Abolishing the U.S. Nuclear
War Plan
Presentation by Robert S. Norris and
the NRDC Nuclear Program
Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference
Washington DC; June 18-19, 2001
Deterrence
Historically deterrence has been a highly elastic
concept.
Nuclear weapons have been assigned the role of
deterring a wide variety of potential threats.
Recent doctrinal assertions claim that U.S.
readiness to preempt or retaliate with nuclear
weapons deter, nuclear, chemical and biological
attacks.
Recent apologia I
The current post-Cold war period is one of great
political and military dynamism.
Nuclear weapons deter WMD use by regional
powers.
New or modified types may be needed to target
underground bunkers or perform other missions.
Source: National Institute for Public Policy, Rationale and Requirements for U.S. Nuclear
Forces and Arms Control (January 2001)
Recent apologia II
“I recently began to worry that . . . far too many
people were beginning to believe that perhaps
nuclear weapons no longer had value.”
Central Deterrence –Russia (Capability One)
Deter wider threats (Capability Two)
Source: Paul Robinson, SNL White Paper, Pursuing a New Nuclear Weapons Policy for the 21st
Century (April 2001)
Targets and War Planning
The act of targeting a nation-state or a group with
nuclear weapons defines it as an enemy.
This first step sets in motion activities to locate
targets, assign weapons to destroy them, and
calculate damage expectancies.
The result is a permanent, in-place operational
plan (e.g. SIOP) with extensive forces and
demanding requirements.
Estimated Targets in the SIOP
2,260 targets in Russia
 1,100 Nuclear weapons facilities
 500 Conventional military
 500 War Supporting Industry
 160 Leadership and command and control
China, Iran, Iraq, North Korea - 100s of targets.
Targeting Requirements Drive
Nuclear Forces
U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces on Alert
Day-to-Day: 2,600 warheads
Generated: 3,600 warheads
All available: 6,200 warheads
Total forces (7,200 warheads)
ICBMs (2,000)
SLBMs (3,450)
Bombers (1,750)
As of June 2001
PD-59 and NSDD-13 Endure
Phoenix Study (1991)
STRATCOM Briefing to Cheney, Powell (1992)
Sun City (1993)
Sun City Extended (1994)
STRATCOM White Paper (1996)
STRATCOM Warfighter Assessment (1996)
Source: Hans M. Kristensen, The Matrix of Deterrence: U.S. Strategic Command Force
Structure Studies (May 2001), The Nautilus Institute
Dominance of the SIOP
If we were to come down below [START III levels] it would require us to
change our strategic plan.
President Bill Clinton, June 4, 2000
Our overall nuclear employment policy [states that] the United States
forces must be capable of and be seen to be capable of holding at risk
those critical assets and capabilities that a potential adversary most
values.
Walter Slocombe, Department of Defense, May 23, 2000
Our force structure needs to be robust, flexible and credible enough to
meet the worst threats we can reasonably postulate. Our nation must
always maintain the ability to convince potential aggressors to choose
peace rather than war, restraint rather than escalation, and termination
rather than conflict continuation.
Adm. Richard Mies, US Strategic Command, May 23, 2000
The Need for Change
Current START III proposals for smaller forces (between
2,500 and 1,500 warheads) that remain grounded in the
basic SIOP assumptions are not fruitful avenues to pursue.
The “needs” of the war plan now dictate the possibilities
and limitations of arms control and force reductions.
Force requirements must be decoupled from the current
plans.
For real change something more fundamental must occur.
“Today’s Russia is not our enemy”
Clarify the U.S. relationship with Russia
and reconcile declaratory and employment
policy.
A permanent, in-place war plan is a recipe
for unceasing arms requirements.
A Paradigm Shift is Needed
The U.S. should abolish the SIOP as it is currently
understood, implemented and practiced.
Restrict the roles and missions assigned to nuclear
weapons. The sole reason for U.S. possession of
nuclear weapons is to deter the use of nuclear
weapons by another state.
Reduce the geo-political value of nuclear
weapons, by word and action.
Replace the SIOP with a
Contingency Model
The U.S. should not target nuclear weapons against any
nuclear weapon state in peacetime.
The current SIOP process should be replaced with a
contingency war planning capability.
A new paradigm will alleviate the need for large numbers
of weapons.
A new paradigm will defuse the negative political and
psychological implications that go with targeting.
Openness and Honesty
Abandon much of the secrecy that surrounds the
SIOP.
Demand explanations of the reasoning behind the war
plan and be told would happen if it were executed.
The nuclear war planning function carried out in
Omaha should be brought to Washington to be done
by a joint civilian-military staff with Congressional
involvement.
Unilateral Deep Cuts
Unilaterally reduce U.S. nuclear forces and
challenge the Russians to do the same.
Deep cuts on the road to the “cessation of
the nuclear arms race at an early date and to
nuclear disarmament” (to quote the U.S.
NPT obligation) can only occur with revised
presidential guidance.
Don’t Make Things Worse
Reject the integration of national missile defense
with offensive nuclear deterrent forces.
MAD (“mutual assured destruction”) is neither a
policy choice nor a doctrine. It is rather a
condition, a situation that two nations find
themselves in when they have nuclear weapons
aimed at one another.
Nuclear vulnerability cannot be overcome through
missile defense sufficiently to alter the
fundamental calculus of nuclear deterrence. The
only effective way to alter MAD is to stop
targeting one another.
False Promises
Any plan by the Bush administration for lower
numbers of strategic warheads that does not
abandon counterforce as the ruling assumption—
the core strategy of the war plan—is flawed and
dangerous.
Such proposals merely perpetuate Cold War
practices at lower levels and are not a “clear and
clean break.”
Plans to abrogate the ABM Treaty and deploy
national missile defense systems only makes
matters worse.
A “clear and clean break”
Something more fundamental must occur in
order to create real change. As we have
seen through our nuclear war simulation
model, the place to begin is with
dismantling the SIOP war planning process
and apparatus, and the assumptions upon
which it is built.