1. Explain the 6th amendment
a. Explain a speedy trial
i. Can’t be too speedy
1. Arkansas case thrown out because it only took 45 minutes
ii. Klopfer v. North Carolina (1967)
1. Extends 6th amendment to the States (14th amendment)
iii. Barker v. Wingo (1972)
1. Speedy Criteria
a. The length of the delay
b. Reasons
c. Has the delay harmed the defendant
d. Did the defendant ask for the delay
iv. Explain the Speedy Trial Act of 1974
1. Speedy = Usually within 100 days of being arrested
a. Exceptions = mental tests / witnesses are ill
b. Explain a public trial
i. Public = Coverage from media must not infringe on defendant’s rights
1. Judge’s decision
2. OJ Simpson case / TV coverage???
3. Right is to the defendant not the media
ii. Estes v. Texas (1965)
1. Case dismissed because TV cameras made the trial a “circus-like” event
iii. Chandler v. Florida (1981)
1. Cameras are constitutional, just don’t get crazy
c. Explain a trial by jury
i. Defendant has the right to:
1. Jury trial, chosen from “the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law.”
a. Williams v. Florida (1970)
i. Facts of the Case: In 1967, the state of Florida passed
legislation to allow six-member juries in criminal cases.
Johnny Williams was tried and convicted for robbery by
such a jury. Williams, lost in a Florida appellate court; he
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
ii. Question: Did a trial by jury of less than 12 persons
violate the Sixth Amendment?
iii. Conclusion: The Court held that "the 12-man [jury]
requirement cannot be regarded as an indispensable
component of the Sixth Amendment." The Court found
that the purpose of the jury trial was "to prevent
oppression by the Government," and that the performance
of this role was not dependent on the particular number of
people on the jury. The Court concluded that "the fact
that the jury at common law was composed of precisely
12 is a historical accident, unnecessary to effect the
purposes of the jury system and wholly without
significance 'except to mystics.'"
b. Burch v. Louisiana (1979)
i. Facts of the Case: Burch was found guilty by a
nonunanimous six-member jury of showing obscene
d.
films. The court imposed a suspended prison sentence of
two consecutive seven- month terms and fined him
$1,000.
ii. Question: Does a conviction by a nonunanimous sixmember jury in a state criminal trial for a nonpetty
offense violate the accused's right to a trial by jury as
protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments?
iii. Conclusion: The Court found that convictions by the
nonunanimous six-member jury violated the Constitution.
Tracing the development of the Court's considerations of
this issue, Justice Rehnquist indicated that Burch's case
sat at the "intersection of our decisions concerning jury
size and unanimity." Rehnquist relied on the Court's
holding in Ballew v. Georgia (1978) and the practices in
several of the states to find against convictions by
nonunanimous juries of six members. Only two of the
states that used six-member juries in trials for petty
offenses allowed verdicts to be less than unanimous. This
"near uniform judgment of the Nation" of the
inappropriateness of this jury arrangement, argued
Rehnquist, provided the Court with a "useful guide" in
determining constitutionally allowable jury practices.
c. Strauder v. West Virginia (1880)
i. Jury = “drawn from a fair cross section of the
community”
d. Taylor v. Louisiana (1975)
i. Cannot discriminate against groups in the community
e. Miller-El v. Dretke (2005)
i. Cannot discriminate by “the pigmentation of skin, the
accident of birth, or the choice of religion”
ii. "selection process was replete with evidence that
prosecutors were selecting and rejecting potential jurors
because of race." -- black
f. Explain how to serve as a juror
2. “Change of venue”
a. People are prejudice towards you
3. May waive a jury trial
a. One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States
(1972)
i. Judge can force jury trial even if defendant waives the
right
b. Define bench trial
i. Judge alone hears the case
Explain the right to an adequate defense
i. Defendant has the right:
1. To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
2. To be confronted with the witnesses against him, and question them in
open court
3. To have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor (that is,
favorable witnesses can be subpoenaed, or forced to attend)
4. To have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense
ii. Gideon v. Wainwright (1963)
1. A defendant must have the attorney if he/she wants one (even if you
cannot afford one)
2. Usually a lawyer from the local community or a private legal aid
association that provides counsel
3. Now, more and more come from local tax dollars
iii. Confrontation Clause
1. Pointer v. Texas (1965)
a. Petitioner was arrested and brought before a state judge for
preliminary hearing on a robbery charge. The complaining
witness testified but petitioner, who had no counsel, did not
cross-examine. Petitioner was later indicted and tried. The
witness had moved to another State, and the transcript of his
testimony at the hearing was introduced over petitioner's
objections that he was denied the right of confrontation. He was
convicted and the highest state court affirmed.
b. You have the right to be confronted with the witnesses against
him, and question them in open court
2. Smith vs. Illinois (1968) – Confrontation Clause
a. Addressed the issue of whether or not the state could introduce as
evidence, statements obtained from an undercover police
informant, against a defendant charged with selling drugs. The
state would not produce the witness (undercover police
informant) in person because it said that revealing his identity
would undermine the secretive nature and strategies used by the
police department.
The defendant claimed that his 6th Amendment Confrontation
Clause right to confront the witness had been violated in his trial
and that the conviction should be thrown out. The Court agreed
with the defendant. The right to cross-examine a witness is
absolute.
3. Bruton vs. United States (1968)
a. In this case, the two defendants, Bruton and Evans, were charged
with armed postal robbery. During the trial, a postal inspector
said that Evans had confessed to him that both he and Bruton had
committed the crime. Neither Evans nor Bruton took the stand in
the trial. When the jury was deliberating its decision, the judge
instructed them that the hearsay testimony of the postal inspector
could not be used as evidence against Bruton, and they should
disregard this statement when making their decision. He also told
them that the statement could be used against Evans himself.
The principle being addressed here is that Bruton's defense
attorney could not cross-examine the witness, Evans, who
allegedly made the statement, because Evans was not going to
take the stand! This violated Bruton's 6th Amendment
Confrontation Clause right to cross-examine the witness!
The first court found Evans and Bruton guilty. The Supreme
Court ruled that the conviction against Bruton had to be thrown
out because his Confrontation Clause right to cross-examine
the witness had been violated. Later, by the way, the conviction
against Evans was thrown as well, based on other violations.
This was an important case because it is a favorite trick of
prosecutors to conduct a joint trial and use witnesses’ statements
against each other. The statements can't be used by the jury if the
witnesses aren't taking the stand, but the jury heard them anyway
and the statements might influence them even though they are
told to disregard them. Although there are exceptions, this ruling
has eliminated many joint trials.
4. Washington v. Texas (1967)
1. Petitioner and another were charged with a fatal shooting.
Petitioner's alleged co-participant was tried first and convicted of
murder. At petitioner's trial for the same murder, he sought to
secure his co-participant's testimony, which would have been
vital for his defense. On the basis of two Texas statutes which, at
the time of trial, prevented a participant accused of a crime from
testifying for his coparticipant (but not for the prosecution), the
judge sustained the State's objection to the coparticipant's
testimony. Petitioner's conviction ensued, and was upheld on
appeal.
2. Unconstitutional to deny the ability to obtain witnesses in his
favor
iv. Escobedo v. Illinois (1964)
1. Danny Escobedo, picked up for questioning in his brother-inlaws murder, asked numerous times for an attorney. Police
denied requests, even though his lawyer was in the police station
and was trying to see him. Escobedo made numerous damaging
statements.
2. Unconstitutional (freed then from jail)
i. Became a drifter. Arrested in 2001 for probation
violation and was a suspect in a 1981 stabbing murder.
v. Scott vs. Illinois (1979)
1. A case involving a defendant who was convicted of shoplifting and fined
$50 in a bench trial. The applicable Illinois law stated that the maximum
penalty for the crime was a $500 fine or one year in jail, or both. The
defendant appealed the case claiming that his 6th Amendment right to
counsel had been violated because he did not have personal means to
hire an attorney and the court had not appointed one for him.
The Court disagreed with the defendant. Before this case, the Court's
rule had been that if imprisonment was even a possible punishment, the
defendant was entitled to appointed counsel. In this case, the Court ruled
that just the fact that imprisonment was a possible punishment alone did
not require that an attorney be appointed. Instead, the Court said that
imprisonment must be the actual sentence laid down in order to require
the court to appoint an attorney for the defendant.
vi. Halbert v. Michigan (2005)
Facts of the Case
Halbert pleaded no contest in a Michigan court to two counts of criminal
sexual conduct. The day after Halbert's sentence was imposed, Halbert
moved to withdraw his plea. The trial court denied the motion and told
Halbert the property remedy for his complaint was the state appellate court.
Michigan required a defendant convicted on a guilty or no contest plea to
apply for leave of appeal to the state appellate court. Halbert asked the trial
court twice to appoint counsel to help him with his application. The trial
court refused. Without counsel, Halbert still applied for leave to appeal,
which the court of appeals denied. The state supreme court also denied
Halbert's application for leave to appeal to that court.
Question
Did the due process and equal protection clauses require the appointment of
counsel for defendants, convicted on their pleas, who sought access to a
Michigan appellate court?
Conclusion
Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court
held that the due process and equal protection clauses required Michigan to
provide counsel for defendants who wanted to appeal to the state appellate
court. The Court reasoned that if indigent defendants convicted on their
pleas did not have counsel to guide them through Michigan's complex
appellate process, their right to appeal would not be meaningful.
vii. Insanity Defense
 A defense asserted by an accused in a criminal prosecution to avoid
liability for the commission of a crime because, at the time of the crime,
the person did not appreciate the nature or quality or wrongfulness of
the acts.
 HISTORY: "Complete madness" was first established as a defense to
criminal charges by the common-law courts in late-thirteenth-century
England. By the eighteenth century, the complete madness definition
had evolved into the "wild beast" test. Under that test, the insanity
defense was available to a person who was "totally deprived of his
understanding and memory so as not to know what he [was] doing, no
more than an infant, a brute, or a wild beast"
1. Queen v. M'Naghten (1863)
a. FACTS:
i. M’Naghten believed he was persecuted by Tories, and he
sought to assassinate Prime Minister Robert Peel. Failing
to accurately identify Peel from behind, he inadvertently
shot the Prime Minister’s secretary, Edward Drummond,
who died several weeks later. M’Naghten was found not
guilty on the grounds of insanity.
b. ISSUE:
i. What is the proper standard for insanity? What questions
should be posed to the jury, and how should the jury be
instructed?
c. M’Naghten Rule (“Right or Wrong” test)
i. To establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must
be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of
the act, the party accused was labouring under such a
defect of reason, from a disease of the mind, as not to
2.
3.
4.
5.
know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if
he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what
was right or wrong.
Durham Rule (1954)
a. The rule, as stated in the court's decision, held that "an accused is
not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of
mental disease." It required a jury's determination that the
accused was suffering from a mental disease and that there was a
causal relationship between the disease and the act. Because of
difficulties in its implementation, the Durham rule was rejected
by the same court in the 1972 case United States v. Brawner
United States v. Brawner (1972)
a. The Court decided to accept the American Law Institute
definition of insanity as defined below for trials after this date. A
person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of
such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.
b. A mental disease or defect includes any abnormal condition of
the mind which substantially affects mental or emotional
processes and substantially impairs behavior controls.
Ake v. Oklahoma (1985)
a. FACTS:
i. An indigent defendant was charged with first-degree
murder and firing a gun with intent to kill. The trial court
judge ordered a competency evaluation due to his odd
behavior at the arraignment four months after
commission of the crime. A psychiatrist initially
determined he was incompetent to stand trial, but
reversed his opinion six weeks later, after the defendant
had been medicated with large doses of an anti-psychotic
drug to control symptoms of his chronic illness.
Defendant's pretrial request for a psychiatric evaluation at
state expense was denied in spite of the fact that insanity
was the sole defense to be asserted. Defendant was
convicted and, at the guilt phase of the trial, psychiatric
evidence as to his dangerousness was admitted. No
testimony as to his sanity at the time of the offense was
presented. At sentencing, the State requested and received
the death penalty, relying on evidence of the defendant's
future dangerousness. The defendant was unable to rebut
this expert testimony or to present mitigating evidence.
b. RESULT:
i. The U.S. Supreme Court announced the federal
constitutional right of an indigent criminal defendant to
receive, at state expense, the assistance of a psychiatric
expert.
Insanity Defense Act (1985)
a. The Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 (Act) was the first
comprehensive U.S. federal law governing the insanity defense
and the disposition of individuals suffering from a mental disease
or defect who are involved in the criminal justice system.
b. Some of the important provisions of the Act are:
i. The Act significantly modified the standard for insanity
previously applied in the federal courts.
ii. Shifted the burden of proof on the defendant to
establish the insanity defense by clear and convincing
evidence.
iii. Eliminated the defense of diminished capacity.
iv. Limited the scope of expert testimony on ultimate legal
issues.
v. Provided for federal commitment of persons who become
insane after having been found guilty or while serving a
federal prison sentence.
vi. Created a special verdict of "not guilty only by reason
of insanity," which triggers a commitment
proceeding.