Chronology of Boxed Section
March 1936
July 1936 - 39
Rhineland
Spain
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March 1938
October 1938
1920s – 1939
Anschluss
Munich
Overview (8 marker)
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Issues: Factors shaping Government reaction to events i.e. the use of appeasement political economic military public opinion dilemmas (public and private concerns of the government at the time which influenced how they dealt with issues at the time

Source A: from a letter from a member of the public to the editor, Glasgow Herald, 13 March
1936.
Source C: from an article by George
Bernard Shaw in the Evening Times, 17
March 1938.
Source E: from Neville Thompson,
The Anti-Appeasers (1971).
It seems to me that if we are to keep Europe from war we must concentrate on Hitler's offer, letting bygones be bygones, and, perhaps, even go to the length of complimenting the German people on a constructive and comprehensive gesture towards peace. This would please them and restore to them a measure of the selfesteem they crave for. France, paralysed by past experience and fear, has tried to keep her heel on Germany since the war.
This cannot and ought not to be done. Britain has too long allowed herself to be influenced by the French outlook, and now we have a chance to break away and view the new proposals from our, instead of their, standpoint. I consider Hitler's offer a Godgiven opportunity that must not be let slip.
The Treaty of Versailles has been the making of the Fuhrer, who has the sense to judge rightly how much of the treaty we could or could not fight for twenty years after indulging our worst passions in imposing its silly and wicked provisions on the vanquished.
In his book Mein Kampf, he made it very clear to every sympathetic reader that his earliest political dream was of a united Austria and Germany.
This was only a dream until the mischievous treaty disabled and broke up the Austrian Empire and left Vienna to starve.
Union with Germany was then Austria's only chance. She was under Hitler's hand to be taken in. He had nothing to fear from the Allies.
We may as well accept the Anschluss without grumbling, not only because it is an excellent thing in itself but because at Versailles we helped to create the situation which has made it inevitable.
In the inter-war years it was the expression of a battle scarred generation's faith and hope that negotiations and agreements could replace wars as a means of settling disputes between countries. This naturally appealed to radicals and pacifists, who denied that
Germany had been solely responsible for the First World
War; who believed that conflict could have been avoided by negotiation and good will; who maintained that the war had solved nothing; who claimed that
Germany had been unjustly treated at the peace conference; and who put their trust in universal disarmament and the League of Nations...But these feelings were not restricted to left wingers. It was Neville Chamberlain, the
Conservative Prime Minister, who declared that, "In war there are no winners. There is nothing but suffering and ruin for those who are involved".
How far do Sources A, C and E explain the reasons for Britain's adoption of the policy of appeasement?
8

How far do Sources A, C and E explain the reasons for
Britain's adoption of the policy of appeasement?
8

•Identify the reasons in the sources to explain why Britain adopted appeasement
•Use recall to explain why the factors they highlight were relevant in the shaping of British foreign policy.
•Use additional recall to identify other factors not mentioned in the sources which also influenced the adoption of appeasement.

•Set Q in context
•sources refer to Rhineland/ Anschluss and fear of war; they do highlight the issues underlying the development of appeasement
•show awareness of what 'appeasement' was.
•define it and acknowledge debate then/since over the merits/flaws of the policy

Highlights attitude that we should accept the reoccupation of the
Rhineland and move on - new treaty, new relationship with Germany -these views were dominant and influential in shaping of appeasement as was desire to avoid war with Hitler
Source A -Big Picture

Points from Source A Recall
• 'let bygones be bygones‘ •The sources highlights a feeling that
Britain should move on and not be bound by the terms/conditions of Versailles and anti-German feelings of WWI and that
Hitler had legitimate grounds for revision of restrictions of Versailles
•Hitler's offers' and
'self esteem they crave for'
•Another reason highlighted by this point is the growing attitude in Britain shared by the Government at the time that negotiation would be more constructive and recent naval pact and offers by
Hitler of 25yr non-aggression pact
/return to League etc encouraged this view that we could trust him and that his demands were reasonable and this would satisfy Hitler/settle and satisfy Germany

Points from Source A
Role of France -Britain should be independent and not influenced by
France
Recall
Accurate as a factor influencing British policy. Growing concern over French policy
(spoiling disarmament conferences, scandal over Hoare-Laval pact, Franco-
Soviet pact). Widely held attitude that
France were obsessed and this was destructive and their reliability was doubted as an ally - all of this influenced
British policy

Additional Recall – overall – accurate?
Source A highlights issues influencing the move away from following France, blindly upholding
Versailles, i.e. to think about revision of
'negotiable' changes to Versailles and the influence of public opinion over the Rhineland which was antiwar and highlighted depth of attitudes against war.

Urges the Govt. to accept the
Anschluss and appreciate
Hitler's position. Source highlights further the attitudes encouraging compromise with
Germany
Source C -Big Picture

Points from Source C
•'Treaty -silly and wicked'
•'political dream'
•'union Austria's only chance'
•'Versailles made it
(Anschluss) inevitable'
Recall
Sympathy for this view in Britain that the Anschluss was another 'wrong' righted and yet again -revision of
Versailles part of appeasement policy
Accepted by Chamberlain as common sense appeasement sensible response and not as an expansionist /aggressive move
Chamberlain prepared to accept that it was in both countries interest
Confirmed as a fundamental force shaping appeasement were the wider aims of Chamberlain to reach a new
'general settlement' in Europe to take into account new conditions since 1918

Additional recall –overall – accurate?
Source highlights the influence of desire for revision of Versailles to remove sources of conflict

Historical overview of the reasons behind the policy of appeasement and the anti-war attitude in the 1930s which was a great influence on the policy of appeasement.
Source E -Big Picture

Points from Source E
•'battle scarred generation'
•'Germany not solely to blame for WWI'
•Chamberlain 'war -no winners'
Recall
•Accurate in importance of anti-war feeling after WWI and public opinion was for the League/Disarmament and pacifism as expressed by Peace Ballot etc
•Relevant factor in shaping of attitudes to Germany
•Role of Chamberlain -his background, attitudes, personality and experiences
(cousin killed in WWI) all pre-disposed him against war and a belief that any price was worth paying -and as a businessman he believed war was bad for business. A war in the late 1930s would undo all his work as Chancellor of
Exchequer to help Britain recover.

Additional Recall –overall – accurate?
Source E highlights a number of the factors shaping appeasement and the key role played by Chamberlain. Recall to put the views of the sources into wider context with other factors shaping Britain’s policy of appeasement
• impression that Hitler could be trusted and wanted peace
• fear of war on 3 fronts
• bomber will always get through (Spain showed up the threat of civilian bombing)
• lack of allies -not even from our the Empire
• faith in the League disappeared as the 1930s developed
• economy could not support a war
• lack of military preparedness
• belief that appeasement would buy time
• communism was the greater threat
• Hitler -a block to communism -potential help

Conclusion
The sources do therefore highlight some of the many issues/attitudes/factors which together persuaded the British Government that the policy of appeasement was the most sensible and practical solution to the potential threat posed by war with
Germany.

Cut off Descriptors
1-3 Selects relevant evidence from the sources and/or recalled knowledge but without making the required evaluation.
4-6 Selects relevant evidence from the sources and uses limited recall to inform a basic evaluation in terms of the question.
7-8 Establishes the main points of the sources and uses recalled knowledge to evaluate these in order to reach an appropriate conclusion.