THE FALL OF THE RADICAL
DEMOCRACY: ATHENS 415-404 B.C.
Background Briefing Topics: - Introduction - The Peloponnesian War
- The Effects of the Sicilian Expedition
- The Renewed Persian Threat
- The Rise of the Oligarchy of the Four Hundred
- The Five Thousand
- The Restoration of the Democracy
- The Victory of Sparta
1. Introduction: The Peloponnesian War
Athenian involvement in the war against Sparta would expand until it became a war between
two extended alliances, focused in part on different political systems, but in reality a contest
for hegemony in the Greek and eastern Mediterranean worlds. Before the end of the war, the
theatre of operation would spread well beyond Greece and the Aegean into the middle
Mediterranean, as well as operations in Asia Minor and parts of the Levant. Events began to
run against Athens, first with the continued pressure against her alliance by revolts in subject
states, then with defeats in Thrace and Chalcedon, followed by unsuccessful battles in the
Peloponnese (southern Greece). The events after 415 B.C. are set out in the following table: Table 1: Greek Affairs 415-404 B.C. (Based on Rex Warner's translations of Thucydides and
Xenophon)
Date Events
415 B.C. Launching of the Sicilian Expedition
415 B.C. The Athenian fleet arrives in Sicily
415 B.C. Recall of Alcibiades to face trial in Athens
415 B.C. Athenian victory before Syracuse
415 B.C. Camarina in Sicily remains neutral, though decides to
help Syracuse secretly
415-4 Alcibiades defects to Sparta
415-4 Continued Athenian Successes at Syracuse
414 Spartan commander Gylippus with fleet arrives in Syracuse
414-3 Letter of Athenian general Nicias to Athenians pointing
out difficulties in Sicily
413 Spartans fortify Decelea in Attica, 13 miles from Athens,
controlling the countryside
413 Athenian naval defeat in the Great Harbour of Syracuse
413 Athenian reinforcements arrive at Syracuse
413 Athenian defeat in land battle of Epipolae in Sicily
413 Total Destruction of the Athenian Sicilian Expedition
411 Persian forces in Ionia and revolt of Athenian ally Chios
411 Treaty between Persian and Spartans accepting Persian
control of cities on coast of Asia Minor
411 Rule of the oligarchy of the Four Hundred in Athens
411 Samians and allied fleet uphold democratic constitution
411 Defeat of Athenian home fleet off Euboea and loss of
control of Euboea
411 Four Hundred deposed and the rule of the Five Thousand
established
411 Athenian naval victory at Cynossema (Hellespont)
411-10 Naval successes of Athenians in Hellespont under
Alcibiades
409-8 Further naval victories by Alcibiades
407 Cyrus, crown-prince of Persia, arrives to take control of
Ionian coast and help Spartans
407 Thasos in revolt from Athens
407 Alcibiades returns to Athens, appointed supreme commander
407 Lysander takes control of Peloponnesian fleet and defeats
Athenians at Notium
407 Alcibiades dismissed as Athenian commander
406 Lysander's command given over to Callicratidas, who
blockades Athenians forces at Mytilene
406 Athenians defeat Spartan fleet at Battle of Arginusae
406-5 Recall of Lysander. Athenian fleet defeated at Battle of
Aegospotami
405 Spartans control Hellespont and Aegean
405 Spartan army invades Attica, Spartan fleet attacks Aegina,
Salamis and anchors in Piraeus
404 Athens surrenders, accepts Spartan terms, begins to tear
down the Long Walls
Of all the Athenian defeats it was the disaster of the Sicilian expedition which caused the
greatest depletion of manpower, ships, and financial resources. More than this, it also created
a crisis in confidence within Athens and its alliances. Likewise, the Spartan fortified position
at Decelea (within Athenian territory itself) was beginning to cause them real problems,
presumably in conjunction with a weakened naval domination of the Aegean.
The crisis in the war also undermined confidence in Athenian radical democracy, eventually
leading to a temporary return to an oligarchic system. This had been stated in text known as
The Constitution of Athens, whose authorship is normally attributed to Aristotle. Speaking of
the Athenians, it states: Now as long as the fortune in the war was equally balanced, they retained the
democracy. But when, after the disaster in Sicily, the Lacedaemonian side became
stronger through the alliance with the Persian king, they were compelled to abolish
the democracy and establish the constitution of the Four Hundred. The speech
initiating this resolution was made by Melobius, and the resolution itself was drafted
by Pythodorus of the deme Anphlystus. What chiefly won over the masses to support
the resolution was the belief that the king of Persia would be more likely to take part
in the war on their side if they had an oligarchic constitution. (Athenian Constitution
29.1)
This is a startling change of affairs, and it is clear that Athens now felt unable to withstand
her enemies, fearing imminent defeat. But we must go beyond these general statements. To
what extent were the factors of the failure of the Sicilian Expedition and the fear of Persia
directly responsible for the oligarchic revolution of the Four Hundred?
Greece in 421 B.C. (Courtesy PCL Map Library,
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/history_europ
e.html#G)
2. The Effects of the Sicilian Expedition
Alicbiades was one of the main promoters of this scheme to conquer large sections of Sicily
and thereby bolster the power of the Athenians against the huge forces now mustered by the
Spartan alliance (Lacedaemonian Alliance). It is surprising how quickly Alicibiades emerges
into political prominence after the failure of his political schemes to break up the
Lacedaemonian Alliance. However, he managed to avoid an ostracism (a formal political
exile voted on by the Athenian city body) by arranging some kind of political alignment with
Nicias, and in 417 B.C. both were elected strategoi, generals (Bloedow 1973, p9).
It is easy to say in hindsight that this expedition would likely be a disaster, since it greatly
extended Athens theatre of operations at a dangerous time. Caution was undermined by the
excessive hopes and fears produced by the war, undermining political and military
judgement, a central theme in Thucydides' work as a whole (see MacLeod 1974; Farrar 1988,
p156; Jordan 2000). In the case of the first naval expedition, it seems likely that in spite of
appearances, it was under-funded, undermanned in terms of numbers and quality of its
hoplites and cavalry, and was voted for in the Assembly because of the expectation of 'private
and public' financial gain to be achieved (Jordan 2000). Indeed, these commercial motives
may have begun to undermine the expedition's strategic goals: Almost incidentally we hear that soldiers, sailors, and merchants also take money
along for the purpose of trading overseas . . . the military expedition has virtually
become a commercial venture, and in fact more than that, . . . we see that many noncombatants, not only merchants looking for profit, but also masons, builders, millers,
and so on, voluntarily accompanied the fleet in many cargo ships. The expedition . . .
amounted to a large-scale effort to plant an Athenian colony in Sicily; it was, in effect,
a 'city on the move' (Jordan 2000, p66, following Thucydides VI.31 & VI.44 and Avery
1973)
Moreover, it seems clear that Alcibiades both used this expedition to bolster his own
popularity, and at the same time felt that he could break the dominance of Syracuse over the
eastern area of Sicily, essentially by creating an alliance of smaller Greek cities and the native
Sicels of the interior (Bloedow 1973, pp9-11). This would allow Athens to extend it alliance
and access he resources and manpower of the wealthy island. This scheme however, and even
while Aliciades was in command, was not well accepted by many Sicilian cities; Messana,
Naxos and Catana did not come over onto the Athenian side, perhaps because Athens had
already gained a rather negative reputation as a harsh imperialist (Bloedow 1973, pp11-12)
due to her treatments of cities such as Mytilene and Melos. Alicibiades, moreover, had been
arraigned on charges of impiety just before the fleet was to leave, but had been unable to
secure a trial before he left Athens as one of the expedition's generals. Knowing that his
political enemies would have made advantage of his absence to bolster the charges against
him, he chose not to accept the summons to return for trial, but defected to the Spartan side
(for a time).
Thucydides says that a total of 40,000 men were engaged in the siege of Syracuse, and that
these were totally defeated (Thucydides VII.87). The magnitude of such a disaster is
expressed in the speech by one of their generals, Nicias, who suggests that the defeat in Sicily
could lead on to a defeat in Athens as well (Thucydides VII.64). A later source, Diodorus
Siculus, believed that the defeat in Sicily caused the Athenians to voluntarily set up the Four
Hundred: Choosing four hundred men they put in their hands the supreme authority to direct
the conduct of the war; for they assumed that an oligarchy was more suitable than a
democracy in critical circumstances like these. (Diodorus Siculus, XIII.36, p219)
This simplified view, however, ignores the time gap between the defeat in Sicily and the
advent of the Four Hundred, and also underestimates the vigour with which the Athenian
democracy tried to meet this disaster. Thucydides states that: Nevertheless, with their limited resources, they must not give in; they would equip a
fleet, getting the timber from wherever they could; they would raise money, and see
that their allies, particularly Euboea, remained loyal; and in Athens itself they would
take measures of economy and reform. (Thucydides VIII.1)
The defeat at Syracuse, then, was one important factor in setting up the pre-conditions for the
fall of the radical democracy, but did not lead directly to the oligarchic revolution itself.
Rather, in threw doubt on the ability of the democracy to wisely set policy and choose
generals. Nicias, who had been against the expedition, was over-ruled by the Assembly, even
though he too was sent out as one of the commanders to Sicily.
3. The Renewed Persian Threat
Too much weight should not be placed on the statement in The Athenian Constitution that 'the
Lacedaemonian side became stronger through the alliance made with the Persian king.' (29.1)
Certainly treaties were made and funds were supplied (Thucydides VIII.18,37,58), but
Persian aid was both rather indirect and at times tardy. The Persian satraps involved did not at
first pay the Peloponnesian fleet adequately (Thucydides VIII.8,29,46,83), and did not bring
the promised Phoenician fleet into operations in the Aegean (Thucydides VIII.87,146).
Thucydides believes that the intervention of the Phoenician fleet would have swiftly brought
an end to war in Sparta's favour, but that this was not done on the advice of Alcibiades, who
had influence with the Persians and argued that a balance should be kept between Sparta and
Athens to try and wear them both down (Thucydides VIII.87). It is likely that Alcibiades was
playing a 'triple game' in order to avoid the total defeat of his home city, and preparing
conditions for a possible return to political eminence in the city.
The demos of Athens, along with their naval forces stationed at Samos, probably felt that the
king of Persian would be more likely to support them if they had an oligarchic constitution
(Thucydides VIII,49 &53). They were aware, firstly, that Persian-controlled naval forces
could tip the balance against them in the Aegean, but were equally concerned about the
influence of Persian financial resources. The Athenians were strongly aware of the financial
requirements of a long war, and the Persian resources, even those derived from Asia Minor,
greatly exceeded theirs.
3. The Rise of the Oligarchy of the Four Hundred
A third reason, however, needs to be added to this account of the destabilizing of the
Athenian democracy. In Thucydides we find a major theme expressed by the Syracusan
Hermocrates, who says that: We should realize that internal strife is the main reason for the decline of cities.
(Thucydides IV, 61).
This internal problem, according to Thucydides, was fuelled by bad public decisions based on
the private ambition and the private policies of the leaders who followed Pericles
(Thucydides II.64), especially Cleon and Alcibiades. Plutarch reports the humorous tale that a
certain misanthrope called Timon, came up to Alcibiades and said, 'You are doing well, my
boy! Go on like this and you will soon be big enough to ruin the lot of them.' (Alcibiades, 16)
Indeed, Alcibiades had been one of the main promoters of the Sicilian expedition, so the jibe
was not entirely untrue. In passing we might also note that once Alcibiades had joined the
Spartan side to avoid political prosecution at Athens, he did give very good advice to the
Spartans. This included the policy of fortifying Decelea in Attica, which cut off the silver
mines at Laurium, and stopped the Athenians using their countryside year round. Likewise,
his advice to the Peloponnesians to support the revolt of Chios and Miletus forced the
Athenians to station a strong force of 100 triremes permanently at Samos (Thucydides
VIII.8,16,20).
However, Alcibiades outstayed his welcome at Sparta, and eventually engineered his
welcome back at Athens. Alcibiades had 'his views <made> known to the best people in the
army and to say that, if there was an oligarchy instead of the corrupt democracy which had
exiled him, he was ready to return to his country and take part with his countrymen and make
Tissaphernes <the Persian satrap> their friend.' (Thucydides VIII.47)
It was such words which would have helped motivate the leaders of the political 'clubs' who
favoured an oligarchic form of government. Thucydides notes that: The idea of an oligarchy was very badly received by the people at first, but when
Pisander had made it perfectly clear that there was no other way out, their fears (and
also the fact that they expected to be able to change the constitution again later)
made them give in. They voted that Pisander and ten others should sail out and make
whatever arrangements seemed best to them with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades.
(Thucydides VIII.54)
After securing control through a change of generals of the Athenian fleet, members of the
oligarchic faction went on to secretly kill Androcles, one of the main speakers for the
democratic faction. This man had also been an opponent of Alcibiades (Thucydides VIII.65).
According to The Constitution of Athens the leaders of this oligarchic coupe included very
able men such as Pisander, Antiphon, and Theramenes ((Athenian Constitution, 32).
Ironically, this group operated independently of Alcibiades, though they used his name and
influence to further their own policies. They later on tried to keep Alcibiades out of power,
but were unable to do so in the end (Alcibiades ended up becoming a general of the
democratic fleet, stationed at Samos, and become one of the main threats to the Four
Hundred.)
The critical situation created by the difficulties of the war gave the oligarchs and their
political clubs the opportunity and pretext to seize power. The selection of the Four Hundred
men to rule occurred in the following way, according to Thucydides: That five men should be selected as presidents; that these should choose 100 men,
and each of the 100 should choose three men; that this body of 400 should enter the
Council chamber with full powers to govern as they thought best. (Thucydides VIII.67)
This view is not supported by the Athenian Constitution, which states: Four hundred men should form the Council according to the ancestral order, 40 from
each of the tribes, elected of bodies of candidates over thirty year old previously
selected by their tribesmen. (Athenian Constitution 31.1)
It is not really possible to reconcile these two varying accounts. Though the Athenian
Constitution's account does seem to confirm more closely to the traditional Council of the
Four Hundred set up under Solon, this does not mean that this account is more likely - it may
be here following what it would have expected to have been the 'valid' structure of such a
council (see Fuks 1953 for the past as a model of current and future reform in the Greek
world).
The real nature of the Four Hundred is clearly shown by their choice of 'an Assembly' area at
Colonus, a ground about a mile from the city (Thucydides VIII.67). Such a meeting place,
outside the walls, with the Spartan army situated at Decelea, would have prevented large
numbers of Athenians from attempting to attend, especially those without horses or armour as
protection. Furthermore, large numbers of adult citizens would have needed to keep on
manning the walls of the city, and the Long Walls which headed down to the coast, and
would not be able to leave their posts long enough to reach the external assembly area
(Thucydides VIII.69).
The real issue is, 'Which body passed the motion to select the Four Hundred?'. If it was the
full Assembly, then the radical democracy voted itself out of existence for reasons of
expediency and national survival. Another possibility is that an assembly of 5,000, probably
including the rich and the better off of the hoplites, might have voted to give the Four
Hundred these powers. Alternatively, it may be that the voting was nothing more than a
fiction designed to cover up some kind of take-over, led by an oligarchic group who could
always open the city to the Spartans if required. It is not easy to settle this question
definitively. However, the venue of the Four Hundred at Colonus suggests that the motions
passed by this body should not be viewed as motions passed by the 5,000. At this time the
Five Thousand was little more than a thin veneer of legality given to what was in effect an
oligarchic revolution.
Thus the Four Hundred, along with the ten men who had been given extra-ordinary powers,
entered the Council house and ruled the city (Athenian Constitution 31.3). The substantially
personal nature of their ambitions is stated by Thucydides. When their position was
threatened they were willing to discuss terms with Sparta on the following basis: What they really wanted in the first place was to preserve the oligarchy and keep
control over the allies as well; if this was impossible their next aim was to hold onto
the fleet and fortifications of Athens and retain independence; but if this also proved
beyond them, they were certainly not going to find themselves in the position of being
the first people to be destroyed by a reconstituted democracy, and preferred instead
to call in the enemy, give up the fleet and fortifications and make any sort of terms at
all for the future of Athens, provided that they themselves at any rate had their lives
guarantied to them. (Thucydides VIII.91-2)
The historian G. Grote has accurately assessed the success of this group: The ulterior success of the conspiracy - when all prospect of Persian gold, or
improved foreign position, was at an end - is due to the combinations alike nefarious
and skilful, of Antiphon, wielding and organizing the united strength of the aristocratic
classes at Athens; strength always exceedingly great, but under ordinary
circumstances working in factions disunited and even reciprocally hostile to each
other - restrained by the ascendant democratic institutions - and reduced to corrupt
what it could not over-throw. (Grote 1967, p69)
The Four Hundred operated not so much through popular acceptance, as through popular
fear. Fear of Sparta and Persia, the fear generated by the assassination of Androcles, the
existence of a band of 'Hellenic' youths armed with daggers who were the strong-arm of the
oligarchs, with the democratic elements in the end frozen by the possibility that the Five
Thousand were not just a myth but a reality by this stage. (Thucydides VIII.92)
4. The Five Thousand
The rule of the Four Hundred lasted for four months and was soon replaced by the rule of the
Five Thousand. According to The Constitution of Athens, the main reason for the removal of
the Four Hundred were their failures in conducting the war: -
When they <the Athenians> were defeated in the naval battle off Eretria, and when
the whole of Euboea with the exception of Oreos revolted, the Athenians were more
embittered by the revolt than by anything that had happened before, for they drew
more support from Euboea than from Attica itself. And, in consequence, they
abolished the rule of the Four Hundred, entrusting the government to the five
thousand capable of doing military service with full equipment, and decreed at the
same time that there was to be no pay for any public office. (Athenian Constitution
33.1)
If this is accurate, then the 5,000 is a rather low number for Athens' available hoplites, but at
this stage of the war, after many losses, and with sizeable numbers of hoplites serving in the
fleet and foreign garrisons, the number is not impossible. It is also possible that 5,000 was a
nominal 'round figure' that fitted in with the classical view of a moderate Athenian
democracy. Thus, these 5,000 might represent a narrower conservative body within the fiscal
class which can support hoplite status.
Thucydides agrees with the importance of the loss of Euboea, but gives a somewhat different
chronology of events. He believes that this revolution was initiated by the Five Thousand and
began with the tearing down of fortifications which gave the Four Hundred the control of the
harbour. This was done in the name of the Five Thousand, the body which the Four Hundred
had promised but which had not been allowed to meet yet (Thucydides VIII,92-4). The prodemocratic forces then decided to march on the city, but were forestalled by messengers from
the Four Hundred with the following political accommodation:
They <the Four Hundred> would publish the names of the Five Thousand and that
the Four Hundred would be chosen from them in rotation, just as the Five Thousand
should decide. (Thucydides VIII.93)
Thus the replacement of the Four Hundred was already underway, and the loss of Euboea was
sufficient to undermine whatever broader support they may have had. The reasons for this
revolution probably included a veiled desire on the part of some for a return to the
democracy, and upon the personal political ambitions of two leaders, Theramenes and
Aristocrates (Thucydides VIII.89). The Constitution of Athens infers that these men
promoted the change due to a genuine desire for moderation (Athenian Constitution 33.2).
Alcibiades also had a hand in this revolution. Having been excluded from power by the
oligarchs at Athens, and having been recalled to the democratic faction in the fleet at Samos,
he once again changed his policy. In reply to the envoys of the Four Hundred he had said: He was not opposed to the government being in the hands of the Five Thousand, but
he did demand that they should get rid of the Four Hundred and that the original
Council of the Five Hundred should be reinstated. (Thucydides VIII.86)
The desire that Athens shouldn't be turned over to the Spartans, and the fact that the oligarchs
could not survive, may have been the main motivations for Theramenes to come to a more
moderate position. Alcibiades control of the fleet at Samos may also have been a convincing
factor. According to Thucydides: The assembly met at the Pynx, where they used to meet before. The Four Hundred
were deposed and it was voted that power should be given over to the Five Thousand
. . . (Thucydides VIII.97)
There are varying modern views on what this actually meant. G.E.M. de Ste. Croix believes
that this revolution was really a return to democracy, except for the absences of jury pay,
'although effect control of affairs was reserved for the upper classes' (Ste Croix 1956, p2).
P.J. Rhodes, however, claims that the hoplite assembly became the sovereign body during
this period and that the ('lower') thete class lost the vote (Rhodes 1972, p122). However, I
would suggest that the upper classes could not have kept direct control with a full assembly
sitting. Nor does the number 5,000 equate with either the current or traditional numbers of
hoplites in Athens.
What does seem clear from the account in the Constitution of Athens is that the rule of the
Five Thousand was regarded as something separate from the full democracy. Furthermore,
there is some evidence for a 'third party' in Athens, who neither supported a narrow oligarchy,
nor a full democracy. According to the trial speech made by Lysias, there was such a third
party led by Theramenes and Aristocrates (Lysias For Polystratus, XX). In Xenophon,
Theramenes makes the following speech: "But I, Critias, am forever at war with the men who do not think there could be a
democracy until the slaves and those who would sell the state for lack of a shilling
should share in the government, and on the other hand I am forever an enemy to
those who do not think that a good oligarchy could be established until they should
bring the state to the point of being ruled absolutely by the few." (Xenophon
Hellenica, II.4.47-50)
Although political leaders such as Theramenes might be very fickle, we should note that both
Thucydides (VIII.89-90) and the Constitution of Athens (33.2) state that this man played a
crucial role of the ending of the rule of the Four Hundred. If so, half of the above statement
was backed up by appropriate action. It seems unlikely that he would have re-introduced a
full democracy. Likewise, the absence of any precise dates in our ancient sources for the
return of the full democracy only suggests that the return was a gradual one (Kurt & Kapp,
1974, pp180-1, note 117).
Another issue of significance is whether the Council of the Five Hundred operated under the
Five Thousand - if it did their 'hoplite Assembly' would have been the sovereign body in the
state, without undue oligarchic influence. Certainly we do hear of a Council in 406 B.C.
recommending motions to the Assembly in the prosecution of 8 generals, but their actions do
not tell us whether they were a properly constituted Council of Five Hundred or not
(Xenophon Hellenica I.7). Summing these issues up, whether the rule of the Five Thousand
involved depriving the thetes of the vote or not, it still involved a type of government
different in fact from a full, direct democracy.
5. Restoration of Democracy
The final restoration to a full democracy was probably not a revolution as such, but a more
peaceful return to a still rather moderate democracy. It included the return of pay for political
offices, and a vote in the assembly for the thetes, many of whom, we must remember, were
rowers in the war fleets. Full rights may have only been restored in the face of a massive
Spartan victory in 405 B.C., but that this was done would indicate that democratic institutions
and ways of thinking were deeply ingrained in Athenian thought. The Spartan victory and the
tyranny by The Thirty would be only short breaks in the continuation of an effective
Athenian democracy that operated down till the late fourth century.
It is certainly true that Athenian democracy was quite radical once again by 399 B.C., and
was willing to hunt down the enemies of the democracy, or those associated with antidemocratic persons, including thinkers such as Socrates. However, once the impacts of the
defeat in the Peloponnesian War and the tyranny of The Thirty had been absorbed, Athenian
democracy set itself on a more moderate path. In particular, it dampened the use of trials as a
political weapon, and a calmer adjustment was made between elite leadership and democratic
participation. Recent history had taught the Athenians that powerful cities decline more due
to internal division, not just due to external threats.
6. The Victory of Sparta
The victory of Sparta was based on her gaining naval superiority in the Aegean and
Hellespont. If she could close the Hellespont leading onto the Black Sea, then she could
choke Athens' external grain supply, crucial now that her garrison at Decelea excluded any
use of Attican harvests. Normally, the Athenians kept a small group of nine ships in the
Hellespont to guard their merchantmen (Xenophon Hellenica I.1), but after 411 B.C. they
sent more ships there to counter Spartan efforts in the region.
Spartan war aims were completed with the effective support of the Persian Cyrus, who
provided 500 talents and considerable land forces to the war effort. It was largely these funds
which allowed the Spartans to maintain such a large and effective navy. Good leadership was
also shown by the Spartan commanders Lysander and Calicratidas in 407 and 406 B.C. We
can see how stretched Athenian naval forces were after the blockading of their fleet,
commanded by Conon at Mytilene: When the Athenians heard what had happened and of how Conon was under
blockade they voted in favour of sending 110 ships to his relief, and put aboard these
ships all men of military age, slave or free. . . . there were even many men who were
entitled to serve in the cavalry who took part in this expedition. (Xenophon Hellenica
I.6)
It is clear then that Athens was not only short of hoplites, she was also very short of rowers.
This may help account for the rather vicious behaviour of the Athenian Assembly in 406
B.C., when, even though they had been victorious at the Battle of Arginusae, six generals
were put to death on charges of not picking up survivors who had been lost at sea (Xenophon
Hellenica I.7). Theramenes, who helped bring the charges, was also saving his own skin,
while removing some political competition.
This reprieve, however, was a temporary one. In 405-4 B.C. Lysander led the Spartans to a
decisive victory in the Hellespont - at the Battle of Aegospotami he effectively destroyed
most of the Athenians fleet. The Spartans now controlled the Hellespont, Byzantium and
Calchedon (Xenophon Hellenica II.1): Athenians main food supply had been cut. Lysander
then sailed out of the Hellespont with 200 ships and settled affairs in the Aegean as he
wished. Only Samos held out, with the people slaughtering their aristocratic party and taking
control of the government. After Athens' decisive naval defeat 'every state in Greece except
Samos had abandoned the Athenian cause' (Xenophon Hellenica II.2). The Peloponnesian
army once again invested Attica, but now a large fleet worked along side them. The fleet
restored the independence of Aegina and Melos, devastated Salamis, and anchored at Piraeus
with 150 ships. Athens was now completely cut off. A city with such a large population,
whose reserves had already been worn down by years of fighting, would soon find itself at
the point of starvation.
Athens did try to resist for a time. In an order to avoid internal stasis and to mobilize as many
people as possible, rights were given back 'to all who had been disfranchised and, though
numbers of people in the city were dying of starvation, there was no talk of peace' (Xenophon
Hellenica II.2). At this time then, if not before, the rule of the Five Thousand certainly
reverted back to a full democracy. Eventually, however, Athens had no choice but to ask for
peace terms from their enemies. The Thebans and Corinthians wanted Athens completely
destroyed. The Spartans terms were comparatively mild: They offered to make peace on the following terms: the Long Walls and the
fortifications of Piraeus must be destroyed; all ships except twelve surrendered; the
exiles to be recalled; Athens to have the same enemies and the same friends as
Sparta and to follow Spartan leadership in any expedition Sparta might make either
by land or sea. (Xenophon Hellenica II.2)
I suspect that Sparta knew that the complete destruction of Athens would make Sparta feared
by the smaller Greek cities: but more importantly, the removal of this important power might
shift the balance too far in the favour of Corinth and Thebes (Thebes, in fact, would seriously
defeat the Spartans in the next century.)
For the time being, however, Greece was at peace. It was probably for this reason that the
walls of Athens 'were pulled down among scenes of great enthusiasm and to the music of
flute girls. It was thought that this day was the beginning of freedom for Greece. (Xenophon
Hellenica II.2) This was only partially true, and only for a relatively short time.
7. Bibliography and Further Reading
Ancient
ARISTOTLE (trans. K von Fritz & E. Kapp) The Constitution of
Athens, N.Y., Hafner Press, 1974
DIODORUS SICULUS Histories, (trans. C.Oldfather) Vol 5,
Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1962
LYSIAS, (trans. W.Lamb) For Polystratus, Cambridge MA, Harvard
University Press, 1967
PLUTARCH Plutarch's Lives, trans. by Bernadotta Perrin, 7
vols., London, Heinemann, 1914
PLUTARCH The Rise and Fall of Athens: Nine Greek Lives, trans.
by Ian Scott-Kilvert, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1960
THUCYDIDES, (trans. R.Warner) History of the Peloponnesian War,
Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1988
XENOPHON, (trans. C.Brownson) Hellenica, Cambridge MA, Harvard
University Press, 1968
XENOPHON, (trans. R.Warner) A History of My Times (Hellenica),
Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1966
Modern
AVERY, H.C. "Themes in Thucydides' Account of the Sicilian
Expedition", Hermes, 101, 1973, pp1-13
BLOEDOW, Edmund F. Alcibiades Reexamined, Wiesbaden, Franz
Steiner Verlag Gmbh, 1973
CARY, M. "Notes on the Revolution of the Four Hundred at
Athens", Journal of Hellenic Studies, 72, 1952, pp56-61
FARRAR, Cynthia The Origins of Democratic Thinking, Cambridge,
CUP, 1988
FUKS, Alexander The Ancestral Constitution, London, Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1953, pp1-25
GOMME, A.W. "The Working of Athenian Democracy", in More Essays
in Greek Literature, Oxford, 1962
GROTE, G. "The Threat of the Oligarchs" in J. Claster, Athenian
Democracy: Triumph of Travesty?, New York, Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1967
HARDING, P. "The Theramenes' Myth", Phoenix, 28, 1974, pp101111
JORDAN, B. "The Sicilian Expedition Was a Potemkin Fleet", The
Classical Quarterly, Vol. 50, No. 1., 2000, pp63-79
MACLEOD, C.W. "Thucydides' Plataean Debate", GRBS, 18, 1977,
pp227-246
OBER, Josiah Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric,
Ideology, and the Power of the People, Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 1989
RHODES, P.J. "Athenian Democracy after 404 BC", Classical
Journal, 74, 1979-80
RHODES, P.J. "The Five Thousand in the Athenian Revolution of
411 B.C.", Journal of Hellenic Studies, 92, 1972, pp115-127
STE CROIX, G.E.M. de "The Constitution of the Five Thousand",
Historia, 5, 1956, pp1-23
Essays in History, Politics and Culture Copyright R.
James Ferguson © 2001