic and economic drivers that were in play and which, over time, would cause American
economic power to decline relatively and produce a shift in global distribution of power. The
declinists contended that the United States was afflicted by a slow—’’termite’’—decline caused by
fundamental structural weaknesses in the American economy.7 Kennedy himself was explicitly looking
ahead to the effects this termite decline would have on United States’ world role in the early twenty-first century. As he wrote, ‘‘The
task facing American statesman over the next decades. .. is to recognize that broad trends are under way, and that there is a need to
‘manage’ affairs so that the relative erosion of the United States’ position takes place slowly and smoothly, and is not accelerated by
policies which bring merely short-term advantage but longer-term disadvantage’’ (Kennedy 1987:534; my emphasis). When one
goes back and re-reads what the 1980s declinists pinpointed as the drivers of American decline, their analyses look farsighted
because the
same drivers of economic decline are at the center of debate today: too much
consumption and not enough savings; persistent trade and current account deficits; chronic
federal budget deficits and a mounting national debt; and de-industrialization. Over time, 1980s
declinists said, the United States’ goals of geopolitical dominance and economic prosperity would
collide. Today, their warnings seem eerily prescient. Robert Gilpin’s 1987 description of America’s economic and
grand strategic plight could just as easily describe the United States after the Great Recession: With a decreased rate of
economic growth and a low rate of national savings, the United States was living and
defending commitments far beyond its means. In order to bring its commitments and power
back into balance once again, the United States would one day have to cut back further on its
overseas commitments, reduce the American standard of living, or decrease domestic
productive investment even more than it already had. In the meantime, American hegemony was
threatened by a potentially devastating fiscal crisis. (Gilpin 1987:347–348) In the Great Recession’s wake—
doubly so since it is far from clear that either the United States or global economies are out of the woods—the United States now is
facing the dilemmas that Gilpin and the other declinists warned about.
Impact
Unipolarity undermines cooperation over issues like terrorism
Gvosdev 7-6-‘12 ( Nikolas Gvosdev, former editor of the National Interest, and a frequent
foreign policy commentator in both the print and broadcast media. He is currently on the faculty
of the U.S. Naval War College. “The Realist Prism: U.S. Power and Its Discontents”
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12133/the-realist-prism-u-s-power-and-itsdiscontents)
There are two simultaneous and contradictory trends occurring right now in the international
system. The first is the diffusion of power, as reflected by the displacement of the old Group of
Seven, which at its founding in the 1970s comprised the bulk of the world’s productive
capacity, by the Group of 20, where there is no longer one dominant power capable of driving the
global agenda. The second is the reality that the United States still far outstrips any other one
state or group of states in terms of capabilities, ranging from the power of its currency to its
ability to project military force to any corner of the globe. The result has been a growing “trust
deficit” between the United States and several of the rising and resurgent powers, such as
Russia and China, which in turn has had an impact on the latter states’ willingness to work
with Washington to address major international challenges, such as in Syria and Iran. The
recent jeremiads about American decline notwithstanding, the United States still holds the
bulk of the world’s political, economic and military power. As a result, other countries remain
focused on finding ways to limit how Washington deploys that power. In a recent monograph on arms
control, Paul Saunders of the Center for the National Interest notes how “the asymmetries between America’s
global capabilities and ambitions and Russia’s more limited options and aims” produce
continued uneasiness in Moscow, something that was quite evident to me during the recent sessions of the Dartmouth
Dialogue on U.S.-Russia relations, held in Valdai, Russia. These concerns are shared by other rising powers,
including China, who seek reassurances and formal treaty limitations that would constrain
America’s ability to use its power in the international system. Whether arguing against U.S.
plans for theater ballistic missile defense, seeking a binding international agreement on cybercapabilities or pushing for a very limited and stringent definition of the conditions under
which the “right to protect” can be invoked, these governments, cognizant of their own
weaknesses and capabilities deficits, are expressing their concern over their vulnerability. This
sense of exposure is heightened by what appears to them to be the unpredictable way in
which the U.S. exercises its power. In other words, the question they all must consider is, what will
“set Washington off”? How and why the U.S. intervened in Libya when Washington routinely ignores humanitarian crises
elsewhere raises the unpleasant notion that the United States does not operate according to any fixed set of criteria.
Governments in Moscow and Beijing are left to wonder whether, given the right set of
circumstances, the United States would push for regime change in Russia or China, too. Hence
the growing trend of these powers seeking to limit the exercise of U.S. power whenever
possible. These fears also limit their enthusiasm for wanting to help Washington solve some of
the current intractable issues it faces. None of the world’s great powers want Iran, for instance, to
pursue a nuclear “breakout” and become an atomic-weapons state. But, as Russian
interlocutors have sometimes privately indicated, they see no rush in solving this problem
either. Assuming that the United States might be inclined to turn its attentions to thwarting
some of Russia’s geopolitical objectives once the problem of Iran’s nuclear program is settled,
what incentive does Moscow have to help get the Iran portfolio quickly off America’s
agenda?9 Considered in this light, the course that Russia and China and other rising powers
have adopted makes sense: some sanctions on Tehran, notably for its sins of omission and
nondisclosure, but otherwise not bringing their full force to bear on Iran to help force a
settlement. Washington, for its part, is unwilling to give the types of commitments that the rising
powers want to reassure them of U.S. intentions. In a dangerous and unpredictable world, the
United States does not want to foreclose on its options or voluntarily sign away any tool that
might become acutely necessary. Missile defense is a good example. With the continuing
spread of both missile and nuclear technology around the world, who can say with any
certainty whether the current status quo will endure? Within a few years, a whole host of unsavory
regimes, not to mention even less accountable nonstate actors, might have access to dangerous
technologies that could threaten the American homeland. America’s position is that it seeks
limited but effective defenses against such threats and that the established nuclear powers
need to trust that whatever capabilities Washington deploys are not designed to upset the
pre-existing global strategic balances. At best, the United States is willing to accept only unilateral
and, if necessary, easily reversible limits on its capabilities, rather than locking in such barriers
in terms of longer-term and more-binding compacts. The United States also sees no reason to
voluntarily limit the exercise of its own power and to trust that other countries will “do the
right thing” to help protect America’s own security. The continuing leakage of sensitive
technologies from countries such as Russia -- sometimes in defiance of government efforts to
stop such export, sometimes with officials turning a blind eye to the trafficking -- raises
questions in Washington as to whether other powers would really exert themselves to take
action to stop threats aimed at America. As the 2011 raid that killed Osama bin Laden showed,
Washington is perfectly willing to ignore international rules to “get the job done.” Whether it
concerns utilizing drones or deploying sophisticated cybertools to cripple an opponent’s
infrastructure or research programs, the United States is not going to forego any of the tools it
has in its arsenal that could neutralize emerging threats. Washington’s first preference will always be to work
through international institutions, as demonstrated by its approach to both Iran and Syria. In its efforts to bring pressure to bear on
both Tehran and Damascus, the United States has worked through the United Nations Security Council -- where both Moscow and
Beijing have a veto and emerging powers such as India, Brazil and South Africa often have a vote -- and taken part in international
conferences, such as the P5+1 negotiations with Iran and the recent conclave in Geneva that produced the agreement for a possible
transition of power in Syria. But
if these efforts fail, the United States will find a way to act, even over
the objections of Moscow or Beijing. If that happens, however, finding a way to assuage the
insecurities of the rising powers will become an absolute necessity. Right now, despite some
opposition to U.S. policies, there is no sustained anti-American bloc in the world interested in
consistently and uniformly contesting Washington’s power around the world. U.S.
policymakers must therefore focus on finding the right mix of incentives to keep such a bloc
from emerging. Being more sensitive to how the U.S. exercises its power is an important first
step.
The United States’ Military and Economic Power Threatens Other Countries
Ivo H. Daalder, U.S. Permanent Representative on the NATO Council, and James M. Lindsay, Senior Gice President,
Director of Studies, and Maurice R. Greenberg Chair at the Council on Foreign Relations, Brookings Review, “The
Globalization of Politics”
2003 pg 12-17
Which brings us to the issue of how to transform this unquestioned power into influence.
Unless employed deftly,
America's military and economic superiority can breed resentment, even among its friends. A
growing perception that Washington cares only about its own interests and is willing to use its
muscle to get its way has fueled a worrisome gap between U.S. and European attitudes.
European elites increasingly criticize the United States as being morally, socially, and culturally
retrograde--especially in its perceived embrace of the death penalty, predatory capitalism,
and fast food and mass entertainment. Europe has also begun to exercise diplomatic muscle in
international institutions and other arenas, seeking to create new international regimes
designed to limit America's recourse to its hard power.
Kritiks
Geopolitics
Using words such as “the” creates an “us”-“them” dichotomy, which is
inherently aggressive
Nigel Thrifter,Professor of Geography at the University of Bristol, 2000. Geopolitical
Traditions: A Century of Geopolitical Thought, “The Little Things” pgs. 383-385.
http://frenndw.files.wordpress.com/2011/03/geopolitical-traditions-a-century-of-geopoliticalthought-edited-by-klaus-dodds-and-david-atkinson_copy.pdf accessed 7/19/12
Let us finally come to one more arena: the arena of words. After all, here we¶ might be thought to have the clearest
example of representation at work, the word.¶ Yet, what we do not get from critical geopolitics is a clear enough sense of ¶ words
function to bring about geopolitical change and it is not possible to do so as long as
geopolitical forces continue to be framed as ‘big’ and ‘commanding’ (with¶ all the masculine overtones).
Some of the most potent geopolitical forces are, I¶ suspect, lurking in the ‘little’ ‘details’ of people’s lives,
what is ‘“carried” in the¶ specific variabilities of their activities’ (Shotter and Billig 1998:23), in the context¶ of utterances. And
these variabilities have immediate consequences. Thus,¶ As Bakhtin notes , and as is confirmed by the work in conversational¶
analysis, ‘we sensitively catch the smallest shift in intonation, the slightest¶ interruption of voices in anything of importance to us in
another person’s¶ practical every day discourse. All those verbal sideward glances ,¶ reservations, loopholes, hints, thrusts do not
slip past our ear, are not¶ foreign to our own lips’ (Bakhtin 1984:201). And we in turn show our¶ stance to what they do or say also
in fleeting bodily reactions , facial¶ expressions, sounds of approval or disapproval, etc. Indeed, even in the¶ continuously responsive
unfolding of non-linguistic activities between¶ ourselves and others—in a dance, in a handshake, or even a mere chance¶ collision on
the street—we are actively aware of whether the other’s¶ motives are, so to speak, ‘in tune’ or ‘at odds’ with ours. And in our¶
sense of their attunement or lack of it, we can sense their attitude to us as¶ intimate or distant, friendly or hostile, deferential or
arrogant, and so on.¶ (Shotter and Billig 1998:23)¶ Thus, very effective work has been done in disciplines like anthropology and¶
discursive psychology (Billig 1995, 1997) which attempts to provide a sense of how¶ national
identity and an accompanying
geopolitical stance are inscribed through the¶ smallest of details. Thus, for example, national
identity is not accomplished in grand¶ displays which incite the citizen to wave the flag in a fit of patriotic fervou
r.¶ Instead, it goes on in more mundane citations: it is done unobtrusively on the margins of conscious awareness by little¶
words such as ‘the’ and ‘we’. Each day we read or hear phrases such as¶ ‘the prime minister’, ‘the nation’, or the ‘weather’.
The definite article¶ assumes deictically the national borders. It points to the homeland: but¶ while we, the
readers or listeners, understand the pointing, we do not¶ follow it with our consciousness—it is a ‘seen but unnoticed’ feature of¶
our everyday discourse.¶ 6¶ (Shotter and Billig 1998:20)¶ Such work goes some way towards understanding
the
deep, often unconscious¶ aggressions which lurk behind so much geopolitical ‘reasoning’, which
through small details build a sense of ‘us’ as not like ‘them’, and from which political¶ programmes then flow
as infractions are identified and made legible.¶ 7¶ In these few brief comments, I hoped to have outlined a parallel
agenda for¶ critical geopolitics, one still based on discourse, but on discourse understood in a¶ broader
way, and one which is less taken in by representation and more attuned to¶ actual practices In turn , such an agenda leads us away
from interpretation of¶ hyperbolic written and drawn rhetorics (which, I suspect, are often read by only a¶ few and taken in by even
fewer) towards
the (I hesitate to say ‘real’) work of¶ discourse, the constant hum of practices and their attendant
which geopower ferments and sometimes boils over.l
territorializations within¶
Geopolitical borders breed racism and must be rejected
Mustafa Dikec, PhD candidate in the Department of Urban Planning at the University of
California, 2002. Pera Peras Poros: Longings for Spaces of Hospitality, “Openings: On not being
Home” pgs. 243-244. http://tcs.sagepub.com/content/19/1-2/227.full.pdf+html accessed
7/19/12
California’s Proposition 187 was an attempt to build ‘safe homes’ for Californians, not for all of them of course. The political abuse of
the image of¶ home as a sheltered and safe place drew upon an ‘exclusionary, territorializing, xenophobic, premodern and
patriarchal cult of home’ (Antonopoulos,¶ 1994: 57). It was an elaborate fixing of boundaries, making California a safe¶ home for its
‘legal’ residents based on the exclusionary politics of home.¶ Boundaries, evidently, not only evoke the idea of hospitality, but
of hostility and racism as well.¶ 12¶ It is important to remember, however, that it is not only the situation¶ of the guest but
also the host that needs to be reconsidered since, in the¶ case of immigration, for example, it is ‘both receiving populations and
immigrants [that] . . . risk mutual transformation, [that] . . . engage and attenuate their home-yearning for each other’s sakes and for
the sake of their¶ political life together’ (Honig, 1999: 203). The point, therefore, is about¶ openings, about ‘keeping open the
question of who “the people” (the demos)¶ is’, since the question of democracy ‘always arises at the limit of the demos¶ . . . wherein
native, subject, citizen, or people receives its designation as¶ such from the way the human encounter with the stranger and the
strange¶ is assumed’ (Dillon, 1999: 120 and 96). There is
a need to reconsider the¶ boundary, not only as a
separator but as a connector as well, where hospitality comes into play pointing beyond the boundaries. There is a need,¶
perhaps, to reflect on what the title words, in Greek, of this text suggest:¶ Pera – peras – poros: the other side/beyond – limit –
passage; ‘beyond the¶ limits that interdict passage’ (Baptist, 1999: 102). There is a need, more¶ importantly, if a cosmopolitan
approach is to be assumed, to think about¶ hospitality ‘that would be more than cosmopolitical, that would go beyond¶ strictly
cosmopolitical conditions’, that would go beyond the interests, authority, and legislation of the state (Derrida, 1999a: 43).¶ To
conclude, there is no way, I would argue, to escape the advent of¶ the stranger, to avoid questions and questionings
that tremble, if not stir,¶ the socio-political order that once appeared, perhaps, as a safe home. Nor¶ is there a way to avoid the
production of others. What is more important,¶ instead of reflecting on the ways by which no other would be produced, isto be able
to resist processes that produce and reproduce others; processes¶ that stabilize themselves, that close spaces, and that derive their
sustainability from the very process of othering itself. Again, what is
more important, rather than reflecting on the ways by
to be able to provide for the social, cultural,
institutional,¶ ethical and political spaces where we could learn to engage with and learn¶
from each other, while being able to constitute our subjectivities free from¶ subordination, in democratic ways. The point,
which to avoid the ‘disturbance’¶ of the stranger, is
then, is to open spaces,¶ spaces where recognition as well as contestation and conflict can take place.¶ Furthermore, the point is not
merely to open spaces; more importantly, it is¶ to keep them open. Hospitality is aimed at such a concern.
Single Payer
Good
Universal Health Care improves the quality of life.
Kathy Lavidge, Yale school of management, April 2008, yale.edeu Does universal healthcare
make everyone's life better? Pg.1 http://qn.som.yale.edu/content/does-universal-healthcaremake-everyones-life-better July 20, 2012
I have lived in England, which has universal healthcare, for 14 years, and I have become a firm believer in the benefits
universal access to healthcare brings to all -- even those who do not need or intend to use it.
In the UK, healthcare is a universal right: You will be treated the same way whether you are working for a corporation or are a selfemployed dance teacher; whether you are retired, or have just been made redundant. In England, if you need healthcare, you get it - at no cost. There are no forms to fill out and no insurance claims to file or fight over. If the ambulance is called, no one is going to
ask to see your health insurance card before they put you in the vehicle, nor will they detour away from the closest hospital to find
the one that takes “charity” cases.¶ In
a nutshell, the primary benefit of universal healthcare is that it
improves the quality of life for everyone. ¶ • No one in England remains in a job they
absolutely hate because they are afraid of losing healthcare insurance for themselves or a
family member. • No one stays in a job because they have a “pre-existing” condition and
know they will never be covered again. • No one has to worry about having to mortgage their
house to pay the hospital, doctor, or pharmacy while they are waiting for repayment from the
insurance company, which may never come. • No one has to worry because they have a
significant illness and their insurance company has told them they have reached the maximum
payout under their policy. • No one has to become frantic when an uninsured relative gets
into an accident, and assets saved for a well-planned retirement are put at risk in order to
assure care for the injured individual. • No one has to fear a true accident occurring on their
property and finding out that the lawyers plan to file a big lawsuit because the injured party
does not have health insurance. • No one worries that the last six months of their life will
deplete their family’s savings, forcing them to choose whether or not to pay for treatments. •
No one worries that parents too young to qualify for Medicare will become a financial burden
if they become ill. • No one has to decide that that lump can wait to be checked or that blood
in their stool is not really “too serious” -- only to have it truly become too serious. • No one is
frantic when a child is born with a serious, but treatable, defect because there is no insurance
to cover the hospitals and doctors.
Single Payer Good-Economy
Abortion is paid for from individuals pocket
Dana Cody, Et. Al, Attorney at Law, President and Executive Director of the Life Legal Defense
Foundation, February 14, 2012, Life Legal Defense Foundation, U.S. Supreme Court Brief
Highlights Unconstitutionality of Obamacare, http://www.lldf.org, Access Date: July 19th 2012.
Tuesday, February 14, 2012: Today, Life Legal Defense Foundation and four other pro-life law firms filed a friend of the court brief in
the United States Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (ACT) on Free Exercise and First Amendment grounds. The brief, written by attorneys with the Bioethics Defense Fund, was
filed on behalf of several religious and pro-life medical associations, such as the Christian Medical and Dental Association and
Physicians for Life.
Some of the primary arguments in today’s filing with the Supreme Court are as follow:
 The ACT contains a hidden “Abortion Premium Mandate” that compels enrollees in certain
health plans to pay a separate abortion premium from their own pocket, while denying
enrollees the ability to decline abortion coverage based on moral objection.
 The ACT and its individual mandate violate the Free Exercise Clause by imposing
this“Abortion Premium Mandate” without regard to religious objection.
 Our nation has a long and deeply-rooted history of respecting and protecting the conscience
rights of individuals to not be forced into the practice or funding of elective abortions.
Our founders’ protection of individual liberty, including religious liberty, is directly
undermined by the ACT’s transgression of the constitutional limits on congressional power.
“This ACT and President Obama want citizens to have their choices impermissibly limited by
being forced to choose between their conscience and a health insurance plan that requires an
abortion premium,” said Cody. “How could Congress allow for this ACT to make pro-life
individuals pay for a pro-abortion agenda?”
Arguments on the constitutionality of the Act will be heard at the Supreme Court in March.