Toni D. Cerna
PHIL 2300-042
December 6, 2012
Position Paper
Only Machines are Machines: Why Koko the Gorilla Should Have Rights
Introduction
In this paper, I will argue that Koko the gorilla should be granted access into the moral circle
because she is a sentient creature who is the subject of a life and is not inherently inferior to
humans. First, I will examine Singer's concept of sentience. Next, I will turn to Regan and his
"subject of a life" theory. Finally, I will counter Descartes' theory of animals as clever machines
based on his own criteria. I will then conclude, based on the frameworks of these theorists, that
Koko the gorilla should be morally included and given the same considerations as humans.
The Issue at Hand
Koko is a female lowland gorilla who was born in 1973 and raised at the San Francisco Zoo. At
the age of one, she began receiving instruction in American Sign Language from a graduate
student named Penny Patterson. After decades of communication with the now-Dr. Patterson,
Koko uses a vocabulary of more than 1,000 words to express her emotions, tell stories, and
create new words of her own (The Gorilla Foundation). In order to argue for Koko's access into
the moral circle, I will be examining her capacity for pain, her awareness of her life as valuable,
and her ability to reason.
Arguments for Animal Entry into the Moral Circle
Peter Singer argues that animals are sentient; therefore, they have the right to be considered
within the moral circle. Singer's argument follows this logical path:
If a being is capable of feeling pleasure and pain (sentient), then it has interests. If it has
interests, then it should have the right to have its interests taken into account in all situations.
Animals are capable of feeling pleasure and pain; therefore, they should have the right to have
their interests taken into account in all situations.
Singer's argument in favor of including all animals in the moral circle is best summarized by a
Jeremy Bentham quote that he references in making his argument, "The question is not, Can
they reason? nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer? (Singer p. 107)"
Tom Regan argues that moral rights stem from being subject of a life, which is true for both
humans and animals; therefore, animals should have moral rights just as humans do. Regan's
logical argument is structured as follows:
If human beings and animals are the subject of a life that is independently valuable to them,
then they have inherent value. If human beings and animals have inherent value, then they
have moral rights. Human beings and animals are the subjects of a life that is independently
valuable to them; therefore, they have moral rights.
"In other words, it is individuals who have inherent value who have moral rights, and it is
because they have value of this kind that they have a moral right not to be treated in ways that
deny their having this kind of value (Regan p. 115)."
Arguments against Animal Entry into the Moral Circle
René Descartes theorized that animals are no different from clever machines in comparison to
their equality with humans. His argument, while quite extensive, states essentially that men are
capable of reason, which makes them inherently special among living creatures. This difference
can be read as one of superiority: Descartes saw it as proof that animals were owed less
consideration than humans were in terms of morality.
This is the logical structure of Descartes' argument:
If men or animals can communicate pure thoughts, then they have thoughts. If they have
thoughts, then they are capable of reason. If men are capable of reason and animals are not,
then men are inherently superior to animals. If men are inherently superior to animals, then
they deserve rights while animals do not. Men do communicate pure thoughts; therefore, they
are capable of reason. Animals do not communicate pure thoughts; therefore, they are not
capable of reason. Men are capable of reason and animals are not, therefore men are
inherently superior to animals. Men are inherently superior to animals; therefore, they do
deserve rights while animals do not.
There are further premises included (some unstated) in Descartes' argument. All humans
communicate. Animals' lack of speech is not a problem of physical lack, since parrots can clearly
make speech noises. There is also the following sub-argument that I had trouble
comprehending: it is not possible that animals talk and we are unable to understand them,
since they "have many organs which are allied to our own, they could communicate their
thoughts to us just as easily as to those of their own race (Descartes, p. 15)."
In addition to Descartes' argument that animals do not communicate because they have no
thoughts, an objection could also be made that animals cannot communicate even in cases
where we have perceived communication. This counter-argument would state that any
indications of communication are actually the result of conditioning: animals learn to "talk"
based on training in which they earn treats for expressing the desired behavior, rather than
truly originating speech from their internal thoughts.
Theoretical Application to Koko the Gorilla
When judging whether Koko should be granted access into the moral circle and the rights of
consideration that follow, we must look at the three ways in which she could gain access. If she
is sentient, subject of a life, and not inherently inferior to humans, then based on the
frameworks of Singer, Regan and Descartes she should be given moral consideration.
Koko is capable of expressing pleasure or pain even without the use of sign language, as most
animals are. As a creature that feels pain and pleasure, she meets Singer's criteria for sentience
and thus moral inclusion. Koko is aware of her life as existing independently of what others
think of it, therefore she is the subject of a life according to Regan's criteria. This would also
include her in the moral circle.
Koko is capable of speech, including speech about concepts that lack strong emotion (for
example, wanting to have a baby). By Descartes' reasoning, that proves that Koko has thoughts.
According to his argument as stated earlier, having thoughts means having the ability to reason,
which is how humans merit their moral superiority. Thus, even according to Descartes'
argument against animal rights, Koko would be included with humans based on her ability to
reason.
Conclusion
All three theoretical frameworks can be strongly applied to the case of Koko and her
communication. The one unresolved counter-argument is the idea that instances of animal
"communication" are really responses to training. I see no way to dismiss fully this argument,
but I also do not feel that it invalidates my conclusion. Perhaps Koko has learned to combine
signs for the sake of reward, without really understanding them, and her human conversation
partners have interpreted meaning where none exists. However, I would argue that if Koko has
simply learned to use signs for reward gaining, that behavior pattern shows a capacity for
reason, which fulfills Descartes' criteria. After all, if Koko is able to use signs in ways that
humans interpret as thoughtful language without understanding them herself, she must be able
to learn and therefore think, albeit about how to manipulate humans rather than communicate
with them. This would still count as reasoning capability using Descartes' logic.
Because Koko is a sentient being who is the subject of a life, and she does not lack any capacity
that humans possess that makes her inherently inferior, she should be included in the moral
circle and granted the moral consideration that humans receive. How such consideration could
be practically applied and what Koko's inclusion means for other gorillas are questions beyond
the scope of this paper. However, recognizing Koko as an equal part of the moral circle is an
important place to begin.
Works Cited
Descartes, René. "Animals Are Machines." In Environmental Ethics: Divergence and
Convergence. Eds. S. J. Armstrong and R. G. Botzler. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993. p. 15.
Web. 6 Dec. 2012.
The Gorilla Foundation. Koko.org. The Gorilla Foundation, 2012. Web. 6 Dec. 2012.
Regan, Tom. "Animal Rights, Human Wrongs." Environmental Ethics 1980: p. 115. Web. 6 Dec.
2012.
Singer, Peter. "All Animals Are Equal." Philosophic Exchange 1974: p. 107. Web. 6 Dec. 2012.