Identity Management:
Dealing with Disclosure
“constructing identity
management solutions
that are provably
appropriate for a
particular context"
privacy.cs.cmu.edu
Latanya Sweeney, PhD
latanya@privacy.cs.cmu.edu
Privacy Technology
1.Privacy is here to stay.
2.Computer scientist must help solve this problem.
3.Selective Revelation
4.Example: video surveillance
5.Example: bio-terrorism surveillance
6.Example: identity theft
7.Example: distributed surveillance
8.Example: privacy-preserving surveillance
9.Example: DNA privacy
10.Example: Identity theft protections
11.Example: k-Anonymity
12.Example: Webcam surveillance
13.Example: Text de-identification
14.Example: Policy specification and enforcement
15.Example: Scam Spam
privacy.cs.cmu.edu
Privacy Technology
1.Privacy is here to stay.
2.Computer scientist must help solve this problem.
3.Selective Revelation
4.Example: video surveillance
5.Example: bio-terrorism surveillance
6.Example:
identity
thefttheft
6.
Example:
Identity
7.Example: distributed surveillance
8.Example: privacy-preserving surveillance
9.Example: DNA privacy
10.Example:
Identity
thefttheft
protections
10. Example:
Identity
protections
11.Example: k-Anonymity
12.Example: Webcam surveillance
13.Example: Text de-identification
14.Example: Policy specification and enforcement
15.Example: Scam Spam
privacy.cs.cmu.edu
HandShot ID
new
A Fast 3-D Imaging System
for Capturing Fingerprints,
Palm Prints and Hand
Geometry
Latanya Sweeney, PhD
School of Computer Science
Carnegie Mellon University
latanya@cs.cmu.edu
Victor Weedn, MD, JD
Forensic Science Program
Duquesne University
weednv@duq.edu
Very Grateful to the U.S. Department of
Justice for the opportunity to build HandShot
and study the science of fingerprint matching.
privacy.cs.cmu.edu/dataprivacy/projects/handshot/index.html
new
Testimony European Union Commission
How should policy makers think about drafting
policy for RFID technologies?
1. Cornerstones of privacy protection can be
incorporated within many ubiquitous technology
applications to provide privacy protection.
2. Focus policy at the general nature of ubiquitous
technology and not on specific instances or uses
of specific technologies.
privacy.cs.cmu.edu
Acknowledgements
Special thanks to
Mike Gurski
Richard Owens
Pasha Peroff
for inviting me to this outstanding conference.
I am always extremely honored to be here.
Addressed in This Talk
This talk will examine the nature of
identity management problems and
examine roles biometrics can play
along with accompanying policy or
additional technology. An integrated
solution (“identity phone”) will be
presented as a working example.
privacy.cs.cmu.edu/dataprivacy/talks/CACR-05-11.html
This Talk
1. Identity Management Problems
2. Biometric Technologies
3. Applying Biometrics to Problems
4 Identity Phone Example
privacy.cs.cmu.edu
This Talk
1. Identity Management Problems
Examine identity theft in terms of the
acquisition of fraudulent credit cards
and related issues to the U.S. Social
Security number.
[Identity Angel* & SSNwatch Projects]
2. Biometric Technologies
3. Applying Biometrics to Problems
4. Identity Phone Example
* Recently on CBS News
Historical Highlights of the SSN
• 1935 Social Security Act
SSNs only to be used for the social security program.
• 1943 Executive Order 9397
Required federal agencies to use SSNs in new record systems
• 1961 IRS began using SSN
As taxpayer identification number
• 1974 Privacy Act
Government agencies use of SSN required authorization
and disclosures (exempt agencies already using SSN)
• 1976 Tax Reform Act
Granted authority to State and local governments to use
SSNs: state and local taxes, motor vehicle agencies
•Over 400 million different numbers have been issued.
Source: Social Security Administration, http://www.ssa.gov/history/hfaq.html
Non-Government Uses of SSN
•Corporate use of the SSN is not bound by the laws.
You can request an alternative number.
You can refuse to provide, they can refuse service.
• Most common non-government use relates to credit
bureaus and credit granting companies:
Recognition – to locate your credit history for sharing
it with you or with others with whom you sought
credit.
Linkage – to make sure new entries are added to your
credit report.
•Common uses until recently are for corporate identification
Example: medical and school identification cards
Quality of the SSN Assignment
Ability to acquire the number and use it falsely
grows as more copies of the number are stored
for different purposes.
A Social Security number is almost always
specific to one person and one person typically
has a unique SSN. There are exceptions.
Unusual case of SSN 078-05-1120
Used by thousands of People!
In 1938, a wallet manufacturer provided a sample
SSN card, inserted in each new wallet.
The company’s Vice President used the actual SSN
of his secretary, Mrs. Hilda Schrader Whitcher.
The wallet was sold by Woolworth and other stores.
It had "specimen" written across the face, but many
purchasers of the wallet adopted the SSN as their
own. SSA voided the number. (Mrs. Whitcher was
given a new number.) In total, over 40,000 people
reported this as their SSN. As late as 1977, 12 people
were still using it.
Source: Social Security Administration, http://www.ssa.gov/history/ssn/misused.html
Social Security Number
Summary
SSNs are used to represent a person:
easy to replicate,
easy to provide in-person and remotely
easy to store and match
BUT
not verifiable when presented
easily forged
encoded, thereby leaking information
SSNwatch
On-line SSN validation
system. Given the first 3
or 5 digits of an SSN,
returns the state in which
the SSN was issued along
with an estimated age
range of the person.
Sample uses:
Job Applications
Apartment Rentals
Insurance Claims
Student Applications
privacy.cs.cmu.edu/dataprivacy/projects/ssnwatch/index.html
SSNwatch Results for SSN 078-05Geography
Date of issuance
Year of Birth
(5-digit prefix)
New York
Issued before 1993
64% born 1889 to 1910
98% born 1879 to 1921
If the person presenting the SSN is
about age 20, then it is extremely
unlikely that the provided SSN was
issued to that person.
SSNwatch Results for SSN 078-05Geography
Date of issuance
Year of Birth
(5-digit prefix)
New York
Issued before 1993
64% born 1889 to 1910
98% born 1879 to 1921
If the person presenting the SSN
fails to list or acknowledge New York
as a prior residence, then it is
extremely unlikely that the provided
SSN was issued to that person.
What is Identity Theft?
Identity theft
Identity theft occurs when a person uses
another person’s personally-identifying
information such as name, Social
Security number, credit card number or
other explicitly identifying information,
without permission to commit fraud or
other crimes.
Source: Federal Trade Commission, http://www.consumer.gov/idtheft/
Problems Posed by Identity Theft
Identity theft is a serious crime.
People whose identities have been stolen can
spend months or years - and their hard-earned
money - cleaning up the mess thieves have
made of their good name and credit record.
Victims may lose job opportunities, be refused
loans, education, housing or cars, or even get
arrested for crimes they didn't commit.
Source: Federal Trade Commission, http://www.consumer.gov/idtheft/
Federal Trade Commission Report: Overview of
the Identity Theft Program, Oct 1998 – Sep 2003
Federal Trade Commission Report:
Victim Complaint Data
Federal Trade Commission Report:
Victim Complaint Data
More than 40% involve
credit card fraud!
Federal Trade Commission Report:
Victim Complaint Data
Federal Trade Commission Report:
Victim Complaint Data
More than half are
young adults, who are
mobile and active on
the web!
Identity Angel Project
Is there sufficient information freely
available on-line to obtain fraudulent
credit cards?
Thousands of Americans are at risk
to identity theft immediately!
Can be done with little technical knowledge!
Student
application
Basic
information
and School
Information
Basic Information Necessary
For a Credit Card Application
• Name
• Social Security number
• Address
• Date of birth
• Mother’s maiden name
Strategy: if one can identify these fields for a person,
they have the basic information needed to acquire a
credit card in that person’s name.
Basic Information Necessary
For a Credit Card Application
Do these
first.
• Name
• Social Security number
• Address
• Date of birth
• Mother’s maiden name
Strategy: if one can identify these fields for a person,
they have the basic information needed to acquire a
credit card in that person’s name. Therefore, we need
only demonstrate how this information can be obtained
on-line.
One Approach is to Buy an SSN
There are websites that advertise SSNs for sale.
The California-based Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights
said for $26 each it was able to purchase the Social Security
numbers and home addresses for Tenet, Ashcroft and other top Bush
administration officials, including Karl Rove, the president's chief
political adviser. [Associated Press, “Social Security numbers sold
on Web” 8/28/2003]
Google: resume ssn site:.edu 1
[DOC]RESUME
File Format: Microsoft Word 2000 - View as HTML
RESUME. RICHARD ALLEN BROWN. Richard Allen
Brown. PO Box 782. Kayenta, AZ 86033.
Home Telephone-520-697-3513. NAU Telephone-520-5234099. DOB: 03-10-77. SSN: 527-71 ...
dana.ucc.nau.edu/~rab39/RAB%20Resume.doc
Many found. One is shown above.
But the actual resumes are amidst lots of
non-resume pages!
Google: resume ssn site:.edu 2
resume
... 2843. DOB: 10-10-48 New Britain, CT 06050-4010. F:
(860) 832-3753.
SSN: 461-84-8245 H: (203) 740-7255 C: (203) 561-8674.
Education. Ph. ...
www.math.ccsu.edu/vaden-goad/resume.htm
A second example.
Google: resume ssn site:.edu 3
Scot Lytle's Resume
Scot Patrick Lytle. Home: (301)-249-5330 2116 Blaz Court
School: (410)-455-1662
Upper Marlboro, MD 20772 SSN: 578-90-8915
OBJECTIVE. ...
userpages.umbc.edu/~slytle1/resume.html
We emailed warnings to these people that
this is not a good practice!
One claimed to have been the victim of a
identity theft recently.
Job Banks are On-line with Resumes
Listing {SSN, name, address}
... Welcome to Maryland's Job Bank! ... Are You Looking For
Dream Job. ... Search for jobs nationwide,
and by creating a resume, thousands of employers across the
nation ...
www.ajb.dni.us/md/ - 29k
NationalJobBank.com - Post your jobs or resume for FREE!
... The National Job Bank is a web-site developed
specifically for job seekers, employers ... We
encourage you to post your resume, post a job listing or
contact ...
www.nationaljobbank.com/ - 16k - Sep 9, 2003
Basic Information Necessary
For a Credit Card Application
Done.
Next...
• Name
• Social Security number
• Address
• Date of birth
• Mother’s maiden name
Strategy: if one can identify these fields for a person,
they have the basic information needed to acquire a
credit card in that person’s name. Therefore, we need
only demonstrate how this information can be obtained
on-line.
Google: resume ssn site:.edu 1
[DOC]RESUME
File Format: Microsoft Word 2000 - View as HTML
RESUME. RICHARD ALLEN BROWN. Richard Allen
Brown. PO Box 782. Kayenta, AZ 86033.
Home Telephone-520-697-3513. NAU Telephone-520-5234099. DOB: 03-10-77. SSN: 527-71 ...
dana.ucc.nau.edu/~rab39/RAB%20Resume.doc
This on-line resume, located earlier,
actually listed date of birth too!
Google: resume ssn site:.edu 2
resume
... 2843. DOB: 10-10-48 New Britain, CT 06050-4010. F:
(860) 832-3753.
SSN: 461-84-8245 H: (203) 740-7255 C: (203) 561-8674.
Education. Ph. ...
www.math.ccsu.edu/vaden-goad/resume.htm
This on-line resume, found earlier, also
listed date of birth!
Google: resume ssn site:.edu 3
Scot Lytle's Resume
Scot Patrick Lytle. Home: (301)-249-5330 2116 Blaz Court
School: (410)-455-1662
Upper Marlboro, MD 20772 SSN: 578-90-8915
OBJECTIVE. ...
userpages.umbc.edu/~slytle1/resume.html
The third resume did not have his DOB
listed.
anybirthday.com given a
name, provides a
birthday
Had
several hits
matching
name, but
only one in
his ZIP.
Finding Dates of Birth
Anybirthday.com tends to have information on
people over the age of 30. Younger people are
often not included.
Many other population registers can be used,
such as voter lists. Anybirthday.com is not he
only source!
Basic Information Necessary
For a Credit Card Application
Done.
Done.
Next...
• Name
• Social Security number
• Address
• Date of birth
• Mother’s maiden name
Strategy: if one can identify these fields for a person,
they have the basic information needed to acquire a
credit card in that person’s name. Therefore, we need
only demonstrate how this information can be obtained
on-line.
Publicly Available Birth Records
Not all states, but many consider birth records,
the kind of information included on a person’s
birth certificate in the United States, as publicly
available information.
A few states have gone further to provide this
information on-line.
In the United States, birth certificate information
tends to include the mother’s maiden name!
California on-line Birth Records
Results of search on ‘Jones’
Source: http://www.vitalsearch-ca.com/gen/_nonmembers/ca/_vitals/cabirths-nopsm.htm
Basic Information Necessary
For a Credit Card Application
Done.
Done.
Done.
• Name
• Social Security number
• Address
• Date of birth
• Mother’s maiden name
Strategy: if one can identify these fields for a person,
they have the basic information needed to acquire a
credit card in that person’s name. Therefore, we need
only demonstrate how this information can be obtained
on-line.
Resulting Concern
Done.
Done.
Done.
• Name
• Social Security number
• Address
• Date of birth
• Mother’s maiden name
Thousands of people are at risk!
Even if this is not the current means accounting
for the bulk of fraud related to new credit card
accounts, this is clearly a very serious and
growing threat!
Identity Angel –resumes
1. Locate on-line resumes
(using Filtered Searching)
2. Extract sensitive values
(using regular expressions)
3. Email subjects about their risks
L. Sweeney. AI Technologies to Defeat Identity Theft Vulnerabilities. AAAI Spring
Symposium on AI Technologies for Homeland Security, 2005.
(Updated version appearing in IEEE journal next month.)
http://privacy.cs.cmu.edu/dataprivacy/projects/idangel/index.html
Identity Angel –resume findings
1000 resume hits on Google using
fliteredSearch, revealed 150 resumes,
of which 140 (or 93%) had complete 9digit SSNs.
10 resumes had partial, invalid, or
some other country’s SSN.
L. Sweeney. AI Technologies to Defeat Identity Theft Vulnerabilities. AAAI Spring
Symposium on AI Technologies for Homeland Security, 2005.
http://privacy.cs.cmu.edu/dataprivacy/projects/idangel/index.html
Identity Angel –resume findings
In terms of combinations:
104 (or 69%) resumes
had {SSN, DOB};
105 (or 70%) had {SSN, email},
76 (or 51%) had {SSN, DOB, email}.
L. Sweeney. AI Technologies to Defeat Identity Theft Vulnerabilities. AAAI Spring
Symposium on AI Technologies for Homeland Security, 2005.
http://privacy.cs.cmu.edu/dataprivacy/projects/idangel/index.html
Identity Angel –resume findings
A single email message was sent to
each of the 105 people having {SSN,
email} alerting them to the risk.
Within a month, 42 (or 55% of all of
DBB) no longer had the information
publicly available.
A year later, 102 (or 68% of all of
DBA) no longer had the information
available. ``
L. Sweeney. AI Technologies to Defeat Identity Theft Vulnerabilities. AAAI Spring
Symposium on AI Technologies for Homeland Security, 2005.
http://privacy.cs.cmu.edu/dataprivacy/projects/idangel/index.html
Credit Card Transactions
At issuance,
credentials not verifiable
During use,
not verifiable with remote use
inadvertent copies of information
Person-specific criteria weak:
signature (picture or other) matching
card possession
Credit Card Transactions
At issuance,
credentials not verifiable
Traditional: credit card
During use,
application is issued,
not verifiable with remote
use
but the recipient
may
notinformation
be the correct
inadvertent copies of
person. The model
assumes
the recipient
Person-specific criteria
weak:
is other)
the only matching
person with
signature (picture or
knowledge of {name,
card possession
address, SSN, DOB}
Credit Card Transactions
At issuance,
credentials not verifiable
During use,
not verifiable with remote use
Traditional:
credit card
inadvertent copies of
information
use over Web does not
verify
recipient.
Person-specific criteria
weak:
Assumes
access
signature (picture or
other)limited
matching
to
card
number,
card possession
expiration date, etc.
Assumes address for
receipt of goods.
Credit Card Transactions
At issuance,
credentials not verifiable
During use,
not verifiable with remote use
inadvertent copies of information
Traditional: copies of
Person-specific criteria
weak:
relevant
information
forother)
use canmatching
be copied
signature (picture or
and impersonated.
card possession
Credit Card Transactions
At issuance,
credentials not verifiable
During use,
not verifiable with
inadvertent copies
Traditional: assumes
non-experts can easily
identify signature
remote
use
forgeries.
Attention to
of
information
even pictures is weak.
Person-specific criteria weak:
signature (picture or other) matching
card possession
Credit Card Transactions
At issuance,
credentials not verifiable
During use,
not verifiable with remote
useassumes
Traditional:
card
holder is in
inadvertent copies of
information
complete control of the
cardweak:
and its
Person-specific criteria
information.
signature (picture or
other) matching
card possession
Travel Documents
At issuance,
credentials not verifiable
During secondary use,
inadvertent copies of information
Person-specific criteria weak:
signature (picture or other) matching
card possession
This Talk
1.Identity Management Problems
2. Biometric Technologies
3. Applying Biometrics to Problems
4. Identity Phone Example
privacy.cs.cmu.edu
PL 107-56 SEC. 403 c)
S. 1749 [Patriot Act]
The Attorney General and the Secretary of State
jointly, through the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST), ….shall develop and
certify a technology standard that can be used
to verify the identity of persons applying for a US
visa or such persons seeking to enter the US
pursuant to a visa for the purposes of conducting
background checks, confirming identity, and
ensuring that a person has not received a visa
under a different name…..
Biometrics
Primary goal of biometrics is usually authentication
Fingerprints
RFID Implant
Iris scans
Retinal scans
DNA
Hand geometry
Voice
Behavioral
Palm print
Keyboard typing
new
Face
Signature
A biometric is a measurement of the person that is
specific to the person.
Iris Scanning
Iris and retina scans are the
most accurate of all biometric
techniques and, currently, the
most costly.
Iris scans analyze the features that exist in the colored
tissue surrounding the pupil which has more than 200
points that can be used for comparison, including rings,
furrows and freckles.
The scans use a regular video camera style and can be
done from even 2 feet away.
Retinal Scanning
Retinal scanning analyses the blood vessels located
at the back of the eye, reading its 400 unique points.
A person steps in front of a device, keeping head
perfectly still. Takes about 12 seconds.
Disadvantage: retina can become diseased
(cataracts), be fairly close to the machine
Hand Geometry
Source:
Arun Ross, Anil Jain and Sharat Pankanti,
biometrics.cse.msu.edu/hand_proto.html
Hands are not so unique, but one can use finger
length, thickness, and curvature for the purposes of
verification but not for identification.
Lab last term! Measurements from traces.
Vein Recognition in Hand
Source: Fujitsu, http://vn.fujitsu.com/news/BioAuTech.pdf
Verify a person’s identity by recognizing patterns of
blood vessels in the palm.
RFID
• Radio-frequency ID
• Passive RFID: device with no battery that
draws power from a radio-frequency field
• Power drives a processor that can
communicate back to a reader
• Used for product identification, payment
cards, animal tracking
• First use: Identification friend or foe (IFF) in
WWII
Courtesy: Michael Shamos
Shoplifting Tag
No data is sent. Only
presence is detected
Courtesy: Michael Shamos
How RFID Works
•
•
•
•
•
Tag enters RF field
RF signal powers tag
Tag transmits ID, plus data
Reader captures data
Reader sends data to
computer
• Computer determines action
• Computer instructs reader
• Reader transmits data to tag
Antenna
Tag
RFID
Reader
Computer
Courtesy: Michael Shamos
SOURCE: PHILIPS
Hitachi -chip
•
•
•
•
•
0.4 mm square
128-bit storage
Range: 1 foot
Embedded antenna
Small enough to put in currency
Courtesy: Michael Shamos
Verichip Human Implant
Courtesy: Michael Shamos
Verichip RFID Human Implant
Replace Social
Security number
with a unique
implanted
In the more general case personal
of identity management, identifier.
implanted RFID works
similar to naturally
occurring biometrics.
Biometrics
Primary goal of biometrics is usually authentication
Fingerprints
RFID Implant
Iris scans
Retinal scans
DNA
Hand geometry
Voice
new
Behavioral
Generally:
-always
carry
Palm
Keyboard
typing
-always
on (except RFID)
Face
Signature
-notofmodify
(except
A biometric is a measurement
the person
that is RFID)
specific to the person.
-uniquely associated
Consequences of Technologies
Once Widely Deployed
Impact of large, autonomous
biometric data collection
• Personal identified tracking
(across computers, web browsing,
auto use, etc.)
• No Fair Information Practices
• Impersonation possible,
but no new fingers!
• Law enforcement use
This Talk
1.Identity Management Problems
2. Biometric Technologies
3. Applying Biometrics to Problems
4. Identity Phone Example
privacy.cs.cmu.edu
Credit Card Transactions
Using Biometrics
At issuance,
credentials not verifiable
During use,
not verifiable with remote use
inadvertent copies of information
Person-specific criteria weak:
signature (picture or other) matching
card possession
Biometric-based encryption or hash value
Solved, not a problem
Problems remain
Credit Card Transactions
Biometrics v. Traditional
At issuance,
credentials not verifiable
Biometric: requires the
Duringregistration
use,
original
of
verifiable
thenot
biometric
to bewith
correct.
Not so easy!
inadvertent
copies
Traditional: credit card
application is issued,
remote
use
but the recipient
may
notinformation
be the correct
of
person. The model
assumes
the recipient
Person-specific criteria
weak:
is other)
the only matching
person with
signature (picture or
knowledge of {name,
card possession
address,
SSN,
DOB}
Biometric-based
encryption
or hash
value
Solved, not a problem
Problems remain
Credit Card Transactions
Biometrics v. Traditional
At issuance,
credentials not verifiable
During use,
not verifiable with remote use
Biometric:
only credit
Traditional:
credit card
inadvertent
copies of
information
card information, not
use over Web does not
the
biometric is used.
verify
recipient.
Person-specific
criteria
weak:
Assumes
access
signature (picture or
other)limited
matching
to
card
number,
card possession
expiration
date,
etc.
Biometric-based encryption or hash value
Assumes
address for
Solved,
not a problem
receipt
of goods.
Problems
remain
Credit Card Transactions
Biometrics v. Traditional
At issuance,
credentials
not verifiable
Biometric:
far superior!
Traditional: assumes
non-experts can easily
During use,
identify signature
forgeries.use
Attention to
not verifiable with remote
even
pictures is weak.
inadvertent copies of
information
Assumes card is in
possession.
Person-specific criteria
weak:
signature (picture or other) matching
card possession
Biometric-based encryption or hash value
Solved, not a problem
Problems remain
Travel Documents
At issuance,
credentials not verifiable
During secondary use,
inadvertent copies of information
Person-specific criteria weak:
signature (picture or other) matching
card possession
Biometric-based encryption or hash value
Solved, not a problem
Problems remain
This Talk
1.Identity Management Problems
2. Biometric Technologies
3. Applying Biometrics to Problems
4. Identity Phone Example
privacy.cs.cmu.edu
Sweeney Identity Phone
new
Issued at birth and remains with
a person until death.
Special set of phone numbers
that can be used like Social
Security numbers.
A special mobile phone that includes:
Phone capability to send/receive calls
Biometric readers: fingerprint, camera
GPS (location)
Recognition software: voice, fingerprint, face
Sweeney Identity Phone
Sample Sessions
• Issue phone number like SSN for matching and
storing.
• Want to verify a person facing you, phone their #
and check GPS location.
• Want to authenticate a person facing you, phone
their #, check GPS location, and verify using
fingerprint reader.
• Make a credit card purchase: merchant sends their
phone# to credit card company, buyer authenticates
and approves using buyer phone.
Credit Card Transactions
Identity Phone v. Biometrics
At issuance,
credentials not verifiable
During use,
not verifiable with remote use
inadvertent copies of information
Person-specific criteria weak:
signature (picture or other) matching
card possession
Biometric-based encryption or hash value (right)
Sweeney Identity Phone (left)
Solved, not a problem
Problems remain
Credit Card Transactions
Identity Phone v. Biometrics
At issuance,
credentials not verifiable
Identity
Phone:
Biometric: requires the
During
use,
registration
is not at with
original
registration
of
not
verifiable
remote
use
card issuance but at
the biometric to be
of information
birth. inadvertent copies
correct.
Not so easy!
(Of course,
no forgivingcriteria weak:
Person-specific
or forgetting!)
signature (picture or other) matching
card possession
Biometric-based encryption or hash value (right)
Sweeney Identity Phone (left)
Solved, not a problem
Problems remain
Credit Card Transactions
Identity Phone v. Biometrics
At issuance,
credentials not verifiable
During use,
not verifiable with remote use
copies
of information
Identityinadvertent
Phone:
Biometric:
only credit
authenticates
person criteria
card information,
not
Person-specific
weak:
and vendor! Vendor
the biometric is used.
signature
(picture
or
other)
matching
phones credit card
possession
company,card
which
in turn
Biometric-based
encryption or hash value (right)
calls customer
for
Sweeney Identity Phone (left)
authorization of Solved, not a problem
charge.
Problems remain
Credit Card Transactions
Identity Phone v. Biometrics
At Phone:
issuance,
Identity
same
Biometric: far superior
credentials
as biometric
alone! not verifiable
over traditional
approach!
During use,
not verifiable with remote use
inadvertent copies of information
Person-specific criteria weak:
signature (picture or other) matching
card possession
Biometric-based encryption or hash value (right)
Sweeney Identity Phone (left)
Solved, not a problem
Problems remain
Travel Documents
Identity Phone v. Biometrics
At issuance,
credentials not verifiable
During secondary use,
inadvertent copies of information
Person-specific criteria weak:
signature (picture or other) matching
card possession
Biometric-based encryption or hash value (right)
Sweeney Identity Phone (left)
Solved, not a problem
Problems remain
Identity Phone Summary
The purpose of the Identity Phone is not
to sell phones but to show how
combinations of biometrics, location
information and authoritative issuance
can work together to solve some key
identity management problems.
Addressed in This Talk
This talk will examine the nature of
identity management problems and
examine roles biometrics can play
along with accompanying policy or
additional technology. An integrated
solution (“identity phone”) will be
presented as a working example.
privacy.cs.cmu.edu/dataprivacy/talks/CACR-05-11.html
This Talk
1.Identity Management Problems
2. Biometric Technologies
3. Applying Biometrics to Problems
4. Identity Phone Example
privacy.cs.cmu.edu