Harrison Hartsough
PLSC 318: Constitutional Law I
Dr. Deutsch
3/20/14
Hammer v. Dagenhart
NATURE OF CASE
The appealing party, representing appellant William Hammer, sought relief from the Court in the form of
having the decision enjoining the implementation of the Federal Child Labor Act by a lower Court
overturned. This case came to the Court through its appellate jurisdiction over lower court decisions
through a writ of certiorari. The case concerns itself with the commerce power of the federal government,
as well as the Tenth Amendment and reserved state powers.
FACTS
With a growing concern for the lack of government controls over business practices and the growing
progressive interests within the US, Congress in 1916 enacted the Federal Child Labor Act. This Act
prohibited shipments of factory products made by children under the age of 14, or by children between
the ages of 14 to 16 who worked more than 8 hours a day.
The Executive Committee of Southern Cotton Manufacturers, headed by Chairman David Clark, sought
to have the bill declared unconstitutional. Clark decided to bring suit against the Fidelity Manufacturing
Company. The suit itself was brought on behalf of Roland Dagenhart (D), appellee and defendant in the
case before the Supreme Court. Dagenhart’s (D) sons had both been affected by the new law. His elder
son could now only work 8 hours, while his younger son could not work at all. Clark, having found
lawyers whose political views suited his own, filed an injunction against the company the Dagenharts (D)
worked for and against William Hammer (P), a US attorney. Hammer (P) was appellant in the case
before the Supreme Court.
Before the Supreme Court, Hammer’s (P) counsel, John W. Davis, would argue that individual states’
rights to regulate business based on police powers were irrelevant, and that Congress was acting within its
bounds. The commerce clause, he asserted, was being used as a regulation. The movement and flow of
goods towards a final sale was, in his opinion, an essential part of interstate commerce.
Giving a far broader argument, Dagenhart’s (D) counsel argued that the framers had intended the
interstate commerce clause to eliminate problems within the Articles of Confederation. They argued that
the purpose of the act was ultimately not to regulate commerce but to exercise a police power that the
federal government was not given. The “pretransportation” of goods did not fall under the commerce
clause. Finally, appellee’s counsel would put forth the view that child labor and its effects, however
negative, were local, and did not fall within the purview of the federal government.
Upon hearing the arguments of both sides, a North Carolina District Court ruled in favor of Dagenhart
(D). This stayed enforcement of the act.
ISSUES
Does the plenary power of the commerce clause grant Congress the ability to regulate the transportation
of goods that have been produced by child labor, even if this entails more of a moral consideration than
one of interstate commerce?
DECISION
No. The commerce clause does not grant Congress the ability to regulate the transportation of goods that
have been produced by child labor. Its power does not extend into this area, as this concerns itself more
with the police powers of the individual states.
HOLDING
Majority - Justice Day, Joined by Justices White, Pitney, Van Devanter, and McReynolds
Justice Day’s opinion at its outset takes into account the suggestion made by appellee that the framers did
not intend for Congress’s power vested in the commerce clause to extend to areas not related to the
nation’s economic concerns. He states: “the grant of power to Congress over the subject of interstate
commerce was to enable it to regulate such commerce, and not to give it authority to control the states in
their exercise of the police power over local trade and manufacture.” Clearly, the integrity of the Tenth
Amendment is to be respected, even if this means overriding the wishes of a more unitary federal
government.
Moreover, Day takes this idea further, adding that states must be sovereign in the area of their police
powers, lest we risk the “preservation of our institutions.” But he does not believe that it is the Court’s
duty to call into question the motivations Congress had. In this way, the question of whether Congress’s
actions and their concern for morality are not considered, at least not insofar as it inherently works against
the commerce clause. He continues what was established in Knight by considering whether or not the law
is regulating manufacture rather than commerce itself, while also asserting that it extends beyond the
authority the federal government is given over the states.
In his decision, Day considered especially the fact that the law moves too far into the police authorities of
the states. He also considers the fact that these were not products being transported, but that Congress
was attempting to alter the course of how and who can manufacture them. From this, he reasons that the
act cannot stand as it is repugnant to the Constitution. His principle of law appears twofold. First, the
law goes beyond the commerce powers given to Congress. Congress is not regulating the commerce, or
act of shipping, these products. Rather, Congress seeks to control the conditions within which they are
made. This is inconsistent with the definition of commerce. Second, it violates the Tenth
Amendment. Public welfare and health are left up to the states.
Dissent - Justice Holmes, Joined by Justices McKenna, Brandeis, and Clarke.
Justice Holmes considers extremely relevant that fact that these products were to be shipped across state
lines. He makes the point that crossing a border constitutes interstate commerce. He also stresses the
importance of the “national welfare” which may not be understood than “some self-seeking state.”
Holmes, then, takes into consideration Marshall’s definition of commerce as a plenary power.
EDITOR’S ANALYSIS
If we consider decisions such as Champion, we must ask if the Court’s choosing to ignore Congress’s
motivations in passing law is the right choice. Considering morality and consistent application, if
Congress were to prohibit alcohol again today, we would no doubt overturn it because it constituted an
improperly based decision; one arrived at based on the morals of a faction being forced on the nation as a
whole. While its guise may be one of economic concern, perhaps for the detrimental effects addiction has
on one’s pocketbook, it would be a decision based in morality at the federal level. The suppression of an
alleged evil is an issue both in Champion and in Hammer. But it does not appear to have been applied
consistently. To be sure, Champion presents a more definable area unconcerned with
production. Perhaps that is why the Court ruled as it did. But in that case as well it is possible that
Congress sought to legislate on national morality with the commerce clause. At some point, we will have
to answer the question of just how plenary the commerce power is. Can Congress use it to suppress evils
it perceives within society? What slippery slope does this present? Considering HUAC and what we
have learned about the investigatory powers Congress possesses, adding the commerce clause to their
ability to legislate on their perception of evil is a frightening thought. This embraces precedent, the
Court’s reasoning in the case, and even its political ramifications.
Child labor is an issue that takes on a national scope and there is no doubt that this decision had a widely
felt political impact. While it certainly did not intend this, the Court allowed child labor to continue in the
US. The Court’s decision restrained Congress. Although judicial activism has been associated more with
the likes of Chief Justice Earl Warren, in this instance the Court did not present deference to Congress as
the elected body of government. Judicial activism, oddly enough, can take on overtones of both
conservatism and liberalism.
Another issue that deals specifically with the legal reasoning presented in the case is that at its outset, this
suit could be regarded as collusive. The original suit was filed against the company which the Dagenharts
worked for, a company that also wanted to see the repeal of the act. Although William Hammer was
added to the suit, the fact that two parties to the case held the same interests and sought the same outcome
can still lead the case to be seen as collusive. Although it may be a legitimate legal operation, this should
have been called into question and was not. The company Dagenhart worked for was cooperating while
also being an opposing party in a suit. Undoubtedly counsel for Dagenhart wanted to have their
cooperation, but the means for this may have been questionable, especially considering they would likely
have gotten it anyway.