A Behavioral Framework for Managing Massive
Airline Flight Disruptions through Crisis
Management, Organization Development,
and Organization Learning
Dr. Tulinda Larsen
Doctorate of Management
University of Maryland University College
www.tulindalarsen.com
March 2013
1
Problem Statement
Airlines continue to mismanage massive flight disruptions,
despite government intervention, impacts on customer
service, and related costs.
• This study argues that by considering massive
flight disruptions through a crisis management
lens and layering organization development
(OD) interventions with organization learning
(OL), airlines can improve the management of
events that result in massive flight disruptions to
improve passenger satisfaction, reduce costs,
and mitigate additional government
intervention.
2
Behavioral approach
Research Question:
How can airlines adapt
organization development (OD) interventions
and organization learning (OL) processes
to better manage massive flight disruptions to
increase passenger satisfaction, minimize costs,
and mitigate government intervention?
3
Methodology
Evidence Based Research (EBR) and Systematic Review
• Management research approach adapted from health care industry
• A systematic review and analysis of existing research to identify gaps
and to produce new knowledge
– Scholarly research, case studies, white papers, dissertations, etc.
• Four primary steps:
1. Establish research questions
2. Identify literature on the selected topic
3. Filter the resulting literature based on criteria, and
4. Evaluate the selected literature
• I supplemented EBR through discussions with airline operations
experts and visits to airline operations centers
4
The missing management perspective
• Previous research needs a real-world management perspective
• Massive flight disruption literature falls into four dimensions:
– Economics and financial cost
(Ball, et al., 2006; Jenkins, 2010)
– Tactical decision management (methods and tools)
(Irrgang, 1995; Rogers & Hoyme, 2000; Zang, 2006; Jenkins, 2010; Hoyt, et al., 2010: Bruce, 2011)
– Robust schedule planning and recovery
(Baker, 1995; Clark, Lettovsky & Smith, 2000; DeArmon, Wanke, Beaton, & Miller, 2000)
– Impact on the travelling public
(Ball, et al., 1995; Mether & Rospenda, 2000, Marks & Jenkins, 2010; OIG 2000, 2001, 2007, 2008, 2010;
GAO, 2011; U.S. Senate JEC, 2008)
• This study focuses on behavioral dimensions to the airline
management of massive flight disruptions.
– Disruption management is a human process based on
judgments in Ops Center and technology based decisionmaking tools
5
Multiple stakeholders are involved
• The FAA is responsible for air traffic control in the U.S.
– Controls aircraft from departure movement area to arrival
– FAA, airports and airlines manage aircraft on the ground
– Boundaries can be gray between FAA, airport and airline
jurisdiction, particularly during massive flight disruptions
• Airlines can manage how their operations prepare for, and react
to, reduced airspace system capacity resulting from weather
and congestion
• Despite sophisticated decision support tools, no single model
has solved the complex operational issues at the time of
massive flight disruptions
– Airlines poorly manage massive flight disruptions
– Excessive cancellations vs. prolonged recovery
6
What are flight disruptions?
There is little consensus about the definition of massive disruptions
GAO
Flight disruptions include delays, cancellations, long tarmac delays,
and denied boardings.
Office of Inspector
General
A flight is considered delayed if its actual gate arrival time
is 15 or more minutes after its published scheduled arrival time.
United Airlines
Irregular Operations occur when unplanned flight disruption requires
involuntary itinerary change [not] requested by passenger.
IRROPS take place with little or no advance warning.
American Airlines
“[A]nything not on-time, even a single flight. But typically it means some amount
of flights or portion of the network that is experiencing non-routine operations
such as ATC, weather, security, labor, or mechanical issues.”
Airports Council
International
Extraordinary events, not falling under an Emergency Operation Category (e.g.
crash, hijackings, bomb threat) which disrupt optimized flight schedules and
negatively impacts the normal flow of passengers.
7
My definition of massive disruption
A disruptive event that results in multiple flights
being delayed, diverted to another airport,
or canceled throughout the airline route network.
These events are weather or natural disaster related and include
snowstorms, thunderstorms, hurricanes, tropical storms, and
volcanic eruptions. Does not include Emergency Events, such as
crash, terrorism, highjackinsg, bomb-threat, etc.
Massive flight disruptions negatively impact customer
service, create additional costs for airlines,
and have led to government intervention.
8
It all began in Detroit 1999
•In early January 1999, a blizzard
blanketed the Detroit airport.
•Thousands of Northwest Airlines
passengers found themselves stranded
on planes for hours -- some without
food, water or functioning lavatories
•The House and Senate conducted
hearings and the Office of Inspector
General investigated the customer
service issues
•Congress, the Department of
Transportation (DOT), and the industry
worked together to implement a
voluntary program known as the Airline
Customer Service Commitment
The 1999 Detroit snowstorm
kick-started airline
mismanagement of massive
flight disruptiona – and triggered
regulatory intervention.
9
Voluntary programs did not prevent passengers from
being stranded on aircraft
:
Date
Airline
Description
December 29, 2006
American
100+ flights from DFW were diverted due to severe weather.
Flight diverted to Austin exceed airport capacity. Passengers trapped.
February 14, 2007
JetBlue
Ice storm at JFK caused 355 canceled flights and 6 divert flights.
10 aircraft were frozen to the ground and passengers were trapped
December 22, 2008
Alaska
Snowstorm in SEA caused massive flight cancelations
and stranded 9,000 passengers.
August 25, 2009
ExpressJet
Thunderstorms and tornados in Midwest caused
flight diversion to airport with no Continental support.
December 24-28, 2010
System
Massive snowstorm causes flight cancelations and
shut airports in the Northeast.
May 29, 2011
American Eagle
Bad weather in Chicago caused 15 flights with 608 passengers
to be held for 3+ hrs, resulted in DOT Fine under new rules.
JetBlue, American
Early snowstorm forced flights to be diverted to Hartford
where JetBlue and American Airlines passengers
were trapped on aircraft for more than 7 hours.
October 29, 2011
10
More examples of massive flight disruptions
:
Date
Airline
Description
October 28–30, 2012
System
Hurricane Sandy shut down 9 airports and resulted in massive flight
disruptions with more than 20,000 flights cancelled.
November 7, 2012
American, Delta,
United, US Airways,
and JetBlue Airways
Nor’easter dumped snow on NY, NJ, CT, Boston and Philadelphia,
disrupting operations and causing more than 20,000 flight disruptions.
December 26, 2012
American Airlines, Snowstorm Euclid disrupted travel in the Midwest and Northeast, and 2,100
Delta Air Lines,
flight cancellations.
United Airlines, and
US Airways
11
Mismanagement drove DOT intervention
•
•
•
Contingency plan for lengthy tarmac delays
– Air carriers will not permit an aircraft to remain on the tarmac for more than three hours.
– For all flights, assurance that the air carrier will provide adequate food and water no later than two hours
after the aircraft leaves the gate or lands.
– For all flights, assurance of operable lavatory facilities and medical attention, if needed
– Assurance of sufficient resources to implement the plan
– Assurance that the plan has been coordinated with airport authorities
– Retention of records related to lengthy tarmac delays for two years
– Customer Service Plan
– Meet customers’ essential needs during lengthy tarmac delays
– Self auditing of plan and retention of records with results made available to U.S. Department of
Transportation
– Notice and Contract of Carriage
– Contingency Plan for Lengthy Tarmac Delays must be included in Contract of Carriage with air
passengers
Response to Consumer Problems
– An employee is to be designated the advocate for passengers’ interests and is responsible for monitoring
the effects of flight delays, flight cancelations, and lengthy tarmac delays on passengers. This employee
is to be included in the decision-making at the time of Massive flight disruptions as to which flights are
cancelled and which will be delayed the longest.
Unrealistic or Deceptive Scheduling
– Chronically delayed flight means any domestic flight that is operated at least10 times a month and arrives
more than 30 minutes late, including cancelation, more than 50 percent of the time during that month.
– Chronically delayed flights are considered unfair or deception practice, an unfair method of competition,
and are subject to enforcement.
Source: USDOT Final Rule Enhancing Airline Passenger Protection (2009)
12
The stakes are high - $27,500 per passenger
• ORD May 2011: massive disruption that resulted in government fines
• Textbook case of airport gridlock and management disarray
– Aircraft held at gate, arriving aircraft had no gate, flight crews
trapped on in-bound aircraft
• Hefty $900K fines imposed by DOT on American Eagle
13
Operations decision-making flow begins with
whole airline involvement
Decision-Making
Organizational Level
Vision, Objectives, Goal
Setting
Top Management
CEO/COO/CFO/CMO
Management Science
Approach
Models and Simulation
Programmed Decisions
SVP Operations
Management Science Approach
Operations Research
Programmed Decision Making
Non-programmed Decision Making
Decision Support Tools
Day-Of
Individual Decision Making
Rational/ Bounded Rationality
Decision Making
Judgment / heuristics
Intuition
Operations Center Mgr.
Aircraft Dispatch/Flight
Following
Crew Dispatch
Maintenance Coordination
Airport Ramp Control
Airport Staff/Services
Passenger Services
Examples of Decisions
Operation style, e.g. Mainline,
Low Cost, Regional, Charter
Network Carrier versus Linear
Route System
Domestic versus International
Fleet Planning
Schedule Planning &
Scheduling
(at lower level in Marketing)
Flight Operations and
Management
Maintenance Control System
Crew Scheduling
Load Planning
Customer Service services
Airport/Ramp Operations
Network Operations
Flight tracking
Crew tracking
Maintenance tracking
Ground services coordination
Passenger routings
14
Flights are planned 6 months prior to departure,
then handed over to Operations Center
6 Months Prior To Departure
Marketing
Finance
Product definition, Markets, Pricing
Passenger reservations and sales
Costing, Profitability
48 hours
prior to
Departure
Operations Center
Operations Planning
Day of Flight
Resource Allocation, i.e. aircraft,
crew, airport
15
Massive flight disruptions become responsibility
of Operation Center
•
Airlines are multifaceted
•
Extremely complex operations
– A “symphony orchestra” (Baker)
– Numerous individuals performing
interconnected tasks
– Requires a combination of technology
and human decision-making
•
Interconnected factors resulting from
massive flight disruptions include:
Airline
Flight
Schedules
Disruption
Weather
Natural
Disaster
– Passenger misconnects
– Crew members out of place or limits
– Aircraft in the wrong place
– Disruption to maintenance
Airline
Disrupted
Flight
Schedules
– Impact to subsequent flights
16
Operations Center is focused on day-of-operation
Preplanned
Schedule
Aircraft
Scheduling
Operations
Center
Maintenance
Operations
Control Center
(MOCC)
Crew Scheduling
Station
Operations
Control Center
(SOCC)
Passenger and
Payload Flow
17
Airlines have different names for Operations Centers
• American is transitioning to Integrated Operations Center (IOC),
renovating existing DFW infrastructure to include maintenance,
currently in Tulsa
– Operations center is moving to back-up facility
January 2013 during construction
• Delta recently renovated the Operations Control Center (OCC)
in Atlanta following the merger with Northwest
– State-of-the-art facility employing best practices of both airlines
• United recently opened its Network Operations Center (NOC)
– 52,000 sq. ft. facility in Chicago’s Willis Tower
– Moved Continental’s operations to Chicago
• US Airways Operations Control Center (OCC) is in Pittsburgh
– Will be moved to Dallas following merger with American
18
Recovery from massive flight disruptions should
not be solely Operations Center responsibility
Calm in Other
Departments
Massive
Flight
Disruption
Stress In Ops Center
19
Massive flight disruptions qualify as crises
• Crisis is “any situation that has the potential to affect long-term
confidence in an organization or product, or which may interfere
with its ability to continue operating normally”
• Despite differing definitions of crisis, there is consensus on its
major characteristics. These include:
– Events that have low probability of occurring, but have a
major potential impact on an organization and individuals
both inside and outside the organization
– There is uncertainty about resolution; and
– There is a limited time in which to act.
• Crisis management is a “systematic attempt” for management
to prevent a crisis and mitigate impacts
20
Carole LaLonde Framework
My study adapts LaLonde’s crisis management framework to airline
management of massive flight disruptions, combining methods of
Crisis Management and Organizational Development
•
•
•
•
COORDINATION/
TECHNO-STRUCTURAL
Crisis Management
• Communications
• Collaborative structures
OD Intervention
• Mainly techno-structural
• Networks/Collaboration
PLANNING
Crisis Management
Assess capacity to prepare
Risk Analysis
OD Intervention
Integrate into corporate strategy
Include all stakeholders
CRISIS
RESILIENCE
- Individual
- System
LEADERSHIP
Crisis Management
• Sensitive to external environment
• Rapid decision-making and risk-taking
OD Intervention
• Leadership development
• Coaching & Training
CIVIL SOCIETY
Crisis Management
• Civic behavior
• Role of media
OD Intervention
• Community
Development
Source, Lalonde, 2011
21
Four principles of crisis management
• Planning and preparedness
– Risk assessment
– Triggers
– Developing crisis management
plan
– Prepare and train personnel
– Simulations
– Allocate resources
– After event assessment
• Leadership
– Sensitivity to external environment
– Adaptive to stages of crisis (pre-,
during, post)
– Foster rapid decision making
– Courage to take risks
• Coordination
–
–
–
–
Communication, internal & external
Development of collaborative structures
Development of technology solutions
Crisis cells with multidisciplinary
resources and expertise
• Civil Society
– Accounting for citizen and government
involvement, impacts, and responses
– Recognizing role of media
22
OD and OL applied to Crisis Management
• Organization development (OD) is a system-wide application
and transfer of behavioral science knowledge to planned
development, improvement, and reinforcement of the strategies,
structures, and processes that lead to organization effectiveness
– Both “culture and operational soundness”
– A set of methods to “address issues of changes, process,
and relationships”
– Open systems approach
• Organizational learning (OL) is the process of creating,
acquiring, and transferring knowledge, and at modifying
behavior to reflect new knowledge and insights
– Integration of the acquired knowledge and lessons learned
– Double feed-back loops to address core issues
– Goal: Avoid repeating same errors and minimize impact
23
This Study Expanded Lalonde Framework
Crisis Management Principles
P2
COORDINATION/
TECHNO-STRUCTURAL
PLANNING
P1
Organization
Development
Quantification and plan for
vulnerabilities based on
probabilities of massive flight
disruptions
Collaboration with between
planning and Op Center;
Integration of Op Center with
other departments
Crisis cells
Collaboration across
departments
P3
LEADERSHIP
Top management
commitment to fostering
collaboration across the
airline and innovation
Real time situational analysis
tools with integration to
Crisis Cells, rapid decision
single platform
making, risk taking based on
Op Research tools
CIVIL SOCIETY
Passenger understanding
through communication
Communication with media
Operate within 3-Hour
Tarmac Rule regulatory
constraints
P4
Organization
Learning
Feed-back loops
Learning from previous
massive flight disruptions
Learning from preparation
and response to Emergency
Events
Tools to understand the root Fostering open systems and
causes
culture of innovation
Learning from tools from Encouragement of knowledge
other departments
transfer
Culture of innovation
Learn from customer
experience
Learn from government
hearings and studies
P6
P5
RESULT
RESILIENCE
Individual/Controller; Expertise; Innovative; Resourceful
System/Airline; Responsive; Focused; Learning
 Improved Customer Satisfaction
 Minimized costs
 Mitigated government intervention
24
Propositions
• Proposition 1 Planning
– From an OD intervention perspective, planning includes the quantification
and assessment of vulnerabilities using probabilities. From an OL
perspective, planning includes identifying trigger events using the review
and analysis of previous events.
• Proposition 2 Coordination- Techno-Structure
– From OD intervention perspective, coordination includes collaboration
across different departments and the development of technology solutions
(e.g., situational analysis). From an OL perspective, coordination includes
the creation of a learning environment that fosters innovation.
• Proposition 3 Leadership
– From an OD intervention perspective, leadership includes training and
coaching. From an OL perspective, leadership includes fostering a culture
of innovation, learning, and knowledge transfer.
• Proposition 4 Civil Society
– From an OD intervention perspective, civil society includes improving
communications with passengers, the public, and governments. From an
OL perspective, civil society includes learning from customers and
complying with governmental rules (e.g., the 3-Hour Tarmac Rule).
25
Propositions 5 & 6
• Proposition 5 Resiliency
– Adapting OD interventions with OL processes leads to resiliency. Resiliency
for an individual is the ability to leverage his or her expertise by being
innovative and resourceful in addressing the issues that result from a crisis
or unexpected-yet-recurring events. Resiliency for an organization is the
ability to return to normal operations as quickly as possible with the least
impact on operations, customers, and resources. The organization needs to
be responsive to triggers and changes in the environment, to focus on the
situation, and to be open to learning from the event.
• Principle 6 Sustainable Results
– Proposition 6 is essentially the feedback loops within the conceptual
framework moving OL processes back into planning, leadership, technology
coordination, and civil society to ensure that the changes driven by crises or
unexpected-yet-recurring events that lead to operational disruptions are
sustainable.
26
Adapted to airline operations management
• Planning and
preparedness
–
–
–
–
• Coordination and TechnoStructure
– Integrate decision-making tools
(aircraft, crew, airport facilities,
passengers)
– Strive for real-time situational
awareness for all resources
– Collaboration within Operations
Center and with other
departments
Assess vulnerabilities
Identify triggers
Collaboration across airline
Double-loop assessment
following massive flight
disruption
• Leadership
– Top management
commitment to fostering
collaboration across the
airline and innovation
– Crisis cells with
multidisciplinary resources
and expertise
– Rapid decision-making and
risk taking
•
Civil Society
– Communicate with passengers
• Social media, direct text/email,
announcements
– Communicate with media
• Social media, direct text/email,
announcements
– Government
27
Planning and preparedness
• Quantify and develop a
strategic plan based on
probabilities of massive
flight disruptions
• Develop entire airline
strategy around crisis
management tools
Seasonality of Massive Flight Delays
21% 21%
9%
6%
6%
– FAA System Ops Calls
– Historical analysis of
weather patterns
– Action plan based on
triggers
– Risk-taking to preempt
“heroic” actions
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
6%
5%
4%
Sep
Oct
3%
– Include all stakeholders
• Identify triggers
9%
8%
3%
Nov
Dec
Source: GAO, 2011 Average for 2001-2010
There are about 60 days a year in the U.S. when
flight delays potentially result in massive disruptions.
More than 50 percent of disruptions in flight
operations are clustered in 20 days each year
Airlines should adjust planned schedules and
resources (aircraft, crew, airport facilities) accordingly
28
Organization Learning through feedback loops
• Collaboration between other departments and Operations Center
• Rethink operational models, routines, and cultures – feedback!
Marketing
Finance
Feedback Loop
Passenger impacts, assessment of
schedule planning
Revenue and cost impact
Feedback Loop
Operations Center
Operations Planning
Post- Disruption
Improvements to resource
allocation, i.e. aircraft, crew, airport
29
Socio-technical – Integration of technology with
human decision-making, including other departments
• Integration of resource
decision-making tools
–
–
–
–
Aircraft maintenance programs
Crew scheduling
Passenger re-accommodation
Real time situational analysis
• Collaborative integration of
Operations Center with other
departments
– Massive flight disruptions are not just
an operations center problem
– Impact entire airline
Finance
- Revenue metrics
- Cost metrics
Marketing Data
- Passenger itinerary and
rebooking
- Passenger satisfaction
- Competitive market position
Operations Center
(OC)
Maintenance Operations Control
Center (MOCC)
- Aircraft maintenance restrictions
Operations
- Aircraft and crew
positioning
- Crew restrictions
Station Operations Control Center
(SOCC)
Passengers on-board
Ground service availability –
gates, catering, baggage, fuel
30
Commitment to finding new recovery strategies
must start with top management
• Commitment to fostering collaboration across the airline
• Corporate culture to treat massive flight disruptions as a crisis
• Create “Massive Flight Disruption Crisis Cells”
– Draw from across the airline
– Lessons learned from previous massive flight disruptions
– Identify resources for response
– Debrief and learning after event
• Coaching and training on rapid decision making
• Assume some risks
– Use OR resources to respond to triggers and preempt “heroic”
solutions once massive flight delays develop
• Learn from airline Emergency Response Programs for catastrophic
events, i.e. terrorism, crash, high-jacking, bomb threat, etc.
31
Civil Society
• Passengers
– Gain passenger understanding through communication
– Leverage technologies for direct passenger communications
• Text/email/phone, social media (FaceBook, Twitter)
• Communicate with media
• Stay ahead of the news
– Social media, direct text/email, announcements
• Government and regulators
• Observe regulatory limits
• Situational awareness
• Documentation
32
PLANNING
Summation
Quantification and strategic
plan for vulnerabilities based on
probabilities of massive flight
disruptions. Collaboration with
between planning and
Operations Center
COORDINATION/
TECHNO-STRUCTURAL
Collaborative integration of
Operations Center with other
departments
Real time situational analysis
tools with integration
LEADERSHIP
Top management commitment
to fostering collaboration across
the airline and innovation
Crisis Cells, rapid decision
making, risk taking based on
OR tools
RESILIENCE
Individual/Controller
Expertise
Innovative
Resourceful
System/Airline
Responsive
Focused
Learning
Improved
Passenger
Satisfaction
Minimized costs
Mitigated
government
intervention
CIVIL SOCIETY
Passenger understanding
through communication
Communication with media
Operate within 3-Hour
Tarmac Ruler regulatory
constraints
33
Findings
Crisis is a Catalyst for Change
• Organization development provides tools to implement
change
• Organization learning provides culture for sustainable
change
Airlines Do Not Address
Massive Flight Disruptions as a Crisis
• Massive flight disruptions are isolated to a single
department issue, i.e., operations
• Risk-adverse: Operations staffing have deep operations
experience, but no experience across airline departments
Answer to research question
“The resources required to manage massive flight disruptions are
enormous and not practical to have on stand-by” (Russ Chew)
Hence the need for a behavioral management approach
•Massive flight disruptions are viewed as an operations problem,
but they’re actually a crisis involving the entire airline
– Solution: Collaboration across the airline
– Behavioral approach: Crisis management tools integrate with
Organization Development interventions
•SOC staff have deep but narrow experience in airline operations and are
risk adverse
– Solution: Develop a culture fostering innovation, which includes
other airline departments
– Behavioral approach: Organization Learning interventions
35
For a copy of dissertation:
Tulinda Larsen
tulinda@tulindalarsen.com
www.tulindalarsen.com
Tel: +1 443-510-3566
Twitter @TulindaLarsen
Thank you to Tim Antolovic, AA, Jack Keis, Metron Aviation, Tim Jacobs, US,
Stephen G. Smith, US Office of Inspector General, Dr. Darryl Jenkins,
American Aviation Institute, Josh Marks, masFlight, Dr. Carole Lalonde, and
my dissertation advisor, Dr. Michael Evanchik for their invaluable support and
guidance in my research and in developing my framework.
Literature Review
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Management
3.Organizational
Learning
2.Organizational
Development
4.Airline
Management
of Flight
Disruptions
37
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Organization Learning
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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