THE RISE AND EXPANSION OF SWAT TEAMS ACROSS THE UNITED STATES
A Thesis
Presented to the faculty of the Division of Criminal Justice
California State University, Sacramento
Submitted in partial satisfaction of
the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE in
Criminal Justice by
Ryan David Opatz
SPRING
2014

THE RISE AND EXPANSION OF SWAT TEAMS ACROSS THE UNITED STATES
A Thesis by
Ryan David Opatz
Approved by:
__________________________________, Committee Chair
William Vizzard, D.P.A
__________________________________, Second Reader
Shihlung Huang, Ph.D.
____________________________
Date ii

Student: Ryan David Opatz
I certify that this student has met the requirements for format contained in the University format manual, and that this thesis is suitable for shelving in the Library and credit is to be awarded for the thesis.
__________________________ , Graduate Coordinator
Yvette Farmer, Ph.D.
Division of Criminal Justice iii
___________________
Date

Abstract of
THE RISE AND EXPANSION OF SWAT TEAMS ACROSS THE UNITED STATES by
Ryan David Opatz
Statement of Problem
The purpose of this study was to examine the validity of Kraska et al.’s theory that
SWAT teams expanded across the United States because they embodied a militaristic entity that gave an impression of an elite status symbol. The study also attempted to identify alternative influences both internal and external that may have played a role in the expansion of SWAT teams across the United States.
Sources of Data
The researcher conducted in-depth interviews asking twenty questions to retired law enforcement individuals during the adoption and expansion of SWAT teams. These individuals either had worked with SWAT teams or had direct knowledge of SWAT.
Conclusions Reached
The research findings are consistent with Kraska et al.’s explanation that SWAT expanded across the United States because they embodied a militaristic entity that gave an impression of an elite status. However, the research also supports the conclusion that iv

the expansion of SWAT was more complex than the process described by Kraska et al. and that it reflected numerous influences both internal and external to law enforcement.
_______________________, Committee Chair
William Vizzard, D.P.A.
_______________________
Date v

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to acknowledge my wife Miranda. With her continued support and tough love, I would not have been able to complete this without her. She is my better half and I will love her always.
I would also like to acknowledge the following individuals for their support and guidance as well throughout this process:
My father, David, who taught me the importance of working hard and never giving up, even when things seemed most impossible.
My mother, Deborah, who instilled in me that an education is key to achieving one’s dreams. Even though she is no longer with us today, I know that she is smiling down from the heavens.
Dr. William Vizzard, who was so helpful in guiding me throughout this entire process, I cannot thank you enough.
Dr. Shihlung Huang, my second reader, who willingly took on the task of reading my thesis during its final stages.
Dr. Yvette Farmer, who has been such a wonderful mentor throughout my entire graduate experience.
I would also like to thank all my other family members and friends. Without your love and support, I would not be here today. vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................... vi
Chapter
1. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................1
Statement of the Problem ...................................................................................3
2. BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY ........................................................................6
History of SWAT; a violent beginning ..............................................................6
Lessons Learned: The Formation of a Specialized Team ..................................9
Th e Growth of SWAT Teams across the United States ...................................14
Federal Government Intervention ....................................................................15
Media and the Police ........................................................................................18
Militarization of Special Weapons Teams in Police Agencies ........................20
Opposing Philosophies of Militarization .........................................................27
Tipping Point, Social Contagion, and Growth Complex Theories ..................28
Hypotheses .......................................................................................................32
3. METHODOLGY ...................................................................................................33
Purpose .............................................................................................................33
Research Design...............................................................................................33
Human Subjects Approval ...............................................................................34 vii

Eligibility .........................................................................................................34
Participants .......................................................................................................35
Sampling Procedure .........................................................................................35
Data Collection ................................................................................................36
Instrumentation ................................................................................................38
Strengths and Weaknesses of In-Depth Interviews .........................................38
Reliability and Validity ....................................................................................39
Limitations of the Study.................................................................................. 40
4. ANALYSIS OF THE DATA .................................................................................42
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION ...................................................................62
Hypothesis #1...................................................................................................62
Hypothesis #2...................................................................................................65
Implications for Theory Building ....................................................................66
Implications for Research ................................................................................67
Concluding Remarks ................................................................................................... 68
Appendix A. Consent to Participate in Research .......................................................71
Appendix B. Interview Questions ..............................................................................72
References ....................................................................................................................74 viii

Chapter 1
Introduction
The great American crime wave began in 1962 (Walker, 1998). Crime rose rapidly with murder doubling between 1962 and 1975 and the robbery rate more than
1 tripled in many urban cities across the United States (Walker, 1998). No longer, was the badge and police uniform a shield for safety. Police officers and civilians were both targets of violent crimes and murder during the 1960s (Cardarelli, 1968). The law enforcement community was on edge and all that it needed was a small number of grotesque acts of violence to help form an entity to help rid of these violent individuals.
James Q. Wilson wrote, “It all began about 1963, that was the year, to over dramatize a bit, that a decade began to fall apart” (Dempsey & Forst, 2008).
Among the reactions to this crime wave was the emergence of tactical teams known as Special Weapons and Assault Team (SWAT); a highly specialized unit that assisted police officers in high-risk situations (Phillips, 2005). Throughout history, the
United States has utilized specially trained individuals who are trained and skilled in the art of marksmanship to achieve specific objectives; however prior to 1967, law enforcement agencies did not have a specialized task force to help alleviate events that required more than a basic police officer (Kolman, 1982). The term used to designate this special unit is the Special Weapons and Tactics Team or also known as SWAT
(Phillips, 2005).
In 1967, Los Angeles was in a tumultuous period of unrest in the form of anti-
Vietnam protests and race riots, which spread to other cities across the United States

(Fisher, 2010). Police throughout the United States were on high alert, so the Los
Angeles Police Department responded by creating 15 four-man paramilitary units to
2 help protect the department’s facilities (Fisher, 2010). The eventual concept of SWAT as a combat-trained paramilitary police unit came from an officer by the name of John
Nelson; who then passed that idea to Inspector Daryl Gates; who then presented that to the chief of police in 1969 (Fisher, 2010). Gates proposed that the SWAT team would respond to street militants and hostage situations (Cannon, 1997).
The first deployment of SWAT was in 1969, by acting assistant chief Daryl
Gates on the Black Panthers Headquarters (Cannon, 1997). Following a 4-hour standoff and gun battle the Black Panthers finally gave up (Fisher, 2010). Surprisingly, the incident ended without any deaths. In May of 1974, the Los Angeles Police Department utilized the special weapons team to assist in the arrest of six Symbionese Liberation
Army (SLA) members. The domestic terrorists began firing when police officers fired tear gas canisters into the building. The shoot-out ended when a fire broke out and burned to death all the occupants that were in that house. In total 3,772 bullets were fired by members of the SLA and over a thousand rounds were fired by the police
(Cannon, 1997; Fisher, 2010).
At the same time, other large cities across the United States were also experiencing a dramatic rise in violent crimes and many cities looked towards Los
Angeles for the answer. Many cities across the United States followed their lead and created their own SWAT teams as well (Williams & Westall, 2003). In just 10 years after the raid on the Black Panther Headquarters, 55 percent of United States’ cities

3 with populations over 50,000 people had a police department that employed the use of a
SWAT team (Kraska, 1999). This innovative idea about a specialized police force spread like a contagious disease across the United States.
Statement of the Problem
Special Weapons and Assault Teams have played a crucial role in law enforcement by dealing with high-risk incidents (Klinger & Rojek, 2008). However,
Special Weapons and Assault Teams have had their share of controversy as well. Singh
(2001) notes that critics question the constitutionality of joint-training exercises between the military and civilian police; as well as the Fourth Amendment considerations raised by SWAT tactics and the use of force.
Today a vast majority of police agencies serving populations over 50,000 have some degree of a SWAT team. Not only has the number of SWAT teams grown, but also the sophistication of gear and tactics has vastly improved (Kraska & Kappeler,
1997). The adoption and use of SWAT teams continue to increase in the United States;
“today in America, SWAT teams are deployed about 100-150 times per day, or about
50,000 times per year—a dramatic increase from the 3,000 or so annual deployments in the early 1980’s, or the few hundred in the 1970’s” (Balko, 2013, para. 8). No longer was SWAT just deemed as a special group of individuals responding to street militants and hostage situations of the past, SWAT teams evolved into a special task force that dealt with barricaded suspect(s) situations, the service of high-risk warrants, dignity protection, and the rescue of hostages (Melekian et al., 2002).

4
While crime rates were continuing to decrease during the 1990’s, the growth of
Special Weapons and Assault Teams continued across the United States (Williams &
Westall, 2003). The number of SWAT deployments between 1980 and 1997 rose by
538 percent in cities with more than 50,000 people and 157 percent in smaller-size cities in the United States (Kraska, 1999). Police departments across the United States now consider SWAT teams an important component of their department, and those without a SWAT team say they would like a SWAT team (Kraska, 1999). This is evident even in small towns. As an example, Dinuba, California justified a SWAT team in a department of only twenty-two police officers (Weber, 1999).
Peter Kraska and his colleagues proposed that SWAT teams continued to expand across the United States because special weapons and assault teams reflected an
“elite self-perception and status” that was granted to these police units which stems from “the high status military groups have in the military culture” (Kraska & Kappeler,
1997, p.11). Kraska and Kappeler (1997) uses the term Paramilitary Police Unit (PPU) to further his theory that many police agencies across the United States were creating these units in attempt to emulate the U.S Special Forces teams. Kraska (1994) noted:
Changes in the post-Cold War world and the influence of contemporary militarism – the reliance on military-style force to solve problems – are eroding the separation between police and military activity, resulting in a military involved in law enforcement, and the police at times operating militarily, all under the guise of ameliorating social problems (p.1).
The growth and integration of SWAT teams in police departments rose at a dramatic rate, but while many studies have cited Kraska, very little research has been conducted on the topic (Williams & Westall). The literature fails to examine alternative

explanations for the rapid growth of police SWAT teams in the United States. The
5 original use of SWAT was a reactive approach to eliminate domestic terrorists and end hostage stand-offs, not a means to arrest criminals and deter crime in contemporary
America.
This study will examine the validity Kraska et al.’s theory that SWAT teams expanded across the United States in pursuit of status generated by associating police with military symbols. The limited existing body of research fails to address alternative explanations for the growth of SWAT after crime began to decrease in the U.S. The researcher will try to identify complex interactive forces both internal and external that played a role in the expansion of SWAT teams across the United States. The researcher will conduct interviews with retired law enforcement officials that have knowledge and understanding of special weapons and assault teams. It will also be essential to examine the literature in order to determine if alternative explanations exist as well. The researcher will then attempt to utilize both the contagion theory and growth complex theory as alternative theories to help understand why SWAT teams became a fixture in police departments across the United States.
Research Question #1 : Does the available evidence support the theory, advanced by Kraska et al. that the expansion of SWAT reflects a militarization of US policing resulting from the pursuit of organization and occupational status?
Research Question #2 : Do other alternative explanations exist that provide equally viable explanations for the growth of SWAT in the United States?

6
Chapter 2
Background of the Study
A perfect storm of events and a national crisis swept across the American landscape in the 1960’s. Beginning in 1962, police officials began to notice an increase in crime. Between 1960 and 1975, the murder rate doubled and the robbery rate more than tripled in many large cities across the United States (Walker, 1998). From 1964-
1968, riots were erupting from Chicago to San Francisco which predominantly focused on racial issues and police aggression (Walker, 1998). The United States had many hurdles to jump during this tumultuous era from racial tensions, the growing unpopularity of the war in Vietnam, and the decline in economic opportunities for many young men and women (Johnson, Jones, & Wolf, 2008). The violent upheaval that spread across the American landscape in the 1960s lead to the formation of one of the most well known entities in law enforcement; the Special Weapons and Assault Team, also known as SWAT.
History of SWAT; a violent beginning
The postwar boom of the 1950s and 1960s, failed to reach many of the urban poor minorities in U.S. cities. This led to a large racial and economic disparity in the
United States especially in areas with a substantial African American population
(Dreier, 2003; Walker, 1998). On August 11, 1965, an arrest for drunken driving in the
Watts community of Los Angeles escalated into a “frenzy of anarchy, violence, and destruction” that would engulf both the city of Los Angeles and the newspaper headlines (McCarthy & Mijares, 2008). Looters and protestors cried out “burn baby,

7 burn” and “get whitey,” exposing the riot as a racially motivated matter (Walker, 1998).
In an effort to quell the riot, the Los Angeles Police Department responded by bringing in more police officers and squad cars (McCarthy & Mijares, 2008). This strategy quickly backfired and continued to stoke the flames of this already out of control incident.
The Watts riot raged for a total of six days. During those six days, the most regarded police department of the United States illustrated that they were ill prepared for an incident of this magnitude. Field commanders were using improvised tactics while the events were unfolding in front of their eyes (McCarthy & Mijares, 2008). The governor of California had to call out the National Guard to assist the police officers
(Walker, 1998). The police officers had inadequate training and hardware to deal with an event of this magnitude.
Once the destruction ended, 34 citizens died and 1,032 were injured. The police also arrested 3,592 individuals (Dreier, 2003). Forty-Million dollars worth of property was destroyed, six hundred buildings were damaged by fire and two hundred buildings destroyed (Walker, 1998). However, this would not be the only riot that would overwhelm large cities across the United States. From 1964 to 1968, riots would engulf cities from San Francisco to Detroit. The “long, hot summer riots,” caused an incredible amount of destruction and led to the premature death of many American citizens (Walker, 1998).
Almost a year later after the Watts Riot; Charles Whitman, a twenty-five year old former U.S. Marine Corps marksmen, loaded a foot-locker full of firearms and

ammunition and proceeded to go up a passenger elevator inside the Administration
8
Building of the University of Texas at Austin (Kolman, 1982). For the next ninety-six minutes, Charles Whitman started firing from concealed and covered positions around the observation tower.
After an hour and a half of pure terror from below, two police officers, Ramiro
Martinez and Houston McCoy, worked their way up the tower and killed Charles
Whitman (Snow, 1996). The heroism that those two officers displayed was paramount in ending this tragic incident; however many police managers realized that the success of these two officers was pure luck and not skill (Snow, 1996).
According to McCarthy and Mijares (2008), local ambulance companies used their vehicles to provide cover for the officers and civilians while retrieving the wounded and dead. The police department had to ask for additional aid from nearby military bases for armored vehicles to remove individuals from the streets. The Austin
Police Department was clearly unprepared for an incident of this degree and nature.
The weapons that many of the officers were equipped with were ineffective because of the distance from the ground to the 27 th
floor (McCarthy & Mijares, 2008). Tragically, fifteen people lost their lives and thirty-one people were injured, some of the injured were as far as two blocks away from the actual incident (Lavergne, 1997).
An event like the Texas Tower sniper incident sounds like a movie; however the
1960s and early 1970s was a turbulent and violent era in America (Kappeler & Kraska,
1997). According to Snow (1996), the pace of horrific murders committed by demented individuals seemed to happen once every ten years. The frequency of violence in

9
America suddenly changed in the mid 1960s. Just two weeks prior to the Texas Tower shooting; a man by the name of Richard Sparks went into a hospital in Chicago and brutally murdered eight nurses (Snow, 1996). The violent era of the 1960s, propelled crime to a national level.
Never before had crime been a prominent issue in national politics; never before had the day-to-day operations of the police and prisons been as seriously challenged; and never before had there been such a pervasive sense that something was fundamentally wrong with the criminal justice system…As never before, Americans were deeply divided over the very purpose of the criminal justice system (Walker, 1998, p. 180).
No longer was crime a local or state issue. Criminals were no longer arming themselves with knives and bats. Criminals armed themselves with guns, and in some instances better armed and more willing to use their weapons on police officers (McGuinness,
2000). In response, Los Angeles Police Department created the first Special Weapons and Assault Team to handle these deadly criminals.
Lessons Learned: The Formation of a Specialized Team
Amid the unrest in the form of anti-Vietnam war protests, race riots, and several sniping incidents against police officers and civilians which was occurring in Los
Angeles during the mid 1960’s; the Los Angeles Police Department formed fifteen teams of a four-man paramilitary unit to protect the department’s facilities (Fisher,
2010; SWAT: Los Angeles Police Department, n.d). The Los Angeles Police
Department referred to these paramilitary teams as Station Defense Teams (SWAT: Los
Angeles Police Department, n.d.). However, these special units were not full-time positions. John Nelson, a police officer with the Los Angeles Police Department

(Fisher, 2010), introduced the concept of a full-time tactical unit that would be used
10 specifically to takedown violent criminals.
John Nelson relayed this idea to Inspector Daryl Gates, a rising star in the Los
Angeles Police Department, who would eventually become the Police Chief for the Los
Angeles Police Department (Cannon, 1997; Fisher, 2010). Daryl Gates would then present this concept to Los Angeles Police Chief William Parker. Daryl Gates originally had wanted to use the name Special Weapons and Attack Teams (Fisher,
2010). However, the name flirted too closely with a militaristic tone for a civilian agency. The police managers revised it the Special Weapons and Tactics Teams.
The Los Angeles Police Department merged the station defense teams to form the LAPD SWAT teams. Fifteen teams were available, with each team consisting of four police officers (Fisher, 2010; Phillips, 2005). The Los Angeles Police Department spread the teams throughout city (Fisher, 2010). Each officer had a military background and a specialized skill ranging from excellent marksmanship, intimate knowledge of bombs and explosives and other physical and mental skills (Phillips,
2005). The Special Weapons and Tactics teams of the Los Angeles Police department had a very small budget. In most cases, the officers used their own weapons that they purchased themselves (Fleischer, 2011). However, this would not deter their ultimate goal; remove violent criminals off the streets of Los Angeles.
On December 9, 1969, the Los Angeles Police Department was serving warrants for illegal weapons on the 41 st
and Central Streets, the headquarters of the Black
Panther Party (Fisher, 2010; SWAT: Los Angeles Police Department, n.d.). SWAT

11 officers attempted to enter through the front door; but the Black Panthers were ready for them and fired, striking three officers (Fisher, 2010; Fleischer, 2011). The SWAT team retrieved the three injured officers and retreated from the building. The operation was not going well (Fleischer, 2011).
Officers decided to change their point of entry, headed to the roof, and began to exchange gunfire from the roof directly into the building. They hoped that they could incapacitate the Black Panther members (Fleisher, 2011). However, this tactic just made large holes in the roof; which allowed the tear gas to escape the building; rendering it useless (Fleisher, 2011). Fleisher (2011) concludes that the element of surprise was lost, SWAT had run out of plans and the Black Panthers would not give up. The operation ended in a stalemate.
The gun battle lasted a total of four hours. The Los Angeles SWAT and the
Black Panthers exchanged over two-thousand rounds of ammunition. The number of wounded tallied to a total of six individuals; three Black Panthers and three Los Angeles
Police Department SWAT officers (Fisher, 2010; SWAT: Los Angeles Police
Department, n.d.). Surprisingly, not a single individual died that day. The raid on the
Black Panthers Headquarters provided invaluable information. Training and tactical entry was to be a paramount necessity (Clark, Jackson, Schaefer, & Sharpe, 2000).
The Los Angeles SWAT team was ill prepared for the raid; Patrick McKinley a
SWAT officer involved in the raid expresses the luck that watched over them: “Oh,
God, were we lucky…These weren’t simple thugs we were dealing with. These were well-armed, politically motivated individuals, and a lot of them had some good training.

12
I’m extremely proud of what we did that day. We got our targets and no one died. But oh, God, were we lucky” (Fleisher, 2011, para. 36). Daryl Gates and other individuals within the Los Angeles Police Department realized that better weapons and armored vests would not be the only solution in making a successful SWAT team after this event
(Fleisher, 2011). They vowed that they would no longer be ill prepared for an event of this magnitude again.
Two years after the raid on the Black Panthers headquarters, the Los Angeles
SWAT team became a full-time assignment for the police officers; the first of its kind in the law enforcement community (Fisher, 2010). The amount of resources and training would increase. Rather than the fifteen teams of SWAT officers spread throughout the city of Los Angeles, the agency felt in order to decrease response time, improve training and bring about a sense of camaraderie they moved the SWAT team to police headquarters in downtown Los Angeles (Fisher, 2010). The Los Angeles Police
Department also provided better firepower for the SWAT officers as well (Fisher,
2010). Their dedication showed results. They resolved numerous hostage incidents without any loss of life (Cannon, 1997).
Once again, the Los Angeles Police Department would find themselves in the national spotlight when their SWAT team was called out to assist in arresting six members of the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) (Fisher, 2010). The Symbionese
Liberation Army was involved in multiple bank robberies, murders, and the infamous kidnapping of Patricia Hearst, the granddaughter of William Randolph Hearst (House
Committee on Internal Security, 1974). On May 17 th , 1974, the police arrived at the

13
SLA members house on East 54 th
at Compton Ave and ordered that they come outside peacefully without any incident (Fisher, 2010). The members refused and barricaded themselves inside the home.
The Los Angeles Police Department and SWAT teams surrounded the home and ordered that the members of the SLA give up peacefully. Again, the members refused.
The officers lobbed tear gas into the building in order to coax the individuals out
(Fisher, 2010). However, the members responded with a hail of gunfire aimed at the police officers that were present on the scene. The officers responded with their own gunfire eventually wounding all six members located inside. During the shoot-out, a fire broke out inside the home, killing all the occupants that were located inside the building (Fisher, 2010). In total, over five-thousand rounds of ammunition were fired from the police officers and the SLA members (Fisher, 2010). The Los Angeles Police
Department would receive criticism because of how the situation quickly turned chaotic. The police managers responded by continuing to improve training standards and SWAT unit admissions (Fisher, 2010).
Incidents like the Texas Tower shooting, raid on the Black Panthers, and the takedown of six Symbionese Liberation Army members persuaded many police departments across the country into adopting similar special units like SWAT (Snow,
1996) because of the high number of violent crimes that were occurring in the United
States. Police departments were in need and wanted a special weapons team that would be able to assist in an incident that standard police officers were not equipped and trained to do (Snow, 1996) in order to save the lives of civilians and officers.

14
The Growth of SWAT Teams across the United States
After witnessing explosive riots, crazed gunmen, and ruthless domestic terrorists, police departments across the nation began to adopt and train special weapon units as well. In the 1970s and early 1980s, police agencies across the United States saw the Los Angeles Police Department as one of the most professional, respected and widely accepted leaders in American policing and many police departments developed their own SWAT team from the Los Angeles SWAT model (Phillips, 2005).
In 1996, Peter Kraska and Victor Kappeler conducted a national survey on all police departments serving populations of 50,000 people or more to determine the number of agencies that had “police paramilitary units” (termed by Kraska). This study yielded an eighty percent response rate (Kraska & Kappeler, 1997). According to
Kraska & Kappeler (1997), 548 departments that responded to their survey, 89.4 percent had indicated that they have a Special Weapons and Assault Team. The departments without a special weapons unit responded that they were “planning on establishing one in the next few years” (Kraska & Kappeler, 1997, p.6). Most notably the largest increase in SWAT teams occurred in 1975 with 48 departments adopting a special weapons unit in their police department (Kraska & Kappeler, 1997).
In 1999, Kraska conducted a similar survey on smaller police agencies across the United States. He found that between the years of 1985 to 1995, the number of police paramilitary units that served populations from 25,000 to 50,000 had increased

by 157 percent (Kraska, 1999). Kraska (1999) also reported that over 65 percent of
15 small-town departments currently have a police paramilitary unit.
Federal Government Intervention
The very nature of policing was changing during the 1970s. Citizens across the
United States responded politically to what they perceived as an alarming rise in senseless violence that continued to occur in their cities (Walker, 1998). It not only became a significant political issue in local politics, but national politics as well. In an effort to prevent the continual increase in crime in the early 1970s (Walker, 1998) the federal government infused resources into police departments across the United States.
Federal intervention and support played a significant role in shaping the size and nature of United States law enforcement in the 1970s (Shank, 1999). According to
Shank (1999), police agencies received sixty percent of the nation’s 15 billion dollars of the Justice Department’s budget; eight times the amount allocated a decade earlier. Not only were police agencies receiving a large amount of subsidies from the federal government; they also received military expertise, command and control techniques, weapons, communications, and data collection techniques (Shank, 1999). These new resources helped many law enforcement agencies put together a special weapons unit like that of the Los Angeles Police Department.
Much of the resources that law enforcement departments obtained to help implement a special weapons team in their department would not have been available without the passage of two very important initiatives, the first being the Law
Enforcement Assistance Act (LEAA) of 1968. This law provided federal assistance to

16 state and local governments in order to impede the rising tide of crime (Johnson, Jones,
& Wolf, 2008). Law enforcement agencies that applied and received the additional federal money spent the funds on riot gear and training (Johnson et al., 2008; Walker,
1998).
Secondary resources would not have been made available to police agencies across the United States without the passage of the Omnibus Safe Streets and Crime Act in 1968 (Singh, 2001). A purpose of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 was to provide assistance to state and local governments in the effort to reduce the rapidly rising crime rate by increasing the coordination of law enforcement and criminal justice systems at the local, state and federal level (42nd United States
Congress, 1968). The Omnibus Safe Streets and Crime Act provided an influx of funding that allowed police departments to not only upgrade the necessary technology in order to function at a necessary level, but it also provided training and expertise to deal with very violent criminals (McCarthy & Mijares, 2008).
The Law Enforcement Assistance Act of 1968 and the Omnibus Safe Streets and
Crime Act of 1968 worked hand in hand with each other to help provide the assistance that law enforcement agencies needed to bolster their police force and technology.
Without those funds, law enforcement agencies would not have had the resources to go out and purchase the necessary items they needed to be an efficient police department
(Johnson et al., 2008).
Another influencing factor in the expansion of SWAT was the increase use of drugs in the United States (Phillips, 2005). The United States government began

providing both resources and attention on drug control in the US beginning in 1969
17 under the Nixon administration. The amount of resources accelerated to an unprecedented amount during the Reagan administration and George H.W. Bush administration (Phillips, 2005). The use of SWAT teams to apprehend and arrest drug users, dealers, and traffickers has increased significantly over the last thirty years
(Kraska, 1999). Drug dealers in American society are a serious threat to public safety, requiring a heavy-handed law enforcement response (Singh, 2001).
In 1981, largely in response to concerns about drug trafficking, Congress amended the Posse Comitatus Act to include the Military Cooperation with Law
Enforcement Act, 10 U.S.C. §§371-74 in which it authorized the military to “assist” civilian police in the enforcement of drugs (Singh, 2011). According to Singh (2001) prior to 1981, the federal military was unable to participate in any domestic law enforcement activity without express presidential decree. Diane Weber presents a summarization of the law:
The act encouraged the military to (a) make available equipment, military bases, and research facilities to federal state, and local police;
(b) train and advise civilian police on the use of the equipment; and (c) assist law enforcement personnel in keeping drugs from entering the country. The act also authorized the military to share information acquired during military operations with civilian agencies (as cited in
Singh, 2001, p. 688).
The engagement of federal agencies and resources assisted law enforcement agencies in combating the “drug war” (Singh, 2011). However, with federal government intervention it provided a template to help make a more efficient SWAT team, but it

18 also had a trickle-down effect in establishing better training and procedures for police officers as well (Phillips, 2005).
The Department of Homeland Security disbursed thirty-five billion dollars in grants to state and local police between 2002 and 2011 and the Pentagon has provided gear to more than seventeen thousand law enforcement agencies (“The Economist”,
2014).
Media and the Police
The media for the longest time has had the “insatiable appetite” for crimerelated stories (McCarthy & Mijares, 2008). Not only does the local news bombard the individual with a constant barrage of stories on murder, rape, drive-by shootings and stalkers (Marin, 1994), major networks have joined in as well. Major networks understand the value and the exposure that individuals seek about how police operate without leaving the comfort of their own home (McCarthy & Mijares, 2008). Television shows like Dragnet , SWAT , CHiPs , and the FBI were some of the first programs to highlight the workings of law enforcement officials (McCarthy & Mijares, 2008).
Many of these shows provided a positive boost in the form of public relations because of the department’s professional portrayal (Brooks & Marsh, 1985). At the end of episodes of the FBI
, they would display the FBI’s “Most Wanted List.” America’s
Most Wanted , another popular show would display the picture and most recent information of the individual that they highlighted on that episode. According to
Brooks & Marsh (1985) and Nelson (1989), showing the real life photos of these criminals at the end of the episodes helped encourage public support for the agency’s

efforts to catch the portrayed criminals.
America’s Most Wanted
, which still runs on
19 television, contributes its success by not only recreating crime scenes, but also it explains how the perpetrator killed the victim (McCarthy & Mijares, 2008). Individuals who were not aware that they may have been directly involved would see the episode and provide that information over to the police. The television series also provides viewers of the show a crime hotline, which has led to numerous apprehensions of these dangerous individuals (Nelson, 1989).
According to a study by Katz-Schiavone, Levenson and Ackerman (2008), most individuals received their information about public policy and crime related issues through multiple media outlets. The popularity of law enforcement television shows continue because the media portrays these officers as protagonists; risking life and limb to capture the worst criminals in our society (Vizzard, 1995).
The media also allows an individual to observe something they may not normally see. Being able to observe has a significant impact on whether products or ideas will catch on (Berger, 2013). According to Berger (2013), observable innovations or ideas open up the possibility a discussion will occur. Once this discussion begins the likelihood of something being adopted or purchased is very high (Berger, 2013). The media allowed police managers to observe how SWAT teams handled a situation and in most cases felt a positive response to try and create one within their department as well because of their observations (McCarthy & Mijares, 2008).

20
Militarization of Special Weapons Teams in Police Agencies
The increasing number of “police paramilitary units” within police departments alarmed researchers like Kraska (Kraska & Kappeler, 1997; Kraska & Paulsen, 1997;
Kraska, 1999). Kraska noticed that many police academics had become fixated on community and problem oriented policing; rather than looking the increasingly nature of a militaristic police unit (Kraska & Kappeler, 1997). Kraska and Kappeler (1997), define the term militarism as “a set of beliefs and values that stress the use of force and domination as appropriate means to solve problems and gain political power, while glorifying the tools to accomplish this” (p.1).
Kraska and Kappeler (1997) theorized that the primary reason for a growing number of police departments adopting a special weapons unit was because of the military culture that was being integrated into police departments based off the weapons, uniforms, tactics, and training that many departments were receiving.
In studying the formation of these units in numerous jurisdictions it seems that a large part of what drives their popularity is the seductive power of paramilitary subculture as promoted heavily by for-profit industry. The techno-warrior garb, heavy weaponry, sophisticated technology, hyper-masculinity, and “real work” functions are nothing less than intoxicating for paramilitary unit participants and those who aspire to work in such units (Kraska, 1999, p.6).
Kraska & Kappeler (1997) point out that the injection of military hardware and the training that the police officers receive from special operation groups in the U.S. armed forces for example the Navy Seals, Delta Force, and Army Rangers allowed the culture of the military to spread while police departments were adopting their SWAT teams.
Police departments not only saw SWAT teams as a necessity, but they were regarded as

21 a highly popular program during their initiation in the early 1970s (Kraska & Paulsen,
1997); Phillips, 2005).
Not only do the U.S. Armed Forces play an integral role in the promotion and spread of military training and hardware in police departments, but also the for-profit corporations have done a successful job in marketing its military paraphernalia, weapons, and artwork to police departments across the United States through a variety of media outlets and seminars (Kraska & Paulsen, 1997). Kraska (2001) notices multiple police magazines have advertisements by for-profit corporations that exploit the hierarchy of status in militaristic thinking by regarding the individual that uses such weapons as an “elite” member. The message was:
This weaponry will distinguish you, just like the revered Navy Seals, as an elite soldier in the war on drugs…From the Gulf War to the Drug
War…Winning the war against drugs requires some very special weapons. Weapons that law enforcement professionals can stake their lives on. The MPS Navy model submachine gun was developed especially for one of America’s elite special operations units. Battle proven in the Gulf War, this model is now available for sale to the police at a special low price (Kraska, 2001, p.146).
The militaristic tone and the use of keywords such as “elite,” “stake their lives on,” and
“battle proven” continues to construct a higher status symbol within a small group of individuals that engage in highly dangerous police activities (Kraska, 2001).
Kraska & Paulsen (1997) and Gibson (1994) point out that the weapons such as
M16s, H&K9 mm submachine guns fitted with noise suppressers, and sniper rifles are representative of a military culture that turned its militaristic tendencies domestically following the Cold War era in the United States. Many police departments found them

22 to be a very popular tool in their policing arsenal. In order to obtain and use the weapons, police agencies created special weapons teams as a means to have these new weapons available to them (Kraska, 1994).
Not only is the weaponry an essential item of a SWAT officer, but the Battle
Dress Uniforms also known as BDUs play an important role in distinguishing SWAT officers from those of street cops (Kraska & Kappeler, 1997). These teams typically wear black or urban camouflage, lace-up combat boots, full body armor, Kevlar helmets, and in some instances goggles with “ninja” style hoods (Kraska & Kappeler,
1997).
Police agencies initially justified the adoption of SWAT to address armed barricaded suspects and rescue hostages (Kraska & Kappeler, 1997). However, the number of call-outs for events of this nature began to decline in the 1980’s and the number of high-risk warrant searches increased (Kraska, 1999). Police departments that served small, medium, and large jurisdictions reported that they deployed SWAT teams about 3,000 times in 1980 (Kraska & Paulsen 1997; Kraska, 1999). However, by the end of 1995, SWAT teams across the United States were deployed to handle 30,000 incidents (Kraska & Cubellis, 1997; Kraska, 1999). A number of SWAT teams were no longer limited almost exclusively to reactive deployments like the rare hostage, barricaded suspect, or civil disturbance situation of the past. In most agencies, 80 to 90 percent of SWAT actions result from proactive implementation rather than reactions to barricade or hostage incidents (Kraska, 1999).

23
The most common proactive use of SWAT teams was the investigative contraband searches of private residences homes using the “dynamic entry,” no-knock tactic (Kraska, 1999). In most cases, a number of SWAT individuals dressed in battle fatigue would arrive in an armor vehicle and surround the home during the pre-dawn hours. An entry team would use either a specialized battering ram or entry explosive in order to enter the home. Once inside the SWAT team would subdue any individuals, and search the home for any drugs, weapons, or contraband (Kraska, 1999).
Kraska and Kappeler (1997), postulate that this radical change in mission from barricaded subjects and hostage rescue to warrant service and arrests facilitated the continued growth and expansion of SWAT. A study by Kraska and Kappeler (1997) note that respondents to their survey reported that the majority of deployments were to conduct “high-risk warrant work” which were mostly drug raids. The warrant work accounted for 75.9 percent of all SWAT activity in 1995. More and more police departments across the United States initiated a SWAT team within their department in order to conduct these types of military raids (Kraska, 1999).
The adoption of these military style tactics have in some cases led to police departments executing SWAT officers to saturate “hot spots” throughout their city
(Kraska & Kappeler, 1997). The intersection of militarism and police work was very much at the forefront of this method of operation. Kraska and Kappeler (1997) interviewed a SWAT commander in regards to this type of police work: “They geared up every night- 30 officers every night for four months” (p. 10). The commander states that there reason was to target “suspicious vehicles and people. We stop anything that

24 moves. We’ll sometimes even surround suspicious homes and bring out the MP5s. We usually don’t have any problems with the crack-heads cooperating” (p. 10). This type of policing may or may not work for certain police departments, but by sending SWAT officers in full tactical gear to track and stop any suspicious individuals sends a message to those that are watching. It distinguishes the SWAT officers as an elite group of individuals that you do not want to encounter (Kraska & Kappeler, 1997; Gibson,
1994).
Kraska & Paulsen (1997) and Gibson (1994) found that not only is the type of operations that the SWAT teams conduct rooted to have a form of military culture, but also the training plays a central role in this subculture. Training constructs and reinforces the dangerousness of the SWAT team’s work, the importance of feeling and thinking as a team rather than an individual, and the feeling that this elite unit of police officers is doing “real” police work (Kraska & Kappeler, 1997). Almost all SWAT officers train by simulating realistic “tactical” situations. These types of tactical simulations are similar to special operations teams in the military (Kraska & Paulsen,
1997). Many officers that Kraska interviewed cited that the most rewarding aspect of being part of the special weapons unit was the training (Kraska & Paulsen, 1997).
Kraska (1996), points out that these military-style simulations allow the officers to dramatize most men’s boyhood fantasies about being a “warrior.”
Being a police officer is a very difficult and dangerous job. There exists a universal fear among police officers that they may be victims of violence while performing their job (Kraska & Paulsen, 1997). According to Kappeler, Sluder, and

25
Alpert (1994), the heightened fear that a police officer feels acts as a unifying trait that creates a deep bond between other police officers. This fundamental fear contributes to the sustainment of the police subculture of sticking together for the good of the department (Kraska & Paulsen, 1997). According to Kraska and Paulsen (1997), being a part of a special weapons unit amplifies the fear that an officer may feel because of the dangers that are involved when performing their mission. Kraska and Paulsen
(1997) conducted an interview with a SWAT team from an undisclosed police department. In this interview, officers expressed an extreme fear that the worst may happen to them, emphasizing that the next call-out could be their last. An officer interviewed by Kraska provides some information, “obviously, when we know we are going in against armed individuals, there is always an apprehension that somebody is going to get hurt seriously, or that I am going to get hurt seriously” (Kraska & Paulsen,
1997, p. 263).
This intensified fear lead to a greater camaraderie that many individuals experience while in battle. These battle tested men form the highest type of friendship, they become a “band of brothers” (Gibson, 1994). One officer explains the close relationship that he has with his teammates:
As far as I am concerned it’s a very tight group, more so than anywhere else in the department because you depend on each other. You can say I depend on a backup officer on a domestic call, and you do. But when you get out there, if the man behind you isn’t looking out for you, then you could very well get shot. So we’re very tight knit in that we count on each other (Kraska & Paulsen, 1997, p. 263-264).

26
The emphasis of relying on fellow officers plays an important role in the success and outcome when conducting a high-risk warrant search. Officers are able to communicate to one another much easier than when five or six individual police officers arrive on the scene to assist (Kraska & Kappeler, 1997).
Many officers have indicated they have a fear that they may be either injured or killed while on duty; several officers express a sense of excitement and glamour while being on a special weapons unit (Kraska & Paulsen, 1997). Kraska (1996) explains that police work often times borders on monotony, filled with routine calls for service and multiple police reports (as cited in Kraska & Paulsen, 1997). Being part of a SWAT team acts as a counterbalance to those mundane and often boring aspects of policing
(Kraska & Paulsen, 1997). Officers experience a sense of “rush” that many military personnel experience when engaging in battle with their enemies (Kraska & Paulsen,
1997). This rush of adrenaline and excitement allows officers to live out their reality that police work is a very dangerous occupation.
Police departments and police managers unknowingly help construct, sustain, and perpetuate the “elite status” of their special weapon units. By implementing difficult evaluations and training standards (McCarthy & Mijares, 2008) and celebrating these officers as the best, the department in effect celebrates and glorifies a militaristic culture within the SWAT unit (Kraska & Paulsen, 1997). Officers derive a sense of superiority when police managers designate them as an elite individual. Numerous individuals cited that many joined the SWAT team because of the benefits of wanting to advance administratively (Kraska & Paulsen, 1997).

27
The militarization of police forces greatly expanded and changed the original mission of a SWAT team (Kraska & Paulsen, 1997). Kraska (1999) points out that several factors such as the weapons, uniforms, elitism, camaraderie, and dangers of high risk-warrant searches played an important role in the expansion of SWAT teams in police departments across the United States. Kraska asserts that without the growing influence of a military culture in SWAT teams; there would be a drastic decline in the use of special weapons units to conduct high-risk warrant searches (Kraska, 1999).
Opposing Philosophies of Militarization
Kraska et al. (1996) provide a picture of a SWAT officer as a militaristic
“masculine” man dressed up in their battle uniform, weapon drawn and ready to kick down the door. This was clearly the predominant approach in the early days of SWAT, for example, when officers were conducting the raid on the Black Panthers
Headquarters or when military personal attempted to diffuse the Munich hostage situation (Phillips, 2005). The philosophy of going in guns blazing was a no-nonsense approach, which resulted in bloodshed and civil litigation (Phillips, 2005). In January
1973, two New York Police Department officers tested an alternative approach when dealing with a hostage situation at a sporting goods store. The officers opted for an extended, de-escalation of the situation versus a police assault (Phillips, 2005).
According to Phillips (2005), the approach was successful in that no lives were lost and thus the practice of “hostage negotiation” was born.
Phillips (2005) notes that many SWAT teams across the United States changed their name to reflect a “softer” image to promote their special weapons team as an

28 emergency or crisis oriented team. This philosophy expresses a concept of containment without the show of force when dealing with barricaded subjects and hostage takers.
Phillips (2005) points out that many critical incident teams use negotiation rather than tactical assault as their primary weapon and that assault tactics were employed as a last resort. The primary goal was to deescalate the current crisis by employing stress, logical reasoning, time, utility control, barter, tolls, and devices in an attempt to ease the crisis (Phillips, 2005).
Tipping Point, Social Contagion, and Growth Complex Theories
The militarization of SWAT officers may have influenced the expanding role of special weapons teams across the United States. It is essential however to examine any additional underlying theories that may have precipitated a growth in special weapons teams. In some instances, it only takes a single random act of violence to propel issues to a national level. Cobb and Elder (1983) describe these incidents as triggering devices. These triggering devices have the ability to catapult an issue from relative obscurity to a place of prominence on the national stage (Wood, 2006). Thomas
Birkland describes triggering devices as potential focusing events that will occur suddenly, be relatively rare, be large in scale, and become known to policymakers and the public virtuously simultaneously (as cited Wood, 2006, p. 421). These descriptors match up well with what was occurring during the early 1960s and 1970s with the infrequent shootings of innocent civilians and police officers suddenly rising and largescale mass riots.

These triggering devices or focusing events led many police managers to examine their current capabilities at the time and concluded that a special team of
29 individuals was essential to help assist in apprehending barricaded suspects or hostage takers; a task that a patrol officer was neither equipped or trained to handle. Once the
Los Angeles Police Department created their SWAT team, police departments across the country started to follow suit. Most notably following the highly publicized raid on the SLA members and the infusion of resources from the federal government, the spread of SWAT teams increased drastically. This is evident in the research completed by
Kraska & Kappeler (1997), in which a majority of police departments adopted a SWAT team between the years of 1972 and 1979. According to their research from 1972 to
1979, over 300 police departments with a population of 50,000 or more citizens adopted a SWAT team. Following 1973, the cumulative growth of police departments with a
SWAT team increased drastically from 100 departments having a SWAT team to 324 by 1982.
The “tipping point” relates to this type of occurrence. Gladwell (2000) describes the “tipping point” as a “magic moment when an idea, trend, or social behavior crosses a threshold, tips, and spreads like wildfire” (p. 12). Gladwell (2000) further explains that the tipping point is not random, but a function of how well the message is conceived, communicated, and received by the environment it wishes to take hold. It requires the efforts of a handful of exceptional people (Gladwell, 2000). The belief is that anything these individuals adopt or talk about will become popular (Berger, 2013).

30
The Los Angeles Police Department during the era of police professionalism was regarded the most respected police department in the United States (Walker, 1998,
Phillips, 2005). Creating and adopting the SWAT team as a full-time function within the Los Angeles Police Department sent a message out to other departments that this is something they should do. However, once an innovation or idea spreads it must have the ability to continue to grow and spread, because like a wildfire, it can be extinguished.
Yellow livestrong bracelets, Greek yogurt, low-fat diets and the one-hundred dollar cheesesteak may seem to have no relationship to law enforcement programs; however, they all relate to exponential expansion. These are all examples of social epidemics; ideas, products, and behaviors that diffuse through a population (Berger,
2013). These ideas or fads will typically start with a small set of individuals or organizations and spread, often from person to person, almost like a virus.
Berger (2013) lays out six characteristics of a contagious idea or innovation.
These six characteristics are social currency (the relation of visible symbols of status), triggers (environmental stimuli), emotion, public (making innovations observable and creating a lasting effect on the individuals that are exposed to the idea or innovation), practical value, and stories; however, not all six need be present for an idea or innovation to grow (Berger, 2013).
A bureaucracy’s most basic instinct is to survive and grow (Kraska, 2004). This theoretical idea also relates to that of the growth and expanded uses of SWAT teams across the United States. During the 1980s and 1990s, the violent crime rate was

31 dropping; however, the number of SWAT teams was continuing to increase (Kraska and
Kappeler, 1997; Kraska and Paulsen, 1997; and Phillips, 2005). This was pointed out by Kraska et al. (1996) because the use of SWAT teams were no longer being used just for barricaded suspects or hostage takers, but more departments were using SWAT teams for high-risk warrant searches. Not only has the function changed, but the amount of resources and funding being funneled into the criminal justice system is astronomical. Between the years of 1982-1999, spending on police, courts, and corrections has increased by over three-hundred and fifty percent (Bureau of Justice
Statistics, 2002). Kraska (2004) suggests that this reasoning constitutes a “growth complex,” an entity that has taken on a life and logic of its own. The original objective may have changed in order for it to increase in size and power. The increased use of
SWAT teams more often than not helps justify their existence (Weber, 1999).
SWAT teams have become the most visible manifestation of policing because of their intrigue and visible appeal. Since its inception, the media for the most part has always had a favorable view of SWAT teams, which has helped it become so popular among the public at large. Not only is it popular among the public, but popular among police agencies across the country. Almost all medium to large police agencies have a
SWAT team (Kraska & Kappeler, 1997). The literature that is available on SWAT teams tells a violent story of their upbringing and their purpose to apprehend violent criminals, barricaded subjects, and hostage takers. They are here to get the worst of the worst. It has been shown that the growth of SWAT teams began in the early 1970s and

32 from that point on police departments from all over the nation have adopted some form of a SWAT team.
However, research is limited in providing a viable explanation on why SWAT teams expanded across the United States in such a drastic function. Some researchers postulate that with the militarization of these special units based on their weapons, uniforms, tactics, and training helped play a large role on their overall expansion into other police departments across the United States. The literature does not provide other viable explanations or alternative theories as to why SWAT teams were adopted by police departments across the United States.
The limited research on SWAT teams demonstrates the importance that more needs to be published by both academic researchers and persons who have had a direct relationship in that field. Academic researchers will provide their own take on the subject in order to meet their objectives. It is for this reason the researcher needs to go out into the field and speak with individuals who had a close relationship with SWAT teams since their early inception, to find out if other viable alternatives exist in regards to their growth an expansion to what the current literature has to offer.
Hypotheses
This study aims to test the following hypotheses:
 H
01
- The expansion of SWAT reflects a militarization of police culture that occurred in pursuit of status and image.

H
02
- Alternative explanations exist that provide equally viable explanations for the growth of SWAT in the United States.

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Chapter 3
Methodology
Special Weapons and Assault teams have become an important entity in almost all police departments in the United States (Kraska, 1999); surprisingly there is very little research on their inception, growth, and use in the last four decades (Williams &
Westall, 2003). The number of studies is limited when examining SWAT teams in
American police departments (Kraska & Kappeler, 1997; Kraska & Paulsen, 1997;
Kraska, 1999; and Berger & Hill, 2009). These researchers advance the theory that militarization of policing subculture in pursuit of image and status constituted the primary rationale for many police departments to adopt a specialized team within their department.
Purpose
The purpose of this research is to seek additional or other alternative explanations for SWAT teams becoming such an integral component of police departments across the United States. The research conducted will also examine the validity of other studies by Kraska et al. to determine if their assessment of the militarization of police units constitutes the sole reason for SWAT’s expansion across the United States.
Research Design
The research design is qualitative in nature. The researcher will be conducting in-depth interviews with individuals that have knowledge of special weapons and assault teams and that have a background in law enforcement. Babbie (2010) states that

a qualitative interview is an interaction between an interviewer and a respondent in
34 which the interviewer has a general plan of inquiry, including topics to be covered, but not a set of questions that must be asked with particular words or in a particular order.
Face-to-face interviews give the interviewer the opportunity to ask, expand and gather more data from the questions that the interviewer is asking (Dillman & Salant, 1994).
This type of research design seemed most applicable in order for the researcher to achieve both rich and in-depth data.
Human Subjects Approval
In order for the researcher to receive approval to conduct in-depth interviews, the researcher was required to obtain approval from the Criminal Justice Division
Human Subjects Committee before collecting any data. The researcher was required to determine if any individuals that agreed to the in-depth interviews were to subject to any risk. In March 2014, the Criminal Justice Division-level Human Subjects committee reviewed the researcher’s application and categorized the research as
“exempt.” Research falling under this category did not require any additional approval.
Eligibility
The concept and adoption of SWAT teams in American policing occurred during a very tumultuous and violent period in U.S. history (Kraska, 1999). The primary use of SWAT teams in its early stages was to rescue hostages and apprehend barricaded subjects. However, their mission evolved into conducting high-risk warrants, apprehension of violent criminals, protection of dignitaries and combating terrorist threats (Kraska & Kappeler, 1996).

35
It was important to find an individual that was involved in law enforcement during both the adoption and evolution of SWAT teams in American policing. It was also important that the interviewee had knowledge of SWAT teams. In order for an individual to be eligible to participate in the in-depth interview, the interviewee had to be retired from law enforcement. This was important because the researcher must obtain viable information in regards to a specific expertise. The interviewees must be retired from the law enforcement community in order to ensure there is no longer a real or perceived conflict of interest in this subject. It was important to follow these three factors in order to gain an accurate consensus in regards to the questions that the researcher is asking.
Participants
Five individuals participated in the in-depth interview process. Each interviewee worked in law enforcement during the implementation of SWAT within their department. All interviewees were retired law enforcement professionals that were able to provide valid information in regards to SWAT. Each individual came from a different department and either worked at a local or federal law enforcement agency.
Some interviewees had experience in both the local and federal level.
Sampling Procedure
In order to achieve viable data from the interviews, it was important for the researcher to use purposive sampling. The reason for this type of sampling is that the researcher is looking for a specific group of individuals that had a career in law enforcement during the integration of SWAT within their department. It was also

36 important that these individuals interacted with the SWAT team during their employment. This type of sample group will have the most knowledge and understanding in regards to the topic of SWAT teams.
In order to obtain a sample of individuals for the interview, the faculty advisor provided a few names for the researcher to contact. The interviewer met with the interviewee at a determined location. The interviewer then provided the interviewee a consent form (See Appendix A). The consent form explained the reason for the research. Once the interviewee consented to the research, the researcher began the semi-structured interview. Following the interview, the researcher used snowball sampling to expand the sample size. Babbie (2010) explains that this non-probability sampling method, often used in field research, allows the researcher to ask each person after the interview to suggest additional persons who they feel may be qualified to be able to partake in this type of interview. This type of sampling method helps increase the number of interviews, which helps provide the researcher with more viable data.
However, it should be noted that not all subjects met the qualifications when conducting this type of method.
Data Collection
To gain the most practical data to answer the two research questions presented in Chapter 1, a qualitative approach by conducting in-depth interviews was used.
Patton (1990) categorizes interviews into three general types: the informal conversational interview, the general interview guide approach, and the standardized open-ended interview. The researcher created twenty questions to ask the participants.

These questions would act as a general direction for the conversation and allow the
37 interviewee to respond to the questions as he or she chooses (See Appendix B). During the interview, the researcher may ask the interviewee to elaborate on an answer to provide better clarification or understanding.
In this case, five subjects met all the prerequisites to proceed with the interview.
For ethical reasons, voluntary participation in any social research is necessary (Babbie,
2010). The researcher and interviewee then met at a pre-determined location. After the researcher introduced himself to the interviewee and established a rapport with the individual, the researcher explained the consent form which outlined the purpose of the study, respondent eligibility, sampling procedures, possible risks and discomforts, benefits of participating in the study, the steps the researcher is taking to ensure anonymity of the interviewee and voluntary participation. Each interviewee was required to sign the consent form. A copy of the consent form was given to the interviewee.
Once the consent form was signed, the interview could begin. The researcher estimated that each interview would take between one to two hours to complete. This depended on the length of answers and the time it took the interviewer to write those answers down. When all twenty questions were asked and the interviewee had no more answers to provide, the researcher thanked them for their time. In an effort to gain additional participants, the researcher asked if the interviewees knew of any persons that may meet the qualifications to participate in this research. If so, the researcher was given their name and contact information.

38
The researcher then typed the answers onto an electronic document for safekeeping. The researcher then destroyed the original hand-written notes.
Instrumentation
In an effort to ensure that the in-depth interview is the same for all interviewees, a twenty-question interview guide was created to help organize the interview (see
Appendix B). The questions related to the interviewee’s career in law enforcement, knowledge of their agency’s SWAT team, and general knowledge of SWAT teams.
The interview questions consisted mostly of open-ended questions. A few questions had follow-up questions attached that were closed-ended questions. If the interviewee was unable to respond to a question, the interviewer moved onto the next question.
Strengths and Weaknesses of In-Depth Interviews
In comparison to other research designs, the use of in-depth interviews has it strengths and weaknesses. An in-depth interview is a great tool to use to gather large amounts of data quickly and it provides the guarantee that the questions will be answered (Marshall & Rossman, 1995). For example, rather than mailing out questions to be asked by an individual and then having to wait to see if they will send it back.
The researcher is able to communicate to an individual to see if they would like to participate and then meet at a pre-determined location to conduct the interview.
Marshall and Rossman (1995) further explain that in-depth interviews also provide the researcher a greater amount of breadth and depth in their data results and that immediate follow-up and clarification is possible. Another advantage to in-depth

39 interviews is that they can be relatively inexpensive depending on the type of research one wishes to conduct (Babbie, 2010).
In contrast, the use of in-depth interviews does also have its weaknesses.
According to Marshall and Rossman (1995), interviews involve personal interaction; cooperation is essential. Some interviewees may be unwilling or uncomfortable sharing all that the interviewer hopes to explore. The type of interview questions that are being asked may also not evoke long narratives from participants because of lack of expertise or familiarity of the subject or the interviewee may not fully comprehend the question being asked by the interviewer (Marshall & Rossman, 1995). According to Douglas
(1976), at times some interviewees may have good reason not to be truthful to their interviewer.
Reliability and Validity
Reliability and validity is significant for any research study. Babbie (2010) refers to reliability as the quality of measurement method that suggests that the same data would have been collected each time in repeated observations of the same phenomenon. Validity, on the other hand, refers to whether or not the concept in question actually measures what it is intended to measure.
Interestingly, qualitative research such as in-depth interviews may actually pose problems of reliability (Babbie, 2010). With the use of in-depth interviews, it becomes more personal for the respondent. No respondent went through the same exact situation in his or her life as the other respondent may have. One’s judgment of a situation or event can be very different from that of another individual. In order to keep the

research as reliable as possible it is important for the researcher to sort out his or her
40 own biases and points of view prior to conducting an interview.
Although qualitative research tends to pose problems of reliability of a study, the validity tends to be much stronger (Babbie, 2010). Babbie (2010) explains that the comprehensive measurements available to the field researcher tap a depth of meaning in the concepts that are to be measured. For example, statistics and quantitative data cannot provide an understanding of why the number of SWAT teams increased across the United States. They can only provide a measurement of how many SWAT teams increased over a period of time.
Limitations of the Study
Due to the nature of the study, there are limitations that must be addressed. The limited number of questions, the limited sample size, and the use of the snowball sampling method are areas of concern. Because an in-depth interview was being conducted, it was important for the interviewer to create interview questions to help structure and organize the interview; however, it was also important to be respectful to the interviewee’s time. More interview questions could have been added to enhance the data already received from the interviewee; however taking more than two hours of his or her time may have been asking too much.
Another limitation of the study was the sample size. The sample size consisted of five retired law enforcement professionals. Even though the individuals that were interviewed did not work in the same law enforcement agency, the data cannot be generalized to the greater population because the sample was not chosen randomly. In

addition, the size of the sample was small and the use of snowball sampling did not
41 always produce the warranted individuals that the researcher was looking for. At times, the interviewee was actually given wrong names and contact information.

42
Chapter 4
Analysis of the Data
The researcher was able to collect data from five retired law enforcement professionals. Once the data were collected, the researcher analyzed and reviewed all answers to look for similar themes and consensus in regards to their responses given to the researcher. The responses that were provided will assist in answering the two hypotheses that were presented in Chapter 2. In this chapter, the questions will be listed and a summarization of the responses will be given.
1) What department or agency did you work for while being involved in law enforcement and when?
Four of the five interviewees began their law enforcement career working for local law enforcement agencies. Two of the four interviewees that worked for local law enforcement agencies also worked at the state and federal level. One of the five interviewees worked only at the federal level. The earliest date that an interviewee began their law enforcement career was in 1961. The latest date for an interviewee to begin their law enforcement career was 1973.
2) When do you feel that SWAT became an established entity within your department or agency?
Three of the five respondents that worked only at the local law enforcement level informed the researcher that their SWAT team became a more established entity from
1971 to 1976. The interviewee that worked at both the local and federal level informed the researcher that the local law enforcement agency that they were employed at began

43 in the early 1970s. The interviewee also responded that the federal agency established a
SWAT team in 1988. The interviewee that worked only at the federal level informed the researcher that the SWAT team became an established entity in 1983.
3) Were you aware of other agencies adopting or considering a SWAT team?
All five respondents reported they were fully aware of other agencies adopting
SWAT teams. All the interviewees informed the researcher that it was a very tumultuous and dangerous time for law enforcement officers in the 1960s. Law enforcement officers during that time were poorly equipped and not trained effectively to handle dangerous situations such as mass shootings, barricaded subjects and hostage rescue missions. Four of the five respondents mentioned that the Los Angeles Police
Department was one of the primary factors that many other agencies were adopting
SWAT teams within their departments. Many agencies favored utilizing specialized teams to help deescalate and end dangerous situations without putting a larger number of officers in danger.
4) If your department adopted a SWAT team was it considered to be: a) Full-time
SWAT team; b) Part-time SWAT team; or c) Hybrid of both full-time and parttime.
The interviewees had a varied response for this question. Interviewee #1 informed the researcher that their department’s SWAT team was regarded as part-time. The officers would leave their equipment in their vehicle and would then mobilize to the scene if needed. Each officer that was involved in the SWAT team trained in a certain position. Interviewee #2 informed the researcher that the agency had two full-time

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SWAT teams while be employed at that police department. The officers were consistently training if not being utilized in a certain capacity. Interviewee #3 informed the researcher that originally the SWAT team was regarded as part-time; however with the expansion of both the city and police department the SWAT team was moved into full-time status. The police department had two teams; one that worked day shift and the other worked the night shift. Interviewee #4 informed the researcher that the police department they worked for regarded their SWAT team as full-time. Two officers worked in an unmarked car conducting high-risk felony arrests. Interviewee #5 informed the researcher that it appeared that the SWAT team was regarded more as a hybrid of both full-time and part-time SWAT teams. In most cases, if SWAT was not involved in an incident that required all the team members’ full attention, then many officers were conducting special operations or going after dangerous criminals with ties to drugs and guns.
5) If you had a SWAT team, did your agency have any influence in establishing
SWAT teams in other outlying agencies? Did agencies ask for your assistance if they needed a SWAT team? What assistance did you provide if your department or agency was asked for help?
Three of the five respondents felt that their agency or department did not have any influence in establishing SWAT teams in other outlying agencies. Interviewee #2 and
Interviewee #3 informed the researcher that many of the other outlying agencies had already adopted a SWAT team or were in the processes of establishing one of their own.
However, both mentioned that over time when the departments had an established

45
SWAT team they would meet as a regional group and discuss on how to increase the effectiveness and safety of the officers.
Interviewee # 1 informed the researcher that their SWAT team did seem to have an influencing factor on the outlying agencies close to their department. The reasoning was because the SWAT team was able to assist the smaller departments in dealing with dangerous criminals because the smaller departments did not have the resources or capacity to have a SWAT team of their own. However, over time when the smaller cities received more funding and resources they were able to create a SWAT team of their own.
Interviewee #2 informed the researcher that their department had a direct impact and influence on establishing SWAT teams not only in California about across the United
States. The federal agency that interviewee #2 worked with provided both tactical and weapons training for police agencies all across the state of California. Many agencies did not yet establish their own individual training program because of the lack of funding and tools to support one.
6) If you had a SWAT team, what was its organizational structure?
All five interviewees responded that the organizational structure resembled that of a top-down structure. The researcher was informed that usually a Captain or Lieutenant operated the SWAT team. Then you had a Sergeant who usually acted as the field commander. The field commander would in essence be making all the decisions for the team at the incident. Depending on the type of incident and the number of teams, each team would have a team leader. Each team leader would then be in command of the

SWAT officers. Three of the five respondents mentioned that in essence it loosely
46 resembled the structure of the military. Interviewee #2 and interviewee #4 both mentioned the fact that the military displayed a sense of discipline and uniformity and that many police departments felt that SWAT should both display discipline and unity because of the dangerous scenarios that many of these officers were undertaking.
7) If your department had a SWAT team, who were the main supporters of a SWAT team within your department?
All the interviewees reported that management was the main supporter of establishing a SWAT team within their department. Three of the five interviewees responded that the police chief understood the importance of utilizing a specialized team of individuals to help contain a very dangerous situation. Interviewee #3 mentioned that their police chief thought a better outcome would follow if SWAT was to be used. Both interviewee #1 and interviewee #4 mentioned that the management level preferred SWAT because it redistributed both officers and detectives from having to issue high-risk warrants which freed up more of their time to focus on patrol and cases. Not only did it free up more time for the patrol officers and detectives, but also the risk of injury or death was less likely to occur because they were not conducting these high-risk warrants on very dangerous criminals. Interviewee #5 informed the researcher that management at the local law enforcement level favored having a SWAT team; however, that was not the same for the management level at the federal level.

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8) Was there any opposition to having a SWAT team and why?
All five interviewees informed the researcher that there was always some type of opposition when any department was looking to create a SWAT. Both interviewee #1 and interview #2 mentioned that there may have been some internal opposition to having a SWAT team. Interviewee #1 mentioned the fact that some officers may have been upset that SWAT was now taking over their assignments and duties. Interviewee
#2 mentioned that the SWAT team provided a new mission to the agency in which it started to hold a higher standard to all employees. Employees that were not regularly out in the field were required to meet higher training standards than before and this made them upset.
Interviewee #3 informed the researcher that the main opposition to having a SWAT team was from the community, media and elected officials. The community and the media felt that SWAT teams were very secretive and they did not fully trust how the police department may use them. The interviewee pointed out that the opposition from the community and media slowly eroded because the department felt the need to be as transparent as possible. It coordinated with both the media and the community as much as possible to continue to keep their trust. It created logs for the media and always tried to keep an open channel of communication between the department and community because it understood that there might be a time that the police department will have to disrupt a community if an incident is close by. The interviewee also mentioned that elected officials opposed SWAT teams because that would require more resources for

the police department and they did not want to pay for the additional officers and
48 upkeep of the weapons and equipment.
Interviewee #4 also informed the researcher that public support was lacking when adopting a SWAT team. During this time, court decisions on the use of force and training standards were a hot topic and many felt SWAT would attempt to exempt themselves from any procedures. Interviewee #5 mentioned that the main opposition at the federal level was management. Many top managers opposed SWAT teams because of the logistical and geographical difficulty at the federal level.
9) Has the SWAT mission evolved since its original inception? If yes, what was its original use and how did they expand within your department?
When asked this question all interviewees responded that they felt that SWAT has evolved since its original inception. All the interviewees brought up the fact the primary focus of SWAT teams was their ability deescalate and end dangerous scenarios such as hostage rescues, barricaded suspects, and riots. All five of the interviewees informed the researcher that many SWAT teams including their own no longer solely focused on its original mission, but that many SWAT teams became involved in the use of serving search warrants for drugs, guns, and dangerous criminals. Interviewee #1 mentioned that this seemed to be a more practical use and once SWAT took over the police became more successful in both the operation and the execution of search warrants. All the interviewees mentioned that this greatly decreased the chance of injury or death for both the officer and suspect and the likelihood of drugs and weapons being seized greatly increased.

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10) What influencing factors allowed SWAT to continue to grow and thrive?
All the interviewees informed the researcher that the primary reasons that SWAT continued to grow was because of the proliferation of drugs, the increase use of automatic weapons and the apprehension of dangerous criminals. Interviewee #1 explained that the dope industry was continuing to grow all over the United States.
Many criminals were arming themselves with automatic weapons in order to protect both themselves and their drugs.
Interviewee #2 mentioned that criminals were becoming more dangerous and aggressive around law enforcement officials. No longer were criminals simply giving up. The amount of firepower and weapons that the criminals were using were at times superior to that of law enforcement. The cases themselves were becoming more complex and sophisticated and that no longer were you dealing a just a few individuals, but at times dealing with multiple suspects at one location.
Interviewee #3 informed the researcher that the increase in drugs and automatic weapons were the primary reasons why their SWAT team was growing within their police department. The interviewee also explained that because of where the department was located they were required to protect dignitaries and high-ranking officials when they came to visit.
Interviewee #3, interviewee #4 and interviewee #5 explain that many SWAT teams continue to take on new roles. Because of the terrorist attacks on America and the

increase in terrorism around the world, many SWAT teams have trained in counter-
50 terrorism threats. This allows the standard operation of police departments to operate without having to remove or re-allocate resources.
11) What external forces may have pushed SWAT to become a more established entity within the law enforcement community?
The interviewees informed the researcher that the external forces that may have pushed SWAT to become a more established entity was because of the proliferation of drugs, the increase and use of automatic weapons being used by criminals, SWAT teams being used in high-risk warrant searches and the arrest of dangerous criminals.
Interviewee #5 also informed the researcher that additional resources and training by the federal government helped to either create or expand SWAT teams across the
United States. Interviewee #5 also explains that many police departments felt pressure that they should begin creating a SWAT team of their own because so many departments were adopting one in the 1970s and 1980s.
Four of the five interviewees responded to the researcher that the media also was an external force for the establishment of their SWAT team within their police department.
Interviewee #4 mentions that during the 1970s and 1980s television shows portrayed
SWAT teams as being this group of police officers that conducted these “cool” operations in the cover of darkness. Interviewee #1 and interviewee #5 mentioned with the technological advances in media such as the portable camera when they would show up to an incident they always wanted to portray SWAT as this heroic image. This heroic portrayal of SWAT teams caught the attention of other police departments across

the United States. Interviewee #1 mentioned this type of heroic portrayal led many
51 individuals to want to join their local police departments and become a member of
SWAT.
12) What internal forces may have pushed SWAT to become a more established entity within the law enforcement community?
Four out of the five interviewees informed the researcher that upward mobility was a big internal factor for police officers within the department. Interviewee #1 explained that many SWAT officers received promotions within their department and that three of the last police chiefs were members of the SWAT team. Interviewee #3 and interviewee #4 explained that not only was there a financial benefit in regards to promotion within the department, but many officers during their tenure as a SWAT officer received a higher salary and were more likely to incur more overtime hours, which significantly increased their pay. Interviewee #4 also points out that SWAT is a highly coveted position within the police department. Officers received popular assignments and many regarded it as “the best of the best.”
Interviewee #2 explained that younger officers were more motivated to join SWAT teams because many individuals wanted to increase their tactical and weapons training.
Individuals saw it as a way to increase both their physical strength and mental capacity.
Interviewee #1 pointed out that when officers are involved in a dangerous incident not only is tactical and weapons training important, but the officers have to have a high mental capacity in order to think on their toes if unexpected situation occurs.
Interviewee #1 continued to point out that physical strength was an important variable

when choosing an officer, but the evaluation of an individual’s mental strength and
52 knowledge was just as important, if not more.
All five of the interviewees responded that SWAT officers were highly praised because the added danger and risk that these individuals performed while conducting police work. Interviewee #1 and interviewee #3 informed the researcher the difficulty and risk that these officers had to go through while training. Both responded that it was both mentally and physically grueling and that officers would at times get hurt while training or preparing for a mission.
13) What was the professional perception of SWAT while working at your police department or federal agency?
All interviewees responded that there was a high level of professionalism towards members of the SWAT team. Interviewee #4 pointed out that no member of the police department had anything bad to say about SWAT because they understood the physical and mental demands that these individuals put themselves through. Interviewee #1 and interviewee #2 responded that many officers were grateful that these individuals risked their lives for their fellow officers and knew that they were not going to go into a situation just to fire their weapons, but to find a solution in apprehending the criminal or criminals without a single gunshot.
Interviewee #2 explained that in the beginning many individuals had a misconception of SWAT because it was so new to both the agency and the public.
However, over-time SWAT teams have become a highly professional occupation within the law enforcement community because they have done such a first-class job. The

53 training these officers receive is completely different than the military. These officers do not rush into buildings and kill the bad guys. Their mission is to apprehend and ensure that the criminals are brought to justice.
Interviewee #4 and interviewee #5 informed the researcher that there was and currently still is a sense that these individuals have a sense of entitlement to who they are. At times SWAT officers would act macho and at times regard themselves as better police officers.
14) What was the public perception of SWAT while working at your police department or federal agency?
All five respondents indicated that public perception for the most part was very positive. Interviewee #1 informed the researcher that the goal of their SWAT team was to ensure that there were not going to be any bad shootings. This type of success reflected both positively on the media and on the public. Interviewee #2 responded that in most instances SWAT teams were receiving a high level of praise because of the great job that they were doing. The public also enjoyed SWAT teams because they were tough on crime and getting the job done.
Interviewee #3 informed the researcher that their SWAT team focused on the use of a SWAT Negotiator. The use of the negotiator helped deescalate and even prevent the officers from having to go in. The SWAT team did not fire a single shot until six years after its inception within the police department. The public and the media have and continue to have a positive public perception of the SWAT team.

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Interviewee #4 mentioned that their department at first tried to keep SWAT under the radar by not publicizing their stories and relaying their operations to the media.
This caused a significant hostile response from the community. The department immediately reversed their ways and became very transparent about their SWAT team in an effort to re-connect with their community. They held SWAT team functions that were open to the public. They showed off some tactical and training exercises but stressed the importance about keeping the community safe. Over time, the public were always expecting the SWAT team to come out and help deal with difficult situations and praised them for the hard work they were doing.
15) Did the police culture have an effect on how SWAT teams worked within a police department?
Three of the five interviewees were able to provide a response to this question.
Interviewee #1 informed the researcher that the idea of always having each other’s backs had a positive effect on how SWAT teams worked with each other. You could have the most well trained and best equipped officers, but if no one trusts each other then you have the worst SWAT team. Interviewee #2 also mentioned how police departments rely on the trust of their officers and this reliance on trust was very important for their SWAT team. Interviewee #3 mentioned that their SWAT team did everything together from eating out to playing a game of basketball. This was important because it was important to know the individual that has your back because they are the ones who are making sure that you go home to your family at the end of the day.

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16) Did the role of the military or culture of the military have an impact on the expansion of SWAT teams across the United States?
All the interviewees informed the researcher that the military and the culture of the military may had played a role in the expansion of SWAT teams in the 1970s and
1980s. Every interviewee mentioned the fact that many veterans from the Vietnam and
Korean War were returning home and many of those individuals gravitated towards police work. Many individuals that first joined SWAT were recently from the military because they already possessed certain skills that the police managers were looking for.
Interviewee #1 explained that the tactics that the military possessed were instrumental in providing police officers with the training to deal with violent individuals. However, even though the tactics were the same, the rules of engagement were completely different. Police departments either received money to purchase weapons and equipment or the military would provide hand-me downs to help supply their arsenal.
Interviewee #2 mentioned that SWAT commanders looked at the military on how to improve both tactics and training. The type of training was relatively new for police managers and many saw the military as a great place to start in regards to making their training better. In order for SWAT to be both efficient and effective discipline was going to be the key. Many police managers knew that the military had that going for them already. Many police managers and managers at the federal government level took the military’s playbook in training standards and tweaked them to fit their mission.

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Interviewee #3 informed the researcher that the military integration came from military personnel entering police work in the 1950s, 60s and 70s. However, overtime you saw less assimilation because there was no more draft and military professionals were no longer entering police work as a line of profession when finishing their duties.
Interviewee #3 also mentioned that the military did provide both technical and weaponry advances that helped many police officers deal with dangerous individuals.
Interviewee #3 continued to reference SWAT teams as “the point of the spear.” This reference seemed to make the statement that they are the most important tool when fighting criminals, because without the tip of the spear you have just a stick.
Interviewee #4 informed the researcher that a military presence was partially true in the expansion of SWAT teams. The military did help SWAT teams and police officers acquire automatic weapons. This mainly happened because criminals were using these types of illegal weapons more often. It was necessary for SWAT to fight on the same playing field. Cross training was used to help increase the skills of SWAT officers. Many tactics were adopted by SWAT; however, they went by a different creed. That creed was to ensure that SWAT both protected and saved lives. It was the duty of SWAT to go in and apprehend the criminals. Their weapons were there in case that was their last resort. SWAT used the tactical responses by the military because they worked so well. There was no reason to have to think of new and or different tactics.
Interviewee #5 informed the researcher there is definitely a mutual reference between SWAT and the military. The United States had the best-trained soldiers and

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SWAT teams wanted to emulate that training because there was no real reason to have to think up new tactics and training standards. Of course, at times SWAT had to use different tactics or tweak certain ways to handle a situation. For example, when a riot broke out, it was important that SWAT and the police officers were trained to work together as a team. It was important for officers to show restraint by holding the line together. Even though it may have resembled a military tactic, you usually will not see
SWAT coming down the street with a tank.
Interviewee #5 also mentioned that SWAT did create a subculture on the same lines that the military exhibited because of how much trust each officer has for one another. SWAT officers are always working out, training, and shooting with each other. This type of bond displays a heightened level of masculinity, which may bring about a sense of elitism within the group.
Interviewee # 4 and interviewee #5 also mentioned that you could see the resemblance of the military in today’s body armor. Interviewee #4 mentioned that the original color of their body armor and uniform was tan; however, later the department adopted the color black because many felt that it was a more intimidating color.
Interviewee #4 said that many officers in the beginning of their experience with SWAT said the armor was “cool” to wear. However, they realized that the body armor became an important tool for them to be safe when dealing with any high-risk criminal activity.
SWAT officers do not worry about how they look; they just want to ensure that everyone stays safe and alive.

Interviewee #5 informed the researcher that the style was reminiscent of what today’s military uses because it was both comfortable and versatile. Officers were
58 drawn to the uniforms that the SWAT officers wore because they were so drastically different from what they currently used. The uniforms definitely segregated the SWAT officers to show both the police officers and the public that were are the top dogs and you do not want us to come to your door. In a sense it gave them a sense of pride and power.
17) What type of innovations did SWAT teams bring to the law enforcement community?
All the interviewees responded that SWAT teams have been the largest contributors of innovations to the law enforcement community. Interviewees #2 and #5 could not stress more about how SWAT helped improve the training standards for police officers.
SWAT continues to be at the forefront of tactical innovation. Not only are they trying to ensure that they stay safe when conducting high-risk warrant searches, but they are also trying to find ways to keep their fellow officers safe as well.
All the interviewees informed the researcher that body armor and advanced weaponry was another big innovation for law enforcement officers. Interviewee #3 explained that prior to SWAT police officers did not have any protection. However, once SWAT began and officers were using body armor when storming buildings they saw the need for police officers to have body armor as well. Eventually, bulletproof vests were produced and it has become a standard that all officers wear them when they are out in the field.

All interviewees responded that the weaponry has greatly increased because of
SWAT. Interviewee #1 points out the use and development of silent weaponry as a
59 means to surprise your target. Interviewee #4 points out that SWAT has been at the forefront of non-lethal weaponry with most notably the invention of the flash bang which can stun your enemy giving your SWAT team enough time to get in the building and apprehend any suspects. Also the continued use of high-powered bean-bag guns to which incapacitate, but not kill an individual. Interviewee #1 also pointed out the use of chemical deterrents to stun and incapacitate suspects.
Interviewee #2 and interviewee #3 also informed the researcher that SWAT provided a sense of camaraderie within the department because in many cases officers looked at SWAT and said if they can be that physically fit and well trained; they can do that as well. The ethic of hard work and discipline definitely flowed from the SWAT team down to the other officers.
18) How has the role of SWAT teams evolved since their implementation?
All the interviewees mentioned that the role of SWAT no longer was a group of specially trained individuals to deal with hostage rescues, barricaded subjects and riots.
All across America SWAT teams are now conducting high-risk search warrants on criminals. They continue to be at the forefront of innovation for many police departments across the United States. Interviewee #5 informed the researcher that their role would continue to change with the times.

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19) What will be the role of SWAT teams in the future? Do you believe that SWAT teams will be a viable tool in the future for police departments?
All the interviewees informed the researcher that SWAT teams will continue to be a viable tool in the future. Interviewee #3 mentioned that SWAT teams are here and they are here to stay. They have become such an integral part of law enforcement.
Interviewee #1 and interview #4 mentioned that they could see that the role of SWAT teams will not just be at localized level, but even regional teams will be something of the future.
Interviewee #4 felt with the proliferation of terrorism and the chance that something can happen again on U.S. soil keeps police managers and officers on their toes in major cities. The use and training of regional teams will help benefit police departments that may not have the ability to handle a situation by themselves.
Interviewee #1 also explained that SWAT continues to find advancements in weaponry, armor, helmets, and facial protection. Currently, officers have no facial protection; however, with the advancement in the field of upper armor, it could virtually keep the officer safe.
20) Is there anything that you would like to add that will assist in providing a great understanding for this thesis that involves SWAT that was not asked in the above questions?
Interviewee #3 mentioned that transparency is the most important tool to keep both the public and media on your side. Show the numbers to the community and media.
The less transparent you are the more scrutiny you will receive. Debriefings are a very

61 important tool that SWAT uses to help change procedures in a positive way. Physical training will continue to be a priority in order to keep the officers healthy, but also to be ready for incidents that we hope will never happen in any one’s lifetime. Always keep and continue good rapport with the media.
Interviewee #5 let the researcher know that SWAT needs to continue to work on team planning and operational planning in order to reduce the possibility of injury or death. Always try to find a way to deescalate a situation before having to use force.
After reviewing all the interviewee’s responses to the questions that the researcher presented in the interview, all five interviewees had consensuses on most of the responses. The interview questions acted as a guideline for the interview process. It appears that the questions provided valuable data to help answer the research questions.
Chapter 5 will provide further data analysis and discussion of these findings. This discussion will determine if the two hypotheses presented by the researcher are true or not. Suggestions of further research will be discussed as well.

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Chapter 5
Discussion and Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to examine the validity of Kraska et al.’s theory that SWAT teams expanded across the United States because they embodied a militaristic entity that gave an impression of an elite status symbol. The purpose of this study was also to help identify complex internal and external forces that may have played a role in the expansion of SWAT teams across the United States. By examining these internal and external forces, the researcher may be able to utilize the growth complex theory and/or social contagion theory to help understand why SWAT teams expanded across the United States.
The researcher used a qualitative method of in-depth interviewing to help answer the research questions that were proposed. The interviewer asked twenty questions of retired law enforcement officials that had knowledge of SWAT teams.
Hypothesis #1- The expansion of SWAT reflects a militarization of police culture that occurred in pursuit of status and image
Kraska et al. theorized that many police departments across the United States adopted SWAT teams because many displayed tactics, uniforms, and culture that represented that of the military. According to Kraska and Kappeler (1997), a military culture cultivated itself within police departments, which greatly influenced police departments to adopt SWAT teams as a means to apprehend criminals with a high degree of force and weaponry. At the same time, Kraska et al. cautioned that the

63 continued use of SWAT teams would grant police departments the authority to close down streets and patrol areas with tanks (Kraska & Kappeler, 1997).
The interviews that were conducted may indicate that Kraska was partially correct in emphasizing that a military culture was present in SWAT teams across the
United States. An important finding was that all five interviewees agreed that the role and culture of the military could have had an impact on the expansion of SWAT teams across the United States. In addition, many veterans of the military when returning from the Vietnam and Korean War went into police work. The interviewees noted that these veterans could have brought that culture of being a “tough” person and the status of “elitism” into the department, which then transferred over to SWAT teams when they were being implemented. In addition, the interviewees mentioned how popular SWAT teams were within their departments and out in the public.
Kraska and Kappeler (1997) state that many police departments use SWAT teams because of their highly aggressive tactics, many centering on a paramilitary approach with the use of force. However, the interviewees mentioned that SWAT differed from their military counterparts in that they emphasized on avoiding the use of force and their weapons at all times.
Because of the training and tactics that are involved are both difficult and dangerous, a high degree of trust is required from all team members. Kraska (1997) explains that this high-degree of trust actually separated SWAT officers from both the general police and public. Kraska and Kappeler (1997) and the interviewees both mention that many SWAT officers would be involved in extra-curricular activities

64 together because this was the only group they knew and trusted. Kraska (1997) believes that this directly reflects what many military personnel go through when engaging in field training and battle. The socialization created by stress and interdependence during these experiences becomes an impediment to reintegrating in civilian life.
Kraska and Kappeler (1997), point out that “battle dress uniform” reflected a militaristic style that many SWAT officers found to be attractive because individuals may have felt a sense of honor. A few of the interviewees did support this idea. The uniforms and weapons definitely set the officers apart from other police officers. An interviewee mentioned that wearing the uniform gave the officer both a sense of pride and power.
However, a key finding was that the advancement of body armor and weapons were also a byproduct of having to deal with more violent and aggressive individuals than previously. According to the interviewees the federal government and military may had assisted in providing those weapons and armor at the time because funding was so greatly limited. An interviewee also mentioned that many SWAT teams choose the style of uniform because it provided both comfort and it had the necessary means to carry all their tools.
The results from Question 6 indicate that SWAT teams used a top-down organizational structure in which they have a specific chain of command. This is also evident in the organizational structure of the military as well (Kraska, 1994).

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Hypothesis #2 – Alternative explanations exist that provide equally viable explanations for the growth of SWAT in the United States
The researcher anticipated that through the course of the interviews that additional information would indicate other possible explanations for the expansion of
SWAT in the United States. The interviews did support the conclusion that multiple influences contributed to SWAT adoption and expansion. The original mission of
SWAT teams was the rescue of hostages and the apprehension of dangerous criminals.
However, over time SWAT officers began to issue and serve high-risk warrants on dangerous suspects. The interviewees all stated that the ability of SWAT to accomplish high-risk entries without any injuries or deaths of either suspects or police contributed as being one of the primary factors in the expansion of SWAT teams in the United
States.
All interviewees attributed management as a primary influence in the expansion of SWAT teams in the United States. Management saw SWAT teams as an essential component to their police department. It was essential in a pragmatic sense because they needed a team that could accomplish dangerous tasks, but also many managers adopted SWAT teams simply because other departments were doing this as well. This example is parallel to how clothing styles and recent fads in food trucks have become so popular in today’s culture (Berger, 2013; Vizzard, 2009).
All the interviewees mentioned that the public and media had favorable views on SWAT teams and that SWAT operations received extensive TV coverage, providing police managers with a strong incentive to adopt SWAT. The interviewees also

66 expressed that SWAT gave many officers the opportunity to promote within their police department.
The interviews revealed that SWAT proved instrumental in providing better training, tactical procedures, weapons and body armor to police officers. The interviewees mentioned that SWAT is at the forefront when it comes to new technology for police departments. SWAT teams across the United States get together in yearly competitions to both show their skills, but also to find ways to do their job better. The training standards and professionalism has increased because of SWAT.
Implications for Theory Building
This study offers support for growth complex theory as a partial explanation for the spread of SWAT. Kraska and Kappeler (1997), point out that the rate of violent crime continued to decrease in the 1980s and 1990s; however, SWAT teams continued to expand in police departments all across the United States. The growth complex theoretical orientation states that a “bureaucracy’s most basic instinct is to survive and grow” (Kraska, 2004, p.177). Stillman (2005) defines a bureaucracy as formal structural elements of a type of human organization. When examining both the literature and data that were collected from the interviewees it can be explained that in order for SWAT teams to continue to be relevant and grow they had to find additional means to further increase their size and power.
Another theory that may explain the expansion of SWAT teams is the theory known as social contagion. Berger (2013) proposes that social contagion is the spread of ideas, products or behaviors that diffuse through a population. These ideas or fads

will typically start with a small set of individuals or organization and then spread
67 throughout the population. The six principles that formulate a contagious idea or innovation is social currency (the relation of visible symbols of status), triggers
(environmental stimuli), emotion, public (making innovations observable and creating a lasting effect on the individuals that are exposed to the idea or innovation), practical value, and stories (Berger, 2013).
After analyzing the data from the interviewees, it appears that all six principles apply to SWAT expansion. Social currency relates to SWAT’s uniforms and weaponry.
The triggers (environmental stimuli) relates to the type of incident or operation that they may be conducting. Emotion relates directly to crime. Crime is very personal and can be emotionally devastating to anyone that maybe involved. The public relates to the media and the exposure that SWAT teams receive when an incident occurs. The practical value is that SWAT teams apprehend criminals and decrease the necessity for death. Lastly, stories relate to all the successful operations that SWAT teams perform in their department. Once all these triggers are in place it may just be a matter of time for the idea or innovation to catch on and then more and more individuals follow that idea or innovation and that innovation for this example would be SWAT.
Implications for Research
Additional research in regards to the expansion of SWAT teams in the United
States is necessary. SWAT teams have become the most popular policing unit in the
United States. The data in this study was limited to five retired law enforcement professionals. It is unclear if the data would vary if the researcher interviewed

68 individuals from different departments across the United States. However, it would be important to continue this study to see if other retired law enforcement officials had the same opinion.
Little research has been conducted on SWAT teams and their rapid expansion in the United States. Kraska and Kappeler (1997) state that researchers and academics have focused all their attention on community based policing and less on other phenomena especially pertaining to SWAT. Further analysis should be conducted to determine if there were other internal or external factors that may have contributed to expansion of SWAT teams.
Concluding Remarks
It was expected that the reflection of a militarizing police culture in the pursuit of status and image might have been a factor in the expansion of SWAT teams in the
United States. After conducting interviews with five retired law enforcement professionals it appeared that the militarization of police forces may have had a contributing factor, but it was not the sole reason. It appears through both research and interviews that other pragmatic situations caused the expansion of SWAT teams in the
United States. Not only were there internal and external factors that caused an expansion of SWAT, but two different theories (social contagion and growth complex theory) were presented to show an underlying causation for SWAT teams to expand.
This study also shows the potential risk that researchers may run into when invoking a single paradigm phenomenon when there can be multiple explanations for why something may have occurred. It can present a danger that observers may narrow

69 their focus on a subject. Even though there was strong support for the first hypothesis, other themes emerged from the interviews that show a need for additional research.
This study was only able to provide five interviews; however, by expanding the sample it would provide greater reliability and potentially more insight into the process.

Appendices
70

71
Appendix A
Consent to Participate in Research
Your are being asked to be a participate in research which will be conducted by Ryan
Opatz, a Graduate student in the Criminal Justice Department at the California State
University, Sacramento. The purpose of this study is to explore alternative explanations to why SWAT teams expanded across the United States. The study will cover the historical background of SWAT from its inception in 1969 to its current use. The answers you provide will serve as data for the researcher.
The interviewer will ask a series of questions. The interviewer will be asking openended questions. While responding to the questions; the interviewer will be taking notes. The interviewer may ask follow-up questions or may ask that you repeat an answer. The interviewee is free to provide as much information as they wish to disclose. The interview should take no more than 1-2 hours to complete.
The interview is completely safe and is not associated with any known health risks.
You may not personally benefit from participating in this research. However, providing relative information to this subject will help the researcher in exploring alternative explanations to why SWAT expanded across the United States.
Your answers will be kept on a secured flash drive that only my Thesis Chair, Second
Reader, Graduate Coordinator, and myself will have access to. The original research notes will be typed on an electronic document. Once they are translated to an electronic document they will be destroyed. Your answers will then be saved on a secured flash drive. It will be secured (locked) in a lock box that will be only accessible with a key.
The researcher will be the only one with the key. One the thesis is completed; your information will be held for one year (365 days) and then they will be permanently deleted from the flash drive. This consent form will be saved for three years. Once the three years has elapsed it will also be destroyed.
No compensation will be provided to you, but I do thank you for your valuable time in assisting in this research.
If you have any questions about this research, you may contact Ryan Opatz (researcher) at ###-###-#### or email ########@gmail.com. Or you may contact my Thesis Chair
Dr. Vizzard at ###-###-#### or email #######@csus.edu.
You may decline to participate in this study without any consequences. Your signature below indicates that you have read this page and agree to be a participant in the research.

72
Appendix B
Interview Questions
1) What agency/department did you work for while being involved in law enforcement and when?
2) When do you feel that SWAT became a more established entity within your department or agency?
3) Were you aware of other agencies adopting or considering a SWAT team?
4) If your department adopted a SWAT team was it considered to be: a.
Full-time SWAT team b.
Part-time SWAT team c.
Hybrid of both full-time and part-time police officers
5) If you had a SWAT team, did your agency have any influence in establishing
SWAT teams in other outlying agencies? a.
Did agencies ask for your assistance? b.
What assistance did you provide if your department or agency was asked for help?
6) If you had a SWAT team what was its organizational structure?
7) If your department had a SWAT team, who were the main supporters of a
SWAT team within your department?
8) Was there any opposition to have a SWAT team and why?
9) Has the SWAT mission evolved since its original inception? a.
If yes, what was its original use and how did they expand within your department?
10) What influencing factors allowed SWAT to continue to grow and thrive?
11) What external forces may have pushed SWAT to become a more established entity within the law enforcement community?
12) What internal forces may have pushed SWAT to become a more established entity within the law enforcement community?

73
13) What was the professional perception of SWAT while working at your police department or federal agency?
14) What was the public perception of SWAT while working at your police department or federal agency?
15) Did the police culture have an effect on how SWAT teams worked within a police department?
16) Did the role of the military or culture of the military have an impact on the expansion of SWAT teams across the United States?
17) What type of innovations did SWAT teams bring to the law enforcement community?
18) How has the role of SWAT teams evolved since their implementation?
19) What will be the role of SWAT teams in the future? Do you believe that they will still be a viable tool in the future for police departments?
20) Is there anything that you would like to add that will assist in providing a greater understanding for this research that involves SWAT that was not asked in the above questions?

74
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