[Fuyuki, Professor of Sociology at York University, “Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of
Prevention and the Work of Foresight.” 2004, Constellations, Vol. 11, No. 4]
Independently of this room for maneuver and the chances of success
. Humanitarian, environmental, and technoscientific activists have convincingly shown that we cannot afford not to engage in preventive labor. contractualist justification, global civil society actors are putting forth a number of arguments countering temporal myopia on rational grounds. They make the case that no generation, and no part of the world, is immune from catastrophe
. Complacency and parochialism are deeply flawed in that even if we earn a temporary reprieve, our children and grandchildren will likely not be so fortunate unless steps are taken today. Similarly, though it might be possible to minimize or contain the risks and harms of actions to faraway places over the short-term, parrying the eventual blowback or spillover effect is improbable. In fact, as I argued in the previous section, all but the smallest and most isolated of crises are rapidly becoming globalized
due to the existence of transnational circuits of ideas, images, people, and commodities.
Regardless of where they live, our descendants will increasingly be subjected to the impact of environmental degradation, the spread of epidemics, gross North-South socioeconomic inequalities, refugee flows, civil wars, and genocides
. What may have previously appeared to be temporally and spatially remote risks are ‘coming home to roost’ in ever faster cycles. In a word, then, procrastination
makes little sense for three principal reasons: it exponentially raises the costs of eventual future action; it reduces preventive options; and it erodes their effectiveness.
With the foreclosing of long-range alternatives, later generations may be left with a single course of action, namely, that of merely reacting to large-scale emergencies as they arise. We need only think of how it gradually becomes more difficult to control climate change, let alone reverse it, or to halt mass atrocities once they are underway
.
Preventive foresight is grounded in the
opposite logic, whereby the decision to work through perils today greatly enhances both the subsequent
Moreover, I would contend that farsighted cosmopolitanism is not
as remote or idealistic
a prospect as it appears to some, for as Falk writes,
“[g]lobal justice
between temporal communities, however, actually seems to be increasing, as evidenced by various expressions of greater sensitivity to
past injustices and future dangers
.”36 Global civil society may well be helping a new generational self-conception take root, according to which we view ourselves as the provisional caretakers of our planetary commons.
Out of our sense of responsibility for the well-being of those who will follow us, we come to be more concerned about the here and now.

Paul
, associate professor and director of the Global Environmental Policy Program at
American University, Winter
, Dissent, online: http://www.dissentmagazine.org/menutest/archives/2003/wi03/wapner.htm
All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions-except one. Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and non-
existence. As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings we ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. We can't ascribe meaning to that which
doesn't appear. What doesn't exist can manifest no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But we need not doubt the simple idea that a prerequisite of expression is existence.
This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world-in all its diverse embodiments-must
be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation. Postmodernists reject the idea of a universal good. They rightly acknowledge the difficulty of identifying a common value given the multiple contexts
of our value-producing activity. In fact, if there is one thing they vehemently scorn, it is the idea that there can be a value that stands above the individual contexts of human experience.
Such a value would present itself as a metanarrative and, as Jean-François Lyotard has explained, postmodernism is characterized fundamentally by its "incredulity toward metanarratives." Nonetheless, I can't see how postmodern critics can do otherwise than accept the
value of preserving the nonhuman world. The nonhuman is the extreme "other"; it stands in
contradistinction to humans as a species. In understanding the constructed quality of human
experience and the dangers of reification, postmodernism inherently advances an ethic of
respecting the "other." At the very least, respect must involve ensuring that the "other" actually continues to exist. In our day and age, this requires us to take responsibility for protecting the actuality of the nonhuman. Instead, however, we are running roughshod over
the earth's diversity of plants, animals, and ecosystems. Postmodern critics should find this particularly disturbing. If they don't, they deny their own intellectual insights and compromise their fundamental moral commitment.
[Hallvard, Faculty of Philosophy Cambridge University, “Consequentialism and global ethics.”
Forthcoming in M. Boylan, Ed., Global Morality and Justice: A Reader, Westview Press, Online, http://www.phil.cam.ac.uk/teaching_staff/lillehammer/Consequentialism_and_Global_Ethics-1-
2.pdf
] /Wyo-MB
Contemporary discussions of consequentialism and global ethics have been marked by a focus on examples such as that of the shallow pond. In this literature, distinctions are drawn and analogies made between different cases about which both the

consequentialist and his or her interlocutor are assumed to have a more or less firm view. One assumption in this literature is that progress can be made by making judgements about simple actual or counterfactual examples, and then employing a principle of equity to the effect that like cases be treated alike, in order to work out what to think about more complex actual cases. It is only fair to say that in practice such attempts to rely only on judgements about simple cases have a tendency to produce trenchant standoffs. It is important to remember, therefore, that for some consequentialists the appeal to simple cases is neither the only, nor the most basic, ground for their criticism of the ethical status quo.
For
some of the historically most prominent consequentialists the
evidential status of judgements
about simple cases depends on their derivability from basic ethical principles
(plus knowledge of the relevant facts). Thus, in The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidgwick argues that ethical thought is grounded in a small number of self-evident axioms of practical reason.
The first of these is that we ought to promote our own good
.
The second is that the good of any one individual is objectively of no more importance than the good of any other ( or, in Sidgwick’s notorious metaphor, no individual’s good is more important ‘from the point of view of the Universe’ than that of any other). The third is that we ought to treat like cases alike. Taken together
, Sidgwick takes these axioms
to imply a form of consequentialism
.
We ought to promote our own good. Yet since our own good is objectively no more important than the good of anyone else, we ought to promote the good of others as well. And in order to treat like cases alike, we have to weigh our own good against the good of others impartially, all other things being equal.
iv It follows that the rightness of our actions is fixed by what is best for the entire universe of ethically relevant beings.
To claim otherwise is to claim for oneself and one’s preferences a special status they do not possess
.
When understood along these lines, consequentialism is by definition a global ethics: the good of everyone should count for everyone, no matter their identity, location, or personal and social attachments, now or hereafter
. v Some version of this view is also accepted by a number of contemporary consequentialists, including Peter Singer, who writes that it is ‘preferable to proceed as Sidgwick did: search for undeniable fundamental axioms, [and] build up a moral theory from them’ (Singer 1974, 517; Singer 1981). For these philosophers the question of our ethical duties to others is not only a matter of our responses to cases like the shallow pond. It is also a matter of whether these responses cohere with an ethics based on first principles. If you are to reject the consequentialist challenge, therefore, you will have to show what is wrong with those principles.

[Stephen Eric, Professor Poli Sci, Comp Lit, German Studies @ Rutgers, Reclaiming the
Enlightenment: Toward a Politics of Radical Engagement, p159-160]
Solidarity with the outcast and the dissident, with those whose voices are denied, is the most
radical product of the Enlightenment.
Its joy in experimentation and its emphasis on expanding the range of individual choices provided liberty with content
. Reason in its two prime variants was employed to this critical end: scientific rationality contested traditional prejudices and religious claims to truth while speculative rationality crystallized the purposive ends that science might serve. Insisting upon the need for “absolute” foundations in order to avoid relativism and “chaos,” or embracing relativism and chaos due to the lack of an absolute, has nothing to do with the
Enlightenment: it cannot escape from the religious universe. Such thinking ignores the practical element within knowledge.
Much has been written about the need for a “new science” no longer defined by instrumental rationality and incapable of reifying the world. But
these new undertakings always seem to ignore the need for criteria of verification
or falsification; science without such criteria is, however, no science at all.
Contempt for
“instrumental” scientific rationality, moreover, undermines the possibility of meaningful dialogue between the humanities and the sciences. And that is a matter of crucial importance: popular debates are now taking place on issues ranging from the eco-system to cloning, the assumptions of western medicine to the possibilities of acupuncture, using animals for experiments to state support for space travel. This shows ethical progress, again perhaps not in the sense that people have become more “moral,” but surely in the sense that more questions of everyday life have become open to moral debate.
Science has not eroded ethics. T he
Frankfurt School misjudged the impact of science from the beginning. It is still the case that science plays a crucial role in subverting religious authority— consider only the battle between evolutionists and the Christian coalition— and fostering political equality by enabling each to judge the veracity of truth claims.
There is also nothing exaggerated in the claim that “the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century was perhaps the single greatest influence on the development of the idea that political resistance is a legitimate act.”6 Critics of the
Enlightenment may have correctly emphasized the price of progress, the costs of alienation
and reification, and the dangers posed by technology and scientific expertise for nature and a democratic society. Even so
, this does not justify romantic attempts to roll back technology. They conflate far too easily with ideological justifications for rolling back the interventionist state
and progressive legislation for cleaning up the environment.
Such a stance also pits the Enlightenment against environmentalism: technology, instrumental rationality, and progress are often seen as inimical to preserving the planet.
Nevertheless, this is to misconstrue the problem.
Technology is crucial for dealing with the ecological devastation brought about by modernity. A redirection of technology will undoubtedly have to take place: but seeking to confront the decay of the environment without it is like using an umbrella to defend against a hurricane. Institutional action informed by instrumental
rationality and guided by scientific specialists is unavoidable.
Investigations are necessary into the ways government can influence ecologically sound production, provide subsidies or tax-benefits for particular industries, fund particular forms of knowledge creation, and make “risks” a matter of public debate. It is completely correct to note that: “neither controversial social issues nor cultural concerns can be settled simply by scientific fiat, particularly in a world where experts usually disagree and where science can be compromised by institutional sponsors. No laboratory can dictate what industrial practices are tolerable or what degree of industrialization is permissible. These questions transcend the crude categories of technical criteria and slide-rule measurements.”7 Enlightenment thinking is not intrinsically committed to treating nature as an object for technical manipulation.
But, if it were, the need would exist for a philosophical corrective. This would treat nature as a subject in its own right or, better, with pressing needs that underpin our own as a species. Revising narrow definitions of “evidence” will prove necessary to bring that about and it will prove necessary to revise existing standards of accountability for dealing with conditions in which human interaction with nature is be- coming ever more specialized, bureaucratic, and complex. In theoretical terms, it may even be necessary to move a step further.

[Michael, Professor of Political and Environmental Science at Allegheny College, Confronting
Consumption, “Individualization: plant a tree, buy a bike, save the world.” Pg. 43-66. Published by The MIT press] /Wyo-MB
For the lack of a better term, call this response the individualization of responsibility. When responsibility for environmental problems is individualized, there is little room to ponder institutions, the nature and exercise of political power, or ways of collectively changing the
distribution of power and influence in society— to, in other words, ‘‘think institutionally,’’ as
UC Berkeley sociologist Robert Bellah says. 4 Instead, the serious work of confronting the
threatening socioenvironmental processes that The Lorax so ably illuminates falls to
individuals, acting alone, usually as consumers. We are individualizing responsibility when we agonize over the ‘‘paper-or-plastic’’ choice at the checkout counter, knowing somehow that
neither is right given larger institutions and social structures. We think aloud with the neighbor over the back fence about whether we should buy the new Honda or Toyota hybrid-engine automobile now or wait a few years until they work the kinks out. What we really wish for, though, is clean, efficient, and effective public transportation of the sort we read about in science fiction novels when we were young— but we cannot vote for it with our consumer dollars since, for reasons rooted in power and politics, it is not for sale. So we ponder the
‘‘energy stickers’’ on the ultraefficient appliances at Sears, we diligently compost our kitchen waste, we try to ignore the high initial cost and buy a few compact-fluorescent lightbulbs. We read spirited reports in the New York Times Magazine on the pros and cons of recycling while sipping our coffee, 5 carefully study the merits of this and that environmental group so as to properly decide on the destination of our small annual donation, and meticulously sort our recyclables. And now an increasing number of us are confronted by opportunistic greenpower providers who urge us to ‘‘save the planet’’ by buying their ‘‘green electricity’’—while doing little to actually increase the quantity of electricity generated from renewable resources.
(CARL BOGGS – Professor and Ph.D. Political Science, National University, Los
Angeles -- Theory and Society 26: 741-780)
The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizing impulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacity of individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens,
urgent problems
that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved
-- perhaps even unrecognized -- only to fester more ominously into the future. And such problems ( ecological crisis, poverty, urban
decay, spread of infectious cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context
diseases, technological displacement of workers) of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically, the widespread
retreat from politics
, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time
when agendas that ignore or side-step these
global
realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence.
In his commentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics, as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life of common involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions.74 In the meantime,
The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of
anti-politics becomes more compelling and even

fashionable in the U nited
S tates, it is the vagaries of
political power
that
will continue to
.
This last point demands further elaboration.
The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that social hierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military
structures will lose their hold over people's lives. Far from it: the space abdicated by a broad citizenry,
well-informed and ready to participate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary
elites
-- an already familiar dynamic in many lesser- developed countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not very far removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a part of the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in the face of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more virulent guise -- or it might help further rationalize
the
existing power structure.
In either case
, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collec- tive interests that had vanished from civil society.75

[Michael, Professor of Political and Environmental Science at Allegheny College, Confronting
Consumption, “Individualization: plant a tree, buy a bike, save the world.” Pg. 43-66. Published by The MIT press] /Wyo-MB
The same dynamic now permeates mainstream discussions of global environmental ills. Pratap
Chatterjee and Matthias Finger, seasoned observers of global environmental politics, highlight the rise of a ‘‘New Age Environmentalism’’ that fixes responsibility on all of us equally and, in the process, cloaks important dimensions of power and culpability. 30 They point, for example, to international meetings like the 1992 Earth Summit that cultivate a power-obscuring language of ‘‘all of us needing to work to together to solve global problems.’’ In the same vein, academics like Gustavo Esteva and Suri Prakash lament how the slogan ‘‘think globally, act locally’’ has been shaped by global environmentalism to support a consumer-driven, privatized response to transboundary environmental ills. In practice, thinking globally and acting locally means feeling bad and guilty about far-off and megaenvironmental destruction, and then traveling down to the corner store to find a ‘‘green’’ product whose purchase will somehow empower
somebody, somewhere, to do good. 31 Mainstream conversations about global sustainability advance the ‘‘international conference’’ as the most meaningful venue for global
environmental problem solving. It is here that those interests best able to organize at the international level— states and transnational corporations— hold the advantage in the battle
to shape the conversation of sustainability and craft the rules of the game. And it is precisely these actors who benefit by moving mass publics toward private, individual, well-intentioned consumer choice as the vehicle for achieving ‘‘sustainability.’’ It is more than coincidental that as our collective perception of environmental problems has become more global, our prevailing way of framing environmental problem solving has become more individualized. In the end, individualizing responsibility does not work— you cannot plant a tree to save the world— and as citizens and consumers slowly come to discover this fact their cynicism about social change
will only grow: ‘‘You mean after 15 years of washing out these crummy jars and recycling them, environmental problems are still getting worse— geesh, what’s the use?’’ Individualization, by implying that any action beyond the private and the consumptive is irrelevant, insulates people from the empowering experiences and political lessons of collective struggle for social
change and reinforces corrosive myths about the difficulties of public life. 32 By legitimating notions of consumer sovereignty and a self-balancing and autonomous market (with a wellinformed ‘‘hidden hand’’), it also diverts attention from political arenas that matter. In this way, individualization is both a symptom and a source of waning citizen capacities to
participate meaningfully in processes of social change. If consumption, in all its complexity, is to be confronted, the forces that systematically individualize responsibility for environmental
degradation must be challenged.

, Reader in Political Theory at the University of Southampton (David, “Reorienting
International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, http://mil.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/31/3/653)
Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like
“epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR
theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its
dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of
ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or
epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these
philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one
kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a
theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls
for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because

general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since
‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for socialscientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy
easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular
image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the
Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical
approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers,
and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

[Michelle, “Reality, Language, Translation: What Makes Translation Possible?” American
Translators Association Conference, enlightenment.supersaturated.com/essays/text/michelleframcohen//possibilityoftranslation.ht
ml, 9-24-06//uwyo-ajl]
Nida did not provide the philosophical basis of the view that the external world is the common source of all languages. Such a basis can be found in the philosophy of Objectivism, originated by Ayn Rand. Objectivism, as its name implies, upholds the objectivity of reality. This means that reality is independent of consciousness, consciousness being the means of perceiving
?reality, not of creating it. Rand defines language as "a code of visual-auditory symbols that
denote concepts." (15) These symbols are the written or spoken words of any language.
Concepts are defined as the "mental integration of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing characteristic(s), with their particular measurements omitted." (16) This means that concepts are abstractions of units perceived in reality. Since words denote concepts, words are the symbols of such abstractions; words are the means of representing concepts in
a language. Since reality provides the data from which we abstract and form concepts, reality
is the source of all words--and of all languages. The very existence of translation demonstrates this fact. If there was no objective reality, there could be no similar concepts expressed in
different verbal symbols. There could be no similarity between the content of different languages, and so, no translation. Translation is the transfer of conceptual knowledge from one language into another. It is the transfer of one set of symbols denoting concepts into another set of symbols denoting the same concepts. This process is possible because concepts have
specific referents in reality. Even if a certain word and the concept it designates exist in one language but not in another, the referent this word and concept stand for nevertheless exists in
reality, and can be referred to in translation by a descriptive phrase or neologism. Language is a
means describing reality, and as such can and should expand to include newly discovered or innovated objects in reality. The revival of the ancient Hebrew language in the late 19th Century demonstrated the dependence of language on outward reality. Those who wanted to use
Hebrew had to innovate an enormous number of words in order to describe the new objects that did not confront the ancient Hebrew speakers. On the other hand, those objects that existed 2000 years ago could be referred to by the same words. Ancient Hebrew could not by itself provide a sufficient image of modern reality for modern users.
Jill
, Speech prof @ CMU,
, Southern Comm. Journal, Spring, v. 60, Iss. 3,
“Other Ways”, p pq
The postmodern passwords of "polyvocality," "Otherness," and "difference," unsupported by
substantial analysis of the concrete contexts of subjects, creates a solipsistic quagmire. The political sympathies of the new cultural critics, with their ostensible concern for the lack of power experienced by marginalized people, aligns them with the political left. Yet, despite their adversarial posture and talk of opposition, their discourses on intertextuality and inter-

referentiality isolate them from and ignore the conditions that have produced leftist politics--
conflict, racism, poverty, and injustice. In short, as Clarke (1991) asserts, postmodern emphasis on new subjects conceals the old subjects, those who have limited access to good jobs, food, housing, health care, and transportation, as well as to the media that depict them. Merod
(1987) decries this situation as one which leaves no vision, will, or commitment to activism. He notes that academic lip service to the oppositional is underscored by the absence of focused collective or politically active intellectual communities. Provoked by the academic manifestations of this problem Di Leonardo (1990) echoes Merod and laments: Has there ever been a historical era characterized by as little radical analysis or activism and as much radicalchic writing as ours? Maundering on about Otherness: phallocentrism or Eurocentric tropes has become a lazy academic substitute for actual engagement with the detailed histories and
contemporary realities of Western racial minorities, white women, or any Third World population. (p. 530) Clarke's assessment of the postmodern elevation of language to the "sine
qua non" of critical discussion is an even stronger indictment against the trend. Clarke examines Lyotard's (1984) The Postmodern Condition in which Lyotard maintains that virtually all social relations are linguistic, and, therefore, it is through the coercion that threatens speech that we enter the "realm of terror" and society falls apart. To this assertion, Clarke replies: I can think of few more striking indicators of the political and intellectual impoverishment of a view of society that can only recognize the discursive. If the worst terror we can envisage is the threat not to be allowed to speak, we are appallingly ignorant of terror in its elaborate
contemporary forms. It may be the intellectual's conception of terror (what else do we do but speak?), but its projection onto the rest of the world would be calamitous....(pp. 2-27) The realm of the discursive is derived from the requisites for human life, which are in the physical
world, rather than in a world of ideas or symbols.(4) Nutrition, shelter, and protection are basic human needs that require collective activity for their fulfillment. Postmodern emphasis on the discursive without an accompanying analysis of how the discursive emerges from material circumstances hides the complex task of envisioning and working towards concrete social
goals (Merod, 1987). Although the material conditions that create the situation of marginality escape the purview of the postmodernist, the situation and its consequences are not overlooked by scholars from marginalized groups. Robinson (1990) for example, argues that "the justice
that working people deserve is economic, not just textual" (p. 571). Lopez (1992) states that
"the starting point for organizing the program content of education or political action must be
the present existential, concrete situation" (p. 299). West (1988) asserts that borrowing French post-structuralist discourses about "Otherness" blinds us to realities of American difference going on in front of us (p. 170). Unlike postmodern "textual radicals" who Rabinow (1986) acknowledges are "fuzzy about power and the realities of socioeconomic constraints" (p. 255), most writers from marginalized groups are clear about how discourse interweaves with the concrete circumstances that create lived experience. People whose lives form the material for postmodern counter-hegemonic discourse do not share the optimism over the new recognition of their discursive subjectivities, because such an acknowledgment does not address sufficiently their collective historical and current struggles against racism, sexism, homophobia, and economic injustice. They do not appreciate being told they are living in a world in which there are no more real subjects. Ideas have consequences. Emphasizing the discursive self when a person is hungry and homeless represents both a cultural and humane failure. The need to look beyond texts to the perception and attainment of concrete social goals keeps writers from marginalized groups ever-mindful of the specifics of how power
works through political agendas, institutions, agencies, and the budgets that fuel them.

Fred
, CPA and MBA, Staff writer for Renew America, 3-22-
, “American innovation and the culture war: A golden age of American innovation,” http://www.renewamerica.us/columns/hutchison/040322
Reductionist ideas reduce (hu)man(s) to a simplistic caricature. When man looks in the mirror and sees something less than what is there, it has a depressing effect on his spirit and his mind.
Deterministic ideas are the most powerfully compressing of the reductionist ideas. When man believes he is but a cog in a great machine, he feels crushed in a brutal and inhuman wine press.
The most pitiless and repressive states are based on deterministic ideas — such as the Soviet regime under Stalin. When man is told that he is not created according to a design but was haphazardly evolved he is reduced to a subhuman status — an animal of no designed species but a beast-monstrosity of accidental origins. In some ways this is worse than being a cog in a machine. At least a cog has a design and an understandable purpose as an integral part of the great machine. Determinism is based upon the inflation of the principle of causation.
Causation can be decisively established only for extremely simplified situations . In modern science, an experiment must be reduced to its simplest essentials before proof of causation is possible. But human nature and society is exceedingly complicated and contradictory.
Reductionism in the pursuit of proof of causation is illusive because human nature is
irreducibly complex. This goes through my mind whenever I hear a liberal speak of "root causes." The illusion that we can ferret out the root causes indicates a liberal who has never read the classics — and is profoundly ignorant about human nature. Our history of trying to
manipulate root causes through social programs is a discouraging one — filled with the
surprises of unintended consequences. Three Fatal Determinisms The three fatal determinisms of our age are economic determinism, cultural determinism, and biological determinism.
Economic determinism is the belief that what we are and what we do is shaped by economic forces. This is an extremely radical reductionism if ever there was one. All the incredibly complicated things that combine in mysterious synergies to make up human nature are all to be explained by one single cause — economics. If ever their was a myth grounded in false confidence and the radical ignorance of tunnel vision — this is it. When liberals speak of the
"root causes" of social problems, they typically are borrowing ideas from economic determinism. Root cause arguments obscure rather than enlighten. The poor are not responsible for their poverty because of root causes — we are told. Criminals are not responsible for crime because of root causes. Terrorists are not responsible for murder because of root causes. Such thinking rules out the idea of human conscience, and moral responsibility.
When the belief in root causes relieves us of responsibility for our actions it also weakens the
belief in the existence of free will. Nothing will destroy a golden age of innovation faster than
a paralysis of the will. If we doubt we have a will because of a belief in the myth of root causes, the will becomes either paralyzed or undisciplined. We become ether zombies or maniacs — and return to adolescence.
(Greg, Professor of Political Science at Salisbury State University “What Causes war?: An introduction to theories of international conflict” pg. 9)

Two warnings need to be issued at this point. First, while we have been using a single variable explanation of war merely for the sake of simplicity, multivariate explanations of war are likely to be much more powerful . Since social and political behaviors are extremely complex, they are almost never explainable through a single factor. Decades of research have led most analysts to reject monocausal explanations of war . For instance, international relations theorist J. David Singer suggests that we ought to move away from the concept of “ causality” since it has become associated with the search for a single cause of war; we should instead redirect our activities toward discovering “explanations”—a term that implies multiple causes of war , but also a certain element of randomness or chance in their occurrence.
[Professor of International Relations at American University, 2001 (Joshua S., War and Gender:
How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa, pp.411-412) ]
First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace.
Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, “if you want peace, work for justice”.
Then if one believes that sexism contributes to war, one can work for gender justice specifically
(perhaps among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way.
War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influences wars’ outbreaks and outcomes
. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices. So, “if you want peace, work for peace.” Indeed, if you want justice (gener and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes toward war and the military may be the most important way to “reverse women’s oppression/” The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book’s evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.

– Prof Philosophy @ U South Carolina (Darryl, Studies in International Relations,
“International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism”, pg. 2)
While Hoffmann might well be correct, these days one can neither begin nor conclude empirical research without first discussing epistemological orientations and ontological assumptions. Like a vortex, metatheory has engulfed us all and the question of "theory" which
was once used as a guide to research is now the object of research. Indeed, for a discipline whose purview is ostensibly outward looldng and international in scope, and at a time of ever encroaching globalization and transnationalism, International Relations has become
increasingly provincial and inward looking. Rather than grapple with the numerous issues that
confront peoples around the world, since the early 1980s the discipline has tended more and more toward obsessive self-examination.3 These days the politics of famine, environmental
degradation, underdevelopment, or ethnic cleansing, let alone the cartographic machinations in Eastern Europe and the reconfiguration of the geo-global political-economy, seem scarcely to concern theorists of international politics who define the urgent task of our time to be one of
metaphysical reflection and epistemological investigation. Arguably, theory is no longer concerned with the study of international relations so much as the "manner in which international relations as a discipline, and international relations as a subject matter, have
been constructed."4 To be concerned with the latter is to be "on the cutting edge," where novelty has itself become "an appropriate form of scholarship."5
– Prof Philosophy @ U South Carolina (Darryl, Studies in International Relations,
“International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism”, pg. 16-17)
There are,
of course, problems with ontologically derived forms of theory
. Postmodernists naturally dismiss this conception of theory and are not entirely wrong for doing so.
Realism is not above criticism
, and structural-realism even more so.58 But then again, neither is postmodernism
! But this is not the point. I am not here attempting to defend realism against postmodernism or to dismiss postmodernism entirely from the purview of International Relations. Rather, what I am attempting to
do is defend the institution of theory against postmodernism which
, in its more virulent forms, aims at its deconstruction and obliteratio n. So too am I attempting to defend
the ontological aspect of theory against those who would engage exclusively in epistemological debate
. For there to be theory in
International Relations, ontological description must be the first order of things; without first defining the domain of international politics, identifying those entities and things we wish to explain and understand, epistemological debate would be altogether pointless.
Save for this, the discipline threatens to transpose itself into philosophy and not
International Relations, to be condemned to perpetual metaphysical reflection but without reference to the social world we are attempting to understand
. Of course, this does not exonerate us from previous mistakes. International Relations, largely because of the dominance of positivism in the discipline, has, in the past, been apt to ontological description in the absence of epistemological reflection. Practitioners in the discipline have rarely seen a need to question the epistemological basis of their scholarship as Thomas Biersteker forcefully acknowledged.59 Yet, as he also reminds us, developing theory and generating knowledge requires judicious use of both ontological description and epistemological explanation. These are not mutually exclusive dimensions of theoretical discourse, but the elemental ingredients necessary to the construction of discourse itself. The exclusive focus upon one dimension to the detriment of the other probably explains why,
according to William Kreml and Charles Kegley, "
International relations research today . . . has failed to reach agreement about several fundamental issues .
.. (1) the central questions to be asked, (2) the basic units of analysis (e.g., states or nonstate actors), (3) the levels of analysis at which various questions should be explored, (4) the methods by which hypotheses should be tested and unwarranted inferences prevented, (5) the criteria by which theoretical progress is to be

judged, and (6) how inquiry should be organized in order to generate the knowledge that will lead to international peace, prosperity, and justice."60 ^

(Andrew, Senior Writer for the Ayn Rand Institute and Ph.D. in Philosophy, “The Nobel Peace
Prize Should Go to Those Who Really Support Peace”, October 11, http://www.aynrand.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5453 )
If one admires men who cause war, one will ignore or vilify men who promote peace. Those who respect and support individual rights and political/economic freedom are the only true
lovers of peace. Private capitalists and businessmen are outstanding examples. Business requires the barring of the initiation of force. Businessmen deal with one another peacefully, by means of trade, persuasion and voluntary contracts and agreements. Because businessmen respect the rights of all individuals, they have helped liberate the best minds to innovate, invent and advance, and thereby helped produce great general prosperity and peace. By helping to
spread free trade across the globe, they have created peaceful relations among the individuals of many nations. Yet perversely, capitalists are denounced as exploiters of man. If we sincerely
seek to attain the inestimable value that is world peace, it is individual rights and therefore capitalism that we must endorse. Capitalism is the only political-economic system that
protects individual rights by banning the initiation of force. As Ayn Rand observed, it was capitalism that gave mankind its longest period of peace--an era in which there were no wars involving the entire civilized world--from the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 to the outbreak of World War I in 1914. If we truly want to recognize and promote the cause of peace, let us award a peace prize to Capitalism.
John Blundell, director general of the Institute for Economic Affairs, 2004 (“Mission to Mars must go private to succeed,” February 2, http://www.iea.org.uk/record.jsp?type=news&ID=166)
What we need is capitalists in space. Capitalism needs property rights, enforcement of
contracts and the rule of law. The ideological tussle does not cease once we are beyond the ionosphere. With the exception of Arthur C Clarke, none of us imagined the entertainment
potential from satellites. Geostationary lumps of electronic gadgetry beam us our BSkyB television pictures. I remain in awe that Rupert Murdoch can place a device in the skies above
Brazil that sends a signal to every home in each hemisphere. Who could have foreseen that mobile phones could keep us chattering without any wiring, or that global position techniques could plot where we all are to within a metre? These are business applications. Business is already in space. Markets detect and apply opportunities that are not envisaged by even the
most accomplished technicians. I’m not saying Murdoch has special competences. I imagine he is as baffled by digital miracles as I am. The point is that companies define and refine what public bodies cannot achieve. Lift the veil of course and all those satellite firms are an intricate
web of experts supplying ideas and services. We have an infant space market. What use will the Moon be? Is there value on Mars other than the TV rights? The answer is nobody can know.
We can only make some guesses. The Spanish ships that set off for the US thought they would get to India. The Portuguese knew they’d reach China. The English followed them westwards seeking gold. In fact, they got tobacco. Events always confound expectations. The arguments for

putting men on Mars are expressly vague from President Bush. Perhaps he was really bidding for votes. From my reading the best results may be medical. Zero, or low, gravity techniques may allow therapies of which we are ignorant. It seems facetious to suggest tourism may be a big
part of space opportunity but as both the North and South poles are over-populated and there is a queue at the top of Mount Everest, a trip to the Sea of Tranquility may prove a magnet for the wealthy. Instead of NASA’s grotesque bureaucracy it may be Thomas Cook will be a greater force for exploration. NASA could be a procurement body. It need not design and run all space ventures. It could sub-contract far more extensively. Without specialised engineering expertise it is not easy to criticise projects such as the shuttle. It seems to be excessively costly and far too fragile. There are private space entrepreneurs already. They are tiddlers up against the mighty
NASA. Yet Dan Goldin, the NASA leader, says he favours the privatisation of space: "We can’t afford to do solar system exploration until we turn these activities over to the cutting edge
private sector..."Some may say that commercialising portions of NASA’s functions is heresy.
Others may think we are taking a path that will ruin the wonders of space. I believe that when
NASA can creatively partner, all of humankind will reap the benefits of access to open space". Is it possible the Moon has a more noble future than merely a branch office of NASA? Is it tolerable that Mars could be a subsidiary of the USA? Could it be nominally a further state of the union? These are not silly questions. In time space will be defined by lawyers and accountants as property rights will need to be deliberated. One possibility may be that both environments are so hostile that Mars and the Moon will never be more than token pockets for humanity. On the evidence so far it is the orbiting satellites that have made us see the Earth through new eyes. We can survey and explore the planet better from 200 miles up than stomping on the surface. The emerging commercial body of space law is derived from telecommunications law. It is perplexing and contrary to our immediate senses. How can you own or exchange something as intangible as digital messages bouncing off satellites? Yet we all pay our mobile phone bills.
Many of the business results of space exploration are unintended consequences of NASA’s early adventures. Computer development would probably have been slower but for the need for instrumentation for Apollo. Are there prospects for Scottish firms in space? The prizes will not go to only the mega corporations. Perhaps Dobbies, the Edinburgh garden centre group, can create new roses by placing pots beyond gravity. Edinburgh University laboratories, or rather their commercial spin offs, could patent new medicines. Is it possible the genetic magicians at the Bush could hitch a ride into space and extend their discoveries? NASA is a monopolist. All monopolies are bad for business. They only stunt opportunities. They blunt alternatives. By opening space to entrepreneurship we will be starting on what FA Hayek memorably describes as "a discovery procedure". Science is an open system. So is capitalism.
(Joseph, Director of the Space and Advanced Communications Research institute at George
Washington University and Executive Director of the Arthur C. Clarke Foundation,
“COMMENTARY: Why Space? The Top 10 Reasons”, September 23, http://www.space.com/news/commentary_top10_030912.html)
Actually the lack of a space program could get us all killed. I dont mean you or me or my wife or children. I mean that Homo sapiens as a species are actually endangered. Surprising to some, a
well conceived space program may well be our only hope for long-term survival. The right or wrong decisions about space research and exploration may be key to the futures of our grandchildren or great-grandchildren or those that follow. Arthur C. Clarke, the author and

screenplay writer for 2001: A Space Odyssey, put the issue rather starkly some years back when he said: The dinosaurs are not around today because they did not have a space program. He was, of course, referring to the fact that we now know a quite largish meteor crashed into the
earth, released poisonous Iridium chemicals into our atmosphere and created a killer cloud above the Earth that blocked out the sun for a prolonged period of time. This could have
been foreseen and averted with a sufficiently advanced space program. But this is only one example of how space programs, such as NASAs Spaceguard program, help protect our fragile planet. Without a space program we would not know about the large ozone hole in our
atmosphere, the hazards of solar radiation, the path of killer hurricanes or many other
environmental dangers. But this is only a fraction of the ways that space programs are crucial to our future. He Continues… Protection against catastrophic planetary accidents: It is easy to assume that an erratic meteor or comet will not bring destruction to the Earth because the probabilities are low. The truth is we are bombarded from space daily. The dangers are greatest not from a cataclysmic collision, but from not knowing enough about solar storms, cosmic radiation and the ozone layer. An enhanced Spaceguard Program is actually a prudent course that could save our species in time.