Methodological naturalism and
the identity of practical reasons
Marko Jurjako
University of Rijeka
Structure of the talk
• The role of methodological naturalism
1. Theories of practical reasons
2. Identity of reasons (norms of rationality)
3. Explaining normative intuitions
Philosophical naturalism
• Two kinds of philosophical naturalism
1. Metaphysical naturalism
It is “concerned with the contents of reality,
asserting that reality has no place for
‘supernatural’ or other ‘spooky’ kinds of entity.”
(Papineau 2007)
1.1 Moral naturalists “concentrate on finding the
place of value and obligation in the world of
facts as revealed by science.” (Harman 2000,
79)
2. Methodological naturalism:
“[M]ethodological component is concerned with the
ways of investigating reality, and claims some kind of
general authority for the scientific method. [...]
Methodological naturalists see philosophy and science
as engaged in essentially the same enterprise,
pursuing similar ends and using similar methods.
Methodological anti-naturalists see philosophy as
disjoint from science, with distinct ends and
methods.” (Papineau 2007)
Why methodological naturalism?
• Platitudes about science: science is the most
successful human enterprise for explaining the
natural phenomena …
• professional necessity:
“It is not possible to step far into the ethics
literature without stubbing one’s toe on empirical
claims. (…) There are just too many places where
answers to important ethical questions require—
and have very often presupposed—answers to
empirical questions. “(Doris & Stich 2010, 112)
Ontological constraint
• Naturalistic constraints make certain robust
forms of normative realism implausible
• A Darwinian Dilemma for a Normative Realist
(Street 2006)
Theories of practical reasons
1. Dispositional-functional theory
– X has a reason to  if and only if there is a sound
or rational deliberative route from X’s current
mental states to X’s -ing (see e.g. Wedgwood
2011, 180; Williams 1981; 1995)
– an agent (…) has a reason to Φ in C, if and only if,
if she were fully rational, she would desire that
she Φs in C.” (Smith 2004, 20)
Theories of practical reasons
2. Reasons as normative explanations
– Reason for you to  is an explanation why you ought to 
(Broome 2004, 35)
3. Reasons as evidence
– Necessarily, a fact F is a reason for an agent A to φ iff F is
evidence that A ought to φ (where φ is either a belief or an
action) [Kearns & Star 2009, 216]
4. Reason as a primitive concept
– Reason is a fact that counts in favor of holding some
attitude … (Parfit 2011, Scanlon 1998, Skorupski 2010)
Methodological naturalism
• favors dispositional theories of reasons
• practical reasons determine choice
rational choice theory, decision theory …
C={pi Bpi}, D={piVpi}, (C,D)= D*
• David Lewis, Michael Smith … reflections on
decision theory
Methodological naturalism
• favors dispositional theories of reasons
• practical reasons determine choice
rational choice theory, decision theory …
C={pi Bpi}, D={piVpi}, (C,D)= D*
• David Lewis, Michael Smith … reflections on
decision theory
Dispositional theories
• Reasons are determined by the norms that
govern agent’s responses to certain facts
• rational norms: core norms that every rational
agent will obey
• Which norms are rational norms?
• How to answer that question?
• Are there some substantive reasons that will
be shared by all rational agents?
• Are moral reasons those reasons?
Identity of reasons (norms of
rationality)
• Universality of practical reasons - every
possible rational being will have some reason
to obey substantive requirements e.g. moral
rules
• Relativity of practical reasons – practical
reasons are contingent on values, preferences,
personal projects, … of a deliberating subject
(Harman 2000, Williams 1981)
Moral demands and practical reasons
• ‘’To say that there is a moral law that ‘applies
to everyone’ is, I hereby stipulate, to say that
everyone has sufficient reasons to follow that
law.’’ (Harman, 2000, 84)
Moral relativism
• ‘’Moral relativism denies that there are
universal basic moral demands, and says
different people are subject to different basic
moral demands depending on the social
customs, practices, conventions, values, and
principles that they accept.’’ (Harman 2000,
85)
Harman’s naturalism
• Different approaches for doing moral philosophy
can be differentiated by their attitude towards
science (Harman 2000, 79).
• Moral naturalists “concentrate on finding the
place of value and obligation in the world of facts
as revealed by science.” (ibid.)
Basic structure of the argument
• Moral absolutism (MA)  everyone has a
sufficient reason to obey certain basic moral
demands (SR)
• Methodological naturalism (MN)  ~(SR)
∴
• ~(MA & MN)
Harman’s argument
• Proposed moral requirement: there is a basic moral
prohibition on causing harm or injury to other people
• First Premise: “if a person does not intend to do
something and that is not because he or she has
failed in some empirically discoverable way to
reason to a decision to do that thing then according
to the naturalist the person cannot have a sufficient
reason to do that thing.” (Harman 2000, 86)
-
inattention, lack of time, failure to consider or appreciate certain arguments,
ignorance of certain available evidence, an error in reasoning, some sort of
irrationality or unreasonableness, or weakness of will
• Second Premise: “there are people, such as certain
professional criminals, who do not act in accordance
with an alleged requirement not to harm or injure
others, where this is not due to any of these failings.”
(Harman 2000, 87)
• Conclusion: moral absolutism is false if naturalistic
characterization of reasons is taken for granted
First premise: structure of reasons
• Person A has sufficient reason to Φ iff there is
warranted reasoning that person A could perform
that would lead A to decide to do Φ (Harman
2000, 86)
• Naturalistic constraint:
– if A fails to respond to a reason that she has then
there must be some empirical explanation of that
failure
– if A does not intend to do Φ and that is not because of
some empirically discoverable failure then A does not
have a reason to Φ
Second premise
• description of a type of person that is not
irrational (at least not in any empirically
discoverable way) but does not respond to
moral requirements
• If premise 2 is true then not everyone has a
sufficient reason to obey the same basic
(moral) requirements
• Therefore, naturalistic constraint favors
relativity of practical reasons
Undermining the argument
• M. Smith (2012)
– Naturalistic constraint is not relevant for the
argument
• Person A has sufficient reason to do Φ iff
there is warranted reasoning that person A
could perform that would lead A to decide to
do Φ
Undermining the argument
• M. Smith (2012)
– Naturalistic constraint is not relevant for the
argument
• Person A has sufficient reason to do Φ iff
there is warranted reasoning that person A
could perform that would lead A to decide to
do Φ
What constitutes warranted
reasoning?
What are the principles of
warranted reasoning?
Principles of rationality
• MEANS-ENDS+
– rationality requires one to possess true and evidentially wellsupported beliefs, and complete and transitive preferences
• UNIVERSALIZATION+
–
Kant’s Formula of Humanity
• REASONS+
– intrinsic nature of harm and injury provide any rational
being with a reason to desire not to be harmed and
injured and not to harm or injure anyone else
Examples
• Principles of rationality
– Reason requires (RR)
• ME: RR(If someone has an intrinsic desire that p and a
belief that he can bring about p by bringing about q,
then he has an instrumental desire that he brings
about q)
• UNI: RR(If someone has an intrinsic desire that p, then
either p itself is suitably universal, or satisfying the
desire that p is consistent with satisfying desires whose
contents are themselves suitably universal)
• INT: RR(People desire not to be harmed or injured and
not to harm and injure others) [cf. Smith 2009]
How to determine the correct
principles of rationality?
Michael Smith
• validity of rational principles is decided on a priori
grounds (2012, 238-239)
• “[A] characterization of rationality and reasonableness
will follow from a spelling out of everything that we can
know a priori about belief and desire.” (239)
• “[N]aturalism is thereby shown to be completely
irrelevant to the issue that divides them [absolutists] from
their relativist opponents. What divides them is what we
can say a priori about belief and desire. This is what
relativists and absolutists really disagree about.” (240)
Full-blown naturalism
• Methodological naturalism
• “[M]ethodological component is concerned with the ways of
investigating reality, and claims some kind of general authority
for the scientific method. [...] Methodological naturalists see
philosophy and science as engaged in essentially the same
enterprise, pursuing similar ends and using similar methods.”
(Papineau 2007)
• proper characterization of rationality defers to
the scientific concept of rationality
– reasoning sanctioned by our best scientific theories
(Colyvan 2009), concept of rationality that is used in
science …
Principles of rationality in science
• Instrumental and epistemic rationality
(decision theory, game theory, probability
theory)  MEANS-ENDS+
• “Reason is wholly instrumental. It cannot tell
us where to go; at best it can tell us how to
get there. It is a gun for hire that can be
employed in the service of any goals we have,
good or bad.” (Simon 1983, 7-8, in Over 2004,
5)
Rationality and mechanisms
Functional
specification of an
agent (norms of
rationality)
To do list
Figure adapted from
Hendricks (2006,
138)
Norms of rationality
Contingency of reasons
Contingent reasons
3. Normative intuitions
• We have many intuitions about reasons that
cannot be captured by instrumental
conception of rationality
– intuitively many intrinsic desires and goals seem
irrational
• Devotion to counting blades of grass seems irrational
• future Tuesday indifference
• agreeing to experience great amount of pain later in
order to avoid little pain now … (Parfit 2011)
Programmatic response
• There are no mind-independent normative facts
that provide reasons for action – our normative
intuitions are shaped and influenced by
evolutionary (and cultural) history (Street 2008)
• These intuitions indicate situations that decrease
fitness, and expose preferences that do not track
fitness resources (Sterelny 2012)
• Interesting research question is why we have
intuitions and deliver judgments about reasons of
third-parties (persons) who do not affect our
well-being (fitness or even utility) directly?
References
•
•
Broome, J. (2004). ''Reasons.'’ In Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz, J. Wallace,
M. Smith, S. Scheffler i P. Pettit, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 28–55.
Colyvan, (2009). Naturalizing Normativity. In Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism, D. BraddonMitchell and R. Nola (eds.), A Bradford book, Cambridge: MIT Press, 303-313.
•
Doris, J., M. & Stich, S., P. (2012). As a Matter of Fact: Empirical Perspectives on Ethics. Chapter 11 in Stephen Stich's
Collected Papers, Volume 2: Knowledge, Rationality, and Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
•
Harman, G. (2000). Is There a Single True Morality. in his Explaining Value and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy,
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 77-99.
•
•
•
Hendricks, V., F. (2006). Mainstream and Formal Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kearns, S. & Star, D. (2009). "Reasons as Evidence." Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4, 215-242.
Parfit, D. (2011). On What Matters, vol. 1 & 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
•
•
Railton, P. (1986). Moral Realism. The Philosophical Review, 95(2): 163-207.
Over, D. (2004). Rationality and the Normative/Descriptive Distinction. In Blackwell Handbook of Judgment and
Decision Making, D. J. Koehler and N. Harvey (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 3-18.
Scanlon, T., M. (1998). What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
Simon, H. A. (1983) Reason in Human Affairs. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Skorupski, J. (2010). The Domain of Reasons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Smith, M.(2009). Desires, Values, Reasons, and the Dualism of Practical Reason. Ratio 22(1): 98-125.
Smith, M. (2012). Naturalism, absolutism, relativism. In Ethical Naturalism: Current Debates, S. Nuccetelli and G.
Seay (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 226-244.
Sterelny, K. (2012). From fitness to utility. In Evolution and Rationality, S. Okasha & K. Binmore (eds.) Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 246-273.
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•
•
•
•
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Street, S. (2006). A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value. Philosophical Studies 127, no. 1: 109-166.
•
Street, S. (2008). Constructivism about practical reasons. In Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3, R. Shafer-Landau
(ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 207-246.
Williams, B. (1981). Internal and External Reasons. In his Moral Luck, 101-112.
•
Objection
• naturalistic conception of rationality does not really
address the questions that are of great importance
to us, questions that are connected to our intuitive
conception of reasons, i.e. what we intuitively think
we have reasons to do (cf. Smith 2012, 244-245).
• the case of professional criminal
what would be the purpose of our blaming and
holding responsible some person that rationally
does not care about what morality demands?
would not this position just make any set of
consistent preferences equally valuable and not
amenable to rational criticism?
1. Answer
• we can make a difference between kinds of
reasons
– moral, epistemic, aesthetic, rational reasons, etc.
• so, one can have a moral reason to do
something and be morally responsible for
acting in that way
• however, failing to comply with the moral
demand will not imply rational failure
2. Answer
• the purpose of our activity of blaming and holding
responsible will depend on what we want or what
goals we actually find valuable
• if we want to reap the benefits of living in an ordered
society we have to endorse some moral rules to
regulate our interactions
- from this perspective practice of blaming and holding
responsible has a definite purpose
• However, as naturalists we cannot claim that every
rational agent has an a priori reason to care about or to
be committed to a full cooperation in some community
and to obey its norms
Possible replies
• MA  SR
• MN  ~(SR)
Railton (1986)
Smith (2012)
Ambiguity
• how to interpret ‘moral demands apply to
everyone’
• every actual human being
• every possible human being
• every possible rational being  M. Smith
Objection
• Why should we rely on current scientific
practice?
• That is what it means to be a methodological
naturalist – current practice has a default
authority
Objection
• The argument that relies on methodological
naturalism is circular
• For example, the concept of instrumental
rationality comes from a particular philosophical
theory of rationality  to argue that science
gives it some legitimation constitutes a sort of
confirmation bias
• Hence the authority of science cannot settle the
philosophical question which principles of
rationality are valid
Answer
• Instrumental concept of rationality has explanatory
and predictive value
• cognitive science – explaining and predicting behavior
and cognitive processes
• economy – explaining and predicting the behavior of
the market
• social sciences – explaining the evolution of
cooperation and social dynamics
• so, confirmation comes from the successes of the
paradigms that use the concept of rationality
• Plus – naturalism does not give support to the claim
that there are intrinsic values or purposes in the nature
Psychopathy Check list-revised
Factor1
Interpersonal
1. Glibness/Superficial charm
2. Grandiose sense of self-worth
4. Pathological lying
5. Conning/Manipulative
--------------------------------------Affective
6. Lack of remorse or guilt
7. Shallow affect
8. Callous/Lack of empathy
16. Failure to accept
responsibility
Factor2
Lifestyle
3. Need for stimulation
9. Parasitic lifestyle
13. Lack of realistic, long-term goals
14. Impulsivity
15. Irresponsibility
-----------------------------------------------Antisocial
10. Poor behavioral controls
12. Early behavioral problems
18. Juvenile delinquency
19. Revocation of conditional
release
20. Criminal versatility