Strategic Ambiguity K
Shell
A. The Affirmative Chooses a Discourse of Strategic Ambiguity
The affirmative is an exercise of strategic symbolic politics—In order to maximize their
strategic flexibility in the debate round they made the strategic choice to include
ambiguous terms like “substantially curtail” in the text of their advocacy. It gives
them the strategic flexibility to be able to perm counterplans. The outcome is the
perpetuation of strategically ambiguous discourse that renders their discursive choices
ontologically, ethically, and effectively flawed.
Bluhdorn & Welsh 13 Ingolfur Blühdorn is reader in politics and political sociology at the University
of Bath, England, Ian Welsh is Reader in Sociology in the Cardiff School of Social Sciences, The Politics of
Unsustainability: Eco-Politics in the Post-Ecologist Era pp. 72-5
If
surrogate politics is a matter of strategic choice rather than inescapable pressures. i.e. if it is the intentional avoidance of
theoretically available, more effective alternatives
(type BII). this may either simply be a matter of convenience, i.e. the attempt to avoid - or at
a cunning and sinister strategic
instrument used by power elites to deceive the public into believing that its concerns are being heard
and addressed, whilst the elites are secretly pursuing their own interests which probably confiict with those of the public (type BII.2). An important difference of this variety of
least postpone - uncomfortable implications of a policy measure that is in principle accepted to be necessary and appropriate (type Bll.l); or it may be
symbolic politics in comparison to the BI varieties is that in the latter the political class. rather than cunningly abusing their power for deceiving the masses, appear themselves as victims of
unfavourable conditions which are beyond their control. The distinctive feature of symbolic politics in the present sense (type BII.2). however, is the malicious deception of the unsuspecting
symbolic politics is geared towards generating false impressions under the cover of
which political elites may pursue their own agendas. It is worth reiterating that in political practice the different forms of symbolic politics that are
and vulnerable public. This type of
analytically distinguished in this tentative typology often cannot be neatly separated from each other. Political action has several interlocking layers and levels. and features of different
analytical types of symbolic politics blend into each other. Nevertheless, this typology is useful because it illustrates that symbolic politics is a highly complex phenomenon that requires
differentiated analytical approaches and sensitive criteria of assessment. The typology demonstrates that generalising assertions such as that 'symbolic politics is based on strategic action of
political elites. who are interested in the in-transpa rency of the true and zuir/m-lying processes of politics' (Nullmeier. 2005: I99: emphases in the original) are simplistic and unhelpful. It also
sheds doubts on the popular idea of the 'duplication of the political' (Offe. I976,-"2005: x) according to which 'politics breaks down into two realities: that of polished facades which is relayed
to the citizens primarily through the media, and the politics of interests which is secretly conducted behind closed doors' (Nullmeier. 2005: I99).7 A Narrative of Deception, Repression and
Authentic (Eco-)po|itics As regards the insufiiciency of environmental policy. much of this can be explained on the basis of symbolic politics types Bl.l. BI.2. Bll.l or a combination of parameters
which are analytically distinguished in these types. Yet. the common rhetoric of and complaint about nwrely sjvmbalic environ- mental policiesinsinuates the prevalence of type Bll.2. This is the
meaning which Murray Edelman (1964. l97l) implied when he introduced the term symbolic politics. and today 'we are making implicit reference to the basic argument of his book. whenever
symbolic politics was clearly a matter of political elites making strategic
use of symbols. myths and rituals in order to deceive and control the mass public and in order to maximise their own interests.
Symbolic politics in this sense is subject to at least four kinds of criticism: 0 it is mere performance. illusion. appearance; 0 it is inadequate with regard to
the concrete issues which politics is supposed to address: it is morally rotten because it aims to distort political
realities. deceive righteous citizens and conceal hidden agendas: 0 it is politically damaging in that it undermines public trust in political institutions. replaces free rational
public deliberation with the dark power of psychological manipulation and emotional mobilisation and impairs the ability of citizens to make effective use of their democratic rights. The
first of these criticisms regards the inferior ontological quality of BII.2-type symbolic politics. The second
criticism concerns its effectiveness or problem- solving capacity. The third concerns the ethical
predisposition of political actors adopting strategies of symbolic politics. And the last aspect focuses on the effect on the
we describe politics or a policy as symbolic' (Nullmeier. 2005: 199).' For Edelman'
democratic culture. Together, these four dimensions of insufficiency define the respects in which (eco-)politics supposedly 'can and ought to be different' (Hansjiirgens & Liibbe-Wolll. 2000:
12). If authentic politics is an appropriate term for this supposedly better alternative. it may be described as politics that is genuinely committed to responding to the citizens' concerns and to
effectively addressing the 'real issues'. Figure 2 summarises the expectations which are implied in the notion ofauthentic politics and contrasts them with the characteristics of svmbolic;
politics.
B. Choice is Tragic
The choice to include strategic ambiguity through the use of what Orwell calls “weasel
words” functions to corrupt political action
Grono 8 Ben Grono Australian National University, The Corruption of Language,
https://eview.anu.edu.au/cross-sections/vol4/pdf/ch05.p55-6
Language that carries political discourse is constantly under threat of corruption, making George Orwell’s ideas
about the manipulation of language as relevant to politics now as they were over half a century ago. This essay begins by exploring the
language that Orwell contested ‐ from vague and meaningless discourse to far more manipulative concepts ‐ before focusing on the way in
which the objective reality that Orwell subscribed to has been undermined and how the use of language in contemporary politics has moved in
directions that he did not envisage. As perceived by both Nietzsche and Lakoff, the concept of truth itself is caught up in a constant battle to
influence the way people perceive the world around them. This framing and reframing illustrates a much more complex link between truth and
language than even Orwell envisaged. In conclusion, the difference between corrupted language and persuasive framing is now blurred beyond
Orwell’s recognition, leaving the revival of language as yet another concept in dispute. The human ability to use language and communicate
with others about matters not immediately in front of us gives us an understanding of reality greater than our personal experience.1 This
shared truth transforms a world dominated by the unilateral exercise of power into one where deliberation can take place and power can be
negotiated and shared.2 Orwell realised that there is one caveat to this progressive role that language plays in human society. Because
the
limits of language often prescribe the limits of thought, vague expressions, deliberate ambiguities,
obscured meaning, and unfathomable phrases corrupt public language and obstruct people from formulating complex arguments,
carrying out serious deliberation and making informed decisions.3 Public language is integral to discerning truth, deliberating on the state of
reality, and sharing power. Yet language seems to be most corrupted by public figures who are most influential in our society. The
way
that the language of contemporary politics is misused to deceive us and obscure reality mirrors
Orwell’s imagined future in which truth and honesty are absent from political discourse.4 However, no
matter how deceptive contemporary political discourse may be, the corruption of language is nothing new. This corruption is central
to exploitative politics, and, as Orwell proclaims, the ‘defence of the indefensible’.5 Ambiguity must be recognised as
deliberate and a major purpose of some political language.6 In Politics and the English Language, Orwell was
most critical of vague and incompetent political language that concealed reality by tending away from
concrete meaning.7 This language ‐ weasel words, stale metaphors, managerial buzz words, pretentious diction and other
meaningless phrases ‐ continues to proliferate in contemporary political discourse. Seeking a shield against attack, public
figures instinctively use ambiguous expressions, described as weasel words, to complicate meaning .8
Reflecting the observations made by Orwell in his own era, contemporary political discourse is padded with the buzz words of managerial
language, signalling conformity and approval at the expense of simple verbs, active voice and meaning.9 Our growing awareness of the natural
environment on which we depend has spurred the creation of the most recent set of buzz words and meaningless terms. The most notorious of
these words—often labelled as astro‐turfing—are the adjectives ‘sustainable’ and ‘green’, which can (and are) applied to any idea or policy in
search of support.10 Other phrases include ‘being proactive’, ‘social responsibilities’, ‘sustainable value creation’, and ‘stakeholder
engagement’.11 The 2007 Sydney APEC Leaders’ Declaration on climate change, energy security, and clean development remains a prime
example of vague language tending away from the concrete. APEC economies announced that ‘we agree to work to achieve a common
understanding on a long‐term aspirational global emissions reduction goal to pave the way for an effective post‐2012 international
arrangement’.12 Considering that a decade had passed since the Kyoto Protocol was adopted, and binding emissions reduction targets on many
national economies entered into force in 2005,13 the aspirational (and not binding) goals that the APEC declaration refers to are meaningless
weasel words designed to give nothing more than the appearance of commitment. Whilst weasel
words allow politicians to
escape without making any real commitments, meaningless political language can also exclude people from communication
altogether. People can only engage in political discourse if they are familiar with the terms being used to communicate meaning. Pretentious
diction and pompous language – both meaningless jargon – are used to conceal meaning and shield against uncertainty. People are excluded
from whole areas of discourse, particularly when related to economics, because they are not fluent in meaningless words like ‘diversity’,
‘transparency’, ‘social cohesion’, ‘inclusion’, ‘adding value’ and ‘stakeholding’.14
The road to hell is paved with good intentions—The discursive fluidity of whiteness
means that even explicit claims by the affirmative to oppose racism can function to reentrench whiteness when they are grounded in the language of strategic ambiguity
De Valasco 10 Antonio de Velasco is an assistant professor of rhetoric in the Department of
Communication at the University of Memphis, Centrist Rhetoric: The Production of Political
Transcendence in the Clinton Presidency p. 57-8
In describing whiteness in terms of its construction via centrist political rhetoric, I begin with the insights of a body of scholarship founded in
the notion that constructions
of whiteness are coincident with the concealment of their power. In short,
whiteness is an active social force that is continually hiding its own role as such. As Richard Dyer argues, "White
power secures its dominance by seeming not to be anything at all." This claim establishes a tight fit between means of establishing
"dominance" and means of "seeming not to be anything at all," which invites a demystifying, decoding critical practice. Since "public political
figures avoid mentioning whiteness in their discourse” rhetoricians must, Carrie Crenshaw has argued, try to "make whiteness. visible and
overturn its silences for the purpose of resisting racism."" As in other critical discourses of power focused on dismantling social asymmetries
and hierarchies, the most common approach to studying whiteness hinges on the premise that white identification works to turn differences in
pigment into deviations from a presumptive social or biological norm. "White," says George Lipsitz, works as an "unmarked category against
which difference is constructed," though one that never has to "acknowledge its role as an organizing principle in social and cultural relations.""
established as an "unmarked" space apart from marked differences-for example, while as the blank canvas upon which "ethnic" and "minority"
differences stand out-while also continually entering into this field of differences contrastively-for example, white against black or brownwhiteness defines itself through oscillating between invisibility and visibility. This dual effect-performing a contrastive function, while
establishing a position that presumes to orient all other positions-shares an elective affinity with the political center's similarly mixed rhetorical
'character as a topos, allowing us to study one alongside the other. Whiteness. Thomas Nakayama and Robert Krizek argue, functions
as a strategic rhetoric that works to "to resecure the center, the place, for whites" in a position of social dominance.'"
While explicit legal structures of white supremacy once served to secure the center, in the post-civil rights era, tacit and more ambiguous forms
of white power "resecure" this position by coloring it while, so to speak. Nakayama and Krizek advance this line of thought when they argue
that whiteness "makes itself visible and invisible, eluding analysis yet exerting influence over our everyday life" from the "normalizing position
of the center."" This
understanding of whiteness as a fluid discourse effect (it seeps into spaces undetected)
that nevertheless establishes a fixity of power relations (it keeps in place a legacy of division) from the center allows for us to grasp a
contradiction that inheres in Clinton's treatment of Whiteness in the Souljah speech and elsewhere. symbolic fluidity affords Clinton the means
to advance, in the same discursive space, seemingly incongruous aims pertaining to the politics of race. Whiteness does not work unilaterally in
his rhetoric against blackness as a social signifier, but in a complex manner that both challenges and "re-secures" the center as a place reserved
for whites. According to Robyn Wiegman, a similar kind of process defines a dominant formation of white identity in the United States. She
describes a form of "liberal
whiteness" in which an active "disaffiliation from white supremacist practices"
becomes put to "multiple and contradictory political purposes." When explicit rejections and
denunciations of overt racist practices in the name of inclusion can themselves harness and be
harnessed by the logic of whiteness' rhetorical power, we are in the realm of the production of political
transcendence.
Links
Curtail
The affirmative advocacy statement locks surveillance in place--- In law curtail cannot
mean abolish. Putting curtail in the plan means that race based targeting is not
abolished under the plan
Supreme Court of Connecticut 85
IN RE JUVENILE APPEAL (85-AB) (12391) 195 Conn. 303 (1985) IN RE JUVENILE APPEAL (85-AB) Decision
released February 26, 1985
http://www.leagle.com/decision/1985498195Conn303_1470.xml/IN%20RE%20JUVENILE%20APPEAL%2
0(85-AB)
In an attempt to suggest that the statutory right to a private hearing under General Statutes § 46b-122 is not really nullified by their opinion,
the majority points to General Statutes § 46b-124. While recognizing, as they must, that their position does result in publicity, they nevertheless
argue that § 46b-124 by prohibiting disclosure of records and proceedings in juvenile matters does "curtail the additional publicity that a public
trial would generate." Two points should be made to counter this "justification." First, as one court said: "[I]n common parlance, or
in law
composition, the word `curtail' has no such meaning as `abolish .'" State v. Edwards, 207 La. 506, 511, 21 So.2d 624
(1945). Rather, it means "`to cut off the end, or any part, of; hence to shorten; abridge; diminish; lessen; reduce.'" Id. Second, the statutory
right to a private hearing in § 46b-122 does not talk at all in terms of relativity, of something is to be diminished, lessened or reduced. It confers
a right that is not to be diluted, let alone nullified.
The word curtail increases discretionary power and allows arbitrary decisions
Compliance Matters 14
OCTOBER 2014 VOLUME NO PUBLISHED BY: ClearView Financial Media Ltd,
clearviewpublishing.com/.../issues/ComplianceMattersOct2014.pdf
Registered insurance brokers will, if the MAS’s plans come to fruition, be required to meet the same management expertise, financial and
compliance requirements that are going to apply to licensed financial advisors; failing which the MAS will ‘restrict’ their advisory operations.
Whenever the regulator uses the word ‘restrict’ it does so in opposition to the word ‘curtail’, which
(alongside its frequently expressed yearning for new discretionary power) suggests that this is an
area in which it might end up making arbitrary decisions. It plans, in any case, to issue new guidelines about the things
that registered brokers should do before they are allowed to perform the full range of financial advisory activities.
Curtail cannot legally mean abolish
O’Niell 45 Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Louisiana. · 207 La. 506 (La. 1945) STATE v. EDWARDS, https://casetext.com/case/statev-edwards-70
According to Webster's New International Dictionary, 2 Ed., unabridged, the word "curtail" means "to cut off the end, or any part, of; hence to
shorten; abridge; diminish; lessen; reduce." The
word "abolish" or the word "suspend" is not given in the dictionaries as
one of the definitions of the word "curtail". In fact, in common parlance, or in law composition, the word
"curtail" has no such meaning as "abolish".
Curtail does not mean to terminate—It locks in the continued existence of surveillance
Clark 49 CLARK, Circuit Judge U.S. Court of Appeals 178 F.2d 559 COMMISSION OF DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC UTILITIES OF COMMONWEALTH, OF MASSACHUSETTS, v. NEW YORK, N.H. & H.R. CO. No. 40,
Docket 21392. United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit. (court)
https://law.resource.org/pub/us/case/reporter/F2/178/178.F2d.559.40.21392.html
When these provisions are read in the light of the background stated and particularly the rejection of express provisions for the power now
claimed by the New Haven, it is obviously difficult to accept the New Haven's present view that a complete abandonment of passenger service
was not intended. Even the words used point to the decisive and- under the circumstances- clean-cut step. The
word 'discontinue' is
defined by Webster's New International Dictionary, 2d Ed. 1939, as meaning ' * * * to put an end to; to cause to cease;
to cease using; to give up'- meanings quite other than the connotations implicit in the word 'curtail,'
which it defines ' * * * to shorten; abridge; diminish; lessen; reduce.' It goes on to give the meaning of 'discontinue'
at law as being 'to abandon or terminate by a discontinuance'- an even more direct interpretation of the critical term. An interesting bit of
support from the court itself for this view is found in Art. XI, s. 2(m), of the final Consummation Order and Decree, which reserved jurisdiction in
the District Court: 'To consider and act on any question respecting the 'Critical Figures' established by the Plan with respect to the termination
by the Reorganized Company of passenger service on the Old Colony Lines.' A
'reduction.'
'termination' is quite different from a
Substantially
The use of the word substantially in the advocacy statement makes the mandates of
the affirmative hollow—It creates strategic ambiguity that makes the appearance of
solvency a hollow shell
Garner 11 Bryan A. Garner is editor in chief of all current editions of Black's Law Dictionary, A
Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage p. 926
WEASEL Words. Theodore Roosevelt
said, in a speech in St. Louis, May 31. 1916: 'One of our defects as a nation is a
tendency to use what have been called weasel words. When a weasel sucks eggs it sucks the meat out
of the egg and leaves it an empty shell. If you use a weasel word after another there is nothing left of
the other." Some writers have incorrectly assumed that the metaphor suggested itself because of the wriggling. evasive character of the
weasel. In any event, sensitive writers are aware of how supposed intensives (for example very. q.v.) actually have the effect of
weakening a statement . Many other words merely have the effect of rendering uncertain
or toothless the
statements in which they appear. Among these are significantly, substantially , reasonable. meaningful, compelling,
undue, clearly, obviously, manifestly, if practicable. with all deliberate speed (orig. a weasel phrase. now with a history), all reasonable means,
or as soon the neafler as may be. rather. somewhat. duly. vir- tually, and quite. Sec clearly. Cf. I-'UDGI-: worms.
Substantially is a weasel word that locks in strategic ambiguity
McDonnell 10 Thomas McDonnell is Professor of Law at Pace Univerity, The United States,
International Law, and the Struggle Against Terrorism p. 266
The problem with the "substantial involvement" test, however, is its vagueness. "Substantial" is a weasel
word like "reasonable." In proof contexts, some US courts, for example, have held that a "substantial" likelihood is less than a 50 percent
probability, making even a 10 percent chance "substantial." A victim state could thus characterize any assistance a state gives a terrorist
organization as "substantial involvement." For example, should a suspected haven stare let one of its hospitals offer medical treatment to a
"known terrorist," a "victim state" could plausibly claim that the "haven state" in providing medical assistance is "substantially involved" with
the terrorist organization and its acts. Giving
victim states the right to use force on such a loose standard creates
too broad a license to attack another state.
Weasel words like substantially destroy the power of discourse and are used as a
strategic means of bending the truth to prevent any meaningful discussion
Daly, 11 [Christopher, BA in history from the University of Virginia and a MFA in writing from the University of Southern Maine, “World
Wide Weasel Words,” https://thebettereditor.wordpress.com/2011/12/09/world-wide-weasel-words/]
According to Garner, Teddy Roosevelt was one of the first to attach a definition to the phrase weasel words, in a speech given in St. Louis,
Missouri, on May 16, 1916: One of our
defects as a nation is a tendency to use what have been called weasel
words. When a weasel sucks out eggs it sucks the meat out of the egg and leaves it an empty shell. If you
use a weasel word after another there is nothing left of the other. Who knew TR was such a keen observer of
language? I’m sorry to say, Teddy, things haven’t changed much in the last century. About the only difference these days is that in modern
English syntax weasel words usually come before the word being drained (“clearly correct”) rather than after (“support substantially“). The
kind of weasel words TR was complaining about are sloppy intensifiers that suck the life out of words around
them: significantly, substantially, reasonable, meaningful, compelling, undue, clearly, obviously, manifestly, if practicable, rather,
somewhat, duly, virtually, quite (this list is Garner’s). You can easily find examples of other words that qualify; they’re usually modifiers:
consistently, nearly, frequently, almost, absolutely, and so on. They’re similar to the filter words writers sometimes carelessly use, but more
corrosive. The idea expressed by TR is that clear writing (or speech) doesn’t need these flabby modifiers. All they manage to do is inflate the
language around what’s being communicated, in the process undermining the strength of the actual words being used. It’s
hard to disagree, although modern writing has become so infested with this sort of construction that they’re very difficult to get rid of. In this
single paragraph, I’ve arguably used no fewer than ten weasel word constructions, even while being aware of the problem. Most, if not all, of
them probably slipped by you unnoticed. They might be the fnords of modern discourse. TR wasn’t the first (or last) to use the phrase. Its
purported origin (with this meaning) goes back to 1900. Or 1879. Or even to a couple of Shakespeare plays. The great scholar Friedrich Hayek
(1899-1992), darling of the far right in recent decades, apparently thought the adjective “social” was the worst of all weasel words. In his 1988
book, Hayek opined that phrases such as social justice, social awareness, and social work were particularly insidious. That covers the traditional
definition for weasel words. Words that suck away meaning, the way the weasel sucks eggs. But in common use, you’re more likely to
encounter another meaning. If you hear the phrase weasel words in conversation, it’s much more likely to be used in a way that – instead
of sucking out the meaning – indicates
that the speaker (or writer) is instead acting like a weasel. They’re being
slippery; they’re bending around the truth (such a pesky obstacle); they’re wriggling out of a situation, or trying
hard to make sure that they don’t get into “a situation” in the first place.
Impact Extensions
Turns the Case -- Racial reforms built on the discourse of strategic ambiguity
empirically make racism worse while creating the appearance of solving racism—It
masks the ongoing racism. The affirmative claim to “substantially curtail” racist
surveillance through the lens that says ongoing surveillance will no longer be “based
on race” locks in and legitimates racism by making it less visible.
Murakawa 14 Naomi Murakawa is an associate professor of African American Studies at Princeton
University The First Civil Right: How Liberals Built Prison America Pp 150-52
Liberal agendas to deracialize punishment bloomed in a normative haze. Democratic proposals for racial fairness found support from Republicans and
southern Democrats who supported carceral modernization, but for different purposes. When Johnson Democrats attempted to correct racism in
criminal justice, resulting reforms to "modernize" ultimately strengthened the carceral state, usually with the result of
exacerbating racial disparity . As highlighted in this study, civil rights advocates like Emanuel Celler, Philip I-Iart, the U.S. Civil Rights Commission,
and the ACLU supported early Democratic proposals to professionalize police with better training, higher standards, and more money. As finally enacted and
administered, however, the Safe Streets Act of 1968 ultimately gave money for police equipment and quasi-militarization, largely because the conservative coalition
amended Democratic proposals with alter- nate priorities and funding administration. Similarly, Johnson-era demands for reduced sentencing disparity (with anticarceral specifics) were transformed into subsequent bipartisan policies for reduced sentencing disparity (with pro-carceral specifics), culminating with the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. When Clinton New Democrats enacted legislation for community policing and death penalty expansion, their "rightward" punitive
policies reposed on justifica- tions from liberalisms past. The rights-laden liberal system secured the integrity of brutal, even lethal state violence, and the discourse
of a community engagement enabled more order-maintenance policing. Perhaps some liberal
lawmakers hoped to cement racial bias
out of the machine. Perhaps others hoped to harden machinery to contain racial threat. In the strategic ambiguities of
policymaking, it is difficult to distinguish policies for racial fairness from policies for racial discipline . I
have argued that, in the logic of liberal law-and-order, this is a distinction without a difference. If legitimate punishment means that the state surveils, confines, and
kills with the right techiques and protocols, then liberal law-and-order specified and refined quality administration with the outcome of legitimating the carceral
state. In the end,
new administrative fixes made violence appear less emotional and more rights-laden.' In the
end, the Big House may serve racial conservatism, but it was built on the rock of racial liberalism. Liberal law-and-order promised to deliver freedom from racial
violence by way of the civil rights carceral state, with pro fessionalized police and prison guards less likely to provoke Watts and Attica. Despite all their differences,
Trumans first essential right of 1947,_]ohnson's police professional- ization, Kennedy's sentencing reform, and even Biden's death penalty proposals landed on a
shared metric: criminal justice was racially fair to the extent that it ushered each individual through an ordered, rights-laden machine. Routinized
administration of race-neutral laws would mean that racially disparate outcomes would be seen, if
seen at all, as individually particularized and thereby not racially motivated. Expunged from institutions and
abstracted from the material world, race did its damage in psychic territory. This summons Gunnar Myrdal's heavenly spirit of the American Creed, those virtuous
commitments to liberty and democratic egalitarianism that float above the hardware of the U.S. racial state. As original sin, white prejudice left its mark in the
form ofblack criminal propensities, making African Americans the embodiment of "a moral lag in the development ofthe nation."" In this sense, liberal law-andorder was especially powerful in entrenching notions o f black criminality. I say especially because liberal law-and-order maintained a politics of pity that, through
references to African American family deficits and at-risk youth, softened the hard edges of conservatism and carceral neoliberalism. Crime policy was akin to other
civil rights issues in this sense: when liberal lawmakers selectively accommodated activist demands, they did so in ways that transformed, decontextualized, and
even inverted original visions of justice. Like campaigns for fair employment and quality education, campaigns for racially fair law-and-order faced a dilemma best
explained by critical race theorist Kimberly Crenshaw: the very reforms won through rights rhetoric seemed "to undermine the ability to move forward toward a
broader vision of racial equality." In other words, while victories
for anti-discrimination law yielded many benefits, they simultaneously
legitimated a rights regime that could barely confront the abject material conditions of people of
color. Thus, Crenshaw concludes: "In the quest for racial justice, winning and losing have been part of the same
experience." The biography of Brown v. Board of Education is a case in point. Brown reposed on a paltry conception of racial
harm, so its victory meant the loss of more ambitious, economic, and international definitions of racism. In particular, the
Brown ruling reveals how the postwar emphasis on racial classification, stigma, and psychological damage ultimately truncated the
broader economic goals of civil rights. Brown sanctified the racial common sense equating discrimination with classification; this equation
factored out racial harm manifest in material condi- tions that civil rights legal campaigns of the previous two decades had sought to address. Ordinary rights talk
ofthe late 1930s and early 1940s equated "civil rights" with labor rights, decent wages, union rights, and freedom from peonage and police brutality. The
civil
rights "victory" of Brown actually restricted the meaning of racial justice. Legal historian Risa Goluboff puts it in a clean
equa- tion: "once Brown was constructed as it was,_]im Crow became synonymous in popular understanding with state-mandated segregation. And the answer to
Jim Crow became the 'color-blind' Constitution." Reforms to professionalize police and nationalize due process were no different than Brown or the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 in the sense that they represented no permanent victory. Instead,
every fight over the carceral state, like every fight
over anti-discrimination law, "represents an ongoing ideological struggle in which the occasional
winners harness the moral, coercive, consensual power of the law."'-'
Crushes all solvency - Empirically strategic ambiguity will be exploited to continue and
mask ongoing colonial domination-Maira 9 Sunaina Maira is Professor of Asian American Studies at the University of California, Legal
ambiguity Missing: Youth, Citizenship, and Empire after 9/11 Pp 50-1
Amy Kaplan (2005) points out that the
US. brand of imperialism led to the creation of new designations of overseas
obscuring
the nature of U.S. imperialism. This process has continued to the present day and is illustrated by the contradictory national space
territories, under vary- ing degrees of U.S. control, and new categories of persons and citizens serving imperial interests while
occupied by Guantanamo Bay, neither fully under Cuban or U.S. sovereignty but clearly under U.S. control (Kaplan 2005). Spaces such as
Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib in Iraq, and also lesser- known sites such as Bagram Prison in Afghanistan-as well as the secret planes used by the cm
to ship "ghost detainees" to prisons in Europe and other countries-represent the "spaces of exception" that make the empire's violations of
Legal ambiguity is exploited by the U.S. military in Iraq in its
outsourcing of "security," interrogation, and torture to private contractors who are not bound by the
conventions applying to soldiers (Joshua Comaroff 2.007). The inhabitants of the American military prison at "Gitmo," who are classified as
international law the norm (Hansen and Steputat 2005, 1)."
"enemy combatants" and not prisoners of war deserving of internationally recognized rights, live in a hellish legal limbo. Kaplan astutely
observes that Guantanamo is a metaphor for the paradoxical form of "American Empire, a dominion at once rooted in specific locales and
dispersed all over the world" (2005, 832). This nuanced analysis captures the
simultaneous localization and dispersal of
power that characterizes the United States as an imperial state. The deterritorialization and ambiguity of U.S.
imperial control underlie the mythologies justifying imperial policies in the name ofhumanitarian intervention and obscuring
the settler-colonial roots of the nation-state.
In the context of surveillance—Legal ambiguity will be exploited to crush all solvency
NYT 14 A Surveillance Bill That Falls Short By THE EDITORIAL BOARDMAY 22, 2014
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/23/opinion/a-surveillance-bill-that-falls-short.html?_r=0
Privacy advocates said the N.S.A. could use the changed language to demand records for an entire ZIP
code, state or region. Administration officials say they don’t intend to do that, but their record of
exploiting legal loopholes doesn’t provide much confidence. “If we leave any ambiguity at all,” said
Zoe Lofgren, Democrat of California, “ we have learned that the intelligence community will drive a
truck through that ambiguity.” The bill, she said, will not actually end bulk collection.
The use of weasel words distracts from the fact that the aff’s curtailment could result
in no change
Rudinow and Barry, 8 [Joel and Vincent, Joel received his B.A. in Philosophy from the University of California at Santa Barbara
and his Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of British Columbia. He is currently Chair of the Department of Philosophy at Santa Rosa Junior
College. Vincent has been professor of philosophy at Bakersfield College for over thirty years, An Invitation to Critical Thinking, pg. 317]
The expression “weasel words” is derived from the egg-eating habits of weasels. A weasel will bite into
the eggshell and suck out the contents, leaving what appears to the casual observer to be an intact egg.
Similarly, a weasel word sucks out the substance of what appears on the surface to be a substantial
claim. In effect, the weasel word makes the claim in which it is used a vague claim while at least
partially concealing the vagueness. “Help” functions in advertising as a weasel. “Help” means literally
aid or assist and nothing more. Yet as one author has observed, “’help’” is the one single word which, in
all the annals of advertising, has done the most to say something that couldn’t be said.” Once “help” is
used to qualify a claim, almost anything can be said after it. Accordingly, we are exposed to ads for
products that “help keep us young,” “help prevent cavities,” and “help keep our houses germ free.” Just
think of how many times a day you hear or read pitches that say “helps stop,” “helps prevent,” “helps
fight,” “helps overcome,” “helps you feel,” and “helps you look.” But don’t think “help” is the only
weasel in the advertiser’s arsenal. “Like” (as in “makes your floor look like new”), “virtual” or “virtually,”
(as in “virtually no cavities”), “up to” (as in “provides relief for up to 8 hours”), “as much as” (as in “saves
as much as one gallon of gas”), and other weasels say what cannot be said. Studies indicate that on
hearing or reading a claim containing a weasel word, we tend to screen out the weasel word and just
hear the claim. Thus on hearing that a medicine “can provide relief for up to 8 hours,” we screen out the
“can” and the “up to” and infer that the product will give us relief for 8 hours, because that’s what we
want—relief. According to a strict reading of the wording of the ad, the product may give no relief; and
if it does give relief, the relief could vary in length from a moment or two to anywhere under 8 hours.
Their use of weasel words is part of a process of exploitation that legitimizes
imperialism and dominance
Seedat, 14 Mohamed Seedat is a professor in the College of Human Sciences at University of South
Africa [Mohamed, “Mobilising Compassionate Critical Citizenship and Psychologies in the
Service of Humanity,” from the journal Psychology Serving Humanity]
I am aware that it is always easy and tempting to string together what David Watson (2004) calls ‘weasel words’.3 From my reading of Watson
(2004), I understand weasel
words to be those words that contain magnetic social and emotive appeal, yet these are words
stripped of their substantive meanings, words that are routinely and craftily deployed by politicians, bureaucrats, captains
of industry, world leaders, powerful people and the treacherous to obtain legitimacy and credibility, steal, spy, assassinate, create
smokescreens and entrench dominance while pretending to uphold transformation. Weasel words are
those that justify deaths of civilians in the name of ‘collateral damage’, legitimize lies in the guise of misspoken speech, and conceal the
violent charge for empire as a fight against terror. Weasel words are intended to help their users to escape from the truth just as a
weasel flees with the substance of an egg (see Watson 2004).