Review
Parmenides Argument Against
Change
Thesis: Reality is a Static Monism
Supporting Argument:
1. There is no non-being.
2. there is generation only if there is non-being.
3. therefore there is no generation.
4. there is real change only if there is generation.
5. therefore, there is no real change.
6. sense perception records a world of real change.
7. therefore, there is no real change. (the senses are
systematically mistaken)
Zeno’s Paradox of Motion
(Jason explains)
After the Rationalists (Pythagoras,
Parmenides, Zeno)
Pericles’ Decline, Sophists’ Rise (500-400 BCE)
Four Threads:
a) Rise of democracy (citizen councils)
b) Rise of the Sophists in Athenian life
c) Warfare with powers on the boundary of the
expanding Athenian empire (Persia east,
Sparta south)
d) Continuing influence of the nature philosofs
Consequences of Four Threads
• Rise of relativism
• Rise of skepticism
Protagorean Relativism: no difference between
opinion and truth. Arguments and explanations
are as good as they seem. Persuasive bad
arguments are – persuasive good arguments.
Skepticism: human beings lack the necessary
equipment to distinguish truth from falsehood.
Relativism and Skepticism: Some Cases
Can you distinguish between truth and opinion
in the following cases?
1. 2+2=4 (is 2+2=5 just as good?)
2. The sun is shining upon Boulder now (is “It is
overcase in Boulder now” equally good?)
3. Murder is wrong.
4. Democracy is a better form of gov’t than
oligarchy (rule by the aristocrats)
5. God exists.
6. God is love.
7. That for which there is no argument, there is
no reason to believe.
Problems the Presocratics Left for
Socrates, Plato and Aristotle
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
What the Presocratics left for P & A & S:
problem of the one and the many
problem of what the world is made of
problem of what being is
problem of how change is possible
problem of how to judge what counts as
a good explanation for natural phenomena
problem of how to judge what is moral (the gods
offer no help)
• problem of how to judge what the right
political form is
• generally: to clarify the new-found rational
methods of thought, argument and
explanation, and to show how they were
compatible with justice in both individuals and
the polis.
Euthyphro—Defining Piety
What Socrates means by “definition” in
Euthyphro:
• Picks out some feature found in every pious
action.
• This feature not shared by any impious action.
• This feature (or lack thereof) makes an action
pious (impious).
Euthyphro’s Three Definitions
• E’s 1st defn.: pious=the variety of pious
actions.
Weakness: not general, not the form of pious
things, just a grab bag.
• 2nd defn.: pious=what the gods love
• weakness: fails elenchus challenge
(consistency test): gods love and hate the
same things hence, pious=F & not F, which
fails conditions of definition S is looking for.
The Elenchus Method
How does it work? Inconsistent triad resulting from your
hypothesis (Piety=What All the Gods Love), what follows from
your hypothesis (The Gods Love All the Same Things), and
other things you believe to be true (All True Beliefs are
Consistent with Each Other).
• P-->not Q (alternatively, P-->Q) [draw some reasonable
consequence from P [The Gods Love All the Same Things]
• Q (alternatively, not Q) [note a fact which denies the
consequence drawn from P (It is never true both that P and
that Not-P)]
• These are not consistent propositions: one of the three
must be rejected to maintain consistency. Appeal to
rationality.
Is Elenchus purely destructive?
In the Euthyphro, not clear:
• 4th/5th defns. (12e): pious = part of the just concerned
with care of the gods
• (14c) pious = prayer and sacrifice. trad'l reverence for gods.
• problem: we cannot care for the gods as we might care for
horses....their benefit cannot be an objective of ours, so we
can only care for the gods by making ourselves slaves to
their wishes.
• Same is true of the traditional reverence, since all we can
do is give Gods what they want from us by way of prayer
and sacrifice.
• But then, it seems piety is nothing more than giving the
Gods what they love (back where we started!)
Is Socrates guilty of anything?
Two ways to take this:
a) is he guilty of one of the charges they specify?
b) is his mission a bad thing for Athens?
The Charges
Old:
• Studies things in sky and below earth
• Makes the weaker argument the stronger
• Teaches these to others
Socrates’ Replies:
• No one has heard me speak of any of these
things.
• I am not a Sophist (accepts no money, does not
advise how to make weak arg. strong).
• The Oracle-made-me-do-it.
New Charges
• Socrates Corrupts the Young
• S does not believe in the old gods
• S believes in new divinities
Socrates Replies to First Charge:
• To the first charge: couldn't be only one who corrupts, all others not
(analogy to doing good and relation to expertise).
• No one harms himself willingly (to harm the young he must be
prepared to harm himself, since evil youngsters are a danger to
everyone, including S)
• If S did harm the young, therefore, it must have been unintentional,
and in Athens, unintentional harmful behavior is not illegal and the
punishment, normally, is to advise the malefactor of their badmaking, but unintentional behavior so they can correct it.
Socrates Replies to Second and Third Charges:
Socrates ties Meletus in knots by asking a series
of questions about whether, given various
known facts about Socrates’ behavior and
statements regarding the Gods, he believes in
the Gods or not. Meletus ends up agreeing both
that Socrates believes in the Gods and that
Socrates disbelieves in the Gods. Minimally, this
shows that Meletus hasn’t thought carefully
about the claims he has made against Socrates,
as he seems unable to keep straight what
exactly he thinks, or to make his beliefs
consistent with each other.
Is Socrates guilty of anything?
If guilty, guilty of what?
And if guilty, what is the appropriate
punishment?
If not guilty, what should Athens have done that
it did not do? Is Athens guilty of anything?
Socrates’ Mission
Socrates says his conduct is according to a
mission that he claims has been imposed on him
by the Delphi oracle’s surprising claim (that
Socrates was the wisest man in Athens). What is
Socrates trying to accomplish? Only to show he
knows nothing, and no one else does either?
How is that productive? If it is productive,
productive of what?
• Traditional answer: eudaimonia (‘human
flourishing’) for the citizens of Athens
Socrates’ Extended Argument that He
Should Not Escape
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
One must never do wrong.
Therefore, one must never return wrong for wrong.
To harm someone is to do wrong.
Therefore, one must never harm anyone.
Therefore one must never harm anyone, even if one has been
harmed.
(6) Whenever one violates a just agreement, one harms the person
with whom one has formed the agreement.
(7) Therefore one must never violate a just agreement.
(8) Escaping from prison would be to violate a just agreement.
(9) Therefore escaping from prison would be wrong.
(10) Therefore, Socrates concludes, he must not escape from prison.
Arguments of the
Personified Laws of Athens
(1) We gave you birth
(2) You are our servant. You must honor country more
than parents and are not entitled to destroy us even if
we destroy you.
(3) Persuade or obey!
After all, you tacitly accepted our rule by
(a) not criticizing laws of childrearing or education
(b) not leaving Athens in your life
(c) raising your children here
(d) not proposing exile as a counterpenalty
Meno: Socrates’ argument that Virtue
must be a kind of Wisdom
1.
2.
a.
b.
3.
4.
Virtue, courage, intelligence, memory, mental quickness,
moderation, justice, munificence are all parts of the soul.
Things in the soul are:
made beneficial when conjoined with wisdom
made harmful when not conjoined with wisdom
Virtue is never harmful, and is the only part of the soul
which is never harmful.
Virtue must be wisdom or must have a part which is
wisdom (since it is the only part of the soul that always
yields something beneficial)
(the only question is whether virtue is simply identical with
wisdom, or whether virtue just has a part which is wisdom)
Subargument…
• No one is virtuous by nature, since if that were
true, we would seek these talented people out
as children and set them aside in a place safe
from moral corruption until they are grown up
so the city would benefit from their wisdom.
Problematic Argument #1
1. If virtue can be taught, then there should be
those who are teaching it and those learning
it (application of the Craft Analogy to
virtue=knowledge).
2. In fact there are no teachers of virtue.
3. Virtue cannot be taught.
Problematic Argument #2
1. Perhaps the CA is not wrong, and anyone who is
virtuous is able to teach virtue to others.
2. Themistocles (Aristides, Pericles) was virtuous,
but his son was not.
3. There is no reason to think Themistocles did not
try to teach his son everything which he knew
(evidence: taught him to be a good horseman).
4. Therefore, though virtuous, Themistocles was
not able to teach his son virtue.
Socrates Conclusion: Something Has
Gone Wrong―Why?
Answer:
Because if one cannot be virtuous by
nature, and one cannot be taught to be
virtuous, it begins to be quite mysterious
how anyone can ever become virtuous.
Socrates Realizes What is Wrong…
the claim that wisdom produces beneficial
results does not mean that only knowledgeable
people can produce beneficial results.
"Correct opinion" is just as good as knowledge in
the guidance of affairs toward the beneficial.
What, then, is the difference between “correct
opinion” and “knowledge” in pursuit of virtue?
Answer:
Knowledge is correct opinion "tied down" (i.e.,
correct opinion with "an account of the reason
why" it is true.....such an "account" is acquired
through recollection....98a).
Good men who guide their fellow citizens to
beneficial results are just lucky.
Why isn’t luck enough?
If we depend on luck, we run the risk of
following the advice of Sophists, rather than the
wise and virtuous.
How, then, to be virtuous?
Plato’s answer: the Slave Story (the theory of
recollection)
How does this help?
Answer: By eliminating bad answers, the elenchus
method (exemplified by Socrates’ conversation with
the slave boy) clears the mind of its confusion and
leads it away from false opinion, toward true
opinion and, we hope eventually, an account (true
opinion ‘tied down’) of virtue.
Looking Ahead to Republic Book One: Why
the Elenchus Method is Not Enough
Remember our thought experiment: suppose we know
that there are only six possible accounts of virtue, and the
elenchus method allows us to eliminate bad accounts by
checking each possible account for consistency with a)
what follows from each account, and b) everything else
we believe is true.
Suppose we are lucky and the first four accounts
we consider each turns out to be inconsistent with what
follows from each, and other things we believe are true.
Now we know: the true account must lie in one of the
remaining accounts.
Oops…..
Even if the two remaining accounts are mutually
inconsistent (to believe one you must reject the
other), unless they are contradictories (each is
the negation of the other), it remains possible
that both are consistent with all our other
beliefs!
But in that case, Elenchus will not reveal which
one is true, will it? Aporia (Greek for a state of
puzzlement/logical impasse)
Plato’s Response
• Book I of The Republic, where he reconsiders
the elenchus method and introduces other,
equally problematic weaknesses in this tool
for discovering what we do not already know.
What About that Theory of Recollection?
Doesn’t that Solve the Problem?
Sure, if Plato can explain exactly how we can
spot the correct answer when we have
narrowed the field of possible answers to
(ideally) two using the Elenchus method, as in
our thought experiment.
Republic I
Plato’s objective: establish the nature of justice
while:
Refuting conventionalism (conventionalism=Justice
concerns action in conformity with law: Actions that
follow the conventions/laws of conduct in any given
society)
Refuting naturalism (naturalism=ethical Darwinism:
it is natural for the strong to ruler over and exploit
the weak)
Republic’s Main Questions
What is justice?
Does justice benefit its possessor: does it
produce a good life?
Ordinary View of Justice
Justice = Observing certain rules of socially-acceptable
behavior (be honest, don’t steal…Ten Commandments,
etc.)
Socrates notes: If you are Cephalus (wealthy, socially
successful) it is easy to be just, since your own needs
are entirely satisfied under the rules of your society
(otherwise, you wouldn’t be successful!)
What if you are poor? Cephalus desires to be just, but
this is only because he is lucky: what he naturally
desires for himself coincides with what his society
requires of him.
Objections to Ordinary View
• Justice is easy to achieve, and so leads to
complacency
• There is no intellectual backing for your beliefs
about how to behave. Consequence: when
anything challenges your law-abiding beliefs, they
are easily shattered.
• Leads to skepticism: just conduct looks like
arbitrary rule-following that serves the interests
of the socially successful (Justice is, then, a racket
serving the rich and powerful)
Socrates’ Challenger: Thrasymachus
Thrasymachus’ First Definition of Justice: Justice is
the advantage/interest of the stronger [ruler]
(ethical Darwinism) (338c)
Socrates: does the ruler always estimate their own
interest correctly?
Thrasymachus: No.
Socrates: Then justice cannot simply be what the
ruler believes is in their interests (consequence:
conventionalism is false, since obedience to law
[the wishes of the ruler] is not enough to create just
conditions).
Thrasymachus’ Second Try
Justice is the objective interest of the ruler/ stronger
(justice = craft of ruling)
Socrates: Ok, then isn’t that just what is beneficial
to those ruled (analogy to shepherding)?
Thrasymachus: No, for the well-being of sheep is
only of value to the shepherd for the $$ it brings.
Which view is right? Is shepherding for the benefit
of the sheep or for the benefit of the shepherd?
Thrasymachus’ Real Challenge
Socrates thinks justice must be a virtue, in which
case it must both be good for the just and good
for others. For him, justice is like shepherding
since both the sheep and the shepherd must
benefit if it is to be successful.
Thrasymachus disagrees that justice must be a
virtue, because he thinks that, in fact, acting
justly sometimes harms the just while
benefitting the unjust, and vice versa.
T’s Argument
a)
b)
c)
d)
Justice is a virtue (trivially true)
My virtue always benefits me
My being just benefits other people
What benefits others sometimes harms me &
vice versa
Conclusion: one of these beliefs must be false,
since they are inconsistent (Elenchus in action!)
The Failure of Elenchus
The method does not tell us which of the beliefs
we should abandon.
Socrates wants T to abandon (d) above.
Thrasymachus abandons © above.
Elenchus does not justify either choice.
The Failure of the Craft Analogy
Both S and T assume the craft analogy applies to
just action (it serves a purpose and just action is
designed to accomplish that purpose)
This picture can be used to undermine both
views of justice:
Undermines S because shepherding does not
always benefit the sheep
Undermines T because shepherding does not
always benefit the shepherd
Conclusion: We need a New
Method of Discovery, and we need
a New Model of Justice
Republic II
• Offers news ways of expressing these
problems
• Offers a new method (Plato’s Dialectic)
Glaucon’s Challenge
Perhaps Thrasymachus was right: Justice is a sort of
compromise: I would avoid justice if I
could….(Gyges’ Ring)
Socrates’ response: Let’s consider how we
distinguish the different kinds of Goods.
There are three kinds:
1. Intrinsic Goods
2. Instrumental Goods
3. Goods with are both Instrumental and Intrinsic
What kind of Good is Justice?
Socrates’s answer: Type #3
Thrasymachus’s implicit answer: Type #2
Who is right? Proposal: consider Gyges and what
he did when he had the invisibility ring.
Glaucon: Suggests we only act just in order to
achieve what we are really after (i.e., Type #1
goods, exhaustively: our narrow self-interests),
not because we want to be just (as S believes)
Justice is Merely a Social Contract
• Doing wrong is desirable
• If I do wrong, others will do it
• My suffering from a wrong is worse than
benefitting from my own wrongful action
• We should band together due to our
weakness (we cannot avoid suffering at the
hands of others) and, though we would prefer
to do wrong, agree to restrain ourselves
Socrates’ Answer
Proposal: Justice is a Type 3 Good (good in itself,
good for what it produces)
Investigation:
What is justice in the State? How do we discover
that?
Answer: Consider which states seem best (since
Justice is the same as, or a part of, what is Good)
Discovery: looking around, the best states seem to
be those that have a kind of health (and health is a
Type 3 Good)
Question: But what is Health in a
State?
To answer this, we need to know what a state is
for … why do States exist?
Answer: to better serve the diverse needs of
human beings
Evidence: it is a fact that human beings cannot
satisfy their needs best by acting entirely alone,
separated from other human beings.
What makes a state Better?
If a State exists to promote the satisfaction of
the greatest number of the needs of its
members, to the greatest extent possible, how
can that be achieved?
Socrates: Just consider healthy states and ask:
how did they do it?
Discovery: those states that have a division of
labor, and each citizen only does what they are
best at doing are The Healthiest!
The Natural Classes of a Healthy State
• Producers [specialists in satisfying human appetities]
(those who meet citizen’s ongoing material needs for
food, shelter, clothing, physical well-being…in short,
providers of goods and services)
• Auxiliaries [specialists in war] (those who protect the
city from outside interference from other states)
• Guardians [specialists in general knowledge] (those
who study the world and the State to understand what
is best for the overall welfare of the
community…govern how the producers and auxiliaries
interact and function together, and how the State
relates to other States)
Justice in the State = The Correct
Relation Among its Classes
The healthiest states are those that divide labor
according to the three fundamental needs of a
State: 1) meeting the basic needs of the
citizenry, 2) protecting the state from external
(or internal) interference and disorder, and 3)
coordinating the activities of all classes with a
view to producing the healthiest objective
condition of the State
Is Tripartite Class Arrangements
Enough to achieve a Justice State?
No!
Why?
A healthy state must be guided by its objective
interests. Since only the Guardians have the general
knowledge required to grasp what is in the
objective interests of the State as a whole, and only
they are specialists in helping others to see what
they understand is true, a Just State is one in which
there is a division of labor according to these three
classes, with the Guardians guiding the rest.
Where We Are Now
Plato has met Glaucon's challenge (myth of Gyges)
by
• Showing that justice in the state is not merely a
name for the rule under law (social contract) but
rather is
• The name for the proper division of labor in a
system of interdependence which is natural for
human beings, and which generates the basis for
the moral distinction between good and bad in
the state (good=healthy community,
bad=unhealthy community).
What Remains to be Shown
Plato must respond to Glaucon’s other challenge
(why isn't it better to seem just than to be just:
isn't it better, in terms of outcomes for the
individual, to be an undiscovered thief than
Socrates drinking the hemlock?)
How to Do That?
Establish that a soul has three parts
(appetite, spirit, and reason), each
corresponding to the three classes in the
State, and that health in the soul arises
when the three parts are arranged with
reason in charge of the other two
Proof that the Soul has Three Parts
1. The same thing can [never] act or be acted upon in
two opposite ways, or be two opposite things, at the
same time, in respect of the same part of itself, and in
relation to the same object.
2. People are sometimes both thirsty and unwilling to
drink (thirst is inhibited).
3. People can desire something by which they are
simultaneously disgusted (Leontius and the executed
criminals).
4. People can feel indignant at unjust treatment and yet
cease their pursuit of justice under the influence of
their capacity for reflection (Book IV, 440).
• Given (1) and (2), people must have at least two parts,
one associated with thirst (appetite), one associated
with the inhibition of thirst (reflection...reason).
• Given (1) and (3), people must have at least two parts,
one associated with desire (appetite), one associated
with moral indignation (the "spirited part").
• Given (1) and (4), people must have at least two parts,
one associated with moral indignation (the spirited
part) and one associated with reflection (reason).
• Given these conclusions, there must be three parts to
the soul: one associated with appetite, one associated
with moral indignation, one associated with
reflection/reason.
Recap
• Platonically Just Person is one whose soul is in
harmony, with each part doing what it is best
at, and with Reason in charge
• Platonic Justice is an inward trait (both in the
individual [soul harmony] and in the State
[each class ‘doing its own’ with philosophers
as guides]
Plato Now Must Show 2 Things:
1. That the just person is happier than the unjust
person
2. Since Justice depends on knowledge of what is
Good (=Form of the Good) in both the individual
and in the State, how do we acquire this
knowledge?
#1 is shown because the just person is mentally
healthy, the unjust person mentally ill
#2 is answered by the Sun Analogy, the Divided Line
and the Myth of the Cave
Knowledge of Forms
[necessary for Justice]
If we understand what a form is, both its
function and how it simultaneously provides an
object of knowledge and a means to knowledge,
we will then see how Plato’s new method of
knowledge (dialectic) is possible, and can then
study how it works.
(Dialectic = Elenchus + Rational Intuition)
Sun Analogy
508c-e: The Sun makes things grow and also
makes them perceptible. This is analogous to
the way the Form of the Good makes it possible
for all intelligible things [other Forms] to exist,
and makes them intelligible to our minds.
But what, exactly, is a ‘Form’?
It is a model, a paradigm on the basis of which
individual items in the world have a way of
existing. Without it, nothing could exist.
Plato’s Insight
Everything that exists must have a set of properties and
relations that constitute its way of existing.
These properties and relations are only intelligible to us
because we recognize them as instances of various
concepts we must use in grasping their ways of existing.
Their intelligibility is what is most real about them
(Parmenides was right to think that what is stably
intelligible is what is most real)
Upshot: The Forms are more real than the particular
individual things that have/participate in those
forms/ways of existing.
The Form of All Forms
Each form is a paradigm/model of some
property/relation, or complex thereof, required for all the
actually existing individuals to have their particular way of
existing.
But something must give all paradigms their property
(i.e., the property “standing as a
template/model/paradigm”
The Form of the Good imparts to all more-specific forms
their power to act as paradigms….it gives them The Form
of the Paradigmatic
Like the Sun, all else that exists depends on this Form of
the Good
World as Idea
509-511e: The world is divided into The
Intelligible (More/Most Real) and The Visible
(Less/Least Real).
These two divisions are subdivided into two
additional subdivisions each, yielding four
realms.
This is the Divided Line, which is both a
description of the parts of reality, and of the
ideas and beliefs required to grasp each.
Nichomachean Ethics
Based on notes of lectures Aristotle gave in the
Lyceum (a gymnasium in Athens). These lectures
were created for (or edited by, or both) his son,
Nichomachus.
Scholars think it represents Aristotle’s mature
thinking about ethics, a modification and
improvement on his Eudemian Ethics.
Ari’s Strategy for discovering what is
considered Good in Human Life
• Recognize that human life is a set of
activities (activity is the essence of living)
• Recognize that all activities are directed
at some end or purpose
• Thus, the good of any activity is always
constituted by the end to which it is
directed
Are all Goods Equally Valuable?
Ari: No. Here’s why:
• Some goods, being instrumental (only good
because they promote some other good) are less
valuable than the good[s] they promote
• Not all goods can be instrumental (if they were,
there would be no point in acting at all [because
there would be no ultimate purpose in pursuing
them..there must be a final end to any action]
• So, some goods must be ends in themselves
(Plato called these intrinsic goods). These are
necessarily more valuable than instrumental
goods.
Are all Intrinsic Goods Equally
Valuable?
• No, everyone thinks Happiness is the Chief Good. But
what is it? Everyone seems to have a different idea of
what happiness is, after all, and since there are many
different kinds of goods, there cannot just be one Form
of the Good that captures what is good in all of them
(Plato was wrong).
Well then, let’s consider what various people think
happiness is:
1. Some think it is pleasure.
2. Some think it is honor.
3. Some think it is wealth.
4. Some think it is/is found in contemplation.
Why Happiness cannot be Honor,
Wealth, or Pleasure
1. Happiness must be a complete good (i.e.,
good in itself)
2. Since it is the end of our actions, those ends
that are under our command are better than
those that are not.
3. Given (1) and (2), happiness cannot be honor,
since it depends on the opinions of others,
which is beyond our control
• It cannot be pleasure, because the life of
sensual pleasures is slavish (addictive) and
more appropriate to brute beasts than to
humans. That which is enjoyable is not
necessarily worthwhile.
• It cannot be the pursuit of wealth, since
money is only valued instrumentally, and
happiness is an end in itself.
What is Required for Happiness?
•
•
•
•
Must be something specifically human.
Must be our own achievement.
Must be an activity, or pursuant to activity.
Must be self-sufficient (nothing essential is
missing in the life that is happy).
• Must be perfect, final and complete.
So is Happiness just, trivially, “maximal
goodness for humans”?
• Ari: No. It must be some kind of general well-being,
sustained over the course of an entire life.
How to get a substantive account?
• Consider that well-being for a human must be
whatever constitutes well-functioning for humans.
• Consider that humans, like all living things, engage in
activities which are distinctive for each kind.
• Possibility: if we can discover what is the distinctive,
natural function of human beings, then
successful/well-functioning of this particular kind
might constitute happiness for humans.
Do Humans have a Natural Function?
• Yes, because, as living things, their nature
determines them to act in certain ways, and
excellence in those particular ways of acting
constitutes well-being for each kind of living
thing.
• Also, each distinct kind of living thing has a
distinctive function that sets it off from all other
living things.
• So, the natural function of human beings is
whatever function is distinctive for their kind of
living thing.
What is the Human Function?
• Not the merely nutritive function (plants have
that, as to animals)
• Not merely the perceptive function (animals
have that)
What is the action that only human beings an
perform?
Answer: we can act according to a rational
principle (we can act under the direction of
reasoning and our power of reflection)
The Human Function
“an activity of the soul in accordance with, or
not without, rational principle”
But, if happiness is action guided by a rational
principle, it must not just be any such action,
but one that achieves excellence in this rational
function.
So, happiness must be “excellence” [aretê] in
this activity of soul in accordance with a rational
principle. What is that? Virtuous action!
Chapter/Section 13: Ari’s Final Answer
• “Happiness is an activity of the soul expressing
complete virtue” [1105]
• This means it is necessary to examine human
virtue.
• Something is considered to have reason in two
senses: that which has reason in itself and that
which listens to reason.
• These two senses are the origin of the distinction
between intellectual and ethical virtues,
respectively.
Book II, Chapter 1:
The Nature of Virtue
1. Virtue comes in two kinds: intellectual and
moral
How they differ:
a. Intellectual virtue requires training and so
depends on “experience and time”
b. Moral virtues (virtues of character) require
formation of habits
Given (2b), moral virtue does not arise from
nature (since nature does not build habits)
Good vs. Bad Habits
The capacity to form habits is a provision of nature (borne
of our many capabilities for action), but how that capacity
is realized (for good or for ill) with respect to any activity
depends on how that capacity is developed.
Examples: exercise by running develops the habit of
running. Running well produces a good habit. Running
poorly produces a bad habit.
Upshot 1: whether we are virtuous or vicious depends on
the habits we form.
Upshot 2: the habits we form determine the character we
have (character = a stable disposition to behave in certain
ways, not in others)
Book II, Chapter 2:
Habits depend on Repeated Actions, so Virtuous
Habits depend on Repetition of Virtuous Actions
Virtuous action = right action
Therefore, virtuous actions require actions that
“express correct reason” [1103b30]
But actions in accordance with reason designed to
establish virtuous habits require knowledge of what
contributes to virtuous/right action.
Clue: good actions tend to be ruined by excess or
deficiency (example: eating is good, but eating too
much or too little ruins what is good in eating)
What is true of Good Eating is true of
Bravery, Temperance, and the other Virtues
If we avoid all pleasure, we become boors; if we
seek all pleasures, we become intemperate.
If we avoid all risky situations, we are cowardly, but
if we leap into every risky situation, we are rash.
Upshot: seeking those actions that fall in the middle
between excess and deficiency promotes good
results, and hence, constitute good actions. States
that generate these kinds of actions are better than
those that do not.
Book II, Chapter 3:
Pleasure is the goal of action, but different
people take pleasure in different things
What pleasure someone takes in a certain kind of action
reveals the state of that person with respect to that kind
of action.
Example: a person who takes pleasure in abstinence is a
person in a state of temperance. A person who takes pain
in abstinence is one in a state of intemperance.
Upshot 1: only those trained to take pleasure in the right
actions, pain in wrong actions, can be virtuous.
Upshot 2: This means we need to be trained from an
early age if we hope to have virtuous habits.
Neither Pleasure nor Pain are, in
themselves, virtuous or vicious
All action is guided by pursuit of pleasure,
avoidance of pain. What determines virtuous or
vicious conduct depends on whether the actor
pursues/avoids the right/wrong things, at the
right/wrong times, in the right/wrong ways, etc.
Upshot: Virtue is concerned with pleasures and
pains; “the actions that are its sources also increase
it or, if they are done differently, ruin it”.
Book II, Chapter 4:
What makes one Just/Virtuous?
Worry: if you are saying that doing just things
makes one just, then, if we do just things we must
already be just!
Aristotle: Not so, for one could be just by accident
or by just doing as someone instructs you to do. To
produce grammatical sentences, and in so doing be
grammarians, we must both produce grammatical
sentences and produce them in the way in which
the grammarian produces them.
How Virtue is Different from a Craft
A craft is evaluated solely in terms of its product:
if the luthier’s produce is a goodsounding/looking acoustic guitar, then their
state as luthier is good.
Virtue is not evaluated solely in terms of its
product. Actions that express virtue are not
sufficient to determine that the action was just,
since the agent “must also be in the right state
when he does them.”
What is Required for an Action to be
Virtuous
1. The agent must know <that he is doing
virtuous actions>
2. The agent must decide on these actions, and
decide on them for themselves
3. The agent must also do these actions from a
firm and unchanging state.[1105a25-33]
Aristotle says that, of these three conditions, the
first is the least important, the second and third
the most.
Book II, Chapter 5:
What Virtue Itself Is
• It must be a condition of the soul (=“the form of a
body capable of life”)
• There are three conditions of the soul: feelings,
capacities and states
• Virtue/Vice cannot be feelings, since “we are
called excellent or base insofar as we have virtues
or vices, not insofar as we have feelings”, and
• We are neither praised nor blamed for our
feelings as such (but only for the way we express
those feelings)
• Virtue/vice cannot be capacities, for “we are
neither called good nor called bad insofar as
we are simply capable of feelings”; also, since
we have capacities by nature, and we already
decided that we cannot be virtuous by nature,
this disqualifies capacities from the condition
of the soul associated with virtue and vice.
• Conclusion: Virtue/vice must be states of the
soul.
Book II, Chapter 6:
What Sort of State is Virtue/Vice?
First clue: “every virtue causes its possessors to be
in a good state and to perform their functions well”
(e.g., the virtue of eyes is that it results in a state of
excellent eyesight, the vice that it results in a state
of poor eyesight)
What causes a human being to function well? We
already said well-functioning occurs when our
actions of each particular kind falls between
deficiency and excess relative to us.
Each Kind of Action is Good if it Results in a
State between Deficiency and Excess
• Aristotle calls the pursuit of the good in each kind of craft
the science of that craft, and “every scientific expert avoids
excess and deficiency and seeks and chooses what is
intermediate—but intermediate relative to us, not in the
object”[1106b5-7]
• He means this: the pursuit of virtue is like the pursuit of
one of these crafts in that it seeks ‘the intermediate’
between extremes, although not in the product of virtue
(i.e., the outcome of our virtuous action), as in a craft, but
in our state (since virtue concerns not just the act it
produces, but the state of the agent who produces the act)
• So virtue is a mean between excess and deficiency in action
that produces a state of the virtuous falling within that
mean.
Hitting the Mean is Hard….
• “…..That is why error is easy and correctness
[in action] hard, since it is easy to miss the
target and hard to hit it.”[1106b31-32]
To hit the mean through our actions requires
good judgment (reason).
Summary of What We Have Learned
• Virtue concerns feelings and actions.
• It is a state that seeks to find the mean
between excess and deficiency, either in
respect to feeling, or action, relative to the
person who feels/acts.
• Achieving this mean results in feeling/acting
“at the right time, about the right things,
towards the right people, for the right end,
and in the right way”[1106b20-22]
Aristotle’s Full Account of Virtue
“Virtue, then, is (a) a state that decides, (b)
<consisting> in a mean, c) the mean relative to
us, (d) which is defined by reference to reason,
and e) i.e., to the reason by reference to which
the intelligent person would define it. It is a
mean between two vices, one of excess and one
of deficiency.”[1106b36-1107a1-3]
To Discuss
• Why does Aristotle say that the mean we seek is one
‘relative to us’? Does he mean all human beings, or each of
us in a particular situation regarding a particular kind of
action?
• What does he mean when he says that this mean “is
defined by reference to reason, reason by reference to
which the intelligent person would define it”? Who is this
‘intelligent person’? A philosopher-king? Aristotle?
• What is the relationship between excellence in action and
finding the mean?
• Where does his earlier discussion of virtue as developed on
the basis of habit fit in to his final account of virtue?
Book III, Chapter 1:
Virtue, Praise and Blame
1. Virtue concerns actions and the states that
produce them that are praiseworthy/
blameworthy
2. Praise and blame only apply to voluntary
actions, because we do not hold individuals
responsible for involuntary acts
3. Therefore, to complete our account of virtue
we need a careful account of voluntary vs.
involuntary action
What is Involuntary Action
The tyrant and cargo cases: are these involuntary?
Ari: No, since the agent makes a choice that they partly
determine (a choice between two evils, one greater, one lesser, is
nonetheless a choice, even when subject to some degree of
coercion)
Evidence: we think less of (blame) someone who lets the
tyrant kill their children, more of (praise) someone who saves
them by doing what the tyrant requires.
Evidence: we think imprudent the ship’s captain who
doesn’t throw cargo overboard in a storm that goes on to sink
the ship, admire the good judgment of the one who does.
So what counts as forced
(involuntary) action?
• “…something is forced unconditionally
whenever its cause is external and the agent
contributes nothing” [1110b1]
Can we think of any cases that fit this definition?
Acts both Voluntary & Involuntary
(Mixed)
• “things [that] are involuntary in themselves,
but choiceworthy on this occasion and as the
price of these <goods>, and their origin is in
the agent.” [1110b3]
Examples: cargo, tyrant….what else?
Voluntary Action
• “what is voluntary seems to be what has its
origin in the agent himself when he knows the
particulars that the action consists in.”
[1111a23]
Ari notes that just because an action is partly
taken under the influence of emotion or
appetite does not make it involuntary. Is he
right? What are some examples that might
seem to suggest he is wrong?
Non-voluntary Action
• Actions taken under certain kinds of
ignorance, and where the agent has no regret.
See pg 893 middle [1111a7-18] for examples
Restrictions on this Account
of Vol/Invol/Nonvol Action
• Pleasant and noble objects do not have a compelling
power (p. 892); if they did, all acts would be invol. Bec.
we act for what is pleasant and noble in all we do. So
the pleasant & noble do not make all acts invol.
• Acts done out of anger or appetite are not invol, or else
we'd say children and animals would act invol--but
they don't.
• The mixed cases are actions taken under duress
(cargo/tyrant) where agent makes a choice that they
would avoid if they could (so the conditions under
which the choice is made are forced, but the agent has
a choice of options that remain praise/blameworthy)
Next: Ari’s Final Account of Happiness:
Book X
Review: the good(s) of human life lie(s) in
achieving excellence in all our essential
functions since
a. life is activity
b. the ‘good’ of any activity lies in the
achievement of some end(s)
c. achievement is determined by its degree of
excellence (virtue)
The Nature of Virtue
Book II, Ch. 6 [1106b 36-1107a 2]:
“Virtue, then, is a(a) a [voluntary] state that
decides, (b) <consisting> in a mean, (c) the
mean relative to us, (d) which is defined by
reference to reason, (e) i.e., to the reason by
reference to which the intelligent person would
define it….a mean between two vices, one of
excess and one of deficiency.”
What, then, is Happiness?
• Ari’s general answer: human happiness is not a state, but
an activity(ies) whose end(s) is(are) choiceworthy in
itself(themselves) [i.e., that is intrinsically good] that
count(s) as the chief good of human life (an end that is selfsufficient and complete)
• Human goods are determined by achieving excellence in all
those functions necessary for human life over the course of
a whole life
• So, happiness concerns the application of virtue to all the
functions essential to human life such that excellence in
those functions is realized. (‘the happy life seems to be a
life expressing virtue, which is a life involving serious
actions, and not consisting in amusement’ [1177a2]
• But there are two kinds of virtue (intellectual and
moral), so then, there appear to be two possible
versions of human happiness: excellence in intellectual
activity and excellence in moral activity
• Happiness (Version) One: happiness is the achievement
of excellence in all the activities (nutritive, perceptive,
rational) necessary to the sustenance of human life,
over the course of a whole life.
• Happiness One requires excellence in all the functions
from which all those particular kinds of general goods
we talked about in Books I and II are drawn (wealth,
honor, pleasure, health, friendship, etc.), since honor
without sufficient food to eat, food to eat without
sufficient respect of others, etc., will not result in
excellence in each of those functions on which our
general well-being depends.
Happiness (Version) Two:
The Intellectually Virtuous Life
• Excellence in whatever is the specific function of a
human.
• What is this but excellence in study (the activity
involving our specific function, thinking)?
• This is the proper candidate for the chief good of
human life, since excellence in whatever is our
specific function is what is best for us (given that
we are constituted by the functions/activities of
which we are capable, and whatever function
only we can perform identifies what is specifically
good for us)
Which Version do You Prefer?
Was Ari Serious:
Happiness Two is Happiness Simpliciter?
Compatibilist view: since Happiness One is a
necessary condition of Happiness Two on practical
grounds (you cannot have a life that achieves
excellence in study if you are lacking in sufficient
food, shelter, if you are depressed for lack of
friendship, the respect of your fellow humans, etc.),
Aristotle is not asserting that a life of study is the
only good life. He is just saying that this is the best
life, and that life requires achieving Happiness One
as a precondition.
Meditation One
What is the objective of the Meditations?
Hint: look at second sentence of Med. I.
How do we know he is after Absolute Knowledge (K*)?
How do we get K*? How do we know when we have it?
RD’s Answer: ‘certainty of belief’
1) JP: what is this "certainty"? Confidence? Lots of extreme
confidence?
2) Then does certain belief = "verified belief"? Maybe, but
what provides verification that overcomes the possibility of
error?
RD: one way of getting at certainty is to show what abs.
knowl. looks like, then say "that's what certainty gets at."
The via negativa: first look at what abs. knowl is not.
–i) It is not false (truth seems to be a property of known assertions).
–ii) It is not what I do not believe. But is true belief knowledge?
–iii) No. Is justified true belief knowledge?
–iv) No, since my belief that it was 2:51 last Thursday was justified,
and true, but we decided it was not K*.
3) What more do we need in order to convert JTB
into knowledge? Well, it must be some additional
property of the belief. Call this property X. So K* =
JTB + X.
4) How do we discover what "X" is? Well, RD
thinks certainty is the mark of K*, and it seems like
certainty is just 'indubitability of belief', so perhaps
X = 'indubitability of the justified true belief'.
5) Is this indubitability just the name for a
psychological state we fall into when believing some
things...an inability to bring ourselves to the
psychological attitude of doubting?
–No. The inability to doubt must be something arising in the intellect
alone. It is not a psychological state, but rather a property of a belief
such that it is conceptually beyond doubting, for example. The
impossibility of this doubt is rather more like the impossibility of
completing the concept of a round square (RD has argument for the
claim that any indubitable belief is true)
RD’s Method of Doubt
Find some principles which are indubitable, then
derive, as in a geometric deduction, the rest of the
true beliefs about the world from these. Method of
doubt acts as a filter for our dubitable beliefs. Note
that RD finds actual geometry dubitable
(Meditation #1).
RD generates general doubt about our common
beliefs with a Three Step sceptical attack
that comes in Two Phases
Phase 1
Generate a fully general doubt about all sensory beliefs.
(i) ordinary (insecure) sense beliefs—perceptual
errors and perceptual illusions
(ii) secure sense beliefs—vivid dreams (the dream
hypothesis)
Does this place all sensory beliefs in doubt?
NO. The Dreamer’s Palette remains (what’s that?)
Phase 2
Generate a fully general doubt about all sensory beliefs that remain
unchallenged by the dream hypothesis AND a fully general doubt
about all mathematical beliefs
(iii) beliefs about simple natures/general things (i.e.,
our dream-immune beliefs about the ‘sensory
palette’ and all mathematical / geometrical beliefs—
Evil Demon Hypothesis (EDH)
What beliefs remain intact?
NONE.
Epistemic Vertigo.
Maximus scepticus.
Cognitive despair sets in.
The Plan of the Meditations
1. Use the method of doubt (EDH) to find a criterion for
absolute knowledge (by isolating some belief that cannot be
doubted)
2. Use that criterion to discover some true beliefs that can be
joined in arguments that logically establish conclusions that
defeat evil demon skepticism.
How to do That:
A. prove God exists as the creator of the world and my mind
and all its powers. (Med. III)
B. prove that God is not a deceiver (is not an Evil Demon that
would mislead me in my belief-forming practices) (Med IV)
C. prove that all mathematical truths are instances of absolute
Meditation II:
The Cogito
a. as inference: Nec (Ti->Ei). Not: Nec(Ei)
b. as performance: “I am, I exist.” (Hintikka)
(a) Fails because, on EDH, I need an additional
premise besides (Ti) to infer (Ei): (Ti->Ei) [where
there’s thinking there’s existence of the thing
that thinks]) Why?
Does (a) imply: Nec (Ti<->Ei)?
No! (existence does not imply thinking)
What the Cogito Establishes
The truth criterion is derived from the Cogito.
How?
Ask: what makes the Cogito belief true even on
the EDH?
Answer: when I clearly grasp why when I try to
doubt my existence, something is immediately
evident to my mind which shows I cannot fail to
exist.
So this is a clue about the nature of Absolute K.
The Cogito belief has these properties:
1) It is clear and distinct
2) It is self-confirming
Proposal: whenever I wonder whether a belief
can be known to be true (even on EDH), check
to see if it has these two properties. If it does, I
can trust it!
Upshot
If I can construct arguments to show that: 1)
God exists, 2) Created the world, me and my
ability to form beliefs, 3) is not a deceiving God,
and 4) my beliefs based on sense perception and
stepwise reasoning could only be false if 3) were
false, then:
The EDH is false. Problem solved!
Bertrand Russell:
Appearance and Reality
• In Chapter 1 Russell reconstructs a well-known philosophical
problem that arises when we notice that our common sense beliefs
concerning ordinary objects [that they are a) persisting, b) material
objects with c) stable properties like shape, solidity, color, texture]
conflict with our perceptual evidence (sense data) from which we
infer the nature of ordinary objects.
• This is all derived from what some philosophers call the Thesis of
Indirect Realism (TIR): that our access to ordinary objects is indirect,
through intervening objects of our conscious attention that Russell
calls ‘sense data’.
• Upshot: we have no direct perceptual contact with tables, chairs or
people, but only with sense data, and what is true of sense data
seems incompatible with many things we believe about tables,
chairs and/or people.
Consequences
Different philosophers have reacted differently to this problem.
• Berkeley: the world is nothing more than a
collection of perceptions that depend on an
existing, perceiving mind for their persistence.
(Phenomenalism/Radical Idealism, Empiricist
Branch)
• Leibniz: the world is not at all as we perceive
it, but as a perfectly intelligent and logical
Creator would create it (a ‘community of
minds sharing information’) (Radical Idealism,
Rationalist Branch)
Russell’s Reaction:
The Method of Doubt (Descartes)
As Descartes did in the Meditations, Russell tries
to solve the ‘Appearance vs. Reality’ problem by
finding ‘some more or less fixed point from
which to start’:
“Although we are doubting the physical
existence of the table, we are not doubting the
existence of the sense-data which made us think
there was a table)” (p. 17)
What Can We Establish
Based on the Indubitability of Sense-Data?
• Cogito ergo sum: we can know one thing beyond
the existence of sense-data, i.e., our existence as
thinking things!
• But: does Cogito ergo sum establish the existence
of the Self?
• No: the thinking thing only knows it exists when it
attempts to doubt its existence (Hintikka), but
this does not show that its memory of existing in
the past is accurate (Evil Demon could make this
belief false, along with any belief based on
memory)
What Beliefs Survive?
• Russell: our primitive certainty that what we
are thinking and feeling, perceiving is what we
are thinking, feeling, perceiving cannot be
overturned
• Upshot: our sense-data cannot be doubted as
sense-data, and this forms a starting point for
our investigation into the existence of
matter….i.e., our beliefs about the table as it
seems cannot be doubted.
How Can This Be a Basis for
Belief in ‘Public Neutral Objects’?
What we want: public knowledge of objects whose persisting
qualities are not overturned by differences among those private
objects of consciousness, sense-data, perceived by different
individuals.
How we get it, according to Russell:
Notice that while sense-data are private objects of
consciousness, they show more characteristics in common than
they show differences, and their differences can be accounted
for using the laws of perspective, how light is reflected, etc.
Upshot: The best (because simplest) explanation for
these widespread similarities among my sense-data and yours is
that there are permanent objects that stand as the common
cause of our mildly-divergent sense-data.
How to Proceed from Here
1. Our belief in persisting, public, neutral
objects is based on particular instinctive
beliefs that are formed, not by philosophical
argument, but naturally.
2. If we doubt instinctive beliefs, nothing is left.
3. These instinctive beliefs, and the
noninstinctive beliefs they spawn, organize
our experience in useful ways so long as they
harmonize.
So…..
1. Let us proceed to discover which of our beliefs
are instinctive, which are not, and among each,
which we hold most strongly, which less so.
2. Then, by looking to retain all and only those
beliefs of each kind that organize our picture of
the world in a consistent and harmonious
fashion, we will have constructed a consistent
account of the world built upon mere sensedata!
The Nature of Matter
• Proceeding in the fashion just outlined, what
can we establish about the nature of matter
(i.e., of that underlying stuff out of which
persisting, public, neutral objects are made)?
• Russell: why not consider what the physical
sciences suggest as an answer to this
question?
What Science Says about Matter
• Starting point: science says all natural
phenomena can be reduced to motions.
• But what is moving? Answer: ‘gross matter’.
• What is that? Science says: something that has
position in space and is capable of motion.
• Is this ‘gross matter’ what we see, hear, touch,
taste and smell? Answer: No!
• What is it, then, and how is what we perceive
related to it? Answer: it is the cause of our
perceptions, but different from them.
That’s great, but how is this progress?
Consider an exemplary physical object: a circular coin.
As perceived it has different shapes for different
perceivers, and the space in which it resides is perceived
differently by each.
The scientist’s coin has one, persisting shape and it
resides in real space (which does not change depending
on who is perceiving things lying in space)
Upshot: there is a difference between perceived
properties and actual properties of material objects, and
if we can account for the difference, we can retain our
instinctive belief in the existence of physical space (the
unchanging space), and the persisting, circular coin with
its stable set of properties.
Provisional hypothesis:
Physical Objects Cause Sense-Data,
but are not entirely like them
• This means that, among physical objects, we
must be included, and our sense-data must be
caused by a causal interaction between them and
us.
• This implies that we and they exist in a common,
public, so-called ‘physical space’, and the
positions of perceived objects in perceived space
must bear a systematic relationships to the
positions of the physical objects in physical space
that cause these perceptions.
What Can We Know about
Physical Objects?
• Only how objects of perception correspond to
them.
What does that mean?
• That we can only know about what we directly
perceive (sense-data), and how that
corresponds to what we do not directly
perceive (physical objects in physical space)
• Upshot: we cannot know physical objects as
they exist in themselves
Strange Consequence
“We can know all those things about physical
space which a man born blind might know
through other people about the space of sight;
budt the kind of things which a man born blind
could never know about the space of sight we
also cannot know about physical space. We can
know the properties of the relations required to
preserve the correspondence with sense-data,
but we cannot know the nature of the terms
between which the relations hold.” (p.32)
More Consequences
• What is true of perceived space vs. physical space
is true of perceived time durations/temporal
order vs. physical time durations/temporal order
• Upshot: the time order of sense-data need not
(and often cannot be) the time order of the
events among physical objects that cause them.
And what is true of time order is also true of all
the qualitative features of the world as perceived
through sense-data: they need not be like their
causes, and generally are not (e.g., perceived
color vs. reflective properties of material bodies)
Disturbing Final Consequence
• Given the often radical difference between
world-as-perceived and world-as-neutralpublic-object, and the fact that our ultimate
evidence for belief in physical objects lies
entirely in the content of purely mental
phenomena (sense-data), we seem to have
grounds for saying that matter is a) mental, b)
physical, c) neither, and d) both. Oy!
Russell Chapter 5:
Idealism
• The ‘disturbing final consequence’ mentioned
in the last slide helps to promote the view
that, given a) the mental nature of our
evidence for an external, material world, and
b) the radical difference between Appearance
of that world and the putative Reality of that
world, perhaps the world is really MENTAL.
• This is the thesis of idealism, broadly speaking.
But our Best Science says that
Matter is Real, and not Mental
• Yes, but our best science is grounded in a
mere correspondence between beliefs based
on purely mental facts (sense-data), of which
we can be certain, and beliefs based on the
causes of those mental facts, which we take to
be physical facts, but which are based entirely
on indirect evidence, and hence are only
inferred, and not certain (we could be
mistaken given our evidence).
Some Idealists:
Berkeley’s Argument
a) Immediately known things: sense-data
b) Nonimmediately known things: objects in the
world
Given that all we know about things mentioned in
(b) is based on evidence of the type mentioned in
(a), the very idea of the existence of (b)-type things
consists in their being perceived, and so the idea
that they can exist mind-independently is selfcontradictory.
Esse is Percipi!
Russell’s Rejoinder:
“Being in the Mind” Fallacy
• Russell says that Berkeley failed to recognize
that when was say “the tree is in our minds”
we don’t mean literally that the tree is what
we are conscious of when we have
perceptions of it.
• For this reason, Russell thinks Berkeley’s
argument that trees are mental entities is
based on a fallacy.
Russell’s Mistake:
The Linguistic Fallacy
• Russell assumes that what we should think about the status
of trees is to be determined by how we speak ordinarily
about them. Since we don’t mean that the tree is literally in
our minds the way thoughts are in our minds, there is no
reason to think trees are purely mental just because our
evidence for them is entirely mental.
• But linguistic evidence of this kind cannot show that
Berkeley’s actual argument is fallacious, since that
argument is based on something Russell does not mention,
but which is pivotal to understand Berkeley’s argument,
namely, a theory of justification of belief that depends on
an account of the origin of all concepts used in articulating
our beliefs, including those for which we use words in our
common language.
Upshot
• If ideas (mental content) precede linguistic
entities (words) and what we say depends on
what we first believe independent of linguistic
phenomena, then Russell is making a mistake by
appealing to how we talk about trees in
evaluating Berkeley’s argument.
• If linguistic entities and ideas are equivalent and
necessarily arise with and implicate each other,
and the origin of language is coextensive with the
origins of ideas, then Russell is on the right track.