Proceedings of the Systems Engineering Conference DC 2014
BUDGET-BASED WARGAMING: A SYSTEMS ENGINEERING-DEVELOPED DECISION
SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR FISCALLY SAVVY LEADERS
AUTHORS
Alejandro S. Hernandez
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA
ahernand@nps.edu
Ronald J. Roland
ROLANDS & ASSOCIATES Corporation
Monterey, CA
president@rolands.com
Kathleen Robertson
Athena Strategies Inc.
Washington, DC
kjroberts05@comcast.net
ABSTRACT
This paper presents a budget-based wargaming methodology that translates strategic budget policy
decisions into terms of military effectiveness that better inform policy makers. We develop this decision
support system through a systems engineering approach. It integrates multiple disciplines, including
computer science, economics, and operations research. Their combined power is needed in the current
budgetary environment. Austere fiscal scenarios are challenging for all leaders at every level. The 2013
sequestration saw defense budgets absorb the majority of all cutbacks. These reductions put leaders on
notice that future debates must be accompanied with cost positions grounded in operational terms.
Budget-based wargames provide decision makers with quantifiable, value-based options that result from
credible, repeatable, and defendable analyses.
1.0
BUDGET-AUSTERE ENVIRONMENTS
Sequestration is the cancellation of budgetary resources under a presidential order. It was established in
the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, otherwise known as the GrammRudman-Hollings Act (Poling, 2013). A fundamental requirement in the Act sets deficit reduction targets
for the federal government. Sequestration enforces the realization of those targets. The inability of
Congress and the President to enact legislation in 2013 to reduce the deficit by a prescribed amount of
$1.2 trillion triggered the sequestration process in the same year (Poling, 2013).
A growing number of national leaders argue that sequestration is an unacceptable method for
reducing government expenditures. It treats the military disproportionately harsh. In accordance with
instructions from the Office of Management and Budget, the Department of Defense (DoD) would absorb
half of all reductions, while the other half would be dispersed among the remaining federal agencies. By
law, DoD began a ten year series of cuts that will total $470 billion. The latter half of fiscal year 2013
saw $37 billion of these reductions take effect (Poling, 2013). Another $52 billion is planned for FY14.
In a very short period, these defense cutbacks will spell long-term dangers to U.S. national security. In
September 2013 each Service Chief addressed the House Armed Services Committee and specified the
destructive effects of planned sequestration (Pellerin, 2013). One month later, top officials from each of
Hernandez, Roland, and Robertson
the Services reiterated that continued spending cuts would mark the lowest military budgets in the
nation’s history, slowing and perhaps even eliminating the modernization of U.S. forces (Rushing, 2013).
These testimonials have had little impact. Deficit reductions through defense rebalancing and
gapped budget lines remain in place for the military in FY14. Clearly, indiscriminate decisions to
significantly decrease defense budgets, absent analyses of their strategic implications, could jeopardize
DoD’s ability to meet Title X mandates and the needs of force Commanders.
Sequestration overlooks the synergistic capabilities of the total force. In 2013, twenty percent,
across-the-board cuts from every DoD agency resulted in furloughs. The unintended consequence from
this “salami slice” approach is that decreased capabilities of one department have a nonlinear impact on
another department. For instance, furloughing all civilian faculty in a DoD academic institution may
seem trivial. However, this act suspended instruction for all military members who were still on duty
(Hernandez, 2013). Missed classes in an educational program with tight timelines can risk students from
completing course requirements and qualifications for their next assignments. The required reassignment
actions would have been nightmarish for personnel departments throughout DoD, as well as units
expecting these officers.
Without new strategic approaches the ability to rationally reduce defense spending and maintain
military readiness presents the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) with significant challenges. Defense
leaders are ever mindful that the inability to prepare for future conflicts leaves the U.S. vulnerable.
Compounding this problem is the limited availability of quantitative decision support systems (DSS) that
can associate fiscal policies with military capability and reliably determine the degree of mission success
for various conflict scenarios. Deputy SECDEF, Ashton Carter, expressed his concern that sequestration
will reduce military readiness, but resolved to find answers to this critical issue (Serbu, 2013). We offer
budget-based wargames (BBW) as a powerful DSS that can help DoD carefully orchestrate required
budget reductions without crippling the nation’s security. It informs actions that are expected to achieve
fiscal balance as reported by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO, 2013).
2.0
INTRODUCTION TO WARGAMES
The core principles of BBW are wargaming techniques implemented to support non-traditional decisions.
This section contains general background of wargames. It follows the thought processes of innovation
champions who saw past battlefield scenarios and transitioned gaming to political and economic arenas.
It continues with the recognition that the very nature of business is combative, competitive. Executives
use it as an instrument in their strategic planning. We extend this mindset to our own vision for
developing a wargame methodology that will guide budget decisions with cost positions presented in
terms of military success.
2.1
A Brief History of Wargaming
Military leaders understand how games can educate officers in the art of war, develop their decisionmaking abilities, and help them to gain insights into the effectiveness of strategies and tactics. Sun Tzu
invented Wei Hai (Perla, 1990) approximately five thousand years ago as a vehicle to train military
commanders in the art of “encirclement,” a manifestation of the indirect approach. Creation of
Chatarunga, as a predecessor to Chess, led to the use of games for developing the strategic thinking of
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officers (Oriesek and Schwarz, 2008). Prussia’s introduction of Kriegsspiel forever etched wargames in
the military lexicon (Perla, 1990). The adoption of wargaming as a part of military science in the
curriculum of academic institutions and military schools around the world naturally followed.
Concurrently, the emergence of operations research as a scientific approach to decision-making during
World War II advanced the application of mathematical models in the military and defense communities.
Incorporation of wargaming into operations research gave wargames further credence as a science.
2.2
Games for Other Than War
The evolution of military wargames into the business world is a natural progression of such intellectual
exercises. Wargames, despite the name, are not brawls of brutish forces. It is a systematic approach for
synchronizing resources over time, space, and against intelligent, aggressive opposition in order to
achieve an end. The construct of these wargames lend themselves for applications in more than military
combat. Shortly after the political fallout from the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy’s administration
instituted wargames to inform national strategy (Caffrey, 2000).
Simple board games such as Diplomacy or its spinoff, Colonial Diplomacy, are multi-player
games that require backroom deals, betrayals, and luck. Computer models have yet to equal human
cunning or personalities that shape decisions. Dunnigan (1992) differentiates these board games as hobby
games that are pursued for pleasure. However, it has been their application to teach players the art of
negotiations and to analyze the action and reaction of each move that has transformed them into military
wargames. Assessment is necessary to attain practical value from wargames. It is this unique element of
military gaming that we exploit to the advantage of BBW (Perla, 1990).
2.3
Business Wargames
Wealth is a virtue of economics. Conversely, extreme privation may also result from it (Peters, 2004).
The socio-political environment that either situation presents is a challenging one for business leaders.
They drive expansion during prosperity or hibernation in times of famine. The Harvard Business Review
first published wargame methods to understand corporate problems and to attack them systematically
(Andlinger, 1958). From these games emerged a series of such approaches that continue today.
Web-based simulations for businesses are increasing. Integrative games such as Marketplace
(www.marketplace-simulation.com) are web-enabled business games that offer from junior to executive
level experiential play for competing in a global market. Other games educate and improve business
acumen for all levels of the work force. Virtual games from the 3C Group fit this function
(www.the3cgroup.com). Fun and learning serve a need in the business domain of simulation wargames.
Placing gamers in the midst of complex corporate situations promote and test innovative thinking. These
types of scenarios require software that companies like Celemi have developed (www.celemi.com).
A business wargame is an inventive approach to help decision makers during economic challenges.
The common ground between business and combat wargames is the need for leaders to visualize the
impact of their decisions. The ability to understand the broad scale consequences of choices is powerful.
The use of games for case studies and academic pursuits was an eventuality. Leadership and
organizational wargames prepare companies for the turbulent nature of the market. Organizations support
learning programs by incorporating gaming methods for their work force. It is evident that industry has
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Hernandez, Roland, and Robertson
adopted gaming techniques to enrich their organizations. The current military-political structure faced
with constrained resources is ready for an innovation like BBW.
2.4
Budget-Based Wargames Defined
We stand at a nexus for expanding the application of wargames in extraordinary settings that today’s
political-military landscape presents. In recent years, the U.S. military has rediscovered wargames as an
effective way to explore and gain insights into increasingly difficult environments that common decision
making tools cannot address. Researchers recognize the potential of computers to explore non-traditional
problem spaces. The subsequent coupling of computers and wargames has opened new frontiers that we
now boldly enter with BBW.
BBW is the science of implementing wargaming techniques to address complex problems in
which the influence of fiscal policies on the operational effectiveness of forces is the focus. It is an
integration of many disciplines, to include operations research, systems engineering, economics, and
computer science. BBW addresses two main questions: 1) To what degree do fiscal policy decisions
impact the operational effectiveness of U.S. forces? 2) How do we mitigate the negative impact of budget
decisions on the operational effectiveness of U.S. forces?
3.0
DEVELOPING A NEW APPROACH FOR NAVIGATING FISCAL MINEFIELDS
BBW is a solution for a capability requirement. We use a systems engineering approach to describe the
conceptual design of BBW as a DSS. This discussion includes a methodology for its implementation.
We dissect the required characteristics and reassemble it. The result is a confluence of systems
engineering, cost estimation, modeling and simulation, and experimentation. Central to the development
of this new approach is systems analysis, the combination of operations research and policy analysis
(Gibson et al., 2007). Development of the BBW in this paper ends with its defined system concepts
(Kossikoff, 2011).
3.1
Identifying Requirements or “What Does BBW Address?”
BBW is a proposal for solving complex problems that pit fiscal needs against national defense objectives.
Thus we begin this discussion by identifying the actual capability that U.S. leadership requires.
According to DoD Directive 7045.20, capability is the ability to achieve a desired effect or outcome.
From the very recent past to today, leaders throughout the DoD and government seek a capability to fully
understand the impact of fiscal decisions on the security posture of the U.S. (Poling, 2013; Rushing,
2013). They are faced with a myriad of challenges to identify cost savings while maintaining the
operational effective of U.S. forces.
A needs analysis verifies the required capability for a system that can comprehensively examine
the impact of fiscal decisions on national defense. Supporting evidence lies in the continuing and
escalating rhetoric from military and civilian leaders. Although we recognize that the entirety of the U.S.,
as well as allies have a stake in U.S. military capabilities, we identify these two groups as the named
stakeholders for this system. Senators Lindsey Graham and Roger Wicker announced their support to
pass a budget while addressing defense sequestration, at the same time maintaining military readiness, but
they vehemently opposed cuts in retirement benefits (Jordan, 2013). The vigorous debate that followed
ended with a promise to find a “solution.”
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To this general conclusion we posit a question, “How?” when recent years show no proof that
methods for developing a cogent argument exists or is in use. Similarly, Service Chiefs testified one-byone on how sequestration will impact current and planned capabilities (Pellerin, 2013). They lament the
gutting of operations and maintenance accounts and slowing of investments in technologies such as Cyber
domains. No alternatives were offered. These are only snippets of ongoing deliberations. No clearer
evidence exists of the inability to identify mutually beneficial trade spaces between fiscal and security
demands than the actual 2013 sequestration (Poling, 2013; Serbu, 2013).
The balancing act is difficult and the political fights that follow are absent the quantum meaning
of the decisions being made. There are large amounts of data to show costs and cost savings. An equal
number itemizes the reduction of personnel, weapons, and whole organizations. The relevant question is
how these reductions would eventually affect the success of U.S. forces when they are ordered into future
conflicts. This is a fundamental question: “Can U.S. forces still succeed in the battles that they must
fight?” It is followed by a corollary question: “If U.S. forces cannot achieve their mission as a result of
fiscal decisions, how can those decisions be altered to achieve success?” Though slightly modified from
our earlier BBW objectives, the capability to answer these primal questions is the definitive purpose of
the BBW DSS.
3.2
Functional Design and Interactions of BBW
Systems engineering calls for an understanding of the functions that the system must perform to achieve
its stated purpose. The related explanation for how these functions interact is the functional flow of the
system. In this section we decompose the stated requirements (i.e. questions) into functional elements
(Kossiakoff et al., 2011). Reassembling these elements into a coherent system includes a discussion for
how it works in unison.
A dendritic approach decomposes the fundamental questions that a BBW must address (Stevens,
1979; Gibson et al., 2007). The ensuing tasks that each question entails clarify the expertise and/or
techniques necessary to address the question or sub-questions.
Question 1: “Can U.S. forces still succeed in the battles that they must fight?”










Frame the fiscal bounds.
Define success.
Develop measures for success.
Describe the scenario and the divergent missions of opposing forces.
Translate fiscal bounds into the potential battle order of U.S. forces for the scenario.
Describe the forces that oppose the U.S.
List operational objectives for each force.
Create a credible plan for each side to achieve its mission.
Determine the results of engagements among forces, including the final outcome.
… etc.
In a similar breakdown of the second question we show a different set of tasks that lead to other
disciplines. They have some overlap from the first question, but not exceedingly so.
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Hernandez, Roland, and Robertson
Question 2: “If U.S. forces cannot achieve their mission as a result of fiscal decisions, how can those
decisions be altered to achieve success?”





Compare and contrast fiscal policy decisions in terms of success measures.
Analyze the cost-benefit of improvements or degradation of force structures.
Develop and/or identify operational and doctrinal changes to mitigate force structure changes.
If feasible, develop and/or identify options to force structure changes that will meet still meet
fiscal constraints.
… etc.
There is an interim step to constructing the functional design of the system. It takes shape in similar
fashion to how brainstorming methods help organize a thesis (Skywire, 1979). Gathering these elements
into logical groups initiates a visualization of the system. Each grouping characterizes sub-systems and
internal processes within the BBW. It also starts dialogue for how the tasks are related, thus how the
groups of tasks are connected. This effort forms the functional building blocks of the system (Kossiakoff
et al., 2011; Blanchard and Fabrycky, 2011).
The combined result of identifying the functional elements and their logical reconstruction is the
functional flow of the system. We add another dimension with the phases of functional activities.
Together they outline the integration of different specialties shown in a conceptual diagram (Figure 1).
Policy
Changes
PH 3
Identification of trade-space;
savings vs. effectiveness.
Budget
Constraints
Operational/
Scenario Changes
Objectives and
Measures of
Effectiveness
•
•
•
•
•
Ops. Research
Systems Engineering
Decision Analysis
Test & Evaluation
•
MDMP
•
•
•
•
PH 0
Unbounded
Plan
Bounded
Plan
Cost Estimation
and Cost-Benefit
Analysis: Baseline
Identify factors of
interest; sensitivity.
Modeling & Simulation
Economics
Wargaming
Program/ Business Management
Logistics
PH 1A
Computer Science/
Computer
Experimentation
PH 1B
•
•
•
Cost Estimation
and Cost-Benefit
Analysis
Modeling & Simulation
Design of Experiments
Simulation Analysis
PH 2
Figure 1. Phased functional processes of BBW show the different disciplines that are
required to execute it, as well as the iterative flows of the system.
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3.3
Conceptual Description of BBW Major Processes
BBW falls into four major sub-systems: 1) Problem and Measures Definition, 2) Operational Planning
and Adjudication, 3) Fiscal Translation and Cost Estimation, and 4) Experimentation and Trade-off
Analysis. Within each grouping are internal processes that have other sub-systems. We limit our
discussion to the overview of each major sub-system as the conceptual construct of BBW.
Problem and Measures Definition
Solution development begins with problem definition. So it is with BBW. This fundamental
process is stated in every scientific text written. Books from Kossiakoff (2011); Gibson et al. (2007),
Kaplow and Shavell (2005), Raiffa (1970) are just a few, representing systems engineering, systems
analysis, and decision analysis, respectively. It is absolutely elementary in military handbooks. We
implement a combination of these methods to carefully define the problem, which comes in two
dimensions: 1) Specific budgetary questions beyond the fundamental questions for implementing BBW.
2) Critical operational objectives of the scenario to develop measures of effectiveness.
Measures are vital to the BBW process. They anchor the cost positions that result from it. There
are many approaches to measures development. A basic, but effective approach is the dendritic process
discussed earlier. It is useful for identifying the essential elements of analysis (Stevens, 1979). This
technique borrowed from operational test and evaluation breaks down each fundamental question or
objective in more specific sub-questions or sub-objectives. At each juncture, the analyst asks whether the
objective or sub-objective can be answered with a single quantifiable data element. If the answer is
“yes,” deconstruction of the question stops. Every major question is treated in the same manner until all
are answered positively, or the question can no longer be refined. Those sub-objectives that cannot be
answered with a data element are annotated. The data elements are combined to develop operational
measures. Gibson et al. (2007) and Stevens (1979) provide enduring characteristics of good measures,
which we will leave for the reader to study in greater detail.
A simple, strategic example demonstrates dendritic analysis. Take for instance a campaign
focused on irregular warfare, where the strategic end state is to establish a democratically elected
government. The end state is transformed into a question, “Is the government democratically elected?” A
sub-objective may be, “Are major parties represented?” The waterfall of sub-objectives may eventually
ask, “How many members of each major party voted?” The answer to the question is a countable
quantity. This data element, combined with the known number in each major party, results in percentages
that indicate the legitimacy of the election results. BBW uses these measures as the focal point for
comparing cost cuts and interpreting the analytical products from the effort.
Operational Planning and Adjudication
The deliberate planning process (DPP) is deeply embedded in military science. It is the doctrinal
process that the U.S. military employs. It consists of five phases that culminates in an executable plan for
different contingencies that may involve the U.S. (JFSC Pub 1, 2000). The Joint Operations Planning and
Execution System (JOPES), Volumes I and II provide detailed instructions for conducting DPP (JWFC,
1995). The final product of the DPP is the Commander’s strategic concept of the operation. It is
reviewed by the Joint Staff and approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Upon approval, it
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Hernandez, Roland, and Robertson
is developed into a concept plan, along with supporting plans. Strategic level plans are the target of
BBW. Through them BBW reveals how U.S. forces would perform in the face of fiscal constraints.
Although fiscal decisions have significant impact at much lower levels, the aggregate result is the crucial
point for our named stakeholders.
These plans are implemented in many ways to visualize how they may play out to their possible
conclusions. Even subsets of the plans are important to training and educating staff members in their
duties. The surge of technologies in modeling and simulation (M&S) has made it possible to represent
these dynamic and often complicated scenarios and mission sets in computer assisted exercises or
wargames. As the computational power of computers escalate, their capability to simulate detailed plans
become increasingly important to understand the security environment. There are a number of potential
M&S tools that have the capability for mathematically modeling interactions of forces in many different
settings. The BBW process leans on these M&S capabilities for adjudicating interactions. Furthermore,
M&S is central to experimentation and trade-off analysis.
Fiscal Translation and Cost Estimation
Translating fiscal decisions to their physical end state with regard to U.S. force structures is the
single most difficult process in BBW. It requires a combination of seminar wargames from subject matter
experts (SME) in force structures, analyses from finance management program analysts, as well as buy-in
from senior leaders. This effort produces potentially different force structures that would be available to
force commanders in their planning, thus a change in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP – JWFC,
1995). As a result, joint planners must be part of the group that reviews the force structure, which is
translated from the fiscal policy decisions. The political debate that follows can be exhaustive. A
decision to establish a baseline for the notionally transformed structures is a means to continue progress
with the BBW. It should be clear that the baseline is established as a starting point to initiate exploration
and follow-on experimentation. It serves as a strawman for new evolutions.
Cost estimation for the actual operations is another area that provides a basis for cost positions.
An understanding of expenditures for producing or not producing new systems can be derived from
examining the full spectrum of DOTMLPF (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership,
personnel, and facilities). However, application of systems in an operation requires further examination
of the logistical tail involved, as well as its duration.
The described process will require comprehensive study. It involves a mixture of experts from
many fields. Fiscal Translation and Cost Estimation will consume a large proportion of time allotted for
BBW. There are few known (and shared) efforts to cover this important element. To gain access into the
current DoD processes is a major obstacle in itself. Attempts by agencies external to DoD have been rare.
The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) ran a Strategic Choices Exercise that asked
groups of experts to rebalance U.S. forces capability portfolios when faced with an austere fiscal
environment (Harrison et al., 2013). The results were sets of strategic choices for the types of capabilities
that the U.S. would have in its arsenal. This is only a first step in understanding this critical process in
BBW. How they cascade into actual force structures requires further development.
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Experimentation and Trade-off Analysis
Exploring the resulting force structures based on a given operational plan or plans is a mixture of
seminar and computer wargames, as well as experimentation. It leverages the rise in M&S capabilities
and advancements in designs of experiments for computer simulations. It is through these processes that
analysts can develop recommendations for altering policy decisions and/ or altering choices in force
structure changes. They are offered in terms of measures developed earlier in the BBW process.
An execution of the plan with the current force structure is compared with the modified force
structure that resulted from the given budget scenario in the BBW. This process may begin with a
seminar wargame to bound the problem, as well as gain a sense for potential outcomes. Implementing the
plan in a simulation requires time and input from SMEs for the plans and combat systems. The choice of
simulation is based on the capabilities that it must have to represent the forces and actions required in the
plan. The turn-by-turn computer assisted wargame (CAW) for both force structures would involve
technicians and operational role players. A comparative analysis of the results traces outcomes and
decisions in the game. Should the analysis reveal that differences in measures of operational
effectiveness are not significant, BBW may end. Pending a desire from senior leaders to continue, BBW
would state that DoD can sustain the reductions.
Experimentation is a systematic exploration of options in the likely event that budget reductions
have significantly affected the capability of U.S. forces to achieve success. This process requires
transforming the human-in-the-loop, CAW into a closed-loop, fully automated simulation of the game.
This transformation requires in-depth knowledge of unit operations and decision criteria that players used
during the game. Doctrine as well as tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that are involved must
also be available to guide units in engagements that may have not occurred during the actual CAW.
Depending on the complexity of the scenario and capabilities of the M&S tool being used, CAW-tocomputer experiment transformation may equal the effort of fiscal translation and cost estimation.
We now apply innovations in experimental designs for computer simulations. Exploration of the
design space created by the hundreds, perhaps thousands, of factors in a combat simulation can be
daunting (Kleijnen et al., 2005). The required number of simulation runs to study each potential
combination of factor levels can equal up to ( n !) k , where k is the number of factors and n is the number
of value levels each factor can assume. Factors may be the number of combat teams in the scenario or the
features of the weaponry that the units possess. However, we leverage recent improvements in the
efficiencies of new experimental designs. Saturated nearly orthogonal Latin hypercubes have made it
possible to choose a specific, and much smaller, subset of the combinations that can provide a high level
of confidence in understanding how the measures behave (Hernandez et al., 2012).
Examining the behavior of critical measures as a result of changes to the factors enables the BBW
team to gain insights. A greater understanding can help the team form recommendations to adjust the
original changes to the force structure. The experiment may also identify opportunities to revise TTP or
amend doctrine in light of the new force structure. Such changes may create conditions that allow U.S.
forces to achieve operational success. More importantly, the analysis should inform decision makers
when the defense structure cannot withstand the fiscal cuts. Through trade-off and sensitivity analyses,
the team can recommend changes to fiscal policies that do not dismantle national security. These new
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Hernandez, Roland, and Robertson
policies can then be reviewed by an independent team to create yet a new set of options for force
structures in the given scenario. This iterative process can verify the veracity of the recommendations.
At this point decision makers would have options grounded in operational terms.
4.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Referring to Figure 1, we summarize this iterative process in phases. Phase 0 accounts for developing
the problem statement or purpose of the BBW. It further defines the operational scenario(s) for which the
BBW is to address. Developing success measures or critical metrics for both efforts are necessary for
analyses. Phases 1A and 1B combine translating fiscal bounds to force structures and developing
operational plans for a conflict scenario. A comparative analysis of outcomes from bounded and
unbounded plans determines if budgetary cuts have a significant impact on operational effectiveness. The
costs associated with the force structure and their implementation in a contingency will be of interest in
cost-benefit or trade-off analyses. Computer simulations and experimentation in Phase 2 permit study of
the relevant trade space in the given BBW environment. Phase 3 considers findings from the experiments
to create new fiscal scenarios. Recommendations from the BBW may come in three categories 1)
Doctrinal and TTP revisions, 2) Force structure adjustments to the initial modifications, and 3) Changes
to fiscal policies in scale and targeted defense entities. More likely, a combination of all three
recommendation types will allow U.S. leaders to identify areas for compromise that satisfy fiscal
constraints and security needs.
We propose a BBW proof of concept (PoC). The DoD and its industry partners have all the
necessary components to initiate such an effort. For example, the Joint Theater Level Simulation
(JTLS®) is DoD owned and can serve as the CAW driver. U.S. organizations own the scenarios that have
been played in JTLS (http://www.rolands.com, 2014). If not JTLS, there are other campaign level
simulations that are in use throughout the Services. Our search would include commercial products.
Required characteristics for the simulation are part of planning the PoC. Operational planners and force
structure SMEs are available throughout the defense enterprise. Think tanks are important partners to this
effort, especially in visualizing budget constraints into force capabilities. The CSBA (Harrison, et al.,
2013) has already developed a process for taking the first step. Computer experimentation is a
developing area. The Naval Postgraduate School Simulation Experiments and Efficient Designs Center is
a nationally recognized leader in computer experimentation. Its expertise resides in the ability to use
cluster technologies and customized experimental designs to address complex military issues
(http://harvest.nps.edu, 2014).
The BBW team must be a collection of diverse talents. The overall assembly of this group is
itself a systems engineering effort, where the resulting components are professionals that range from
military to policy advisor, and extend into math, engineering, and social sciences. The internal processes
required in BBW are challenging in time and level of effort. An estimated timeline for complete
realization of a BBW is a period of 270 days. U.S. leaders who are ready to fully understand the impact
of fiscal policies are offered this innovative approach. The payoffs are quantitative cost positions for
programming and budgeting decisions, enduring measures for mission success and associated costs for
alternative scenarios, and a residual capability to help DoD maintain future military capabilities within
budget authorizations.
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Hernandez, Roland, and Robertson
AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES
ALEJANDRO S. HERNANDEZ, PHD, COLONEL, U.S. ARMY (RET.)
Professor Andy Hernandez joined the Systems Engineering Department at NPS after 26 years of military
service. While on active duty he served as a military faculty member and Associate Dean for the Graduate
School of Operational and Information Sciences. He holds a B.S. in Civil Engineering from the United
States Military Academy, an M.S. and Ph.D. in Operations Research from Naval Postgraduate School,
and a Masters in Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College.
Professor Hernandez teaches courses in modeling and simulation, mathematical models, and
capabilities engineering. He is active in different departments and programs; providing graduate
education for the Executive Masters in Business Administration program for California State University –
Monterey Bay, where the course in Strategic Management of Innovation and Technology is foundational.
His research areas include a systems engineering approach to design and analysis of simulation based
events, computer experimentation and design of experiments, and wargaming analysis. Prof. Hernandez’s
experimental designs have been applied to a host of studies that range from a fire support problem to the
examination of UAV distribution in network-centric warfare.
Professor Hernandez’s military career includes serving in leadership and staff positions from
squad to Joint Task Force levels. He is Joint qualified with assignments in the Joint Intelligence Cell
during Joint Task Force Provide Promise with Allied Forces South and with J-7/ Joint Warfighting
Center, U.S. Joint Forces Command. He led an analysis team in support of Joint Task Force Joint
Endeavor. During his tour in Iraq, he served as Director, Analysis & Assessments, Strategic
Communications, J9, USF-I. His last military assignment was on the Army Staff as Chief of the
Warfighting Analysis Division, DAPR-FDA, G-8.
RONALD J. ROLAND, PHD, LIEUTENANT COLONEL, U.S. AIR FORCE (RET.)
Dr. Roland is the co-founder, president, and administrative head of R&A operations. He has managed the
development of several computer simulations. Among them is the Joint Theater Level Simulation (JTLS),
a real-time, interactive wargaming system originally sponsored by U.S. JCS/J-8 for contingency plan
analysis. JTLS is installed worldwide. It is used for command post exercise support, analyses of
contingency and operational plans and potential conflict situations. R&A distributes JTLS to every major
U.S. joint command and twelve non-U.S. agencies. The full list is available at www.rolands.com.
JTLS was one of the first simulations to be developed from inception to be joint and coalition capable
highly distributable. It was also the first operational simulation to be ALSP and HLA compliant, Internet
“web” enabled and internationalized under the I18N criteria. Both the web capability and the I18N
implementations were R&A funded and implemented.
Dr. Roland is Project Manager of the NPS Academic and Research support contract and the PACOM
Wargaming Division support contract. He is the primary interface for all R&A administrative, marketing
and contractual efforts, and is the R&A corporate pilot.
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Hernandez, Roland, and Robertson
KATHLEEN ROBERTSON, JD, PHD
Since the 1990’s, Dr. Kathleen Robertson has been one of the United States’ premier designers of
strategic simulations (wargames) for corporations and government.
Previously a senior level consultant to Fortune 500 companies in the development of international
business and tax strategies, Dr. Robertson was asked in 1992 to be Director of Research and Analysis on
the Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces. At the conclusion of
that study, she joined a government think tank as project director of the National Shipbuilding Business
Strategy Game (1993) and the National Research and Development Technology Game. Both of these
involved senior managers from government departments as well as the military, CEO’s of major
corporations, investment bankers and venture capitalists as well as policy makers from both the legislative
and executive branches.
In 1994, Dr. Robertson was selected to work with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) as the primary negotiator for the government, assessing investment risks, business plans and
partner strategies for technology development. In 1995, Dr. Robertson joined Booz Allen & Hamilton as
a Principal, conducting a number of senior level wargames for OSD, DoD, and the Department of the
Navy. These included an Acquisition Strategy Wargame for Commander of NAVAIR, a Housing
Privatization initiative for ASN-Installations, as well as a strategic simulation for the Presidential
Commission of Critical Infrastructure Protection
Dr. Robertson, as a National Director for Strategic Simulations and Strategy for KPMG, led a team in
conducting a strategic simulation and completing a HUD grant for the City and County of Denver’s
Empowerment Zone Application. From her work on the simulation for the Presidential Commission on
Critical Infrastructure Protection, she was selected to work with the Department of Justice in the
development of the Five-Year Counter Terrorism and Technology Crime Plan. She consulted with
FEMA, DoJ, FBI and Mayors in the development of local community and private industry vulnerability
assessments and strategies.
In addition to her private sector work, Dr. Robertson was appointed as the Program Director for
Wargaming and Acquisition Strategy at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. During
her appointment, she designed and conducted a number of organization, acquisition and operational
security wargames with emphasis on critical interactions between key government and industry
stakeholders, identifying tensions between economic and security priorities. Because of her noted
expertise in corporate priorities and national security/defense issues, she independently advises industry
and government officials on issues related to Business Strategies, Budgets and Operational Priorities. She
recently completed the TACAIR Shortfall Industrial Base Wargames, which then led into the JSF
Sustainment Wargames.
Kathleen Robertson holds a J.D/PhD in International Corporate Law, International Political
Economics and Defense Policy, and a Master of Political Science in International Relations and Defense
Policy. She is a member of a number of professional organizations, including the American Bar
Association and the Wargaming Advisory Panel for the Naval War College.
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