A complementary Understanding of International Nuclear Security Instruments:
Focusing on Physical Protection and Criminalising Related Offences
By Onur Güven
The collection of international instruments on nuclear security has been developed
relatively recently and is faced with certain challenges. For example, neither the
CPPNM (Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material) nor the
CPNNMNF (Amendment of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material) have reached universality. In case of CPPNMNF, it hasn’t even been
ratified by two thirds of the State Parties to the CPPNM.
Besides, the collection of international instruments on nuclear security is not a
holistic system. They have various scopes and definitions in use whereby it becomes
challenging to correctly adopt these instruments into national policies. There is a
risk that non-state actors may exploit the weakest chain in the international
network as their base or target for a criminal offence. In addition, many of the
instruments adopted by the IAEA in the Nuclear Security Series are not always
suitable to function as instruments like treaties do in the legislative sense.
Finally, UNSC 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004) are not vital instruments and do not
have the jurisdiction to adopt legislative measures which fall within the mandate of
the General Assembly. They are a pleasant reinforcement to the regime on nuclear
security and a means to measure and align support by UN Member States, but they
could expose weaknesses of nuclear security, should the support on implementing
these resolutions weaken and should States interpret the resolutions strictly, using
the textual and historical limitations of the UN Charter.
Much more work needs to be done for nuclear security and there is a need to bring
all these instruments together to establish a global network of regime.
Coherence, Fragmentation and Exclusions in the International Legal Regime to
Counter Nuclear Terrorisms
By Matthew Hoisington
For fear of nuclear terrorism and its unique transnational nature, concerted action
has been taken at the international level. Legal instruments, such as the
International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT),
the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (and its 2005
amendment), Security Council resolution 1540, and other legal instruments such as
Non-Proliferation Treaty have been adopted. Specially, ICSANT was drafted
expressly to address the threat of nuclear terrorism, and it provides a formally
coherent system of rules to counter the particular issue of nuclear terrorism as well
as the mechanism to enhance functional coordination between the different
prominent actors who are seized with addressing the threat.
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However, the fragmentation of this international legal regime makes the Convention
difficult to be an organizing force. The implementation of these legal instruments at
the national level is also questionable.
For these problems, preliminary suggestions might include amending ICSANT’s
provisions to allow for increased practical cooperation between the various
prominent actors, particularly on the issue of prevention and threat-monitoring,
operationalizing article 20 of ICSANT as a vehicle for convening formal meetings of
States Parties and undertaking a thorough review of the domestic implementation
of ICSANT’s obligations. It will also be useful to obtain a clear understanding from
representatives of State Parties and the relevant specialized agencies on the utility
of ICSANT as the central instrument to counter nuclear terrorism.
The fragmentation in the legal order has created fragmentation operationally,
which, although not without certain advantages, necessitates effective institutional
methods of cooperation. Particularly, international administrative law can be put to
use to effectively organize the administrative and interactive functions of the
different actors. Putting in place the bare minimum of administrative structures,
such as secretariats, mechanisms for continuous review and mandated lines of
communication, and combining them with a generally applicable set of operating
principles, could, if properly planned and executed, achieve this objective.
In addition, a better understanding of the juridical justifications offered by terrorists
in their pursuit of nuclear terrorism and related activities must be achieved. This
will enable the international community to address one important aspect of the
conditions conducive to nuclear terrorism, namely, the use and issue of juridical
reasoning by terrorists to justify clearly odious acts.
Partial Nuclear Disarmament Measures and the Step-by-Step Approach
By Michael Spies
The step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament continues to be considered the
only possible way forward, despite major changes in the international security
environment since the end of the Cold War. The prevailing notion of this approach
was formulated back in 1957, at a time when the nuclear powers were actively
conducting nuclear tests, building up fissile materials and introducing newer and
more capable nuclear weapon systems. Since then, the nuclear-weapon States have
ceased the production of fissile materials, observed an indefinite moratorium on
nuclear testing, and greatly reduced their stockpiles of nuclear weapons.
Yet, the step-by-step approach, which envisages the sequential conclusion of
separate multilateral instruments to accomplish to above-mentioned objectives, is
still considered the only way forward. Though realist concepts remain popular both
in academia and especially amongst policy-makers, the influence of domestic
military and scientific institutions better explains why disarmament has been
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perpetually forestalled. While there is nothing new in this perspective, it remains
valid despite never captured the attention of mainstream policy-makers.
This perspective is relevant because it points to how the current impasse on nuclear
disarmament might be overcome. It may be useful, for instance, to revive early
proposals for reducing military expenditures and armed forces, particularly as the
UN’s efforts in this area has recently been limited to increasing transparency. Civil
society has been promoting the humanitarian approach, which could be useful if it
can address domestic influences which do not have an interest in disarmament.
In conclusion, there is a need to develop a better theoretical understanding of the
role of domestic institutions in politics. There may be significant scope for this
within the context of current leader-based theories.
A Rights-Based Approach to Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation
By Mutony Mubiala
A competitive approach to Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (NDNP) is
prevalent but it is problematic. Over two decades, the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has been promoting the application
of a rights-based approach to UN international cooperation programmes and
activities, including in the field of peace and security. Integrating the human rightsbased approach contributes to a shift from competitive approach to NDNP.
States possessing nuclear weapons are categorized into two categories: democratic
weapon States and non-democratic weapon States. For democratic weapon States,
disarmament and non-proliferation policy should be implemented at the national
level and the serious and massive consequences of use of a nuclear weapon should
be stressed as a massive violation of human rights. These States are party to the
Human Rights Treaties, which will protect their population from such violations.
In addition, unilateral measures may encourage other countries to take the same
measures. When Gorbachev came into power, the USSR was facing an economic
crisis, and he took unilateral measures, withdrawing nuclear arsenals from Eastern
Europe. Unilateral and a confidence-building approach is important for NDNP. UN
Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon addressed the Monterey Institute for International
Studies with the following: “Be a first mover. Don't look to others or to your
neighbours to start disarmament and arms control measures.”
The Challenge of Non-State Actors in a State-Based Regime
Fiona Simpson
Regime theory was created in the 1970s and many of the political theories in the
80s were about the regime; for example, in 1982, the journal International Relations
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was entirely dedicated to regime theory. Once the regime is established, there was
not much room for discussion on why a regime occurs in the first place and why it
matters. After that, a neo-liberal approach was introduced to theory, which focuses
less on power but more on cooperation.
At the end of the 80s, the rise of the cognitivist’s approach influenced regime theory.
This approach is concerned more with dynamism and the process of how the regime
is made. According to this theory, the regime constantly needs to be changed.
Since the 1990s, regime theory has fallen out of favor. A non-nuclear proliferation
regime is a counterpoint to all of these previous regimes. The first example was
India’s nuclear weapons test in 1974. India was not part of the NPT. International
reaction to this test varied and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was formed to
check international nuclear proliferation. What was shocking to the Western world
politically was the nuclear capability of developing countries.
The revelation of Iran’s nuclear programme in 1991 lead IAEA to do an entire
verification, giving the agency a role in the regime, from accounting to verification.
In 1997, an additional protocol was added to the NPT and the verifying approach
was put in place.
The 1981 bombing by Israel revealed that Iraq was developing a nuclear
programme contrary to the IAEA recommendations, but nothing really happened
afterwards. Cluster events happened in the early 2000s, such as 9.11, the Iraq War
and Libya’s nuclear development, yet little development in political theory has been
seen since the last change.
Academic theories of the regime hold up the reality of how a non-nuclear
proliferation regime works in practice, and practitioners should cooperate more
with academia. Understanding how a regime changes and strengthening the regime
rather than undermining it may help us prevent future conflicts.
Mark MacKew
“Deterring the ‘Undeterrable’”
Deterrence theory was developed during the Cold War but it can still be used today
for extreme terrorist organizations. Deterrence can be categorized into two types;
deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial. For deterrence theory to work,
we have to have certain conditions. Most importantly, we have to assume or
presume that the other actor is rational and one must have leverage over something
the other actor values. The more these conditions are met, the more the theory
works.
Deterrence by punishment is losing value in academia and in policy-making. Its
validity was questioned even during the Cold War. On the other hand, deterrence by
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denial seems more valid and supported by the US government. It is based on the
assumption that if both actors are rational, the adversary is able to formulate a costbenefit analysis of their actions. This deterrence can be realized by increasing the
perceived costs of the value item or decreasing the perceived benefits of the value
item.
As for the tools of the UN and the global system against nuclear terrorism, there is
UNSCR 1540, which is universal and gives incentives to States to achieve the goal of
the resolution. Others are the G8 Global Partnership against the spread of weapons
and materials of mass destruction, and Zangger Committee and Non Suppliers
Group, which work well with UNSCR 1540.
For the future of deterrence and the UN’s role, it is important to develop nonnuclear security, which assists non-nuclear States and develop States in forming and
increasing their security, especially in terms of supply-chain security. It is also
necessary to understand the complexity of different systems, such as law
enforcement, border patrol, finances, as well as to anticipate new risks through
macro-prudential policy and continue to form policy with deterrence as an
objective.
The Humanitarian Initiative to Non-Nuclear Proliferation
Junko Hirakawa
The total elimination of chemical weapons is almost impossible and it’s not even
covered by the Chemical Weapons Convention. About 2 years ago, one chemical
component actually killed around 40,000 people within 24 hours, causing extensive
air and marine pollution. The same chemical component damaged another
community last year. Since 1990, civil society has been calling for the total ban on
this chemical component, but so far no State has created a law actually banning it.
This is actually an analogy and the chemical component discussed here is water –
but as you know, no one can really prohibit water- but this analogy is a good
example to question the State’s ability to completely control anything.
The outcome of 2010 NPT RevCon expresses its concern at the catastrophic
humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and appeals to Member
States to comply with applicable international law. However, can we really eliminate
nuclear weapons because of the humanitarian impact they may cause?
In fact, the Humanitarian Initiative promoted at the Oslo conference in 2013 as the
consequence of 2010 NPT RevCon is not the first time when the international
community tries to prohibit nuclear weapon in light of its humanitarian
consequences. In 1996, the advisory opinion of the ICJ, “Legality of the Threat or Use
of Nuclear Weapons”, says “the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be
contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in
particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law” but it implies that the use of
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nuclear weapons may be legal if it’s exercised as self-defense, and it did not really
touch upon the legality of nuclear threat. But the new development in the outcome
of the 2010 NPT RevCon is that it omitted the word “threat” and condemns only
“any use of nuclear weapons.” You can interpret it as saying that nuclear deterrence
is permitted. Even Pope John Paul II mentioned that nuclear deterrence could be
morally acceptable in his speech in 1982. So the question lies in whether the
Humanitarian Initiative is logical enough to achieve what its promoters want,
nuclear non-proliferation.
Red Line Politics: Why Do States Place Thresholds on Foreign Nuclear
Programs?
Todd C. Robinson
On September 27, 2012, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu identified a
nuclear red line for Iran that, if crossed, may lead to the use of military force to
prevent Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. Israel’s red line for Iran would be the
enrichment of uranium beyond the 90% threshold typically considered necessary
for the production of uranium-based nuclear weapons. Shortly before this
pronouncement, the Obama administration also stated that they would not allow
Iran to manufacture nuclear weapons but stopped short of publicly stating a
threshold beyond which Iran would not be allowed to cross.
Even if the United States or anyone else places a red line, it remains unclear how
much it is able to influence Iran’s decision to develop nuclear weapons or not. Under
the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran is guaranteed the
right to enrich uranium to any level they desire, as long as it is not used in the
production of nuclear weapons. The “dual-use problem”- the fact that virtually all of
the technologies required to produce nuclear weapons may be obtained as a part,
byproduct, or under the guise of other nuclear technologies – makes it difficult to
determine whether the State is developing a nuclear weapon or not. Placing a red
line may also strengthen Iran’s resolve to actually produce nuclear weapons.
This research attempts to develop an understanding of whether the placement of
red lines in general, or specific types of red lines, makes it more or less likely that
the target State acquiesces to the sender’s demands. In addition, it will seek to
develop an understanding of the various factors that may influence whether States,
and the United States in particular, place formal nuclear red lines when proliferation
by another State is suspected. The research first reviews the extant literature on
bargaining, international negotiations, and nuclear proliferation, then turns to a
brief review of the literature on red lines before moving on to an explanation of our
new approach to the empirical study of red lines, which includes a detailed
theoretical argument on the logic of red line creation and placement. Next, it tests
the theory using a focused comparison of a select number of cases. Finally, it
concludes with a discussion of our findings and the implications of the research for
both the academic and policy communities.
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The Nuclear Suppliers Group
Isabelle Anstey
This research aims to question why the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) exists: what
factors led to its creation, why did it take the form it did, and why did it behave the
way it did. The NSG is an informal, non-binding ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ by a group
of States to enact certain domestic legislation. It has no foundation in international
law and has no way to be monitored. There is no obligatory reporting, verification
or record of successes or failures. Nevertheless, it is credited with introducing and
later improving the level of control exercised over sales of sensitive nuclear
technology, the benefit of non-proliferation efforts. The informal, secretive, ad hoc
nature of the group is a key feature of both its success and its limitations. Therefore
understanding why it has developed the way it has is crucial.
There are a number of key explanations competing for primacy suggested by
different theoretical approaches and studies into similar organizations. Some factors
bring pressure to bear from outside forces: commerce, politics, and legitimacy.
There are then internal factors inherent to the Group itself: membership,
technology, and non-proliferation. These six factors will form the analytical
framework of this research. What pressures they bring to bear, how they are
treated, the way they interact and how and when individual factors dominate will
bring a powerful understanding to the nature and actions of the NSG.
Has the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) lost its relevance?
The case of North Korea and Iran
Maryam Kamali
The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is still generally regarded as the centerpiece of
the nuclear non-proliferation regime. However, recent nuclear proliferation by
some Member States of the NPT has led to renewed criticism of the Treaty. The two
pillars of the NPT, namely non-proliferation among non-nuclear-weapon States and
the obligation to eliminate nuclear arsenals among nuclear-weapon-States, may be
in danger of crumbling.
One shortcoming of the NPT is that while it proscribes non-nuclear member States
from acquiring nuclear weapons, it has yet to deal with non-signatory States and
their ability to acquire nuclear weapons. Other weaknesses of the NPT include the
ability of Member States to withdraw from the Treaty easily, such as the case of
North Korea’s withdrawal in 2003. In addition, there is a tension between the
ability of members of the NPT to pursue peaceful nuclear energy use, while at the
same time empowering them to get close to developing or acquiring nuclear
weapons, as is the suspicion with Iran.
Despite its shortcomings, it would be hard for the international community to
abolish the NPT as it would be extremely difficult for 190 countries to sit together
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and agree on a new nuclear disarmament treaty. Therefore, the best hope for the
international community is to amend the NPT to make it stronger. Other steps for
strengthening the NPT would be for nuclear weapon States to make clear and
binding statements to non-nuclear weapon States of the non-use of nuclear weapons
against them if such States are members of the NPT. Another idea is that if a State
violated its safeguards agreement prior to withdrawal from NPT, it should be
punished for that non-compliance even once it has completely withdrawn from the
treaty. The IAEA could also help incorporate the non-NPT States into the system as
much as possible by signing project-specific safeguards agreements with them. It is
also necessary to pursue more forcefully the requirement that nuclear weapon
States disarm for the treaty to have legitimacy.
The Iranian Nuclear Issue: Ongoing Stalemate and Possible Ways Out
Xiaoning Huang
The Iranian nuclear issue is extremely complex and can be examined from many
different perspectives. From a legal standpoint, Iranians say it’s their right under the
NPT to have peaceful nuclear technology and there is a debate as to whether the
IAEA exceeds its mandate regarding Iran. There is also a question regarding
whether the relevant Security Council resolutions against Iran should prevail the
NPT. From a technical standpoint, there is no consensus on whether Iran has
nuclear weapons or not and there is disagreement among the IAEA and Member
States on how far away Iran is from getting nuclear weapons. In political terms, Iran
accuses the international community of politicizing its nuclear programme and
using a double standard to address its nuclear programme. The Iranian nuclear
issue has serious implications for international peace and security and the most
talked-about risk is the possible military attacks by Israel and/or the US on Iran’s
nuclear facility.
To address deep-rooted suspicions about Iran’s nuclear programme, the
international community has been employing a dual-track approach: on one hand,
while seeking a negotiated political solution with Iran, the P5+1 impose a wide
range of sanctions to force Iran to the negotiating table; on the other, sanctions are
reversible if the conditions set by the P5+1 are met. However, despite
unprecedented sanctions on Iran, little progress has been made on the political
front.
The possible ways out for the Iran’s nuclear problem includes: 1) Iran giving up its
nuclear programme or obtaining nuclear weapons [unlikely]; 2) the status quo
[unsustainable]; 3) A Middle East free of WMDs [unlikely]; 4) military solution
[cannot be ruled out but with devastating consequences]; 5) political solution [likely
but difficult: the key is US/Iran direct talks.]
There are high expectations for Dr. Rouhani’s presidency. He is a moderate cleric
and a former nuclear negotiator known as the “Diplomat Sheikh.” However,
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questions remain as to whether the Supreme Leader delegates sufficient authority
for Dr. Rouhani to cut a deal with the US and whether the US is really ready for
direct talks with Iran.
The Future of the Weapons-of-Mass-Destruction-Free Zone in the Middle East:
Challenges and Opportunities
Mina Rizk
Even forty years after the first initiative to create a Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone
(NWFZ) in the Middle East, the efforts to create such a zone today are still centered
on the same regional security question. However, the fast-paced changes occurring
in the Middle East have multiplied the political dynamics and augmented the
challenges to reach a disarmament agreement, especially since these changes are
closely related to the main stakeholders of the initiative, namely the Arab States,
Iran and Israel. Understanding the development of the Weapons-of-MassDestruction-Free Zone (WMDFZ) in Middle East initiative, and identifying the
interests of it stakeholders verify that the current changes in the Middle East
present both challenges and opportunities that the stakeholders and international
co-sponsors should exploit in order to reach a primary set of guidelines for the
WMDFZ framework.
As for the policy recommendations for the international co-sponsors, the postponed
Helsinki Conference should be held before the RevCon in 2015 as well as more
meetings and regional conferences to discuss proposals and observations about the
Confidence Building Measures in the potential free zone. For civil society, spreading
the culture of disarmament is very important for non-proliferation. Having more
work on the grassroots level would work and give more pressure to governments to
work on a Nuclear-Free Zone. For the regional organizations, more discussions are
needed and holding the conference should be emphasized as an effective means to
achieve a Nuclear-Free Zone in the Middle East.
Overcoming the Obstacles on the Road to Zero Nuclear Weapons
Dominique Hatiar
The idea of a Nuclear Weapons Free World (NWFW) has emerged already during
the Second World War. Nevertheless the debate on nuclear elimination has gained
momentum mainly in the past five years. The idea was the key issue of various
conferences and publications such as the Oslo conference in 2008 and the article “A
World Free of Nuclear Weapons” published in the WSJ by Henry Kissinger and other
renowned experts. Culmination of the idea was embodied by the launch of a new
initiative called Global Zero which brings together visionary political, military and
civic leaders fighting for the NWFW.
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The case for a NWFW is developed out of 4 key arguments. Firstly, it rejects viability
of the nuclear deterrence doctrine in the 21st century. Secondly, it argues that in
long term it will be enormously difficult to sustain the current double standards on
nuclear weapons possession as others will always be tempted to obtain them as
well. The third argument elaborates on the risks related to nuclear terrorism, it
proposes a NWFW as the final solution where non-existence of national nuclear
arsenals would make them impossible to obtain. The fourth, moral arguments
(human rights based approach), questions nuclear weapons in their essentiality as it
views their usage and possession as morally unjustifiable. Here it is necessary to
zoom out of the national security system and move towards normative ideas.
However, justifying the NWFW is easier than realizing the goal of a NWFW. The
skeptics have been so far effective in making the NWFW seem unattainable. The
criticism can be divided into two categories, obstacles on route to the NWFW and in
the state of a NWFW. For example, the possibility of cheating seems to be the most
commonly stressed danger linked with the state of being in the NWFW. In response
to this argument, the author hypothesizes that in a NWFW the enforcement and
verification methods will be functioning at a high level enough to make chances of
being caught high and its consequences severe. Different means for obtaining and
sustaining the NWFW is an internationally controlled nuclear deterrent functioning
as a deterrent of the cheating states.
The NWFW idea is also dependent on more effective verification and enforcement.
Verification could be improved by civil society monitoring, extensive transparency
between states and international ownership of fuel cycle facilities. In conclusion, a
NWFW is attainable and the obstacles on the way to it can be overcome.
“Safety of the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space: Measures at the
International and National Levels”
Sergiy Negoda and Niklas Hedman
In considering the broader security and safety aspects relating to nuclear power, it
is also worth addressing the safety of use of space objects carrying nuclear power
sources (NPS).
Space NPS have been developed and used in space applications where unique
mission requirements and constraints on electrical power and thermal management
precluded the use of non-nuclear power sources. According to current knowledge
and capabilities, space NPS are the only viable energy option to power some space
missions and significantly enhance others. Several ongoing and foreseeable missions
would not be possible without the use of space NPS. Past, present and foreseeable
space NPS applications include radioisotope power systems and nuclear reactor
systems for power and propulsion.
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NPS have unique safety considerations compared with terrestrial applications.
Unlike many terrestrial nuclear applications, space applications tend to be used
infrequently and their requirements can vary depending upon the specific mission.
Space NPS regulations exist in the Russian Federation and the US. Argentina and
China, as well as the European Space Agency (and EC) have confirmed that their
regulations are in the development phase. These national regulations are in strict
compliance with relevant international instruments and governments ensure
continuous supervision over their respective national activities in the field of the
use of space NPS, conducted by governmental and/or non-governmental entities.
UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) was established by GA
resolution 1472 in 1959. It is mandated to review international cooperation in the
peaceful uses of outer space, devise programmes in this field to be undertaken
under the auspices of the UN, encourage continued research and dissemination of
information on outer space matters, and study legal problems arising from the
exploration of outer space. It currently has 74 Member States and 32
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations have permanent observer
status with the Committee.
Activities relating to the use of space NPS are regulated by the five United Nations
treaties on outer space. In addition the Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear
Power Sources in Outer Space of 1992 are particularly relevant to the matter. It is
also important to mention two other relevant documents, developed within COPUOS
recently: Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines (2007), and Safety Framework for the
Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space (2009).
Currently, there is general satisfaction among existing and potential operators of
space NPS. They call for the strengthening of the relevant international framework
through implementation of the Safety Framework. Some States believe that a
proposal should be made to develop detailed and technical guidelines that might
help to alleviate the concerns of many developing countries about the effectiveness
of the Safety Framework. There is also a group of States that advocate promotion of
a process that would create international norms and modify those already in
existence to regulate the use of NPS in outer space.
Finally, it is important to stress that by far the international community has been
doing quite well in keeping a regulative regime on the use of space NPS updated
and, to the maximum extent possible, effective. In addition to the above-mentioned
measures and instruments, the General Assembly reiterates in its annual resolution
on international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space, that “… it is
essential that States pay more attention to the problem of collisions of space objects,
including those with nuclear power sources, with space debris, and other aspects of
space debris, calls for the continuation of national research on this question …”.
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Expert Knowledge of Nuclear Materials and the Development of Atomic Energy
Agency Policies
Anna Weichselbraun
The proposed study is an ethnography of the communicative practices through
which civil servants at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an
organization devoted to monitoring nuclear materials and facilities among
signatories to the Nonproliferation Treaty, seek to establish and maintain its
legitimacy as the sole arbiter in the regulation of global nuclear technology. Through
these communicative practices, civil servants mobilize various expert knowledges
(technoscientific, legal, and bureaucratic) in order to produce “technical
independence”—the unbiased technical competence and legal judgment by which
the IAEA’s missions can be made globally acceptable—for a vast international
audience. In a world gripped by nuclear fear, the IAEA’s ability to manage anxieties
surrounding the proliferation of nuclear things can be decisive in matters of war and
peace. But without the ability to enforce the legal agreements it is tasked to monitor,
the IAEA must deploy maximally persuasive language in highly formalized
documents to achieve its objective of regulating nuclear things, as well as nuclear
fear.
This research will thus investigate two related processes which craft consensus
through document production: (1) the internal techno-legal consensus produced by
expert evaluations, and (2) the international political consensus crafted in the
governing bodies of the IAEA, by which member states agree on resolutions to be
presented to the United Nations. These processes require communication across
multiple expert and language boundaries. This project’s careful attention to
language as embedded in a range of other semiotic (sign) systems can offer a novel
perspective on how the nuclear order with its laws and knowledge is constituted
and contested. The research is based on 14 months of participant-observation,
interviews, and archival work at the public information, legal, and training divisions
of the IAEA and will be completed by rigorous linguistic anthropological analyses of
the actors’ interactional, ritual, and documentary practices.
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