ARISTOTLE ON
MORAL VIRTUE
ARISTOTLE VS THE STOICS
In this section of the course we turn to another central point of
disagreement between the Peripatetics and the Stoics.
The first issue concerned the role of so -called external goods in
the happy life.
The second issue concerns the role of emotion. Will the sage
(the virtuous & happy individual) have emotions like anger?
REASON & THE HUMAN GOOD
A good human life is one of activity: the happy individual
exercises her distinctively human capacities well. What sets
humans apart from other living beings is our capacity for
reasoning. So it might seem that reasoning ef fectively, e.g.
calculating well concerning external goods , is central to
happiness.
And in that case virtue would be as Socrates & the Stoics
conceive it: virtue would be intellectual in nature, a matter of
knowledge (know -how). But Aristotle’s view is more complex
thanks to the complexity of reason.
THE COMPLEXIT Y OF REASON
Unlike Socrates, Aristotle allows that weakness of will is
possible and his theory of virtue is shaped accordingly (see EN
I.13).
Reflection on weakness leads Aristotle to acknowledge two
parts distinctive of rational animals (humans):
1. A part that has the capacity to reason.
2. A non-rational part which can be trained to conform to
reason.
THE COMPLEXIT Y OF REASON
reason
non-rational part
which can be
trained to conform
to reason
part which has
reason in itself
demonstrative
reason
deliberative
reason
FROM FUNCTION TO VIRTUE
human virtue
virtues of
character
(moral virtues)
virtues of
thought
wisdom
(scientific
knowledge)
craft
knowledge
practical
wisdom
(intelligence)
VIRTUE IN NICOMACHEAN ETHICS
Virtues of character: Books II -V
Virtues of thought: Book VI
 What do you think is meant by ‘virtues of character’?
Examples?
VIRTUE OF CHARACTER DEFINED
Aristotle defines virtue of character as “[a] a state that decides,
[b] consisting in a mean, [c] the mean relative to us, [d] which
is defined by reference to reason, [e] i.e., to the reason by
reference to which the prudent person would define it .” (1107a)
Let’s take up each part of this account in turn.
[A] A STATE THAT DECIDES
When we look to the nonrational part we find: (i) the capacity
for feeling, (ii) manifestations of this capacity (i.e. feelings),
and (iii) states of this capacity (in virtue of which one is
disposed to feel one way rather than another in the various
circumstances of human life).
 In virtue of which of these is a person called virtuous?
[A] A STATE THAT DECIDES
When we look to the nonrational part we find: (i) the capacity
for feeling, (ii) manifestations of this capacity (i.e. feelings),
and (iii) states of this capacity (in virtue of which one is
disposed to feel one way rather than another in the various
circumstances of human life ).
 In virtue of which of these is a person called virtuous?
Virtue concerns (iii): in calling people virtuous we are praising
the way they are disposed to respond emotionally to the
circumstances they find themselves in. This is the genus of
moral virtue.
[A] A STATE THAT DECIDES
Note that the state in question is one that decides. Moral virtue is
a state with respect to feeling and action, a state that issues in a
decision to act in accord with (correct) feeling .
The role of decision is explained at 1105a : “But for actions
expressing virtue to be done temperately or justly and hence well it
does not suffice that they are themselves in the right state.
Rather, the agent must also be in the right state when he does
them. First, he must know that he is doing virtuous actions;
second, he must decide on them, and decide on them for
themselves, and, third, he must also do them from a firm and
unchanging state.”
 Aristotle thinks that these aspects of virtuous action raise
trouble for the Socratic view of virtue as a kind of craft
knowledge. Why might there be a problem here for Socrates?
[A] A STATE THAT DECIDES
The idea that virtuous actions are chosen ‘for themselves’ is
just the idea that they are done because they are virtuous, i.e.
done ‘for the sake of the fine ( kalos)’:
“Actions in accord with virtue are fine, and aim at the fine .”
(1120a) The fine is one of three objects of choice: “For there
are three objects of choice —fine, expedient, and pleasant —and
three objects of avoidance —their contraries, shameful, harmful,
and painful.” (1104b)
 Are fine actions fine because they perfect our nature (and
thereby lead to happiness)? Or do they perfect our nature
because they are independently fine?
THE EUTHYPHRO DILEMMA
In the Euthyphro Plato has Socrates ask: Do the gods love
certain actions because they are pious ? Or are the actions pious
because the gods love them ?
Plato insists that the gods love the actions because they are
pious.
A closely related question: Does God command what he does
because it is good? Or is something good because he
commands it?
Proponents of the Divine Command Theory insist that things are
only good in virtue of God’s commanding them.
[B] CONSISTING IN A MEAN
The virtuous person is disposed to feel things in a middling way,
thus avoiding the extremes of feeling, e.g., too much anger or
too little.
And the virtuous person is disposed to avoid extremes in action
generally. For example, the generous person avoids giving (and
taking) either too little or too much.
[C] THE MEAN RELATIVE TO US
Aristotle hopes to clarify the notion of a mean by distinguishing
the mean in the object from the mean relative to us: only the
latter is relevant to virtue.
Aristotle illustrates this distinction with his food example.
Suppose 10 lbs. of food is too much for anyone in training and 2
lbs. is too little. The arithmetical mean is 6, but it does not
follow that all those in training should eat 6 lbs. of food. That
amount would be too little for Milo, too much for most
beginners.
[C] THE MEAN RELATIVE TO US
How does this distinction relate to virtue? We might take
Aristotle to be saying that we cannot specify in general terms
what the right amount to feel is: there is what is right for the
one who is beginning moral training, and there is what is right
for the one who is more advanced.
But this reading of Aristotle has very little to recommend it.
[C] THE MEAN RELATIVE TO US
A more plausible suggestion is that by the mean ‘relative to us’
he means relative to our circumstances : “By virtue I mean virtue
of character; for this pursues the mean because it is concerned
with feelings and actions, and these admit of excess,
deficiency, and an intermediate condition . We can be afraid, for
instance, or be confident, or have appetites, or get angry, or
feel pity, in general have pleasure or pain, both too much and
too little, and in both ways not well; but having these feelings at
the right times, about the right things, towards the right people,
for the right end, and in the right way, is the intermediate
condition.” (1106b)
The right amount to feel depends on a wide variety of factors,
and there is no general way to specify what is in the middle.
What is right depends on the circumstances of action.
DIGRESSION: MORAL PARTICULARISM
Aristotle’s claim that ethics is an inexact science can be read as a
commitment to some version or other of moral particularism, the
idea that general moral principles have very little (or no) role to
play in shaping the moral agent’s behavior. Aristotle writes: “And
when our general account is so inexact, the account of particular
cases is all the more inexact. For these fall under no craft or
profession, and the agents themselves must consider in each case
what the opportune action is, as doctors and navigators do.”
(1104a)
Some take Aristotle to be rejecting the idea that there are any
general moral principles . On this reading, the moral agent is
guided by context-sensitive perceptions of value, not by application
of general moral principles .
 Which view seems to capture the true nature of moral
insight/moral reasoning ?
NOTHING IN EXCESS?
 Is Aristotle claiming that, in all circumstances in which one
might reasonably feel anger, one should never be extremely
angry or mildly angry—one ought to be middlingly angry?!
 But if that’s not his view, then how are we to understand his
requirement that our dispositions for feeling conform to a
mean?
DISPOSITION IN THE MIDDLE
Presumably it is the disposition itself that is in the middle,
while the feelings can be extreme .
The disposition is in the middle insofar as it lies between two
extremes, two vices. There are plenty of circumstances that
incite fear. At one extreme there is the person who is deficient
in fearing, the one who fails to fear when it is appropriate to do
so. At the other extreme there is the person who fears too
much. The virtuous person, by contrast, feels the right amount
of fear given her circumstances and will avoid both kinds of
excess.
ALL THINGS IN MODERATION?
 What about feelings like spite, shamelessness, and envy? Is
Aristotle committed to the idea that the virtuous person will
have these feelings too in due measure?
[D & E] DEFINED BY REASON
But what determines which feelings and what degree of feeling
is correct in a given situation?
Correctness is fixed [d] by reference to reason, [e] by reference
to how the prudent person would judge the matter.
OK, but what is prudence, exactly?
PRUDENCE
Prudence (phronesis) is excellence of deliberation, a virtue of
thought: “It seems proper to a prudent person to be able to
deliberate finely about things that are good and beneficial for
himself, not about some restricted area —about what sorts of
things promote health or strength, for instance —but about what
sorts of things promote living well in general.” (1140a)
Deliberation is reasoning about means, not ends: “We
deliberate not about ends, but about what promotes ends.”
(1112b)
Hence, the prudent person is the person who reasons ef fectively
about the means to happiness.
SOME QUESTIONS
We now have an overview of Aristotle’s theory of moral virtue.
Virtue is all about being disposed to feel and decide in a
manner that avoids extremes. Which feelings are appropriate
and to what extent is determined by the prudent person, the
one who is excellent at deliberating about the means to
happiness.
Now it is time to raise some dif ficult questions for Aristotle.
CIRCULARIT Y?
Aristotle’s strategy in Nicomachean Ethics looks circular:
1. Aristotle wants to give an account of well being/happiness
in terms of virtuous activity.
2. He then defines virtuous activity as activity that accords
with the decision of the prudent person.
3. Finally, he defines the prudent person as one who
deliberates successfully towards the end of happiness .
 Do you agree that there appears to be a problem of circularity
here?
A PLATITUDE?
 Is the doctrine of the mean anything more than a useless
platitude like “Nothing in excess!”?
PAROCHIALISM?
Although Aristotle is prepared to augment and systematize
prevalent thinking about the virtues, e.g. recognizing virtues which
lack names in Greek, we can worry that the results of his
theorizing are too parochial .
Take the virtue of magnificence, megaloprepeia, a kind of
excellence in large-scale spending. Aristotle tells us that this
virtue requires significant wealth and adds: “That is why a poor
person could not be magnificent; he lacks the means for large and
fitting expenditures. If he tries to be magnificent, he is foolish; for
he spends more than what is worthy and right for him, whereas
correct spending accords with virtue. Large spending befits those
who have the means, acquired through their own efforts or their
ancestors or connections, or are well born or reputable, and so on;
for each of these conditions includes greatness and reputation for
worth.” (1122b)
 Should we be worried about the fact that there are these cross cultural differences in what character traits count as virtuous?
TWO ACCOUNTS OF HAPPINESS?
A long-standing puzzle about the Nicomachean Ethics is
whether it presents a coherent & unified account of human
happiness. The puzzle arises because Aristotle seems to present
us with not one, but two, theories of happiness and they seem
to be irreconcilable.
THE INCLUSIVE ACCOUNT
So far we have been focusing on the most natural reading of
Book I, where Aristotle tells us that happiness is self-sufficient,
i.e. lacking nothing.
The idea is that happiness includes everything that makes life
worth living, all of the intrinsic goods like friendship, honor,
virtue, and pleasure.
This ‘container’ view of happiness is evident in passages like
the following: “Honor, pleasure, understanding, and every virtue
we certainly choose because of themselves, since we would
choose each even if it had no further result; but we also choose
them for the sake of happiness, supposing that through them
we shall be happy.” (1097b)
THE EXCLUSIVE ACCOUNT
On the exclusive account, happiness excludes everything except
the very best excellence, excellence of understanding (and
whatever is minimally required for study).
“If happiness is activity in accord with virtue, it is reasonable
for it to accord with the supreme virtue, which will be the virtue
of the best thing. The best is understanding, or whatever else
seems to be the natural ruler and leader, and to understand
what is fine and divine, by being itself either divine or the most
divine element in us. Hence complete happiness will be its
activity in accord with its proper virtue; and we have said that
this activity is the activity of study.” (1177a)
WILL THE SAGE GET ANGRY?
Aristotle denies that the virtuous person will have feelings of
spite, malice, or malevolence. At the same time he insists that
the virtuous person will have emotions like anger.
The Stoics deny that the virtuous person will have emotions like
anger. Emotions are false value judgments because they
presuppose that externals can be good or bad .
Seneca of fers some interesting arguments on the topic of anger
in particular…
WHAT USE IS ANGER?
The Peripatetic: anger is needed to motivate.
The Stoic: the sage will be motivated to do the right thing
because it is right. Anger is unnecessary/superfluous.
Further, anger can be worse than unnecessary; it will be
dangerous insofar as it is unruly.
Analogy. The Peripatetics want us to think of anger as good
when it acts like an obedient soldier, conforming to reason. But
if it conforms to the dictates of reason, then anger adds
nothing. And if it rebels, it is dangerous.
RIGHTEOUS INDIGNATION
The Peripatetic: The good person will feel anger in the face of
injustice.
The Stoic: Wrong-doing is a product of ignorance. It should give
rise to pity rather than anger.
Further, there is no end to injustice in the world. But in that
case the sage will be always angry (and not moderately so)!
FOR DISCUSSION
 What value might anger have? In other words, why might the
sage sometimes feel anger appropriately?
 Do the Stoics have ef fective responses to these
considerations?