Auditing Networks,
Perimeters and Systems
Time-Based Security and STAR
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Unit 2: TBS & Star –
Theory and Practice
TBS – Time Based Security
STAR – Security Targetting and Analysis
of Risk
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How the day is going to go
Morning – Principles and Theory
– Audit Process and Goals
– Time Based Security
– Putting it all together
Afternoon – Audit in the Real World
– Using CIS Rulers to build audit plans
– Applying the process to systems
– Putting it all together
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The Course Goals
Construct a Security Checklist for your site.
– Unix
– NT
Use this methodology to develop a response to your
internal auditors.
Have a repeatable method of defining the $$$ cost of
implementing security features at your site.
– This method can be used over time to show trends
Develop a set of reports/matrices that can be used to
quickly identify the security status of a host at your site.
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The General Audit Process
Audit Planning
– Review pertinent background info, research policies,
prepare the audit program
Entrance Conference
– Meet w/IS group leaders to let them know what is
going on and find out if there any specific areas to
check.
Fieldwork
– Visiting the IS systems and performing the steps listed
in the audit program on a sample of systems.
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The General Audit Process
Preparing the Audit Report
– The report should:
•
•
•
•
State what was done
State the results of these actions
Present recommendations
Include in the appendices the audit checklists used to collect the data.
The Exit Conference
– Meet with the people from step 2 and review the results w/them.
This is the time to clear up any misunderstandings. Refine the audit
report and prepare the recommendations paper.
Report to Upper Management (CEO, CFO, CIO, VP)
– Present a summary report of the audit. Provide recommendation
and implementation cost estimates.
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The Auditor’s Goals
Ensure Assets are protected according to
company, local,state and federal regulatory
policies.
Determine what needs to be done to ensure
the protection of the above assets.
Make life miserable for sysadmins…:-)
– Not really. They can save a sysadmin if a
problem occurs.
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The Sysadmin’s Goals
Keep the systems up.
Keep users happy and out of our hair.
Keep auditors at arms’ length.
Get more resources to do the job properly.
Wear jeans or shorts to work when everyone
else has to wear suits…….
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The Sysadmin’s Audit Strategy
Turn a perceived weakness (the audit) into
a strength (security checklists).
Develop a set of reporting matrices that can
be used as audit reports or justification for
security expenditures.
The above info can be used to help develop
your incident response plan.
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Time Base Security
The Time Based Security Model provides:
• A methodology that a security officer can use to
quantifiably test and measure the effectiveness of
security measures.
• A set of matrices/reports that can be used by
security professionals to assign a $ value to the cost.
This figure can be given to mgt. to help them
prioritize their security expenditures.
• Winn Schwartau’s book describes TBS. The
following slides discuss his methodology.
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Time Based Security
Schwartau’s Simple Formula for TBS
– Protection (P) - the bank vault
– Detection(D) - the alarm system
– Reaction(R) - thep police
t
Pt > Dt + Rt
• Pt - the amount of time the Protection system works
• Dt - the amount of time needed to detect the attack
• Rt - the amount of time needed to react to the attack
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Time Based Security
Pt > Dt + Rt (TBS Law)
– If the amount of protection time (Pt) you offer is greater
than the sum of the detection time (Dt) and reaction
time (Rt), then your systems can be considered secure.
– If the detection & reaction times are very fast then
you don’t need as strong a Protection mechanism.
KEY: detect anomalous activity and respond
ASAP!
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Time Based Security
TBS Corollary
– P<D+ R
If it takes longer to detect and respond to an
intrusion than the amount of protection time
afforded by the protection device, P, then
effective security is impossible.
Look at specs for each of the components in
your network architecture.
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Time Based Security
If Pt = Dt + Rt, then Pt implies an
Exposure Time, E.
– E=D+R
You want D+R -> 0. As your detection &
reaction speeds increase, the need for strong
Protection decreases. Hmmm…...
Fortress mentality dictates that P must be
extremely high because D+R is really slow
or non-existent.
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Measuring Security
Measure D+R (sec/min/hrs/day)
Assume the best: active logging, good AUP
(Acceptable Usage Policy), decent IRP (Incident
Response Policy)
• How long does it take to detect an event? (D=x)
• How long to notify affected parties? How long for them to
analyze and respond? (R=y) Out of office? Out to lunch? How
long to answer page?
– How much damage could be done in D+R time?
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TBS Methodology
Assume P=0. Build the following matrix
– Detection systems in place? No then D= ,
E=
and you have 100% exposure (E).
– Reaction System in place? No then R=
,
E=
and you have 100% system
exposure(E).
– How long does the detection mechanism take to
detect an attack? Answer in sec/min/hrs.
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TBS Methodology - Detection
– Once an attack is detected, how are you notified?
Logs? Pager? Phone? Future audit trails?
– How long does the above take? (sec/min/hr/day)
•
•
•
•
•
•
Sitting at your desk: _________
When you’re at lunch: _______
Break time:
_______
Headed home:
_______
Sleeping:
_______
At the movies:
_______
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TBS Methodology - Reaction
– Once notified, how long does it take to do
something about it? (sec/min/hrs/day)
•
•
•
•
•
Sitting at your desk: _______
At lunch:
_______
On break:
_______
Headed home:
_______
Sleeping:
_______
– How long does it take to determine the
cause/effect/solution? Include other folks
• Onsite: _____
Offsite:
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TBS Methodology - D+R
– Severe Attacks: How long does it take to get
permission to take any/all steps to protect the
net/assets including shutting them down? _____
Add the best-case numbers: ______ s/m/h
Add the worst-case numbers: _____ s/m/h
Exposure Time (E) = ______ to _____
best case
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Measure Exposure Time - E
Rule of Thumb: Bw/10/bits = Bw/bytes
• Example: T-1: 1.54Mb/s -> 154KB/s=9.2MB/m
This gives: File Size/Bandwidth=Req.
Attack Time or MB/Mb/S=(Attack Time) or
F/Bw = T= E (Exposure Time)
If the goal is file theft, the size of the target
file F divided by the max. bandwidth of the
network path Bw determines the amount of
time T needed to get the info.
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Measure Exposure Time - E
This is 1 measure of risk. Info theft can be
measured using T + intrinsic value of info.
Remember Bw could be data transfer rates
of floppy or tape drives.
Example: A net has Exposure Time,
E=(D+R) = 10 minutes and a tape drive
with a xfer rate of 6 GB/hr.
• T = 10 minutes = 1/6 hr, Bw = 6 GB/hr, F=Bw*T=
1GB of data could be stolen before
detection/reaction kills the attack.
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Measure Exposure - External
Bandwidth limiting is an effective
response method.
Data Padding: pad the critical files so their
size exceeds E. Using the previous
example:
– E=10 min, Bw=6 Gb/hr.
• File Size = (1/6 hr)/ (6 Gb/hr) = 1 GB=F
• All critical files should be padded to 1Gb.
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TBS - Integrity Attacks
Attacker’s Goal: make undetected,
unauthorized changes to data
TBS analysis:
• Assume you’re an insider w/access to the net &
system. How long does it take you to manually get
to the target application? _____(s/m/h) How long
would a script take to do the same? ______(s/m/h)
• Once logged into that application, how long does it
take as a trusted user to make unauthorized changes
to those records? ______(s/m/h)
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TBS - Integrity Attacks (cont)
• What steps would a knowledgeable user take to
cover their tracks? How long does it take to effect
those changes? _______ (s/m/h)
• Add up the times for manual & automatic
navigation.
– This gives a target maximum value for E and
provides a target guideline for D+R.
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TBS - Measure the $ Damage
Two Formulas: E=D+R, F/Bw=T
• If we know E, we can get F if E=T.
• If we know T, we can get E and D+R.
Coordinate w/Auditors & Mgt. and ask:
• If a critical file gets out, what would be the financial
effect on the company?
• DoS attacks could cripple the company nets. What is
the hourly/daily cost to the company if this happens?
• What is our legal liability if client records or
employee records are compromised?
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TBS Asset Organization
Information Value
– Some info loses value over time. Example:
advance notification, Product announcements
– Some info’s value is still changing. Example:
idea before its time.
4 Categories of Info Assets
• Company Proprietary - product designs, pricing
strategies, patents, source code, customer lists
• Private Employee - HR records, perf reviews, SSN
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TBS Information Assets
Information Asset Categories (cont)
• Customer Private - pricing info, purchase history,
non-disclosure info
• Partner/Gov’t - info assets that don’t fit into the
other categories
Risk Categories
• Critical - if it gets out, we’re out of business
• Essential - Survivable but a major hit. It’ll hurt but
we can spin back to normal
• Normal - may be embarrassing, disruptive only
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TBS Info Asset Matrices
Criticality
Critical
Essential
Normal
Co. Proprietary
Private Employee
Customer Private
Partner/Govt
Prepare matrices listing each asset and risk.
Use the matrices to build an affordable,
workable and maintainable security
environment.
Prepare separate matrices for criticality (like
above), integrity and availability.
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TBS Review Process
Identify and categorize the Info assets
Specify the logical locations of the assets
Identify the physical locations of the assets
The above info tells us:
• If critical assets are all over the place then your
defenses are spread out and cost more
• If you have a single point of failure.
• Negligible info is mixed in with Critical info.
Some info has no place being on the net!
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Layered TBS
Assume your net has a Firewall, fully
patched OS on the DB server and an
application Password server (Oracle
passwords) in place.
TBS variables
–
–
–
–
E(db) - Overall Exposure time for the DB
E(pw) – Exposure time for the Appl password
E(os) – Exposure time for the server’s OS
E(fw) – Exposure time for the FW
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Layered TBS
TBS Equations:
E(db) = P(pw) +
E(fw) + E(os)
E(os) > D(os)+R(os)
E(fw) > D(fw) + R(fw)
E(pw) > D(pw) + R(pw)
The intruder needs to overcome E(pw), E(fw) and E(os)
in order to get to the data E(db).
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Layered TBS Conclusions
All assets are NOT created equal and they
do NOT deserve equal protection.
Asset distribution by physical and logical
separation is a security process but
performed under the network architecture
and topology banner
Design the killing zones, in other words.
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TBS Reaction Matrices
Goal: make D+R as small as possible
– A smaller R reduces the reliance on a higher P value.
R Components
– Notification - tells someone/something that a detection mechanism
was triggered. Schwartau’s 3am rule: “notify someone” means “tell
someone other than the boss who doesn’t want to be bothered at
3am” which increases the R time.
Fill out the matrix with the target E, R or T times.
– This documentation is important since it help mgt. understand the
quantitative nature of TBS.
The matrix is based upon AUP, disaster recovery plans,
amount of risk the org is willing to take - measured in
EXPOSURE TIME - T
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TBS Reaction Matrix - I
Notifica tion Means - REACTION
Desire d Ti me
Predi cte d Ti me
Measu red Time
During Work Hours
ema il to de sk at p eak traffic tim es
ema il to de st a t off-hou rs
ema il whe n no t at des k
pag er with retu rn # or 91 1
pag er with ful l me ssag e
pho ne call to desk
notify 2n d in ch arge
Non Bu sine ss Hou rs
ema il to ho me
ema il whe n no t at hom e
pag er with retu rn # or 91 1
pag er with ful l me ssag e
Phon e call to h ome
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TBS Reaction Matrix - II
Detected Event
5 bad password attempts
Multiple Port Scan
Ping of Death
Response
Desired Time
Log/call sysadmin
Shoot person
Reaction #30
Measured Time
The sysadmin represents the greatest room for error by
making R unacceptably high. Why? People hesitate to
make tough decisions like shut down part of a net.
The “sacrifice the pawn to save the king” strategy can
be very risky if you don’t have policies in place and MGT
support. Automated responses can eliminate this BUT I
saw “Colossus: The Forbin Project”…:-)
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TBS Reaction Matrix
Questions the Reaction Matrix should
answer:
•
•
•
•
•
Is the attack real? What was the goal? Is it ongoing?
Did the R-matrix come to the proper conclusion?
Was the attack thwarted? Post-mortem analysis?
What further steps are needed?
Who did it?
Must be empowered by mgt. and policy to
limit R. Necessary for TBS to work.
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TBS - Evaluating Protection
Previous slides used TBS to evaluate D+R.
Applying E=D+R to Access Control (User Logins)
– E = max. amt. of time needed to accomplish proper
authentication.
– D = time needed to detect the authentication request and
determine its authenticity.
– R = time needed for the detection module to trigger a
PROCEED or STOP reaction.
Applying E=D+R to Enterprise Audit Trails
– D = time needed for an audit tool to record, analyze, transmit
data.
– R = time it takes for the detection tool to trigger the reaction and
how long the reaction takes.
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Course Revision History
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