THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
DECENTRALISATION IN MALAWI
A Presentation for the National Consultative Conference on Local
Governance
by
Dr. Asiyati Lorraine Chiweza
Senior Lecturer, Department of Political and Administrative
Studies
Chancellor College
12th May, 2014
Outline of the Presentation
1. What is the Problem?
2. The status of decentralisation sixteen years later.
3. What does Political Economy Analysis tell us about forces
driving decentralisation in Malawi and the areas that need
attention in order to ensure, accountable and efficient local
authorities in the delivery of public services to Malawians
WHAT IS THE
PROBLEM?
Weak
and
selective
implementation
of
Decentralisation which has constrained the
performance and influence of Local Authorities to
emerge as integrated , efficient, and accountable
public service providers and institutions
promoting democratic participation of citizens at
the local level.
Brief Background
• Local Authorities existed since the colonial but became weak
over time in the one party state.
• After democratisation and adoption of multiparty politics in 1994,
the Malawi Nation sought to strengthen the Local Government
system.
• Section 146 of the 1994 Constitution created Local Government
Authorities with responsibility for the:
• Representation of the people over whom they have jurisdiction for their welfare,
• Consolidation and promotion of local democratic institutions and participation;
• Promotion of infrastructure and economic development
• Participation in the delivery of essential and local services.
Adopted Decentralisation Policy in 1998 which was meant to
•
Eliminate dual administration at the district level with the aim of making
public services more efficient, economic and cost effective
•
Devolve administration and political authority to the district level;
•
Integrate governmental agencies at the district and local levels into one
administrative unit, through the process of institutional integration,
manpower absorption, composite budgeting and provision of funds for the
decentralised services;
•
Divert the center of implementation responsibilities and transfers these to
the districts; assigns, functions and responsibilities to the various levels of
government;
•
Promote popular participation in the governance and development of
districts.
Political
Decentralisation:
Establishment of
elected bodies
Functional/Administrative
Decentralisation,
Institutional Integration,
Manpower absorption,
Planning
Fiscal Decentralisation:
Composite Budgeting and
provision of Recurrent &
Development funds to LAs
16 YEARS DOWN THE
ROAD WHAT HAS
BEEN THE STATUS &
ENVIRONMENT OF
DECENTRALISATION?
(1998- 2014)
Political Decentralisation
• Elected local Councils have not taken root and have not had the chance to
grow due to persistent postponement of local government elections.
• Brief experience of Councillors was characterised by generally poor
performance due to limited and unsystematic induction of Councillors and
role conflict
• Local Authorities have operated without a legal decision making and local
oversight mechanism i.e. the Council and its committees.
• Members of Parliament and Chiefs have for the most part filled the vacuum
created by absence of Councillors, creating role confusion in the process and
a fertile ground for power relations and further conflict once Councillors come
in.
• Council activities have largely been driven by appointed officers- District
Commissioners and Chief Executives.
Functional/ Administrative Decentralisation
• To date 15 sectors have devolved their functions but some
responsibilities are still being performed by line ministries.
• Recruitment, promotion, and disciplining of most key Council staff is being
done by central government.
• Institutional Integration has not been fully achieved. Councils do
not fully operate as integrated units.
• Ministries such as education, health still maintain their own parallel district
implementation plans developed through parallel processes geared
towards meeting the sector standards and targets.
• Sectoral and Council finance staff working separately in most Councils.
• Staff belong to different service commissions and have duo accountability:
to the DC/CEO and to parent ministry.
• Frequent transfer of staff leading to loss of institutional memory and limited
knowledge of decentralisation and local government system among new
Limited Functionality of Sub-district structures and unresolved issues
• Many
participatory sub-district structures such as Village
Development Committees and Area Development Committees in
rural areas & Community Development Committees in urban
areas and have been defunct.
• This has affected participation of citizens, feedback, and flow of information
from and to citizens
• Politicisation of the dissolving and formation of sub-district
development committees following the election of new Members
of Parliament
• There is still an unresolved question of Ward Development
Committees in the rural Councils. Current VDCs and ADCs are
anchored with the Traditional Authority system.
Fiscal Decentralisation
• Councils, particularly rural councils have limited discretionary
spending power.
• This is not the case with Urban local Authorities
• Only the recurrent budgets (ORT) have been devolved to
Councils NOT development budgets
• Even with recurrent budgets, some items are still controlled by the central
ministry
• For example, in education, recurrent expenditure is held at the district level but
procurement and distribution of school teaching materials is held at the center
• Sector ORT transfers constitute a bulk of the funds going to Local
Government Authorities and these have increased overtime. Most of
these transfers are conditional. As a result Councils do not have the
discretion to determine which areas to spend it on
• General resource Fund.
• Only less than 2% of the envisaged 5% is currently being transferred.
• Locally Generated Revenues are minimal and only contribute to
about 20% of rural Local revenues.
• Most profitable local revenue sources are still controlled by the Central
Government e.g. collection of revenue from forestry products, tradelicensing of indigenous business but foreign owned still controlled by
Ministry of Trade.
• As a result, rural local authority’s capacity to implement service
delivery functions and development projects identified through the
District Development Plans is severely affected.
• Urban local authorities fair better that rural councils
• locally generated revenues constitute about 80% own revenues because of
property rates
• Such authority allows them to cover at least 80% of their spending needs
• Creation of parallel development Financing Mechanisms:
• Government created the Local Development Fund (LDF) as a single
discretionary financing mechanism for local government development
investments to support local council improved service delivery discretion.
• A bulk of the funding was earmarked for teachers houses and school blocks
• Introduction of CDF in the 2006/07 as a parallel fund to the LDF
•
•
•
Has been increasing over the years and currently stands at 7 million per
constituency,
The design of the fund is not fully anchored within the local government planning
and development structures
There is no proper law to guide the implementation and management of the
Fund. In practice it is controlled by the MP and it has been difficult for Council
officers to exercise the necessary controls over CDF transactions.
• This creates a fertile ground for conflict between MPs and other
Council members.
• Multiplicity
of Donor and NGO projects with some going
through the sectors and others going directly to the districts.
• Duplication of efforts and it is difficult to track resource flow to the Councils
• The key
challenge is limited coordination and harmonisation of donor,
government, & NGO funding and local level development initiatives in the District
Councils and at the Ministry level.
• In the absence of the Finance Committee of Council, there has
been limited local oversight over utilisation and management of
Council finances
Mainstreaming of cross cutting issues e.g. Gender
• The policy and legislative framework (the Decentralisation Policy and Local
Government Act) is gender neutral but a Gender Mainstreaming Strategy for
Councils exists
• Low Participation of women in Local Governance
• The 2000 local elections showed that only 9.13% of all the 1860
candidates who stood for local elections countrywide were women. Of the
860 councillors who were elected in Malawi only 8.49% went to women.
• Gender Representation in key Council and sub- district structures such
as Development Executive Committees (DEC), the District Consultative
Forums (DCF), and Village Development Committees is predominantly
male
• There
is lack of harmonisation and coordination among donor supported
gender programmes targeting the Councils.
• Tendency for sectors to work in isolation. Some of the programmes clearly show that
they do not have a good grasp of how Local Authorities work.
• There is lack of critical mass for gender mainstreaming at the Ministry level,
in local authorities and communities.
• There is an issue about coordination of gender mainstreaming at the Council level
• Many NGOs and donors working in the local councils typically focus on gender
numbers in project committees and nothing much to boost address the challenges
that women to effectively participate, articulate interests and influence decisions.
• There is limited gender analysis that is undertaken to inform project design and
assess project impacts on men and women, boys and girls.
• Local Authority planning and budgeting frameworks do not effectively take
gender into account
• Although District Social Economic Profiles have useful gender disaggregated data
but, the information is hardly used in the formulation of District Development Plans
which are so far not gender sensitive.
• While many programmes promote gender budgeting, the budgeting templates
provided by NLGFC do not provide room for this.
WHAT ARE THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY
DRIVERS
INFLUENCING THIS
STATE OF AFFAIRS?
Political Economy Approach
• Focuses on understanding what sort of local political and
economic processes are involved in nurturing and contributing to
the way things are.
• The approach pays attention to the following:
• Historical legacies
• Roles and interests of various actors and stakeholders and how
their behaviour has influenced the observed status:
• Political Party leaders, Donors, NGOs/CSOs, Chiefs, Central and local level
bureaucrats and Citizens
• Institutions (rules, norms, policies and laws guiding local
government).
• Structural Factors.
Historical Legacies and role of Political party leaders
• The picture emerging in Malawi is one of a highly selective commitment to
democratic decentralisation. Only those initiatives that seem to have less
political threat are being moved forward by the bureaucratic elites e.g.
functional & some elements of fiscal decentralisation.
• However over the years there has limited attention by the political leadership to providing
direction and dealing with bureaucratic blockages that are affecting sector and fiscal
devolution.
• Apart from capacity issues, two political trends that have been present since
the colonial times remain highly relevant in understanding the status of
decentralisation today:
• The first is that national level leaders have consistently looked towards coopting the power and authority of local government authorities in order to
expand and consolidate their own national power.
• The second trend is a consistent unwillingness of national political actors to
open spaces for genuine political autonomy at local level by postponing
local elections and altering the institutions guiding local government.
• Various strategies have been used by previous governments.
Muluzi- UDF regime: 1994- 2004
• Dissolved
pre-1994 Councils because
considered to be dominated by MCP actors
they
were
• Although the law was passed in 1998,
the creation of elected
councils came into force 2 years later, 6 years after transition in
2000.
• Official reason was that government was studying the various
initiatives to find the best way up until 2000.
• Delay in establishing elected councils can be thought of as a
strategic political calculation to gain control of local authorities in
the center and north
• Councillors were eventually recruited but they were not
supported to enable them perform their functions
effectively as is the case with MPs.
• They had transport and other material challenges
• Training of Councillors was adhoc, haphazard, and not systematic
• Was mostly orientational in nature, mainly targeting committees such as Finance and
Development.
• Largely driven by what particular donors and NGOs were interested in and could possibly
fund.
• Different materials were used and the quality of training was varied
• Not systematically timed as is the case with Parliamentary orientation
• Consequently mostly councillors operated with limited knowledge of what they
were supposed to do.
• Most of them operated on presumption and unrealistic expectations.
• Their performance in monitoring and overseeing Council activities was minimal
• A lot of conflicts emanated between Councillors and Secretariat, Councillors and MPs, and in
some case Councillors and chiefs. In the end the councillors were sandwiched between chiefs
and MPs
• MPs used to consider them as their errand boys/girls. ‘Chikwama cha MP’ etc.
• Dominance of MPs and sometimes Council Officers in Council meetings.
• Poor handling of meetings & demand for regular Council meetings in order to boost
remuneration.
• The regime also amended the original Local Government Act in 2001
that empowered Councils to recruit their own staff to allow central
government to influence the appointment of senior officers like District
Commissioners
Mutharika DPP regime: 2004- 2012
• Characterised by systematic side-lining of elected subnational government.
• Dissolved elected councils in 2005 and postponement of local elections
• Mutharika’s switch from UDF to establish his own party DPP, resulted in a
government with minority status in Parliament, yet 71% of the Local
Councillors were controlled by UDF councillors.
• Further postponement of local elections in 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011
• Official justification was lack of funding in the midst of hunger
• However a critical reading of some of the statements of Mutharika and
some senior political leaders in his government were showing government’s
inclination towards doing away with elected local government in favour of
chiefs, MPs, and District Commissioners:
 ‘The country is not in a hurry to hold local elections because councillors are
not important’.
 ‘Councillors are expensive’
 ‘Government has made significant strides in rural development working with
chiefs and District Commissioners’
• Instituted
District
Consultative
Forums
(DCF)
as
alternative/makeshift key decision bodies in the absence of
elected bodies
• This structure has no legal basis meaning councils cannot
now borrow money or pass changes to outdated by-laws,
something that has been particularly problematic in urban
areas.
• MPs, sector staff and chiefs have the most say in the DCFs,
but MPs have the most in resource allocation
• Neutralised the role of Local Government Service Commission
and increased centralisation in the appointment of District
Commissioners
• No new LGSC commissioners were recruited since 2009 and
the commission was largely defunct.
• DCs were recruited by the central government
• Significant steps to alter the rules of the game surrounding local
government were taken in 2009 and 2010:
• In 2009 the
Malawi constitution was amended to give the President the
authority to determine the date of Local Government elections.
• In 2010 significant amendments were made to the 1998 Local Government
Act.
• Firstly MPs were given voting rights within the District Councils alongside
councillors
• Second, ward sizes were increased, reducing the number of Local Councillors to
two per constituency. This reflects a novel effort to increase central government
authority, rebalancing of power by weakening councillors and strengthening, the
more directly controllable, MPs within Councils.
• Formalised the appointment of District Commissioners directly by the Executive
through the Minister of Local Government
• Removed the policy making powers of local government.
Joyce Banda Regime: April 2012- to date
• Has demonstrated political will to hold local elections
• Some attention has been given to the elections legal framework to provide
room and certainty for tripartite elections.
• Expecting to hold local elections on 20th May, 2014
• However, there is still much that remains to be addressed in the policy and
legal framework that was instituted in 2010 to ensure the effectiveness of
elected Councillors and Local Authorities:
• Increased attention to traditional chiefs requires role clarity versus the
councillors.
• Apart from the Constitution the Local Government Act (1998) remains the
principle legislation governing local government in Malawi. The chiefs Act of
1967 is also relevant here because chiefs are members of the Councils .
The review of this Act was commenced some years ago and a Law reform
process commenced, but it is still dragging
• The Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development
(MLGRD) with support from development partners and
other actors such as MALGA has taken steps to produce a
variety of materials regarding local government and provide
role clarity
• MLGRD has developed a Malawi Municipal Programme as
a road map (2014-2015) to address capacity gaps that exist
in the Local Government System (LGS) as a result of
having had no Councillors in the local government system
since the year 2004.
Donors
• Have played key roles and influence in the design of the
decentralisation Policy reforms and piloting of various initiatives.
• However, there is a lot of piloting with limited learning of lessons, and up scaling.
• Limited dialogue on decentralisation and way forward involving all stakeholders
• Donors have also been key in supporting development projects
and capacity building initiatives but:
• They also have their own interests which are reflected in what they are
willing to support and where the support is provided. This has led to
• Distortion of allocation of development resources between and within Districts;
• Uneven existence, volume and nature of capacity building programmes between
districts.
• Limited harmonisation among the donor community on support
towards decentralisation, approaches, coordination mechanisms,
and other initiatives for local councils.
NGOs/CSOs
• Play key roles in the implementation of projects, capacity
building and service delivery in the Councils however:
• Most of them have strong financial capacity but weak on human resource
capacity as a result they create an overload on Council staff
• Many non-state actors- CSOs have largely focused their projects on micro
level issues, particularly capacity building of VDCs with limited lobbying
and advocacy on bigger national level policy issues that have potential to
drive change.
• Limited knowledge on broader issues of local governance among many non-state
actors doing advocacy work on local governance.
and there is a ‘Go it alone
syndrome’. This has contributed to limited harmonisation and duplication
of projects and capacity building initiatives in the districts.
• THERE IS NEED FOR MAPPING OF INTERESTS, COMPARATIVE
ADVANTAGES & CAPACITY BUILDING OF CSOs.
• Sometimes they pursue their own interests
Political Parties and MPs
• Up until 2013, Decentralisation and Local Government reform was
mentioned in political party manifestos but did not feature highly on
the implementation agenda of many political parties.
• MPs perceive Councillors as a threat to their candidacy in subsequent general
elections and resist policy changes that seem to make councillors
independent:
• There has not
been an evident push for effective legal and policy reforms in
Parliament by opposition political parties.
• Others consider councillors as ‘Chikwama cha MP’
• MPs do not seem to trust the local government sub-district planning
structures and would like to dismantle the structures once elected in
office.
• They usually influence intra district development resource allocation to
be based on equal shares, political interests, other than district data
that points to development gaps in the district.
 IMPLICATIONS
FOR CSO/GOVERNMENT STRATEGIES, TIMING, & ENTRY
POINTS FOR POLICY, LEGAL, & DISTRICT DEVELOPMENT RESOURCE
MECHANISM REFORMS
National and Local level Bureaucrats
• Play key roles in the implementation of decentralisation reforms.
• There is bureaucratic resistance to devolve as reflected in the slow
pace of functional and fiscal decentralisation.
• Without Councillors local bureaucrats have had great influence over
Council decisions and practices.
• HOW DO WE ENSURE THAT THE ADAGE THAT SAYS OLD HABITS DIE
HARD DOES NOT BECOME A REALITY HERE?
• Limited understanding of decentralisation processes among National
and District level sectoral staff (after NDPI)
• Many new staff working in the sectors and also being transferred to
Councils have limited knowledge of the decentralisation process and the
working of a local government system.
• Some do not have the experience of working with elected councillors
Traditional Chiefs
• Chiefs want to constitute primary structures of local governance
in rural areas and they consider themselves as legitimate
representatives of the people.
• Councillors are widely perceived as ‘mwana wa a mfumu’
• The struggle between chiefs and councillors is intensified by
• widespread self-seeking tendencies among national level politicians who
strategically turned to chiefs in order to entrench and consolidate their
legitimacy.
• Lack of clarity on the roles of Chiefs at the local level given the outdated
nature of the 1967 Chiefs Act
Citizens
• Limited knowledge and awareness of decentralisation and the
local government, among the general Malawian populace.
• Many cannot distinguish between the role of MP and
Councillor, central government and local government.
• This has been evident during the district debates with
aspirants. Many aspiring Councillors did not seem to have a
clear understanding of the role of the Councillor
• Unless mobilised by CSOs, there is weak
participation,
articulation of voices and collective action capacity on matters of
local government.
Conclusion
• The coming in of Local Government elections is indeed a
welcome development but the 2014 local elections alone are not
the full answer to having an effective and efficient local
government system.
• While
Decentralisation has administrative and
components it is also inherently a political process.
financial
• What this suggests is that capacity building alone will not lead to
transformed local government. For the 2014 local elections to
translate into improved governance, delivery of public services
and sustainable socio-economic development for Malawians,
there is need for serious advocacy and strategic calculations on
how to address issues that have been prominent in the
environment of decentralisation since 1998.
These include
• The legal and policy framework of decentralisation and local
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
government.
Lack of a harmonised approach to District Development Financing with
LDF operating sided by side with CDF.
Absence of robust vertical transparency and accountability
mechanisms.
Limited coordination of donor, government, & NGO local level
development initiatives in the District Councils.
Limited knowledge of local government system and participation of
citizens in decisions at the local level.
Defunct sub-district structures and poor information flows and limited
feedback to the communities.
Limited knowledge and understanding of local governance among the
CSOs.
Power struggles among key actors at the local level: Chiefs, MPs &