ARISTOTLE’S
FUNCTION ARGUMENT
GOODS AS ENDS
Goods are ends/goals. Two ways of thinking about ends:
 Subjective aim. What one pursues/aims at is typically what
one values most. What is taken to be good.
 Objective point. When we ask what the point of something
(e.g. an activity) is, we are asking about its value. What good
it is.
Aristotle is thinking of goods as ends in both ways. His hope is
that we can make some progress in thinking about goodness if
we think carefully about the ends of human action.
Note: in I.7 Aristotle will move to a dif ferent way of thinking
about goodness.
NOT ALL ENDS ARE THE SAME
Sometimes an end is simply an activity; other times an end
might be a product distinct from the activity that gave rise to it.
 Examples of each?
PRODUCTS AS BETTER
When the end is some product distinct from the activity,
Aristotle tells us that the product is better (more good) than the
activity.
 Why is the product better?
PRODUCTS AS BETTER
When the end is some product distinct from the activity,
Aristotle tells us that the product is better (more good) than the
activity.
 Why is the product better?
Distinguish the means to some end/goal from the goal itself.
Aristotle is assuming that the value of the means depends on
the value of the goal .
The objective point of the means is derivative; accordingly, it is
less valuable than the goal itself.
A COROLLARY THESIS
When one art/technology/science is subordinate to another, the
superordinate is better than the subordinate.
 Examples?
A HIERARCHY OF ENDS
Political
science
Ethics
Technology
Science
Art
ARISTOTLE’S PATERNALISM
Note that knowledge of the good life is supposed to be a central
concern of the legislator.
THE BEST GOOD INTRODUCED
“Suppose, then, that the things achievable by action have some
end that we wish for because of itself, and because of which we
wish for the other things, and that we do not choose everything
because of something else —for if we do, it will go on without
limit, so that desire will prove to be empty and futile. Clearly,
this end will be the good, that is to say, the best good.” (I.2)
FOR DISCUSSION
 Suppose nothing is desired for its own sake —everything is
desired for the sake of something else. Would all desire —not
to mention human existence itself —be empty/vain?
 Are there things desired for their own sake? Do they succeed
in making life meaningful?
 Aristotle concludes that our actions are aimed at THE GOOD
(just one thing, the best good). Suppose we concede
Aristotle’s premise that life is not empty. Does his argument
establish the existence of some one thing (the best good)?
METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS
Ethics/political science are inexact sciences . The nature of the
subject matter is such that generalizations will hold/be valid
only FOR THE MOST PART, not UNIVERSALLY.
So don’t expect the sort of precision and exactness that you’ve
come to expect in, say, mathematics and geometry.
The dif ference stems from the object of inquiry: goods by their
nature are much more messy/unstable and consequently less
predictable than numbers and shapes.
METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS
Young individuals are not suited to ethical inquiry.
First, they lack the experience needed to grasp the
generalizations upon which ethical inquiry depends.
Second, they have nothing to gain. The end of ethics/political
science is action: practical knowledge rather than theoretical
knowledge. But young people tend to be guided in action by
feelings, not practical knowledge: “an immature person, like an
incontinent person, gets no benefit from his knowledge.” (I.3)
HAPPINESS THE HIGHEST GOOD
Suppose that there is a hierarchy of ends and that there is a
highest end. There is verbal agreement about what this end of
human action is, namely, happiness. However, there is
substantive disagreement about what happiness consists in.
The many say pleasure or wealth.
The politically active say honor.
The wise say virtue or the life of study.
 What is wrong with these answers?
INITIAL RESPONSES TO
PROPOSED CANDIDATES
Pleasure: not the human good
Wealth: not intrinsically valuable
Honor: not inherent (because easily stripped away)
Virtue: compatible with a life of inactivity
Life of study: discussion postponed
THE FORM OF THE GOOD AS THE
HIGHEST GOOD
In his survey of prominent views, Aristotle devotes an entire
chapter to discussion of Plato’s theory. One of his central
complaints is that Plato gets the metaphysics & epistemology
of goodness wrong.
THE CATEGORIES OF BEING
Plato is assuming there is some one thing common to/shared
by all things good—much the way all water has something in
common.
Aristotle insists that goodness is more like being than water.
There is no single answer to Socrates’ question “What is it?”
that is true of all beings. A being might be a substance, a
quantity, a quality, a relation… Goodness works similarly.
THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL ROLE OF THE
FORM OF THE GOOD
Aristotle clarifies the epistemological role the Form of the Good
is supposed to play:
“Perhaps, however, someone might think it is better to get to
know the Idea with a view to the goods that we can possess and
achieve in action; for if we have this as a sort of pattern, we
shall also know better about the goods that are goods for us,
and if we know about them, we shall hit on them.”
EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE GOOD
Expertise in the sciences, technology, etc. does not work this
way. Experts do not have knowledge of a singular science of the
Good—there is in fact no such science and no one is seeking it!
After all, how would knowledge of something so highly general,
encompassing all goods, be of use to, e.g., doctors, who need to
know what is good for a specific patient at a specific time?
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS I.7
The most celebrated part of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle’s
most influential work. In this chapter Aristotle develops his own
positive view about the best good. The discussion has two main
parts.
First, he wants to show that there is a best good, namely,
happiness. (There are criteria that the best good must satisfy,
and happiness alone satisfies them.)
Second, he defends a view about what happiness is. (In defense
of his view about the nature of human happiness he of fers his
famous function argument.)
FORMAL CRITERION FOR THE BEST GOOD
What is the best good there is? Aristotle thinks the best good is
going to have certain features that mark it out as best. Roughly,
it will be (1) a final end, (2) good by itself (not just a part of
something better), and (3) not subject to improvement.
1. Most complete: an end which is choiceworthy for its own
sake, not for anything further.
2. Self-sufficient: choiceworthy by itself and lacking nothing,
an all-inclusive good.
3. Most choiceworthy: no addition could make it better.
 Do you agree with these criteria for the best good?
ARISTOTLE’S JUSTIFICATION
Why suppose that the best good will satisfy these criteria?
Most complete. This criterion is a consequence of thinking of
goods as ends. The end of an activity is the source of goodness.
Self-sufficient & most choiceworthy. Suppose some good A were
lacking some good B. In that case the sum of A and B would be
better than A by itself. A would not qualify as the best good.
HAPPINESS AS THE BEST GOOD
 Why think that happiness satisfies these criteria?
1. Most complete: an end which is choiceworthy for its own
sake, not for anything further.
2. Self-sufficient: choiceworthy by itself and lacking nothing,
an all-inclusive good.
3. Most choiceworthy: no addition could make it better.
HAPPINESS AS THE BEST GOOD
1. Most complete. We choose other things for the sake of
happiness; we do not choose happiness for the sake
anything further.
2. Self-sufficient (inclusive). When we call a life happy, we
mean that it includes the things that make a life
worthwhile.
3. Most choiceworthy (not subject to improvement). If you have
happiness, then you have the best sort of life. The best life
cannot be made better by the addition of further goods.
SUMMING UP
At this point we have established that happiness is the best
good. But in Aristotle’s view this is not a big accomplishment,
for everyone is already in agreement with this point.
The real issue at hand is the following: What is the best kind of
life? What is the happy life?
We will turn to Aristotle’s function argument in due course. But
first:
 Is Aristotle right that the conclusion so far is a trivial one? Is
it even true that happiness is the best good?
ARISTOTLE & PSYCHOLOGICAL EGOISM
Psychological egoism is a view about human psychology
according to which the ultimate goal of all voluntar y behavior in
humans is in each case the agent’s personal happiness.
For discussion in groups:
 Do you agree with Aristotle that personal happiness is the
ultimate aim of human action? Do you think we are by nature
selfish and incapable of genuinely altruistic behavior?
ARISTOTLE & HEDONISM
A hedonist version of psychological egoism maintains that
humans always aim at their own personal pleasure. Aristotle
accepts some version or other of psychological egoism, but he
is not a hedonist.
On Aristotle’s view, humans alone have the cognitive
sophistication required to distinguish the apparent good (the
pleasant) from what is in fact good for one . A pleasure is good
only insofar as it is a consequence of some good activity (e.g.
virtuous activity).
A happy human life will include pleasure as a kind of byproduct;
pleasure is not the goal of a happy human life.
HAPPINESS VS. LIFE SATISFACTION
For humans there is an important distinction to be drawn
between (i) how things seem qualitatively “from the inside” and
(ii) how well things are in fact going.
Aristotle rejects a “life satisfaction” view of happiness . Human
happiness is a matter of flourishing as a human being.
Animals & children cannot attain happiness, though they
presumably possess some analogue of it. But even here
“happiness” will be a life of thriving activity, not the sort of life
possible in Nozick’s experience machine.
ARISTOTLE & PSYCHOLOGICAL EGOISM
Aristotle thinks that many plausible explanations of human
action invoke happiness as an ultimate aim/goal/end. Some
actions (e.g. incontinent ones) do not seem to fit this model.
 How might Aristotle respond to these sorts of cases?
ARISTOTLE & PSYCHOLOGICAL EGOISM
Aristotle thinks that many plausible explanations of human
action invoke happiness as an ultimate aim/goal/end. Some
actions (e.g. incontinent ones) do not seem to fit this model.
 How might Aristotle respond to these sorts of cases?
One option is to insist that all rational human action aims at
happiness. So Aristotle is not talking about irrational or non rational behavior.
 The behavior of children & non-human animals is not aimed at
happiness. Is Aristotle committed to an implausible
discontinuity between adult humans and all other agents?
A MODEST EGOISM
Aristotle’s claim that happiness is the ultimate goal of human
action is compatible with two ways of thinking about happiness
as an ultimate end of human action:
1. We do everything solely for the sake of personal happiness.
2. We do everything also for the sake of personal happiness
(though sometimes for independent reasons as well).
We have strong reason to prefer 2 over 1 as an interpretation of
Aristotle. Consider his view that a friend is another self!
EVEN MORE MODEST
What’s more, it is likely that Aristotle acknowledges further
exceptions, and is committed at most to:
We do most everything also for the sake of happiness.
He writes: “Honor, pleasure, understanding, and every virtue we
certainly choose because of themselves, since we would choose
each of them even if it had no further result ; but we also choose
them for the sake of happiness, supposing that through them
we shall be happy. Happiness, by contrast, no one ever chooses
for their sake, or for the sake of anything else at all.” (1097b)
ARISTOTLE’S EGOISM REFORMULATED
In normal circumstances where our actions can impact personal
happiness, our rational voluntary actions are aimed at personal
happiness, but not to the exclusion of other goods. We can
pursue the good of another for their sake and simultaneously
pursue friendship as a component of our own happiness.
FUNCTION & GOODNESS
So far we have been thinking of goods as the things intentional
behavior is aimed at. Happiness is the best good when we are
thinking of goodness in this way.
Aristotle hopes to make progress on the question of what
human happiness is by focusing on a dif ferent way of thinking
about goodness.
Sometimes we characterize something as good insofar as it
performs its function well .
 Examples?
THE ERGON ARGUMENT:
RELEVANT TERMINOLOGY
The ergon of x: x’s distinctive function/work
A good x: an x that performs its ergon well
The aretē of x: the excellence or virtue which allows x to
perform its function well
Expressing aretē: functioning/working well
Illustration: the aretē of a pen is that in virtue of which the pen
performs its ergon (writing) well and so counts as a good pen.
Writing well is an activity that expresses the pen’s aretē.
THE ERGON ARGUMENT
1. There is a human function.
Accordingly,
2. The good human is one who performs her function well.
Accordingly,
3. The good human life (happiness) is a life of activity which
expresses virtue.
What Aristotle needs to do:
A. Establish that there is a human function.
B. Show that performing the human function well is the good
for a human being (happiness).
FUNCTION: PARTS & WHOLES
Aristotle takes for granted that parts of animals have functions.
He moves from this assumption to the conclusion that whole
organisms have functions.
“As each of the parts of the body, like every other instrument, is
for the sake of something, that is, for the sake of some activity,
it is obvious that the body as a whole is composed for the sake
of some complex activity.”
 Do you agree? Is it “obvious” that whole organisms have
functions?
FROM PART TO WHOLE
What is the heart for? For pumping blood, so it circulates
around the body.
And what about the circulation of blood? Does it have a
function in turn?
Suppose it didn’t. If circulation of the blood were pointless,
then presumably we wouldn’t say that a heart which pumps
blood was for something, that it had an end or purpose.
FROM PART TO WHOLE
What is the heart for? For pumping blood, so it circulates around
the body.
And what is the circulation of blood for? It distributes nutrition and
oxygen around the body.
And what is this distributing for? It allows for things like muscle
contraction.
And what is muscle contraction for?...
This and similar chains have to terminate somewhere. According to
Aristotle, they terminate in one thing: the creature’s ergon, its
specific way of life.
TELEOLOGICAL EXPLANATION
Aristotle is taking for granted that teleological explanation has
an important role to play in biology.
Teleological explanation: explanation of why something is the
case by appeal to its promoting some end/purpose. For
example, why does the teapot have a handle?
But if we are going to extend this sort of explanation to
biological organisms, we seem to be committed to the idea that
ends/purposes are present in nature.
 How might this work? Why might we think there are
ends/purposes in nature? (What’s the most obvious answer?)
THEISM
One traditional way of making sense of ends/purposes in nature
is to invoke the supernatural.
A significant part of the scientific revolution was the rejection
of the idea that “final causes” have a place in the natural
sciences.
Descartes and others insisted that speculations about God’s
designs lie outside scientific investigation of the world.
 How might we get ends/purposes in nature without theism?
EVOLUTION
Perhaps things have a function/utility relative to survival for
reproduction.
Karen Neander: “It is a/the proper function of an item ( X) of an
organism (O) to do that which items of X’s type did to contribute to
the inclusive fitness of O’s ancestors, and which caused the
genotype, of which X is the phenotypic expression, to be selected
by natural selection.”
This account was developed with functions in physiology in mind.
The heart has the function of circulating blood —rather than, say,
making a thumping noise —provided circulating blood contributed
to the selection of hearts. In general, we identify the biological
functions of X by asking what past instances of X did to cause that
trait to be selected for.
ARISTOTLE ON EMPEDOCLES
“Why not suppose, then, that the same is true of the parts of
natural organisms? On this view, it is of necessity that, for
example, the front teeth grow sharp and well adapted for biting,
and the back ones broad and useful for chewing food; this
<useful> result was coincidental, not what they were for. The
same will be true of all other parts that seem to be for
something. On this view, then, whenever all the parts came
about coincidentally as though they were for something, these
animals survived, since their constitution, though coming about
by chance, made them suitable <for survival>. Other animals,
however, were dif ferently constituted and so were destroyed;
indeed they are still being destroyed, as Empedocles says of the
man-headed calves.” (198b)
 What part of Darwin’s account is missing?
DARWINISM
Core elements of Darwin’s theory:
 Random variation
 Survival of the fittest
 Inherited characteristics (not present in Empedocles)
ENDS/PURPOSES IN NATURE
 Function in God’s plan
 Function relative to survival for reproduction
Aristotle has a dif ferent take
 Function relative to an organism’s form/nature
ARISTOTLE’S FOUR CAUSES
Aristotle thinks there are four types of causes or forms of
explanation (αιτίαι)
Material cause. Explanation that appeals to something’s
material constitution.
Ef ficient cause. Explanation that appeals to the producer of
some product/change.
Final cause. Explanation that appeals to ends/purposes.
Formal cause. Explanation that appeals to something’s nature
or essence.
FINAL CAUSES PRESUPPOSE FORMAL
Functional explanations in biology have to end somewhere.
Otherwise we would have a problematic regress or problematic
circularity.
Aristotle insists that functional explanation terminates in an
organism’s form understood as the way of life that make a
species what it is.
For Aristotle these forms/natures have always existed, so there
is no explanation in turn of why these natures exist. Formal
explanation is bedrock.
WHOLE-ORGANISM FUNCTION
Tyler Burge: “Functions of individuals are subcases of biological
functions, subcases that contrast with functions of an organ or
a sensory system… They are distinctive in being functions of the
whole individual—not the individual’s subsystems…
Whole animal function is exemplified by basic biological
activities—eating, navigating, mating, parenting, and so on.
These activities are functional in the most commonly cited
sense of biological function. Roughly, their existence is
explained by their contribution to the individual’s survival for
mating, or perhaps in some cases the species’ survival…
Fulfilling these functions —successfully pursuing these
activities—contributes to the individual’s survival for mating.”
(Origins of Objectivity)
BEYOND MERE BIOLOGICAL FUNCTION
Tyler Burge: “There are, I think, further natural functions, other
than the narrowly biological ones, that can be associated with
whole organisms. There is a notion of a naturally flourishing life
in which (beyond surviving long enough for mating) an animal
lives out a life that realizes its natural capabilities, with
relatively little misfortune.” ( Origins of Objectivity )
 Aristotle’s theory of the human good evidently rests on the
idea that there are natural functions beyond the narrowly
biological ones. What do you think of this idea?
THE DISTINCTIVELY HUMAN FUNCTION
So far we have seen support for two main claims:
1. Whole organisms like squirrels have functions.
2. A good squirrel existence is a life of activity that excels with
respect to the squirrels’ distinctive way of life.
Our next task is to understand what the distinctively human
function is. This task takes us into Aristotle’s De anima, which
explores foundational issues in the biological sciences and
psychology.
ARISTOTLE ON THE SOUL
The ψυχή (psukhḗ: soul or breath) is that in virtue of which
living things dif fer from non -living things. It is the ἀρχή (arkhḗ:
principle or source) of life. Even plants have souls .
A soul is not some sort of non -physical or non-natural thing. As
the form of a living body, it is as much a part of nature as the
matter which constitutes a living being.
Think of the soul as the organization of material stuf fs in virtue
of which a living body is able to fulfill the functions distinctive
of living things.
 Should we expect the soul to be something that would survive
death, as Plato thought?
DIGRESSION ON DEATH & SURVIVAL
In discussing the nutritive/reproductive capacities of plants,
Aristotle writes: “Since, then, they cannot share in the
everlasting and divine by continuous existence, because no
perishable thing can persist numerically one and the same, they
share in them insofar as each can some more and some less;
and what persists is not the thing itself but something like
itself, not one in number but one in species.” ( De anima II.4)
Whether Aristotle allows for the survival of the (active) intellect
in humans is somewhat doubtful. The key text ( De anima III.5)
is very brief and obscure.
ARISTOTLE’S DEFINITION OF SOUL
Quick version: the soul is the form/essence of a living being (as
opposed to its matter).
Longer version: the soul is the first actuality ( ἐντελέχεια)
of a natural body which has organs . Begin with an organ:
An eye (matter/potentiality) is what has the potentiality to see.
Sight (form/actuality) is the first actuality of the eye.
Seeing is the second actuality of the eye.
Think of the soul as the first actuality of the entire organic
body.
FUNDAMENTAL LIFE CAPACITIES
The soul is a principle in virtue of which an organic body
possesses the capacities distinctive of living beings :
 Reason
 Locomotion
Hearing/Sight/Smell
 Perception/Desire
Touch/Taste
 Nutrition/Reproduction
Ladder of life: a creature with a capacity higher on the list must
have all the capacities lower on the list. Likewise, anything with
the “distance” senses must have the “contact” senses. (Notice
that the latter distinction is grounded in a dif ference in objects
of sense rather than a dif ference in stimuli.)
 Which creatures might Aristotle have in mind at each level of
the ladder?
ARISTOTLE’S HIERARCHY OF
LIVING BEINGS




Reason (humans)
Locomotion (vast majority of animals)
Perception/Desire (sessile animals like barnacles and corals)
Nutrition/Reproduction (plants)
Notice that this list allows us to read of f the distinctively human
function, namely, reason.
 Is Aristotle committed to an implausible discontinuity
between cognition in humans and other animals?
THE CAPACIT Y FOR REASONING
According to Aristotle, non -human animals lack belief (428a16
f f.). Belief requires conviction & susceptibility to persuasion,
and these demand sensitivity to reasons, which in turn
presuppose the capacity for reasoning. But what is the capacity
for reasoning?
Aristotle distinguishes two forms:
Induction is reasoning from particulars to generalizations, from
observation of particular instances to a conclusion like:
All men are mortal.
Deduction is reasoning from two (or more) generalizations to
another generalization where the latter follows of necessity
from the former.
ARISTOTLE ON THE SYLLOGISM
Aristotle discovered the discipline of logic, and his views
dominated until late in the 19 th century. Aristotle seems to
think that all deductive inference can be reduced to syllogistic
reasoning. A syllogism is an argument with a rather specific
form. It includes three statements, each of which includes a
subject & a predicate and is true or false. Two of the
statements are premises, the other a conclusion.
The statements are generalizations which can take one of four
forms:
 All S are P. (universal af firmation)
 No S are P. (universal negation)
 Some S are P. (particular af firmation)
 Some S are not P. (particular negation)
SOME CONFIGURATIONS THAT YIELD
DEDUCTION
All As are Bs.
All Bs are Cs.
All As are Cs.
No Bs are As.
All Cs are Bs.
No Cs are As.
All Bs are As.
Some Cs are Bs.
Some Cs are As.
No Bs are As.
Some Cs are Bs.
Some Cs are not As.
No Bs are As.
All Cs are As.
No Cs are Bs.
No Bs are As.
Some Cs are As.
Some Cs are not Bs.
All Bs are As.
Some Cs are not As.
Some Cs are not Bs.
All Cs are As.
All Cs are Bs.
Some Bs are As.
No Cs are As.
All Cs are Bs.
Some Bs are not As.
PRACTICAL REASON
Aristotle seems to think that human action is sometimes the
conclusion of a syllogism. In this context it seems that we need
premises drawn from perception and these premises will not be
generalizations (in the sense above).
All cats are in need of petting.
This is a cat.
[action]
ABSENCE OF REASON IN ANIMALS
What does Aristotle mean when he denies that non -human
animals can reason? Animals have memories and perhaps even
form concepts for deployment in perception. Presumably they
do not form the sorts of generalizations involved in syllogism,
i.e.
 All S are P. (universal af firmation)
 No S are P. (universal negation)
 Some S are P. (particular af firmation)
 Some S are not P. (particular negation)
Their actions seem to be explained by their perception of things
that are in fact pleasant/painful or by their perception of things
previously found to correlate with the pleasant/painful.
“OUTLINE” ACCOUNT OF HAPPINESS
“Now we take the human function to be a certain kind of life,
and take this life to be the soul’s activity and actions that
express reason. Hence, the excellent man’s function is to do
this finely and well. Each function is completed well when its
completion expresses the proper virtue. Therefore the human
good turns out to be the soul’s activity that expresses virtue .”
A QUESTION ABOUT ARISTOTLE’S
APPROACH
Let’s grant that Aristotle has identified what makes someone a
good specimen of the kind human.
 What, exactly, does being a good specimen have to do with
happiness? Can’t one of these be present without the other?
EUDAIMONIA
Recall that Aristotle does not identify the good life ( εὐδαιμονία)
with life satisfaction.
Consistently playing the flute well is what thriving qua flute
player is all about. Likewise, consistently excelling as a rational
agent is what thriving qua a human being is all about.
Thriving/excelling as a human being = leading a good human
life = a happy existence.
A FINAL WORRY: CALLICLES AGAIN
A moral skeptic like Callicles will have doubts about Aristotle’s
claim that our human nature is to strive for something more
than survival for reproduction.
 Does Aristotle have a response to someone who insists that
there is in the nature of things no other standard of
excellence/thriving for a human existence other than survival
for reproduction?