1AC — BHL PS
Freedom Act
Plan
Regarding its monitoring of United States persons, the United States
federal government should:
- require use of a “specific selection term” to satisfy current
“reasonable, articulable suspicion standards”
- require that information collected through “pen register or trap
and trace devices” via emergency authorizations be subject to
the same procedural safeguards as non-emergency collections.
- require “super minimization" procedures that delete
information obtained about a person not connected to the
investigation
1AC—Democracy
Global democracy is under threat—the international image of
democracy is the crucial variable
Walker 15 - Christopher Walker is Executive Director of the National Endowment for Democracy’s International Forum for Democratic
Studies, a leading center for the analysis and discussion of the theory and practice of democratic development. (“The Authoritarian Resurgence,”
Journal of Democracy, Volume 26, Number 2, p. 21, Project Muse, April 2015) STRYKER
Attentive readers of this journal will have already noticed that NED’s
International Forum for Democratic Studies is
engaged in a study of what we have varyingly labeled the “ world movement against
democracy” or the “authoritarian resurgence.” This project is divided into two parts—one
focusing on the countries that have been leading this resurgence, and a second examining some
of the key “soft-power” arenas in which they have been seeking to weaken democracy . The first
article generated by this project, Andrew J. Nathan on “China’s Challenge,” appeared in our January 2015 issue. In the pages that follow, we offer
readers essays on four
other major authoritarian countries—Russia, Venezuela, Iran, and Saudi
Arabia—that are seeking both to gain ascendancy in their respective regions and to undercut the
rules-based institutions that have been instrumental in setting global democratic norms. These
regimes may disagree on many things, but they share the objective of obstructing the advance of democracy and weakening the influence of democratic
principles in the world. Lilia Shevtsova analyzes the transformation of Russia’s kleptocratic regime into something far more belligerent and dangerous,
and explains how Vladimir Putin’s new foreign policy is raising the stakes and reshaping the landscape in Europe and Eurasia. Javier Corrales shows
that Venezuela under Hugo Chávez’s successor Nicolás Maduro
has seen a “turn toward greater autocracy.” Abbas Milani
is
actively projecting its influence throughout its neighborhood. Frederic Wehrey examines Saudi
Arabia, Iran’s great regional rival, and the negative impact of Saudi policies on democracy. Over the
past decade, these regimes have proven adept at refining their techniques of repression and control.
But all four of them have been buoyed by high oil revenues, and it remains to be seen how they will fare if the price of
oil remains at sharply lower levels over an extended period of time. The authors of these essays explain the threat posed by these
resurgent authoritarians, but also identify their inherent political and economic weaknesses, including rampant corruption. The
established democracies have been slow to recognize the increasingly determined challenge from
today’s authoritarians, perhaps because they hope that these regimes will be undone by their flaws. But given the resilience
that the authoritarians have displayed so far, it would be rash for the democracies to
underestimate the seriousness of the dangers that they pose.
evaluates the underpinnings of the clerical authoritarian regime in Iran, and in a companion piece Alex Vatanka looks at how Tehran
Surveillance undermines the perceived viability of democracy
The Economist 13 - (“America against democracy,” http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2013/07/secretgovernment 7/9/2013) STRYKER
REVELATIONS in the wake of Edward Snowden's civil disobedience continue to roll in. The New
York Times reports that the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Court, also known as the FISA court, "has quietly become almost
a parallel Supreme Court, serving as the ultimate arbiter on surveillance issues and delivering
opinions that will most likely shape intelligence practices for years to come..." How is the FISA court like a
shadow Supreme Court? Its interpretation of the constitution is treated by the federal government as law. The Times reports: In one of the court’s most
important decisions, the
judges have expanded the use in terrorism cases of a legal principle known as
the “special needs” doctrine and carved out an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s
requirement of a warrant for searches and seizures, the officials said. Of course, there are important differences. None of
the judges of the FISA court were vetted by Congress. They were appointed by a single unelected official: John Roberts, the chief justice of the Supreme
Court. And then there's the fact that "the
FISA court hears from only one side in the case—the government—
and its findings are almost never made public." A court that is supreme, in the sense of having the final say, but where
arguments are only ever submitted on behalf of the government, and whose judges are not subject to the approval of a
democratic body , sounds a lot like the sort of thing authoritarian governments set up when they make a half-hearted attempt to create
the appearance of the rule of law. According to the Times, Geoffrey Stone, a law professor at the University of Chicago, "said he was troubled by the idea
that the court is creating a significant body of law without hearing from anyone outside the government, forgoing the adversarial system that is a staple
of the American justice system." I'm troubled, too. Meanwhile, the Wall Street Journal adds some meat to the story by reporting that "The
National Security Agency’s ability to gather phone data on millions of Americans hinges on the
secret redefinition of the word 'relevant'". In classified orders starting in the mid-2000s, the court accepted that "relevant" could
be broadened to permit an entire database of records on millions of people, in contrast to a more conservative interpretation widely applied in criminal
cases, in which only some of those records would likely be allowed, according to people familiar with the ruling." Relevant"
has long been
a broad standard, but the way the court is interpreting it, to mean, in effect, "everything," is new, says
Mark Eckenwiler, a senior counsel at Perkins Coie LLP who, until December, was the Justice Department's primary authority on federal criminal
surveillance law.[...]Two senators on the Intelligence Committee, Ron Wyden (D., Ore.) and Mark Udall (D., Colo.), have argued repeatedly that there
was a "secret interpretation" of the Patriot Act. The senators' offices tell the Journal that this new interpretation of the word "relevant" is what they
meant. Think about that. Doesn't that suggest to you that Messrs Wyden and Udall were afraid they might be subject to some sort of censure or reprisal
were they to share with the public specific details about the official interpretation of the law to which the public is subject? And those specific details
were about the interpretation of "relevant"? Now that that cat's out of the bag, I guess we're in danger? All
this somehow got me thinking
of the doctrine of "democracy promotion", which was developed under George W. Bush and
maintained more or less by Barack Obama. The doctrine is generally presented as half-idealism, halfpracticality. That all the people of the Earth, by dint of common humanity, are entitled to the protections of
democracy is an inspiring principle. However, its foreign-policy implications are not really so clear. To those of us who are sceptical
that America has the authority to intervene whenever and wherever there are thwarted democratic rights, the advocates of democracy-promotion offer
a more businesslike proposition. It is said that authoritarianism, especially theocratic Islamic authoritarianism, breeds anti-American terrorism, and
that swamp-draining democracy-promotion abroad is therefore a priority of American national security. If
you don't wish to
asphyxiate on poison gas in a subway, or lose your legs to detonating pressure-cookers at a roadrace, it is in your interest to support American interventions on behalf of democracy across the
globe. So the story goes. However, the unstated story goes, it is equally important that American democracy
not get out of hand. If you don't want your flight to La Guardia to end in a ball of fire, or your
local federal building to be razed by a cataclysm of exploding fertiliser, you will need to
countenance secret courts applying in secret its own secret interpretation of hastily drawn,
barely debated emergency security measures, and to persecute with the full force of the world's
dominant violent power any who dare afford a glimpse behind the veil. You see, democracy here at
home must be balanced against the requirements of security, and it is simply too dangerous to
leave the question of this balance to the democratic public. Open deliberation over the appropriate balance would
require saying something concrete about threats to public safety, and also about the means by which those threats might be checked. But revealing such
information would only empower America's enemies and endanger American lives. Therefore, this is a discussion Americans can't afford to have.
Therefore, the
power to determine that this is a discussion the public cannot afford to have cannot
reside in the democratic public. That power must reside elsewhere, with the best and
brightest, with those who have surveyed the perils of the world and know what it takes to meet them. Those deep within the security apparatus,
within the charmed circle, must therefore make the decision, on America's behalf, about how much democracy—about how much discussion about the
limits of democracy, even—it is safe for Americans to have. This
decision will not be effective, however, if it is openly
questioned. The point is that is not up for debate. It is crucial, then, that any attempt by those on the inside to reveal the real, secret rules
governing American life be met with overwhelming, intimidating retaliation. In order to maintain a legitimising democratic imprimatur, it is of course
important that a handful of elected officials be brought into the anteroom of the inner council, but it's important that they know barely more than that
there is a significant risk that we will all perish if they, or the rest of us, know too much, and they must be made to feel that they dare not publicly speak
what little they have been allowed know. Even senators. Even senators must fear to describe America's laws to America's citizens. This
is, yes,
democracy-suppression , but it is a vitally necessary arrangement. It keeps you and your adorable kids and even your cute pet dog
alive. Now, I don't believe I've heard anyone make this argument, no doubt because the logic of the argument cuts against it being made. Yet it seems
similar reasoning must underpin the system of secret government that has emerged from the examination of Mr Snowden's leaks, and I cannot help but
suspect that something along these lines has become the unspoken, unspeakable doctrine of Mr Obama's administration. Yet I remember when the Mr
Obama announced this: My Administration is committed to creating an unprecedented level of
openness in Government. We will work together to ensure the public trust and establish a
system of transparency, public participation, and collaboration . Openness will strengthen our
democracy and promote efficiency and effectiveness in Government. That would have been some real democracypromotion , right here in the homeland. What happened? Is it naive to think Mr Obama really believed this stuff? I'll admit, with
some embarrassment, that I'd thought he did believe it. But this "commitment" has been so thoroughly forsaken one is forced to consider whether it
was ever sincere. It has been so thoroughly forsaken one wonders whether to laugh or cry.
What kind of message are we
sending about the viability these democratic ideals—about openness, transparency,
public participation, public collaboration? How hollow must American exhortations to
democracy sound to foreign ears? Mr Snowden may be responsible for having exposed this hypocrisy, for having
betrayed the thug omertà at the heart of America's domestic democracy-suppression programme, but the hypocrisy is
America's . I'd very much like to know what led Mr Obama to change his mind, to conclude that America is not after all safe for democracy,
though I know he's not about to tell us. The matter is settled. It has been decided, and not by us. We can't handle the truth.
The plan sends the signal of credibility on democracy—domestic
surveillance is both sufficient and necessary
Katulis 9 - Brian Katulis is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress who served on the State Department’s policy planning staff in
the last years of the Clinton administration after living and working on the ground for the National Democratic Institute in Egypt and the Palestinian
territories. (“Democracy Promotion in the Middle East and the Obama Administration,” https://www.tcf.org/assets/downloads/tcf-Katulis.pdf 2009)
STRYKER
More broadly, the
United States should take steps to restore habeas corpus and bring wiretap
surveillance efforts back into the framework of the rule of law in the United
States. Sending the signal that the United States is cleaning up its act on these fronts
is a necessary step for reviving U.S. credibility on democracy promotion in the
Middle East. Without some progress on these measures, anything else that the new
administration tries to do on democracy promotion—whether it is political party building or civil society support, or any of
the other traditional programs in the U.S. toolbox—will likely yield few results because of the substantial
credibility gap. The new administration needs to send a clear message that the United
States intends to practice what it preaches by adhering to the legal obligations it assumed in
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention against Torture, and other human rights
treaties. Strengthening the legal framework for rule of law will require not only action on the part of the Obama administration but also engagement by
leaders in the U.S. Congress. How the United States reintroduces itself to the world—keeping its national security policy in line with the highest human
rights standards—will set the framework for how U.S. actions on the democracy promotion front are perceived throughout the Middle East.
Only domestic policy changes can make democracy promotion
effective
Al-Rodhan 14 - Nayef Al-Rodhan is director of the Centre for the Geopolitics of Globalization and Transnational Security at the Geneva
Centre for Security Policy. (“Reforming Democracy and the Future of History:
To spread Democracy, democratic
nations must look inward first .” http://www.theglobalist.com/reforming-democracy-and-the-future-of-history/ 6/14/2014)
STRYKER
In 1975, a report prepared by the Trilateral Commission, The Crisis of Democracy, signaled the pessimism and
defeatism prevailing in Western democracies at the time about the future and sustainability of
democracy. The report reflected a deep economic downturn, as well as social and political turmoil. This crisis of democracy was tightly connected
with concerns about “monopoly capitalism,” rampant materialism and corruption. Four decades later, democracy is again
in a state of crisis. This comes as somewhat of a surprise, given that successive waves of
democratization have touched every region of the world over the past 40 years. What is becoming
evident now is that an opposite trend has emerged. Democracy has in fact been in retreat for
years, as many repressive governments became even more repressive, civil liberties were
dropped and the military was empowered in many countries. The state of democracy today In the early 1990’s, the end of the
Cold War had brought the revalidation of democracy with great vigour as the most representative form of government. Yet this exuberance has been
counterbalanced with criticism of its failings and shortcomings. Democracies
guarantee political freedom, the rule of
law, human rights and a platform for citizens to engage in the political process. Yet, in practice,
democracies feature numerous inadequacies. Inequality, economic disparity, disempowerment, lack of opportunity,
infringements of civil liberties, ethnic, social and cultural discrimination, corruption and opaque honor titles systems are all present, and apparently
not antagonistic to democracies. Globally, democracies have also acted in ways that suggest an outright renunciation of their principles at home.
Irresponsible conduct, including unwarranted invasions , toleration of brutality, genocide, misuse of the
UN veto system at the expense of global harmony and peace, as well geopolitical machinations or meddling in the affairs of weaker states — these are all
traits that have
characterized the foreign conduct of major democratic states at some point. Inequality
alienates Western democracies like the United States, United Kingdom or France — traditionally considered
“advanced democracies ” — experience acute inequalities, and even cases of abject poverty. In 2009, a U.S. government report
pointed to the dramatic increase in hunger and food insecurity. About 50 million people were identified as having suffered food insecurity at some
point during the previous year. One in five people in the United Kingdom are also identified as falling below the poverty line. Growing inequality is at
times reinforced by, and an enabler of, shrinking opportunity. This fuels disillusionment and low political participation. As Joseph Stiglitz has noted,
“The rich don’t need to rely on government for parks or education or medical care or personal security — they can buy all these things for themselves. In
the process, they become more distant from ordinary people, losing whatever empathy they may once have had.” Corporate financing of political
campaigns have reinforced this, hijacking the democratic process. It further alienates voters who feel they are excluded from a process that is beyond
their control. The role of money in politics is worth singling out as a major problem with democratic governance. Its effects are truly worrisome,
especially when there is little transparency and regulatory mechanisms to limit the distorting role of money in politics. A check is worth a thousand
words The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in the “Citizens United” case openly enshrined the right of unlimited campaign spending, giving
corporations, associations and billionaire donors the freedom to heavily and undemocratically influence government, perversely as an expression of
their free speech. The “super PACs” have blurred the line between the personal and the political. They reinforce and perpetuate the rotation of
policymakers in the U.S. Congress and the executive branch, many of whom are already part of the wealthiest 1% (and, under any circumstance, remain
kept in office by money from the top 1%). Whatever constraints existed to this practice, they were expunged earlier in 2014 when the Supreme Court
opened the door to even more money in politics by striking down the aggregate contribution limits for campaigns. The decision means, in very practical
terms, that one single donor can contribute millions of dollars to political candidates or campaigns and thereby dim the prospect of new entrants, ideas
or challengers to the political arena. Finally, the
sense of disillusionment with democracy in its current form has
been reinforced with disclosures of large-scale government surveillance, violations
of privacy and civil liberties . The claim of sweeping authority over the right to collect
personal data is harmful to core liberties. Overseeing the overseers and keeping states’ need to
know in balance with the safeguard of privacy and civil liberties remains a challenge. Reforming
democracy Opinion polls across many continents reflect this current dissatisfaction with democracy.
These forms of disillusionment indicate the need to embrace a paradigm that goes beyond
political freedom and addresses the basic human need for dignity. Democracy guarantees political freedom and
rights. Yet it is not incompatible with marginalization, exclusion, poverty, disempowerment or disrespect. The triumph of a liberal democratic order as
a final destination of history and historical ideas, as once predicted by the “end of history”, needs a serious re-evaluation. A
greater emphasis
on human dignity and a governance model that places dignity at the center can halt
the current disenchantment with democracy . A more feasible paradigm is an approach I call Sustainable History.
It focuses on dignity rather than just freedom. And it allows for reconciling accountable governance with various political cultures.
Democracy promotion is effective—the US model is crucial
Fukuyama and McFaul 7 - Francis Fukuyama is a professor of international political economy and director of the
International Development Program at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C. Michael McFaul is a Hoover
Senior Fellow, a professor of political science, and director of the Center on Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law at Stanford University. He is
also a nonresident associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a member of TWQ's editorial board. (“Should Democracy Be
Promoted or Demoted?” http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/washington_quarterly/v031/31.1fukuyama.html 2007) STRYKER
Restoring the U.S. Example Inspiration for democrats struggling against autocracy
and a model for leaders in new democracies are two U.S. exports now in short supply . Since the
beginning of the republic, the U.S. experiment with democracy has provided hope, ideas, and
technologies for others working to build democratic institutions . Foreign visitors to the United
States have been impressed by what they have seen, and U.S. diplomats, religious missionaries, and businesspeople traveling abroad have inspired
others by telling the story of U.S. democracy. In
the second half of the twentieth century, during which the
United States developed more intentional means for promoting democracy abroad,
the preservation and advertisement of the U.S. democratic model remained a core
instrument .
Democracy is vital to counterterrorism
O'Connell 12 - Jamie O'Connell is a Senior Fellow of the Honorable G. William and Ariadna Miller Institute for Global Challenges and the
Law at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law, as well as a Lecturer in Residence. He teaches and writes on political and legal
development, and has particular expertise in law and development, transitional justice, democratization, post-conflict reconstruction, and business and
human rights. (“Common Interests, Closer Allies: How Democracy in Arab States Can Benefit the West,” Stanford Journal of International Law, Lexis
Nexis, Summer, 2012) STRYKER
C. Preventing Transnational Terrorism Many
of the bloodiest terrorist attacks against Western countries in the
last fifteen years have had some connection to Arab countries, rather than being entirely homegrown. n150 (It
would be grossly unjust to associate Arabs generally with terrorism; those involved in terrorism
represent a tiny fringe, and Westerners also perpetrate terrorist acts. n151) Social scientists understand
the impact of democracy on transnational terrorism less well than its impact on domestic instability or interstate conflict. n152 Their findings
indicate, however, that democratization of Arab countries is likely to serve Western countries'
interests by reducing the threat of terrorist attacks against them . The U.S. government, under both
Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, has made democratization a central component of the
country's official counterterrorism strategy. Large-sample statistical research supports
this conclusion . n153 The large majority of studies find that freer, more democratic countries have been less
likely to generate transnational terrorist attacks than more repressive, less democratic [*376]
countries. n154 Consequently, Western countries are likely to benefit from liberalization of countries from which terrorism might originate. Alan
Krueger and David Laitin examined countries with high civil liberties and found that attacks on
them were most likely to originate in countries with restricted civil liberties and least
likely to originate in ones with expansive ones. n155 Findings such as these lead some scholars to urge policymakers to
"encourage more liberal institutions to facilitate political and economic freedom" within states, so as to reduce terrorism originating in those states.
n156 Some
transnational terrorists attack foreign targets in order to influence their own
governments. n157 Lacking effective channels for influencing their government directly,
such as voting, citizens of autocracies try to pressure them indirectly, by attacking their Western
democratic allies. n158 (One of Osama bin Laden's oldest grievances was the presence of U.S.
military forces in Saudi Arabia, with Saudi government approval, because this placed them too close to Mecca.
n159) Such attacks can lead the public in the target state to press their own (democratic) leaders to try to influence the policies of the terrorists'
(autocratic) home [*377] government or more generally to scale back their support for it. n160 Democratization
of Arab countries
would reduce the number of their citizens who found foreign terrorism appealing for these
reasons by giving them a peaceful, legal, and less dangerous means for shaping their
governments' policies. n161 As Jennifer Windsor wrote in 2003: The source of much of the current wave of terrorist activity - the Middle
East - is not coincidentally also overwhelmingly undemocratic, and most regimes in the region lack the legitimacy and capacity to respond to the social
and economic challenges that face them... . Democratic
institutions and procedures, by enabling the peaceful
reconciliation of grievances and providing channels for participation in policymaking, can help
to address those underlying conditions that have fueled the recent rise of Islamist extremism. n162 The United States' National
Strategy for Counterterrorism adopts this logic. "Promoting democracy" was the sole "long-term" component of the strategy President George W. Bush
officially promulgated in 2006. n163 "Transnational terrorists are recruited from populations with no voice in their own government and see no
legitimate way to promote change in their own country. Without a stake in the existing order, they are vulnerable to manipulation by those who
advocate a perverse political vision based on violence and destruction." n164 President Obama has maintained democratization as a central component
of his official counterterrorism strategy: Promoting
representative, responsive governance is a core tenet of
U.S. foreign policy and directly contributes to our [ counterterrorism ] goals. Governments that
place the will of their people first and encourage peaceful change directly contradict the al-Qa'ida ideology. Governments that are responsive to the
needs of their citizens diminish the discontent of their people and the associated drivers and grievances that al-Qa'ida actively attempts to exploit.
Effective governance reduces the traction and [*378] space for al-Qa'ida, reducing its resonance and contributing to what it fears most - irrelevance.
n165
Threat of nuclear terrorism is high
Bunn 13 (Matthew, Valentin Kuznetsov, Martin B. Malin, Yuri Morozov, Simon Saradzhyan, William H.
Tobey, Viktor I. Yesin, and Pavel S. Zolotarev. "Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism." Paper, Belfer Center
for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, October 2, 2013, Matthew Bunn.
Professor of the Practice of Public Policy at Harvard Kennedy School andCo-Principal Investigator of
Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International
Affairs. • Vice Admiral Valentin Kuznetsov (retired Russian Navy). Senior research fellow at the Institute
for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Senior Military Representative of the
Russian Ministry of Defense to NATO from 2002 to 2008. • Martin Malin. Executive Director of the
Project on Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. • Colonel Yuri
Morozov (retired Russian Armed Forces). Professor of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences and
senior research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences,
chief of department at the Center for Military-Strategic Studies at the General Staff of the Russian
Armed Forces from 1995 to 2000. • Simon Saradzhyan. Fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs, Moscow-based defense and security expert and writer from 1993 to
2008. • William Tobey. Senior fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International
Affairs and director of the U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, deputy administrator for
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation at the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration from 2006 to
2009. • Colonel General Viktor Yesin (retired Russian Armed Forces). Leading research fellow at the
Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences and advisor to commander of
the Strategic Missile Forces of Russia, chief of staff of the Strategic Missile Forces from 1994 to 1996. •
Major General Pavel Zolotarev (retired Russian Armed Forces). Deputy director of the Institute for U.S.
and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, head of the Information and Analysis Center
of the Russian Ministry of Defense from1993 to 1997, section head - deputy chief of staff of the Defense
Council of Russia from 1997 to 1998., 10/2/2013, “Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism:
Recommendations Based on the U.S.-Russia Joint Threat Assessment”,
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/23430/steps_to_prevent_nuclear_terrorism.html)
I. Introduction In
2011, Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and the Russian Academy of
Sciences’ Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies published “The U.S. – Russia Joint Threat Assessment on Nuclear
Terrorism.” The assessment analyzed the means, motives, and access of would-be nuclear terrorists, and
concluded that the threat of nuclear terrorism is urgent and real. The Washington and Seoul Nuclear
Security Summits in 2010 and 2012 established and demonstrated a consensus among political leaders
from around the world that nuclear terrorism poses a serious threat to the peace, security, and prosperity of
our planet. For any country, a terrorist attack with a nuclear device would be an immediate and
catastrophic disaster, and the negative effects would reverberate around the world far beyond the location
and moment of the detonation. Preventing a nuclear terrorist attack requires international cooperation to
secure nuclear materials, especially among those states producing nuclear materials and weapons. As the world’s two greatest nuclear powers,
the United States and Russia have the greatest experience and capabilities in securing nuclear materials and plants and, therefore, share a
special responsibility to lead international efforts to prevent terrorists from seizing such materials and plants. The depth of convergence
between U.S. and Russian vital national interests on the issue of nuclear security is best illustrated by the fact that bilateral cooperation on this
issue has continued uninterrupted for more than two decades, even when relations between the two countries occasionally became frosty, as
in the aftermath of the August 2008 war in Georgia. Russia and the United States have strong incentives to forge a close and trusting
partnership to prevent nuclear terrorism and have made enormous progress in securing fissile material both at home and in partnership with
other countries. However, to meet the evolving threat posed by those individuals intent upon using nuclear weapons for terrorist purposes, the
United States and Russia need to deepen and broaden their cooperation. The 2011 “U.S. - Russia Joint Threat Assessment” offered both specific
conclusions about the nature of the threat and general observations about how it might be addressed. This report builds on that foundation
and analyzes the existing framework for action, cites gaps and deficiencies, and makes specific recommendations for improvement. “The U.S. –
Russia Joint Threat Assessment on Nuclear Terrorism” (The 2011 report executive summary): • Nuclear
terrorism is a real and
urgent threat. Urgent actions are required to reduce the risk. The risk is driven by the rise of terrorists who seek to
inflict unlimited damage, many of whom have sought justification for their plans in radical
interpretations of Islam; by the spread of information about the decades-old technology of nuclear
weapons; by the increased availability of weapons-usable nuclear materials; and by globalization, which
makes it easier to move people, technologies, and materials across the world. • Making a crude nuclear
bomb would not be easy, but is potentially within the capabilities of a technically sophisticated terrorist group,
as numerous government studies have confirmed. Detonating a stolen nuclear weapon would likely be difficult for terrorists
to accomplish, if the weapon was equipped with modern technical safeguards (such as the electronic locks known as Permissive Action Links, or
PALs). Terrorists
could, however, cut open a stolen nuclear weapon and make use of its nuclear material for a
bomb of their own. • The nuclear material for a bomb is small and difficult to detect, making it a major
challenge to stop nuclear smuggling or to recover nuclear material after it has been stolen. Hence, a primary
focus in reducing the risk must be to keep nuclear material and nuclear weapons from being stolen by continually improving their security, as
agreed at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington in April 2010. • Al-Qaeda
has sought nuclear weapons for almost two
decades. The group has repeatedly attempted to purchase stolen nuclear material or nuclear weapons,
and has repeatedly attempted to recruit nuclear expertise. Al-Qaeda reportedly conducted tests of
conventional explosives for its nuclear program in the desert in Afghanistan. The group’s nuclear ambitions
continued after its dispersal following the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Recent writings from top al-Qaeda
leadership are focused on justifying the mass slaughter of civilians, including the use of weapons of mass
destruction, and are in all likelihood intended to provide a formal religious justification for nuclear use.
While there are significant gaps in coverage of the group’s activities, al-Qaeda appears to have been frustrated thus far in acquiring a nuclear
capability; it is unclear whether the the group has acquired weapons-usable nuclear material or the expertise needed to make such material
into a bomb. Furthermore, pressure from a broad range of counter-terrorist actions probably has reduced the group’s ability to manage large,
complex projects, but has not eliminated the danger. However, there
is no sign the group has abandoned its nuclear
ambitions. On the contrary, leadership statements as recently as 2008 indicate that the intention to acquire
and use nuclear weapons is as strong as ever.
Successful acquisition causes nuclear spoofing – extinction
Barrett et al. 13—PhD in Engineering and Public Policy from Carnegie Mellon University, Fellow in the
RAND Stanton Nuclear Security Fellows Program, and Director of Research at Global Catastrophic Risk
Institute—AND Seth Baum, PhD in Geography from Pennsylvania State University, Research Scientist at
the Blue Marble Space Institute of Science, and Executive Director of Global Catastrophic Risk Institute—
AND Kelly Hostetler, BS in Political Science from Columbia and Research Assistant at Global Catastrophic
Risk Institute (Anthony, 24 June 2013, “Analyzing and Reducing the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War
Between the United States and Russia,” Science & Global Security: The Technical Basis for Arms Control,
Disarmament, and Nonproliferation Initiatives, Volume 21, Issue 2, Taylor & Francis)
War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, which are by far the largest
of any nations, could have globally catastrophic effects such as severely reducing food production for
years, 1 potentially leading to collapse of modern civilization worldwide, and even the extinction of
humanity. 2 Nuclear war between the United States and Russia could occur by various routes, including
accidental or unauthorized launch; deliberate first attack by one nation; and inadvertent attack. In an accidental or
unauthorized launch or detonation, system safeguards or procedures to maintain control over nuclear
weapons fail in such a way that a nuclear weapon or missile launches or explodes without direction from
leaders. In a deliberate first attack, the attacking nation decides to attack based on accurate information about the state of affairs. In an
inadvertent attack, the attacking nation mistakenly concludes that it is under attack and launches nuclear weapons in what it believes is a
counterattack. 3 (Brinkmanship strategies incorporate elements of all of the above, in that they involve intentional manipulation of risks from
otherwise accidental or inadvertent launches. 4 ) Over the years, nuclear strategy was aimed primarily at minimizing risks of intentional attack
through development of deterrence capabilities, and numerous measures also were taken to reduce probabilities of accidents, unauthorized
attack, and inadvertent war. For
purposes of deterrence, both U.S. and Soviet/Russian forces have maintained
significant capabilities to have some forces survive a first attack by the other side and to launch a
subsequent counter-attack. However, concerns about the extreme disruptions that a first attack would
cause in the other side's forces and command-and-control capabilities led to both sides’ development of
capabilities to detect a first attack and launch a counter-attack before suffering damage from the first
attack. 5 Many people believe that with the end of the Cold War and with improved relations between
the United States and Russia, the risk of East-West nuclear war was significantly reduced. 6 However, it also
has been argued that inadvertent nuclear war between the United States and Russia has continued to
present a substantial risk. 7 While the United States and Russia are not actively threatening each other with
war, they
have remained ready to launch nuclear missiles in response to indications of attack. 8 False
indicators of nuclear attack could be caused in several ways. First, a wide range of events have already been mistakenly interpreted as
indicators of attack, including weather phenomena, a faulty computer chip, wild animal activity, and control-room training tapes loaded at the
wrong time. 9 Second,
terrorist groups or other actors might cause attacks on either the United States or Russia
that resemble some kind of nuclear attack by the other nation by actions such as exploding a stolen or
improvised nuclear bomb, 10 especially if such an event occurs during a crisis between the United States and
Russia. 11 A variety of nuclear terrorism scenarios are possible. 12 Al Qaeda has sought to obtain or
construct nuclear weapons and to use them against the United States. 13 Other methods could involve attempts to
circumvent nuclear weapon launch control safeguards or exploit holes in their security. 14 It has long been argued that the probability of
inadvertent nuclear war is significantly higher during U.S.–Russian crisis conditions, 15 with the Cuban Missile
Crisis being a prime historical example. It is possible that U.S.–Russian relations will significantly deteriorate in the future, increasing nuclear
tensions. There
are a variety of ways for a third party to raise tensions between the United States and Russia,
making one or both nations more likely to misinterpret events as attacks. 16
New Freedom Act fails to restore US’s global credibility on Internet
freedom. The original version solves by closing SST loopholes.
Brinkerhoff ‘14
(Internally quoting Cynthia M. Wong is the senior researcher on the Internet and human rights for Human Rights Watch. Before joining Human Rights
Watch, Wong worked as an attorney at the Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) and as director of their Project on Global Internet Freedom. She
conducted much of the organization’s work promoting global Internet freedom, with a particular focus on international free expression and privacy.
She also served as co-chair of the Policy & Learning Committee of the Global Network Initiative (GNI), a multi-stakeholder organization that advances
corporate responsibility and human rights in the technology sector. Prior to joining CDT, Wong was the Robert L. Bernstein International Human
Rights Fellow at Human Rights in China (HRIC). There, she contributed to the organization’s work in the areas of business and human rights and
freedom of expression online. Wong earned her law degree from New York University School of Law. Human Rights Watch is an independent,
international organization that works as part of a vibrant movement to uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. Noel
Brinkerhoff is a Political reporter and writer covering state and national politics for 15 years. “With Support of Obama Administration, House NSA
Surveillance Reform Bill Includes Gaping Loopholes” – AllGov – May 26th - http://www.allgov.com/news/top-stories/with-support-of-obamaadministration-house-nsa-surveillance-reform-bill-includes-gaping-loopholes-140526?news=853242)
Lawmakers in the U.S. House of Representatives claim they have addressed the problems of the National Security
Agency’s (NSA) notorious bulk collection of data, made so famous last year by whistleblower Edward
Snowden. But the legislation adopted to end this controversial practice contains huge
loopholes that could allow the NSA to keep vacuuming up large amounts of Americans’
communications records, all with the blessing of the Obama administration. Dubbed the USA Freedom Act, the bill
overwhelmingly approved by the House (303 to 121) was criticized for not going far enough to keep
data out of the hands of government. “This so-called reform bill won’t restore the trust of Internet users in the U.S. and
around the world,” Cynthia Wong, senior Internet researcher at Human Rights Watch
(HRW), said. “Until Congress passes real reform, U.S. credibility and leadership on
Internet freedom will continue to fade.” Julian Sanchez, a researcher at the Cato Institute, a libertarian think tank, warned
that the changes could mean the continuation of bulk collection of phone records by another name. “The core problem is that this
only ends ‘bulk’ collection in the sense the intelligence community uses that term,” Sanchez told Wired.
“As
long as there’s some kind of target , they don’t call that bulk collection, even if you’re still
collecting millions of records…If they say ‘give us the record of everyone who visited these
thousand websites,’ that’s not bulk collection, because they have a list of targets.” HRW says the
bill, which now goes to the Senate for consideration, contains ambiguous definitions about what can and cannot be collected by the
agency. For instance, an earlier version more clearly defined the scope of what the NSA could grab
under Section 215 of the Patriot Act, which has formed the legal basis for gathering the metadata of phone calls. “Under an earlier
version of the USA Freedom Act, the government would have been required to base any
demand for phone metadata or other records on a “specific selection term” that “uniquely
describe[s] a person, entity, or account.” Under the House version, this definition was broadened to
mean “a discrete term, such as a term specifically identifying a person, entity, account, address, or device, used by the government to limit
the scope” of information sought,” according to Human Rights Watch. “This definition is too open-ended and ambiguous to
prevent the sort of creative interpretation by intelligence agencies that has been used to justify overbroad collection practices
in the past,” the group claims. The New America Foundation’s Open Technology Institute is similarly disappointed in the final House bill.
“Taken together,” the Institute wrote, “the changes to this definition may still allow for massive collection of
millions of Americans’ private information based on very broad selection terms such as a zip
code, an area code , the physical address of a particular email provider or financial institution , or
the IP address of a web hosting service that hosts thousands of web sites.”
1AC—Yemen
Contention _ is Human Intelligence
Information overload drains resources and trades off with targeted
surveillance
Volz, 14
(Dustin, The National Journal, “Snowden: Overreliance on Mass Surveillance Abetted Boston
Marathon Bombing: The former NSA contractor says a focus on mass surveillance is impeding
traditional intelligence-gathering efforts—and allowing terrorists to succeed”, October 20, 2014,
ak.)
Edward Snowden on Monday suggested
that if the National Security Agency focused more on traditional
intelligence gathering—and less on its mass-surveillance programs—it could have thwarted the 2013
Boston Marathon bombings. The fugitive leaker, speaking via video to a Harvard class, said that a preoccupation with
collecting bulk communications data has led to resource constraints at U.S. intelligence
agencies, often leaving more traditional, targeted methods of spying on the back burner. "We miss
attacks, we miss leads, and investigations fail because when the government is doing its 'collect
it all,' where we're watching everybody, we're not seeing anything with specificity because
it is impossible to keep an eye on all of your targets," Snowden told Harvard professor and Internet freedom
activist Lawrence Lessig. "A good example of this is, actually, the Boston Marathon bombings." Snowden said that Dzhokhar and
Tamerlan Tsarnaev were pointed
out by Russian intelligence to U.S. officials prior to the bombings
last year that killed three and left hundreds wounded, but that such actionable intelligence was largely
ignored. He argued that targeted surveillance on known extremists and diligent pursuit of
intelligence leads provides for better counterterrorism efforts than mass spying. "We didn't really
watch these guys and the question is, why?" Snowden asked. "The reality of that is because we do have finite
resources and the question is, should we be spending 10 billion dollars a year on mass-surveillance
programs of the NSA to the extent that we no longer have effective means of traditional [targeting]?"
Anti-spying activists have frequently argued that bulk data collection has no record of successfully
thwarting a terrorist attack, a line of argument some federal judges reviewing the NSA's programs have also used in their
legal reviews of the activities. Snowden's suggestion—that such mass surveillance has not only failed to directly
stop a threat, but actually makes the U.S. less safe by distracting resource-strapped intelligence
officials from performing their jobs—takes his criticism of spy programs to a new level. "We're watching
everybody that we have no reason to be watching simply because it may have value, at the expense of
being able to watch specific people for which we have a specific cause for investigating, and
that's something that we need to look carefully at how to balance," Snowden said.
The plan solves1) Leads to the abandonment of wasteful, inefficient mass
surveillance tactics in favor of targeted surveillance
Walt, 14
(Stephen M. Walt is the (real papa Walt) and Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international
relations at Harvard University, “The Big Counterterrorism Counterfactual Is the NSA actually
making us worse at fighting terrorism?”,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/11/10/counterterrorism_spying_nsa_islamic_stat
e_terrorist_cve, November 10, 2014, ak.)
The head of the British electronic spy agency GCHQ, Robert Hannigan, created a minor flap last week in an article he wrote for the
Financial Times. In effect, Hannigan argued that more robust encryption procedures by private Internet companies were unwittingly
aiding terrorists such as the Islamic State (IS) or al Qaeda, by making it harder for organizations like the NSA and GCHQ to monitor
online traffic. The implication was clear: The more that our personal privacy is respected and protected, the greater the danger we
will face from evildoers. It's a serious issue, and democracies that want to respect individual privacy while simultaneously keeping
citizens safe are going to have to do a much better job of reassuring us that vast and (mostly) secret surveillance capabilities overseen
by unelected officials such as Hannigan won't be abused. I tend to favor the privacy side of the argument, both because personal
freedoms are hard to get back once lost, but also because there's not much evidence that these surveillance activities are making us
significantly safer. They seem to be able to help us track some terrorist leaders, but there's a lively debate among scholars over
whether tracking and killing these guys is an effective strategy. The
fear of being tracked also forces terrorist
organizations to adopt less efficient communications procedures, but it doesn't seem to prevent
them from doing a fair bit of harm regardless. The fear of being tracked also forces terrorist organizations to adopt
less efficient communications procedures, but it doesn't seem to prevent them from doing a fair bit of harm regardless. So here's a
wild counterfactual for you to ponder: What
would the United States, Great Britain, and other wealthy and
powerful nations do if they didn't have these vast surveillance powers? What would they do if they didn't
have armed drones, cruise missiles, or other implements of destruction that can make it
remarkably easy (and in the short-term, relatively cheap) to target anyone they suspect might be a
terrorist? Assuming that there were still violent extremists plotting various heinous acts, what would these powerful states do
if the Internet was there but no one knew how to spy on it? For starters, they'd have to rely more heavily on triedand-true counterterrorism measures: infiltrating extremist organizations and flipping existing
members, etc., to find out what they were planning, head attacks off before they occurred, and eventually roll up organization
themselves. States waged plenty of counterterrorism campaigns before the Internet was invented,
and while it can be difficult to infiltrate such movements and find their vulnerable points, it's not exactly an unknown
art. If we couldn't spy on them from the safety of Fort Meade, we'd probably be doing a lot more
of this. Second, if we didn't have all these expensive high-tech capabilities, we might spend a lot
more time thinking about how to discredit and delegitimize the terrorists' message, instead of
repeatedly doing things that help them make their case and recruit new followers. Every time the
United States goes and pummels another Muslim country -- or sends a drone to conduct a "signature strike"
-- it reinforces the jihadis' claim that the West has an insatiable desire to dominate the Arab and
Islamic world and no respect for Muslim life. It doesn't matter if U.S. leaders have the best of
intentions, if they genuinely want to help these societies, or if they are responding to a legitimate
threat; the crude message that drones, cruise missiles, and targeted killings send is rather
different. If we didn't have all these cool high-tech hammers, in short, we'd have to stop treating
places like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Syria as if they were nails that just needed another
pounding, and we might work harder at marginalizing our enemies within their own societies. To
do that, we would have to be building more effective partnerships with authoritative sources of
legitimacy within these societies, including religious leaders. Our failure to do more to discredit
these movements is perhaps the single biggest shortcoming of the entire war on terror, and until
that failure is recognized and corrected, the war will never end. Third, and somewhat paradoxically, if
we didn't have drones and the NSA, we'd have to think more seriously about boots on the
ground, at least in some places. But having to think harder about such decisions might be a good thing,
because it would force the United States (or others) to decide which threats were really serious and
which countries really mattered. It might even lead to the conclusion that any sort of military intervention is
counterproductive. As we've seen over the past decade, what the NSA, CIA, and Special Ops Command
do is in some ways too easy: It just doesn't cost that much to add a few more names to the kill
list, to vacuum up a few more terabytes of data, or to launch a few more drones in some new country, and
all the more so when it's done under the veil of secrecy. I'm not saying that our current policy is costless or that special operations
aren't risky; my point is that such
activities are still a lot easier to contemplate and authorize than a true
"boots on the ground" operation. By making it easier, however, the capabilities make it easier for our
leaders to skirt the more fundamental questions about interests and strategy. It allows them to "do something," even
when what is being done won't necessarily help. Lastly, if U.S. leaders had to think harder about
where to deploy more expensive resources, they might finally start thinking about the broader
set of U.S. and Western policies that have inspired some of these movements in the first place.
Movements like IS, al Qaeda, al-Nusra Front, al-Shabab, or the Taliban are in some ways indigenous
movements arising from local circumstances, but they did not spring up out of nowhere and the United States (and
other countries) bear some (though not all) blame for their emergence and growth. To say this is neither to defend nor justify violent
extremism, nor to assert that all U.S. policies are wrong; it is merely to acknowledge that there
is a causal connection
between some of what we do and some of the enemies we face. But if some of the things the
United States (or its allies) is doing are making it unpopular in certain parts of the world, and if some
of that unpopularity gets translated into violent extremism that forces us to spend hundreds of
billions of dollars trying to protect ourselves, then maybe we ought to ask ourselves if every single
one of those policies makes sense and is truly consistent with U.S. interests and values. And if not, then maybe we ought
to change some of them, if only to take some steam out of the extremist enterprise. What I'm suggesting, in short, is that the
"surveil and strike" mentality that has dominated the counterterrorism effort (and which is clearly
reflected in Hannigan's plea to let Big Brother -- oops, I mean the NSA and GCHQ -- keep its eyes on our communications) is
popular with government officials because it's relatively easy, plays to our technological strengths, and
doesn't force us to make any significant foreign-policy changes or engage in any sort of self-criticism at all. If we
can solve the terrorist problem by throwing money at it, and enriching some defense contractors and former government officials in
the process, what's not to like? If we can solve the terrorist problem by throwing money at it, and enriching some defense contractors
and former government officials in the process, what's not to like? To be clear: I'm not suggesting we dismantle the NSA, fire all our
cryptographers, and revert to Cordell Hull's quaint belief that "gentlemen [or ladies] do not read each other's mail." But until
we
see more convincing evidence that the surveillance of the sort Hannigan was defending has really and truly
kept a significant number of people safer from foreign dangers, I'm going to wonder if we aren't
overemphasizing these activities because they are relatively easy for us, and because they have a powerful
but hard-to-monitor constituency in Washington and London. In short, we're just doing what comes naturally,
instead of doing what might be more effective.
2) That prevents tradeoffs with human-intel which is critical to
overall US intel.
Margolis ‘13
Gabriel Margolis – the author presently holds a Master of Arts (MA) in Conflict Management & Resolution from UNC
Wilmington and in his final semester of the program when this article was published in the peer-reviewed journal
Global Security Studies . Global Security Studies (GSS) is a premier academic and professional journal for strategic
issues involving international security affairs. All articles submitted to and published in Global Security Studies (GSS)
undergo a rigorous, peer-reviewed process. From the article: “The Lack of HUMINT: A Recurring Intelligence
Problem” - Global Security Studies - Spring 2013, Volume 4, Issue
2http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Margolis%20Intelligence%20(ag%20edits).pdf
The United States has accumulated an unequivocal ability to collect intelligence as a result of the technological advances of
the 20th century. Numerous methods of collection have been employed in clandestine operations around
the world including those that focus on human, signals, geospatial, and measurements and signals
intelligence. An infatuation with technological methods of intelligence gathering has developed
within many intelligence organizations, often leaving the age old practice of espionage as an afterthought.
As a result of the focus on technical methods, some of the worst intelligence failures of the 20th century can
be attributed to an absence of human intelligence. The 21st century has ushered in advances in technology
have allowed UAVs to become the ultimate technical intelligence gathering platform; however human
intelligence is still being neglected. The increasing reliance on UAVs will make the United
States susceptible to intelligence failures unless human intelligence can be
properly integrated. In the near future UAVs may be able to gather human level intelligence, but it will be a long time
before classical espionage is a thing of the past.
Independently, signature strikes are inevitable but faulty intelligence
creates civilian casualties which destabilize and create anti-american
sentiment.
Greenfeild 13 — Danya Greenfield, deputy director of the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle
East at the Atlantic Council, where she leads the Yemen Policy Group, M.A. in International
Studies and Middle East Studies from John Hopkin’s University, B.A. in International Relations
from Tufts University, 2013 (“The Case Against Drone Strikes on People Who Only 'Act' Like
Terrorists,” The Atlantic, August 19th, accessible online at
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/08/the-case-against-drone-strikes-onpeople-who-only-act-like-terrorists/278744/, accessed on 6-25-15)
As Mark Bowden discusses in this month's Atlantic cover story, there is great debate about
whether drone strikes should be a core component of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy. Of all
the the arguments in favor, those those emphasizing effectiveness of signature strikes are
particularly dubious. The term "signature strike" is used to distinguish strikes conducted against
individuals who "match a pre-identified 'signature' of behavior that the U.S. links to militant
activity," rather than targeting a specific person. The United States should not allow signature
strikes because the cost of these attacks far outweighs the potential benefit. Leaving aside
significant concerns about the legality of such strikes, there are serious questions about the
efficacy of this approach in undermining terrorist networks.
The problem with signature strikes is that they open the door to a much higher incidence of
civilian casualties--and this is where the danger lies. If the United States is choosing
targets based on suspicious activity or proximity to other known-terrorists, this falls short of
the threshold for drone strikes set by the Obama Administration, perpetuates a
disastrous U.S. image in Yemen, and serves to invigorate the ranks of those groups
the United States aims to disable.
In response to increasing criticism, President Obama outlined his counterterrorism policy in
May 2013 with a speech at National Defense University. Obama noted that the U.S. will only act
against "terrorists who pose a continuing and imminent threat to the American people, and
when there are no other governments capable of effectively addressing the threat." He did not,
however, directly address the use of signature strikes, leaving open the prospect that they could
be used in the ongoing fight against terrorism. This would be a mistake. In Pakistan and
Afghanistan, extensive signature strikes sparked a significant increase in anti-
American sentiment. After years of drone strikes, 74 percent of Pakistanis considered the
U.S. an enemy by 2012 (up from 64 percent in 2009) according to a Pew Research Center poll.
The White House authorized signature strikes for Yemen, but U.S. officials insist that they have
not employed this tactic to date. If true, the incidence of civilian and non-combatant casualties
in Yemen means that faulty intelligence and targeting failures are to blame, which is
perhaps even more worrisome.
Second, this is specifically true of Yemen — targeted strikes solve
blowback and AQAP recruitment — it’s reverse causal.
Greenfeild 13 — Danya Greenfield, deputy director of the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle
East at the Atlantic Council, where she leads the Yemen Policy Group, M.A. in International
Studies and Middle East Studies from John Hopkin’s University, B.A. in International Relations
from Tufts University, 2013 (“The Case Against Drone Strikes on People Who Only 'Act' Like
Terrorists,” The Atlantic, August 19th, accessible online at
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/08/the-case-against-drone-strikes-onpeople-who-only-act-like-terrorists/278744/, accessed on 6-25-15)
In waging the drone campaign, the United States occasionally hits precisely the wrong
person. A U.S. strike in August 2012 supposedly killed three al-Qaeda militants in Yemen.
Among the casualties, however, was an anti-Qaeda imam and a policeman he had brought along
for protection. The imam was working to dismantle al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP),
making him precisely the sort of local ally the U.S. desperately needs in a place like Yemen.
Yemeni Nobel Prize laureate Tawakkul Karman warned that Yemeni tribal leaders in areas
where civilians have been killed in drone strikes say that these attacks drive more Yemenis
to turn against Washington. During his testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee,
Yemeni writer Farea al-Muslimi recounted an incident where the eldest son of a man killed by a
drone joined AQAP because he identifies the U.S. as his father's killer and wants revenge. As the
deaths and injuries mount, dangerous anti-American sentiment grows. When drone strikes
occur and non-combatants are killed, Yemenis lash out with protests demanding justice and
accountability from the United States--which has not been forthcoming.
In a place like Yemen, although the American drone program is universally hated, many
Yemenis will admit they would support targeted assassinations if there is clear
intelligence that an individual is a senior operative within AQAP and plotting a specific and
imminent act of terror against Americans. The problem with signature strikes is that they do not
meet this threshold--not even remotely-- and they open the door for the U.S. to make
grievous targeting mistakes and be seen as taking sides in a domestic insurgency. Signature
strikes target low-level militants who might be nasty characters, but they are not necessarily
planning an imminent act of terror or hold a leadership position.
Beyond signature strikes, there is a more fundamental question that we should be asking--a
question of overall strategy: is the current drone program achieving our national security
objectives? It is not just civil libertarians and human rights advocates that are sounding the
alarm; a group of 30 foreign policy experts sent a letter to President Obama in March 2013
calling for an end to the current drone strategy. Even senior retired members of the military,
including General Stanley McChrystal, believe drone strikes are counterproductive because
of the blowback they foment among the local population.
Targeted killings may eliminate key al-Qaeda leaders, but when civilians die along with them,
these strikes ensure that a generation of Yemenis, Pakistanis, or Somalis will blame
the U.S. for killing innocent community members, exacerbating America's serious image
problems abroad and creating a space for extremist ideology to take root. In short, the U.S.
drone program not only undermines the long-term national security of the United States
by fostering widespread anti-U.S. sentiment, it also undermines the legitimacy of the
host country government, whose support the U.S. needs, and it provides fodder for
jihadi rhetoric that strengthens the very groups the U.S. seeks to destroy.
Third, Yemen is a test case — success over AQAP prevents regional
terror and instability, but failure emboldens radical groups and
inflames regional rivalries.
Jarrell 14 — Matthew Jarrell, Ph.D. candidate in International Relations at Brown
University, 2014 (“Yemen: The Importance of Success in a Failed State,” Brown Political
Review, October 30th, accessible online at
http://www.brownpoliticalreview.org/2014/10/yemen-the-importance-of-success-in-a-failedstate/, accessed on 6-22-15)
Regional Reverberations
As Yemen deals with this latest round of domestic upheaval, the visible reciprocal relationship
between the nation and foreign interventionists remains. World and regional powers have
consistently had a negative impact on Yemeni internal affairs, and in turn, Yemen’s problems
are hardly confined within its borders. There are numerous parallels between Yemen and other
Middle Eastern nations’ struggles: intense regionalism embodied by the north versus south
dynamic is reminiscent of Libyan civil strife, and the Sunni-Shia sectarian tensions harken back
to Syrian divides. The Islamic State, a powerful terrorist group with international ambitions, has
derailed a domestic political order in Iraq in a similar manner as AQAP in Yemen. As a nation
that is plagued by all of these different dilemmas, it follows that a “solution” in Yemen could
help immensely in shedding light on how to counter terror in the region as a whole.
The first step to a more stable society is loosening the grip of destructive foreign interests. The
lessons that can be learned by examining repeated foreign missteps in Yemen are many:
Britain’s colonial division, Saudi Arabian and American unflinching backup of Saleh, and Iran’s
meddling in the Houthi issue should all have been avoided. Furthermore, if any hope of a
resolution exists in this war-weary republic, it will manifest itself through domestic dialogue
between the competing factions; perhaps the recent entrance of the Houthis into mainstream
political discussion will enable that. Ideally, all Yemenis should form a common front against
AQAP, eliminating one of the world’s most active terrorist groups and serving as a model for
national integration to the entire Middle East.
Fourth, Yemen Instability destroys regional stability — we have two
internal links.
A) Yemen instability ensures a steady flow of weapons and sectarian
divides — causes regional draw-in and escalation.
Salmoni et al. 10 — Barak Salmoni, Associate Professor of International Security Affairs at
the College of International Security Affairs, Ph.D. in Middle East Policy from Harvard
University, B.A. in Middle East Studies from Brandeis University — Bryce Loidolt, Adjunct
Professor of Middle Eastern Affairs at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, M.A. in
Middle East Studies from the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, B.A. in Middle East
Studies from Middleton College — Madeline Wells, Research Assistant at RAND Corporation,
M.A. in Islamic Studies from Columbia University, B.A. in Government from Cornell University,
2010 (“Concerns of Regional Powers,” Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen, Published by
the RAND Corporation, ISBN: 978-0-8330-4933-9, pgs. 281-283)
Concerns of Regional Powers
Over the past three years, regional states have become increasingly involved in the
GoYHuthi conflict. While San‘a has often referred to foreign (Libyan, Iranian) involvement as a
way to explain Huthi persistence, neighboring govenments are concerned that the Huthi
challenge aggravates the mounting threats to Yemen’s internal security. In this respect, the lack
of adequate security along Yemen’s land and maritime borders increases the likelihood that
terrorism, illicit trade, and weapons smuggling will persist throughout the region,
raising the possibility that combatants in numerous substate conflicts will circulate
transnationally, contributing to other simmering conflicts, or may be an element of
regime propaganda focusing on the Huthis’ supposed foreign support. These issues pose a
problem for Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries as well as Iran, while increasing the
dangers in the ungoverned spaces in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea littoral. The regional
threat perception caused by the conflict may also increase Sunni sentiment against alleged
Iranian-Shi‘a encroachment in the Gulf.
Huthi violence in northern Yemen directly increases the threat to Saudi Arabian border regions.
Although Yemen is not yet officially a part of the GCC, instability in a region that shares borders
and security concerns requires a regional focus on boosting Yemeni security capabilities. Part of
the security problem stems from the fact that much of Yemen’s border has never been
satisfactorily delineated, despite recently heightened security coordination. Without consistent
border security, the frequent frontier crossings by Yemeni tribesmen pose a concern to both
states, in light of the Huthi challenge to the GoY. Additionally, tribal populations in the Saudi
provinces of ‘Asir, Jizzan, and Najran (which has a large Isma‘ili and a small Zaydi minority)
may identify with their Yemeni cousins. Specifically, although the Khawlan bin ‘Amr subtribes of
Jabal Fayfa, Bani Ghazi, and Jabal Bani Malik have been on the Saudi side of the border since
1934, their members often travel back and forth for purposes of commerce. Given the
geographical extent of GoY-Huthi clashes, these tribal sections may include some proHuthi
members or may host small numbers of refugees from the conflict in Sa‘da. As we have seen, at
different times the GoY has alluded to cross-border tribal support for Huthi fighters, while
Huthi sources have alleged Saudi provision of funding and arms to the GoY, as well as
cooperation in armed attacks on Huthi supporters.7 In the 2009– 2010 round of fighting, this
became a regular theme of Huthi statements. More basically, unmonitored movement of
population permits the proliferation of the enablers of regional strife, including weapons,
funds, contraband goods, and ideas.
As seen in Chapter Five, the sixth phase of the war in Sa‘da has highlighted the conflict’s
regional aspects and its potential for further transnationalization. Saudi Arabia has become
directly entangled in fighting with Huthi forces on both sides of its border with Yemen and could
persist in anti-Huthi operations. According to local analysts, Saudi involvement reflects
frustration with GoY failures as well as a fear that a border open to Huthi movement could also
permit the reinfiltration of al-Qa‘ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) into Saudi territory, from
which it had been mostly eradicated in 2003–2006. Toward the end of 2009, regional Arab fora,
such as the GCC and Arab League, came out in support of Saudi actions to prevent
“encroachment on Saudi and Yemeni sovereignty,” considering Yemeni security integral to that
of surrounding Arab Gulf States. While Arab League and GCC states maintained the appearance
of a united Arab front, their support for Saudi Arabia and the GoY lessens their ability to act as
impartial mediators in any future conflict abatement process that might begin where the Qatar
process ended.
B) Yemen instability ensures Saudi proliferation — sectarian split
creates a regional arms race.
Ashraf 15 — Maimuna Ashraf, Research Fellow at the Strategic Vision Institute, an
international security think-tank, 2015 (“Muddle of Power Politics and Proliferation in Middle
East – Analysis,” Eurasia Review, May 8th, accessible online at
http://www.eurasiareview.com/08052015-muddle-of-power-politics-and-proliferation-inmiddle-east-analysis/, accessed on 6-21-15)
Likewise, the Saudi military action in Yemen cannot be observed in disconnection to a USIranian nuclear deal. Evidently, the US is focusing on an approach to ensure a Balance of Power
and blow a sectarian divide in the region, as it previously supported Iranian-led Shiite in Iraq
and now reportedly is providing intelligence and mission planning to Saudi Arabia against proIranian al-Houthis. The US does not want Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon because Iran holds
the conventional capability to target US and allied troops stationed in Middle Eastern region.
Thus, the Iranian nuclear weapon developments would increase the threat radically for US.
Whereas, if the Iran-US nuclear deal finalizes, the framework of the deal would probably lead to
the lifting of sanctions from Iran, which may invigorate the Iranian economy to assist their
military or nuclear ambitions.
These advancements might lead to a nuclear arms race in the region, by primarily forcing
Saudi Arabia to pursue such an option. The Saudis have already warned that they would
acquire the atomic bomb if Iran becomes a nuclear power. Recently, Riyadh signed a memo of
understanding with Seoul to build two nuclear power plants, whereas similar projects have
already been taken place with France, Argentina and China.
Recently the US lifted its ban on military aid to Egypt, while Egypt has also announced the plan
to build its first nuclear power plant with Russian help on the Mediterranean coast west of the
port city of Alexandria. Egypt is being considered as another Sunni state in region, emerging as
an atomic proliferate state. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) long ago ahead started
constructing its nuclear reactor. Whereas, Israel’s nuclear plans are widely known, Israel is a
non-party state to NPT, yet it already has a robust nuclear weapons stockpile in the region and is
reportedly in quest of second strike capability. Now almost all the major powers of Middle East
including Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Turkey, Syria, Oman, UAE, Jordon, Morocco, Tunisia, Kuwait,
Qatar and Egypt have either announced plans to produce nuclear energy or have signed nuclear
cooperation accords. Yemen and Libya are the two states that have called off their nuclear
programs. The predominant fear in the region is that most of the states in the region will join the
nuclear arms race to secure themselves, following the Iran case or as result of ongoing regional
power politics.
Conversely, the Yemen issue is widely affecting the Middle East, and the possibility of a
South Asian state becoming embroiled in Yemen’s civil war is high because Riyadh has been
leaning on Pakistan to join its military coalition, whilst the reports of secret Pak-Saudi nuclear
cooperation are already being speculated. Thus, if the Yemen conflict gets complicated and
Houthi rebels extend their vigorous aggression inside Saudi territory, then in such a worsening
situation, Pakistan will be standing at a crossroad to decide about the level of its involvement in
the conflict and scale of its cooperation with Saudi Arabia. Possibly, sighting the geopolitical
calculus, a flat refusal would not be possible for Islamabad, while a direct involvement in Yemen
would be taken as Saudi-led Sunni coalition arrayed against Iran that might ignite PakistanIranian tensions and broader Shiite-Sunni conflict.
Fifth, Saudi proliferation ensures regional proliferation and nuclear
war — it escalates and draws in other powers.
Edelman et al. 11 — Eric Edelman, visiting scholar at the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic
Studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Distinguished
Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Ph.D. in US Diplomatic History
from Yale University, B.A. in History from Cornell University — Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr.,
President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Ph.D. from Harvard
University in International Relations — Evan Montgomery, Senior fellow at the Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Ph.D. in Foreign Affairs from the University of Virginia,
2011 (“The Dangers of a Nuclear Armed Iran,” Foreign Affairs, January/February, accessible
online at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/persian-gulf/2011-01-01/dangers-nucleariran, accessed on 6-21-15)
There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia.
And if it did, proliferation could accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have
long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond
in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but
also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi
government is already pursuing a nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a
slow road to nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be able to
accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response to
the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the
region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from
China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also offered to
sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the CSS-2s, which are not accurate enough to deliver
conventional warheads effectively.
There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear
weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This "Islamabad option" could develop in
one of several different ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery
systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and
technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as
opposed to a decade or longer. Not only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is
currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second
chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it
might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded
arsenal of its own.
Alternatively, Pakistan might offer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy
nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United
States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly
appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are
not violating the NPT since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an
extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because
stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular
opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would
gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as
well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India.
The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how
India would respond. Would it target Pakistan's weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own
conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence
stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India's reaction,
any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would
be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to
pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the
remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons
weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only
circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT.
N-Player Competition
Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nucleararmed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition
would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.-Soviet rivalry
during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among three or more
nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar
competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to
concern themselves with an attack from the other. Multipolar systems are generally considered
to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance
of power and creating incentives for an attack.
More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps
necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states,
the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability,
so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents'
forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest
in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarine-based
nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East,
and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might
be compelled to "launch on warning" of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear
forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level
commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if
early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk
of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated
early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That
is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to
accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with
the pressure to respond quickly, would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the
wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear war.
Most existing nuclear powers have taken steps to protect their nuclear weapons from
unauthorized use: from closely screening key personnel to developing technical safety measures,
such as permissive action links, which require special codes before the weapons can be armed.
Yet there is no guarantee that emerging nuclear powers would be willing or able to implement
these measures, creating a significant risk that their governments might lose control over the
weapons or nuclear material and that nonstate actors could gain access to these items. Some
states might seek to mitigate threats to their nuclear arsenals; for instance, they might hide their
weapons. In that case, however, a single intelligence compromise could leave their weapons
vulnerable to attack or theft.
Meanwhile, states outside the Middle East could also be a source of instability. Throughout the
Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in a nuclear arms race that
other nations were essentially powerless to influence. In a multipolar nuclear Middle East, other
nuclear powers and states with advanced military technology could influence -- for good or ill -the military competition within the region by selling or transferring technologies that most local
actors lack today: solid-fuel rocket motors, enhanced missile-guidance systems, warhead
miniaturization technology, early warning systems, air and missile defenses. Such transfers
could stabilize a fragile nuclear balance if the emerging nuclear powers acquired more
survivable arsenals as a result. But they could also be highly destabilizing. If, for example, an
outside power sought to curry favor with a potential client state or gain influence with a
prospective ally, it might share with that state the technology it needed to enhance the accuracy
of its missiles and thereby increase its ability to launch a disarming first strike against any
adversary. The ability of existing nuclear powers and other technically advanced military states
to shape the emerging nuclear competition in the Middle East could lead to a new Great Game,
with unpredictable consequences.
Finally, only the plan reverses the trend in time to solve — the Middle
East could pass the brink for nuclear war at any moment.
London 10 — Herbert I. London, President of the Hudson Institute, Professor Emeritus at
New York University, Ph.D. from New York University, 2010 (“The Coming Crisis In The Middle
East,” Gatestone Institute, June 28th, available online at
http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/1387/coming-crisis-in-the-middle-east, Accessed 6-22-15)
The coming storm in the Middle East is gaining momentum; like conditions prior to World
War I, all it takes for explosive action to commence is a trigger.
Turkey's provocative flotilla, often described in Orwellian terms as a humanitarian mission, has
set in motion a gust of diplomatic activity: if the Iranians send escort vessels for the next round
of Turkish ships, which they have apparently decided not to do in favor of land operations, it
could have presented a casus belli. [cause for war]
Syria, too, has been playing a dangerous game, with both missile deployment and rearming
Hezbollah. According to most public accounts, Hezbollah is sitting on 40,000 long-, mediumand short-range missiles, and Syrian territory has been serving as a conduit for military materiel
from Iran since the end of the 2006 Lebanon War.
Should Syria move its own scuds to Lebanon or deploy its troops as reinforcement for
Hezbollah, a wider regional war with Israel could not be contained.
In the backdrop is an Iran, with sufficient fissionable material to produce a couple of nuclear
weapons. It will take some time to weaponize the missiles, but the road to that goal is
synchronized in green lights since neither diplomacy nor diluted sanctions can convince Iran to
change course.
From Qatar to Afghanistan all political eyes are on Iran, poised to be "the hegemon" in the
Middle East; it is increasingly considered the "strong horse" as American forces incrementally
retreat from the region. Even Iraq, ironically, may depend on Iranian ties in order to maintain
internal stability.
For Sunni nations like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, regional strategic vision is a combination of
deal-making to offset the Iranian Shia advantage, and attempting to buy or develop nuclear
weapons as a counterweight to Iranian ambition. However, both of these governments are in a
precarious state; should either fall, all bets are off in the Middle East neighborhood. It has long
been said that the Sunni "tent" must stand on two legs: if one, falls, the tent collapses.
Should this tent collapse, and should Iran take advantage of that calamity, it could incite a
Sunni-Shia war. Or feeling empowered, and no longer dissuaded by an escalation scenario,
Iran, with nuclear weapons in tow, might decide that a war against Israel is a distinct
possibility. However implausible it may seem at the moment, the possible annihilation of Israel
and the prospect of a second holocaust could lead to a nuclear exchange.
The only wild card that can change this slide into warfare is an active United States'
policy. Yet, curiously, the U.S. is engaged in both an emotional and physical retreat from the
region.
Despite rhetoric which suggests an Iran with nuclear weapons is intolerable, the U.S. has done
nothing to forestall this eventual outcome. Despite the investment in blood and treasure to allow
a stable government to emerge in Iraq, the anticipated withdrawal of U.S. forces has prompted
President Maliki to travel to Tehran on a regular basis. Further, despite historic links to Israel
that gave the U.S. leverage in the region as well a democratic ally, the Obama administration
treats Israel as a national security albatross that must be disposed of as soon as possible.
As a consequence, the U.S. is perceived in the region as the "weak horse," the one dangerous to
ride. In every Middle East capital the words "unreliable and United States" are linked. Those
individuals seeking a moderate course of action are now in a distinct minority. A political
vacuum is emerging, one that is not sustainable and one the Iranian leadership looks to with
imperial exhilaration.
It is no longer a question of whether war will occur, but rather when it will occur, and
where it will break out. There are many triggers to ignite the explosion, but not many
scenarios for containment. Could it be a regional war in which Egypt and Saudi Arabia watch
from the sidelines, but secretly wish for Israeli victory? Or will this be a war in which there aren't
victors, only devastation? Moreover, should war break out, what does the U.S. do?
This is a description far more dire than any in the last century and, even if some believe
that it is overly pessimistic, Arab and Jew, Persian and Egyptian, Muslim and Maronite tend to
believe in its veracity -- a truly bad sign.
Insider Threat Program
Plan
The United States federal government should curtail Section 6 of
Executive Order 13587
1AC — Intelligence Advantage
Advantage 1: Intel
Case officers are overwhelmed. It place international
counterintelligence cooperation at risk
Rottman 13 - Legislative counsel/policy adviser @ ACLU’s Washington Legislative Office
[Gabe Rottman, “Obama’s Whistleblower Witchunt Won’t Work at DOD,” Defense One, July 29,
2013, pg. http://tinyurl.com/pf3nwws
For two decades during the Cold War, an ultra-secret “mole” hunting squad at the Central
Intelligence Agency, led by James Jesus Angleton, investigated hundreds of loyal government
workers, primarily Eastern Europeans, in an obsessive search for Soviet spies based on tips from
a questionable source. When all was said and done, many careers were ruined, no mole found
and Angleton had lent his name to a new word for things conspiratorial and
paranoiac: Angletonian.
The Obama administration is now on an Angletonian path, but on a meta scale throughout the
government. Two years ago, the White House implemented the Insider Threat Program, an
initiative created by executive order following the WikiLeaks affair. Not surprisingly, civil
liberties groups fear the initiative will open the door to inappropriate and biased reporting based
on racial and ethnic profiling, whistleblower retaliation and personal and political
vendettas that will overload the system with bad information. These critics are joined,
however, by career counter-intelligence experts, many of whom argue that non-professionals are
simply ill-equipped to accurately identify potential threats.
The program requires any government agency with network access to classified information to
design and implement an insider threat plan to better identify both spies and leakers (including
whistleblowers seeking to reveal government fraud, waste, or illegality). The plans address both
network and information security, but much of the focus has been on personnel security.
Implementing agencies must train all of their cleared workers on how to identify “high-risk”
behavior by their colleagues like “stress,” sudden financial problems or “exploitable behavior
traits,” as one Defense Department publication puts it. In certain circumstances and agencies,
failure to report such behavior could leave employees open to disciplinary action or even,
reportedly, criminal penalties. Some agencies have extended the program to all workers, not just
those with clearances, and in many cases the training is far from comprehensive. It’s also
unclear who will run these programs. McClatchy, which broke the story, only notes that the
Pentagon is training managers and security officials at the Defense Department and contractors
to set up “insider threat offices.”
Interestingly, of those looking at the program, few have noted the particularly acute problems
posed by the program at the Defense Department, which will face special challenges for two
related reasons.
The first is simply size. DOD is one of the largest employers in the world and — because of its
size and mission — has the largest pool of security clearances in the government. In a total
population of almost 5 million cleared government workers, the Defense Department has more
than half, which include civilian employees, contractors and military personnel.
Additionally, one of the more important government-wide counterintelligence services is the
Defense Security Service, which is responsible for counterintelligence training and reporting for
the entire defense industry. It also administers the federal industrial security program, which
grants facility security clearances and provides security monitoring for more than 13,500
cleared, contractor facilities at DOD as well as 26 other government agencies. As a result, any
insider threat guidance from DOD administered through DSS would apply very broadly.
By dragooning every cleared defense employee as a potential tipster (and potentially punishing
them if they do not report), the Insider Threat Program will vastly inflate the universe of
potential leads. The sheer volume of data generated by a program that not only invites, but
requires, Defense Department workers to report “suspicious” behavior by colleagues will
overwhelm the smaller number of investigators actually working on legitimate insider threats.
The same “big data” issues have bedeviled the wider counterterrorism enterprise in the years
following 9/11. Legislative and administrative initiatives have prompted unprecedented
information gathering by the government without the requisite resources or technical ability to
digest the data. False positives are, tragically, a frequent occurrence and are all too often the
result of profiling based on a person’s race or ethnicity.
Equally tragic are the investigative failures in the overworked system, which was unable to
detect in advance, for instance, the Boston bombers or the Detroit underwear bomber despite
earlier tips to the government. In the case of Fort Hood shooter Army Maj. Nidal Hasan, the
FBI’s Webster Commission Report specifically said that the post-9/11 “data explosion”
contributed to the failure to properly assess emails between Hasan and Anwar al-Awlaki.
Similarly here, by turning the entire DOD workforce into a tips factory, the number of leads
generated by the Insider Threat Program will only increase the static on the line.
The second problem arises from the government’s purported “indicators” of high-risk behavior.
It is true that some traditional indicators of espionage like sudden and unexplained wealth,
attempts to conceal foreign travel or the mishandling of classified information may provide
leads for counterintelligence agents to initiate investigations. But opening the floodgates
by requiring cleared workers to report every perceived instance of such behavior will only
stress the investigators and increase the risk of system failure.
The current initiative, however, goes beyond these traditional indicators and expands potential
red flags, including things like stress, divorce, financial distress or other life conflicts that are
commonplace. And the program gives agencies the ability to experiment more freely. As
reported by McClatchy, for instance, FBI insider threat guidance warns security personnel to be
on the lookout for “James Bond Wannabe[s]” and people with sympathy for the “underdog” or
for a “particular cause.”
The fatal flaw in the “insider threat” detection system is that it is attempting to systematize
something that is highly subjective. It asks individuals without extensive and proper training in
counterintelligence to determine whether an individual is “acting suspicious.” Some individuals
are going to see a spy or leaker around every corner, and unfortunately many also harbor biases
that make them more likely to suspect certain individuals more than others. Racial and
ethnic profiling, especially against Arabs, Muslims and South Asians, is an unfortunate fact of
life, and government employees are as vulnerable to those biases as everyone else. Requiring
workers to report everything they think is suspicious means a larger haystack of bad
information. It also makes the needles look smaller because the data surplus strains
investigators and makes it easier for the bad guy to hide his tracks.
It’s worth remembering that the Angleton program was eventually dismantled not just for
principled reasons but because, pragmatically, the omnipresent suspicion and lack of
independent checks on Angleton and his staff had hamstrung the CIA in its mission. Case
officers couldn’t recruit sources or collaborate with friendly intelligence
agencies. That operational risk, coupled with both the threat to government employees’
civil liberties and the danger that this will overwhelm counter-intelligence
investigators, counsel strongly against this Angletonian initiative.
Financial incentives and reporting abuse will overwhelm our
counterintelligence analyst
Lange 13 — Degree in counterintelligence studies @ American Military University [Kit Lange,
“The Dangers of the Insider Threat Program, Part 3,” Victory Girl, August 1, 2013, pg.
http://tinyurl.com/q38wgy8
Criticisms of the Program
Officials are hesitant to speak out publicly against the program for fear of being caught up in its
ever-reaching investigative web. Speaking on condition of anonymity, however, their
criticism is direct and caustic, even calling it “something like The Stepford Wives,” referring
to a film about robot housewives.[7] Former analyst Greenstein said she was specifically told
that “If [a co-worker] was having a bad day, the message was to watch out for them.”[8] For
once both left and right political bloggers and pundits are agreeing on an issue, as articles and
opinion pieces have sprung up all over the internet drawing parallels between Obama and the
beginning rise of Hitler in 1932 Germany. Others are calling ITP the “Stasi” program, referring
to the East German intelligence agency/secret police that was responsible for literally infiltrating
the entire populace and reporting dissidents to the government for punishment. Those who
speak out against the program, in or out of the government, do so both anonymously and at
their own peril.
Another top criticism of the ITP program is its use of profiling techniques that are unproven in
this arena. In 2002, Peter Reiher of the University of California-Los Angeles Laboratory for
Advanced Systems Research, performed a study as to whether it was possible to distinguish the
computer use and file access patterns of a regular secure systems user from someone who was
engaging in suspicious activity. His study claimed to find unequivocal evidence that it was in
fact possible to tell the difference, and called for further research on how to implement controls
that would analyze user computer behavior for suspicious acts.[9] Conversely, however, a 2008
National Research Council report on terrorism detection for the Transportation Safety
Administration (TSA) concluded that “There is no consensus in the relevant scientific
community nor on the committee regarding whether any behavioral surveillance or
psychological behavioral monitoring techniques are ready for use at all.”[10] Carnegie Mellon
statistics professor Stephen Fienberg—one of the experts who helped write the National
Research Council Report—wrote that “Doing something similar [as behavioral profiling]
about predicting future leakers seem even more speculative.”[11]
Also of concern to observers is the paradox of forced reporting with the potential for incentives
being paid to those who do report the results of their ‘profiling’. Kel McClanahan, a Washington
attorney who specializes in national security law, drew attention to the potential for creating
what amounts to a hostile work environment, and wrote that “the only thing they haven’t done is
reward [turning in co-workers].”[12] He points to what he sees as the future of the ITP: literally
paying incentives for those who report, even perhaps offering greater incentives for those
who report more. Experts see a high potential for abuse, as the program could be used as
revenge against a strict boss, a disliked co-worker, or even an ex-lover from the workplace.
The rash of unnecessary counterintelligence investigations makes the
ITP an unmitigated disaster.
Lange 13 – Degree in counterintelligence studies @ American Military University [Kit Lange,
“The Dangers of the Insider Threat Program, Part 4,” Victory Girl, August 5, 2013, pg.
http://tinyurl.com/ozv33mp
Conclusions
The ultimate test of any program such as Insider Threat Program is two-fold: is it
Constitutional, and does it work? In this case, the answer to both of these questions is an
unequivocal “no.” It is understood that those who volunteer to work in the intelligence field, or
who are entrusted with classified information need to be screened, and in order to do that they
give up certain privacy rights that other citizens enjoy. The level of intrusion that is present in
ITP, however, is a recipe for disaster. The penalization of employees who are not
overzealous in reporting their co-workers for any real or imagined infraction, combined with
techniques they are not fully trained on and inconsistent standards between agencies, can and
will continue to result in innocent people being caught up in the web of an unnecessary
counterintelligence investigation. In addition, the environment that ITP cultivates leads
to overall added vulnerability for the US, as employees who may have been loyal for many
years are now treated as though they are threats by co-workers. Meanwhile, the Pollards and
Ames will continue to go undetected, and leaks on the scale of Manning and Snowden will
continue to occur.
AND, US intel sharing prevent Sunni returnees from destabilizing
their home countries. Multiple countries are at risk.
Byman 15 - Director of research & Senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy @
Brookings Institution [Daniel L. Byman, “What happens when Arab foreign fighters in Iraq and
Syria go home?,” Brookings Institution, May 7, 2015 10:38am, pg. http://tinyurl.com/njdv9zd
Although much of the attention on foreign fighters has focused on Europeans and Americans
going to fight in Iraq and Syria, the conflict has particularly inspired Sunni Muslims in the
Arab world. Exact figures are elusive, but in February 2015, the head of the National
Counterterrorism Center testified that over 20,000 foreign fighters from at least 90 countries
had gone to Iraq and Syria. Only 3,400 from the United States and Western Europe—the rest
came from Muslim countries, particularly those in the Arab world. Few countries are spared:
longstanding jihadist hotbed Saudi Arabia is again a reliable supplier of fighters, but so too
are countries far from Syria and Iraq like Tunisia, Libya, and Morocco.
But what happens when these fighters return home?
Foreign fighters who gain combat experience in Iraq and Syria pose a double danger. Many of
those who go to war will come back as hardened veterans, steady in the face of danger and
skilled in the use of weapons and explosives—ideal terrorist recruiting material. More
important, their worldview may change. While in the conflict zone, they will form networks with
other radicals, embrace techniques like suicide bombings and beheadings, and establish
ties to jihadists around the world, making them prone to further radicalization and giving
them access to training and weapons they might otherwise lack.
Several countries in the Arab world, notably Libya and Lebanon, face considerable risk of
bleedout from returning fighters and several more face more modest dangers, particularly
Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen. However, there is no simple model of bleedout, in
part because the groups in Syria and Iraq, and the global jihadist movement in general, are
divided as to focus and strategy.
In addition, different countries have different mitigating factors. In particular, the presence or
absence of strong and focused security services will have a profound impact on the risk of
bleedout. Although many countries are at risk of violence, the strategic impact of returning
fighters is likely to be more limited. Militarily and tactically they can create new groups or
strengthen existing ones; however, their ambition, regional focus, lack of discipline, and
brutality often mean they create more enemies than they vanquish and anger local populations,
strengthening the government’s hand.
While it is likely that they will use terrorism, it will primarily be locally and regionally focused,
with international terrorism probably less of a priority. Terrorism against Western targets in the
region is also likely to grow. Those who fight with the Islamic State imbibe its hostility to the
West, both as a military enemy but also as a presence that ideologically is opposed to “true”
Islam. Kidnapping of Westerners for ransom is also likely, largely for financial reasons but also
because of the publicity such actions bring.
Arab states can reduce the risk of bleedout by hindering the travel of volunteers and
constraining their ability to organize, countering the narrative more effectively by stressing the
internecine nature of the violence in the Sunni Muslim community, and developing effective
deradicalization programs. Regional and international cooperation to monitor and
disrupt travel is also valuable. On the other hand, these regimes are likely to take advantage
of the jihadists’ presence to gain more support from the United States, delay democratic
reforms, and crackdown on non-jihadist opposition.
Returning foreign fighters offer new opportunities to gather intelligence that regional services
may be slow to collect and process. In particular, the heavy use of social media like Facebook
and Twitter by today’s foreign fighters is a source of vulnerability, allowing for easy
collection and knowledge of broader networks as well as real-time information about the
movements and activities of fighters. Improving intelligence sharing and offensive
counterintelligence is therefore critical to mitigating the terrorism threat. This is where the
United States can play an important facilitating role by bringing the different
intelligence services together and facilitating the flow of information, particularly in cases where
suspicions (or just politics) limit cooperation.
Their return will fuel Saudi-Iranian proxy wars throughout the
Mideast
Levitt 14 - Directs the Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence @ The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy [Dr. Matthew Levitt (Former Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis @ U.S. Department of the Treasury & Former FBI
counterterrorism analyst, “Regional Implications of the War in Syria,” American Foreign Policy
Council Defense Dossier, Issue 11, July 2014 pg. 14-19
WHEN THE BOYS COME HOME
A rereading of a declassified August 1993 report, “The Wandering Mujahidin: Armed and
Dangerous,” written by the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)
foreshadows that,
some two decades hence, we might find ourselves dealing with a laundry list of difficult
problems stemming from actions taken, or not taken, today.2 The report’s subject was the
possible spillover effect of Afghan mujahedin fighters and support networks moving on to fight
in other jihad conflicts, alongside other militant Islamic groups worldwide. Much of the report
could be applied equally well to the themes we find ourselves facing today.
Consider how fighters are traveling from around the world to go fight on either side of the
increasingly sectarian war in Syria. Much of the discussion about foreign fighters traveling to
Syria has focused on radicalized Muslim youth coming from Western countries, but the greatest
numbers of foreign fighters, on both the Sunni and Shi’ite sides of the equation, have come from
the Middle East. Indeed, it must be noted that while most people focus on the Sunni foreign
fighter phenomenon, there are at least as many Shi’ite foreign fighters in Syria today. Most are
from Iraq, but others have come from as far afield as Yemen, Afghanistan, and even Australia.
This spring, DNI Clapper estimated that more than 7,000 fighters have traveled to Syria from
more than fifty countries.3 In an independent study conducted in December 2013, Aaron Zelin
of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy estimated the numbers to be some 8,500
foreign fighters from seventy-four different countries. His estimates of the range of foreign
fighters from across the region who have come to fight on the Sunni side of the war in Syria are
equally telling:4
The number has since increased to about 12,000 total fighters, exceeding the high-end estimates
from the end of last year even amongst rebel in-fighting. While much of the focus on increasing
numbers has been on western fighters, Arab fighters have increased as well. Some Middle
Eastern security officials have even released official numbers: Algeria now estimates about 200
of its citizens have traveled to Syria, Morocco 1,500, Saudi Arabia 2,500, and Tunisia about
3,000.
On the Shi’ite side of the equation, Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi Shi’ite militants from groups
like Asaib Ahl al-Haqq and Kataib Hezbollah make up a majority of those fighting in support of
the Bashar al-Assad regime. Some estimate that as many as five thousand members of Lebanese
Hezbollah have been active in Syria, on a rotational basis.5 Iraqi Shi’ites fighting in Syria are
also estimated to number as high as five thousand.6 Iranians are present as well in smaller
support and advising roles. Shi’ites from Saudi Arabia, Côte d’Ivoire, Afghanistan, and
Yemeni Houthi fighters have also gone to Syria to fight on behalf of the regime.
In Syria, these foreign fighters are learning new and more dangerous tools of the trade in
a very hands-on way, and those who do not die on the battlefield will ultimately disperse to
all corners of the world, better trained and still more radicalized than they were before. The
majority of radicalized fighters are likely to return home and attack their own homelands
even before they seek to strike the United States, in large part because the events that have
followed the Arab Spring have created conditions favorable for militant Islamist revival.
Consider just a few regional reverberations of the Syrian jihad already being felt today:
For many in the region and beyond, going to fight in Syria is a natural and unremarkable
decision; the fight in Syria is a defensive jihad to protect fellow Sunni Muslims—women and
children—from the Assad regime’s indiscriminate attacks on civilian population centers. And so
it is that Ahmed Abdullah al-Shaya, the poster boy for Saudi Arabia’s deradicalization program—
which boasts a tiny 1.5 percent recidivism rate from among its 2,400 graduates—has now turned
up on the battlefield in Syria.7
“Tunisia’s revolution and those in Syria, Egypt and Yemen, and Libya gave us a chance to set up
an Islamic state and sharia law, and in the Maghreb first,” explained a young Tunisian Salafist in
Tunis, Abu Salah. “We want nothing
less than an Islamic state in Tunisia, and across the region. The first step must be Syria. I am
proud of our brothers in Syria, and I will go there myself in a few weeks.”8
Another young Tunisian, Ayman Saadi, who was raised in a middle-class family with a secular
tradition, was stopped from going to fight in Syria several times by his parents before he finally
snuck out of the country to Benghazi. He trained there for a short time, but instead of going on
to Syria, he was instructed to go back to Tunisia to carry out a suicide attack at a presidential
mausoleum; when he proceeded to do so, Saadi was tackled by guards before he could trigger his
explosives.9
In August 2013, a new, fully Moroccan jihadist organization called Harakat Sham al-Islam was
created in Syria. The group reportedly aims not only to recruit fighters for the Syrian war but
also to establish a jihadist organization within Morocco itself: “Although the [group’s] name
refers to Syria and its theater is Syria, the majority of group members are Moroccans. The
group’s creation was also announced in the Rif Latakia, where most Moroccan jihadists who go
to Syria are based.”10
In Egypt, the government is facing high levels of violence largely in reaction to the ouster of
former president Muhammad Morsi. The Sinai militant group Ansar Beit al-Maqdis attracts
many returnees and has claimed responsibility for a number of attacks in recent months. In
September 2013, following his return from Syria, Walid Badr, a former Egyptian army officer,
conducted a suicide attack that narrowly missed Egyptian interior minister Muhammad
Ibrahim, instead injuring nineteen others.11
In February 2014, an Israeli court convicted an Israeli Arab citizen of joining Jabhat al-Nusra.
The presiding judge expressed concern over the danger posed by Israeli citizens who join the
war in Syria and return home, where “they could use the military training and ideological
indoctrination acquired in Syria to commit terror attacks, indoctrinate others or gather
intelligence for use in attacks by anti- Israel organizations.”12
Also in February, an Iraqi newspaper ceased publishing after receiving death threats from the
Iranian-backed Shiite militia Asaib Ahl al- Haqq. Two bombs were placed in its office in
Baghdad, and protestors carrying photographs of Asaib Ahl al-Haqq’s leader demanded the
paper be shut down. Members openly admit to “ramp[ing] up targeted killings.”13 The militia
has been active in Iraq since the American-led war, in which it carried out thousands of attacks
on U.S. soldiers, and currently has forces in Syria.14
None of this should surprise. Twenty-one years ago, INR’s study of Afghanistan’s spillover
similarly reported that “the support network that funneled money, supplies, and manpower to
supplement the Afghan Mujahidin is now contributing experienced fighters to militant Islamic
groups worldwide.” When these veteran fighters dispersed, the report presciently predicted,
“their knowledge of communications equipment and experiences in logistics planning will
enhance the organizational and offensive capabilities of the militant groups to which they are
returning.” A section of the 1993 report, entitled “When the Boys Come Home,” noted that these
veteran volunteer fighters “are welcomed as victorious Muslim fighters of a successful jihad
against a superpower” and “have won the respect of many Muslims—Arab and non- Arab—who
venerate the jihad.” 15
A SECTARIAN PROXY WAR IN THE LEVANT
The Syrian war is also a classic case of a proxy war, in this case between Saudi Arabia and
other Sunni Gulf states on the one hand, and Iran on the other— with the additional, especially
dangerous overlay of sectarianism. The sectarian vocabulary used to dehumanize the “other” in
the Syrian war is deeply disturbing, and suggests both sides view the war as a long-term
battle in an existential, religious struggle between Sunnis and Shiites.16
Furthermore, the war in Syria is now being fought on two parallel planes: one focused on the
Assad regime and the Syrian opposition, and the other on the existential threats the Sunni and
Shi’ite communities each perceive from one another. The former might theoretically be
negotiable, but the latter almost certainly is not. The ramifications for regional instability are
enormous, and go well beyond the Levant. But they are felt more immediately and more
powerfully in Lebanon to the west and Iraq to the east than anywhere else.
TRENDING TOWARD INSTABILITY
The humanitarian crisis resulting from the Syrian civil war is a catastrophe that grows worse by
the day. In a region long known for its instability and sparse resources, Syria’s neighbors are
simply not equipped to handle 2.4 million registered refugees. Lebanon has taken in Syrians
equal to at least one fifth of the country’s population, a refugee camp is now Jordan’s fourthlargest city, and on average 13,000 new refugees are registered with the Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) every day. Within Syria itself, more than 6.5 million have
been displaced and more than nine million need humanitarian assistance.
Such numbers are more than just a depressing snapshot of the situation on the ground; they
suggest a long-term outlook that is no less dire. Taken together, the Syrian crisis and its
secondary and tertiary effects create a set of “looming disequilibria,” to borrow a phrase from
the National Intelligence Council’s (NIC’s) excellent study entitled Global Trends 2030:
Alternative Worlds.17 Consider, for example, the combined impact on the region of a years-long
conflict, exacerbated by sectarianism and fueled by funds and weapons from the backers of
respective proxies. From education, health, poverty, and migration patterns to humanitarian
assistance needs and the economic impact on fragile economies, the consequences of the Syrian
war for the region would be massive even if the war itself ended tomorrow.
Refugee migrations have long been noted as factors that increase the likelihood of
militant disputes.18 In today’s migration displacements, the vast majority of refugees are
Sunni Muslims, posing a serious threat to the sectarian balance of the region, especially in
Lebanon. Hundreds of thousands of Syrians have moved into Jordan’s cities and put a heavy
strain on local economies. Neither country can sustain for long the added burden to public
services, from water and electricity to health care and education. This stress can open doors for
externally financed terrorist organizations to take the place of the state, as was the case with
Hezbollah in Lebanon in the 1980s. Without considerably more international aid, the entire
region could well be facing increased instability and opportunities for extremists for the
foreseeable future. Indeed, according to one study, “hosting refugees from neighboring states
significantly increases the risk of armed conflict.”19 Refugee camps provide militant groups with
recruits and supplies, and refugee flows include within them fighters, weapons, and
radical ideologies. In the case of Syria, these researchers found, refugee influxes to Lebanon
raise its risk of civil war by 53.88 percent, and raise Jordan’s conflict risk by 53.51 percent.20
DOWNWARD SPIRAL
There is no question that the ongoing, deeply sectarian proxy war in Syria will undermine
regional stability, and do so in ways that are both predictable and unexpected. But even before
the current conflict became as severe as it is today, it was possible to envision the general—
negative—direction of regional trends. As the NIC put it:
Chronic instability will be a feature of the region because of the growing weakness of the state
and the rise of sectarianism, Islam, and tribalism. The challenge will be particularly acute in
states such as Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and Syria where sectarian tensions were often simmering
below the surface as autocratic regimes co-opted minority groups and imposed harsh measures
to keep ethnic rivalries in check. In [the] event of a more fragmented Iraq or Syria, a Kurdistan
would not be inconceivable. Having split up before, Yemen is likely to be a security concern with
weak central government, poverty, unemployment [and] with a young population that will go
from 28 million today to 50 million in 2025. Bahrain could also become a cockpit for growing
Sunni-Shia rivalry, which could be destabilizing for the Gulf region.21 pg. 14-18
The Saudi-Iranian security dilemma increases the probability and
severity of each conflict. Escalation is likely
Beauchamp 15 – Former Editor @ ThinkProgress [Zack Beauchamp “Iran and Saudi
Arabia's cold war is making the Middle East even more dangerous,” Vox, March 30, 2015, 3:50
p.m. ET, pg. http://tinyurl.com/nrqnvhb
It's amazing Prince Saud managed to ask his question with straight face. Saudi Arabia was also
taking sides, providing large numbers of weapons to rebels in Syria, some of them Islamist
extremists who have contributed to the conflict's downward spiral. Syria had become more than
just a civil war: it was a proxy conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia, both of which were
escalating the war in their effort to combat each other.
Over the past decade, the Saudis and Iranians have supported opposing political parties, funded
opposing armies, and directly waged war against one another's proxies in Lebanon, Bahrain,
Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. While they did not create the crises in those places, they have
exacerbated them considerably.
Driven by power politics, and fueled by Sunni-Shia sectarianism, the conflict between the two
powers — often called the Middle East's cold war — has become one of the most dangerous
elements defining Middle Eastern politics today. As the 2003 Iraq invasion and the uprisings of
the Arab Spring have upended status quos across the region, both Saudi Arabia and Iran have
rushed in to shape events to their benefit — often at the cost of worsening instability
and violence. The more the Iranian-Saudi rivalry escalates, the worse the region is likely to get.
Iran and Saudi Arabia are fighting for supremacy of the Middle East
The Saudi-Iranian rivalry is, at its core, a competition going back years for power and
dominance across the Middle East.
"The new Middle East cold war predates the Arab Spring by at least half a decade, but increased
Iranian influence in the Arab world dates back even longer," F. Gregory Gause III, a professor of
international affairs at Texas A&M, writes.
After Iran's 1979 Islamic revolution toppled the pro-Western shah, the new Islamic Republic
established an aggressive foreign policy of exporting the Iranian revolution, attempting to
foment Iran-style theocratic uprisings around the Middle East. That was a threat to Saudi
Arabia's heavy influence in the Middle East, and perhaps to the Saudi monarchy itself.
"The fall of the shah and the establishment of the militant Islamic Republic of [founding leader]
Ruhollah Khomeini came as a particularly rude shock to the Saudi leadership," University of
Virginia's William Quandt writes. It "brought to power a man who had explicitly argued that
Islam and hereditary kingship were incompatible, a threatening message, to say the least, in [the
Saudi capital of] Riyadh." In response, Saudi Arabia and other ultra-conservative Gulf
monarchies formed the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), an organization initially designed to
counter and contain Iranian influence.
Iran, weakened by the Iran-Iraq war, backed off of its more aggressive attempts to remake the
Middle East in the late 1980s and early 1990s. But the groundwork for conflict was already laid:
Saudi Arabia and Iran had come to see each other as dangerous threats. Saudi Arabia sees Iran
as bent on overturning a Middle Eastern political order that's quite friendly to Saudi interests;
the Iranians believe the Saudis are actively attempting to keep Iran weak and vulnerable.
This creates what political scientists call a security dilemma: one side, fearing attack, ramps
up defense spending or supports a regional proxy in order to guard against a perceived threat.
The other side sees that as threatening — what if they're planning to attack? — and feels
compelled to respond in kind. This creates a self-sustaining cycle in which both countries to take
actions that are designed to make their country more secure, but end up scaring the other side
and thus raising both the chances and the potential severity of conflict.
"It's what the US and the Soviet Union were involved in" during the Cold War, Daniel Serwer, a
professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, explains.
Serwer believes the security dilemma "is what really brings us to this point." The Saudis and
Iranians see regional power in zero-sum terms: the more powerful Iran is, the more
vulnerable the Saudis feel. And, again, vice versa: "The rationale [the Iranians] give themselves
is very heavily defensive," he says.
That's why proxy struggles in countries such as Syria and Yemen start to seem so important:
Saudi Arabia sees Iran backing the Houthi rebellion in Yemen, and believes it's an initial step
toward not just creating chaos in Yemen but overturning the entire regional order that is so
important to Saudi Arabia's security. Iran, meanwhile, sees Saudi Arabia arming anti-Assad
rebels in Syria and believes the Saudis want to deprive Tehran of an important ally, with the
ultimate goal of isolating Iran and surrounding it with hostile regimes.
Neither wants the other to gain in influence, so they intervene and counter-intervene. For both,
the stakes seem high, so they respond with measures that feel appropriately severe to them:
for Saudi Arabia, bombing Yemen's Houthi rebels and threatening to invade; for Iran, sending
more troops and military advisers to Syria. This ends up escalating both conflicts further,
heightening the mutual fears and, of course, increasing the suffering of Yemenis and Syrians.
And, each additional proxy war makes a Saudi-Iran nuclear war more
likely
Murray 14 - Associate director @ Henry Jackson Society [Douglas Murray (Founded the
Centre for Social Cohesion, a think tank studying extremism and terrorism in the UK) “Why the
great Sunni-Shia conflict is getting ever closer to the surface,” Yemen Times, Published on 28
January 2014, pg. http://tinyurl.com/okrhwas]
The Middle East is not simply falling apart. It is taking a different shape, along very clear lines—
far older ones than those the Western powers rudely imposed on the region nearly a century
ago. Across the whole continent those borders are in the process of cracking and breaking.
But while that happens the region’s two most ambitious centers of power—the house of Saud
and the Ayatollahs in Iran—find themselves fighting each other not just for influence but
even, perhaps, for survival.
The way in which what is going on in the Middle East has become a religious war has long been
obvious. Just take this radio exchange, caught at the ground level earlier this month, between
two foreign fighters in Syria, the first from Al-Qaeda’s Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the
second from the Free Syrian army (FSA). “You apostate infidels,” says the first. “We’ve declared
you to be ‘apostates,’ you heretics. You don’t know Allah or his prophet, you creature. What kind
of Islam do you follow?” To which the FSA fighter responds, “Why did you come here? Go fight
Israel, brother.” Only to be told, “Fighting apostates like you people takes precedence over
fighting the Jews and the Christians. All imams concur on that.”
The religious propulsion of many of the fighters who have flooded into Syria in the three years of
its civil war—400 or more from Britain alone—is beyond doubt. From the outset this has been a
confrontation inflamed by religious sectarianism. In the first stages of the Syrian conflict the
Shia militia of Hezbollah were sent by their masters in Iran to fight on the side of Iran’s ally
Bashar Al-Assad. But those of a different political and religious orientation made their own
moves against this. Across Britain and Europe, not to mention the wider Middle East, many
thousands of young men listened to the call of religious leaders like the Grand Mufti of Saudi
Arabia, Abdul Aziz Al-Asheik and Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, who last year declared that
Hezbollah is in fact not the “army of God,” as its name almost suggests, but rather the “army of
Satan.” Sheikh Qaradawi declared that “every Muslim trained to fight and capable of doing that
[must] make himself available” for jihad in Syria.
It is perhaps inevitable that with the amount of regional influence at stake, and the quantity of
natural resources, there would be numerous powers involved in trying to dictate the Syrian
endgame. But as the country’s civil war has ground on and the region as a whole has started
to fall into a maelstrom, there is not a party or country that has not been shocked by one
particular new reality. That is the fact that what has hitherto been the most important global
player has decided to take a back seat. When two major Iraqi cities fell to Al-Qaeda forces last
week, the American secretary of state, John Kerry, expressed concern but stressed that for the
Iraqi government this was now “their fight.”
One of the cities was Fallujah, the site of the bloodiest battle of the Iraq war, where 10,000
British and American troops fought to depose the Islamists. It is now back under jihadi control,
with the black flag of Al-Qaeda proudly flying—and the West does not want to know. Although
there are Syrian cities also now under Al-Qaeda control, the U.S. and its allies remain unmoved
over acting in that country either.
To an extent, what is happening in the Middle East is what happens when America and the West
suddenly lose interest. But for the U.S., the reasons for that new lack of interest are obvious.
With America soon predicted to attain energy independence, why should the country continue
to involve itself deeply in a region which has cost it so much in blood, treasure and international
reputation? Why should the U.S. Fifth Fleet continue to attempt to maintain regional security in
a continent whose regional resources are increasingly rewarding nobody so much as the
Communist Party of China?
For the U.K. and other lesser western powers, declining involvement in the region is neither a
moral nor an interest-based decision. It is simply a decision based on the fact—as the last decade
has proved—that we no longer have either the cash or the commitment to effect any decent
outcome in the region.
If this remains a reality which is too rarely admitted here at home, it was long ago scented in the
winds of the region. And as the new reality dawned, it was inevitable that the various factions in
Syria’s civil war would reach out to anybody in the region who shared their broadest goals. Vice
versa, the regional powers ended up looking for anybody who could plausibly assist them with
the means and methods to reach their own ends. And so it is that a Middle Eastern proxy-war
which had already reached as far as Washington, D.C. has found its way right back to the very
doorsteps of the countries that were propelling it. And how a war of religion also become a war
of good old-fashioned statecraft.
From the outset of the Syrian uprising, it was inevitable that Iran would weigh in on the side of
its client in Damascus. Indeed, so desperate were the mullahs in Tehran to do everything they
could to protect their own interests that they even put up with protests at home from people
starved of basic supplies complaining about their own government pouring millions into Syria’s
civil war.
But the next step was just as predictable. Saudi Arabia, which fears Iranian influence spreading
any further than it has already throughout the region, began to back the opposition. Starting
cautiously, in recent months that caution has retreated and Saudi is now supporting groups as
close to Al-Qaeda-linked forces as to make little difference. Desperate measures, certainly. But
for the Saudi leadership these are desperate times. Though it is a battle that has been brewing
for decades.
There has always been the ongoing tension of Bahrain, which is under Saudi domination but
which Iran seeks for itself. But then there is the quieter battle for influence in the Gulf states,
which, while interventionist at times, quiver before the clashing of these bigger beasts. It was
only as Syria fell apart and the regional powers were pulled inexorably into a more open battle,
that the cold war between Iran and Saudi found its hot battleground.
There are those who think that the region as a whole may be starting to go through something
similar to what Europe went through in the early 17th century during the 30 Years’ War,
when Protestant and Catholic states battled it out. This is a conflict which is not only bigger than
Al-Qaeda and similar groups, but far bigger than any of us. It is one which will re-align not only
the Middle East, but the religion of Islam.
There is a significant likelihood—as intra-Muslim sectarian tension has had fallout even in
Britain and Europe—that this could be the case. Or perhaps the region is going to descend
into a complex miasma of slaughter as surely as Europe did a century ago. Either way
there will be a need for a Treaty of Westphalia-style solution—a redrawing of boundaries in a
region where boundaries have been bursting for decades.
But for the time being, a distinct and timeless standoff between two regional powers, with
religious excuses and religiously affiliated proxies will in all probability remain the main driver
of this conflict. Certainly the sides remain fundamentally irreconcilable. As one of Saudi Arabia’s
most important figures, Prince Turki Al-Faisal, said on a recent visit to London, “Saudi Arabia is
the custodian of the Two Holy Mosques and the birthplace of Islam. As such, it is the eminent
leader of the wider Muslim world. Iran portrays itself as the leader of not just the minority Shiite
world, but of all Muslim revolutionaries interested in standing up to the West.”
Prince Turki decried Iran’s “meddling” and its “destabilizing efforts in the countries with Shia
majorities—Iraq and Bahrain—as well as in those countries with significant minority Shia
communities such as Kuwait, Lebanon and Yemen.” As he said, “Saudi Arabia will oppose any
and all of Iran’s actions in other countries, because it is Saudi Arabia’s position that Iran has no
right to meddle in other nations’ internal affairs, especially those of Arab states.”
Saudi officials more recently called for the Iranian leadership to be summoned to the
International Criminal Court in The Hague for war crimes. Then, just the month before last, as
the P5+1 countries eased sanctions on Iran after arriving at an interim deal in Geneva, Saudi
saw its greatest fear—a nuclear Iran—grow more likely. And in the immediate aftermath of the
Geneva deal, Saudi sources darkly warned of the country now taking Iranian matters “into their
own hands.” There are rumors that the Saudis would buy nuclear bombs “off the shelf”
from their friends in Pakistan if Iran ever reaches anything like the nuclear threshold. In that
case, this Westphalian solution could be prefaced with a mushroom cloud.
INDEPENDENTLY, US intel sharing undermines Islamic State
recruiting efforts. Their generic terror takeouts do not apply
Byman 15 - Director of research & Senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy @
Brookings Institution [Daniel L. Byman, “The Homecomings: What Happens When Arab
Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria Return?,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 0:1–22, (2015)
Returning foreign fighters offer new opportunities to gather intelligence that regional services
may be slow to collect and process. In particular, the heavy use of social media like Facebook
and Twitter by today’s foreign fighters is a source of vulnerability, allowing for easy collection
and knowledge of broader networks as well as real-time information about the movements and
activities of fighters.106
To disrupt fighters as they travel to and from the war zone, information sharing within the
Arab world is vital. Bilateral or multilateral sharing allows area services to respond quickly to a
fighter transiting their territory. In cases where suspicions (or just politics) limit cooperation,
the United States can play an important role bringing services together, or at least facilitating
the flow of information.
The Islamic State and other jihadist groups in Iraq and Syria are also highly vulnerable to
offensive counterintelligence—that is, playing on fears of spying. By relying on foreign
volunteers, they are leaving the door open to spies—and they know it. They have taken measures
to guard against infiltrators among foreign volunteers, but the large numbers of volunteers
flowing in makes this difficult if not impossible for them to do with 100% success.107 In
addition, sowing suspicion of foreigners can lead them to reject many genuine candidates,
conduct purges, or otherwise reduce the value of foreign volunteers— all of which have
negative effects on the group’s cohesion and effectiveness.
Finally, when conveying information on the threat to policymakers, it is vital to sort out the
different kinds of terrorism and avoid the reflexive use of the word “terrorist” to describe
returnee violence. Much of their violence indeed is likely fall under the exceptionally broad U.S.
definitions of terrorism, but most of it is not likely to be linked to international terrorism, and
confusion will be inevitable. A poor policy response will follow unless distinctions among
categories of terrorism are made clear.
Pg. 17-18
AND, Islamic State is looking to destroy Iran. Iran is its biggest enemy
Al Salami 14 [Jassem Al Salami, “Iran Says It’s Under Attack by ISIS,” The Daily Beast,
10.09.145:55 AM ET, pg. http://tinyurl.com/q8wpvw4
On May 13, 2014, a pickup truck approached a caravan of white vans moving on a road near
Baqubah, east of Baghdad, in Iraq. Within few meters of the caravan, the pickup exploded,
leaving five Iranian engineers and several of their Iraqi guards dead, according to local news
reports. The attack came less than 24 hours after a threat by ISIS spokesperson, Abu
Mohammad al Adnani.
ISIS could—and very much wanted to—“transform Iran into pools of blood,” Adnani said.
After all, Iran was the “bitterest enemy” of the Islamic State.
But al Qaeda long has been known to have deep, complex relations with Iran. And so ISIS, which
grew out of a branch of al Qaeda in Iraq, “held back its soldiers and repressed its rage over the
years to preserve the unity” of al Qaeda’s ranks.
“So let history record that Iran owes an invaluable debt to al Qaeda,” he added.
But in May, Adnani announced a change of plans: ISIS would not respect al Qaeda requests any
more. And while Adnani did not overtly threaten Iran, the May 13th attack turned out to be one
in a string of purported terror attacks against Iran and Iranians. These attacks have been pinned
by local media and Iranian officials to ISIS and other Sunni extremist groups.
The American intelligence community has heard the claims. But they’re not sure whether the
violence can be blamed on the Islamic State—or some other Sunni militants. “While no one is
ruling out the possibility of an ISIL presence in Iran,” a U.S. intelligence official told The Daily
Beast, using the government’s preferred acronym for ISIS, “at this time we are not able to
validate reports of any activity there.”
ISIS’s rampage through Iraq has produced collateral damage that’s been largely unnoticed in the
West. Iran, on the other hand, has been paying close attention. When ISIS took over the city of
Jalawlah near the Iranian border, several Iranian media outlets reported a heavy attack on a
border guard post near the city of Qasr-e-Shirin—on Iranian soil. The initial toll was reported
four guardsmen killed in the incident. Qasr-e-Shirin’s representative in the Iranian parliament,
a hardliner conservative named Fathollah Husseini, denied any casualties. But less than two
days later, Iranian media outlets reported on funerals held for privates killed in the incident.
Later reports suggested at least 11 Iranian border guards were killed in the incident.
Iranian political and military leaders tend to censor terrorist threats inside Iran, to bolster their
reign over the country. But the ISIS threat is so bold inside Iran that even the highest
officials have publicly acknowledged it. MohamdReza Rahmani Fazli, the Iranian interior
minister and the highest ranking government official in charge of coordinating police and
security efforts inside Iran, issued a warning on September 7 saying “Daesh”—a pejorative term
for ISIS—“is posed to attack Iran imminently.”
That triggers nuclear civil wars throughout the Mideast
Ynet News 15 [“An ethnic war in Iran is only a matter of time,” May 29, 2015, pg.
http://tinyurl.com/p6xpco2
On Independence Day, I received a message on Facebook from a man who lives in Iraq and
wanted to congratulate the State of Israel on its independence and thank it for destroying
Saddam Hussein's nuclear reactor in 1981.
If it were not for that, he wrote, Iraq would have been filled with nuclear facilities, and imagine
what would happen now, with the all-out war taking place there, where there are no rules and no
limits and everything is permitted. Israel saved the Iraqi people, he wrote and thanked us.
Indeed, Saddam Hussein's Osirak reactor, had it remained, would now be in the area occupied
by the Islamic State in the al-Anbar province. What would the world do then?
His messages raises a lot of interest not just about what happened and what was prevented, but
also about what will happen. Iran is an ethnically, religiously and tribally torn country, just like
Iraq and Syria, and maybe even more. It has no majority ethnic group, and the Persians, because
of the negative birthrate, have already become a minority, although they are the largest minority
among all other minorities, 24%. The others are Azeris, Balochs (Sunnis), Tajiks (Sunni), Lurs,
Turkmens (Sunnis), Kurds (mostly Sunnis), Arabs (Sunnis) and others.
Some of these minorities want to split from Iran and connect their territory to other
countries. The Azeris want to join Azerbaijan; the Balochs want to join Pakistan; the Kurds want
to establish the "Great Kurdistan," which will extend over parts of Iraq, Turkey, Syria and Iran;
and the Arabs want to establish their own independent state which will be called Ahwaz in
Arabic or Khuzestan in Persian.
In other words, a breakup and a Sunni-Shiite ethnic war and a war between different ethnic
minorities is only a matter of time in Iran. The ground is already on fire, and there are
constant conflicts between the Balochs and Ahwazi Arabs and the regime, which is oppressing
them with an iron fist.
The only thing that is still keeping this huge disintegrating country together is the fear of the
void that may be created instead of the hated regime. They are afraid to become Syria, but when
the ethnic and religious impulses rage, that can no longer be stopped. That's why it's
important for Iran to divert the attention to Israel – in order to hide this destructive
internal hostility.
Imagine Iran falling apart like Syria, Iraq, Libya or Yemen in a civil war with armed militias and
nuclear facilities all over the area – what a danger of mass destruction that will be. It
doesn’t have to be ready bombs. With radioactive materials one can prepare "dirty nuclear
bombs" or other means of horror, and we already know that there is no mercy between the
Sunnis and the Shiites – they just don’t have a nuclear weapon yet.
The American administration is naively assuming that the Iranian regime will continue to rule
the area, but the Bashar Assad or Muammar Gaddafi regimes were as strong, and so were the
regimes in Egypt and Yemen. In addition, Iran is a sort of transit country with representatives
from all the nations in the region – from Afghanistan to Pakistan, from the Persian Gulf
to Turkey – and if it falls apart, dark terroristic forces will penetrate and infiltrate it.
The Persians are actually a relatively weak force among the regional forces, and it will spark a
competition over who will take over the nuclear facilities faster and who will also use them –
because forces like ISIS have no responsibility or limits.
1AC — Groupthink Advantage
Advantage 2: Groupthink
ITP is government-mandated surveillance and snitching that
promotes groupthink.
Kuvach 13 – Researcher for the Bill of Rights Defense Committee [Kyla Kuvach, “"Insider
Threat" program promotes spying on colleagues,” Defending Dissent Foundation, July 2, 2013,
pg. http://tinyurl.com/ph5elyb
On October 7, 2011 President Obama released Executive order 13587, presenting a program
that was ignored by major media coverage until recently.
The Executive Order purports to address "Structural Reforms to Improve the Security of
Classified Networks and the Responsible Sharing and Safeguarding of Classified Information,"
embedded in which was his introduction of the Insider Threat Task Force. Until a recent article
by McClatchy, however, it had gone largely unacknowledged by those concerned with the safety
of whistleblowers in the post-Bradley Manning era.
Even now, with the "Where in the world is Edward Snowden?" conversation, the Insider Threat
Program remains largely outside the realm of discussion despite its enormous implications for
government transparency and the rights of whistleblowers.
The Insider Threat Program relies largely on one modus operandi: government-mandated
snitching. Federal agency employees and their supervisors are instructed to be on the lookout for and report "high-risk persons or behaviors." Though this may seem vague, the program
kindly clarifies that some specific instances that would prompt the categorization of individuals
as "high-risk" would be stress, divorce or financial problems.
The program is a psychological "If you see something, say something," which potentially
criminalizes anyone in the workplace who may be in an emotional slump. An individual going
through a tough divorce, suffering the loss of a loved one, or struggling to make ends meet then
has become the vaguely dangerous INSIDER THREAT.
I offer no exaggeration in this language: the program turns federal agencies like the Peace Corps,
the Social Security Administration and the Educational and Agricultural Departments into
noir-like environments, where each individual is potentially more paranoid and more guilty
than the next. Though the "indicators" that may potentially signify threats are vague and, one
might argue, not an employer's business (let alone the government's), the Program renders such
individual behavior in the workplace a matter of national security.
Officials stated that Bradley Manning, for example, "exhibited behavior that could have
forewarned his superiors that he posed a security risk" - perhaps they would argue the same for
Edward Snowden, who had been a "trusted insider" before his leak. The general consensus
seems to be that concerning oneself with co-workers' personal lives is necessary to the safety of
our country.
Let's assume that some co-workers had suspected that Manning and Snowden might be "up to
no good." If these co-workers did not snitch under the Insider Threat Program, they are now
required to turn themselves or others in for failing to report breaches in security.
The danger here, as the news-breaking McClatchy article pointed out, is that a tendency towards
dangerous "group think" develops, "the kind that was blamed for the CIA’s erroneous
assessment that Iraq was hiding weapons of mass destruction, a judgment that underpinned
the 2003 U.S. invasion."
In the midst of "group think" danger and general paranoia, the Insider Threat Program
continues to be fairly ineffective. Edward Snowden's success in leaking NSA secrets stands as a
prime example of this: the Insider Threat Program was fully operational, but Snowden still
managed to release sensitive government information.
Snowden's successful release of information may lead to an even more aggressive mutation of
the Insider Threat Program, perhaps involving some material reward for
snitches. The McClatchy article quotes Kel McClanahan, a Washington lawyer who specializes
in national security law, as saying, "The only thing they haven’t done here is reward
[snitching]...I’m waiting for the time when you turn in a friend and you get a $50 reward.”
Though the Insider Threat Program seems almost a caricature, it cannot be taken lightly. It
stands as yet another breach of privacy under the Obama presidency, and one that will likely
become more aggressive in days to come. In addition to requiring snitching, the program
equates leaking information to journalists (whether classified or not) with espionage.
The toxic work environment will force people to toe the party line.
Taylor & Landay 13 – Investigative reporter @ McClatchy & National security and
intelligence reporter @ McClatchy [Marisa Taylor & Jonathan S. Landay, “Obama’s crackdown
views leaks as aiding enemies of US,” McClatchy Washington Bureau, June 20, 2013, pg.
http://tinyurl.com/lgfcb4h
President Barack Obama’s unprecedented initiative, known as the Insider Threat Program, is
sweeping in its reach. It has received scant public attention even though it extends beyond the
U.S. national security bureaucracies to most federal departments and agencies nationwide,
including the Peace Corps, the Social Security Administration and the Education and
Agriculture departments. It emphasizes leaks of classified material, but catchall definitions
of “insider threat” give agencies latitude to pursue and penalize a range of other conduct.
Government documents reviewed by McClatchy illustrate how some agencies are using that
latitude to pursue unauthorized disclosures of any information, not just classified
material. They also show how millions of federal employees and contractors must watch for
“high-risk persons or behaviors” among co-workers and could face penalties, including criminal
charges, for failing to report them. Leaks to the media are equated with espionage.
“Hammer this fact home . . . leaking is tantamount to aiding the enemies of the United States,”
says a June 1, 2012, Defense Department strategy for the program that was obtained by
McClatchy.
The Obama administration is expected to hasten the program’s implementation as the
government grapples with the fallout from the leaks of top secret documents by Edward
Snowden, the former National Security Agency contractor who revealed the agency’s secret
telephone data collection program. The case is only the latest in a series of what the government
condemns as betrayals by “trusted insiders” who have harmed national security.
“Leaks related to national security can put people at risk,” Obama said on May 16 in defending
criminal investigations into leaks. “They can put men and women in uniform that I’ve sent into
the battlefield at risk. They can put some of our intelligence officers, who are in various,
dangerous situations that are easily compromised, at risk. . . . So I make no apologies, and I
don’t think the American people would expect me as commander in chief not to be concerned
about information that might compromise their missions or might get them killed.”
As part of the initiative, Obama ordered greater protection for whistleblowers who use the
proper internal channels to report official waste, fraud and abuse, but that’s hardly comforting
to some national security experts and current and former U.S. officials. They worry that the
Insider Threat Program won’t just discourage whistleblowing but will have other grave
consequences for the public’s right to know and national security.
The program could make it easier for the government to stifle the flow of unclassified and
potentially vital information to the public, while creating toxic work environments poisoned
by unfounded suspicions and spurious investigations of loyal Americans, according to these
current and former officials and experts. Some non-intelligence agencies already are urging
employees to watch their co-workers for “indicators” that include stress, divorce and financial
problems.
“It was just a matter of time before the Department of Agriculture or the FDA (Food and Drug
Administration) started implementing, ‘Hey, let’s get people to snitch on their friends.’ The only
thing they haven’t done here is reward it,” said Kel McClanahan, a Washington lawyer who
specializes in national security law. “I’m waiting for the time when you turn in a friend and you
get a $50 reward.”
The Defense Department anti-leak strategy obtained by McClatchy spells out a zero-tolerance
policy. Security managers, it says, “must” reprimand or revoke the security clearances – a
career-killing penalty – of workers who commit a single severe infraction or multiple lesser
breaches “as an unavoidable negative personnel action.”
Employees must turn themselves and others in for failing to report breaches. “Penalize clearly
identifiable failures to report security infractions and violations, including any lack of selfreporting,” the strategic plan says.
The Obama administration already was pursuing an unprecedented number of leak
prosecutions, and some in Congress – long one of the most prolific spillers of secrets – favor
tightening restrictions on reporters’ access to federal agencies, making many U.S. officials
reluctant to even disclose unclassified matters to the public.
The policy, which partly relies on behavior profiles, also could discourage creative thinking
and fuel conformist “group think” of the kind that was blamed for the CIA’s erroneous
assessment that Iraq was hiding weapons of mass destruction, a judgment that underpinned the
2003 U.S. invasion.
“The real danger is that you get a bland common denominator working in the government,”
warned Ilana Greenstein, a former CIA case officer who says she quit the agency after being
falsely accused of being a security risk. “You don’t get people speaking up when there’s
wrongdoing. You don’t get people who look at things in a different way and who are willing to
stand up for things. What you get are people who toe the party line, and that’s really
dangerous for national security.”
Groupthink undermines foreign policy decision making. Active
checks will force the administration to find alternatives
Kennedy 12 – JD from University of Southern California [Brandon Kennedy (MA in Middle
East Regional Studies from Harvard Graduate School of Arts and Science), “The Hijacking of
Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Groupthink and Presidential Power in the Post-9/11 World,”
Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal, 21 S. Cal. Interdis. L.J. 633, (Spring 2012)
VIII. CONCLUSION
This Note has highlighted the danger of groupthink syndrome in presidential foreignpolicy decision making. As the examples of groupthink fiascoes in presidential administrations
have demonstrated, groupthink can severely deteriorate decision-making processes, thereby
reducing the likelihood that an efficient outcome will result. In the post-9/11 world, an increased
likelihood that this danger will manifest, particularly during "wartime," has resulted from a
continuing expansion of presidential powers. n269 While President Obama and his decisionmaking team seem to have successfully prevented groupthink in the decision-making process
that led to the increase in troops in the War in Afghanistan, it is important that current and
future administration members remain alert to the dangers of groupthink to avoid the foreign
policy fiascoes of past administrations.
Nevertheless, it is equally important that external actors such as Congress, the public, and the
press actively check and engage with the president and his or her advisers to prevent the
excesses of executive-branch power that contribute to the antecedent conditions for groupthink
syndrome. The inquiry does not end here. Further studies should, for example, explore the
applicability of successful anti-groupthink decision-making procedures employed in other
institutions, such as the military, in which political influence is low at the lower and middle
levels of command.
While this Note does not attempt to provide a panacea, the recommendations contained herein
can do much to reduce the likelihood of future executive-branch groupthink. This reduction
in groupthink would go [*680] a long way toward improving the quality of presidential
decision-making processes regarding foreign policy and, as a result, would increase the
likelihood that decision makers explore and ultimately implement the most efficient
course of action.//AT: CP
AND, Groupthink is laying the groundwork for confrontation with
Russia. A lack of original thought and skepticism will make it a replay
of Iraq.
Parry 15 — Investigative reporter and founder of the Consortium for Independent Journalism
(CIJ), a non-profit US-based independent news service. [Robert Parry (Broke the Iran-Contra
stories for The Associated Press and Newsweek in the 1980s.), “Enforcing the Ukraine ‘Group
Think’” Consortiumnews.com, May 9, 2015, pg. http://tinyurl.com/nkff5zu
So, as the United States rushes into a new Cold War with Russia, we are seeing the makings of
a new McCarthyism, challenging the patriotism of anyone who doesn’t get in line. But this
conformity presents a serious threat to U.S. national security and even the future of the planet.
We saw a similar pattern with the rush to war in Iraq, but a military clash with nuclear-armed
Russia is a crisis of a much greater magnitude.
One of Professor Cohen’s key points has been that Official Washington’s “group think” about
post-Soviet Russia has been misguided from the start, laying the groundwork for today’s
confrontation. In Cohen’s view, to understand why Russians are so alarmed by U.S. and
NATO meddling in Ukraine, you have to go back to those days after the Soviet Union collapsed
in 1991. Instead of working with the Russians to transition carefully from a communist system to
a pluralistic, capitalist one, the U.S. prescription was “shock therapy.”
As American “free market” experts descended on Moscow during the pliant regime of Boris
Yeltsin, well-connected Russian thieves and their U.S. compatriots plundered the country’s
wealth, creating a handful of billionaire “oligarchs” and leaving millions upon millions of
Russians in a state of near starvation, with a collapse in life expectancy rarely seen in a country
not at war.
Yet, despite the desperation of the masses, American journalists and pundits hailed the
“democratic reform” underway in Russia with glowing accounts of how glittering life could be in
the shiny new hotels, restaurants and bars of Moscow. Complaints about the suffering of average
Russians were dismissed as the grumblings of losers who failed to appreciate the economic
wonders that lay ahead.
As recounted in his 2001 book, Failed Crusade, Cohen correctly describes this fantastical
reporting as journalistic “malpractice” that left the American people misinformed about the onthe-ground reality in Russia. The widespread suffering led Putin, who succeeded Yeltsin, to pull
back on the wholesale privatization, to punish some oligarchs and to restore some of the social
safety net.
Though the U.S. mainstream media portrays Putin as essentially a tyrant, his elections and
approval numbers indicate that he commands broad popular support, in part, because he stood
up to some oligarchs (though he still worked with others). Yet, Official Washington
continues to portray oligarchs whom Putin jailed as innocent victims of a tyrant’s revenge.
After Putin pardoned jailed oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the neocon Freedom House
sponsored a Washington dinner in Khordorkovsky’s honor, hailing him as one of Russia’s
political heroes. “I have to say I’m impressed by him,” declared Freedom House President David
Kramer. “But he’s still figuring out how he can make a difference.”
New York Times writer Peter Baker fairly swooned at Khodorkovsky’s presence. “If anything, he
seemed stronger and deeper than before” prison, Baker wrote. “The notion of prison as
cleansing the soul and ennobling the spirit is a powerful motif in Russian literature.”
Yet, even Khodorkovsky, who is now in his early 50s, acknowledged that he “grew up in Russia’s
emerging Wild West capitalism to take advantage of what he now says was a corrupt
privatization system,” Baker reported. In other words, Khodorkovsky was admitting that he
obtained his vast wealth through a corrupt process, though by referring to it as the “Wild West”
Baker made the adventure seem quite dashing and even admirable when, in reality,
Khodorkovsky was a key figure in the plunder of Russia that impoverished millions of his
countrymen and sent many to early graves.
In the 1990s, Professor Cohen was one of the few scholars with the courage to challenge the
prevailing boosterism for Russia’s “shock therapy.” He noted even then the danger of mistaken
“conventional wisdom” and how it strangles original thought and necessary
skepticism.
“Much as Russia scholars prefer consensus, even orthodoxy, to dissent, most journalists, one of
them tells us, are ‘devoted to group-think’ and ‘see the world through a set of standard
templates,’” wrote Cohen. “For them to break with ‘standard templates’ requires not only
introspection but retrospection, which also is not a characteristic of either profession.”
Current politics make US uniquely vulnerable to groupthink
triggering a nuclear war over Ukraine
Parry 15 — Investigative reporter and founder of the Consortium for Independent Journalism
(CIJ), a non-profit US-based independent news service. [Robert Parry (Broke the Iran-Contra
stories for The Associated Press and Newsweek in the 1980s.), “Ready for Nuclear War over
Ukraine?” Consortiumnews.com, February 23, 2015, pg. http://tinyurl.com/qbp5pr7
A senior Ukrainian official is urging the West to risk a nuclear conflagration in support of a
“full-scale war” with Russia that he says authorities in Kiev are now seeking, another sign of the
extremism that pervades the year-old, U.S.-backed regime in Kiev.
In a recent interview with Canada’s CBC Radio, Ukraine’s Deputy Foreign Minister Vadym
Prystaiko said, “Everybody is afraid of fighting with a nuclear state. We are not anymore, in
Ukraine — we’ve lost so many people of ours, we’ve lost so much of our territory.”
Prystaiko added, “However dangerous it sounds, we have to stop [Russian President Vladimir
Putin] somehow. For the sake of the Russian nation as well, not just for the Ukrainians and
Europe.” The deputy foreign minister announced that Kiev is preparing for “full-scale war”
against Russia and wants the West to supply lethal weapons and training so the fight can be
taken to Russia.
“What we expect from the world is that the world will stiffen up in the spine a little,” Prystaiko
said.
Yet, what is perhaps most remarkable about Prystaiko’s “Dr. Strangelove” moment is that it
produced almost no reaction in the West. You have a senior Ukrainian official saying that the
world should risk nuclear war over a civil conflict in Ukraine between its west, which favors
closer ties to Europe, and its east, which wants to maintain its historic relationship with Russia.
Why should such a pedestrian dispute justify the possibility of vaporizing millions of human
beings and conceivably ending life on the planet? Yet, instead of working out a plan for a
federalized structure in Ukraine or even allowing people in the east to vote on whether they want
to remain under the control of the Kiev regime, the world is supposed to risk nuclear
annihilation.
But therein lies one of the under-reported stories of the Ukraine crisis: There is a madness to the
Kiev regime that the West doesn’t want to recognize because to do so would upend the dominant
narrative of “our” good guys vs. Russia’s bad guys. If we begin to notice that the right-wing
regime in Kiev is crazy and brutal, we might also start questioning the “Russian aggression”
mantra.
According to the Western “group think,” the post-coup Ukrainian government “shares our
values” by favoring democracy and modernity, while the rebellious ethnic Russians in eastern
Ukraine are “Moscow’s minions” representing dark forces of backwardness and violence,
personified by Russia’s “irrational” President Putin. In this view, the conflict is a clash between
the forces of good and evil where there is no space for compromise.
Yet, there is a craziness to this “group think” that is highlighted by Prystaiko’s comments. Not
only does the Kiev regime display a cavalier attitude about dragging the world into a nuclear
catastrophe but it also has deployed armed neo-Nazis and other right-wing extremists to wage
a dirty war in the east that has involved torture and death-squad activities.
Not Since Adolf Hitler
No European government, since Adolf Hitler’s Germany, has seen fit to dispatch Nazi storm
troopers to wage war on a domestic population, but the Kiev regime has and has done so
knowingly. Yet, across the West’s media/political spectrum, there has been a studious effort to
cover up this reality, even to the point of ignoring facts that have been well established.
The New York Times and the Washington Post have spearheaded this journalistic malfeasance
by putting on blinders so as not to see Ukraine’s neo-Nazis, such as when describing the key role
played by the Azov battalion in the war against ethnic Russians in the east.
On Feb. 20, in a report from Mariupol, the Post cited the Azov battalion’s importance in
defending the port city against a possible rebel offensive. Correspondent Karoun Demirjian
wrote:
“Petro Guk, the commander of the Azov battalion’s reinforcement operations in Mariupol, said
in an interview that the battalion is ‘getting ready for’ street-to-street combat in the city. The
Azov battalion, now a regiment in the Ukrainian army, is known as one of the fiercest fighting
forces in the pro-Kiev operation.
“But … it has pulled away from the front lines on a scheduled rest-and-retraining rotation, Guk
said, leaving the Ukrainian army — a less capable force, in his opinion — in its place. His advice
to residents of Mariupol is to get ready for the worst.
“‘If it is your home, you should be ready to fight for it, and accept that if the fight is for your
home, you must defend it,’ he said, when asked whether residents should prepare to leave. Some
are ready to heed that call, as a matter of patriotic duty.”
The Post’s stirring words fit with the Western media’s insistent narrative and its refusal to
include meaningful background about the Azov battalion, which is known for marching under
Nazi banners, displaying the Swastika and painting SS symbols on its helmets.
The New York Times filed a similarly disingenuous article from Mariupol on Feb. 11,
depicting the ethnic Russian rebels as barbarians at the gate with the Azov battalion defending
civilization. Though providing much color and detail – and quoting an Azov leader prominently
– the Times left out the salient and well-known fact that the Azov battalion is composed of neoNazis.
But this inconvenient truth – that neo-Nazis have been central to Kiev’s “self-defense forces”
from last February’s coup to the present – would disrupt the desired propaganda message to
American readers. So the New York Times just ignores the Nazism and refers to Azov as a
“volunteer unit.”
Yet, this glaring omission is prima facie proof of journalistic bias. There’s no way that the editors
of the Post and Times don’t know that the presence of neo-Nazis is newsworthy. Indeed, there’s
a powerful irony in this portrayal of Nazis as the bulwark of Western civilization against the
Russian hordes from the East. It was, after all, the Russians who broke the back of Nazism in
World War II as Hitler sought to subjugate Europe and destroy Western civilization as we know
it.
That the Nazis are now being depicted as defenders of Western ideals has to be the ultimate
man-bites-dog story. But it goes essentially unreported in the New York Times and Washington
Post as does the inconvenient presence of other Nazis holding prominent positions in the postcoup regime, including Andriy Parubiy, who was the military commander of the Maidan protests
and served as the first national security chief of the Kiev regime. [See Consortiumnews.com’s
“Ukraine, Through the US Looking Glass.”]
The Nazi Reality
Regarding the Azov battalion, the Post and Times have sought to bury the Nazi reality, but both
have also acknowledged it in passing. For instance, on Aug. 10, 2014, a Times’ article mentioned
the neo-Nazi nature of the Azov battalion in the last three paragraphs of a lengthy story on
another topic.
“The fighting for Donetsk has taken on a lethal pattern: The regular army bombards separatist
positions from afar, followed by chaotic, violent assaults by some of the half-dozen or so
paramilitary groups surrounding Donetsk who are willing to plunge into urban combat,” the
Times reported.
“Officials in Kiev say the militias and the army coordinate their actions, but the militias, which
count about 7,000 fighters, are angry and, at times, uncontrollable. One known as Azov, which
took over the village of Marinka, flies a neo-Nazi symbol resembling a Swastika as its flag.” [See
Consortiumnews.com’s “NYT Whites Out Ukraine’s Brownshirts.”]
Similarly, the Post published a lead story last Sept. 12 describing the Azov battalion in flattering
terms, saving for the last three paragraphs the problematic reality that the fighters are fond of
displaying the Swastika:
“In one room, a recruit had emblazoned a swastika above his bed. But Kirt [a platoon leader] …
dismissed questions of ideology, saying that the volunteers — many of them still teenagers —
embrace symbols and espouse extremist notions as part of some kind of ‘romantic’ idea.”
Other news organizations have been more forthright about this Nazi reality. For instance, the
conservative London Telegraph published an article by correspondent Tom Parfitt, who wrote:
“Kiev’s use of volunteer paramilitaries to stamp out the Russian-backed Donetsk and Luhansk
‘people’s republics’… should send a shiver down Europe’s spine.
“Recently formed battalions such as Donbas, Dnipro and Azov, with several thousand men
under their command, are officially under the control of the interior ministry but their financing
is murky, their training inadequate and their ideology often alarming. The Azov men use the
neo-Nazi Wolfsangel (Wolf’s Hook) symbol on their banner and members of the battalion are
openly white supremacists, or anti-Semites.”
Based on interviews with militia members, the Telegraph reported that some of the fighters
doubted the Holocaust, expressed admiration for Hitler and acknowledged that they are indeed
Nazis.
Andriy Biletsky, the Azov commander, “is also head of an extremist Ukrainian group called the
Social National Assembly,” according to the Telegraph article which quoted a commentary by
Biletsky as declaring: “The historic mission of our nation in this critical moment is to lead the
White Races of the world in a final crusade for their survival. A crusade against the Semite-led
Untermenschen.”
The Telegraph questioned Ukrainian authorities in Kiev who acknowledged that they were
aware of the extremist ideologies of some militias but insisted that the higher priority was
having troops who were strongly motivated to fight.
Azov fighters even emblazon the Swastika and the SS insignia on their helmets. NBC News
reported: “Germans were confronted with images of their country’s dark past … when German
public broadcaster ZDF showed video of Ukrainian soldiers with Nazi symbols on their helmets
in its evening newscast.”
But it’s now clear that far-right extremism is not limited to the militias sent to kill ethnic
Russians in the east or to the presence of a few neo-Nazi officials who were rewarded for their
roles in last February’s coup. The fanaticism is present at the center of the Kiev regime,
including its deputy foreign minister who speaks casually about a “full-scale war” with nucleararmed Russia.
An Orwellian World
In a “normal world,” U.S. and European journalists would explain to their readers how insane
all this is; how a dispute over the pace for implementing a European association agreement
while also maintaining some economic ties with Russia could have been worked out within the
Ukrainian political system, that it was not grounds for a U.S.-backed “regime change” last
February, let alone a civil war, and surely not nuclear war.
But these are clearly not normal times. To a degree that I have not seen in my 37 years covering
Washington, there is a totalitarian quality to the West’s current “group think” about
Ukraine with virtually no one who “matters” deviating from the black-and-white depiction of
good guys in Kiev vs. bad guys in Donetsk and Moscow.
And, if you want to see how the “objective” New York Times dealt with demonstrations in
Moscow and other Russian cities protesting last year’s coup against Ukrainian President Viktor
Yanukovych, read Sunday’s dispatch by the Times’ neocon national security correspondent
Michael R. Gordon, best known as the lead writer with Judith Miller on the infamous
“aluminum tube” story in 2002, helping to set the stage for the invasion of Iraq in 2003.
Here’s how Gordon explained the weekend’s anti-coup protests: “The official narrative as
reported by state-run television in Russia, and thus accepted by most Russians, is that the
uprising in Ukraine last year was an American-engineered coup, aided by Ukrainian Nazis, and
fomented to overthrow Mr. Yanukovych, a pro-Russian president.”
In other words, the Russians are being brainwashed while the readers of the New York Times
are getting their information from an independent news source that would never be caught
uncritically distributing government propaganda, another example of the upside-down
Orwellian world that Americans now live in. [See, for example, “NYT Retracts Russian Photo
Scoop.”]
In our land of the free, there is no “official narrative” and the U.S. government would never
stoop to propaganda. Everyone just happily marches in lockstep behind the conventional
wisdom of a faultless Kiev regime that “shares our values” and can do no wrong —
while ignoring the brutality and madness of coup leaders who deploy Nazis and invite a
nuclear holocaust for the world.
Only our Ukraine scenario risks human extinction. Other scenarios
will have a far more “limited” impact
Baum 14 — Executive Director @ Global Catastrophic Risk Institute [Seth Baum (Ph.D. in
Geography @Pennsylvania State University and a Post-Doctoral Fellowship @ Columbia
University Center for Research on Environmental Decisions), “Best And Worst Case Scenarios
for Ukraine Crisis: World Peace And Nuclear War,” Huffington Post, Updated: 05/07/2014 5:59
am EDT, pg. http://tinyurl.com/lxx49og
Here's the short version: The best case scenario has the Ukraine crisis being resolved
diplomatically through increased Russia-Europe cooperation, which would be a big step towards
world peace. The worst case scenario has the crisis escalating into nuclear war between the
United States and Russia, causing human extinction.
Let's start with the worst case scenario, nuclear war involving the American and Russian
arsenals. How bad would that be? Put it this way: Recent analysis finds that a "limited" IndiaPakistan nuclear war could kill two billion people via agricultural declines from nuclear winter.
This "limited" war involves just 100 nuclear weapons. The U.S. and Russia combine to possess
about 16,700 nuclear weapons. Humanity may not survive the aftermath of a U.S.-Russia
nuclear war.
It seems rather unlikely that the U.S. and Russia would end up in nuclear war over Ukraine.
Sure, they have opposing positions, but neither side has anywhere near enough at stake to justify
such extraordinary measures. Instead, it seems a lot more likely that the whole crisis will get
resolved with a minimum of deaths. However, the story has already taken some surprising plot
twists. We cannot rule out the possibility of it ending in direct nuclear war.
A nuclear war could also occur inadvertently, i.e. when a false alarm is misinterpreted as real,
and nuclear weapons are launched in what is believed to be a counterattack. There have been
several alarmingly close calls of inadvertent U.S.-Russia nuclear war over the years. Perhaps the
most relevant is the 1995 Norwegian rocket incident. A rocket carrying scientific equipment was
launched off northern Norway. Russia detected the rocket on its radar and interpreted it as a
nuclear attack. Its own nuclear forces were put on alert and Boris Yeltsin was presented the
question of whether to launch Russia's nuclear weapons in response. Fortunately, Yeltsin and
the Russian General Staff apparently sensed it was a false alarm and declined to launch. Still, the
disturbing lesson from this incident is that nuclear war could begin even during periods of calm.
We shouldn’t ignore the secondary effects – It will undermine the
credibility of US security guarantees
Allison 14 - Director of the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs [Graham Allison, “Could the Ukraine Crisis Spark a World War?,” The
National Interest, May 7, 2014, pg. http://tinyurl.com/l4yqyol
Some hard-headed realists have argued that even if Ukraine shrinks with the loss of several
autonomous republics (as Georgia did in 2008 when Abkhazia and South Ossetia seceded), the
impact on American interests would be limited. They also argue that since it is now clear that no
one (other than Russia) is prepared to fight for Ukraine, what is happening is unfortunate but
not that important. What this complacency overlooks are potential secondary effects. Two
deserve attention.
First, on the current track, the combination of Putin’s actions and Western reactions will poison
relations between Putin and Obama for the remainder of his two-and-a-half years in office. This
is the critical period for what has been a promising prospect of a negotiated agreement that
stops Iran verifiably (and interruptibly) short of a nuclear bomb. If an isolated Russian
spoiler undermines the sanctions regime that has motivated Iranian interest in a negotiated
solution, and Iran resumes or accelerates the nuclear program it was pursuing before the
current pause, the United States and Israel will rapidly come to a crossroad. They will be forced
to choose between seeing Iran acquire a nuclear bomb or bombing it to prevent that happening,
igniting what is likely to become a wider war in the Middle East.
Second, think about the Baltics. Imagine a scenario in which we see a replay of Crimea or
Donetsk in Latvia where one quarter of the population are ethnic Russians or Russian
speakers. With or without Putin’s encouragement, several hundred of them occupy government
buildings in Riga; Latvian police and security services evict them in an operation that turns
violent and leaves as many corpses as last week’s fire in Odessa; the occupiers call on Putin to
honor his pledge to “defend the rights of compatriots.” If the principles and precedent
established by the Putin Doctrine lead to Russia’s little green men without insignia entering
Latvia in what threatens to become another creeping annexation, who will fight for Latvia?
The brute fact that Latvia is a member of the NATO alliance is hard to ignore. The United States
and other members have solemnly pledged themselves to regard “an attack upon one as an
attack upon all.” But will German troops come to Latvia’s rescue? And if they did, would a
majority of Germans support that action? Would the French, or British? Would Americans?
If we do, we will cross a bright redline Republican and Democratic presidents assiduously
avoided over four decades of Cold War: American and Russian troops would be killing each
other. Any such conflict would raise risks of escalation in which each nuclear superpower
remains capable of erasing the other from the map. But if we don't, we will see a precipitous
collapse of the credibility of U.S. security guarantees that have been the central pillar of the
international security architecture the United States has constructed since World War II. Not
only European allies, but Japan, South Korea, and others who have staked their survival on a
U.S. security umbrella will look to their own defense. //AT: Withdrawal/No intervention CP
Diminished US credibility risks miscalculated nuclear wars
Chertoff 14 – Former Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security [Michael Chertoff,
“The U.S. must stand behind its security obligations,” Washington Post, April 16, 2014, pg.
http://tinyurl.com/odtdxyq
Of course, diminished U.S. credibility is a result of more than administration policy. Some neoisolationist Republican lawmakers and advocacy groups have repeatedly disparaged the value of
standing with our allies or been dismissive of aggression on the other side of the globe. They
have supported budget cuts that seriously diminish U.S. military capabilities and contradict our
promises of support for allies.
Make no mistake: A world that doubts whether the United States will stand with its allies is a
much more dangerous world. If nations in the Middle East and Asia believe that we are
irresolute in our security commitments, they will make their own arrangements. The risk of
miscalculation leading to conflict will increase. Some nations will take the lesson that
securing themselves requires obtaining nuclear capability. And when countries believe our
red lines are revocable or mere bluffs, the danger that they will provoke a war increases, as
did Saddam Hussein’s misreading of U.S. intentions in 1990, which led to the invasion of
Kuwait.
Ending the ITP is the only check on a rogue and adventurist executive
branch
Goodman 13 — Senior fellow @ Center for International Policy. [Melvin A. Goodman
(Former CIA analyst and a professor of international relations @ National War College), “The
Need for National Security Leaks,” Consortium News.com, June 19, 2013, pg.
http://tinyurl.com/naftchn
A major problem in the United States is not there are too many whistleblowers … there are
too few. Where were the whistleblowers when the Central Intelligence Agency was operating
secret prisons; conducting torture and abuse; and kidnapping individuals off the streets in
Europe and the Middle East and turning them over to foreign intelligence agencies that
conducted torture and abuse?
Where were the whistleblowers when the National Security Agency violated the Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution against “unreasonable searches and seizures” and conducted
widespread warrantless eavesdropping? Where were the whistleblowers when the State
Department permitted the use of a consulate to serve as a cover for an inadequately protected
intelligence platform in Benghazi?
Where were the whistleblowers when the Pentagon was building secret facilities in North Africa
and the Arabian Peninsula in order to conduct military strikes in countries where the United
States was not at war?
President Barack Obama, a Harvard-trained lawyer and former professor of constitutional law,
has made it particularly difficult for whistleblowers and has displayed a stunning disregard for
the balance of power and the need for oversight of foreign policy decision-making. He has
pursued more leak investigations than all previous presidents combined since the passage of the
Espionage Act in 1919.
Several press disclosures have been referred to the Justice Department for investigation, and in
May 2013 the department subpoenaed two months of records for 20 telephone lines used by
Associated Post reporters and editors. This was the most aggressive federal seizure of media
records since the Nixon administration.
Attorney General Eric Holder even departed from First Amendment norms by approving an
affidavit for a search warrant that named a Fox News reporter as a possible co-conspirator in
violations of the Espionage Act, because the reporter might have received classified information
while doing his job.
President Obama has also inexplicably contributed to the need for whistleblowers by weakening
the traditional institutions for oversight in the national security process, the Office of the
Inspector General. Inspectors General are not popular institutions within the federal
government, but they are essential for keeping the government honest by unearthing fraud,
abuse and other illegal activities.
The Obama administration from the outset focused on weakening the OIG at the CIA by taking
more than a year and a half to replace an outstanding IG, John Helgerson, whose staff had
exposed the improprieties linked to extraordinary renditions as well as torture and abuse.
The most outrageous pursuit of a whistleblower was conducted against Thomas Drake, who
determined that NSA eavesdroppers were squandering hundreds of millions of dollars on failed
programs while ignoring privacy issues. Drake took his issues to the IG at NSA, the IG at the
Pentagon, and to the congressional intelligence committees. (I am aware of individuals who
have contacted congressional staffers with issues that required congressional scrutiny, but were
warned that they would not receive a friendly reception from key members of the committee.)
After failing in these efforts, Drake turned to a reporter from the Baltimore Sun. As a result,
Drake faced ten felony charges involving mishandling of classified information and obstruction
of justice, which a judge wisely dismissed.
The case of Bradley Manning also demonstrates the mindset of the Obama administration and
the mainstream media. Although Manning has entered a plea of guilty to charges that would
give him a 20-year prison sentence, the government is pursuing a charge of aiding the enemy,
which would mean a life sentence. The government has also ignored the Sixth Amendment’s
guarantee of a “speedy and public trial,” with Manning’s trial beginning on June 3, nearly three
years after his arrest.
The military handling of Manning, particularly its imposition of unconscionable solitary
confinement, has amounted to abuse and is in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
of “cruel and unusual punishment.” The scant coverage of the trial in the press is another
example of the marginalization of a whistleblower.
The absence of checks and balances in the national security system over the past ten years has
virtually assured the abuse of power that has taken place. In general, Congress has acquiesced in
the questionable actions of both the Bush and Obama administrations since 2001, permitting
foreign policy to be the sole preserve of the Executive Branch and not the shared responsibility
of the President and the Congress.
Congressional intelligence committees have become advocates for the intelligence community,
particularly the CIA, instead of rigorous watchdogs. Similarly, the Armed Services committees
have been advocates for the Pentagon and have not monitored the abuses of weapon’s
acquisitions programs.
Since the Vietnam War, we have observed a system of judicial tolerance, with the Supreme Court
only intervening on foreign policy matters to endorse the policies and powers of the President.
This deferential attitude toward the White House has resulted in an absence of judicial scrutiny
of illegalities, including warrantless eavesdropping and the destruction of the torture tapes at
the CIA that documented torture going beyond methods authorized by the Justice Department.
Ironically, the destroyer of the 92 videotapes of interrogations, Jose Rodriquez, who ignored a
White House order not to destroy the tapes and should have faced at least obstruction of justice
charges, has published a book sanctioned by the CIA that maligns the OIG for a “holier-thanthou attitude and the prosecutorial ways they routinely treated fellow CIA employees.”
In addition to the failure of Congress and the courts to provide necessary regulation and
oversight of the national security process, the mainstream media has been complacent about its
watchdog role regarding secret agencies in a democratic arena. The media require the efforts of
contrarians and whistleblowers in order to penetrate the secrecy of the policy and intelligence
communities, but typically ignore the reprisals taken against whistleblowers.
Often, they disdain the information provided by whistleblowers that is critical of senior officials
and government agencies – preferring to protect their access to these officials. David Ignatius of
the Washington Post falsely claimed that journalists “instinctively side with leakers,” but he was
quick to ridicule Edward Snowden who has exposed NSA’s spying on millions of Americans‘
phone records and the Internet activity of hundreds of millions of foreigners.
Ignatius, moreover, has been an apologist for the CIA and has relied on clandestine operatives to
present a one-sided picture of the CIA’s National Clandestine Service. His novel (Agents of
Innocence) provided a laudatory account of CIA tradecraft, relying on sensitive leaks from a
senior operations officer.
My own experience with the mainstream media as a whistleblower is revelatory. During my
congressional testimony in 1991 against the nomination of Robert M. Gates as director of CIA, I
provided background information to Elaine Sciolino of the New York Times in order to counter
malicious rumors emanating from the White House that was designed to compromise my
credibility.
Sciolino initially reported this information accurately, but then tilted to support Gates’s
confirmation. In a conversation several weeks after the confirmation hearings, Sciolino
explained that it was becoming obvious that Gates would be confirmed and would be an
important source to her as a CIA director. She added that, as I would return to the National War
College as a professor of international relations, I would be of little further use.
Sciolino noted that whistleblowers make good sources only in the short run, while journalists
must rely on policymakers for long-term access and should not gratuitously offend them. This
explains the conventional analysis offered by the press corps and its reluctance to challenge
official sources.
As a result of the imbalance in the process of foreign policy decision-making, we have come full
circle from President Woodrow Wilson, who wanted to make the “world safe for democracy,” to
Presidents George W. Bush and Obama, who find the world too dangerous to honoring
constitutional democracy.
The excesses of the Vietnam War; Watergate; Iran-Contra; and the Global War on Terror have
contributed to the creation of a dangerous national security state and a culture of secrecy.
Whistleblowers can help all of us decide whether the ends justify the means regarding these
excesses.
Meanwhile, secrecy itself has fostered dangerous ignorance in the United States. The overuse of
secrecy limits necessary debate and dialogue on foreign policy and deprives citizens of
information on which to make policy and political judgments. Only a counter-culture of
openness and a respect for the balance of power in the conduct of foreign policy can reverse the
damage of the past decade.
As long as Congress defers to the President in the conduct of foreign policy; the courts intervene
to prevent any challenge to the power of the President in the making of foreign policy; and the
media defer to authorized sources, we will need courageous whistleblowers.