Aerospace Control & Guidance Systems Committee
SAE A-6 Project A-6A3-08-1
Aerospace Recommended Practice ARP94910
Aerospace- Flight Control Systems - Design,
Installation and Test of, Military Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles, Specification Guide
Shawn Donley
ACGSC Meeting 102
1
Rev B, 10/08/08
ARP94910 Origins – Project Definition & Approval
•
In 2007 the A-6 Systems panel completed AS94900 – Aerospace Standard
for FCS for Military Manned Aircraft
•
Spec released July 6, 2007 adopted by DoD to replace MIL-F-9490
November 5, 2007
•
Version of the AS for UA’s suggested and informally polled in industry to
mixed results
•
The US Navy, Army and Air Force expressed support which justified
initiating the project
•
May 2008, A-6 Steering Council approved project
– But as an Aerospace Recommended Practice, not an Aerospace Standard
– Explicitly confined to vehicle subsystem (ground station and data links not
included)
– Targeting late 2009 for a draft ARP
ACGSC Meeting 102
15-17 Oct 2008
2
Rev B, 10/08/08
Project Sponsored by the SAE A-6A3 Flight and Utility
Control Systems Panel
• A-6A3 “Systems” Panel Officers
– Ian Halley, Chairman and Co Sponsor
• Boeing Phantom Works
– Dave Flavell, Vice Chairman and Co Sponsor
• Moog Inc
– Floyd Fazi, Secretary and ASD Liason
• Lockheed Aeronautics
ACGSC Meeting 102
15-17 Oct 2008
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Rev B, 10/08/08
Moving Forward with the ARP
• AS94900 is written for manned military aircraft. Implicit
premise that total loss-of-control should an exceedingly rare
event rather than an occasionally acceptable event.
• At least for some UAS’s to date, occasional losses seem to be
acceptable in today’s climate. Some would claim even frequent
losses are acceptable in certain circumstances.
• AS94900 may serve as a basis for developing the ARP, but
clearly not all requirements in AS94900 are applicable to all
UA’s. Some UA requirements are missing all together.
• If manned aircraft loss-of-control criteria are not technically or
economically achievable for some classes of UA’s, what should
our expectations be?
Thoughts which follow are VERY preliminary and subject to change.
Your feedback encouraged !
shawn.donley@navy.mil
william.facey@navy.mil
ACGSC Meeting 102
15-17 Oct 2008
4
Rev B, 10/08/08
From Weibel & Hansman, MIT, May 2005
(with F-18 data added)
Unmanned Aircraft1
Accidents/ 100,000 hr
–Global Hawk (4 accidents)*
–RQ-2A Pioneer
–RQ-2B Pioneer
–Predator RQ-1A*
–Predator RQ-1B*
168
363
139
43
31
Manned Military Aircraft1,3
–F-16
–F-18
3.5
2.8
Manned Civil/ Commercial Aircraft Accident Rates (2003)2
–General Aviation
–General Aviation (Fatal)
–Part 121 Scheduled & Unscheduled
–Part 121 Scheduled & Unscheduled (Fatal)
Sources:
1.) National Defense Magazine, May 2003
2.) NTSB Press Release, March 22, 2004
3.) NAVAIR System Safety, August 2008
ACGSC Meeting 102
15-17 Oct 2008
6.7
1.4
0.313
0.012
*Total Operational Hours < 100,000 :
Predator (65,000 hr); Global Hawk (2,500 hr)
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Rev B, 10/08/08
What Does the Customer Expect a UA to Do After a FCS
Failure ?
• Need to answer this question before we can generate a useful
ARP.
• Answer depends on the characteristics of the UA (size, cost,
range), its mission and its operating area.
• Perhaps trying to answer this question provides a framework
for linking ARP flight control recommendations to UA
behavioral expectations.
– Applicability of an ARP paragraph would depend upon expectations for
post-failure behavior.
ACGSC Meeting 102
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Rev B, 10/08/08
Proposal
Develop a Concept of “Types” of UA FCS Post-Failure Behavior
•
Applicability of an ARP paragraph would depend upon FCS Type
•
If “Type” is the wrong name, pick another one
•
Brute-force redundancy may not be the best or only answer
– for smaller UA’s, it may be impossible or cost prohibitive
•
Definitions of behavior and comments are very preliminary
•
Have purposely avoided trying to assign a PLOC number to each Type
since I don’t trust these numbers, and because management focuses
on them as absolutes when they are not
•
If PLOC numbers become unavoidable, recommend considering
“Probability of Containment” requirement to augment PLOC
– Probability of containment is the probability that the UA will not stray outside predefined geographical coordinates
ACGSC Meeting 102
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Rev B, 10/08/08
How Should the Vehicle Respond After a Flight Control Failure
(For purposes of this table, FCS includes Nav Sensors such as GPS/INS, but not data links)
Type
Acceptable Behavior After First FCS
Failure
Comments
Acceptable
Behavior
After Second
Failure
0
Immediate loss of attitude, altitude or speed
control, resulting in immediate loss of flight path
control and eventual or immediate uncontrollable
impact with terrain/obstructions.
Characterized by a single thread system with
no analytical redundancy or control
reconfiguration features.
N/A
1
Degraded control of attitude, altitude or speed.
Vehicle unable to complete the original mission.
Vehicle able to maintain safe altitude and airspeed
in some cases. Sufficient flight path control to
maintain a pre-defined fail-safe heading that
minimizes risks to third parties.
Type 0 system where special efforts are made
to keep the processors and their power
sources alive. If data link is available,
ground control could provide vector to
alternate recovery area. Controllable landing
may not be possible.
Type 0
2
Degraded control of attitude, altitude or speed.
Vehicle unable to complete the original mission or a
modified mission without risk of loss. Vehicle
attempts to estimate if it can reach the recovery
point of original intent or an alternate for a
controllable but possibly degraded recovery. If not,
vehicle attempts to reach a pre-defined
geographical coordinate and terminate flight.
Characterized by very high integrity simplex
digital processors and processor power
supplies/sources, or at least duplex
redundancy in these components . Servos
may be simplex but designed to minimize
probability of hardover failures. Analytical
redundancy and control reconfiguration used
to provide sufficient control and navigation to
safely reach a recovery point for degraded
landing, or a pre-defined flight termination
coordinate.
Type 1
ACGSC Meeting 102
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Rev B, 10/08/08
FCS “Type” Continued
Type
Acceptable Behavior After First FCS
Failure
Comments
Acceptable
Behavior After
Second Failure
3
Partial degradation of attitude, altitude or
speed control. Vehicle may be unable to
complete the mission without risk of loss unless
mission parameters are modified. Vehicle still
capable of reaching recovery point of original
intent or an alternate for a controllable but
possibly degraded recovery.
Characterized by at least duplex or
higher levels of redundancy in control &
guidance processing and power sources.
Analytical redundancy, control
reconfiguration or sensor/actuator
physical redundancy used to mitigate
failure effects.
Type 2
4
No degradation of attitude, altitude or speed
control, or degradation not severe enough to
warrant termination of the mission. Vehicle
capable of returning to recovery point of
original intent or a pre-defined alternate for
safe recovery.
Characterized by at least triplex or
higher levels of redundancy in control &
guidance processing, sensors and
actuator control paths. Flight control
actuators physically redundant or use
redundant surfaces. Analytical
redundancy and control reconfiguration
may be used to further mitigate failure
effects.
Type 3
ACGSC Meeting 102
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Rev B, 10/08/08
What Sets Required FCS Type
• Required “Type” is some function of:
Vehicle + Payload Cost, Mission, Operating Area, Kinetic Energy,
Weapons carriage ?
– Change any parameter and the required “FCS Type” may change
– Operating Area may be bigger driver than Mission (although related)
• Need some definitions of “Operating Area”
• Not strictly an airspace classification
– Change the Operating Area and the FCS may no longer be suitable
• Need to adopt a taxonomy for UA Categories
– Use 2007 DoD UAV Roadmap ?
• Make “mission creep” difficult without reconsideration of FCS
applicability and safety.
• Break the habit of assuming “small = throw-away”
– Even an insect will try to save itself when injured
ACGSC Meeting 102
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Rev B, 10/08/08
UA Categories From DoD 2007 UAV Roadmap
http://www.acq.osd.mil/usd/Unmanned%20Systems%20Roadmap.2007-2032.pdf
Current System Attributes
JUAS Categories
Operational
Altitude (ft)
T1 - Tactical 1
Special Operations
Forces (SOF) Team
Small Unit Company
& below
≤ 1,000
2
T2 - Tactical 2
Battalion/Brigade
Regiment SOF
Group/Flight
≤ 5,000
3
T3 - Tactical 3
Division/Corps
MEF/Squadron/
Strike Group
1
4
O – Operational JTF
Typical
Payload
Launch Method
Weight (lbs)
S – Strategic
National
ACGSC Meeting 102
15-17 Oct 2008
Endurance
(hrs)
Hand launched
≤ 20
≤ 60
<4
Mobile launched
20 - 450
≤ 100
< 24
Radius
(nm)
< 10
Primarily
EO/IR or
Comm
Relay
≤ 10,000
≤ 40,000
Above, plus
SAR,
SIGINT,
Moving
Target
Indicator
(MTI), or
WPNS
Conventional or
Vertical Take-off
and Landing
(VTOL)
450 – 5,000
> 40,000
Above, plus
RADAR
< 100
≤ 250
< 2,000
Current Systems (Projected
by 2014)
Hornet, BATCAM, Raven,
Dragon Eye, FPASS, Pointer,
Wasp, BUSTER (raillaunched), MAV
Neptune, Tern, Mako, OAV-II,
Shadow, Silver Fox,
ScanEagle, Aerosonde
Maverick, Pioneer, Hunter,
Snow Goose, I-Gnat-ER,
ER/MP, Dragonfly, Eagle
Eye, Firescout, BAMS,
Hummingbird, Onyx
< 36
≤ 15,000
Conventional
5
Airspee
d (kts)
Predator, N-UCAS, Reaper
> 250
> 15,000
Theater
wide
Global Hawk
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Rev B, 10/08/08
Operating Area/Mission Considerations
Preliminary Definitions of Operating Areas
Note: No attempt (yet) to marry these up with NAS definitions or FAA Notice 07-01
Op Area
Definition
1
UA’s intended to operate only in Restricted and Warning
Areas under controlled and supervised conditions, or
in combat areas with few no-combatants present.
2
UA’s intend to regularly operate in areas of low population
density, and/or in Restricted and Warning Areas,
and/or in a maritime environment, and/or in combat
zones.
3
UA’s that are intended to regularly operate a majority of
the time over densely populated urban areas where
uncontrolled loss of the UA may cause injury/fatalities
to civilian population or damage to property.
4
UA’s that intend to regularly operate in all classes of
airspace including those outside of Restricted/Warning
Areas and combat zones.
ACGSC Meeting 102
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Rev B, 10/08/08
Notional Relationship of FCS Type to UA
Category and Operating Area
FCS Type
Op
Area
Shipboard operations
Aerial refueling capability
Weapons carriage
Payload classification
Active structural load control
Swarming ops (multiple UA’s in same
airspace)
ACGSC Meeting 102
15-17 Oct 2008
Cat 1
Cat 2
Cat 3
Cat 4
Cat 5
1
0
1
2
3
4
2
0
1
2
3
4
3
1
3
4
4
4
4
2
3
4
4
4
Op Area
Definition
1
UAS intended to operate only in Restricted and
Warning Areas under controlled and
supervised conditions, or in combat areas with
few no-combatants present.
2
UAS intend to regularly operate over areas of low
population density, and/or in Restricted and
Warning Areas, and/or in a maritime
environment, and/or in combat zones.
3
UAS that are intended to regularly operate a majority
of the time in densely populated urban areas
where uncontrolled loss of the UA may cause
injury/fatalities to civilian population or
damage to property.
4
UAS that intend to regularly operate in all classes of
airspace including those outside of
Restricted/Warning Areas and combat zones.
Baseline FCS Type Could be Adjusted Up for:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
UA Category
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Rev B, 10/08/08
Summary
• Aerospace Recommended Practice rather than a Spec
• Challenge of accepting some vehicle losses without compromising
safety to people and property
• Challenge of encompassing large range of UA sizes, cost, missions,
etc
• Smaller UA’s may be able to utilize flight control failure
accommodation strategies that are considered too risky, immature
or unconventional for manned aircraft
• Volunteers needed to help develop the ARP
ACGSC Meeting 102
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Rev B, 10/08/08
Aerospace Control & Guidance Systems Committee
Backup Charts
Shawn Donley
ACGSC Meeting 102
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Rev B, 10/08/08
Definition of a UAV
From STANAG 4671
• UAV
• An aircraft which is designed to operate with no human pilot on board
and which does not carry personnel.
• Moreover a UAV :
– Is capable of sustained flight by aerodynamic means,
• Comment: Is jet lift considered “by aerodynamic means?”
– Is remotely piloted or automatically flies a pre- programmed flight profile,
– Is reusable,
– Is not classified as a guided weapon or similar one shot device designed for
the delivery of munitions.
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ARP94910 Origins – SAE A-6 and Panel A-6A3
• Systems Panel Place in A-6
Committee A-6
Aerospace Actuation, Control &
Fluid Power Systems
Subcommittee A6A
Systems/Subsystems
Integration
Panel A6A1
Commercial Aircraft
Panel A6A2
Military Aircraft
Panel A6A3
Flight & Utility
Control Systems
Subcommittee A6B
Actuation and Control
Subcommittee A6C
Fluid Power Generation
and Distribution
Panel A6B1
Servovalve and
Actuation
Panel A6C1
Contamination and
Filtration
Panel A6B2
EHA/IAP
Panel A6C2
Seals
Panel A6B3
Mechanical and EM
Actuation Systems
Panel A6C3
Fluids
Panel A6C4
Tubing
Systems Panel membership: 47 total
8 Government Agencies, remainder
half Prime Contractors, half Suppliers
ACGSC Meeting 102
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Panel A6C5
Components
Panel A6C6
Power Sources
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Rev B, 10/08/08
ARP vs AS
• Aerospace Recommended Practice rather than an
Aerospace Standard because, “although the FCS technology
employed for UAs is mature, the application is not”
• Definitions from the SAE “Aerospace Council Organization
and Operating Guide, 6th Revision, February 2006
• AS - Aerospace Standard - These Technical Reports contain specific
performance requirements and are used for: (1) design standards, (2)
parts standards, (3) minimum performance standards, (4) quality, and (5)
other areas conforming to broadly accepted engineering practices or
specifications for a material, product, process, procedure, or test method.
• ARP - Aerospace Recommended Practice - These Aerospace Technical
Reports are documentations of practice, procedures, and technology that
are intended as guides to standard engineering practices. Their content
may be of a more general nature, or they may propound data that have
not yet gained broad acceptance.
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Revised Approved Scope
• Approved by SAE A-6 Steering Council, May 2008;
– Revised by “Customer TOR” Meeting Sept 3, 4, Warrendale, PA
– “This document will provide a comprehensive guide to the
specification of the general performance, design, test, development
and quality assurance requirements for the Flight Control System
(FCS) of a military Unmanned Aircraft (UA). It will recognize the levels
of FCS capability required for UAs of differing size, function and
operational strategy. (Prior emphasis on categorization removed)
Specific focus areas will include flight safety and the integration of the
FCS with other systems and subsystems, such as the electrical and
hydraulic systems. (reference to “See and Avoid” removed) It will
address the integration with the up-link and down-link of the
command loop but not the specification of these links or the design of
the associated Control Station, both of which will customarily be
separately specified by the procuring activity. It will be similar in
structure to the new standard for manned military aircraft, AS94900.”
ACGSC Meeting 102
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Draft Terms of Reference for Working Group
• WG Mission
– Produce an aerospace standard that provides recommended
practices for the specification of the Flight Control System (FCS)of a
military Unmanned Aircraft (UA). The document will be titled
“ARP94910 Aerospace- Flight Control Systems - Design, Installation
and Test of, Military Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Specification Guide”.
• Document to be Based on:
– The document shall be closely related to the new standard for the
FCS of manned military aircraft, AS94900. That Aerospace Standard
(AS) takes the form of a specification whereas ARP94910 will be a
guide to the writing of a specification.
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Draft Terms of Reference for Working Group (Cont’d)
• Document Structure and Scope
– The document shall be:
• An ARP rather than an AS
• A guide to the specification of the FCS for the UA and not for the entire UAS
• Applicable to the FCS capability required for the range of UAs covered by figure
A.4 in the DOD 2007 roadmap. There will be a limit to the smallest size covered to
be decided on kinetic energy and other grounds.
• A comprehensive guide to the specification of the general performance, design,
test, development and quality assurance requirements of the FCS.
• Similar in structure, scope and depth to AS94900.
• Performance oriented:
– guiding the specification of the FCS performance requirements, the design of
the FCS and its subsystems, and of its integration with the vehicle, and not
specific architectural approaches.
• A guide to the specification of the design and manufacture of the FCS
components.
• A guide to the documentation, testing, verification, validation and other quality
assurance requirements of the FCS.
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Draft Terms of Reference for Working Group (Cont’d)
• Document Emphases
– The ARP will pay particular attention to:
• The definition of a UA flight control system.
• The definition of a range of FCS capability. (Ref. to UA categories
deleted)
• Flight safety, including the definition of minimum acceptable capability
following failure and the associated probability.
• Integration of the FCS with other systems and subsystems within the
UAS.
• (Ref. to impact of “Detect, Sense and Avoid” deleted.)
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Draft Terms of Reference for Working Group (Cont’d)
• Requirements Assessment
– Many national and international bodies are currently working to define
suitable airworthiness requirements to allow the certification of UASs
for flight within the non-segregated, controlled national airspaces of
participating countries. In support of these efforts, several Standards
Development Organizations (SDOs) are producing aerospace
standards, currently mostly for UASs rather than for UAs. The WG will
track these airworthiness and standards efforts and the ARP will
incorporate the relevant portions of the UA flight control requirements
and recommendations that result from them. References for these
requirements and recommendations will be cited. (See Appendix to
the TOR document - Documents of Interest.)
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What Constitutes a UAV Flight Control System ?
From STANAG 4671
•
•
Flight control system
The flight control system comprises sensors, actuators, computers and all
those elements of the UAV System, necessary to control the attitude, speed
and flightpath (trajectory) of the UAV.
–
–
•
•
•
The flight control system can be divided into 2 parts:
Flight control computer – A programmable electronic system that
operates the flight controls in order to carry out the intended inputs.
Flight controls – sensors, actuators and all those elements of the UAV
System (except the flight control computer), necessary to control the
attitude, speed and flightpath of the UAV.
–
•
•
•
Comment: Navigation sensors (GPS, INS, other) are part of FCS for ARP94910 purposes
Comment: Data Links are not part of FCS for our purposes
Comment: Not sure we need to make this distinction for the APR
Flight controls can further be defined as:
Primary flight control – Primary flight controls are those used in the UAV
by the flight control system for the immediate control of pitch, roll, yaw and
speed.
Secondary flight control - Secondary controls are those controls other
than primary flight controls, such as wheel brakes, spoilers and tab controls.
–
Comment: Useful definitions for the ARP
ACGSC Meeting 102
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Rev B, 10/08/08
Draft Terms of Reference for Working Group (Cont’d)
• Requirements Assessment
– Many national and international bodies are currently working to define
suitable airworthiness requirements to allow the certification of UASs
for flight within the non-segregated, controlled national airspaces of
participating countries. In support of these efforts, several Standards
Development Organizations (SDOs) are producing aerospace
standards, currently mostly for UASs rather than for UAs. The WG will
track these airworthiness and standards efforts and the ARP will
incorporate the relevant portions of the UA flight control requirements
and recommendations that result from them. References for these
requirements and recommendations will be cited. (See Appendix to
the TOR document - Documents of Interest.)
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Tech – Categories- Roadmap Table A.1
Table A.1 Alignment of UAS Categories with FAA Regulations
Certified Aircraft /
UAS (Cat III )
Nonstandard Aircraft /
UAS (Cat II)
RC Model Aircraft
/ UAS (Cat I)
FAA Regulation
14 CFR 91
14 CFR 91, 101, and 103
None (AC 91-57)
Airspace Usage
All
Class E, G, &
non-joint-use Class D
Class G
(<1200 ft AGL)
Airspeed Limit, KIAS
None
NTE 250 (proposed)
100 (proposed)
Example
Types
Manned
Airliners
Light-Sport
None
Unmanned
Predator, Global Hawk
Shadow
Dragon Eye, Raven
UAS (Cat III). Capable of flying throughout all categories of airspace and conforms to Part 91 (i.e., all the
things a regulated manned aircraft must do including the ability to S&A). Airworthiness certification and
operator qualification are required. UASs are generally built for beyond LOS operations. Examples: Global
Hawk, Predator
UAS (Cat II). Nonstandard aircraft that perform special purpose operations. Operators must provide evidence
of airworthiness and operator qualification. Cat II UASs may perform routine operations within a specific set
of restrictions. Example: Shadow
UAS (Cat I). Analogous to RC models as covered in AC 91-57. Operators must provide evidence of
airworthiness and operator qualification. Small UASs are generally limited to visual LOS operations.
Examples: Raven, Dragon Eye.
The JUAS COE has since further divided these three categories into six categories, as shown in Figure A.4.
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Domestic Use UAS “Levels” From DoD UAV 2007
Roadmap
Current System Attributes
Domestic Use
UAS Levels
Airspeed
(kts)
Weight
(lbs)
Operating
Altitude (ft)
Current Systems (Projected by 2014)
Description
Level 0
≤2
≤1,200
Hornet, BATCAM, Wasp
Systems under 2 lbs, within LOS
control, operating in unregulated
airspace
Level 1
2 – 20
≤3,000
Raven, Dragon Eye, FPASS, Pointer,
BUSTER, MAV
Systems under 20 lbs, operating below
VFR airspace
Level 2
21 –
1,320
Silver Fox, FINDER, Aerosonde, MARTS
ScanEagle, Neptune, OAV-II, Tern, Mako,
Shadow, Pioneer, REAP, RAID, TARS,
JLENS, Killer Bee
Systems under 1,320 lbs fall under light
sport aircraft standards
1,321 –
12,500
Maverick, Snow Goose, Dragonfly,
Hunter A, Hunter B, Onyx, I-Gnat-ER,
Eagle Eye, ER/MP, Firescout, BAMS,
Hummingbird, Predator
Systems over 1,320 lbs, operating
below Class A airspace
Currently no DOD UAS fall in this
category. Example system is Killer Bee
concept UAS
Systems operating below 10,000 ft
MSL with max airspeeds that exceed
the limit of 250 kts
Reaper, Global Hawk N-UCAS, HAA,
NSMV
Systems operating at or above 18,000
ft MSL fall under Class A airspace
standards
≤250
Level 3
Level 4
250
≤12,500
Level 5
Any
> 12,500
ACGSC Meeting 102
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< 18,000
≥18,000
UAS Examples
27
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Combination, Courtesy of Mr. R. Burton
Domestic
Use UAS
Levels
DoD
Roadmap
(2005)
Current System Attributes
FAA
Regulation
Airspeed
(kts)
Level 0
Category I
Category II
Operating
Altitude (ft)
≤2
≤ 1,200
Hornet, BATCAM, Wasp
Systems under 2 lbs, within
line-of-sight control, operating
in unregulated airspace
2 - 20
≤ 3,000
Raven, Dragon Eye, FPASS,
Pointer, BUSTER, MAV
Systems under 20 lbs,
operating below Visual Flight
Rules (VFR) airspace
Silver Fox, Aerosonde, Scan
Eagle, Neptune, OAV-II, Tern,
Mako, Shadow, Pioneer, REAP,
RAID, MARTS, TARS, JLENS
Systems under 1,320 lbs fall
under light sport aircraft
standards
Maverick, Snow Goose,
Dragonfly, Hunter A, Hunter B,
Onyx, I-Gnat-ER, Eagle Eye,
Warrior, Firescout,
Hummingbird, Predator
Systems over 1,320 lbs,
operating below Class A
airspace
Currently no DoD UAS fall in
this category. Example system
is Killer Bee concept.
Systems operating below
10,000 ft Mean Sea Level
(MSL) with max airspeeds that
exceed the limit of 250 kts.
Reaper, Global Hawk, N-UCAS,
HAA, NSMV
Systems operating at or
above 18,000 ft MSL fall
under Class A airspace
standards
None
(Advisory
Circular
91-57)
Level 1
Level 2
Weight (lbs)
14 CFR
Parts
91/101/103
≤ 250
21 – 1,320
1,321 –
12,500
Level 3
Category III
Level 4
Level 5
ACGSC Meeting 102
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14 CFR
Part 91
> 250
≤ 12,500
Any
> 12,500
< 18,000
≥ 18,000
Current Systems
(Projected by 2014)
Description
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UAS Stds and Airworth. – Stds Devel Orgs (SDOs)
– SDOs from DoD roadmap 2007 & UAV Forum, see updated Table below
– Also, in Europe, EUROCAE and ETSI are working standards
SDO
Category of Information
AIAA
ASTM
ANSI
ANSI/ISO
UAV/ROA CoS
F38
SC-203
AS-4, G-10, A-6
Oct 2002
Jul 2003
Dec 2004
Aug2004
~15
209
~200
~120
Craig Day
Dan Schultz
Rudy Ruana
Becky Lemon
- Produced (Total)
60
15,000
152
8,300
- On Aviation
7
200+
152
4,000+
- Adopted by DoD
3
2,572
0
3,240
- Recommended by FAA
0
30+
152
numerous
- Produced on UAS
1
11
0
8
- In Work on UAS
0
12
3
1
Certification
UAS Committee(s)
Formed
No. of Members
SDO Staff Manager
RTCA
SAE
ANSI
No. of Standards:
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UAS Stds and Airworth. – Stds Released & in Work
• RTCA
– 3 MASPS in work – top level and not duplicative
• ASTM
– 11 released, 12 in work
– 5 of these 23 are relevant but not duplicative
• SAE ASD AS-4 & GPD G-10
– 8 released – top level or training and not duplicative
• AIAA
– 1 released – terminology, superseded by ASTM spec
• EUROCONTROL
– 1 released – list of UAS standards needed, of interest but not
duplicative
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UAS Stnds and Airworth. – Airworthiness Bodies & Docs
•
NATO FINAS USAR
– STANAG 4671 Airworthiness – draft form but highly relevant (See 4.)
•
NATO NNAG & JAPCC
– Two released STANAGs, one in work, one flight plan – of interest but not believed to be
relevant
•
FAA
– Two released procedural cert. docs - Controlling UAS cert through CoA and Exp
Certificate
•
ICAO
– Study Group Report – Guidance for state UAS regulation
•
EASA
– Certification policy doc
•
DoD
– MIL-HDBK-516 –Rev B includes UASs– relevant check lists but no numbers
•
US Army
– UAV Airworthiness procedural document
•
UK MoD
– Design & airworthiness DEF STAN doc. – relevant but overtaken by STANAG?
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Rev B, 10/08/08
UAS Stnds and Airworth. - Summary
• Two released ASTM standards and three in work are
relevant
– But not duplicative
• Two regulatory docs relevant
– STANAG 4671 (See next agenda section)
– DEF STAN 00970 Part 9 (Rel. 2006. Emphasis now on the
STANAG?)
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Rev B, 10/08/08
NATO Airworthiness – Draft STANAG 4671
•
DRAFT STANAG 4671 - UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE SYSTEMS AIRWORTHINESS REQUIREMENTS (USAR)
• “This document contains a set of technical airworthiness requirements
intended primarily for the airworthiness certification of fixed-wing military
UAV Systems with a maximum take-off weight between 150 and 20,000
kg that intend to regularly operate in non-segregated airspace. Certifying
Authorities may apply these certification requirements outside these
limits where appropriate.”
• General. If a National Certifying Authority states that a UAV System
airworthiness is compliant with STANAG 4671 (and any appropriate
national reservations), then, from an airworthiness perspective, that UAV
System should have streamlined approval to fly in the airspace of other
NATO countries, if those countries have also ratified this STANAG.
ACGSC Meeting 102
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Rev B, 10/08/08
Structure of ARP94910
• AS94900 Structure appears to be adequate for new ARP
• Many updates needed to content of various sections
–
–
–
–
Need to incorporate guidance and navigation recommendations.
Need to incorporate contingency management recommendations.
Many references to pilot and crew station that need to be cleaned up
Many references to pilot controls that are no longer applicable or that
need to be reworked to remotely piloted vehicle requirements.
– Many references to other specifications (i.e. MIL-STD-1797, ADS33E-PRF, MIL-F-83300) that may not support UAV requirements
– Includes transient and ride quality requirements, do these need to be
retained to cover the potential of carrying passengers?
• Combat MEDVAC
ACGSC Meeting 102
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Rev B, 10/08/08
Structure of ARP94910
1.
SCOPE
2.
REFERENCES
3.
3.1
REQUIREMENTS
General System Requirements
Applicable.
3.1.1
Safety and Operability Considerations
Probably applicable but will require a re-write to remove references to pilot and AFCF.
3.1.2
Reliability Considerations
May need to consider new vehicle classification.
3.1.3
Redundancy Considerations
Probably applicable but may need to be rewritten to consider new vehicle classification
3.1.4
Maintainability Considerations
Mostly applicable but needs rework to reference ground station, maintenance concepts and
also needs to consider Contingency Management
3.1.5
Survivability Requirements
Applicable but may need to consider new vehicle classifications.
3.1.6
Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) Limits
Applicable
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Rev B, 10/08/08
Structure of ARP94910
3.2
3.2.1
System Performance Requirements
General FCS Performance Requirement
Needs to be reworked, includes references to other specifications that may not support
UAV’s.
3.2.2
Primary FCS Requirements
Applicable
3.2.3
Secondary FCS (SFCS)
Applicable
3.2.4
Automatic Flight Control Function (AFCF) Performance Requirements
Not applicable, need to consider how to include performance requirements related to
navigation and guidance.
3.3
System Testability Requirements
Mostly applicable but needs rework to reference ground station, maintenance concepts and
also needs to consider Contingency Management
3.4
System Design Requirements
Mostly applicable except section 3.4.5, Electrical FCS Design may need updating
dependent on vehicle classification and mission.
3.5
Subsystem Design Requirements
Applicable except section 3.5.8, Display and Annunciator Subsystem needs to be re-written
to refer to the ground station operation.
ACGSC Meeting 102
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Structure of ARP94910
3.6
Component Design and Fabrication Requirements
All sections applicable except 3.6.7, Specific Component Requirements is not applicable,
related to pilot controls
4.
4.1
QUALITY ASSURANCE PROVISIONS
General Requirements
Applicable
4.2
Analysis Requirements
Applicable
4.3
Software Verification
Applicable
4.4
Test Requirement
Mostly applicable but may need updating dependent on vehicle classification and mission.
4.5
Qualification (Preproduction) Tests
Mostly applicable but may need updating dependent on vehicle classification and mission.
4.6
Documentation
Mostly applicable but may need updating dependent on vehicle classification and mission.
ACGSC Meeting 102
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Rev B, 10/08/08