New
Plan Text
The United States Federal Government should substantially curtail its bulk collection
of domestic phone, internet, email, and-or associated electronic records.
Contention One
Contention One – the Status Quo fails, and the Aff solves.
The new Freedom Act fails. Pen register, super-minimization, and SST standards from
the original draft of the Freedom Act would solve.
Greene ‘15
(et al; David Greene, Senior Staff Attorney and Civil Liberties Director for the Electronic Frontier Foundation. David is also an
adjunct professor at the University of San Francisco School of Law, where he teaches classes in First Amendment and media law
and an instructor in the journalism department at San Francisco State University. David has significant experience litigating First
Amendment issues in state and federal trial and appellate courts and is one of the country's leading advocates for and
commentators on freedom of expression in the arts. “ACLU v. Clapper and the Congress: How The Second Circuit’s Decision
Affects the Legislative Landscape” - Electronic Frontier Foundation - May 11, 2015 https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/05/aclu-v-clapper-and-congress-how-second-circuits-decision-affects-legislative)
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in ACLU v. Clapper has determined that the NSA’s telephone records program went far beyond
what Congress authorized when it passed Section 215 of the Patriot Act in 2001. The court unequivocally rejected the government’s secret
reinterpretation of Section 215. Among many important findings, the court found that Section 215’s authorization of the collection of business
records that are “relevant to an authorized investigation” could not be read to include the dragnet collection of telephone records. The court
also took issue with the fact that this strained application of the law was accomplished in secret and approved by the secret and one-sided
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA Court). EFF filed amicus briefs in this case in both the district and circuit courts, and we
congratulate our colleagues at the ACLU on this significant victory. The Second Circuit’s opinion stands as a clear sign that the courts are ready
to step in and rule that mass surveillance is illegal. That’s great news. The
Second Circuit’s decision, however, also marks a
significant change in the context of the ongoing legislative debate in Congress. Above all, it is clear that Congress
must do more to rein in dragnet surveillance by the NSA. Clean Reauthorization First, the Second Circuit’s
opinion should stop the idea of a "clean reauthorization" (a reauthorization with no reforms) of Section 215,
which is set to expire June 1. Last month, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and Senate Intelligence Chair Richard Burr
introduced S. 1035, a bill that would extend the current language of Section 215 through 2020, thereby continuing the mass spying rubberstamped by the FISA Court. The morning of the Second Circuit decision, both Senators took to the Senate floor to vehemently defend the bulk
collection program and push for a clean reauthorization. But a clean reauthorization is much more complicated now. Congress can’t pretend
that the Second Circuit's narrow reading of “relevant to an authorized investigation” doesn’t exist. It’s likely that if Congress merely does a
“clean” reauthorization of Section 215, then the district court in ACLU v. Clapper will enjoin the government from using Section 215 as
authorization for the call records dragnet, because the district court is bound by the Second Circuit decision. However, if a reauthorization
made it clear that Congress intended to reject the Second Circuit’s narrow reading of the law, it could cause further confusion and the
government could argue that Congress has fully embraced the dragnet. We’re encouraging people to call Congress and tell their lawmakers to
reject Senator McConnell's clean reauthorization in order to avoid the risk that Congress might reject the Second Circuit’s decision The
USA
Freedom Act Must Be Strengthened In light of the Second Circuit’s decision, EFF asks Congress to strengthen its
proposed reform of Section 215, the USA Freedom Act. Pending those improvements, EFF is withdrawing our support of the bill.
We’re urging Congress to roll the draft back to the stronger and meaningful reforms included in the
2013 version of USA Freedom and affirmatively embrace the Second Circuit’s opinion on the limits of Section 215. Most importantly,
the Second Circuit’s correct interpretation of the law should be expressly embraced by Congress in order to avoid any
confusion going forward about what the key terms in the statute mean, especially the terms “relevant” and “investigation.” This
recognition could be in the bill itself or, less preferably, in legislative history. The House Judiciary Committee has already included such language
in its report to the full House of Representatives, but now the Senate must include the language in the bill or in its own legislative history. This
easy task will make sure that the law is not read as rejecting the Second Circuit’s reading and will help ensure
that the USA
Freedom Act actually accomplishes its goal of ending bulk collection. The House Report on USA Freedom, issued
today, takes a step forward by stating that: Congress’ decision to leave in place the ‘‘relevance’’ standard for Section 501 orders should not be
construed as Congress’ intent to ratify the FISA Court’s interpretation of that term. These changes restore meaningful limits to the ‘‘relevance’’
requirement of Section 501, consistent with the opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in ACLU v. Clapper. Ensuring that the
Senate doesn't move away from the legislative history should be a top priority as the bill moves forward. But that’s the bare minimum Congress
must do. The Second Circuit, and especially Judge Sack’s concurrence, noted a lack of both transparency and a true adversary in the FISA Court.
The 2014 and 2013 USA Freedom Act had stronger FISA Court reforms, particularly around the creation of a special advocate who would argue
against the government in the FISA Court. The Second Circuit’s opinion also emphasizes that typical subpoenas seek only records of "suspects
under investigation, or of people or businesses that have contact with such subjects." Under the current USA Freedom Act, the government can
collect records of a "second hop,"—the numbers, and associated metadata, that have been in contact with the numbers collected initially—
without any additional authorization. The bill should be changed so that the government must file another application for any further records it
wants to collect. Automatically obtaining a "second hop" is unacceptable because it sweeps in too many people’s records. The
current USA
Freedom Act is also out-of-sync with the court’s narrow view of permissible collection of records because it
lacks a rigorous definition of the "specific selection term" the government can use to identify the
records it wants to collect. This can be addressed by two changes: (1) drawing upon last year's definition in
the USA Freedom Act; and, (2) closing down potential loopholes like the definition of "address" or the use of a "person" to include a
corporate person. Restoring Important Parts of 2013’s USA Freedom Act This is also an opportunity and a new
context for Congress to address the shortcomings of the newly introduced USA Freedom Act that we previously wrote
about. Congress should put back key provisions that were dropped along the way as well as remove those that were
introduced at the behest of the intelligence community. First, the "super minimization" procedures, which were key
privacy procedures that mandated the deletion of any information obtained about a person not
connected to the investigation, should be reintroduced. Key provisions establishing a higher legal
standard and compliance assessment for the use of pen register/trap-and-trace devices, legal standing to sue the
government over surveillance practices, and the original transparency provisions allowing government and corporate disclosure of surveillance
orders should
also be resuscitated.
Democracy Advantage
Contention 2 is Democracy
Surveillance undermines the perceived viability of democracy
The Economist 13 - (“America against democracy,” http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2013/07/secret-government 7/9/2013)
STRYKER
REVELATIONS in the wake of Edward Snowden's civil disobedience continue to roll in. The New York Times reports that the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Court,
also known as the FISA court, "has quietly become almost a parallel Supreme Court, serving as the ultimate arbiter on surveillance issues and delivering opinions
that will most likely shape intelligence practices for years to come..." How is the FISA court like a shadow Supreme Court? Its interpretation of the constitution is
treated by the federal government as law. The Times reports: In one of the court’s most important decisions, the judges have expanded the use in terrorism cases of
a legal principle known as the “special needs” doctrine and carved out an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of a warrant for searches and seizures,
the officials said. Of course, there are important differences. None of the judges of the FISA court were vetted by Congress. They were appointed by a single
unelected official: John Roberts, the chief justice of the Supreme Court. And then there's the fact that "the FISA court hears from only one side in the case—the
government—and its findings are almost never made public." A court that is supreme, in the sense of having the final say, but where arguments are only ever
submitted on behalf of the government, and whose judges are not subject to the approval of a democratic body, sounds a lot like the sort of thing authoritarian
governments set up when they make a half-hearted attempt to create the appearance of the rule of law. According to the Times, Geoffrey Stone, a law professor at
the University of Chicago, "said he was troubled by the idea that the court is creating a significant body of law without hearing from anyone outside the
government, forgoing the adversarial system that is a staple of the American justice system." I'm troubled, too. Meanwhile, the Wall Street Journal adds some meat
to the story by reporting that "The National Security Agency’s ability to gather phone data on millions of Americans hinges on the secret redefinition of the word
'relevant'". In classified orders starting in the mid-2000s, the court accepted that "relevant" could be broadened to permit an entire database of records on millions
of people, in contrast to a more conservative interpretation widely applied in criminal cases, in which only some of those records would likely be allowed, according
to people familiar with the ruling."Relevant" has long been a broad standard, but the way the court is interpreting it, to mean, in effect, "everything," is new, says
Mark Eckenwiler, a senior counsel at Perkins Coie LLP who, until December, was the Justice Department's primary authority on federal criminal surveillance
law.[...]Two senators on the Intelligence Committee, Ron Wyden (D., Ore.) and Mark Udall (D., Colo.), have argued repeatedly that there was a "secret
interpretation" of the Patriot Act. The senators' offices tell the Journal that this new interpretation of the word "relevant" is what they meant. Think about that.
Doesn't that suggest to you that Messrs Wyden and Udall were afraid they might be subject to some sort of censure or reprisal were they to share with the public
specific details about the official interpretation of the law to which the public is subject? And those specific details were about the interpretation of "relevant"? Now
that that cat's out of the bag, I guess we're in danger? All this somehow got me thinking of the doctrine of "democracy promotion", which was developed under
George W. Bush and maintained more or less by Barack Obama. The doctrine is generally presented as half-idealism, half-practicality. That all the people of the
Earth, by dint of common humanity, are entitled to the protections of democracy is an inspiring principle. However, its foreign-policy implications are not really so
clear. To those of us who are sceptical that America has the authority to intervene whenever and wherever there are thwarted democratic rights, the advocates of
democracy-promotion offer a more businesslike proposition. It is said that authoritarianism, especially theocratic Islamic authoritarianism, breeds anti-American
terrorism, and that swamp-draining democracy-promotion abroad is therefore a priority of American national security. If you don't wish to asphyxiate on poison gas
in a subway, or lose your legs to detonating pressure-cookers at a road-race, it is in your interest to support American interventions on behalf of democracy across
the globe. So the story goes. However, the unstated story goes, it is equally important that American democracy not get out of hand. If you don't want your flight to
La Guardia to end in a ball of fire, or your local federal building to be razed by a cataclysm of exploding fertiliser, you will need to countenance secret courts
applying in secret its own secret interpretation of hastily drawn, barely debated emergency security measures, and to persecute with the full force of the world's
dominant violent power any who dare afford a glimpse behind the veil. You see, democracy here at home must be balanced against the requirements of security,
and it is simply too dangerous to leave the question of this balance to the democratic public. Open deliberation over the appropriate balance would require saying
something concrete about threats to public safety, and also about the means by which those threats might be checked. But revealing such information would only
empower America's enemies and endanger American lives. Therefore, this is a discussion Americans can't afford to have. Therefore, the power to determine that
this is a discussion the public cannot afford to have cannot reside in the democratic public. That power must reside elsewhere, with the best and brightest, with
those who have surveyed the perils of the world and know what it takes to meet them. Those deep within the security apparatus, within the charmed circle, must
therefore make the decision, on America's behalf, about how much democracy—about how much discussion about the limits of democracy, even—it is safe for
Americans to have. This decision will not be effective, however, if it is openly questioned. The point is that is not up for debate. It is crucial, then, that any attempt
by those on the inside to reveal the real, secret rules governing American life be met with overwhelming, intimidating retaliation. In order to maintain a legitimising
democratic imprimatur, it is of course important that a handful of elected officials be brought into the anteroom of the inner council, but it's important that they
know barely more than that there is a significant risk that we will all perish if they, or the rest of us, know too much, and they must be made to feel that they dare
not publicly speak what little they have been allowed know. Even senators. Even senators must fear to describe America's laws to America's citizens. This is, yes,
democracy-suppression, but it is a vitally necessary arrangement. It keeps you and your adorable kids and even your cute pet dog alive. Now, I don't believe I've
heard anyone make this argument, no doubt because the logic of the argument cuts against it being made. Yet it seems similar reasoning must underpin the system
of secret government that has emerged from the examination of Mr Snowden's leaks, and I cannot help but suspect that something along these lines has become
the unspoken, unspeakable doctrine of Mr Obama's administration. Yet I remember when the Mr Obama announced this: My Administration is committed to
creating an unprecedented level of openness in Government. We will work together to ensure the public trust and establish a system of transparency, public
participation, and collaboration. Openness will strengthen our democracy and promote efficiency and effectiveness in Government. That would have been some
real democracy-promotion, right here in the homeland. What happened? Is it naive to think Mr Obama really believed this stuff? I'll admit, with some
embarrassment, that I'd thought he did believe it. But this "commitment" has been so thoroughly forsaken one is forced to consider whether it was ever sincere. It
has been so thoroughly forsaken one wonders whether to laugh or cry. What kind of message are we sending about the viability these democratic ideals—about
openness, transparency, public participation, public collaboration? How hollow must American exhortations to democracy sound to foreign ears? Mr Snowden may
be responsible for having exposed this hypocrisy, for having betrayed the thug omertà at the heart of America's domestic democracy-suppression programme, but
the hypocrisy is America's. I'd very much like to know what led Mr Obama to change his mind, to conclude that America is not after all safe for democracy, though I
know he's not about to tell us. The matter is settled. It has been decided, and not by us. We can't handle the truth.
The plan sends the signal of credibility on democracy—domestic surveillance is both
sufficient and necessary
Katulis 9 - Brian Katulis is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress who served on the State Department’s policy planning staff in the last years of
the Clinton administration after living and working on the ground for the National Democratic Institute in Egypt and the Palestinian territories. (“Democracy
Promotion in the Middle East and the Obama Administration,” https://www.tcf.org/assets/downloads/tcf-Katulis.pdf 2009) STRYKER
More broadly, the United States should take steps to restore habeas corpus and bring wiretap surveillance efforts back into the framework of the rule of law in the
United States. Sending the signal that the United States is cleaning up its act on these fronts is a necessary step for reviving U.S. credibility on democracy
promotion in the Middle East. Without some progress on these measures, anything else that the new administration tries to do on democracy promotion—whether
it is political party building or civil society support, or any of the other traditional programs in the U.S. toolbox—will likely yield few results because of the
substantial credibility gap. The new administration needs to send a clear message that the United States intends to practice what it preaches by adhering to the
legal obligations it assumed in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention against Torture, and other human rights treaties.
Strengthening the legal framework for rule of law will require not only action on the part of the Obama administration but also engagement by leaders in the U.S.
Congress. How the United States reintroduces itself to the world—keeping its national security policy in line with the highest human rights standards—will set the
framework for how U.S. actions on the democracy promotion front are perceived throughout the Middle East.
Only domestic policy changes can make democracy promotion effective
Al-Rodhan 14 - Nayef Al-Rodhan is director of the Centre for the Geopolitics of Globalization and Transnational Security at the Geneva Centre for
Security Policy. (“Reforming Democracy and the Future of History: To spread Democracy, democratic nations must look inward first.”
http://www.theglobalist.com/reforming-democracy-and-the-future-of-history/ 6/14/2014) STRYKER
In 1975, a report prepared by the Trilateral Commission, The Crisis of Democracy, signaled the pessimism and defeatism prevailing in Western democracies at the
time about the future and sustainability of democracy. The report reflected a deep economic downturn, as well as social and political turmoil. This crisis of
democracy was tightly connected with concerns about “monopoly capitalism,” rampant materialism and corruption. Four decades later, democracy is again in a
state of crisis. This comes as somewhat of a surprise, given that successive waves of democratization have touched every region of the world over the past 40 years.
What is becoming evident now is that an opposite trend has emerged. Democracy has in fact been in retreat for years, as many repressive governments became
even more repressive, civil liberties were dropped and the military was empowered in many countries. The state of democracy today In the early 1990’s, the end of
the Cold War had brought the revalidation of democracy with great vigour as the most representative form of government. Yet this exuberance has been
counterbalanced with criticism of its failings and shortcomings. Democracies guarantee political freedom, the rule of law, human rights and a platform for citizens to
engage in the political process. Yet, in practice, democracies feature numerous inadequacies. Inequality, economic disparity, disempowerment, lack of opportunity,
infringements of civil liberties, ethnic, social and cultural discrimination, corruption and opaque honor titles systems are all present, and apparently not antagonistic
to democracies. Globally, democracies have also acted in ways that suggest an outright renunciation of their principles at home. Irresponsible conduct, including
unwarranted invasions, toleration of brutality, genocide, misuse of the UN veto system at the expense of global harmony and peace, as well geopolitical
machinations or meddling in the affairs of weaker states — these are all traits that have characterized the foreign conduct of major democratic states at some point.
Inequality alienates Western democracies like the United States, United Kingdom or France — traditionally considered “advanced democracies” — experience
acute inequalities, and even cases of abject poverty. In 2009, a U.S. government report pointed to the dramatic increase in hunger and food insecurity. About 50
million people were identified as having suffered food insecurity at some point during the previous year. One in five people in the United Kingdom are also
identified as falling below the poverty line. Growing inequality is at times reinforced by, and an enabler of, shrinking opportunity. This fuels disillusionment and low
political participation. As Joseph Stiglitz has noted, “The rich don’t need to rely on government for parks or education or medical care or personal security — they
can buy all these things for themselves. In the process, they become more distant from ordinary people, losing whatever empathy they may once have had.”
Corporate financing of political campaigns have reinforced this, hijacking the democratic process. It further alienates voters who feel they are excluded from a
process that is beyond their control. The role of money in politics is worth singling out as a major problem with democratic governance. Its effects are truly
worrisome, especially when there is little transparency and regulatory mechanisms to limit the distorting role of money in politics. A check is worth a thousand
words The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in the “Citizens United” case openly enshrined the right of unlimited campaign spending, giving corporations,
associations and billionaire donors the freedom to heavily and undemocratically influence government, perversely as an expression of their free speech. The “super
PACs” have blurred the line between the personal and the political. They reinforce and perpetuate the rotation of policymakers in the U.S. Congress and the
executive branch, many of whom are already part of the wealthiest 1% (and, under any circumstance, remain kept in office by money from the top 1%). Whatever
constraints existed to this practice, they were expunged earlier in 2014 when the Supreme Court opened the door to even more money in politics by striking down
the aggregate contribution limits for campaigns. The decision means, in very practical terms, that one single donor can contribute millions of dollars to political
candidates or campaigns and thereby dim the prospect of new entrants, ideas or challengers to the political arena. Finally, the sense of disillusionment with
democracy in its current form has been reinforced with disclosures of large-scale government surveillance, violations of privacy and civil liberties. The claim of
sweeping authority over the right to collect personal data is harmful to core liberties. Overseeing the overseers and keeping states’ need to know in balance with
the safeguard of privacy and civil liberties remains a challenge. Reforming democracy Opinion polls across many continents reflect this current dissatisfaction with
democracy. These forms of disillusionment indicate the need to embrace a paradigm that goes beyond political freedom and addresses the basic human need for
dignity. Democracy guarantees political freedom and rights. Yet it is not incompatible with marginalization, exclusion, poverty, disempowerment or disrespect. The
triumph of a liberal democratic order as a final destination of history and historical ideas, as once predicted by the “end of history”, needs a serious re-evaluation. A
greater emphasis on human dignity and a governance model that places dignity at the center can halt the current disenchantment with democracy. A more
feasible paradigm is an approach I call Sustainable History. It focuses on dignity rather than just freedom. And it allows for reconciling accountable governance with
various political cultures.
African democracy is slipping—the US needs to alter DOMESTIC practices to beat out
authoritarianism
Joseph 14 - Richard Joseph is John Evans Professor of International History and Politics at Northwestern University. He is the author of Democracy and
Prebendal Politics in Nigeria (1987; reissued 2014). He is writing books on post-1975 Nigerian politics and society; and on governance, development, and the state in
Africa. (“Growth, Security, and Democracy in Africa,” Journal of Democracy, Volume 25, Number 4, pp. 60-72, Project Muse, October 2014) STRYKER
Today, as is often observed, democracy in many places must battle unfriendly circumstances while experiencing a global slippage. In line with this trend, democracy
in Africa has been on the retreat. As Freedom House has charted in its annual Freedom in the World reports, swings in civil-liberties and political-rights scores have
been more pronounced in sub-Saharan Africa than in any other world region. Two years ago, I noted that media accounts presented Africa’s story as a hopeful tale
accompanied by impressive economic-growth statistics. There has also been a disaster narrative of corruption, bogus elections, rights abuses, epidemics, and violent
conflicts. Readers have been left to resolve the antinomies.1 I suggested a third account called “prismatic” because, just as a [End Page 61] prism separates the
various colors that comprise a beam of light, this account explores the complex interplay of local, regional, and global factors that affect Africa.2 Security is now high
on the African agenda, and so are accelerated growth and development as well as democracy. Discoveries of major oil, natural gas, and coal deposits are making the
continent more significant in meeting global energy needs. Abundant and underused land will steadily contribute to global food supplies. And expanding economies
will continue to provide increased opportunities for investors. It is the physical-security side of the African ledger, however, that poses the greatest challenge, as
dramatized recently by violent insurgencies and disease outbreaks in West Africa. How this challenge is tackled will greatly affect progress in other spheres. The
“complex interplay” of forces in contemporary Africa is one that prevailing paradigms are unable to explain. The present reflections, like the ones I offered in these
pages almost a quarter-century ago regarding the original democratic abertura, are provisional.3 Now as then, events are moving swiftly and on a broad front. The
stalling of democratization globally is taking place amid other major developments, especially terrorism, warfare, and the rise of a phenomenon referred to as
authoritarian modernization. Authoritarian modernization is curious because, scarcely two decades ago, the very term would have seemed an oxymoron.
Commenting on the revolutions of 1989, Marc Plattner recently wrote that a “key reason for the resurgence of democracy undoubtedly lay in the increasingly
manifest failings of its autocratic rivals.”4 Today, that assessment is often reversed. The Western model of liberal-democratic development is losing ground to an
authoritarian alternative. John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge capture this trend and suggest that the liberal democracies need a “fourth revolution” in
governance and affairs of state (to follow the revolutions of state sovereignty, individual rights, and moderate welfarism) if they are to avoid falling permanently
behind their autocratic rivals. “A global race is on,” write these two British journalists, “to devise the best kind of state and the best system of government.” The
dysfunctions of liberal democracy can be contrasted, they contend, with “the impressive track records” of “modernizing authoritarianism pursued by Asian
countries such as Singapore and China.” The key concern is performance—namely, “which innovations in governing yield the best results.”5 Michael Ignatieff agrees
that “the liberal state is in crisis.” Authoritarian modernization now forms “an alternate route to modern development: growth without democracy and progress
It is “difficult to defend liberal democracy with
much enthusiasm abroad if it works so poorly at home.”7 Plattner is hopeful that the “apparent vigor”
without freedom.”6 Ignatieff’s conclusion is widely shared:
today of modernizing autocracy as compared to liberal democracy will “prove to be temporary.”8 David Brooks is not sure. He sees “an ideological war” being [End
Page 62] waged “between centralized authoritarian capitalism and decentralized liberal democratic capitalism.” This “battle of regimes is playing out with special
force in Africa.” While democracy is experiencing “a crisis of morale,” autocracies “are feeling confident and on the rise.”9
The US is key
Gyimah-Boadi 15 - E. Gyimah-Boadi is executive director of both the Ghana Center for Democratic Development and the Afrobarometer, and
professor of political science at the University of Ghana, Legon. (“Africa’s Waning Democratic Commitment,” Journal of Democracy, Volume 26, Number 1, p. 100111, Project Muse, January 2015) STRYKER
Finally, the illiberal acts of the United States and other Western democratic nations in the post-9/11 global “war on terror” have given Africa’s elected autocrats
easy justification for their own retreat from the principles and practices of democratic accountability. African political elites opportunistically cite U.S. actions such
as the rendition or waterboarding of suspected terrorists as examples to justify their own privileging of national-security interests over citizens’ rights. Similarly,
Africa’s elected autocrats are finding great comfort in the resurgence of authoritarian and illiberal role models provided by China, Iran, Russia, Venezuela, and
others.
African democracy is crucial to stability
Ohlson and Söderberg 2 - Thomas Ohlson is an Associate Professor at the Department of Peace and Conflict at Uppsala University. Mimmi
Söderberg is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Peace and Conflict at Uppsala University. (“From Intra-State War To Democratic Peace in Weak States,”
http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/18/18593_UPRP_No_5.pdf 2002) STRYKER
***2002 was the date of an earlier version of this article
To understand politics in the weak state context, Chabal and Daloz argue, one must consider the ways in which individuals, groups and communities seek to
instrumentals the resources that they command within the context of political and economic disorder. Disorder in many African states, for example, should not be
viewed merely as a state of failure or neglect, but should also be seen as a condition that offers opportunities for those who know how to play the system. The
failure of the state to be emancipated from society may have limited the scope for good government and sustainable economic growth, but the weakness and
inefficiency of the state has nevertheless been profitable to political elites and probably even more so to European and North American economic actors. The
clientelist networks within the formal political apparatus have allowed the elite to raise the resources necessary for providing their constituencies with protection
and services in exchange for the recognition of their political and social status. The instrumentalisation of the prevailing political disorder may thus function as a
disincentive to the establishment of a more properly institutionalised state on the Weberian model as well as to the implementation of a democratic political
system. “Why should the African political elites dismantle a political system which serves them so well?” (Chabal and Daloz 1999, p. 14). In our view, the important
merit of the above arguments is that they point to the highly negative potential of patrimonial structures. Undeniably, these structures pose problems for durable
peace, legitimacy and for addressing the so-called national question, that is, for the processes of state formation and nation-building. However, we caution against
seeing this as a zero-sum game: either the holders of state power pursue a genuine national interest in the Weberian sense or they completely succumb to the
structures of private, sectarian interests. Such is not the case. Rather, we argue that every state, weak or strong, has both Weberian and patrimonial structures.
This, too, is a continuum and the balance between the two types of structure 13 should be understood as a variable, not a constant. Neither enlightened leadership
nor popular pressure from below should be underestimated. Many weak states have made considerable moves towards greater legitimacy. In addition, when
legitimacy is really low, even minor improvements in degrees of rule of law and good governance may generate major improvements in terms of closing the
legitimacy gap.
African war goes nuclear
DEUTSCH 2002
(Jeffrey, Political Risk Consultant and Ph.D in Economics, The Rabid Tiger Newsletter, Vol 2, No 9, Nov 18, http://list.webengr.com/pipermail/picoipo/2002November/000208.html)
The Rabid Tiger Project believes that a nuclear war is most likely to start in Africa. Civil wars in the Congo (the country formerly known as Zaire), Rwanda, Somalia
and Sierra Leone, and domestic instability in Zimbabwe, Sudan and other countries, as well as occasional brushfire and other wars (thanks in part to "national"
borders that cut across tribal ones) turn into a really nasty stew. We've got all too many rabid tigers and potential rabid tigers, who are willing to push the button
rather than risk being seen as wishy-washy in the face of a mortal threat and overthrown. Geopolitically speaking, Africa is open range. Very few countries in Africa
are beholden to any particular power. South Africa is a major exception in this respect - not to mention in that she also probably already has the Bomb. Thus,
outside powers can more easily find client states there than, say, in Europe where the political lines have long since been drawn, or Asia where many of the
countries (China, India, Japan) are powers unto themselves and don't need any "help," thank you. Thus, an African war can attract outside involvement very quickly.
Of course, a proxy war alone may not induce the Great Powers to fight each other. But an African nuclear strike can ignite a much broader conflagration, if the other
powers are interested in a fight. Certainly, such a strike would in the first place have been facilitated by outside help - financial, scientific, engineering, etc. Africa is
an ocean of troubled waters, and some people love to go fishing.
Liberal democracy is good
Hobson, and Kurk 9/20/11 (Professor in International Relations Theory. BA University of Hull
MscEcon University of Wales, Aberystwyth PhD University of Wales/ Scholar of international political
theory Assistant Professor in the School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University.) “The
Conceptual Politics of Democracy Promotion” accessed online 7/8/15
https://books.google.com/books?id=seoAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA100&dq=Misunderstanding+the+maladies+of+liberal+democracy+promotion%E2
%80%9D,&hl=en&sa=X&ei=UzOdVdbSB8WmgwTIsIP4CQ&ved=0CCIQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q&f=false
Two commonly made assumptions rest on empirical ground that is not firm. The first of these is the
assumption that Western powers are in essence over- promoting liberal democracy. The facts suggest
instead that tl1ey are not doing much to promote democracy of any type, whether liberal or othenvise.
This is the most notable policy trend of recent years. under-stressed if not entirely ignored by arguments
that derive from critical theory. Second is the supposition that where they are active in democracy
support, Western powers follow a rigidly liberal template that is inappropriate and inat- tentive to local
demands and specificities. Of course, in places some such concerns are well founded and injustices are
undoubtedly committed in the pursuit of political change. But this argument is far too sweeping when
forwarded as a general n1ela-critique of democracy promotion. Real-life policy fonnulation is much
more ad hoc and varied in its conceptual bases. This is evident if one takes the trouble to look at the
nitty-gritty substance of what democracy promoters are doing on the ground. In some cases Western
powers assertively promote liberal democracy. But other combinations are also adopted. Sometimes
policy favours illiberal demo- cracy; sometimes it seeks advances in liberal rights without democracy;
and sometimes it is active in supporting neither the 'liberal' nor the 'democracy' strands of liberal
democracy. The precise nature and balance of such policy options varies across different democracy
promoters, different 'target states and over different moments in time. Critical theory inspired
approaches risks seeing a uniformity that simply does not exist in concrete democracy_\;' support
strategies. It is if anything more straight jacketed than the policy-makers it mocks as rigidly simplistic in
their conceptual understanding of deinocrac_\;'. This is not to suggest that all is well in the democracy
promoters' house; but the renovations needed are more subtle in nature.
An undiluted Freedom Act is crucial to democratic accountability
HRW 14 - Human Rights Watch (“US: Surveillance Reform Advances in the Senate,” https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/29/us-surveillance-reformadvances-senate 7/29/2014) STRYKER
(Washington, DC) – The US Senate should move swiftly to approve a surveillance reform bill introduced on July 29, 2014, by Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick
Leahy, Human Rights Watch said today. The bill, known as the USA Freedom Act, is a significant improvement over a companion bill that the US House of
Representatives passed on May 22 and, if approved, has the potential to end bulk collection of phone records in the US. “The NSA’s large scale collection of phone
metadata has deeply undermined the public’s trust in government and is doing serious harm to basic freedoms and democratic accountability in the US,” said
Cynthia Wong, senior Internet researcher at Human Rights Watch. “The Senate’s bill is a much-needed first step, and Congress should act quickly to approve it
without letting it be diluted.” Human Rights Watch had previously criticized the ambiguous language in the House version of the bill. That version would leave
broad loopholes that could ultimately fail to end mass phone data collection, despite the fact that its sponsors say that is the central objective of the draft law. The
House-passed bill also would weaken transparency and oversight provisions in an earlier draft of the USA Freedom Act that could have improved supervision of
surveillance practices.
India Advantage
Contention 3 is India
The US can alter India’s surveillance practices by pressuring global internet companies
to demand privacy. But, this only works when US is less hypocritical.
Wong ‘13
Cynthia M. Wong is the senior researcher on the Internet and human rights for Human Rights Watch. Before joining Human
Rights Watch, Wong worked as an attorney at the Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) and as director of their Project on
Global Internet Freedom. She conducted much of the organization’s work promoting global Internet freedom, with a particular
focus on international free expression and privacy. She also served as co-chair of the Policy & Learning Committee of the Global
Network Initiative (GNI), a multi-stakeholder organization that advances corporate responsibility and human rights in the
technology sector. Prior to joining CDT, Wong was the Robert L. Bernstein International Human Rights Fellow at Human Rights
in China (HRIC). There, she contributed to the organization’s work in the areas of business and human rights and freedom of
expression online. Wong earned her law degree from New York University School of Law – “ Surveillance and the Corrosion of
Internet Freedom” - July 30, 2013 - Published in: The Huffington Post and also available at the HRW website at this address:
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/30/surveillance-and-corrosion-internet-freedom
Defenders of US and UK surveillance programs argue that collecting metadata is not as problematic as “listening to the content
of people’s phone calls” or reading emails. This is misleading. Technologists have long recognized that metadata can reveal incredibly sensitive information, especially if it is
collected at large scale over long periods of time, since digitized data can be easily combined and analyzed. The revelations have also exposed glaring
contradictions about the US Internet freedom agenda. This has emboldened the Chinese state media, for example, to cynically denounce US
hypocrisy, even as the Chinese government continues to censor the Internet, infringe on privacy rights, and curb anonymity online. Though there is hypocrisy on both sides, the
widening rift between US values and actions has real, unintended human rights consequences. For the human rights
movement, the Internet’s impact on rights crystalized in 2005 after we learned that Yahoo! uncritically turned user account
information over to the Chinese government, leading to a 10-year prison sentence for the journalist Shi Tao. The US government
forcefully objected to the Chinese government’s actions and urged the tech industry to act responsibly. In the end, that incident
catalyzed a set of new human rights standards that pushed some companies to improve safeguards for
user privacy in the face of government demands for data. US support was critical back then, but it is
hard to imagine the government having the same influence or credibility now. The mass surveillance scandal has damaged
the US government’s ability to press for better corporate practices as technology companies expand globally. It
will also be more difficult for companies to resist overbroad surveillance mandates if they are seen as
complicit in mass US infringements on privacy. Other governments will feel more entitled to ask for the
same cooperation that the US receives. We can also expect governments around the world to pressure companies to store user data locally or maintain a local
presence so that governments can more easily access it, as Brazil and Russia are now debating. While comparisons to the Chinese government are overstated, there is reason to
worry about the broader precedent the US has set. Just months before the NSA scandal broke, India began rolling out a centralized
system to monitor all phone and Internet communications in the country, without much clarity on
safeguards to protect rights. This development is chilling, considering the government’s problematic use of sedition and Internet laws in recent arrests. Over the last
few weeks, Turkish officials have condemned social media as a key tool for Gezi Park protesters. Twitter has drawn particular ire. Now the
government is preparing new regulations that would make it easier to get data from Internet companies and identify
individual users online. The Obama administration and US companies could have been in a strong position to push back in
India and Turkey. Instead, the US has provided these governments with a roadmap for conducting secret, mass
surveillance and conscripting the help of the private sector.
Independently, US bulk surveillance sets precedent that causes indiscriminate
surveillance in India.
Sinha ‘14
(et al; Authors Include: G. Alex Sinha, Aryeh Neier fellow with the US Program at Human Rights Watch and the Human Rights
Program at the American Civil Liberties Union. Sinha holds a J.D. from New York University’s School of Law. This includes a
specialization as a Scholar from NYU’s Institute for International Law & Justice. The author also holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy
University of Toronto. Additional authors include - Maria McFarland Sanchez-Moreno, US Program deputy director at Human
Rights Watch, who participated in some of the research interviews; and Andrea Prasow, deputy Washington Director at Human
Rights Watch, who also participated in one of the research interviews and provided key contacts. Human Rights Watch is an
independent, international organization that works as part of a vibrant movement to uphold human dignity and advance the
cause of human rights for all. From the Report: WITH LIBERTY TO MONITOR ALL How Large-Scale US Surveillance is Harming
Journalism, Law and American Democracy – This report is based on extensive interviews with some 50 journalists covering
intelligence, national security, and law enforcement for outlets including the New York Times, the Associated Press, ABC, and
NPR. JULY 2014 – available at: http://www.hrw.org/node/127364)
The questions raised
by surveillance are complex. The government has an obligation to protect national security, and in some
cases, it is legitimate for government to restrict certain rights to that end. At the same time, international human rights and
constitutional law set limits on the state’s authority to engage in activities like surveillance, which have the potential to
undermine so many other rights. The current, large-scale, often indiscriminate US approach to surveillance carries
enormous costs. It erodes global digital privacy and sets a terrible example for other countries like India,
Pakistan, Ethiopia, and others that are in the process of expanding their surveillance capabilities. It also damages
US credibility in advocating internationally for internet freedom, which the US has listed as an important
foreign policy objective since at least 2010. As this report documents, US surveillance programs are also doing damage to
some of the values the United States claims to hold most dear. These include freedoms of expression and association, press
freedom, and the right to counsel, which are all protected by both international human rights law and the US Constitution.
We have two unique internal links:
India’s surveillance is not narrowly-targeted. This indiscriminate, bulk collection
becomes a “honeypot” for cyber-targeting.
Trivedi ‘13
Anjani Trivedi. The author holds a Master Degree in Journalism from the University of Hong Kong and a Bachelor’s Degree in
Mathematics from MIT. The author has previously held internships at the New York Times and CNN International. This piece
internally quotes Meenakshi Ganguly, The South Asia director for Human Rights Watch; Anja Kovacs of the Internet Democracy
Project; and Sunil Abraham, executive director of India’s Centre for Internet and Society. “In India, Prism-like Surveillance Slips
Under the Radar” – Time Magazine – 6-30-13 - http://world.time.com/2013/06/30/in-india-prism-like-surveillance-slips-underthe-radar/#ixzz2YpWhRsrB
CMS is an ambitious surveillance system that monitors text messages, social-media engagement and phone calls on
landlines and cell phones, among other communications. That means 900 million landline and cell-phone users and 125 million Internet
users. The project, which is being implemented by the government’s Centre for Development of Telematics (C-DOT), is meant to help national law-enforcement
agencies save time and avoid manual intervention, according to the Department of Telecommunications’ annual report. This has been in the works since 2008,
when C-DOT started working on a proof-of-concept, according to an older report. The government set aside approximately $150 million for the system as part of its
12th five-year plan, although the Cabinet ultimately approved a higher amount. Within the internal-security ministry though, the surveillance system remains a
relatively “hush-hush” topic, a project official unauthorized to speak to the press tells TIME. In April 2011, the Police Modernisation Division of the Home Affairs
Ministry put out a 90-page tender to solicit bidders for communication-interception systems in every state and union territory of India. The system requirements
included “live listening, recording, storage, playback, analysis, postprocessing” and voice recognition. Civil-liberties
groups concede that
states often need to undertake targeted-monitoring operations. However, the move toward extensive “surveillance
capabilities enabled by digital communications,” suggests that governments are now “casting the net wide, enabling intrusions into private lives,” according to
Meenakshi Ganguly, South Asia director for Human Rights Watch. This extensive communications surveillance through the likes of Prism and CMS are “out of the
realm of judicial authorization and allow unregulated, secret surveillance, eliminating any transparency or accountability on the part of the state,” a recent U.N.
report stated. India is no stranger to censorship and monitoring — tweets, blogs, books or songs are frequently blocked and banned. India ranked second only to
the U.S. on Google’s list of user-data requests with 4,750 queries, up 52% from two years back, and removal requests from the government increased by 90% over
the previous reporting period. While these were largely made through police or court orders, the new system will not require such a legal process. In recent times,
India’s democratically elected government has barred access to certain websites and Twitter handles, restricted the number of outgoing text messages to five per
person per day and arrested citizens for liking Facebook posts and tweeting. Historically too, censorship has been India’s preferred means of policing social unrest.
“Freedom of expression, while broadly available in theory,” Ganguly tells TIME, “is endangered by abuse of various India laws.” There is a growing discrepancy and
power imbalance between citizens and the state, says Anja Kovacs of the Internet Democracy Project. And, in an environment like India where “no checks and
balances [are] in place,” that is troubling. The potential for misuse and misunderstanding, Kovacs believes, is increasing enormously. Currently, India’s laws relevant
to interception “disempower citizens by relying heavily on the executive to safeguard individuals’ constitutional rights,” a recent editorial noted. The power
imbalance is often noticeable at public protests, as in the case of the New Delhi gang-rape incident in December, when the government shut down public transport
near protest grounds and unlawfully detained demonstrators. With an already sizeable and growing population of Internet users, the government’s worries too are
on the rise. Netizens in India are set to triple to 330 million by 2016, according to a recent report. “As [governments] around the world grapple with the power of
social media that can enable spontaneous street protests, there appears to be increasing surveillance,” Ganguly explains. India’s junior minister for
telecommunications attempted to explain the benefits of this system during a recent Google+ Hangout session. He acknowledged that CMS is something that “most
people may not be aware of” because it’s “slightly technical.” A participant noted that the idea of such an intrusive system was worrying and he did not feel safe.
The minister, though, insisted that it would “safeguard your privacy” and national security. Given the high-tech nature of CMS, he noted that telecom companies
would no longer be part of the government’s surveillance process. India currently does not have formal privacy legislation to prohibit arbitrary monitoring. The
new system comes under the jurisdiction of the Indian Telegraph Act of 1885, which allows for monitoring communication in the “interest of public safety.” The
surveillance system is not only an “abuse of privacy rights and security-agency overreach,” critics say, but also
counterproductive in terms of security. In the process of collecting data to monitor criminal activity, the
data itself may become a target for terrorists and criminals — a “honeypot,” according to Sunil Abraham,
executive director of India’s Centre for Internet and Society. Additionally, the wide-ranging tapping
undermines financial markets, Abraham says, by compromising confidentiality, trade secrets and intellectual
property. What’s more, vulnerabilities will have to be built into the existing cyberinfrastructure to make way for such a system. Whether the
nation’s patchy infrastructure will be able to handle a complex web of surveillance and networks, no one can say. That,
Abraham contends, is what attackers will target.
A hack on the CMS will eventually succeed. That escalates to mass de-stabilization of
India.
Dilipraj ‘13
Mr E. Dilipraj is a Research Associate at Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi. He is also pursuing his PhD at the Centre for
Latin American Studies from JNU, New Delhi. This evidence is internally quoting Sunil Abraham, who is the Executive Director of
the Bangalore based research organisation, the Centre for Internet and Society. The Centre for Internet and Society is a nonprofit research organization that works on policy issues relating to freedom of expression, privacy, accessibility for persons with
disabilities, access to knowledge and IPR reform, and openness. Sunil Abraham also founded Mahiti in 1998, a company
committed to creating high impact technology and communications solutions. Sunil was elected an Ashoka fellow in 1999 to
'explore the democratic potential of the Internet' and was also granted a Sarai FLOSS fellowship in 2003. Between June 2004
and June 2007, Sunil also managed the International Open Source Network, a project of United Nations Development
Programme's Asia-Pacific Development Information Programme serving 42 countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Between
September 2007 and June 2008, he managed ENRAP an electronic network of International Fund for Agricultural Development
projects in the Asia-Pacific facilitated and co-funded by International Development Research Centre, Canada. Also internally
quoting Mr. Sachin Pilot, India’s Minister of State for Communications and Information Technology. Modified for potentially
objectionable language. “CYBER WARFARE AND NATIONAL SECURITY” - AIR POWER Journal Vol. 8 No. 3, MONSOON 2013 (July-
September) – available at: http://www.academia.edu/7534559/CYBER_WARFARE_AND_NATIONAL_SECURITY__AN_ANALYSIS_OF_INCIDENTS_BETWEEN_INDIA_AND_PAKISTAN
security providers for the cyber space have
always been lacking in vigilance to provide security to their country’s cyber networks and infrastructures. Sunil
Abraham, Executive Director of the Bangalore-based Centre for Internet and Society, said during an interview to ‘Al Jazeera,’ “The Indian
government has a very low level of cyber awareness and cyber security. We don’t take cyber security as
seriously as the rest of the world”. The problem of cyber attacks by the hacking groups would not be a big problem if it
stopped with the hacking and defacing of websites. But, in reality, it moves on to the next stages. The same
people who carry out hacking and website defacing jobs may get involved in cyber espionage and data
mining against their enemies. These people may also volunteer their expert services to the terrorist organisations in return for
money and other forms of remuneration. According to a cyber security professional working with one of India’s
intelligence agencies, We once sat down to check the Delhi [internet] Backbone. We found thousands of systems compromised. All
were government systems, Research and Analysis Wing, Intelligence Bureau, Military Intelligence... we don’t realise how much damage has already happened. The lack
of awareness and the lethargic approach in monitoring and providing security to the cyber networks by India led to thousands of compromised computers across the country. The
infection ranges from small Viruses, Botnets to that of Stuxnet level malwares which can hamper the total
operations of the network connected to the compromised computer. It has been observed that out of the 10,000 Stuxnet infected
Indian computers, 15 were located at critical infrastructure facilities. These included the Gujarat and Haryana Electricity Boards and an ONGC offshore oil rig. Though Stuxnet
reached the networks of these infrastructures, thankfully, it did not activate itself on them. In other
words, India was only a few flawed lines of code away from having its power and oil sectors crippled
(destroyed). The list of new malwares goes on – Stuxnet, Flame, Duqu, etc – and many more are in the process of coding; their abilities to operate as cyber
weapons are incredible and, at the same time, unbearable, if not protected against properly. Assuming that the hacker groups get access such
malwares, then the situation would become extremely dangerous for the national security as it is equivalent to terrorists getting
access to nuclear weapons. While talking about the same, Mr. Sachin Pilot, Minister of State for Communications and
Information Technology said: The entire economies of some countries have been (destroyed) paralysed by
viruses from across the border. We have to make ourselves more resilient. Power, telecom, defence, these areas are
on top of our agenda. A careful study of the series of hacking on one another’s websites and networks by the private hacking groups of India
and Pakistan would reveal a basic fact that something which started as a small act of hate has now taken on a much
different shape in the form of personal revenge, economic profits, a race to show off technical supremacy, and anti-national propaganda. This was
While aggression is the only tactic followed by the hacker groups in both countries, on the contrary, the
very much evident from one unwanted event that disturbed the internal security of India in August 2012. The Indian government was alerted by the exodus after thousands of people from the
northeast gathered at railway stations in various cities all over the country after being threatened by the rounds of SMS and violent morphed pictures that were being circulated on more than
100 websites. The SMS threatened the northeastern people living in various cities in India of a targeted attack on them, asking them to go back to their homeland, whereas the pictures
circulated on the internet were images of some violent bloodshed. Out of the various SMS that were in circulation, one said: It is a request to everyone to call back their relatives, sons and
daughters in Bangalore as soon as possible. Last night, four northeastern guys were killed by Muslims in Bangalore (two Manipuri, two Nepali). Two Nepali girls were kidnapped from Brigade
Road. The reports say that from August 20, marking Ramzan, after 2 pm, they are going to attack every northeastern person. The riot started because of the situation in Assam.32 Another SMS
said: Many northeast students staying in Pune were beaten up by miscreants believed to be Muslims following the Assam riots. Heard that it is happening in Muslim areas like Mumbai, Andhra
Pradesh, Bangalore. At Neelasandra, two boys were killed and one near passport office.33 The Government of India reacted soon on this matter and a 43-page report was prepared by
intelligence agencies along with the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) and India Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-IN) which traced several doctored images to
Pakistan. The origins of these morphed images were later traced back in specific to Lahore, Rawalpindi and other Pakistani cities by the Indian intelligence agencies. "From all available forensic
Another senior official who has been involved in
India's Pakistan watch for several years said, It has been happening for several months now. This is a low cost, very effective way
of destabilising us. They don't need to send terrorists and explosives to create mayhem. Internet has been a
very effective platform for instigating communal divisions in India. They also have a multiplier effect, first
resulting in anger and hatred, then riots and, finally, many taking to terrorism. This act of unnecessary involvement by Pakistan-based elements is seen as cyber terrorism and
cyber psychological warfare against India to cause internal security disturbance and eventually to create a huge crisis in the country. This incident which
evidence, we are fairly convinced that all those postings came from Pakistan," said an official of NTRO.
created major turmoil in the internal security of the country is the biggest example of the adverse effects of wrong use of cyber technology.
A hack on CMS will collapse India’s financial markets, which are key to India’s
Economy.
Goyal ‘14
Dr. Sakshi Goyal, former Faculty member at the Kaling Institute of Management Studies, Faridabad, Haryana (India). “Indian
Financial Markets: A Global Perspective” - Journal of Business Management & Social Sciences Research (JBM&SSR) - Volume 3,
No.6, June 2014 - ISSN No: 2319-5614. Available at:
http://www.borjournals.com/a/index.php/jbmssr/article/viewFile/1729/1078
Financial markets are a vital part of an economy making it possible for industry, trade and commerce to
flourish without any obstacle in terms of resources. Today most economies around the world are judged by the performance of
their financial markets. The financial markets have indicators in place that reflect the performance of companies whose securities are traded in those markets. The financial markets also serve a vital
purpose in the growth and development of a company, which wants to expand. Such companies with expansion plans and new projects are in need of funding and the financial market serves as the best platform from which a
company can determine the feasibility of such possibilities
Krishnan (2011) mentioned that, the economic literature acknowledged that efficient and developed financial markets could lead to
increased economic growth by improving the efficiency of allocation and utilization of savings in the economy. Better functioning financial systems ease the external financing constraints that impede firm and industrial expansion.
There is a growing body of empirical analyses, including firm-level studies, industry-level studies, individual country
studies, and cross-country comparisons, which prove this strong, positive link between the functioning of the
financial system and long-run economic growth. In addition, they better allocate resources, monitor managers and exert corporate
control, mobilize savings, and facilitate the exchange of goods and services”. A capital market is a market for securities (debt or equity), where business enterprises
“
(companies) and governments can raise long-term funds. It is defined as a market in which money is provided for periods longer than a year as the raising of short-term funds takes place on other markets (e.g., the money market).
The capital market includes the stock market (equity securities) and the bond market (debt) The capital market of a country can be considered as one of the leading indicators in determining the growth of its economy. As
mentioned by C.Rangarajan, Ex Governor, RBI (1998), “The growth process of any economy depends on the functioning of financial markets which also helps to augment its Capital formation. According to Professor Hicks, the
industrial Revolution in England was ignited more by the presence of liquid financial market than the technological investment”. He writes interestingly- “What happened in the Industrial Revolution is that the Range of fixed capital
goods that were used in production Began noticeably to increase. But fixed capital is sunk; it is embodied in a particular form, from which it can only gradually be released. In order that people should be willing to sink large
amounts of capital it is the availability of liquid funds which is crucial. This condition was satisfied in England ...by the first half of the eighteenth century The liquid asset was there, as it would not have been even a few years earlier
“ Thus, liquidity is a very important component of Financial Market and plays a very vital role in the long run economic development of any country as it helps not only in promoting the savings of the economy but also to adopt an
effective channel to transmit various financial policies by creating liquidity in the market. Therefore Financial System of any country should be well developed, competitive, efficient and integrated to face all shocks. The financial
system and infrastructure of any country at any time can be considered as the result of its own peculiar historical evolution. This evolution is resulted by continuous interaction between all the participants existing in the system and
public policy interventions. The evolution of Indian financial markets and the regulatory system has also followed a similar path. India began with the central bank, Reserve Bank of India (RBI), as the banking sector regulator, and
the Ministry of Finance as the regulator for all other financial sectors. Today, most financial service providers and their regulatory agencies exist. The role of regulators has evolved over time from that of an instrument for planned
development in the initial stage to that of a referee of a relatively more modern and complex financial sector at present. Over this period, a variety of financial sector reform measures have been undertaken in India, with many
important successes. An important feature of these reforms has been the attempt of the authorities to align the regulatory view the needs of the country and domestic factors. These reforms can be broadly classified as steps taken
towards: a) Liberalizing the overall macroeconomic and regulatory environment within which financial sector institutions function. b) Strengthening the institutions and improving their efficiency and competitiveness. c) Establishing
and strengthening the regulatory framework and institutions for overseeing the financial system.The history of Indian capital markets spans back 200 years, around the end of the 18th century. It was at this time that India was
under the rule of the East India Company. The capital market of India initially developed around Mumbai; with around 200 to 250 securities brokers participating in active trade during the second half of the 19th century. There are
a number of factors that have paved path for India market growth. After the economic liberalization, policies were undertaken in the 1990s, the economy of the country has been steadily rising which has led to more demands and
supply circles. This has introduced diverse market sectors and industries in the country, which has led to a competitive consumer market. Through this research paper, an attempt is made to understand the evolution of Global
financial system with more emphasis on Indian markets. It also aims to study the global perspective of financial markets of any country and to understand that how a country’s financial markets is integrated with the other world
markets. Also the concept of efficiency is highlighted which says that a country whose financial markets are well integrated with the world markets are more efficient as compared to one whose financial markets are not very well
integrated. Lastly the paper concludes by leaving scope and opportunities to understand these global concepts in an easier way to the reader and further can be used for extensive research. A financial system or financial sector
the areas of surplus to the areas of deficit. A Financial System is a composition of various institutions, markets, regulations and laws, practices, money
manager, analysts, transactions and claims and liabilities. Indian Financial market can be considered as one of the oldest across the globe and is experiencing favorable
time during the recent years, which have prospered the economy of the country to a great extent. Presently, India
functions as an intermediary and facilitates the flow of funds from
is rated by six international credit rating agencies, namely Standard and Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s Investor Services, FITCH, Dominion Bond Rating Service (DBRS), the Japanese Credit Rating agency (JCRA), and the Rating and
Investment Information Inc., Tokyo( R&I).
Mass instability and an economic collapse in India sparks nuclear war with Pakistan –
risks of miscalc, accidents, and unauthorized theft all increase.
Busch ‘4
Please note that an updated edition of this book was re-released in Feb of 2015, but the original date was placed in the citation.
Dr. Nathan Busch, Professor of Government and co-director of the Center for American Studies at Christopher Newport
University. The author holds a Ph.D. in International relations from the University of Toronto and an MA in Political Science
from Michigan State University. The author previously held the position of Research Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University and also held the position of Visiting Faculty, National
Security Office, Los Alamos National Laboratory. This piece of evidence internally quotes George Perkovich, a South Asia expert
at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. It also internally quotes François Heisbourg. He chairs the Geneva Centre
for Security Policy and the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. His career has included positions in
government (member of the French mission to the UN, international security adviser to the Minister of Defence), in the defense
industry (vice-president of Thomson-CSF; senior vice president for strategy at Matra Défense Espace) and in academia
(professor of world politics at Sciences-Po Paris, director of the IISS). He is also a member of the International Commission on
nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and has sat on a number of national and international blue-ribbon bodies. From
the book: No End in Sight: The Continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation - p. 202-209
In addition, because
the Indian military currently has little experience handling nuclear weapons, the risks of
accidental use could be very high during a crisis situation, at least for some time to come. If the order were given to prepare India's
nuclear weapons for possible use, the military (perhaps in conjunction with India's nuclear scientists) would need to assemble the warheads rapidly; mate them to
the deliver)' vehicles (gravity bombs or missiles); and prepare them for use, either by loading them into bombers or by aiming the missiles and preparing them for
launch. All these procedures require training and precision, and, given the early stages of India's new command-and-control arrangements, it is not at all clear that
the Indian military would be able to carry them out safely under extreme time constraints.194 If India decided to develop a rapid-response capability, some of these
dangers would be lessened, but more serious dangers would be introduced. In particular, there would be a significantly increased risk of an accidental launch of
nuclear-armed missiles. India
would need to engage in a great deal of additional research into safety mechanisms
to prevent such an accidental launch, and it is simply not known how much effort India is devoting, or
will devote, to this area.195 Because the Prithvi and the two-stage Agni-I missiles contain a nonstorable liquid fuel, it would be impossible to deploy
the current configuration of either missile to allow for a rapid response. This significantly reduces the likelihood of these missiles being launched accidentally during
normal circumstances, though the
risks of accidental launches would probably increase significantly if they were fueled during a
crisis situation. As noted, however, India has conducted several successful flight tests of the Agni and Agni-II missiles. Because these missiles use a solid fuel, they
could be deployed in a rapid-response state. If India were to choose such a deployment option, the risks of an accidental launch could increase significantly. These
risks would depend on the extent to which India integrates use-control devices into its weapons to prevent accidental launches, but there is little evidence that India
is currently devoting significant efforts to develop such use-control devices.196 Furthermore, even if India intends to develop such use-control devices, if a nuclear
crisis were to arise before India had developed them, it still might be tempted to mate warheads on its missiles. If India does decide to weaponize its arsenal, it still
remains to be seen what type of deployment option it would choose. According to a statement in November 1999 by India's foreign minister, Jaswant Singh, India
would not keep its weapons on a "hair-trigger alert," though he did suggest that these weapons would be dispersed and made mobile to improve their chances of
surviving a first strike.197 If this statement is true, then the risks of accidental launch would be relatively small during normal circumstances.198 But these risks
would increase significantly during crisis situations, when India would presumably mate the warheads to the missiles.199 If the military still has not been given
physical control over the warheads, this would further reduce risks of accidental use during peacetime, though the transfer of nuclear weapons to the military
during a crisis could significantly increase the risks of an accident due to the military's inexperience in handling the nuclear weapons.200 What deployment option
Pakistan might adopt depends in part on India's weapon deployment. It appears that if India were to adopt a rapid-response option, Pakistan would probably adopt
a similar missile deployment, thereby increasing the risks of an accidental launch of its nuclear weapons as well. But even if India were to deploy its weapons (in
field positions) withour the warheads mated, concerns about survivability might nevertheless cause Pakistan to adopt a rapid-response capability. If such an event
were to occur, the risks of Pakistani accidental missile launches could be quite high, especially because it is unlikely that Pakistan currently has the technical capacity
to integrate sophisticated launch controls into its missile designs. Just
as in India, it is also unlikely that Pakistan's nuclear
devices are designed to minimize risks of accidents.201 Because Pakistan's warheads are based on an
early Chinese warhead design, they probably do not contain one-point safety designs, IHE, or fire-resistant
pits. If Pakistan were to assemble its nuclear warheads, there could be an unacceptable risk of an
accidental detonation of its nuclear weapons. Moreover; if Pakistan were to mate nuclear warheads to its missiles, either because it chose
to establish a rapid-response capability or because of an ongoing nuclear crisis, then similar concerns would exist about accidental launches of Pakistani nuclear
weapons. The current
risks of unauthorized use of nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan are probably relatively small
because they have a very small number of nuclear weapons and those weapons are tightly controlled by their nuclear establishments. But there are a number of
factors that could increase risks of unauthorized use in the future. Although both India and Pakistan currently possess nuclear
weapons that could be delivered by aircraft, and are both actively developing nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, none of their weapons appear to contain
sophisticated use-control devices to prevent unauthorized use. Instead, the nuclear
controls in both countries appear to be based on
guards, gates, and guns. As we have seen in the Russian and Chinese cases, while the "3 G's" might be sufficient during
normal circumstances, they are particularly vulnerable during political, economic, and social upheavals. The
Russian case has demonstrated that severe domestic upheavals can undermine central controls and weaken the infrastructures that previously
maintained the security for nuclear weapons. In particular, such upheavals can undermine the loyalty of guards and
workers at nuclear facilities, especially if the state collapses economically and can no longer afford to pay those
employees. Neither India nor Pakistan appears to have taken the necessary steps to prevent such weaknesses from arising in their nuclear controls.
Because Indian and Pakistani nuclear controls rely on the "3 G's" while reportedly lacking personnel reliability programs, there
could be a significant risk of thefts of nuclear weapons during severe upheavals. The Russian analogy is particularly
relevant in the Pakistani case. The Pakistani state is far from stable. After the nuclear tests in 1998 and the military coup in 1999, the Pakistani economy came close
to collapsing and remained quite unstable for the next several years.202 In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the United States removed
economic sanctions and approved nearly $1 billion in international foreign aid to Pakistan. But with a debt burden of nearly $39 billion, massive economic
disparities, and continuing low levels of foreign investment, there still is significant cause for concern about the prospects for Pakistan's long-term political and
economic stability.203 If the Pakistani state were to fail, there could be significant risks of a collapse in its nuclear controls. Were such an event to occur, there could
be an extreme risk of thefts of nuclear weapons or of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of Islamic militants.204 In the events following the September 11
attacks and President Musharraf's decision to support U.S. military strikes in Afghanistan, there were serious concerns about a potential collapse of Pakistani
nuclear controls. These concerns were spurred by reports of public riots, a close affiliation among some elements of the Pakistani military and intelligence
community with the Taliban regime and al Qaeda, and the tenuous hold that Pakistani president Musharraf appears to have in Pakistan.205 In October 2001,
President Musharraf took significant steps to centralize his control by removing high-level military and intelligence officers with ties to the Taliban, but analysts have
nevertheless continued to raise concerns about Musharraf's ability to maintain control.206 Due to the seriousness of these risks, President Musharraf ordered an
emergency redeployment of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, and the United States has offered to advise Pakistan on methods for securing its nuclear stockpile. ' If the
U.S. military strikes in Afghanistan had extended for a longer period, Musharraf might have found it increasingly difficult to remain in power and reign in the more
extreme elements in his country. One also cannot
rule out the possibility that terrorists might choose to target nuclear
facilities in India and Pakistan, especially if domestic instability were to increase. Both India and Pakistan have serious
problems with domestic terrorism.208 These terrorists are increasingly well-armed and have targeted critical infrastructures and military bases in the past.209
Although current defenses at both Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons storage facilities are probably sufficient to defend against most terrorist attacks,210 the
physical protection systems at other nuclear facilities might be less effective.211 Moreover, if the defenses
at the most sensitive facilities were
weakened by domestic upheavals, then the risks of successful terrorist attacks—either for purposes of theft or
sabotage—could increase significantly. But even if such extreme events did not occur, the tightly controlled decision-making and
underdeveloped command-and-control structures in both India and Pakistan could potentially allow unauthorized use, particularly during crises. In India, some of
these risks have been minimized by the formalization of its command structure, though the military units are still fairly inexperienced with handling these
weapons.212 Moreover, because
India probably still lacks clearly defined, detailed operational procedures and established, resilient
communication channels, there would still be a fairly high risk of unauthorized use arising from confusion or
miscommunication during a crisis. These concerns will probably remain for some time to come, though the specific risks could eventually be
improved, depending on the training the military receives and the degree of professionalism among the troops. Because Pakistan is currently under military rule,
and its nuclear weapons are controlled by the military, one would expect a better coordination of nuclear decision-making and command-and-control systems.
Nevertheless, there are potential problems with Pakistani command and control as well. The lack of a clear operational use doctrine, combined with inadequate C3I
could increase the risks of unauthorized use during crises: "there is no enunciated nuclear doctrine, nor are there decision-making and communications systems
adequate for either strategic or tactical command and control in the nuclear environment. Nuclear targeting information could not be passed in time to be of use in
a rapidly changing situation, which would increase the probability of own-troop strikes by tactical [nuclear] missiles."213 The risks or unauthorized use would
increase if India and Pakistan were to deploy their weapons on ballistic missiles. Risks of decapitation and questions about the survivability of the nuclear forces
would probably cause both India and Pakistan to deploy mobile systems if they were to operationalize their nuclear forces. These systems would significantly
increase difficulties in command and control, especially because their weapons lack use-control devices.214 In addition, because of the risks of decapitation,
Pakistan is likely to adopt a "delegative" system, where the authority to launch nuclear weapons is given to a number of military officials.215 As the number of
people authorized to launch nuclear weapons increases, so does the risk of a use of nuclear weapons that has not been commanded by the central authorities.216
The greatest concerns have been raised about a possible inadvertent use of nuclear weapons in South Asia.
The combined effects of mutual mistrust, very short flight times for missiles, continual armed conflicts along their borders, and few reliable CBMs make the risks of
inadvertent use quite severe, especially during crisis situations. According
to George Perkovich, a South Asia expert at the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Kargil proved that having nuclear weapons would not
deter new conflicts. It also showed that unless such conflicts themselves were prevented, the possibility of an accidental or deliberate nuclear exchange
would also increase given both states' relatively poor systems of intelligence surveillance and nuclear command and control."217 Due to continual
mistrust between the two countries, each would be likely to misinterpret military movements, missile tests, or
accidental detonations as an impending attack by the other side. The risks of misinterpreting each other's motives are
compounded by the vulnerability of their nuclear forces and the short flight times of the forces to key targets. For example, because the runways at Pakistani Air
Force bases could be destroyed by a conventional air strike or nuclear attack,218 India could effectively eliminate Pakistan's nuclear bomber capability. During
an acute crisis, Pakistan might be faced with a "use them or lose them" dilemma, in that it would need to
attack rapidly or lose its ability to retaliate altogether. For this reason, Pakistani officials would be extremely
suspicious of any Indian actions that could be interpreted as preparations for an attack. Because the flight time
of Indian bombers is approximately ten minutes, Pakistani leaders would have a very limited amount of time to decide whether to launch their own attack.219
These conditions thus create an ongoing environment in which inadvertent use is quite possible. In addition, both countries have unreliable intelligence systems,
which have repeatedly misinterpreted the other's intentions. For example, during the Brasstacks incident, Pakistani intelligence reported that India's exercise was
merely a cover for an attack. Meanwhile, Indian intelligence overlooked the defensive nature of the Pakistani troops' position. These intelligence failures caused
each side to escalate the tensions unnecessarily. In addition, their intelligence systems have sometimes failed to detect major troop movements altogether. As we
have seen, during the Brasstacks crisis, Indian surveillance planes did not detect Pakistani troops positioned at their border for two weeks. And in the 1999 Kargil
war, Indian intelligence failed to detect the Pakistani invasion until several months after they had positioned themselves at strategic locations in the Kargil heights.
These intelligence failures could have two consequences. First, if either side were surprised by comparatively benign actions (such as Pakistan's defensive
positioning during the Brasstacks crisis), it would be more likely to overreact and mistakenly conclude that an attack is imminent. And second, if one side (especially
Pakistan) is confident that an invasion would not be detected at first, it might be more likely to launch attacks across the border: Each of these scenarios would
greatly increase the risks of nuclear escalation.220 Presumably owing to the massive intelligence failure prior to the 1999 Kargil war, however, India has recently
made significant investments in its intelligence-gathering capabilities, which could reduce risks of such failures by India in the future.221 The
dangers of
miscalculations and intelligence failures are increased by the crude early-warning systems employed by
both countries, particularly Pakistan. Several incidents serve to illustrate this point. First, prior to Pakistan's nuclear tests in 1998, Pakistan
reported that it had detected an air force attack on its radars and warned that it had mated a number of warheads to its Ghauri missiles.222 While this report might
have been circulated in order to justify their nuclear tests, circulating such a report could have caused India to mate weapons to its missiles, greatly increasing the
risks of inadvertent use (as well as accidental and unauthorized use). Another, perhaps more troubling, incident occurred prior to the U.S. missile strike on
Afghanistan in August 1998. The United States sent a high-level U.S. official to Pakistan because it feared Pakistan would detect the missile and interpret it as an
Indian strike. Pakistan never even detected the missile, however. Scholars have pointed out that this incident emphasizes not only the U.S. concern about
inadvertent nuclear war between India and Pakistan, but also that Pakistan's early-warning system "has serious flaws, and such shortcomings are more likely to
foster nervousness than calm. To the extent that they lack reliable early-warning systems, India or Pakistan could base launch decisions on unreliable sources,
increasing the chance of mistakes."223 But even if India and Pakistan had reliable early-warning systems, the risks of inadvertent war would still be extremely high.
If Indian or Pakistani radars detected aircraft headed toward them, they would have very little time to decide what to do before the aircraft reached their targets. In
addition, because there would be a great deal of uncertainty about whether attacking bombers carried conventional or nuclear weapons, the attacked side
(especially Pakistan) could
face a "use them or lose them" scenario and be tempted to launch a nuclear
attack to ensure that its nuclear capability was not destroyed.224 Thus, even if India and Pakistan do not deploy nuclear
weapons on missiles, the risks of an inadvertent use in these circumstances could be extremely high. If India and Pakistan were to deploy their nuclear weapons on
missiles (a scenario that is quite likely, given the vulnerability of Pakistani airfields and India's stated need for deterrence against the People's Republic of China), the
risks of inadvertent use would become even worse. Because the flight time for ballistic missiles between the two countries is less than five minutes,225 Indian and
Pakistani leaders would have virtually no time to decide what action to take (or perhaps even to launch a retaliatory strike) before the missiles hit their targets.226
The psychological effect on the two countries would be tremendous. According
to Francois Heisbourg, once theater missiles are deployed in
situation will resemble the Cuban missile crisis, except that it "would be permanent rather than temporary, would occur without adequate C3I in place, and with political leadership located less than five minutes from
mutual Armageddon."227
South Asia, the strategic
Even a limited nuclear war between India & Pakistan causes extinction – smoke and
yields prove
Toon ’07
(et al, O. B. Toon -- Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences, Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics, University
of Colorado, Boulder, CO, -- “Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of
individual nuclear terrorism” – Atmospheric Chemistry & Physics – April 19th -- http://www.atmos-chemphys.net/7/1973/2007/acp-7-1973-2007.pdf)
We assess the potential damage and smoke production associated with the detonation of small nuclear
weapons in modern megacities. While the number of nuclear warheads in the world has fallen by about a factor of three since its peak in 1986, the number of
nuclear weapons states is increasing and the potential exists for numerous regional nuclear arms races. Eight countries are known to have nuclear weapons, 2 are
constructing them, and an additional 32 nations already have the fissile material needed to build substantial arsenals of low-yield (Hiroshima-sized) explosives.
Population and economic activity worldwide are congregated to an increasing extent in megacities, which might be targeted in a nuclear conflict . We
find
that low yield weapons, which new nuclear powers are likely to construct, can produce 100 times as
many fatalities and 100 times as much smoke from fires per kt yield as previously estimated in analyses for full
scale nuclear wars using high-yield weapons, if the small weapons are targeted at city centers. A single “small” nuclear detonation in an
urban center could lead to more fatalities, in some cases by orders of magnitude, than have occurred in the major historical conflicts of many countries. We analyze
a regional nuclear exchange involving 100 15-kt explosions (less than 0.1% of the explosive yield of the current global nuclear
could produce direct fatalities comparable to all of those worldwide in World War II, or to
those once estimated for a “counterforce” nuclear war between the superpowers. Megacities exposed to
the likely outcome of
arsenal). We find that such an exchange
atmospheric fallout of long-lived radionuclides would likely be abandoned indefinitely, with severe national and international implications. Our analysis shows that
smoke from urban firestorms in a regional war would rise into the upper troposphere due to pyro-convection.
Robock et al. (2007) show that the smoke would subsequently rise deep into the stratosphere due to atmospheric heating , and then might induce
significant climatic anomalies on global scales. We also anticipate substantial perturbations of global
ozone. While there are many uncertainties in the predictions we make here, the principal unknowns are the type and scale of conflict that might occur. The
scope and severity of the hazards identified pose a significant threat to the global community. They deserve
careful analysis by governments worldwide advised by a broad section of the world scientific community, as well as widespread public debate. In the 1980s, quantitative studies of the
consequences of a nuclear conflict between the superpowers provoked international scientific and political debate, and deep public concern (Crutzen and Birks, 1982; Turco et al., 1983;
Pittock et al., 1985). The resulting recognition that such conflicts could produce global scale damage at unacceptable levels contributed to an ongoing reduction of nuclear arsenals and
improvements in relationships between the major nuclear powers. Here we discuss the effects of the use of a single nuclear weapon by a state or terrorist. We then provide the first
comprehensive quantitative study of the consequences of a nuclear conflict involving multiple weapons between the emerging smaller nuclear states. Robock et al. (2007) explore the climate
changes that might occur due to the smoke emissions from such a conflict. The results of this study show that the potential effects of nuclear explosions having yields similar to those of the
weapons used over Japan during the Second World War (WW-II) are, in relation to yield, unexpectedly large. At least eight countries are capable of transport and detonation of such nuclear
devices. Moreover, North Korea appears to have a growing stockpile of warheads, and Iran is suspiciously pursuing uranium enrichment – a necessary precursor to weapons construction.
Thirty-two other countries that do not now have nuclear weapons possess sufficient fissionable nuclear materials to construct weapons, some in a relatively short period of time. For these
nations, a regional conflict involving modest numbers of 15-kiloton (kt, the TNT explosive yield equivalent) weapons to attack cities could cause casualties that exceed, in some cases by orders
of magnitude, their losses in previous conflicts. Indeed, in some case, the casualties can rival previous estimates for a limited strategic war between the superpowers involving thousands of
weapons carrying several thousand megatons (Mt) of yield. Early radioactive fallout from small nuclear ground bursts would leave large sections of target areas contaminated and effectively
uninhabitable. (Hiroshima and Nagasaki were attacked by airbursts, which will not deposit large amounts of local radiation unless it is raining. They were continuously inhabited.) Because of
the smoke released in fires ignited by detonations, there is a possibility that 100 15-kt weapons used against city centers would produce global climate disturbances unprecedented in recorded
human history (Robock et al., 2007). An individual in possession of one of the thousands of existing lightweight nuclear weapons could kill or injure a million people in a terrorist attack. Below
we first discuss the arsenals of the existing, and potential, nuclear powers. We then describe the casualties due to blast and to fires set by thermal radiation from an attack on a single megacity
with one low yield nuclear weapon. Next we discuss the casualties if current and projected arsenals of such weapons were ever used in a regional conflict. We then discuss the impact of
radioactive contamination. Finally, we describe the amounts of smoke that may be generated in a regional scale conflict. At the end of each of these sections we outline the associated
uncertainties.
We have attempted to employ realistic scenarios in this analysis. However, we do not have access to the war
plans of any countries, nor to verifiable data on existing nuclear arsenals, delivery systems, or plans to develop, build or deploy nuclear weapons. There are
obviously many possible pathways for regional conflicts to develop. Opinions concerning the likelihood of a regional nuclear war range from highly improbable to
apocalyptic. Conservatism in such matters requires that a range of plausible scenarios be considered, given the availability of weapons hardware and the history of
regional conflict.
In the present analysis, we adopt two potential scenarios: i) a single small nuclear device detonated in a city center by terrorists;
and ii) a regional nuclear exchange between two newly minted nuclear weapons states involving a total of 100 low yield (15-kt) detonations. We do not justify these
most citizens and politicians today are aware of the potential disaster of an Israeli-Iranian-Syrian
nuclear confrontation, or a Indian-Pakistani territorial confrontation. Moreover, as nuclear weapons knowledge and implementation
scenarios any further except to note that
proliferates, the possible number and combinations of flash points multiplies. The fact that nuclear weapons of the type assumed here have been used in past
hostilities substantiates the idea that such scenarios as we propose are executable.
The new Freedom Act won’t solve US image. Protections from the original version do
solve, even without protections for persons outside the US.
Ries ‘14
(Internally quoting Zeke Johnson, director of Amnesty International's Security & Human Rights Program. Also internally quoting
Cynthia M. Wong is the senior researcher on the Internet and human rights for Human Rights Watch. Before joining Human
Rights Watch, Wong worked as an attorney at the Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) and as director of their Project on
Global Internet Freedom. She conducted much of the organization’s work promoting global Internet freedom, with a particular
focus on international free expression and privacy. She also served as co-chair of the Policy & Learning Committee of the Global
Network Initiative (GNI), a multi-stakeholder organization that advances corporate responsibility and human rights in the
technology sector. Prior to joining CDT, Wong was the Robert L. Bernstein International Human Rights Fellow at Human Rights
in China (HRIC). There, she contributed to the organization’s work in the areas of business and human rights and freedom of
expression online. Wong earned her law degree from New York University School of Law. Also internally quoting Center for
Democracy and Technology Senior Counsel Harley Geiger – Brian Ries is Mashable’s Real-Time News Editor. Prior to working at
Mashable, Brian was Social Media Editor at Newsweek & The Daily Beast, responsible for using Twitter, Facebook, and Tumblr
to cover revolutions, disasters, and presidential elections. During his time at The Daily Beast, he contributed to a team that won
two Webby Awards for “Best News Site”. “Critics Slam 'Watered-Down' Surveillance Bill That Congress Just Passed” - Mashable May 22, 2014 – http://mashable.com/2014/05/22/congress-nsa-surveillance-bill/)
As a result, many
of its initial supporters pulled their support. “We supported the original USA Freedom act,
even though it didn’t do much for non-US persons,” Zeke Johnson, director of Amnesty International's
Security & Human Rights Program told Mashable after Thursday's vote. He described the original
version as “a good step to end bulk collection.” However, in its current version, it's not even clear that
this bill does that at all, Johnson said. He added that Congress left a lot of "wiggle room" in the bill — something he
said is a real problem. "Where there is vagueness in a law, you can count on the administration to exploit it," Johnson
said. However, Laura W. Murphy, director of the ACLU Washington Legislative Office, took a more positive view of the bill. "While far from perfect, this bill is an
unambiguous statement of congressional intent to rein in the out-of-control NSA," she said in a statement. "While we share the concerns of many — including
members of both parties who rightly believe the bill does not go far enough — without it we would be left with no reform at all, or worse, a House Intelligence
Committee bill that would have cemented bulk collection of Americans’ communications into law." The Electronic Frontier Foundation simply called it "a weak
attempt at NSA reform." “The
ban on bulk collection was deliberately watered down to be ambiguous and
exploitable,” said Center for Democracy and Technology Senior Counsel Harley Geiger. “We withdrew support for USA FREEDOM
when the bill morphed into a codification of large-scale, untargeted collection of data about Americans
with no connection to a crime or terrorism.” And Cynthia Wong, senior Internet researcher at Human Rights
Watch, said, “This so-called reform bill won’t restore the trust of Internet users in the US and around the
world. Until Congress passes real reform, U.S. credibility and leadership on Internet freedom will
continue to fade.”
Data overload Advantage
Contention 4 is Human intelligence
Information overload drains resources and trades off with targeted surveillance
Volz, 14
(Dustin, The National Journal, “Snowden: Overreliance on Mass Surveillance Abetted Boston Marathon
Bombing: The former NSA contractor says a focus on mass surveillance is impeding traditional
intelligence-gathering efforts—and allowing terrorists to succeed”, October 20, 2014, ak.)
Edward Snowden on Monday suggested
that if the National Security Agency focused more on traditional intelligence
gathering—and less on its mass-surveillance programs—it could have thwarted the 2013 Boston Marathon
bombings. The fugitive leaker, speaking via video to a Harvard class, said that a preoccupation with collecting bulk
communications data has led to resource constraints at U.S. intelligence agencies, often leaving more
traditional, targeted methods of spying on the back burner. "We miss attacks, we miss leads, and
investigations fail because when the government is doing its 'collect it all,' where we're watching
everybody, we're not seeing anything with specificity because it is impossible to keep an eye on all of your
targets," Snowden told Harvard professor and Internet freedom activist Lawrence Lessig. "A good example of this is, actually, the Boston
Marathon bombings." Snowden said that Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev were pointed out by Russian intelligence to U.S.
officials prior to the bombings last year that killed three and left hundreds wounded, but that such actionable
intelligence was largely ignored. He argued that targeted surveillance on known extremists and diligent
pursuit of intelligence leads provides for better counterterrorism efforts than mass spying. "We didn't
really watch these guys and the question is, why?" Snowden asked. "The reality of that is because we do have finite
resources and the question is, should we be spending 10 billion dollars a year on mass-surveillance programs of
the NSA to the extent that we no longer have effective means of traditional [targeting]?" Anti-spying
activists have frequently argued that bulk data collection has no record of successfully thwarting a terrorist
attack, a line of argument some federal judges reviewing the NSA's programs have also used in their legal reviews of the activities. Snowden's
suggestion—that such mass surveillance has not only failed to directly stop a threat, but actually makes the
U.S. less safe by distracting resource-strapped intelligence officials from performing their jobs—takes his
criticism of spy programs to a new level. "We're watching everybody that we have no reason to be watching simply
because it may have value, at the expense of being able to watch specific people for which we have a specific
cause for investigating, and that's something that we need to look carefully at how to balance," Snowden said.
The plan solves1) Leads to the abandonment of wasteful, inefficient mass surveillance tactics in
favor of targeted surveillance
Walt, 14
(Stephen M. Walt is the (real papa Walt) and Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international
relations at Harvard University, “The Big Counterterrorism Counterfactual Is the NSA actually making us
worse at fighting terrorism?”,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/11/10/counterterrorism_spying_nsa_islamic_state_terrori
st_cve, November 10, 2014, ak.)
The head of the British electronic spy agency GCHQ, Robert Hannigan, created a minor flap last week in an article he wrote for the Financial
Times. In effect, Hannigan argued that more robust encryption procedures by private Internet companies were unwittingly aiding terrorists
such as the Islamic State (IS) or al Qaeda, by making it harder for organizations like the NSA and GCHQ to monitor online traffic. The implication
was clear: The more that our personal privacy is respected and protected, the greater the danger we will face from evildoers. It's a serious
issue, and democracies that want to respect individual privacy while simultaneously keeping citizens safe are going to have to do a much better
job of reassuring us that vast and (mostly) secret surveillance capabilities overseen by unelected officials such as Hannigan won't be abused. I
tend to favor the privacy side of the argument, both because personal freedoms are hard to get back once lost, but also because there's not
much evidence that these surveillance activities are making us significantly safer. They seem to be able to help us track some terrorist leaders,
but there's a lively debate among scholars over whether tracking and killing these guys is an effective strategy. The
fear of being
tracked also forces terrorist organizations to adopt less efficient communications procedures, but it
doesn't seem to prevent them from doing a fair bit of harm regardless. The fear of being tracked also forces terrorist
organizations to adopt less efficient communications procedures, but it doesn't seem to prevent them from doing a fair bit of harm regardless.
So here's a wild counterfactual for you to ponder: What
would the United States, Great Britain, and other wealthy and
powerful nations do if they didn't have these vast surveillance powers? What would they do if they didn't have
armed drones, cruise missiles, or other implements of destruction that can make it remarkably easy (and
in the short-term, relatively cheap) to target anyone they suspect might be a terrorist? Assuming that there were still
violent extremists plotting various heinous acts, what would these powerful states do if the Internet was there but no one knew how to spy
on it? For starters, they'd have to rely more heavily on tried-and-true counterterrorism measures: infiltrating
extremist organizations and flipping existing members, etc., to find out what they were planning, head attacks off before
they occurred, and eventually roll up organization themselves. States waged plenty of counterterrorism campaigns
before the Internet was invented, and while it can be difficult to infiltrate such movements and find their vulnerable points, it's
not exactly an unknown art. If we couldn't spy on them from the safety of Fort Meade, we'd probably be
doing a lot more of this. Second, if we didn't have all these expensive high-tech capabilities, we might
spend a lot more time thinking about how to discredit and delegitimize the terrorists' message, instead
of repeatedly doing things that help them make their case and recruit new followers. Every time the
United States goes and pummels another Muslim country -- or sends a drone to conduct a "signature strike" -- it
reinforces the jihadis' claim that the West has an insatiable desire to dominate the Arab and Islamic
world and no respect for Muslim life. It doesn't matter if U.S. leaders have the best of intentions, if they
genuinely want to help these societies, or if they are responding to a legitimate threat; the crude message
that drones, cruise missiles, and targeted killings send is rather different. If we didn't have all these cool
high-tech hammers, in short, we'd have to stop treating places like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Syria as
if they were nails that just needed another pounding, and we might work harder at marginalizing our
enemies within their own societies. To do that, we would have to be building more effective partnerships
with authoritative sources of legitimacy within these societies, including religious leaders. Our failure to
do more to discredit these movements is perhaps the single biggest shortcoming of the entire war on
terror, and until that failure is recognized and corrected, the war will never end. Third, and somewhat
paradoxically, if we didn't have drones and the NSA, we'd have to think more seriously about boots on
the ground, at least in some places. But having to think harder about such decisions might be a good thing,
because it would force the United States (or others) to decide which threats were really serious and which
countries really mattered. It might even lead to the conclusion that any sort of military intervention is counterproductive. As we've
seen over the past decade, what the NSA, CIA, and Special Ops Command do is in some ways too easy: It
just doesn't cost that much to add a few more names to the kill list, to vacuum up a few more terabytes
of data, or to launch a few more drones in some new country, and all the more so when it's done under the veil of secrecy. I'm
not saying that our current policy is costless or that special operations aren't risky; my point is that such activities are still a lot
easier to contemplate and authorize than a true "boots on the ground" operation. By making it easier, however,
the capabilities make it easier for our leaders to skirt the more fundamental questions about interests and strategy. It allows
them to "do something," even when what is being done won't necessarily help. Lastly, if U.S. leaders had to
think harder about where to deploy more expensive resources, they might finally start thinking about
the broader set of U.S. and Western policies that have inspired some of these movements in the first
place. Movements like IS, al Qaeda, al-Nusra Front, al-Shabab, or the Taliban are in some ways indigenous movements
arising from local circumstances, but they did not spring up out of nowhere and the United States (and other countries) bear some
(though not all) blame for their emergence and growth. To say this is neither to defend nor justify violent extremism, nor to assert that all U.S.
policies are wrong; it is merely to acknowledge that there
is a causal connection between some of what we do and
some of the enemies we face. But if some of the things the United States (or its allies) is doing are making it
unpopular in certain parts of the world, and if some of that unpopularity gets translated into violent
extremism that forces us to spend hundreds of billions of dollars trying to protect ourselves, then maybe
we ought to ask ourselves if every single one of those policies makes sense and is truly consistent with U.S.
interests and values. And if not, then maybe we ought to change some of them, if only to take some steam out of the extremist enterprise.
What I'm suggesting, in short, is that the
"surveil and strike" mentality that has dominated the counterterrorism
effort (and which is clearly reflected in Hannigan's plea to let Big Brother -- oops, I mean the NSA and GCHQ -- keep its eyes on our
communications) is popular with government officials because it's relatively easy, plays to our technological
strengths, and doesn't force us to make any significant foreign-policy changes or engage in any sort of self-criticism at
all. If we can solve the terrorist problem by throwing money at it, and enriching some defense contractors and former government officials in
the process, what's not to like? If we can solve the terrorist problem by throwing money at it, and enriching some defense contractors and
former government officials in the process, what's not to like? To be clear: I'm not suggesting we dismantle the NSA, fire all our cryptographers,
and revert to Cordell Hull's quaint belief that "gentlemen [or ladies] do not read each other's mail." But until
we see more convincing
evidence that the surveillance of the sort Hannigan was defending has really and truly kept a significant number of
people safer from foreign dangers, I'm going to wonder if we aren't overemphasizing these activities
because they are relatively easy for us, and because they have a powerful but hard-to-monitor constituency in
Washington and London. In short, we're just doing what comes naturally, instead of doing what might be more effective.
2) That prevents tradeoffs with human-intel which is critical to overall US intel.
Margolis ‘13
Gabriel Margolis – the author presently holds a Master of Arts (MA) in Conflict Management & Resolution from UNC
Wilmington and in his final semester of the program when this article was published in the peer-reviewed journal Global
Security Studies . Global Security Studies (GSS) is a premier academic and professional journal for strategic issues involving
international security affairs. All articles submitted to and published in Global Security Studies (GSS) undergo a rigorous, peerreviewed process. From the article: “The Lack of HUMINT: A Recurring Intelligence Problem” - Global Security Studies - Spring
2013, Volume 4, Issue 2http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Margolis%20Intelligence%20(ag%20edits).pdf
The United States has accumulated an unequivocal ability to collect intelligence as a result of the technological advances of the 20th
century. Numerous methods of collection have been employed in clandestine operations around the world
including those that focus on human, signals, geospatial, and measurements and signals intelligence. An infatuation
with technological methods of intelligence gathering has developed within many intelligence organizations, often
leaving the age old practice of espionage as an afterthought. As a result of the focus on technical methods, some of
the worst intelligence failures of the 20th century can be attributed to an absence of human intelligence. The
21st century has ushered in advances in technology have allowed UAVs to become the ultimate technical intelligence gathering
platform; however human intelligence is still being neglected. The increasing reliance on UAVs will make
the United States susceptible to intelligence failures unless human intelligence can be properly
integrated. In the near future UAVs may be able to gather human level intelligence, but it will be a long time before classical espionage is a
thing of the past.
HUMINT key to success to counter state and non-state threats.
Wilkinson ‘13
Kevin R. Wilkinson – United States Army War College. The author is a former Counterintelligence Company Commander, 205th
Military Intelligence Battalion. This thesis paper was overseen by Professor Charles D. Allen of the Department of Command
Leadership and Management. This manuscript is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic
Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States
Association of Colleges and Schools – “Unparalleled Need: Human Intelligence Collectors in the United States Army” - March
2013 - http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA590270
In the twenty-first century, the role of HUMINT is more important than ever. As employed during the Cold War, a
significant portion of intelligence was collected using SIGINT and GEOINT methods. The COE assessment now discerns a hybrid threat encompassing both
conventional and asymmetric warfare, which is difficult to obtain using SIGINT and GEOINT alone. Unlike
other intelligence collection disciplines,
such as weather or terrain do not hinder HUMINT collectors.12 HUMINT collection played a key role
during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. OIF was initially a force-on-force ground war using traditional maneuver forces. After six months of conventional
conflict and on the verge of defeat, the Iraqi armed forces, with the assistance of insurgents, employed asymmetrical warfare. The continuation
of conventional warfare paired with the asymmetric threat created a hybrid threat. HUMINT is effective when countering a
conventional threat that consists of large signatures, such as discerning troop movement. However, it becomes invaluable when
presented with an asymmetrical threat that entails a smaller signature, such as focusing on groups of
insurgents, which other intelligence collection disciplines cannot solely collect on.
environmental conditions
BW and nuclear use coming. HUMINT key to stay-ahead of these risks.
Johnson ‘9
Dr. Loch K. Johnson is Regents Professor of Political Science at the University of Georgia. He is editor of the journal "Intelligence
and National Security" and has written numerous books on American foreign policy. Dr. Johnson served as staff director of the
House Subcommittee on Intelligence Oversight from 1977 to 1979. Dr. Johnson earned his Ph.D. in political science from the
University of California at Riverside. "Evaluating "Humint": The Role of Foreign Agents in U.S. Security" Paper presented at the
annual meeting of the ISA's 50th ANNUAL CONVENTION "EXPLORING THE PAST, ANTICIPATING THE FUTURE", New York
Marriott Marquis, NEW YORK CITY, NY, USA, Feb 15, 2009 – available via:
http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/3/1/0/6/6/p310665_index.html
The world is a dangerous place, plagued by the presence of terrorist cells; failed or failing states; competition for scarce
resources, such as oil, water, uranium, and food; chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, not to mention bristling arsenals
of conventional armaments; and deep-seated animosities between rival nations and factions. For self-protection, if for no other
reason, government officials leaders seek information about the capabilities and—an especially elusive topic—the intentions of those
overseas (or subversives at home) who can inflict harm upon the nation. That is the core purpose of espionage: to
gather information about threats, whether external or internal, and to warn leaders about perils facing the homeland. Further, the secret services hope to
provide leaders with data that can help advance the national interest—the opportunity side of the security
equation. Through the practice of espionage—spying or clandestine human intelligence: whichever is one's favorite term—the
central task, stated baldly, is to steal secrets from adversaries as a means for achieving a more thorough
understanding of threats and opportunities in the world. National governments study information that is available in
the public domain (Chinese newspapers, for example), but knowledge gaps are bound to arise. A favorite metaphor for intelligence is the jigsaw
puzzle. Many of the pieces to the puzzle are available in the stacks of the Library of Congress or on the Internet; nevertheless, there will continue to be several
missing pieces—perhaps the most important ones. They may be hidden away in Kremlin vaults or in caves where members of Al Qaeda hunker down
in Pakistan's western frontier. The public pieces of the puzzle can be acquired through careful research; but often discovery of the missing secret pieces has to
rely on spying, if they can be found at all. Some things— "mysteries" in the argot of intelligence professionals—are unknowable in any definitive way, such as who is likely to replace
the current leader of North Korea. Secrets, in contrast, may be uncovered with a combination of luck and skill—say, the number of Chinese nuclear-armed submarines, which are vulnerable to
Espionage can be pursued by way of human agents or with machines, respectively known
inside America's secret agencies as human intelligence ("humint," in the acronym) and technical intelligence ("techint"). Humint consists
satellite and sonar tracking.
of spy rings that rely on foreign agents or "assets" in the field, recruited by intelligence professionals (known as case officers during the Cold War or. in more current jargon, operations
officers). -_
Techint includes mechanical devises large and small, including satellites the size of Greyhound buses, equipped with fancy cameras and listening
devices that can see and hear acutely from orbits deep in space; reconnaissance aircraft, most famously the U-2; unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or drones, such as the Predator—often
armed with Hellfire missiles, allowing the option to kill what its handlers have just spotted through the lens of an onboard camera); enormous ground-based listening antennae, aimed at
enemy territory: listening devices clamped surreptitiously on fiber-optic communications cables that carry telephone conversations; and miniature listening "bugs" concealed within sparkling
cut-glass chandeliers in foreign embassies or palaces.
Techint attracts the most funding in Washington, D.C. (machines are costly, especially heavy
satellites that must be launched into space), by a ratio of some nine-to-one over humint in America's widely estimated S50 billion annual intelligence budget. Human spies, though, continue to
be recruited by the United States in most every region of the globe. Some critics contend that these spies contribute little to the knowledge of Washington officials about the state of
only human agents can provide insights into that most vital of all
national security questions: the intentions of one's rivals— especially those adversaries who are well
armed and hostile. The purpose of this essay is to examine the value of humint, based on a review7 of the research literature on intelligence, survey data, and the author's
international affairs; other authorities maintain, though, that
interviews with individuals in the espionage trade. The essay is organized in the following manner: it opens with a primer on the purpose, structure, and methods of humint; then examines
some empirical data on its value; surveys more broadly the pros and cons of this approach to spying; and concludes with an overall judgment about the value of agents for a nation's security.
Those impacts cause extinction.
Ochs ‘2
Richard - Chemical Weapons Working Group Member - “Biological Weapons must be Abolished Immediately,” June 9,
http://www.freefromterror.net/other_.../abolish.html]
Of all the weapons of mass destruction, the
genetically engineered biological weapons, many without a known cure or
vaccine, are an extreme danger to the continued survival of life on earth. Any perceived military value or deterrence pales in
comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories. While a "nuclear winter," resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear
weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth and severely compromise the health of future generations, they are easier to control. Biological weapons, on the
other hand, can
get out of control very easily, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. There is no way to guarantee the security of these
doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown to horrendous proportions. The Black Death of the
Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they
can also kill millions of people outright, their persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical
weapons would have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized chemical
extermination is over, it is over. With
nuclear and biological weapons, the killing will probably never end. Radioactive
elements last tens of thousands of years and will keep causing cancers virtually forever. Potentially worse than that,
bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with no known cure could wreck even greater calamity on the human race than could
persistent radiation. AIDS and ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of such
plagues? HUMAN EXTINCTION
IS NOW POSSIBLE.