Reflections on the
Humanitarian
Response to
Cyclone Pam
ACMC Civil Society
Roundtable
24 June 2015
Outline
• Disaster Risk in the Pacific
• Community-based DRR
• Civil Society Response
• National Coordination
• International Response
• Recommendations
Disaster Risk in the Pacific
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One of the most vulnerable regions in
the world: high exposure to disasters +
low capacity to manage risk.
Particularly exposed to tropical
cyclones, which are likely to become
more intense, bring with them heavier
rains and cause more extensive
flooding.
PICs face a disproportionate share of
disaster-related economic loss. Of the
20 countries with the highest average
annual disaster losses relative to GDP in
the world, eight are in the Pacific.
Average annual disaster loss = 80% of
social expenditure in Vanuatu, 59% in
Tonga and 43% in Fiji.
A 1-in-100 year disaster event could cost
143% of annual GDP in Niue, 63% in
Tonga, 52% in Micronesia and 50% in
Vanuatu.
Community preparedness:
Pre-disaster
Pre-Disaster:
• Established and functioning Community
Disaster Committees (CDCs)
• Disaster simulations
• Identifying safe houses and traditional
practices
Pastor Silas Nilwo displays some of the taro
that survived Cyclone Pam. He planted it after
CARE ran a session on food preservation and
disaster resilient crops.
CDC members with a Cyclone Tracking Map - 2014
Community preparedness: during disaster
‘Even though Cyclone Pam was much stronger than
previous cyclones, this time there were no deaths
and no serious injuries … [without the trainings]
people would have stayed in houses that fell down,
plenty of trees would have fallen on houses if we
hadn’t cut them, people would have been scattered
and running everywhere instead of inside safe
houses.’
Martha Yahwo, Assistant CDC Coordinator, points out where
the CDC helped people cross the river to safety during
Cyclone Pam.
During disaster
• Established and functioning
CDCs
• Identified safe houses,
organised evacuation, cut
down trees close to
buildings, stored water in
jerry cans.
• Strengthened houses,
stored food/water,
identified safe houses
Community preparedness:
after disaster
CDCs:
• Assess data,
collated and deliver
to DM authorities
• Monitor and
support community
recovery efforts
• Promote women’s
leadership
“Sometimes people see me as just a girl…but now,
they listen to me”: CDC member Sabrina Yaviong
shows off her new kitchen garden, planted after the
cylcone.
Community preparedness:
Communities not supported to prepare for
disasters
• “A few people did things to
prepare, like strengthening
their houses and putting nails
in the roof, but most of the
things were written off when
the cyclone came. We didn’t
prepare for the size of the
cyclone.”
• No functioning CDCCCs
• Majority of houses not built to
withstand disasters: 81% of
houses damaged
• Majority of households
building back same as before
Civil Society Response
Legal and regulatory framework for disaster management
National structures for humanitarian coordination
Vanuatu Humanitarian Team
• Recognised in the Cyclone Support Plan &
NDMO SOPs, and MOU between NDMO
and VHT
• Regarded as model for humanitarian
coordination in the Pacific
Clusters
• Government leadership, VHT-member coleads
• Roles and responsibilities described in
National Cyclone Support Plan and
NDMOs SOPs
• Not the PHT clusters
But never tested in a large-scale disaster
• Structural issues
• Awareness regarding national structures
International response: Too Many Cooks?
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100+ new NGOs, many new, limited understanding of existing
structures/processes
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Significant coordination challenge:
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“The problem is that many NGOs came and just … went straight to the field, and we’d
receive reports of some people receiving tarps, and others not. … You need to know who’s
in your own backyard, so you don’t waste time and money on areas where people are
already working.”
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“Coordination got progressively more difficult the further you got from day zero. At the start,
… it was just existing actors, with their existing relationships. Once surge capacity came in,
complications increased exponentially.”
Mercy Corps example:
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“Following several days examining the situation and context, our analysis indicated our
immediate role was not required … it is evident that the Vanuatu government is in control of
the situation and taking full advantage of international support, in particular the UN, bi-lateral
donors, militaries and a number of well-established NGOs”
International tools and services for humanitarian
response
International tools & services for humanitarian response
UNDAC
• Got things going
• Only one team available from the
Pacific; mostly from other parts of the
world, little experience of
Pacific/Vanuatu
• Minimal knowledge of existing
coordination structures
• No prior agreement between
UNDAC/VHT/NDMO
Humanitarian Action Plan
• Formally govt-approved, but generally
described as OCHA led:
• “It’s an automatic thing. It’s the second
phase of the Flash Appeal. It was
presented as a process that had to be,
‘now it’s time to do the HAP’. It wasn’t
debated.”
• Limited understanding amongst existing
actors of HAP, incl fact that govt could not
be included in HAP:
• “The disability desk had developed a
project … we had to tell them you can’t
have govt agencies in there, and then we
called around NGOs saying ‘someone
needs to put these guys under them’.”
• National NGOs had to be approved by
Geneva, not feasible
• Time-consuming
International response: military assets
• Huge military response: land, air &
sea assets from six countries
(Aust, French, NZ, Sols, Tonga &
Fiji)
• Critical logistics support when no
alternative available
• Query whether assets were the
right ones? limited by weather
conditions
• Coordination and communications
with NGOs during response
• Appropriate prioritisation of
incoming goods?
• Need for better civmil
preparedness planning
International Response: cultural issues
“I never spoke in a meeting
when the cluster lead was
“When international staff
present. If I wanted to say
came in, taking dominant
something, I’d write a note and
standpoints and speaking
pass it to the [ministry
over the top of senior
representative] so that he
government authorities, it
could say it”.
didn’t go down well.”
“It’s a positive thing to
have organisations that
work for the ministry,
“If she’d respected the
and speak for the
authorities, they would
ministry”.
“I’ve never felt so have respected her back.
People are used to just
disrespected in my
coming in and doing
life.”
whatever they want”.
International Response: cultural issues
“I never felt
comfortable talking in
a cluster meeting,
because it was all
experts”
“The UN
doesn’t like
to be
second.”
“There’s hardly a Ni-Van representative there.
The culture was completely foreign – early morning
starts, loud, militarised, everyone there with their
wanker jackets and badges, high pressure,
completely different from the way anyone operates
here, it would have been a very difficult thing for a
Ni-Van to walk into that room”
“I will never forget walking into the EOC for the first time …
I walked into a room that was overflowing with white faces,
the only Pacific person in the room was the Fijian SPC rep, the
tension in the room was tangible and everything about it just
felt wrong. The NDMO Ni-Van staff were all sitting in the
office across the corridor. There was no way I wanted
to sit in that room.’”
Summing Up
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First stage of response saw significant achievements:
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Emergency food rations distributed in all affected areas
>21,000 received safe drinking water
>26,000 people benefited from repair of water supply systems
67,500 received tarpaulins
>55,000 people received tool kits to rebuild their homes
Temporary learning spaces provided so that children could return to school
But issues related to the inter-operability of national/international actors
Lots of rhetoric about the need to localise the humanitarian response and
better orient international systems to support national governments.
National systems were in place, but we struggled to step back and not have
things done our way.
Why?
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Humanitarian imperative
International humanitarian systems not designed to fit within national structures
The scale of the response did overwhelm national absorptive capacities (why weren’t
national structures better prepared?)
Recommendations
Supporting national governments
Improving the international response
Promote understanding amongst national
actors of the international tools and
services available to assist with disaster
response.
IASC & PHT: review international and
regional humanitarian rules, templates,
checklists, guidelines and terms of
reference and remove default assumption
that international systems will be used,
with the UN in the lead.
Support national governments to
strengthen and promote understanding of
their national disaster laws and policies in
order to ensure better facilitation of
international humanitarian assistance.
Support national governments to promote
understanding amongst international
responders of their disaster response
laws, policies, systems and structures.
Step up efforts to support national
governments to manage international
humanitarian assistance.
Get much better at understanding
contexts, respecting cultural mores and
utilising in-country experience and local
knowledge.