Jordan Noonan
Andrew Lee
Eric Rodriguez
Mike Long
Thesis

The IAEA and the nuclear nonproliferation treaty represent steps in the
right direction for global nuclear
safeguards. These protections, however,
are outdated and ineffective in preventing
the proliferation of nuclear weaponry. We
must overhaul current anti-proliferation
strategies in order to mitigate these
security risks.
The IAEA

The International Atomic
Energy Agency
– Created in 1957, as the
“Atoms for Peace”
organization, within the
UN.

3 Main Pillars: (Oversee
Compliance with NPT)
– Safety and Security
– Science and Technology
– Safeguards and Verification
The IAEA (cont.)

STRENGTHS

WEAKNESSES
-
“Grand Bargain”
Creating a channel for cooperative
global nuclear research
1968 signing of NPT
1996 Test Ban Treaty
1990’s 1st Nuclear Weapons Free
Zone, in Latin America
Former Republics of Russia
relinquish all nuclear weapons
back into Russian control.
1993 South Africa voluntarily
dismantled entire Nuclear wepons
program.
-
Inadequate verification and
enforcement provisions.
Lack of universal export control
system
No Time Table for Disarmament.
Allows members to withdraw from
the treaty without penalty.
Four states with Nuclear weapons
not signitories of NPT; Isreal,
Pakistan, India, North Korea.
-
-
-
-
The Nuclear non-proliferation treaty

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is an international treaty
designed to limit the spread of nuclear weapons.
– opened for signature on July 1, 1968.
– There are currently 189 countries part of the treaty, five of which have
nuclear weapons: the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, and
China (the permanent members of the UN Security Council).

3 Pillars of the Treaty; (1) Non-Proliferation, (2) Disarmament, (3) Peaceful
use of Nuclear Technology.

Only four nations with nuclear weapons are not signatories: India, Israel,
Pakistan and North Korea.
– India and Pakistan both possess and have openly tested nuclear bombs.
Israel has had a secretive policy regarding its own nuclear weapons
program. North Korea ratified the treaty, violated it, and later withdrew.
The Khan Network



Abdul Qadeer Khan, the
"Godfather" of Pakistan's
nuclear weapons
program.
Prime Minister Ali Bhutto
appointed Khan to run
Pakistan’s nuclear
research program.
By 1988, he completed 5
underground nuclear
tests.
The Khan Network (cont.)
Countries associated with: Iraq, Iran, North
Korea, Libya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Sudan,
Malaysia, Indonesia, Algeria, Kuwait, Burma, &
Abu Dhabi
 Also linked to Osama bin Laden & Al Qaeda
 web of sponsors and suppliers, have linked
companies and banks in Europe, groups in Asia
and the Middle East have provided high-tech
equipment and financing for nuclear weapons
programs.

Soviet Union Nukes
the Soviet Union had 18,000 nuclear weapons at the height of the Cold
War.
 a large number are unaccounted for, unsure as to how many are actually
missing.
 Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) 1993 designed to destroy nuclear
weapons and increase security in the satellite countries of Russia that
housed nuclear weapons but it is not enough.
 almost impossible to keep into account of every single nuclear weapon from
the Soviet Union and on the market.

Dirty Bombs
weaker version of a nuclear bomb
 made from radioactive waste
 easier to penetrate civilian nuclear waste facilities than a weapons facilities
 not a weapon of mass destruction but a weapon of mass disruption

Real Threat of Nuclear Attack?

Construction of a bomb
would take up to four
months.

Size of technical team would
have to be immense.

Constant maintenance of
nukes takes a lot of
resources.

Obtaining the materials
necessary for making a
bomb is difficult to achieve
without arousing suspicion.

Obtaining nuclear fuel is
almost exclusively available
to large states.

Rogue states can bar IGO’s
like the IAEA from
inspecting their nuclear
facilities.

Terrorists can still create
lots of dirty bombs or obtain
nuclear weapons and deploy
them rapidly.

Very little deterrence for
terrorists in using nuclear
weapons.
Nuclear Weapons and Terrorist
Organizations

Acquisition of Weapons/Materials
– Purchase off the black-market or rogue states
– Seizure of a nuclear stock pile by force or theft

Terrorist Organizations
– al-Qaeda
– Hezbollah
Nuclear Terrorism

States Linked to
Terror Organizations:
Libya, Iran, Pakistan
Syria and North Korea
-Iran; links to Hezbollah
anti-Israeli rhetoric
-Pakistan; Instability in
the nation of alQeada’s operations
base

Terrorist
Organizations as a
Threat
– Doctrine of MAD no
longer shared
– Organizational wealth
in finance
– Validation of terrorists’
political agendas
through “the bomb”
Thesis

The IAEA and the nuclear nonproliferation treaty represent steps in the
right direction for global nuclear
safeguards. These protections, however,
are outdated and ineffective in preventing
the proliferation of nuclear weaponry. We
must overhaul current anti-proliferation
strategies in order to mitigate these
security risks.
Can Proliferation be Stopped?

Realist
– Rational deterrence
theory.
– Mutually assured
destruction (MAD).
– Proliferation =
international stability.

Neo-liberal
Institutionalism
– Domestic determinants
 Economic and political
– Role of international
institutions
 NPT, IAEA, and U.N.
New Anti-Proliferation Strategies

The Graham Allison Plan
– No “loose” nukes
 Bolster security not only of
nuclear weapons, but also
civilian nuclear material.
– No new nascent nukes
 Barr production of new
uranium and plutonium.
– No new nuclear weapons
 Halt the production of any
new nuclear weapons
from current states and
prevent new nuclear
states.
Anti-Proliferation Strategies (cont.)

Contain North Korea
and Iran
– If North Korea and/or
Iran obtain capable
nuclear technology,
regional arms races
could spell the
dissolution of the NPT.
 South Korea, Japan,
Middle East
 Use economic and
political pressures.
Works Cited





Albright, David. "Uncovering the Nuclear Black Market: Working
Toward." Institute for Nuclear Materials Management. Institute
for Nuclear Materials Management (INMM)45th Annual
Meeting. Orlando, FL. 02 July 2004. 05 Apr. 2008
<http://www.isisonline.org/publications/southasia/nuclear_black_market.html>.
Cooper, Mary H. "Nuclear Proliferation and Terorism: Can "Rogue"
States and Terrorists Aquire Nuclear Weapons?" Congressional
Quarterly 14 (2004): 299-319. 05 Apr. 2008
<http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/cqr_proliferation.pdf
>.
"Nuclear Issues: Facts At a Glance." CDI. 04 Fe
b. 2003. Center for Defense Information. 05 Apr. 2008
<http://www.cdi.org/nuclear/facts-at-a-glance-pr.cfm>.
Traynor, Ian. "Nuclear Chief Tells of Black Market in Bomb
Equipment." The Guardian. 26 Jan. 2004. 05 Apr. 2008
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/jan/26/iantraynor>.