Outline
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QUIZ at start of this Thursday’s class
Newspaper examples for next class discussion
Key questions about institutions
Variables, IVs, and DVs
Why do institutions form?
Two approaches: logic of consequences and
logic of appropriateness
• Eight key questions of course
Prepare for Discussion
for NEXT CLASS
• Real-life examples from the news that differ in
problem structure terms used from this class
session
– Look at Newspaper of your choice before next
class and find two INTERNATIONAL problems that
illustrate one of the differences we will discuss
today
Key questions about institutions
• Formation: Why (and when) do states form
international institutions in the first place?
• Design: Why, given that they do form them, do
they design them in the ways they do?
• Influence: How, given that states cannot be
coerced to do what they do not want to do, do
international institutions ever influence the
behavior of states?
• Non-state action: Why isn’t all this “international
organization” limited to just states?
Variables, IVs, and DVs
• Variable: something that can vary (it varies
between different values)
• Values: what a variable varies between
• E.g.,
– Variable: color
– Values: ROYGBIV
• DV: Dependent variable – what you want to
explain
• IVs: Independent variables – what you use to
explain the DV
Variable Terms and Concepts
Examples
Unit of
analysis
Variable
Level of
Problem
Difficulty
Indicator
Values of variable Values of indicator
Time til Start of
Negotiations
Malign
Long
Benign
Short
Time til Complete
Negotiations
Malign
Long
Benign
Short
Ambitious
Differentiated
Not-ambitious
Common
Strong
Provision present
Weak
Provision absent
Problem
Level of
Difficulty
Treaty
Ambitiousness
Type of Obligations
Strength
Monitoring
Provision
Treaty
Some DVs for the Course
• Always start with the DV – need to know what
you are going to explain before you can figure
out how you will explain it
• DVs for the course
– Whether institution forms or not
– What are the features of the institution
– Behavior of states
Institutional formation
• Basic DV and question: do states (or other
actors) form an institution?
• Variable: institutional formation
• Values: yes or no
• IVs: features of problem structure
– Capacities
– Incentives
– Information and knowledge
– Norms
Logic of Consequences vs.
Logic of Appropriateness
• Logic of consequences
– States calculate what is best
– Independent self-interest (narrow)
– Independent self-interest ( broad)
– Interdependent self-interest
• Logic of appropriateness
– States behave to establish/maintain particular
identity and/or to follow social rules
– Institutions alter of what is right/appropriate
What is problem structure?
• Features of the problem that influence:
– Formation: How hard/easy to solve the problem?
– Design: What kind of solution states arrive at?
– Institutional influence: How effective is the
solution?
• No need for single dimension of hard to easy
• Think about different problem features and
implications for negotiation and effectiveness
Problem structure:
Eight (8) key questions
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Q1: Is it conflict, cooperation, or harmony?
Q2: Who are the actors?
Q3: Absolute capacities and relative power
Q4: Incentives/preferences
Q5: Information/knowledge
Q6: Norms
Q7: Inherent transparency
Q8: Response incentives
Problem structure:
Eight (8) key questions
• Mainly for comparing ACROSS problems
• Answers to all effect
– Whether states will form institution
– What features they will incorporate
– How states will respond to institutional rules
Q1: Is it conflict,
cooperation or harmony?
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Is it conflict or would it be if no institution?
Is it harmony?
If conflict, is it Deadlock, i.e., unresolvable?
Potential for resolution REQUIRES absolute
gains frame
Q2: Who are the Actors?
• How many actors are there?
• What roles do actors have?
• What types of actors are involved?
Q3: Capacities and power
• Do “perpetrators” of problem have capacity to
engage in “good” behavior?
• If not, it’s a “Positive Externality Plagued by
Incapacity”. E.g.,
– Protecting accidental detonation of nuclear weapons
– Reducing AIDS in developing countries
– Helping small countries defend selves from attack
• Behavior not a result of logic of consequences or
logic of appropriateness
Q4: Incentives/preferences
• How do material consequences for
perpetrators depend on other countries?
• Types of incentive problems
– Upstream / downstream
– Coordination
– Collaboration
• All involve logic of consequences issues
Q5: Information/knowledge
• Any unknown effects that perpetrators would
care about if they knew about them?
• Two types of info/knowledge problems
– Epistemic/knowledge problems (unsure about
how the world works): e.g., acid rain in Europe,
trade wars, health quarantine regulations
– Assurance problems (unsure about how other
actors will behave): e.g., war games
• Largely still logic of consequences
Q6: Norms
• Problem is not material consequences but
violations of values and notions of legitimacy
• Normative problems involve “conflicts over
values”, e.g.,
– Human rights abuses
– Apartheid or treatment of women
– Choice of government
• Involves logic of appropriateness
Q7: Inherent transparency
• Question: Is it easy to “see” violations and/or
hard to conceal them?
• Hypothesis: If little inherent transparency,
then strong monitoring provisions are likely.
Q8: Response incentives
• Question: Will states respond to violations?
Do violations matter a lot? Are states very
concerned about them?
– Hypothesis: If strong violation INtolerance, leads
to either preclusive strategies OR careful
monitoring WITH enforcement.
For example: Strong incentives to respond to trade
violations ==> carefully devised dispute resolution
systems
Types of problem
Review
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Deadlock
Positive externality plagued by incapacity
Upstream / downstream problems
Coordination
Collaboration
Epistemic / knowledge problems
Assurance problems
Normative problems
Plus inherent transparency and response
incentives
Conclusion
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Is there a conflict?
Who are the actors
Capacities and power
Incentives
Information / knowledge
Norms
Inherent transparency
Response incentives