2015 NDI 6WS - Neg PICs Core
Exports PICs
Questions:
-
PICing out of a specific country – not sure what the net benefit would be? Dangerous tech
would be checked by the econ compet. Exemption or the sunset review…
Cards talking about what country to not export to = a long list
1NC
1NC Shell - Pakistan
Text: The President of the United States should issue an Executive Order curtailing
government surveillance of exports from the United States by minimizing export
control lists through a sunset principled review process and by establishing an
economic competitiveness exemption except in the context of exports to Pakistan
Solves the entire aff but maintaining controls on Pakistan is key to prevent illicit
militarization
Douglas M. Stinnett and Bryan R. Early 11 (Academic Advisor at the Center for Policy Research-University at Albany and Faculty
Expert in Economic Sanctions, “Complying by Denying: Explaining Why States Develop Nonproliferation Export Controls”, August 3rd 2011,
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1528-3585.2011.00436.x/full)
Weapons of mass destruction programs rely upon a combination of items and technologies that have weapon-specific uses and those that also have legitimate
civilian applications, so-called “dual-use” items. For example, triggered spark gaps can be used both as triggering devices to
detonate nuclear weapons and as part of medical lithotripters used to break up kidney stones. Legitimate trade in
dual-use goods can be quite profitable, making it potentially costly for governments to restrict such trade. Governments therefore tend to impose fewer restrictions on the trade of many dual-use
items than they impose on items like munitions and some chemical weapons precursors, which have dedicated security applications.2
In a trend deeply troubling to policymakers and experts in global trade and security, recent selfdisclosures and IAEA investigations reveal how some states acquired dual-use material and
technology through legal trade, only to use these items illicitly in the production and dissemination
of WMD. The cases of Iraq in the 1990s, Libya, Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan reflect this pattern (Jones 2006). In each case, dense webs of
state and nonstate actors, operating on both sides of the law, deceived businesses into contributing
technology to WMD programs. The programs depended heavily on imported items that were largely
acquired using legitimate commercial channels as cover (Cupitt, Grillot, and Murayama 2001). Yet, in all these cases, the failure of
supplier states to control dual-use material proved to be the critical link to illicit proliferation. The
importance of dual-use technology is further demonstrated in several recent empirical studies by Kroenig (2009b)
and Fuhrmann (2009b), which show that the supply of technology has been a critical determinant of nuclear proliferation.
Given the importance of trade in dual-use technology, this study shifts the emphasis from the small number of states that directly
engage in proliferation to the larger set of states that are the sources of the necessary dual-use goods and technology.
Numerous studies of nuclear proliferation focus on the demand for weapons (Sagan 1996/1997; Singh and Way 2004; Hymans
2006; Jo and Gartzke 2007; Solingen 2007), but very few address the supply of critical technology (Gartzke and Kroenig 2009). Only recently have
scholars begun to conduct systematic studies of the supply-side of nuclear proliferation, by
explaining the causes of trade in dual-use items (Fuhrmann 2008), transfers of sensitive nuclear technology (Kroenig 2009a), and civilian nuclear
cooperation agreements (Fuhrmann 2009a).
1NC Shell – India
Text: The President of the United States should issue an Executive Order curtailing
government surveillance of exports from the United States by minimizing export
control lists through a sunset principled review process and by establishing an
economic competitiveness exemption except in the context of exports to India.
CP solves the aff but restricting dual use goods towards India is key to check
proliferation – Indian proliferation inevitably causes Pakistan to expand its own
program intensifying a nuclear arms race
Albright et al, 11 (David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Andrea Stricker, “Case Study - Man Charged with Exporting U.S. Goods to Pakistan’s Nuclear
Program”, Institute for science and international security, April 14th, http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/man-charged-with-exporting-u.s.-goods-to-pakistansnuclear-program/)
In addition, the
administration recommended that India be invited to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
will need to significantly strengthen its nonproliferation credentials. In
May 2009, a senior U.S. State Department official noted during a discussion with NSG members that India needed to strengthen its export
controls and nonproliferation measures ahead of becoming a member of the NSG, and that the United States would be
hard on India if it did not. If the United States fails to create safeguards against the transfer of dual-use goods
imported by civil, space, and defense entities to India’s nuclear weapons program, this policy risks
facilitating India’s expansion and improvement of its nuclear weapons arsenal and the means to
deliver them. That will inevitably provoke Pakistan into further expanding its own nuclear weapons
program, intensifying the ongoing and dangerous nuclear arms race in the South Asia region. This
Before it is invited to join the NSG, India
announcement unfortunately marks a further reversal of a decades-long policy toward India which prevented sensitive equipment sales to a country with nuclear
weapons outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It sets a poor precedent for NPT non-nuclear weapon states and those with nuclear weapons outside the
NPT, while undermining the central bargain of the NPT. This
policy appears to downplay India’s flawed nonproliferation
record. The country has leaked sensitive centrifuge design information, illicitly procured goods for its
nuclear weapons programs, and not adequately enforced export controls. Increasing India’s access to
dual-use technology before the Indian government fixes these problems increases the likelihood that
some of this technology could leak out through its poorly implemented controls.
1NC Net Benefits
Pakistan – India War
Pakistani militarization exacerbates conflicts with India – mutually assured
destruction doesn’t check conflict
Paul S. Kapur 07 (professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, “Do Nuclear Weapons
Stabilize South Asian Militarized Crises? Evidence from the 1990 Case” January 24 th,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14799850490961099?queryID=%24%7BresultBean.queryID%7D#.VbfT1PlViko)
while nuclear weapons have at
times had important cautionary effects on Indian and Pakistani decision makers, proliferation has played a
role in fomenting a number of the very crises that scholars credit nuclear weapons with defusing. Moreover, it
is not clear that nuclear deterrence was essential to preventing some of these crises from escalating to the
level of outright war. I illustrate my argument with evidence from the period when India and Pakistan were acquiring nascent nuclear weapons capabilities.
I show that during the late 1980s, Pakistan’s emerging nuclear capacity emboldened Pakistani decision makers to
provide extensive support to the emerging insurgency against Indian rule in Jammu and Kashmir. In
early 1990, India responded with large-scale force deployments along the Line of Control and International
Border, in an attempt to stem militant infiltration into Indian territory, and potentially to intimidate
Pakistan into abandoning its Kashmir policy. Pakistan countered with large deployments of its own, and the result was
a major Indo-Pakistani militarized standoff. Although scholars have credited Pakistani nuclear weapons with deterring India from attacking
This article takes a less sanguine view of nuclear weapons’ impact on South Asian militarized crises. It argues that
Pakistan during this crisis, the preponderance of available evidence suggests that Indian leaders never seriously considered striking Pakistan, and therefore were not in
fact deterred from launching a war in 1990. Thus
nuclear weapons played an important role in fomenting a major
Indo-Pakistani crisis during this period, but probably were not instrumental in preventing the crisis from escalating to the level of outright
war.
India and Pakistan war causes extinction
Telegraph 13 (citing Ira Helfand and the International physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, India-Pakistan nuclear war could
'end human civilisation', 10 December 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/10507342/India-Pakistan-nuclear-warcould-end-human-civilisation.html
A nuclear war between India and Pakistan would set off a global famine that could kill two billion
people and effectively end human civilization, a study said Tuesday. Even if limited in scope, a conflict with
nuclear weapons would wreak havoc in the atmosphere and devastate crop yields, with the effects
multiplied as global food markets went into turmoil, the report said. The Nobel Peace Prize-winning International
Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and Physicians for Social Responsibility released an initial
peer-reviewed study in April 2012 that predicted a nuclear famine could kill more than a billion people. In a
second edition, the groups said they widely underestimated the impact in China and calculated that the world's most populous country would face
severe food insecurity. "A
billion people dead in the developing world is obviously a catastrophe unparalleled in
human history. But then if you add to that the possibility of another 1.3 billion people in China being at
risk, we are entering something that is clearly the end of civilization," said Ira Helfand, the report's author. Helfand
said that the study looked at India and Pakistan due to the longstanding tensions between the nucleararmed states, which have fought three full-fledged wars since independence and partition in 1947.
Prolif
Relaxed dual-use export control regimes increases the risk of proliferation –
Pakistan proves
Rizwana Abbasi 12 (PhD in International Security and Nuclear Non-proliferation from the University of Leicester, “Studies in the History
of Religious and Political Pluralism, Volume 7 : Pakistan and the New Nuclear Taboo : Regional Deterrence and the International Arms Control
Regime”, Published by Peter Lang, May 2012
Export control regimes are under challenge because of globalization, one consequence of which has been the
easy exchange and transfer of knowledge and the flow of dual-use technologies. Rapid technological
advance – bringing a decrease in the value of old technology and an increase in the supply of discarded technology – increases the risk of the
proliferation of nuclear-related material and technologies. There is a spread of destabilizing
technologies that could fall into wrong hands. In the past, there were few states selling dual-use technology but in today’s world a
large number of states and firms are supplying high tech dual-use machinery. Such technologies increase
the threat of proliferation. The majority of Asian states also do not have legislation on the re-export of products and material nor any effective transshipment controls. 29 Problems traced to Pakistan are just one aspect of these developments. This part of the
study diagnoses the main loopholes in the existing multilateral export control regime. The behaviour of
states such as Pakistan directly links with the global developments.
Prolif and development of nuclear weapons are the single greatest threat to the
world – allows terrorists to access the weapons
Bob Graham and Jim Talent 08 (a former U.S. senator from Florida, is chairman of the congressionally established Commission on
the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism and former U.S. senator from Missouri, is vice chairman of the WMD Commission and
Distinguished Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, “Nuclear proliferation endangers world stability”, September 15,
http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2008/09/nuclear-proliferation-endangers-world-stability
During the first presidential debate in 2004, President Bush and Sen. John Kerry agreed -- as stated by the president -- that "the
single, largest threat to
American national security today is nuclear weapons in the hands of a terrorist network." Yet despite that
consensus, the subject of weapons of mass destruction proliferation has quickly disappeared from the
national agenda. Few comments or questions on this issue have been posed to the presidential candidates, even though preventing WMD
proliferation should be on the short list of priorities for a McCain or Obama White House. And it rarely appears on polls of
the most urgent concerns of citizens. So, in 2008, after seven years in which there have been no successful terrorist attacks inside the country, why not relax? Here are
the reasons: Terrorists
have continued to demonstrate the intent to acquire a WMD capability. As Director of
National Intelligence Admiral Michael McConnell said in his Sept. 10, 2007, testimony to the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, "al
Qaeda will continue to try to acquire and employ chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
material in attacks and would not hesitate to use them if it develops what it deems is sufficient
capability." The potential human toll of an attack utilizing weapons of mass destruction is appalling. On a normal workday, half a million people crowd the area
within a half-mile radius of Times Square. A noon detonation of a nuclear device in Midtown Manhattan would kill them all. Another attack -particularly with WMD -- would have a devastating impact on the American and the world
economies. As former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan warned, a nuclear terrorist attack would push "tens of millions of
people into dire poverty," creating "a second death toll throughout the developing world." The environment for the
use of nuclear and biological weapons has changed. Although Russia is doing a better job of securing its stockpiles and therefore is less of a threat, North Korea and
Iran have taken its place. North Korea has gone from two bombs worth of plutonium to an estimated ten. Iran has gone from zero centrifuges spinning to more than
3,000. In
what some have termed a "nuclear renaissance," many nations are now seeking commercial
nuclear power capacity that will add to the inventory of nations and scientists who could extend their
interest to nuclear weapons. With the nuclear surprises we've experienced in Iran, Syria and North Korea, it is clear that current
nonproliferation regimes and mechanisms can no longer be certain to prevent more nuclear proliferation
or the theft of bomb-usable materials. Biologists are creating synthetic DNA chains of diseases which have been considered extinct, such as the
1918 influenza virus that killed over 40 million people. The potential of using these laboratory-developed strains against an unaware and noninoculated population is
ominous. There is the necessity of engaging the American people. Unlike the Cold War, which was a superpower vs. superpower confrontation, the current
asymmetric threat that would be dramatically escalated if the terrorists had access to nuclear or biological weapons. The incorrect claims regarding Saddam Hussein's
Nonetheless, there was and is a real danger that al
Qaeda will get a nuclear bomb and attack an American city.
WMD and his collusion with al Qaeda have contributed to public skepticism.
Nuclear Terrorism
Risk of nuclear terrorism high in Pakistan – denial of dual-use tech is key to deter
the threat
Rizwana Abbasi 12 (PhD in International Security and Nuclear Non-proliferation from the University of Leicester, “Studies in the History
of Religious and Political Pluralism, Volume 7 : Pakistan and the New Nuclear Taboo : Regional Deterrence and the International Arms Control
Regime”, Published by Peter Lang, May 2012)
Pakistan is fully alive to the threat of nuclear terrorism. Consistent with its national security interest, Pakistan has put in
place legislative and regulatory frameworks and an organizational infrastructure to deal with the threat. International efforts against nuclear
terrorism should be backed by an international consensus and based on a non-discriminatory approach. No
state would be immune
from the devastating consequences of an act of nuclear terrorism anywhere in the world. The
objective of enhancing nuclear security should therefore be pursued in an inclusive manner. There is a
need to review the approach of any set of arrangements which seeks to exclude non-NPT nuclear weapons states and
which may result in a denial of dual-use technologies, including safety and security-related
equipment. Pakistan should be made a full partner with the world community in the common endeavour against nuclear proliferation.
Nuclear terrorism is an existential threat – draws countries in to war
Robert Ayson 10 (Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of
Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July 2010,
Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)
A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the
first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are
reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly
existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that
possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear
as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and
even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful
nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state
actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of
nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear
weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s
terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors
of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the
superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1
war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that
problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For
in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how
Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state
example,
sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some
possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism
had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be
the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be
“spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and
collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion,
the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41
Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused
to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately
to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a
a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while
very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game
if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in
Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded
of nuclear Cluedo? In particular,
between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this
occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a
should a nuclear terrorist attack occur
in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow
and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager
of the attack?
distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too:
2NC
2NC Solvency
CP solves the entire aff – but the President should maintain current requirements
on countries with an international terrorism threat
Rizwana Abbasi 12 (PhD in International Security and Nuclear Non-proliferation from the University of Leicester, “Studies in the History
of Religious and Political Pluralism, Volume 7 : Pakistan and the New Nuclear Taboo : Regional Deterrence and the International Arms Control
Regime”, Published by Peter Lang, May 2012)
In exercising his authority to export controls, the President is directed to establish and maintain lists of
items subject to control, lists of foreign persons or end-uses subject to control, licensing criteria and licensing alternatives – such as advanced notice in
lieu of licensing, and compliance and enforcement measures. It expands the definition of dual-use items to include those that
could be used for cyber or terrorist attacks. The legislation establishes penalties consistent with the
IEEPA penalties (see above). The legislation also directs the President to establish an inter-agency Transfer Policy Committee to identify strategic threats
requiring export controls and to implement policies to counter those threats. This committee is also charged with regularly reviewing
the control list and establishing and maintaining a licensing system. The legislation requires the
President to maintain current license requirements on countries supporting international terrorism ,
as well as current sanctions regarding missile proliferation and chemical and biological weapons proliferation. It also reauthorizes the anti-boycott provisions from the
EAA.
2NC AT: Perm Do Both
The permutation is impossible – you can’t reduce and maintain export controls on
Pakistan simultaneously – make the aff explain what the world of the permutation
would look like
Severance - the function of the plan is to reduce export controls on all countries –
doing both severs the function of reducing controls on Pakistan.
Severance perms are a voting issue – makes the aff a moving target because they can
spike out any disads or counterplans and it’s impossible to be neg.
2NC AT: Perm do the CP
Severs the function of the plan – aff fiats export controls to be reduced on all
countries and by maintaining controls on Pakistan – they sever out of the function
of curtailing export controls on Pakistan
2NC AT: Other Countries Export
Europe has export controls for dual use tech on Pakistan – UK proves
UK Export Control Organization 14, (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, Foreign & Commonwealth
Office, HM Treasury and Export Control Organisation, “Current arms embargoes and other restrictions”, September 11th 2014,
https://www.gov.uk/current-arms-embargoes-and-other-restrictions)
Implications for exporters The UK will not issue an export licence for small arms and light weapons , components or
ammunition unless the ECOWAS Commission has issued an exception to its moratorium. You can find out about the current ECOWAS
restrictions in arms embargo on West African States. Restrictions
on non-conventional and dual-use items As of 10
UK reviewed its policy towards nuclear-related exports to India. Restrictions on nuclear
exports to Pakistan remain in force. Implications for exporters Exporters can apply for an export control licence
for their goods. All applications will be considered by the UK government in line with the provisions of the
Consolidated Criteria for UK and EU Arms Exports. Find out the details of restrictions on exports of non-conventional and
dual-use items to India and Pakistan in export embargo on nuclear goods to India or Pakistan.
November 2008 the
2NC NB - Prolif
Reducing export controls only stimulates the proliferation of WMDs – doesn’t hurt
the economy
Strom Thurmond 98, (US Senator from South Carolina, “U.S. Export Control and Nonproliferation Policy and the Role and Responsibility of the Department of Defense:
Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services”, October 1st 1998)
The most important thing to recognize about export controls is that they work. They buy the time needed to turn a
country off the nuclear weapon path. Argentina and Brazil agreed to give up nuclear weapons in part of
the costs that export controls imposed upon them. In Iraq, documents discovered by the United Nations inspectors showed that export controls on dual-use
equipment seriously hampered the Iraqi nuclear weapon design team. The Iraqis spent time and money making crucial items that they could not
import. The same controls also stopped Iraq’s drive to make a medium-range missile. In addition, these controls are
now hampering India’s effort to build an ICBM and will hamper the efforts of both India and Pakistan to
weaponize their nuclear arsenals.
But how much do export controls cost? Are they a drag on the U.S. economy? How many jobs are at stake? The total American economy was about 6.7 trillion dollars in 1994, the last year for which I have been able to find complete
only two tenths of 1 percent ($10.7 billion) even went through Commerce Department licensing. Only
$141 million in application were denied –which is less than one hundredth of 1 percent of the U.S.
economy. Export control is not a jobs issue. It is a security issue. It has only a microscopic effect on employment. Reducing export controls
will not stimulate the U.S. economy; it will only stimulate the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.
What about the end of the cold war? Does that mean that export controls are less important? If anything, they are more important. With bipolar stability gone, regional tensions are growing.
These tensions stimulate the appetite for weapons of mass destruction. The nuclear and missile arms race has just shifted into high gear in South
export licensing data. Of that,
Asian and is continuing in the Middle East. It is illogical to say that because the Cold War is over, proliferation is the main international threat, and that export controls, which are one of the best ways of containing that threat, should
be reduced.
the lesson of Iraq was that export controls need to be stronger instead of weaker. But today’s export controls are only a shadow of
Since 1988, applications to the Commerce
Department have dropped by roughly 90%. Cases have fallen from nearly 100,000 in 1989 to 8,705 in 1996 and 11,472 in 1997. The reason is simple: fewer items are controlled
In fact,
what they were before the Gulf War, when Saddam Hussein was buying the means to make his mass destruction war machine.
that we have virtually given up export control as a foreign policy tool.
2NC NB – India Pakistan War
Pakistan avoided attacking India in the past but an increase in military capabilities
will lead to larger and more frequent militarized disputes
S. Paul Kapur 09 (professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, “Dangerous Deterrent:
Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia”, 2009,
https://books.google.com/books?id=bt3WMTNX5QoC&dq=india+reaction+to+pakistan+militarization&source=gbs_navlinks_s)
In this chapter, I examine Indo-Pakistani
security relations during the non-nuclear period from 1972 through 1989.
I show that this
period was
largely peaceful; 186 of the 216 months during this period were completely free of militarized conflict. Militarized conflicts that did occur
nonnuclear period was stable for two main reasons.
First, India was satisfied with the territorial division of the subcontinent after its victory in the Bangladesh War and
had no reason to undertake any aggression against Pakistan. Second, Pakistan was dissatisfied with the territorial division of
the subcontinent following the Bangladesh War, particularly in Kashmir. However, in its
weakened state, Pakistan could not risk any action to alter Kashmiri territorial boundaries and
thus avoided confrontation with India. Despite the relative peace of the nonnuclear years, I show that several developments
occurred during this period that would encourage renewed Indo-Pakistani conflict in the future. First, a process
from 1972 through 1989 remained below the level of outright war. I argue that the
of Islamization within Pakistan made the Kashmir dispute an even more important Pakistani national goal than it had been. Second, the Afghan War’s anti-Soviet
guerrilla campaign offered Pakistan a model of low-intensity conflict (LIC) to employ against Indian Kashmir. Finally, Pakistan’s
burgeoning
nuclear weapons capability made pursuit of a LIC strategy in Kashmir less risky, protecting
Pakistan against the possibility of all-out Indian retaliation. These factors would combine to make
militarized disputes on the subcontinent more frequent and severe during the coming de facto and overt nuclear periods.
FDA PIC
1NC
1NC Shell
The Food and Drug Administration should substantially curtail surveillance of
employees suspected of being whistleblowers with the exception of employees also
suspected of committing fraud.
Monitoring of FDA employees suspected of fraud is necessary to discover fraudulent
activities and misconduct.
Swaminathan and Avery 12 — Vandya Swaminathan, a J.D. Candidate at the University of
California, Hastings College of the Law, and Matthew Avery, Associate at Baker Botts LLP, 2012(“FDA
Enforcement of Criminal Liability for Clinical Investigator Fraud, Hastings Sci. and Tech, September
14th, Available Online at: http://hstlj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/SwaminathanV4I2.pdf, Accessed:
7-28-2015)
There are three mechanisms in place that should theoretically allow sponsors or FDA to discover any
clinical investigator fraud: site monitoring, sponsor auditing, and FDA auditing. For site monitoring, the
sponsor usually selects an appropriately trained individual to monitor the progress of the clinical
investigation.71 Because the sponsor is responsible for ensuring that the clinical investigators’ obligations
are being fulfilled, FDA recommends that the monitor periodically visit the clinical site to ensure the
investigator is adequately performing his duties.72 Site monitors are supposed to review every piece of
data generated by a clinical study and are considered the best line of defense against clinical investigator
fraud.73 Sponsor auditing involves the sponsor of a clinical trial sending its own personnel to make sure
an investigator is conducting a clinical trial in compliance with good clinical practice standards and other
FDA regulations.74 Sponsors usually only conduct their own audits for larger clinical trials.75 Finally,
FDA auditing is when the Agency sends its own monitors to inspect a clinical site and review data
generated there. However, because of the FDA’s budgetary constraints, these audits are relatively
sporadic and are typically reserved for pivotal Phase III trials.
Lack of supervision causes proliferation of harmful drugs and prevents effective
research on new drugs.
Curtin and Relkin 7 — Teresa Curtin, an associate at Weitz & Luxenberg, P.C., a law firm that acts
as plaintiffs’ counsel in pharmaceutical product liability litigations nationwide, including in many
litigations mentioned in this Article. She holds a law degree from New York University School of Law
where she was a Root Tilden Scholar a& Ellen Relkin, of counsel to Weitz & Luxenberg, P.C. and
represents plaintiffs in pharmaceutical product liability and toxic tort cases. She is certified by the New
Jersey Supreme Court as a Certified Civil Trial Attorney. She is an elected member of the American Law
Institute, is a chair of the Toxic, Environmental and Pharmaceutical Torts Section of the American
Association for Justice and a fellow of the Roscoe Pound Foundation, 2007 (“PREAMBLE
PREEMPTION AND THE CHALLENGED ROLE OF FAILURE TO WARN AND DEFECTIVE
DESIGN PHARMACEUTICAL CASES IN REVEALING SCIENTIFIC FRAUD, MARKETING
MISCHIEF, AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, HOFSTRA Law Review, 2007, Available Online at:
http://law.hofstra.edu/pdf/academics/journals/lawreview/lrv_issues_v35n04_cc4.curtinrelkin.35.4.final.pd
f, Accessed: 7-28-2015)
In the past decade, and prior to that, several widely used prescription medications have been removed from
the market either voluntarily, or pursuant to FDA request, upon reports that such medicines were causing life
threatening adverse effects, and in some cases deaths.28 Withdrawal is virtually never the result of the FDA
initiating formal proceedings to remove a drug because, as the Director of New Drugs at the FDA, Dr. John
Jenkins, recently acknowledged, in the context of an FDA expert advisory panel recommending an outright ban of
over-the-counter pediatric cold products for children under the age of six, a forced withdrawal requiring a rulemaking process could take "many years" to carry out.29 The FDA has been criticized for taking "years to
acknowledge risks to millions of patients that had been apparent to some researchers. 3 ° Judge Weinstein,
in rejecting a pharmaceutical company's preemption defense noted that "[i]t is apparent ... that the FDA's own
research is limited and that it relies heavily on the self-motivated representations and studies by the pharmaceutical
industry,",31 suggesting that the "lack of adequate... [FDA] supervision of the pharmaceutical industry" is
actually a factor to be considered in "the larger legal and factual context" in which the determination of fact
and damages is made in 32 pharmaceutical tort cases. The removal of drugs from the market almost uniformly
shows that there are "often important gaps in the ascertainment and reporting of adverse effects associated
with prescription drugs, and the balance of information presented to physicians about the risks and
benefits of medications may understate the former and inflate the latter. 33 The danger of hidden adverse
drug effects is that even a relatively small risk of a serious adverse effect can translate into a high number
of consumers killed or hurt by such adverse effects, due to the vast number of prescriptions written for popular
drugs. For example, related to the selective COX-2 inhibitor drug Vioxx, at the time of its withdrawal, more than
two million patients around the world were taking the drug, leading to an estimated 88,000 to 140,000
Americans suffering Vioxx-related heart attacks, strokes, and other serious medical problems.3
New antibiotics are key to prevent resistant pathogens and the spread of disease.
Boucher 9 — Helen W. Boucher, Division of Geographic Medicine and Infectious Diseases, Tufts
University and Tufts Medical Center, George H. Talbot, Talbot Advisors, John S. Bradley, Division of
Infectious Diseases, Rady Children's Hospital , Division of Infectious Diseases, Harbor—University of
California at Los Angeles (UCLA) Medical Center, John E. Edwards, Los Angeles Biomedical Research
Institute, Torrance, The David Geffen School of Medicine at UCLA , David Gilbert, Division of
Infectious Diseases, Providence Portland Medical Center and Oregon Health Sciences University, Louis
B.Rice, Medical Service, Louis Stokes Cleveland Veterans Administration Medical Center, Cleveland,
Ohio, Department of Medicine, Case Western Reserve University School of Medicine, Michael Scheld,
Department of Medicine, University of Virginia School of Medicine, Brad Spellberg, Department of
Medicine, Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine,, and John Bartlett, 2009 (“Bad Bugs, No Drugs:
No ESKAPE! An Update from the Infectious Diseases Society of America,” Clinincal Infectious
Diseases, Vol 48, January 1st, Available Online at:
http://cid.oxfordjournals.org/content/48/1/1.full.pdf+html, Accessed: 7-28-2015)
The number of antibacterials in phase 2 or 3 of clinical development remains disappointing, and the
absence of agents designed to treat infection due to resistant gram-negative bacilli places patients with
these infections in danger. At this time, there are no systemically administered antimicrobials in advanced
development that have activity against either a purely gram-negative spectrum or bacteria already
resistant to all currently available antibacterials. Ascertaining the true number of compounds in
development remains challenging. Although PhRMA reported 388 medicines and vaccines in testing, 83
of which are antibacterials, we found significantly fewer than 83 new molecular entities in advanced
clinical development. Because no comprehensive survey of antibiotic development was undertaken before
the IDSA's reports of 2004 and 2006 [12, 14], we cannot determine whether the 388 medications and
vaccines reported in development by PhRMA—or even just the new, systemic antibacterials listed in the
present report—reflect an increase or decrease in the development pipeline over the past few years. What
is certain is that the number of new antibacterials that make it through the complete development process
and ultimately receive FDA approval has precipitously decreased over the past 25 years. Indeed, we
found a 75% decrease in systemic antibacterials approved by the FDA from 1983 through 2007, with
evidence of continued decrease in approvals, even during the most recent 5-year period (2003–2007) [3].
These data do not suggest a significant recent increase in antibacterial development. Recent reports about
the decrease in discovery research efforts in large pharmaceutical companies and the decrease in
antibacterial trials, most notably “early phase” clinical trials, further highlight the diminishing industry
focus on antibacterial drug research and development [89, 90]. Only 5 major pharmaceutical
companies—GlaxoSmithKline, Novartis, AstraZeneca, Merck, and Pfizer—still have active antibacterial
discovery programs, and the number of antibacterial trials registered at ClinicalTrials.gov decreased
between 2005 and 2007 [89, 90]. We do observe some small signs of success. The approval of
doripenem is encouraging; its increased in vitro potency against P. aeruginosa may translate into clinical
advantage. Positive results in phase 3 studies for telavancin, ceftobiprole (although not for the VAP
subset in the HAP studies), and cethromycin are encouraging, although the regulatory delays are
troubling. Several compounds in early development appear promising, but phase 2 clinical studies are not
yet under way. We found evidence of potentially increased interest among large pharmaceutical
companies in the recent announcements of collaborations between Mpex Pharmaceuticals and
GlaxoSmithKline, Novexel and Forest Laboratories, and Protez and Novartis [37, 91, 92]. These
relationships reflect some signs of renewed investment interest that must be nurtured very carefully if we
hope to see a productive pipeline. Looking forward over the next 5–10 years, it is possible that the
number of approved antibacterials will plateau at a level similar to that of the past 5 years (i.e., ∼1 drug
per year). It is critical to emphasize that focusing on just the number of approved antibacterials does not
necessarily “tell the full story” of the overall clinical impact of the new drugs. New antimicrobials should
provide clear advances in treatment of infection, compared with already available therapies. As in our
earlier report, the number of truly novel compounds with a new mechanism of action remains small. Most
antibacterial drugs that are currently in the late-stage pipeline do not augur a major advance in our
ability to treat infection due to resistant pathogens, and the overall number of compounds in
development to treat gram-negative infection is small. The fact that much of the discovery effort is based
in Japan is also noteworthy [27]. The IDSA is concerned about the lack of an active international drugdiscovery infrastructure and the attendant consequences—in particular, the decrease in US- and
European-based antibacterial discovery infrastructure.
Pandemics spread like wildfire and cause extinction — only resistance monitoring
solves in the necessary timeframe.
Ferguson et al 6 — Neil M. Ferguson, Derek A. T. Cummings, Christophe Fraser, James C. Cajka,
Philip C. Cooley, and Donald S. Burke, Department of Infectious Disease Epidemiology, Faculty of
Medicine, Imperial College London, Department of International Health, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg
School of Public Health, 2006 (“Strategies for mitigating an influenza pandemic,” Nature, April 26th,
Available Online at: http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v442/n7101/full/nature04795.html#B3,
Accessed: 7-26-2015)
Once a new pandemic virus starts to be transmitted in a country, interventions must be targeted for
maximum impact. Applying the type of intensive control strategies envisaged for containing a pandemic
at source6 is impractical as infection will constantly be reseeded in a country by visitors
(see Supplementary Information). Clinical cases are clearly then the first priority for any more-targeted
approach, as prompt treatment with antivirals reduces clinical severity and
infectiousness18 (see Supplementary Information). Our results indicate that only very rapid treatment
can significantly reduce transmission (Fig. 2c, d), because cases are at their most infectious soon after
symptoms develop (seeSupplementary Information). For the high transmissibility scenario, same-day
treatment of 90% of cases reduces cumulative attack rates from 34% to 29% and peak daily attack rates
from 1.9% to 1.6%, with an antiviral stockpile sufficient to treat 25% of the population (the size many
countries have ordered19) being adequate to implement the policy. If treatment is delayed by 1 day, the
cumulative attack rate for the high transmissibility scenario increases to 32% (meaning that a 29%
stockpile is needed), and the peak daily attack rate to 1.9%. The impact of treatment on the peak daily
attack rate at the height of the epidemic is always greater than that on overall attack rates. Assuming that
more than 50% of infections result in clinical illness requiring treatment would increase the required
stockpile (see Supplementary Information). A real threat to the effectiveness of antiviral-based
mitigation policies would be if resistant strains arose with transmissibility close to the wild-type level20.
Such strains have not yet been detected, but resistance monitoring during a pandemic will be essential.
2NC/1NR Extensions
2NC— Overview
The CP solves abuses against whistleblowers while preventing instances of
misconduct within the FDA— this allows for more effective research toward new
antibiotics and prevents disease spread. Only the CP provides the most sustainable
method for FDA practices —that’s Swaminathan and Avery.
Monitoring of fraud suspects assures good clinical practices and prevents misuse of
data.
George and Buyse 15 — Stephen L George, Department of Biostatistics & Bioinformatics, Duke
University School of Medicine, and Marc Buyse, IDDI (International Drug Development Institute) Inc,
2015 (“Data fraud in clinical trials,” Clinical Investigation, 2015, Available Online at: http://www.futurescience.com/doi/pdf/10.4155/cli.14.116, Accessed: 7-28-2015)
Detection of fraud is one aspect of data quality assurance in clinical trials [58]. As part of good clinical
practice, trial sponsors are required to monitor the conduct of clinical trials. The aim of monitoring
clinical trials is to ensure the patients’ well-being, compliance with the approved protocol and regulatory
requirements, and data accuracy and completeness [59]. Baigent et al. [60] draw a useful distinction
between three types of trial monitoring: oversight by trial committees, on-site monitoring and central
statistical monitoring, and argue that the three types of monitoring are useful in their own right to
guarantee the quality of the trial data and the validity of the trial results. Oversight by trial committees is
especially useful to prevent or detect errors in the trial design and interpretation of the results. On-site
monitoring is especially useful to prevent or detect procedural errors in the trial conduct at participating
centers (e.g., whether informed consents have been signed by all patients or legally acceptable
representatives). Statistical monitoring is especially useful to detect data errors, whether due to faulty
equipment, sloppiness, incompetence or fraud.
2NC — Solvency
No solvency deficit — there is a distinction between whistleblowers and employees
who commit fraud. Whistleblowers release sensitive information about clinical
practices while fraud constitutes careless work practices, intentionally falsifying
data, and other types of misconduct.
CP solves —good-faith whistleblowers are protected while those who engage in
misconduct are punished.
Ankier 2 — Dr. SI Ankie, Ankier Associates, 2002 (“Dishonesty, Misconduct and Fraud in Clinical
Research: an International Problem,” The Journal of International Medical Research, 2002, Available
Online at: http://imr.sagepub.com/content/30/4/357.full.pdf, Accessed: 7-28-2015)
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates scientific studies in human subjects that are designed
to develop evidence of the safety and efficacy of investigational drugs, biological products or medical
devices. Its authority derives from the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (1938) as supplemented by
subsequent amendments,49 with GCP regulations being established by Title 21 of the Code of Federal
Regulations. The remit of the Division of Scientific Investigations of the FDA includes evaluation of the
integrity of the clinical data on which product approvals are based (personal communication from Carolyn
Hommel, Consumer Safety Officer, Division of Scientific Investigations [HFD-45], Office of Medical
Policy, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, US Food and Drug Administration).50 All parties
involved in biomedical research are encouraged to report promptly any breaches of GCP, scientific
misconduct or negligent actions by researchers. The FDA does not use the term ‘whistleblower’ in its
database and has no explicit regulations regarding those who report misconduct. Subject to applicable
regulations, the good-faith whistleblower is entitled to receive conditional legal protection against
retaliation51 if they disclose (to the Office of Research Integrity) allegations of scientific misconduct in
research being funded by the US Public Health Services. Moreover, a private citizen may also seek to
expose false or fraudulent claims for federal funds by bringing a so-called ‘Qui Tam’ suit. As a
Downloaded from imr.sagepub.com at NORTHWESTERN UNIV/SCHL LAW on July 28, 2015 361 SI
Ankier Misdemeanours in clinical research: an international problem reward for being a whistleblower
(also termed a ‘relator’), they receive a significant proportion of any recovered funds while also being
entitled to protection against retaliation.52
2NC — Impact
Pandemics hurt national security, are magnified quickly in urban areas, and are
difficult to contain.
Goldsman et al 13 —David Goldsman, Georgia Institute of Technology Michael Edesess, City
University of Hong Kong, Kwok-Leung Tsui and Zoie Shui-Yee Wong, City University of Hong Kong,
2013 (“Tracking Infectious Disease Spread for Global Pandemic Containment,” AI and Health,
November/December, Available Online at:
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6733224, Accessed: 7-28-2015)
Infectious disease pandemics present serious threats to global health and can potentially impact national
security.1 The Asian-Pacifi c region is often the epicenter of emerging infectious diseases, having given
rise to recent outbreaks of avian fl u, Asian fl u, and Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). In
2003, SARS affected 29 countries, resulting in 8,096 infections and 774 deaths.2 This outbreak
demonstrated that increased population density and mobility can play important roles in the spread of
emerging infectious diseases and could potentially lead to future pandemics. According to the United
Nations Newsletter,3 by 2030 the world’s urban population is estimated to reach 8 billion people and the
number of city dwellers is expected to grow to 5 billion. People living in urban areas are constantly in
close contact, and urban populations experience a vastly different lifestyle than suburban populaces. Mass
gatherings of people in confined spaces and interconnected contacts can increase the probability of
spreading infectious diseases.4 Even for the same swine fl u strain, it has been suggested that the basic
reproductive number (a measure of how quickly the disease spreads) in New York City would be greatly
different than that found in Mexico City, due to differences in population density, environment,
demographics, and behavioral factors.5 Taking the 2003 SARS outbreak as an example, we can identify
several items of strategic importance. First, the SARS coronavirus at hospital wards critically threatened
the lives of healthcare workers and other patients;4 and so it’s of the utmost necessity to quickly quantify
the risk of infectious disease spread within high-risk healthcare facilities to contain the outbreak at the
earliest stages. Additionally, today’s ubiquitous airplane passenger traffic6 and other modes of public
transportation result in fast disease movement and variable disease transmission rates, all of which must
be taken onto account in any analysis. Further, modeling of detailed community interaction dynamics
increases a public health organization’s ability to contain a potential strain at its origin.7 Traditional
influenza simulations typically focus on large-scale populations with a generalized and homogeneous
individual contact structure. They often overlook crucial regional variations when constructing
community structures and thus are inadequate to replicate the true contact dynamics in the highpopulation and high-density environments common in urban areas. Moreover, largescale stochastic
models tend to be computationally ineffi cient if detailed agent dynamics are taken into account; and
usually those systems don’t provide user-friendly and user-adaptable interfaces. We envision a
systematic, quantitative, and easy-to-use approach for tracking infectious disease spread that can
realistically explain critical social contacts and population movements in urban areas. Apart from the
health economics implications,8 such modeling approaches can enable preemptive detection,
identification, and comprehension of pandemic outbreaks, as well as scientific justifications for mitigation
strategies, such as social distancing, biosecurity screening, and quarantines.
AT: Perm
Perm fails — even a reduction on fraud monitoring lets employees skirt restrictions
and fake data —that’s Curtin and Relkin.
FDA employees have a massive incentive to manipulate data—fraud is inevitable
absent surveillance.
Curtin and Relkin 7 — Teresa Curtin, an associate at Weitz & Luxenberg, P.C., a law firm that acts
as plaintiffs’ counsel in pharmaceutical product liability litigations nationwide, including in many
litigations mentioned in this Article. She holds a law degree from New York University School of Law
where she was a Root Tilden Scholar a& Ellen Relkin, of counsel to Weitz & Luxenberg, P.C. and
represents plaintiffs in pharmaceutical product liability and toxic tort cases. She is certified by the New
Jersey Supreme Court as a Certified Civil Trial Attorney. She is an elected member of the American Law
Institute, is a chair of the Toxic, Environmental and Pharmaceutical Torts Section of the American
Association for Justice and a fellow of the Roscoe Pound Foundation, 2007 (“PREAMBLE
PREEMPTION AND THE CHALLENGED ROLE OF FAILURE TO WARN AND DEFECTIVE
DESIGN PHARMACEUTICAL CASES IN REVEALING SCIENTIFIC FRAUD, MARKETING
MISCHIEF, AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, HOFSTRA Law Review, 2007, Available Online at:
http://law.hofstra.edu/pdf/academics/journals/lawreview/lrv_issues_v35n04_cc4.curtinrelkin.35.4.final.pd
f, Accessed: 7-28-2015)
What these drugs’ debacles convincingly demonstrate is that the current FDA scheme is not protecting
public health and safety, leading to what one recent commentator recently noted would be “the serious
concerns raised by a system that would tolerate both tort preemption and regulatory failure.”54 After all,
what impact are multi-million dollar fines when a product is considered to be a potential blockbuster
product, with global sales exceeding $586 million in 2000, growth of 84%, and with forecast sales of $1
billion for the next year?55 Or when a product is by far a company’s most profitable drug, with sales of
$4.2 billion a year?56 In such situations, the effects of a product withdrawal can go beyond an immediate
loss in product sales and impact the company’s long term revenue potential.57 From the authors’ practical
experience in involvement in numerous pharmaceutical cases over the years, the sad result is that
corporate executives may continue aggressive marketing campaigns and negotiating with the FDA for
approval of additional uses or higher approved dosages of blockbuster drugs at the time that internal
documents show the company knew or should have known that patients are developing life-threatening
conditions as a result of using a company’s product. These executives’ bonuses are tied to year-end
revenues and they may very well be at another company by the time that the health concerns relating to a
product come to light.
AT: No Fraud Now
Researchers have a large incentive to commit fraud to meet FDA standards but do
so at the expense of at the expense of drug safety.
Swaminathan and Avery 12 — Vandya Swaminathan, a J.D. Candidate at the University of
California, Hastings College of the Law, and Matthew Avery, Associate at Baker Botts LLP, 2012(“FDA
Enforcement of Criminal Liability for Clinical Investigator Fraud, Hastings Sci. and Tech, September
14th, Available Online at: http://hstlj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/SwaminathanV4I2.pdf, Accessed:
7-28-2015)
Pharmaceutical researchers arguably have many incentives to commit fraud due to the unique challenges
they face bringing their products to market. Before a pharmaceutical company can sell a single pill, it
must first spend hundreds of millions of dollars showing that what is inside the pill is safe for a patient to
take and effective at treating a particular disease.12 To show that a new drug is safe and effective, drug
companies typically hire medical doctors to conduct clinical drug trials, in which these so-called clinical
investigators oversee the testing of the new drug on hundreds to thousands of patients.13 However, the
drug discovery process has a high failure rate,14 and enormous costs are associated with the
identification, development, and testing of new drug candidates. Because of the huge investments
involved, many drug researchers are under intense pressure to achieve positive results during clinical
trials.16 Furthermore, drug researchers face additional pressure to achieve positive results as quickly as
possible. The initial investment for drug trials is very high and, as fewer research dollars become
available, drug researchers find themselves in stiff competition with other researchers to get and keep
these dollars based on initial results.17 These scenarios can lead to a conflict of interest for drug
researchers, where the goal of accurately measuring the safety and efficacy of a drug is at odds with the
need to show positive results in order to keep the money from grants flowing in.18 Unfortunately, some
clinical investigators succumb to these pressures by falsifying the results of their studies and submitting
fraudulent data to FDA. By hiding data that shows that a drug is unsafe or ineffective, a clinical
investigator may be able to convince his industry sponsor, and ultimately FDA, to allow the sale of a
potentially dangerous product. Consequently, it is important that FDA be able to deter such conduct by
prosecuting clinical investigators who submit fraudulent data to the Agency.
Fraud among FDA researchers is high now —misconduct surveillance is key to
solve.
George and Buyse 15 — Stephen L George, Department of Biostatistics & Bioinformatics, Duke
University School of Medicine, and Marc Buyse, IDDI (International Drug Development Institute) Inc,
2015 (“Data fraud in clinical trials,” Clinical Investigation, 2015, Available Online at: http://www.futurescience.com/doi/pdf/10.4155/cli.14.116, Accessed: 7-28-2015)
Despite these difficulties, there have been numerous attempts over the years to assess the prevalence or
incidence of misconduct via surveys, audits and other methods, with conflicting results and conclusions.
In a background paper prepared for an ORI conference on research integrity summarizing the literature on
research misconduct, the reported estimated incidence of research misconduct ranged over several orders
of magnitude [9]. At one end of the scale, based on confirmed cases of fraud (using the narrow PHS
definition of fabrication, falsification or plagiarism) a crude estimate of 0.01% (one in 10,000 active
scientists) is obtained. A review of routine audits of leukemia trials conducted by the Cancer and
Leukemia Group B, one of the multicenter cancer clinical trial groups sponsored by the National Cancer
Institute, reported an incidence of fraud of 0.25% [10]. Similarly, a report of audits in the United
Kingdom revealed that only 0.40% of the contributed datasets were fraudulent [11]. In the first 10 years
of reports from the Office of Research Integrity, there were 136 findings of scientific misconduct (again
using the PHS definition); 36 (26%) of these were in clinical trials or other clinical research) [12]. On the
other hand, surveys of scientists and medical investigators routinely report rather high levels of
misconduct or knowledge of misconduct. These surveys generally fall into one of two types: those that
ask about knowledge of misconduct, presumably by others, and those that directly ask about misconduct
by those being surveyed. The former provide revealing information about perception of misconduct but
do not provide any reliable information about the true incidence; the latter provide direct, but biased,
estimates of incidence because of the negative incentives for self-reporting. Examples of the first type
include a survey of members of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in
which 27% of the scientists reported having encountered some type of misconduct [13]; a survey of
research coordinators in which 19% of respondents reported first-hand knowledge of misconduct within
the previous year – and that only 70% of these were reported [14]; a study of Norway medical
investigators in which 27% of investigators knew of instances of fraud [15]; a survey of members of the
International Society of Clinical Biostatistics, in which over 50% of respondents knew of fraudulent
reports [16]; a survey of medical institutions in Britain in which more than 50% of respondents knew or
suspected misconduct among institutional colleagues [17]; and a survey of New Scientist readers, in
which a remarkable 92% knew of or suspected scientific misconduct by colleagues
Foreign Students PICs
China
1nc
Text: The United States federal government should limit the scope of Student & Exchange Visitor
Information System to the exclusive monitoring of Chinese students.
{insert china brain drain da}
**2nc Solvency**
ISIS solvency
The Counterplan eliminates monitoring on middle eastern students—solves hearts and mind—no
reason China is key .
STEM solvency
The counterplan is sufficient to solve the aff--- even if China forms a large group of foreign
students, other countries fill in. They have ev that foreign students are necessary, but no ev drawing
a brightline about how many we need.
India, Russia, Saudi arabia, Brazil, and more all fill in for the Chinese.
Here’s comparative ev—way more Indian students go into Stem—we’ll insert a graph too
Dutta 14 [Saptarishi is a reporter for Quartz in India. He was previously with The Wall Street Journal
covering general news. September 2014. “The key differences between Indian and Chinese students
studying in the US” http://qz.com/258353/the-key-difference-between-indian-and-chinese-studentsstudying-in-the-us///jweideman]
As for choice of disciplines, technical programs, known as STEM (short for science, technology,
engineering and mathematics) are a clear favorite for Indian students. Around 32% of Indian students are
enrolled in engineering programs, compared with just 17% of Chinese students. In fact, Hyderabad is the top
source of STEM students in the US with 20,840 students (though the city’s figures might be inflated by other factors). Overall, nontechnical programs are more popular among Chinese students, with 61% of them enrolling in non-tech subjects like business and
marketing. Indian students’ love of technical subjects isn’t surprising, given India’s thriving outsourcing industry. The country has more computer programmers than
Silicon Valley.
Brazil solves
Kohli 14 [Sonali is a reporter for Quartz covering education and diversity. She was most recently an
Atlantic Media editorial fellow at Quartz, and before that a metro reporter at the Los Angeles Register and
the Orange County Register. November 2014. “Why Iran and Brazil are sending more college students to
the US” http://qz.com/296952/why-iran-and-brazil-are-sending-more-college-students-to-theus///jweideman]
The government of Brazil is also sending its college students to the US, but specifically for STEM
education. The Brazil Scientific Mobility Program is only for undergraduates, but it’s had the added effect of increasing graduate
student enrollment in the US as well, Bhandari says. The program launched in 2011 and also funds intensive English study. There were
13,286 Brazilians studying in US colleges in 2013-2014; 38.3% were undergraduates and 23.5% graduate
students. Brazil’s scholarship program helps in building its work force, which is “critical to their national
development,” Bhandari says.
Indian and Iranian students are more likely to enter STEM
Ayres 14 [Alyssa, senior fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations.
11/18/14, “India and U.S. Higher Education: Strong Indian Presence In The United States, But Americans
Studying In India Still Meager” http://www.forbes.com/sites/alyssaayres/2014/11/18/india-and-u-shigher-education-strong-indian-presence-in-the-united-states-but-americans-studying-in-india-stillmeager///jweideman]
As the Open Doors fact sheet on India shows, India was the number one place of origin for foreign
students in the United States for eight years, from the 2001-02 survey year through 2008-09. In 2009-10, however, China surpassed India as a
place of origin, with more than 127,000 students in the United States that year compared with India’s nearly 105,000. The number of students from India then began to
dip slightly, dropping to below 100,000 by 2012-13, although it was still the number two place of origin. By comparison, students from China have been rapidly
increasing in numbers such that for the 2013-14 year just released, there were close to 275,000 Chinese students in the United States. An overwhelming number of
Indian students in the United States are at the graduate level, 59.5%. Just 12.3% of the Indian students here are undergrads, and 27% are pursuing optional
practical training (a year of work preceding or following degree completion). This profile differs substantially from the breakdown of Chinese
students in the United States, of whom 40% are undergrads, 42% are graduate level and 12.2% are carrying out optional practical training. More interestingly,
78.6% of the Indian students in the United States are in the “STEM” (Science, Technology, Engineering, Math) fields. The
only country sending a higher proportion of its students in the STEM fields is Iran, with 79.6%. I was surprised
that the number of Indian students in business is just 11.7%. Every other field of study tracked by Open Doors clocks in at 3% or less for Indian students: the social
sciences, just 2.7%; fine arts, 1.4%; humanities, a mere 0.5%, as was education.
This means the average Indian student in the United
States is highly likely to be in a STEM graduate degree program.
**AT: relations**
AT: internal link
Their internal link concludes neg
Chang 14 [Anthony, Writer for the Diplomat. 6/20/14, “Is Overseas Study Helping US-China
Relations?” http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/is-overseas-study-helping-us-china-relations///jweideman]
Both the number and growth of Chinese students at American universities is one of the more startling
phenomena in higher education. A welcome one, too: study abroad would seem to promise a future where
U.S.-China relations might be characterized by greater firsthand knowledge of American culture among
the Chinese. By generating greater understanding, their experience in the U.S. should also expand their
sense of common interests, brightening prospects for cooperation between the world’s main powers.
While few would object to such a future as a goal of foreign policy, how realistic is it? Unsentimental Education Let’s start with the numbers: the Institute of
International Education reports there were more than 235,000 Chinese students in the U.S. during the
2012/2013 academic year, a 21 percent increase from the year prior, making China the number one source
of foreign students in America for four years running. Nearly half of these students are studying either
business or engineering; adding math and the hard sciences would account for over two-thirds. These are
ultimately more applied subjects that tend to be less popular among other international students, let alone
among Americans: in 2011/2012, for instance, only 16 percent of U.S. bachelor’s degrees were conferred
in these fields. Of course, it isn’t just academic majors that determine the character of study abroad, but
even so, there are few indications Chinese students’ experiences are especially representative,
independent of what their coursework looks like. That means less class participation, less involvement in
extracurricular activities, and fewer friendships with Americans, even compared with other foreign
students, despite the fact most American consider all these things inseparable elements of university life. And if Chinese students’ time
abroad isn’t reflective of that broader U.S. experience, then one should ask to what extent their studies are
really maximizing their understanding of America. Given that Chinese numbers have surged only
recently, it might be unrealistic to expect this kind of integration so quickly. Plus, these challenges can face students no matter where they originally come from,
especially places where university culture may differ dramatically. But the stakes involved in helping China’s youth obtain a more
representative view of the U.S. are frankly higher, and both the number of international students (not to mention
the tuition they often pay in full) can actually make it harder for universities to take their acculturation seriously. The more Chinese choose to study in America, the
more tempting it becomes to measure success by the revenue they bring than educational quality, even as these students find it easier to spend their days with
compatriots. Mandarin Is the (Distant) Future (Maybe) At
the same time, educational exchange is a two-way street. While
more and more Chinese arrive on U.S. campuses, there is no comparable trend in the other direction,
making one question just how well America’s next generation will know the Chinese. In 2011/2012, fewer than
15,000 Americans were hitting the books in China, a mere two percent increase from the previous year, and only half the number studying abroad in Italy. And among
this already small group, only 2,200 of them are actually pursuing a degree in China, a number that encompasses programs taught in English. Even high-profile
initiatives like the Schwarzman Scholars program – a kind of Rhodes Scholarship to attend Tsinghua University – will have all its courses taught in English, despite
the program’s founder saying, “In the 21st century, China
has few requirements.
is no longer an elective course.” Yet here is a course that currently
US-Relations Thumpers
Cyberespionage, political tensions, and national security concerns hamper USChina S&T trade
Suttmeier 14 (Richard P. Suttmeier, Dr. Richard P. Suttmeier is a Professor of Political Science, Emeritus, at the
University of Oregon. He has written widely on science and technology development issues in China, “Trends in U.S.-China
Science and Technology Cooperation: Collaborative Knowledge Production for the Twenty-First Century?”, Research Report
Prepared on Behalf of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, September 11, 2014,
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Trends%20in%20USChina%20Science%20and%20Technology%20Cooperation.pdf)
Technology Leakage and Security Concerns For the most part, the
government-to-government relationship is not a
conduit for the transfer of sensitive technologies, especially technologies embedded in physical
artifacts. The fact that the relationship does involve training and visits to U.S. laboratories, however, ensures
that knowledge transfers occur. U.S. concerns over the course of the last decade about “deemed exports” and “human
embodied” transfers of sensitive scientific knowledge or technology have led technical agencies to put in place
mechanisms to vet visiting scientists and engineers. 74 Overall, however, the government-to-government
relationship is much less a conduit for technology transfer than commercial relations or academic
channels. Security concerns have become far more prevalent in the relationship now than in the past, in
large part due to various political tensions between the two countries and China’s rise as a commercial
and potential military competitor. Allegations of cyberespionage activities made by both sides against
the other further highlight the increasing prevalence of information security issues. In particular, concerns
over Chinese espionage and technology acquisition strategies have led to greater wariness in the conduct
of relations on the U.S. side in the face of reports from several agencies that Chinese interests in scientific
collaboration seem to be targeted at specific fields and facilities where China hopes to enhance
capabilities.75 A less-than-transparent state secrecy legal environment on the Chinese side has led to
limitations on data sharing under certain protocols. This has led to U.S. frustrations over the conduct of field research in ways
that are inconsistent with the culture of scientific openness with which U.S. officials and investigators are familiar.76 As a further sign of
deepening security concerns on the Chinese side, the recently formed Central National Security
Commission has included science and technology as one of 11 areas for which state security must be
strengthened. 77 How this development will affect U.S.-China cooperation remains to be seen. From a Chinese perspective, U.S. export
controls and visa processes (though much improved) are also manifestations of a security consciousness that is not always consistent with open
scientific practices. A
recent controversy over the prohibition of Chinese participation in the NASA Ames
Research Center meeting to discuss the findings from the Kepler interplanetary survey mission
illustrates this tension. 78 It has long been assumed by the U.S. side that Chinese intelligence agencies play a key role in identifying
technology acquisition targets, which are then shared with civilian S&T agencies as well as national security agencies.79 Since this report is
being prepared on an unclassified, open source basis, it is not possible to determine the extent to which such technology acquisition targeting
enters into the S&T relationship under the Agreement other than to note that several U.S.
agencies have expressed concern
during interviews with the author about what appears to be Chinese targeting of selected laboratories and
fields of study for cooperative activities.80 Several recent cases do illustrate that S&T cooperation, as discussed further below, is
not immune to espionage.81
Aff does not overcome S&T nationalism in dual-use tech transfer- national security
concerns
Suttmeier 14 (Richard P. Suttmeier, Dr. Richard P. Suttmeier is a Professor of Political Science, Emeritus, at the
University of Oregon. He has written widely on science and technology development issues in China, “Trends in U.S.-China
Science and Technology Cooperation: Collaborative Knowledge Production for the Twenty-First Century?”, Research Report
Prepared on Behalf of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, September 11, 2014,
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Trends%20in%20USChina%20Science%20and%20Technology%20Cooperation.pdf)
But while the stakes are rising, questions about the modalities of relationships in S&T are also becoming more complex. Research
and
innovation today are frequently characterized by the shortened time between scientific discovery and
technological application. Scientific research is therefore seldom far from commercial application and from the emergence of dual-use
technologies having both commercial and military applications. Concerns among business enterprises, universities, and
governments for protecting proprietary knowledge, or knowledge of relevance to national security,
have been heightened. Thus, the win-win, positive-sum assumptions about cooperation in science
have become complicated by the fact that the development of commercial and national security
applications of new knowledge often introduce competitive pressures and the possibility of zero-sum
outcomes. National governments continue to adopt policies designed to capture value from scientific and
technological advances and enhance national capabilities for research and innovation, even as they
expand international cooperation. Both China and the United States exhibit these tensions between
"science and technology nationalism" and "science and technology globalism"; the relationship
between the countries is an especially rich case of how these tensions are managed.
Trade frictions and export controls are an alt cause
Xinbo 11 [Wu Xinbo, a 2006–07 Jennings Randolph senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace,
is currently professor and deputy director at the Center for American Studies and associate dean at the
School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University. 2011. “China and the United
States Core Interests, Common Interests, and Partnership”
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR277.pdf//jweideman]
The financial crisis originated in the United States in the fall of 2008 and revealed many shortcomings in the current world economy at both the microeconomic and
macroeconomic levels, from the slack financial oversight in the United States and the dereliction of duty by international financial institutions to the American
public’s overspending and China’s oversaving of foreign currency. Since the crisis, the greatest challenge has been in securing strong, sustainable, and balanced global
economic growth—a key goal agreed upon at the third Group of Twenty (G-20) financial summit, held in Pittsburgh in September 2009. China and the United States
must act cooperatively to advance this goal, and both countries can play important and unique roles in the process. They are the world’s two largest economies. In
2010, they together contributed over 40 percent to the growth of the global economy.11 Moreover, as the largest developed and developing countries, the development
models of the United States and China, respectively, affect countries in their own categories. Finally,
it is in both Chinese and U.S. interests to
secure strong, sustainable, and balanced global growth, given the two economies’ high degree of
interdependence as well as their deep integration with the world economy generally. Sino-U.S. economic
cooperation must occur unilaterally, bilaterally, and multilaterally. Unilaterally, China—as it already started to do during the financial crisis—should
further boost its domestic consumption to adjust its long-pursued export-oriented development model. It also should base its economic growth more on technological
progress and gradually reduce its dependence on low-end manufacturing industries, which have consumed too many resources and heavily polluted the environment.
For its part, perhaps obviously, the United States must get its public to save more and borrow less—a task that is as important as it is difficult. As the Obama
administration has realized, it is also necessary to emphasize the real economy (such as the manufacturing industry, dealing with material products) and reduce
reliance on the virtual economy (such as finance, dealing with nonmaterial products). Bilaterally,
both China and the United States
should resist the temptation of trade protectionism. Since President Obama’s first year in office, trade frictions between
China and the United States have risen remarkably,12 and with high unemployment rates as well as the Obama administration’s political
ties to trade unions, protectionist pressure is felt strongly and acutely. However, a trade war with China would hurt the U.S. economy in many ways, from reducing the
import of products of U.S. companies that have relocated their production bases to China to suspending China’s buying and holding of U.S. treasury bonds. Sino-
U.S. trade has been largely complementary and generally does not threaten major domestic industries on
both sides. These should not be sacrificed in trying to alleviate domestic economic problems, particularly
on the U.S. side. Robust bilateral trade is crucial to the healthy development of Sino-U.S. economic
relations and underpins bilateral political relations as well. Direct investment is an important part of bilateral economic ties. U.S.
investment in China started in 1980 and reached $59.65 billion by 2008 in accumulative terms. Despite the financial crisis, U.S. companies invested in 1,530 projects
in China in 2009, with an actual utilization of about $2.56 billion.13 However, starting in 2009, U.S. companies began to complain loudly about the changing
investment environment in China.14 Given the importance of foreign direct investment (FDI) to China’s economic development, it is essential that their legitimate
concerns are addressed seriously. Meanwhile, fueled by the world’s largest foreign currency reserve and endorsed by the government’s go-abroad strategy, Chinese
firms recently have sought opportunities for overseas investment more actively. In 2009, Chinese direct investment in the United States reached $620 million,15 a
figure that is relatively small compared with U.S. direct investment in China, but increasing rapidly, as one recent research pointed out, “FDI from China to the United
States is now more than doubling annually.”16 Yet Chinese investors do not regard the investment environment in the United States as encouraging. After the passage
of the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, the U.S. Department of the Treasury promulgated its rules of implementation in November 2008,
involving regulations pertaining to mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers by foreign persons. It has subjected to review transactions involving infrastructure, energy,
and crucial technologies affecting U.S. national security, and has also set strict rules on foreign investment. In the eyes of Chinese companies, the new regulations
create many obstacles to foreign investors.17 More generally, from the failed bidding of the China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) for U.S. oil company
Unocal in 200518 to the recent controversy over Chinese steel company Anshan Iron and Steel Group’s investment plan in a U.S. steel plant,19 Chinese
investors are increasingly concerned about the political and security influences on the U.S. opposition to
Chinese investment. Given the real and potential benefits of Chinese FDI in the United States, such as creating more job opportunities and reducing
bilateral trade imbalances, Chinese investors should not be deterred by investment protectionism in the United States, institutionally or culturally. U.S. export
control to China is another area for improvement. Since the 1950s, China has been a main target of U.S. export
control. However, since the improvements in Sino-U.S. ties starting in the 1970s, U.S. export control policy toward China has been adjusted many times. The
issue became more salient in recent years due partly to the George W. Bush administration’s stepped-up
export control measures against China and partly to the growing trade imbalance between the two
countries. China deems strengthened U.S. export control as unfair, since it is probably the only major
U.S. trading partner to be brought under such strict restrictions. Beijing complains that it usually takes
three months to half a year and sometimes even eighteen months to obtain a license for exports to China,
much more lengthy than in other countries, such as Germany and Japan, where two or three weeks to a month is enough. Besides, in the process of obtaining an export
license, reviews will be carried out by the U.S. concerned authorities whenever necessary, and additional clauses on end-user are attached in commercial contracts.20
**Perm/Theory**
PCP
The counterplan is functionally and textually competitive—it limits the scope of the bill instead of
full legislative repeal which is plan minus.
Curtial means to eliminate
Ackerman 14 (Spencer, national security editor for Guardian US. A former senior writer for Wired,
“Failure to pass US surveillance reform bill could still curtail NSA powers,” October 3rd, 2014, Two members
of the US House of Representatives are warning that a failure to pass landmark surveillance reform will result in a far more
drastic curtailment of US surveillance powers – one that will occur simply by the House doing nothing at all. As the clock ticks
down on the 113th Congress, time is running out for the USA Freedom Act, the first legislative attempt at reining in the National Security
Agency during the 9/11 era. Unless
the Senate passes the stalled bill in the brief session following November’s midterm
elections, the NSA will keep all of its existing powers to collect US phone records in bulk, despite support for
the bill from the White House, the House of Representatives and, formally, the NSA itself. But supporters of the Freedom Act are warning that
the intelligence agencies and their congressional allies will find the reform bill’s legislative death to be a cold comfort. On 1 June 2015, Section
215 of the Patriot Act will expire. The loss of Section 215 will deprive the NSA of the legal pretext for its bulk domestic phone records dragnet.
But it will cut deeper than that: the Federal Bureau of Investigation will lose its controversial post-9/11 powers to obtain vast amounts of business
records relevant to terrorism or espionage investigations. Those are investigative authorities the USA Freedom Act leaves largely untouched.
Section 215’s expiration will occur through simple legislative inertia, a characteristic of the House of Representatives in recent years. Already,
the House has voted to sharply curtail domestic dragnet surveillance, both by passing the Freedom Act in May and
voting the following month to ban the NSA from warrantlessly searching through its troves of international
communications for Americans’ identifying information. Legislators are warning that the next Congress, expected to be more
Republican and more hostile to domestic spying, is unlikely to reauthorise Section 215.
Severence is a voting issue—makes the aff a moving target and kills negative strategy—voter for
fairness and education
PDB
Perm do both links to the net benefit—full repeal stops the monitoring of students from China—
causes brain drain.
They are mutually exclusive—you cannot limit the scope of a repealed act.
ME
Note
The cp doesn’t in any way solve the isis advantage
1nc
Text: The United States federal government should limit the scope of Student &
Exchange Visitor Information System to the exclusive monitoring of Khazakstani,
Afghanistani, Iraqi, Syrian, Iranian, and Saudi Arabian students.
Solves the first advantage—No ev that middle eastern students are key to STEM.
{insert terror da/links from original case neg}
**2nc: Solvency**
2nc- Stem
The Counterplan is sufficient to solve the whole aff—they no logical reason why Middle eastern
students are necessary to solve stem--- BRICS students fill in.
The CP solves china and India—That’s more than sufficient
Kohli 14 [Sonali is a reporter for Quartz covering education and diversity. She was most recently an
Atlantic Media editorial fellow at Quartz, and before that a metro reporter at the Los Angeles Register and
the Orange County Register. November 2014. “Why Iran and Brazil are sending more college students to
the US” http://qz.com/296952/why-iran-and-brazil-are-sending-more-college-students-to-theus///jweideman]
There were 274,439 students from China enrolled at US universities in 2013-2014. The country is still
responsible for sending the most students to the US, largely because the demand for higher education is
greater than the number of seats available in quality institutions in China. China is trying to build a system of excellent
higher education, which is somewhat reflected in the dip in growth of Chinese international students coming to the US (though China still makes up
31% of all US international students). China has actually seen a tiny decrease in the number of graduate students this year compared to years past,
according to a recent report from the Council of Graduate Schools. The 1% dip isn’t enough to be significant, but it’s notable that this follows a 3% decrease in
graduate students the previous year, and could indicate that China is having some success in its attempts to improve higher education, says Jeff Allum, the director of
research and policy analysis at the Council of Graduate Schools. China has a growing middle class, including many one-child families who want to provide the best
education that money can buy for that child, says Rajika Bhandari, the deputy vice president for research and evaluation at the Institute of International Education.
India For the last school year, India accounted for 11.6% of all international students in the US, with
102,673 students. This is the first overall increase of Indian students in the last few years, which is likely attributable to a few factors, Bhandari says. Firstly,
there is a growing college- and- graduate-aged population in India, and like China, India does not have
the educational infrastructure to provide quality, graduate-level education to every student who wants it;
the prestigious Indian Institutes of Technology have an acceptance rate of less than 2%. The economy has also
helped students make the move to the US—the Indian rupee stabilized against the dollar toward the end of 2013, which
gave students more financial flexibility to study in the US, Bhandari tells Quartz. Lastly, the UK, another
large destination for Indian students, saw a sharp drop in Indian students after it complicated immigration policies and raised tuition, Bhandari
says. Most of the growth in Indian students is coming at the graduate level. In 2013-14, 12.3% of Indian students in the US were undergraduate students, 59.5% were
graduate students, and 27% were in optional practical training,
which allows foreign students to work for up to a year in their
field of study before or after they graduate. Bhandari says the high number of graduate students is likely
due to the fact that many of those students are coming for a STEM education, and US universities provide
considerable financial aid for such graduate programs.
**Theory/Perm**
PCP
The counterplan is functionally and textually competitive—it limits the scope of the
bill instead of full legislative repeal which is plan minus.
Curtial means to eliminate
Ackerman 14 (Spencer, national security editor for Guardian US. A former senior writer for Wired,
“Failure to pass US surveillance reform bill could still curtail NSA powers,” October 3rd, 2014, Two members
of the US House of Representatives are warning that a failure to pass landmark surveillance reform will result in a far more
drastic curtailment of US surveillance powers – one that will occur simply by the House doing nothing at all. As the clock ticks
down on the 113th Congress, time is running out for the USA Freedom Act, the first legislative attempt at reining in the National Security
Agency during the 9/11 era. Unless
the Senate passes the stalled bill in the brief session following November’s midterm
elections, the NSA will keep all of its existing powers to collect US phone records in bulk, despite support for
the bill from the White House, the House of Representatives and, formally, the NSA itself. But supporters of the Freedom Act are warning that
the intelligence agencies and their congressional allies will find the reform bill’s legislative death to be a cold comfort. On 1 June 2015, Section
215 of the Patriot Act will expire. The loss of Section 215 will deprive the NSA of the legal pretext for its bulk domestic phone records dragnet.
But it will cut deeper than that: the Federal Bureau of Investigation will lose its controversial post-9/11 powers to obtain vast amounts of business
records relevant to terrorism or espionage investigations. Those are investigative authorities the USA Freedom Act leaves largely untouched.
Section 215’s expiration will occur through simple legislative inertia, a characteristic of the House of Representatives in recent years. Already,
the House has voted to sharply curtail domestic dragnet surveillance, both by passing the Freedom Act in May and
voting the following month to ban the NSA from warrantlessly searching through its troves of international
communications for Americans’ identifying information. Legislators are warning that the next Congress, expected to be more
Republican and more hostile to domestic spying, is unlikely to reauthorise Section 215.
Severence is a voting issue—makes the aff a moving target and kills negative strategy—voter for
fairness and education
PDB
Perm do both links to the net benefit—full repeal doesn’t monitor students from the
Middle East.
They are mutually exclusive—you cannot limit the scope of a repealed act.
Prison Abolition PICs
1NC
1NC -- KKK
Plan except for members of the KKK
SPLC 15 (Southern Poverty Law Center, law firm which advocates for social justice and has had a
series of court successes, “Church of the National Knights of the Ku Klux Klan,” 2015,
http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-files/groups/church-of-the-national-knights-of-the-kuklux-klan)//ghs-VA
Once one of the largest and most active Klan groups in America, the Church of the National Knights of the
Ku Klux Klan has more recently gained a kind of "Keystone Kops" reputation on the white supremacist scene for its
bumbling ways. As disorganized as the Indiana-based group may be, it is still dangerous, as evidenced by a 2001 murder and plot linked to
National Knights members in North Carolina. In Its Own Words "What We Believe. The WHITE RACE: The irreplaceable
hub of our nation, our Christian Faith, and the high levels of Western Culture and Technology." — Nation Knights website
"Our God, we as KLANSMAN acknowledge our dependence on You and Your loving kindness toward us. May our gratitude be full and constant
and inspire us to walk in Your ways. Let us never forget that each Klansman, by his conduct and spirit determines his own destiny, good or bad.
May he forsake the bad and strive for the good as truly being in the image of God. Keep us in the powerful bond and fraternal Union of Klannish
fidelity towards one another and devoted loyalty to this, our great Klan movement. Let us remember that the crowning glory of a Klansman is to
serve his race, his community, his nation and his own high principles. God save our Race and help us to be free people, masters of our own
destiny." — "Klansman Kreed," National Knights website Background The National Knights of the Klu Klux Klan formed in 1960 as a response
to the growing civil rights movement. Originally a collection of splintered Klan groups from several southern states, this loose confederation
quickly grew into one of the largest Klan groups in the nation. According to the Anti-Defamation League, the National Knights coordinated a
series of cross burnings across the South (reportedly more than 1,000) on March 26, 1960, and claimed between 10,000 and 15,000 members.
From 1963 until his death in 1993, James R. Venable served as the imperial wizard, or national leader, of the National Knights. A Georgia lawyer
whose ancestors owned the legendary Stone Mountain near Atlanta — the site of the 1915 rally that inaugurated the so-called "second era" Klan
— Venable used the mountaintop and nearby family land for annual rallies that drew members from the National Knights but also other Klan
factions. In 1993, the year he died, Venable appointed Railton Loy, a former railroad worker who goes by the Klan name Ray Larsen, to take over
as the next imperial wizard. Under Loy's leadership, the National Knights continued to hold rallies at the group's new headquarters outside of
South Bend, Ind. But unlike in the past, attendance at these events was sparse. Just 35 supporters showed up for a May 5, 2001, rally, for instance,
while over 200 people attended a nearby counter-protest, according to the South Bend Tribune. Even worse than the low turnouts, these events
often proved embarrassing for National Knights, leading to tangles with the law. After the 2001 rally was over, as
police escorted the Klan members to their cars and away from the counter-protesters, Klansmen could not remember where they parked. In the
confusion, a fight with counter-protesters began that resulted in eight arrests, including that of Loy's son, Grand Dragon (or
state leader) Richard Loy. It didn't stop there. Local newspaper coverage of the rally used the elder Loy's real name instead of his preferred alias,
Ray Larsen. After Loy allegedly called a reporter, demanding that she use his alias and asking where she lived, he was charged with misdemeanor
telephone harassment. Then, the next month, two sheriff's deputies in Williamson County, Texas, were fired after they tried to recruit a fellow
officer with an application touting "White Supremacy." Dept. David Gay, 44, and Sgt. Greg Palm, 29, had both worked for the sheriff's office for
more than four years. The National Knights really lived up to their "Keystone Kops" reputation when Railton and Richard Loy hosted what was
widely billed as a "Christmas unity rally" on Dec. 8, 2002, at the younger Loy's Osceola, Ind., farm. They hoped to bring together various
factions of the contentious world of professional racists, and indeed, they drew members of two far larger groups — the American Knights of the
Ku Klux Klan and the Aryan Nations, which sent its then-propaganda chief, August Kreis. Close to 50 people gathered for the Saturday afternoon
dinner and cross burning. As hungry racists filed into the shed where food was being served, it quickly became apparent that the Loys had
forgotten a critical fact: Large numbers of Klansmen are followers of Christian Identity, a racist and anti-Semitic theology that holds that Jews are
biologically Satanic and whites are the true Israelites — meaning, according to Identity adherents' reading of the Bible, that whites can't eat pork.
When guest Klansmen strolled into the shed and were confronted by a dead pig that by all accounts was barely cooked, several Klansmen and
Aryan Nations members recoiled with horror. The situation became even more ridiculous. As the gathered haters circulated and clucked about the
culinary faux pas — and while a red-suited "Klanta Klaus" worked the crowd nearby — some got to wondering why Rick Loy had a badly
swollen lip and two missing front teeth. Soon enough, the story came out, provoking a fresh round of mirth. After being presented with a riot
shield that was alleged to be bulletproof, Loy had apparently decided to put the matter to a test, firing a round into the shield at close range.
Unsurprisingly, the bullet ricocheted off the shield — which stood up to the tryout admirably — and hit Loy in the mouth. Things got worse still.
As the climactic moment of the afternoon arrived, Klansmen struggled to set up a giant swastika to burn. It collapsed on the ground. Finally, the
Nazi symbol was burned where it lay. Then it was time for the cross. It quickly became apparent that it wasn't going to be possible to get the cross
upright for burning — at least not the way it had been constructed. In the end, someone had the bright idea of sawing about 12 feet off the
wooden cross' bottom, after which it, too, was finally lit. Not long afterward, the rally then came to an end, and its embarrassed participants
headed for home. Despite its sometimes comical stumbles, the
National Knights remains a potentially violent and
dangerous group. This fact became obvious on Jan. 1, 2003, when Glen Gautier, a member of the National Knights, confessed to authorities
his role in the brutal murder of another Klan member. By his own account, Gautier, who was 50 at the time, had carried out the killing
with three other members of two separate but allied Klan chapters, or "klaverns," that roamed the backwoods of semi-rural central North
Carolina in 2001, stealing guns, making bombs, plotting murders, and carrying out at least one. His confession
triggered parallel state murder and federal gunrunning cases, which have since dragged on for years. In the end, two members of the
National Knights pleaded guilty in 2006 to charges in connection with a plot to blow up the Johnston County, N.C., courthouse and kill Sheriff
Steve Bizzell, and were sentenced to a year in federal prison after cooperating with authorities. Two months later, in December,
a judge found Klan boss and alleged ringleader Charles Barefoot incompetent to stand trial for orchestrating the murder of a fellow Klansman
suspected of informing to police.
1NC -- Serial Killers
Do the plan except for serial killers
Raue 13 (Tom, leader on a U.S. Union Board, “Tearing down the walls,” October 22, 2013,
http://honisoit.com/2013/10/tearing-down-the-walls/)//ghs-VA
A focus on social programs and wealth redistribution would prevent many crimes, and a system focused on
rehabilitation rather than punishment would prevent minor criminals becoming serious ones. However, when it
comes to very serious crimes, it is hard to see alternatives to a prison system. Educating people about respect and
consent is a better approach to rape prevention than punishment after the fact, but some people will never get the message. Most murderers
can be rehabilitated, but there are rare serial killers who will always commit violence if they are left to
their own devices. David stresses that prisons do more harm than good for most prisoners, but that there are some
“career criminals” who are “unimaginable in society”.
1NC -- Police Officers
Plan except for cops convicted of police brutality
Vitale 15 (Alex S, associate professor of sociology at Brooklyn College, “2 Very Different Ways to
Punish Killer Cops,” MAY 5, 2015, http://www.thenation.com/article/two-very-different-ways-punishkiller-cops/)//ghs-VA
Sending killer cops to jail will undoubtedly produce a kind of short-term catharsis for the many victims of police
misconduct and those that support them. It may produce some sense of much needed justice for the family and
friends of Freddie Gray, but will it really make them any safer or reduce the power or predilections of police to go on victimizing poor
people of color? There will also likely be some kind of short-term deterrent effect; officers will certainly start
properly seat-belting prisoners they are transporting. But it is unlikely to bring an end to mass criminalization and the
disrespect and violence that inevitably go with it. We cannot have a kinder and gentler war on drugs, crime, and disorder.
2NC --- KKK
2NC---Solvency Overview
The counterplan solves the case -- the basis of their deconstruction argument is that
black people are always paradigmatically seen as criminal – the counterplan
resolves the petty crime justification which their Alexander evidence identifies as
the core reason black people are able to be locked up but doesn’t allow those who
commit acts of racial violence free.
2NC -- Serial Killers
2NC---Solvency Overview
The counterplan solves the case – the basis of their deconstruction argument is that
black people are always paradigmatically seen as criminal – the counterplan
resolves the petty crime justification which their Alexander evidence identifies as
the core reason black people are able to be locked up.
2NC -- Police Officers
2NC---Solvency Overview
The counterplan solves the case -- we let those who have historically been surveilled
out of jail and keep those who surveil and have enacted violence on marginalized
bodies from causing more violence
2NC -- George Zimmerman
Zimmerman shouldn’t get released -- some people deserve to stay in jail
Jalen 13 (JV, blogger located in California, “The Zimmerman Trial Through An Abolitionist Lens,” 712-2013, http://www.postbourgie.com/2013/07/12/the-zimmerman-trial-through-an-abolitionistlens/)//ghs-VA
Dead weight seems to hang in the air as we wait for the verdict in the trial of George Zimmerman. My fears
and hopes feel hinged on each shallow exhale as I sit at the kitchen table, sifting through articles, nibbling oatmeal, talking heads muted. Like
many people I know, I’ve been angry. The murder of Trayvon Martin has been about a young person who was presumed suspicious, followed,
and shot in the chest on his way back to his father’s house after stepping out for a snack. It is surely about that. But it has also been about black
men everywhere who are read as a threat. It has been about the ease with which the police took Zimmerman’s word when he said he acted in selfdefense, and those weeks he lived regular life after having murdered someone in cold blood. It’s especially about these facts when considered in
relationship to how many black and brown people go to prison for comparatively minuscule reasons: shoplifting a candy bar, driving a little bit
fast, firing a warning shot during an abusive encounter. We have consistently been told that this is “not about race,” perhaps strategically, perhaps
not. But of course — in a country where there is a $2 million bounty on the head of a black woman for allegedly killing a police officer, while a
police officer who participated in the harassment and murder of a black man in front of the world on a BART platform is serving in the army — it
is about race. However, it’s
about race in ways other than the egregious dissimilarities between treatment of
black life and white life. It’s also about the colors of the punishment system, and how we think through our
relationship to it as a whole. As a person who is against the carceral state, I have struggled with my feelings about
the Zimmerman trial. If I truly believe in prison abolition, then it cannot, seemingly, be a sometimes commitment. As I await the jury,
heart in stomach, I am trying to think about how this whole situation could have gone differently through an abolitionist lens. What if, when
people became outraged that Zimmerman was “roaming free,” they had demanded transformative justice rather than arrest? What if, rather than
sitting there dopily, George Zimmerman would have had to explain himself to Tracy Martin and Sybrina Fulton? A friend of mine who advocates
community conflict resolution, even to the point of violence, suggests George Zimmerman deserved to get whatever may or may not have come
to him without state intervention. Are these our alternatives? What do we want? It
feels easier to think about prison abolition
when we confront all the damage the punishment system — which includes laws, their enforcement, and the multiple
institutions and relationships involved in those practices — does to people’s lives. As the United States is home to 5% of the world’s population
and 25% of the world’s prison population, the severity of the problem is blatant. As we consider the disproportionate number of black and brown
people who are targeted by surveillance and other punitive procedures, the violence is clear. But if we also acknowledge that the institution itself
cannot be redeemed, then that means working against its domination, even — and particularly — in cases like Zimmerman’s, when we may not
be sympathetic to the potentially incarcerated. Everyday abolition has to be about thinking of ways to address conflict and harm outside of the
punishment system, on a regular basis. I’m asking you to think with me about the ways that this may be possible. If
George Zimmerman
is convicted, perhaps there will be a moment of joy for a lot of people across the country: here, this apparently
unapologetic man who murdered a teenage boy, will be locked away for some years. He will, maybe, feel regret or fear
or hurt in prison. But, for each George Zimmerman, how many black, brown, trans, gender noncomforming, undocumented, or homeless people
will also be locked away? And for what we might deem far lesser reasons? How many people with disabilities or medical needs will be confined
to some kind of institution, be it called a prison or a hospital?
Privacy Amendment CP
1NC
1NC Shell
Text: The United States federal government should propose an amendment to the
Constitution expressly guaranteeing the right to informational privacy
A constitutional amendment builds on state momentum to ordain privacy as a
fundamental right – only this prevents circumvention by resulting in strict judicial
scrutiny
Jeffrey M. Shaman 6, B.A. from the Pennsylvania State University, J.D. from the University of Southern California, and LL.M. from
Georgetown University, where he was a Keigwin Graduate Fellow. teaches Constitutional Law, State Constitutional Law, and First Amendment
Freedom of Speech, member of the American Law Institute, the American Society of Legal History, and the U.S. Association of Constitutional
Law, 2006, “THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW”, p.1010-1012,
http://org.law.rutgers.edu/publications/lawjournal/issues/37_4/Shaman.pdf)
****states say yes – will pass
Whatever theory is used to formulate it, the right of privacy must be connected to a constitutional
provision in order to have status as a constitutional right. In the federal system, the right of privacy, at one time
located within the penumbra emanating from several constitutional provisions,278 has been established as an aspect of “liberty”
within the protection of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.279 In the state systems, a variety of
provisions have been evoked as the constitutional source of the right of privacy. A number of states have ruled that a right of
privacy is encompassed by the protection of “liberty” afforded by a due process clause, a law of the land clause, or other
constitutional provisions that forbid the exercise of arbitrary power over individual liberty.280 In fact, the term “privacy” frequently
is used interchangeably with the term “liberty,” and courts regularly have turned to constitutional
guarantees of liberty to embrace the right of privacy.281 State constitutional guarantees of equality also may be relied on as a
source of protection for the right of privacy. In some states, a right of privacy has been found implicit in constitutional
provisions declaring, “All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain natural and
inalienable rights,”282 or stating, “The enumeration of rights in this constitution shall not be construed to deny
or impair others retained by, and inherent in, the people.”283 In more recent times, five states have amended their
constitutions to expressly guarantee the right of privacy.284 Finally, as described before, some states have declined
to tie the right of privacy to a single specific constitutional provision, preferring instead to use the penumbra theory to
designate privacy as an animating value that underlies different parts of the state constitution.285
The enactment of
constitutional provisions expressly guaranteeing a right of privacy has the effect of
ordaining privacy as a fundamental right. Privacy may also be endowed as a fundamental right by
recognizing it as such under a more general constitutional provision, such as a provision guaranteeing that
liberty may not be denied arbitrarily or without due process of law. While fundamental rights are not
absolute, they may not be restricted unless the government can demonstrate that it has extremely strong
justification for doing so. Any law that impinges upon a fundamental right will be subject to strict judicial
scrutiny and will be struck down unless the government can show that the law is necessary to accomplish
a compelling state interest. Strict scrutiny is one of three methods that the courts use to review the constitutionality
of legislation. At the other extreme lies minimal scrutiny— sometimes referred to as “rationality review” because it requires only that legislation
possess a modicum of rationality to be constitutional. Under minimal scrutiny, legislation is presumed constitutional and will
not be struck down unless shown to bear no rational relationship to any legitimate state interest. In practice, there are two varieties of minimal
scrutiny, the most common of which is completely deferential to the legislature and reduces minimal scrutiny to virtually no scrutiny at all,
providing nothing more than a pretense of rationality to legislation. The other form of minimal scrutiny, which makes an occasional appearance,
also is deferential, but not completely so. It renders the review of legislation a bit more genuine. Strict scrutiny is not the only tier of heightened
intermediate scrutiny operates somewhere between
strict and minimal scrutiny. While strict scrutiny starts off with a finger on one side of the scale and minimal scrutiny starts off with a
judicial review; an intermediate tier also exists. As its name indicates,
finger on the other side of the scale, intermediate scrutiny supposedly starts off with an equal balance. While strict scrutiny asks if there is a
compelling state interest and minimal scrutiny asks only if there is a valid state interest, intermediate scrutiny asks for something in between—an
important or substantial state interest. While
strict scrutiny asks if the legislative means are absolutely necessary to
accomplish the ends, and minimal scrutiny asks only if the means are reasonably related to the ends,
intermediate scrutiny requires a close, though not perfect, fit between the means and ends of legislation.
Minimal scrutiny operates by granting deference to the legislature, but under strict or intermediate scrutiny such deference is inappropriate either
because the legislation under review is tainted by a suspicious property (such as racial or gender bias) or because it impinges upon the exercise of
a basic right (such as the right to vote) of constitutional magnitude—in other words, a fundamental right. Hence, the
designation of
privacy as a fundamental right, either expressly or implicitly, is extremely consequential because it brings
into play strict judicial scrutiny of legislative action. Once privacy is recognized as a fundamental right
within the protection of strict scrutiny, it then becomes extremely important to define the right of privacy
to determine exactly what activities it encompasses, which accordingly will be entitled to the highest
degree of constitutional protection.
2NC
2NC Solvency
The CP is key to protecting the right to privacy
Jeffrey Rosen 14, an American academic and commentator on legal affairs, “Madison’s Privacy Blind Spot,” 1/18/14,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/19/opinion/sunday/madisons-privacy-blind-spot.html?_r=0
In practice, the neo-Madisonian distinction between surveillance by the government and surveillance by Google makes little sense. It is true that,
as Judge Pauley concluded, “People
voluntarily surrender personal and seemingly private information to transnational corporations which exploit that data for profit. Few think twice about it.Ӧ But why? Why is it O.K.
for AT&T to know about our political, religious and sexual associations, but not the government?¶ You
might say there is a difference between political and cultural information. If the government knows you
attended a Rand Paul rally, it could punish you by auditing your tax returns. But if AT&T knows, it might
send you an ad for a Tea Party Tax Day protest. ¶ That distinction is unconvincing. Once data is collected by
private parties, the government will inevitably demand access.¶ More fundamentally, continuously tracking my location,
whether by the government or AT&T, is an affront to my dignity. When every step I take on- and off-line is recorded, so an
algorithm can predict if I am a potential terrorist or a potential customer, I am being objectified and
stereotyped, rather than treated as an individual, worthy of equal concern and respect.¶ Justice Louis
Brandeis, the greatest defender of privacy in the 20th century, recognized this when he equated “the right to be
let alone” with offenses against honor and dignity.¶ What Americans may now need is a constitutional
amendment to prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures of our persons and electronic effects, whether by
the government or by private corporations like Google and AT&T.¶ Perhaps even Madison, who unsuccessfully proposed a preamble to the
Constitution declaring “that all power is originally rested in, and consequently derived from the people,” and that all people have basic natural
rights, including “the enjoyment of life and liberty” and the right of “pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety,” might have realized that our
rights to enjoy liberty, and to obtain happiness and safety at the same time, are threatened as much by
corporate as government surveillance.¶ In any event, it is clear that, to keep us secure against the 21st-century version of the general
warrants that so alarmed Madison and the other founders, America needs a robust debate about amending the Constitution
to meet the exigencies of our electronic age.¶
There must be a change in current legislation to safe guard privacy. It’s the only
way to protect fundamental rights
David Wright 13, Trilateral founder and Managing Partner, “Integrating privacy and ethical impact assessments,” 2013,
http://web.a.ebscohost.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/ehost/detail/detail?sid=19dc2617-dc92-4b65-aedea9c94253e4fc%40sessionmgr4005&vid=2&hid=4112&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=a9h&AN=92875759 ,2013
One important point to derive from the above discussion is that privacy and ethics are somewhat
intertwined. Privacy is both a fundamental right as well as an ethical issue. This intertwining makes it
plausible, and even desirable or ne- cessary, to assess privacy risks and ethical issues together. In addition
to the intertwining of privacy and ethics, tech- nology and privacy have also been two intertwined notions
that must be addressed together.2 Technology is a social practice embodying the capacity of societies to
transform themselves by creating the possibility to create and ma- nipulate not only physical objects, but
also symbols, cultural forms and social relations. In turn, privacy de- scribes a vital and complex aspect of
these social relations. Thus, technology influences people’s understanding of privacy, and people’s understanding of privacy is a key
factor in defining the direction of technological develop- ment. Either policy-making takes this rich and nuanced interplay
between technology and privacy into account, or we run the risk of failing to govern the current, concomitant, technology and privacy revolution. With the ‘technology revolution(s)’ of the last decades (ranging from the internet to
genetics), the notion of privacy has started a new journey. For instance, there is R&D on information and communication technologies (ICT)
implants, with which it becomes possible that a technologically ‘enhanced’ body communicates with nearby computers and exchanges data (Bo¨
hle et al. 2013). There are scientific development in genomics and proteomics that call for reconsidering the concept of ‘personal information’
(Taylor 2012), not to mention issues raised by technologies such as biometrics, smart sur- veillance systems and neurotechnology (Finn et al.
2011). However, it
becomes clear that many of the privacy problems produced by new technologies can no
longer be adequately assessed and addressed with revised data pro- tection approaches alone. With the advent
of new technologies such as next-generation biometrics, DNA sequencing and human enhancement technologies, the data being collected moves
from simply describing a person to being an inherent part of the person (Hallinan et al. 2013). All
these challenges make it
necessary not only to broaden data protection procedures and regulations but also to take other human
values and rights into account to support policy-makers and decision-takers to better balance
countervailing interests.
Constitution solves, legislature failure
Elbert Lin 2, Solicitor General of West Virginia, June 2002 “Prioritizing Privacy: A Constitutional Response to the Internet” Berkeley
Technology Law Journal Volume 17 | Issue 3 Article 5, http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1383&context=btlj)
A constitutional right would also avoid many of the criticisms surrounding statutory solutions. Critics consider
the mandatory, top down approach of statutes stifling and overbearing. 222 Others argue a statute would be
crippled by its inapplicability to new technologies. 22 3 Statutes are also easily swept aside by a changing
public sentiment 2 94 and unable to compensate for other important values, such as the First Amendment.225 In contrast, the
decision to invoke one's constitutional right ultimately lies with the individual. Constitutional protections
are not tied to specific technologies; their applicability is based on judicial interpretation and thus can 226 adapt to new
technologies. Finally, one of the greatest advantages of a constitutional right is that it is permanent and
inalienable, solid against fickle public sentiment, 227 but that beyond a certain point, its scope is sub- 228 ject to judicial interpretation.
This has allowed major constitutional rights, such as the First Amendment and the Establishment Clause, to coexist. 229
2NC AT: Courts Key
The Supreme Court is a mess – they’re political flip-floppers that are too
ambivalent to ensure a decisive ruling
Shaman 6
Jeffrey M.
, B.A. from the Pennsylvania State University, J.D. from the University of Southern California, and LL.M. from
Georgetown University, where he was a Keigwin Graduate Fellow. teaches Constitutional Law, State Constitutional Law, and First Amendment
Freedom of Speech, member of the American Law Institute, the American Society of Legal History, and the U.S. Association of Constitutional
Law, 2006, “THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW”, p.984-987,
http://org.law.rutgers.edu/publications/lawjournal/issues/37_4/Shaman.pdf)
On occasion, the Court has turned to the past as a source of fundamental rights. Thus, in Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, a 1977 decision, the plurality opinion concluded that the right to live together in an extended family was fundamental
because it was a liberty “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”87 Some years later, a
reluctant majority of the Court would again look to history in order to “assume” that under the
Due Process Clause, an individual possessed a right to bodily integrity, which encompassed the right to refuse unwanted
medical treatment.88 History, though, can be a double-edged sword, wielded either to accept rights on the
basis of their historical pedigree or reject them on the ground that they are not firmly established in our
history and tradition. An example of the latter occurred in a 1989 decision, Michael H. v. Gerald D., ruling that a biological father did not have a right to visit his child
because no such right could be found in the traditions of our society. 89 And in Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court ruled an individual did not have a right to physician-assisted suicide, once
the Court countenanced a different aspect of privacy by
ruling, in Stanley v. Georgia, that the private possession of obscene material cannot constitutionally be made a
crime, even though distribution of the material may be proscribed.91 The decision in Stanley was based on the First Amendment
again because none could be found in the traditions of our society.90 In 1969,
right of an individual to receive information and ideas which, in the Court’s view, takes on an added dimension in the privacy of a person’s own home.92 As the Court put it, “If the First
Stanley
recognized that the concept of privacy may comprehend a spatial element involving sanctity of the
home, an interest related to, though not the same as, the right of individual autonomy.94 In a case involving another component of the First Amendment, freedom of association, the Court
Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch.”93 Thus,
suggested that because the Bill of Rights was designed to secure individual liberty, it should afford substantial protection for the formation and preservation of “certain kinds of highly personal
relationships.”95 As the Court explained, the constitutional shelter granted to these relationships reflects the realization that individuals draw much of their emotional enrichment from close ties
with others. “Protecting these relationships from unwarranted state interference therefore safeguards the ability independently to define one’s identity that is central to any concept of liberty.”96
Regard for personal relationships or the sanctity of the home, however, was shunted aside in Bowers v. Hardwick,
a 1986 decision, in which the Court once again turned to history to cut short the reach of the Due Process
Clause, ruling by a vote of 5-4, that the right of privacy does not encompass the right of a consenting adult
to engage in homosexual conduct, even in the privacy of his or her home.97 In upholding the constitutionality of a Georgia criminal law prohibiting sodomy, the
majority opinion drew a strict distinction “between family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other.”98 Taking a historical approach to constitutional
such a right was
neither “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”99 nor “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”100 Seventeen
years later, however, Bowers was overruled by a 6-3 majority in Lawrence v. Texas, in which the Court held that a Texas sodomy statute making it a
interpretation, the Court refused to give constitutional countenance to a right to engage in homosexual conduct because, in the Court’s reading of history,
crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in intimate sexual relations was a violation of the Due Process Clause.101 Indeed, in Lawrence, not only did the Court decisively overrule
Bowers, 102 it also apologized for it, saying that Bowers was unjustly demeaning to gay and lesbian persons.103 And the Court devoted a good part of its opinion in Lawrence to explaining why
it believed that Bowers had been wrongly decided.104 In Lawrence, the Court dismissed the historical approach that had been taken in Bowers, noting that the historical record was more
complex than understood in Bowers, and that the Court’s historical analysis in Bowers was open to considerable doubt.105 More importantly, the Court thought that the Bowers majority did not
take sufficient account of more recent historical developments: “In all events we think that our laws and traditions in the past half century are of most relevance here.”106 Significantly, that more
recent tradition showed an emerging awareness that liberty provides substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.107 In other
words, more recent history showed a trend toward recognizing that the sexual life of consenting adults was a private matter that should be beyond the realm of state authority, at least state
criminal authority.108 The Court further explained that the liberty component of the Due Process Clause protects persons from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private
places and also protects other spheres of our lives and existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a dominant presence.109 The Court affirmed that “Freedom extends beyond
The instant case involves
liberty of the person both in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions.”110 Quoting Casey, the Court once again
spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.
proclaimed, “These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, arecentral to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”11
The Supreme Court has yet to develop a consistent theory to determine the
scope of the right of privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment. Today, some
of the
Justices
on the high Court
believe in adhering strictly to an historical approach which encompasses only those rights that are
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” or “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”112 Other Justices, though, are more forward
looking; they see history as an ongoing phenomena and constitutional interpretation as an evolving process that comprehends the recognition of new rights that are central to personal dignity and
autonomy. Although the right of privacy is firmly established as a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution,
the Supreme Court
remains ambivalent about the right of privacy, embracing it with fervor in one case, rejecting it in
another. As a result, the Court’s decisions concerning privacy are marked by inconsistency,
leaving the scope of the right of privacy under the Federal Constitution far from certain.
Courts and existing amendment reinterpretations fail
Nicole Tutrani 10, Law Clerk to the Honorable Henry Coke Morgan, Jr. at the Eastern District of Virginia, “The “Right to Privacy” and
its Constitutional Evolution: The Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments”, November 20, 2010,
https://www.regent.edu/admin/stusrv/writingcenter/docs/APSA7thedSamplePaper(PoliticalScienceStudentWriter'sManual).pdf)
In summation, most twentieth-century Supreme
Court opinions regarding the “right to privacy” as derived from the Ninth
are inherently flawed. The original intent of both the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments do not
allow for the liberties the Court has taken in their interpretation. The Ninth Amendment, which was intended to
protect the states against a latitude of governmental interpretation, has instead become the Supreme Court’s perpetual grab bag
of rights in the service of changing social morality. As a states’ rights amendment, provisions from the
Ninth Amendment are also logically un-incorporable to the states through the Fourteenth. Decisions, such as
Amendment
Griswold v. Connecticut, Roe v. Wade, and Lawrence v. Texas are prime examples of how the original meaning of these amendments has been
ignored. Although it is not unreasonable to assume a “right to privacy” as provided for by the first eight amendments, recent
interpretations of this right have resulted in an incredibly flawed body of case law. It would seem that the
Constitution is evolving in such a way that it no longer protects the peoples’ liberty; rather, it answers their
demands for the expansion of license based on an ever-changing social order.
2NC AT: Perm Do Both
Perm Do Both – still links to the net benefit – any inclusion of court action means
_________________ is triggered.
2NC AT: Circumvention/Rollback
Amendments won’t be rolled back or circumvented
-also a solvency deficit to aff
Vermeule 4
Adrian
, John H. Watson Professor of Law, “Constitutional Amendments and the Constitutional Common Law”, University
of Chicago Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 73, 2004,
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1072&context=public_law_and_legal_theory, AB)
On this view, it is an illusion that constitutional common law incurs lower decision costs in the long run , even if
a given change may be more easily implemented through adjudication in the short run. Although at any given time it is less costly to persuade
five Justices to adopt a proposed constitutional change than to obtain a formal amendment to the same effect, the former mode of change
incurs
higher decision costs over time, because common-law constitutionalism allows greater conflict in
subsequent periods. A benefit of formal amendments, then, is to more effectively discourage subsequent
efforts by constitutional losers to overturn adverse constitutional change. Precisely because the formal
amendment process is more costly to invoke, formal amendments are more enduring than are judicial
decisions that update constitutional rules;83 so losers in the amendment process will less frequently attempt to
overturn or destabilize the new rules, in subsequent periods, than will losers in the process of common-law constitutionalism. This
point does not necessarily suppose that dissenters from a given amendment come to agree with the enacting supermajority’s judgment, only that
they accept the new equilibrium faute de mieux. Obviously more work might be done to specify these intuitions, but it is at least plausible to
think that the
simplest view, on which formal amendments incur decisionmaking costs that exceed their
other benefits, is untenably crude. The overall picture, rather, is a tradeoff along the following lines. Relative to common-law
constitutionalism, the Article V process requires a higher initial investment to secure constitutional change. If Mueller is right, however,
constitutional settlements produced by the Article V process will tend to be more enduring over time than
is judicial updating, which can be unsettled and refought at lower cost in subsequent periods.
SSRA PICs
Amash-Conyers CP
Note
Use all relevant cards from the terror da to make this CP work.
Make sure to add a plank to the counterplan to solve internet if that advantage is read.
There are a bunch of other aff answers that apply already in the terror da file.
1nc
CP Text: The United States federal government should
 establish a prohibition on government required electronic surveillance backdoors
 pass the Amash-Conyers amendment to Defense Appropriations
 (insert advantage counterplan to internet)
The Counterplan limits the collection of domestic-domestic calls but allows domestic-foreign calls
Martin 13 [Kate Martin, Director, Center for National Security Studies. 7/23/13, “Amash-Conyers
amendment to Defense Appropriations to stop bulk collection of Americans’ telephone metadata.”
http://democrats.judiciary.house.gov/sites/democrats.judiciary.house.gov/files/images/CNSSAnalysis.pdf/
/jweideman]
The Amash-Conyers amendment would prohibit the NSA from bulk collection of telephone meta-data on
Americans under section 215 of the Patriot Act, 50 U.S.C. 1861. (The text is below.)
• The NSA would still be permitted to use section 215 to obtain the telephone metadata on any American
who is the subject of an investigation “to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence
gathering activities.”
As Representative Sensenbrenner has pointed out, Congress never intended to authorize the bulk
collection of Americans’ telephone meta-data under section 215 when it required that the tangible things
sought under 215 be limited to those relevant to an authorized investigation.
• Restoring Congress’ original understanding of the limits of 215 by enacting the Amash-Conyers
amendment would still leave the NSA and FBI many means to obtain telephone meta-data on individual
Americans. The FBI can use a National Security Letter to obtain such data in secret, including data on
domestic to domestic calls without any court order. Section 702, the 2008 Foreign Intelligence
Amendments Act, 50 U.S.C. 1881(a) also permits the bulk collection in real time of Americans’ overseas
telephone calls (and emails) including the meta-data associated therewith, so long as the government is
targeting foreigners abroad. And the penregister trap and trace authorities in the FISA also permit the
real-time collection of telephone meta-data of Americans’ domestic to domestic calls.
• The current bulk telephone meta-data collection was apparently begun as part of the NSA’s warrantless
wiretapping programs under the previous administration. It apparently began with no court authorization.
After public disclosure of the NSA program by The New York Times in December, 2005, the government
apparently sought and received sometime in 2006 0r 2007, a FISA court order permitting the bulk
collection of domestic telephone meta-data.
• One of the key features of this program is that it allows the collection of meta-data on all of Americans’
domestic to domestic phone calls – not just domestic to foreign calls – and the creation of a database of
such calls. One of its key uses apparently is to do “chain-link” analysis for 3 hops for each number which
the database is queried about. While the NSA has repeatedly stated that it only queries the 215 domestic
call database 300 times a year, each one of those queries apparently asks for all the phone numbers of
individuals 3 hops away from the original suspect–an enormous number of Americans with no connection
to terrorism (Testimony of John C. Inglis, Deputy Director, National Security Agency, House Judiciary
Committee, July 17, 2013).
As The Washington Post reported, General Alexander apparently determined that the way to provide
intelligence support to American troops fighting in Iraq was to collect every minute piece of information
about everyone there. “Rather than look for a single needle in the haystack, his approach was, ‘Let’s
collect the whole haystack,’” . . . “Collect it all, tag it, store it. . . . (“For NSA chief, terrorist threat drives
passion to ‘collect it all,’ observers say,” Ellen Nakashima and Joby Warrick, The Washington Post, July
14, 2013)
Solves terrorism
Executive Office 13 [Administration White Paper. August 9, 2013. “BULK COLLECTION OF
TELEPHONY METADATA UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT “
http://fas.org/irp/nsa/bulk-215.pdf//jweideman]
One of the greatest challenges the United States faces in combating international terrorism and preventing
potentially catastrophic terrorist attacks on our country is identifying terrorist operatives and networks,
particularly those operating within the United States. Detecting threats by exploiting terrorist communications has been, and
continues to be, one of the critical tools in this effort. It is imperative that we have the capability to rapidly identify any terrorist threat
inside the United States. One important method that the Government has developed to accomplish this task is
analysis of metadata associated with telephone calls within, to, or from the United States. The term “metadata” as used
here refers to data collected under the program that is about telephone calls but does not include the content of those calls. By analyzing telephony
metadata based on -3- telephone numbers or other identifiers associated with terrorist activity, trained
expert analysts can work to determine whether known or suspected terrorists have been in contact with
individuals in the United States. International terrorist organizations and their agents use the international
telephone system to communicate with one another between numerous countries all over the world,
including to and from the United States. In addition, when they are located inside the United States, terrorist operatives make domestic U.S.
telephone calls. The most analytically significant terrorist-related communications are those with one end in the United States or those that are purely domestic,
because those communications are particularly likely to identify suspects in the United States—whose activities may include planning attacks against the homeland.
The telephony metadata collection program was specifically developed to assist the U.S. Government in detecting communications between known or suspected
terrorists who are operating outside of the United States and who are communicating with others inside the United States, as well as communications between
operatives within the United States. In
this respect, the program helps to close critical intelligence gaps that were
highlighted by the September 11, 2001 attacks
Nuclear terror is feasible and likely – high motivation
Matthew Bunn 15, Professor of Practice at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Nickolas Roth, Research Associate at the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer
Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard Kennedy School, “Reducing the risks of nuclear
theft and terrorism,” from Routledge Handbook of Nuclear Proliferation and Policy ed. Joseph F. Pilat
and Nathan E. Busch, 5/15/15, pp. 419-420
But we
now live in an age that includes a few groups intent on inflicting large-scale destruction to achieve
more global objectives. In the 1990s, the japanese terror cult Anni Shinrikyo first sought to buy nuclear weapons in
Russia, then to make them themselves, before turning to biological weapons and the nerve gas they ultimatelv used in the Tokyo
subways.¶ Starting also in the 19905, al Qaeda repeatedly sought nuclear materials and the expertise needed to make them
into a nuclear bomb. Ultimately, al Qaeda put together a focused program reporting directly to Ayman al-Zawahiri (now head of the group),
which progressed as far as carrying out crude but sensible conventional explosive tests for the nuclear program in the desert of Afghanistan.‘ ¶
The killing of Osama bin Laden and the many other blows against al Qaeda have surely reduced the risk that al Qaeda could put together and
carry through a nuclear bomb project. But by how much? The
core organization of al Qaeda has proved resilient in the
past.There is every reason to believe Al-Zawahiri remains eager to inflict destruction on a nuclear scale.
Indeed, despite the large number of al Qaeda leaders who have been killed or captured, nearly all of the key
players in al Qaeda’s nuclear program remain alive and at large - including Abdel Aziz al-Masri, an
Egyptian explosives expert who was al Qaeda’s “nuclear CEO." No one knows what capabilities a secret cell of al Qaeda may have
managed to retain or build. And regional affiliates and other groups in the broader violent Islamic extremist movement — particularly
some of the deadly Pakistani terrorist groups — may someday develop the capability and intent to follow a similar
path.¶ North Caucasus terrorist groups sought radiological weapons and threatened to sabotage nuclear
reactors.There is significant, though less conclusive, evidence that they sought nuclear weapons as well —
particularly confirmation from senior Russian officials that two teams were caught carrying out reconnaissance at
Russian nuclear weapon storage sites, whose very locations are a state secret.¶ More fundamentally, with at least two,
and probably three, groups having gone down this path in the past twenty-five years, there is no reason to expect they
will be the last. The danger of nuclear terrorism will remain as long as nuclear weapons, the materials
needed to make them, and terrorist groups bent on large-scale destruction co-exist.
Terrorism causes extinction---hard-line responses are key
Nathan Myhrvold '13, Phd in theoretical and mathematical physics from Princeton, and founded
Intellectual Ventures after retiring as chief strategist and chief technology officer of Microsoft
Corporation , July 2013, "Stratgic Terrorism: A Call to Action," The Lawfare Research Paper Series
No.2, http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Strategic-Terrorism-Myhrvold-7-32013.pdf
Several powerful
trends have aligned to profoundly change the way that the world works. Technology ¶ now
allows stateless groups to organize, recruit, and fund ¶ themselves in an unprecedented fashion. That,
coupled ¶ with the extreme difficulty of finding and punishing a stateless group, means that stateless groups are
positioned to be ¶ lead players on the world stage. They may act on their own, ¶ or they may act as proxies for
nation-states that wish to ¶ duck responsibility. Either way, stateless groups are forces ¶ to be reckoned with.¶ At the same time, a
different set of technology trends ¶ means that small numbers of people can obtain incredibly ¶ lethal power.
Now, for the first time in human history, a ¶ small group can be as lethal as the largest superpower . Such ¶ a group could
execute an attack that could kill millions of ¶ people. It is technically feasible for such a group to kill billions of people, to
end modern civilization—perhaps even ¶ to drive the human race to extinction. Our defense establishment was shaped over
decades to ¶ address what was, for a long time, the only strategic threat ¶ our nation faced: Soviet or Chinese missiles. More recently, ¶ it has
started retooling to address tactical terror attacks like ¶ those launched on the morning of 9/11, but the reform ¶ process is incomplete and
inconsistent. A
real defense will ¶ require rebuilding our military and intelligence capabilities from the ground
terrorism has ¶ received relatively little attention in defense agencies, and ¶ the efforts
that have been launched to combat this existential threat seem fragmented.¶ History suggests what will happen.
The only thing that shakes America out of complacency is a direct threat from a determined adversary
that confronts us with our shortcomings by repeatedly attacking us or hectoring us for decades.
up. Yet, so far, strategic
AT: Circumvention/perception
Solves perception and no No circumvention—oversight, accountability, and legally limiting
MPAC 13 [Muslim Public Affairs Council. Non-profit interest group. 6/24/13, “Amash-Conyers
Amendment: Opportunity for Transparency” http://www.mpac.org/programs/governmentrelations/amash-conyers-amendment-opportunity-for-transparency.php//jweideman]
The amendment seeks to end the NSA’s blanket surveillance on American citizens’ telephone records
unless there is an active investigation open. The amendment ends the blanket collection by: No longer
authorizing the government to hold a pool of metadata on every phone call of every American; Permitting the
government to continue to acquire business records and other “tangible things” that are actually related to an authorized counterterrorism investigation, and;
Imposing more robust judicial oversight on NSA’s surveillance in order to make sure the NSA does
not violate Americans’ civil liberties. President Barack Obama’s Press Secretary Jay Carney responded to the amendment by opposing “the
current effort in the House to hastily dismantle one of our intelligence community’s counterterrorism tools.” While the White House sees the amendment as a blunt
approach to the issue and welcomes an “informed, deliberative and open process,” our nation has not yet been afforded the opportunity to debate the intelligence tool.
national security and privacy concerns are very complicated and nuanced,” said Hoda Elshishtawy, MPAC’s
Legislative and Policy Analyst. “When dealing with these concerns, Americans need to feel comfortable that an
intelligence program like this has a transparent oversight process so that any misuse and abuse is
avoided.” Support for open dialogue on surveillance comes from people on both sides of the aisle. Lee
“Our
Hamilton, Director of the Center on Congress at Indiana University recently wrote, “The Obama administration has said it welcomes a debate on these issues. But it
has not enabled that debate: the discussion has been thrust upon the administration because of the recent leaks.”
AT: CT Doesn’t Solve
It’s try-or-die for counter-terrorism – empirics are meaningless in the context of
prevention
Rachel Brand 14, Senior Advisor to the U.S. Chamber Litigation Center and member of the Privacy
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, "Report on the Telephone Records Program Conducted under
Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and on the Operations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court," 1/23/14, https://www.pclob.gov/library/215-Report_on_the_Telephone_Records_Program.pdf
test for whether the program’s potential benefits justify
its continuation cannot be simply whether it has already been the key factor in thwarting a
previously unknown terrorist attack. Assessing the benefit of a preventive program such as this one requires a
longer-term view.¶ The overwhelming majority of the data collected under this program remains untouched,
unviewed, and unanalyzed until its destruction. But its immediate availability if it is needed is the program’s
primary benefit. Its usefulness may not be fully realized until we face another large-scale terrorist plot
against the United States or our citizens abroad. But if that happens, analysts’ ability to very quickly scan
historical records from multiple service providers to establish connections (or avoid wasting precious time on futile
leads) could be critical in thwarting the plot.¶ Evidence suggests that if the data from the Section 215
program had been available prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001, it could have been instrumental in
preventing those attacks.693 The clear implication is that this data could help the government thwart a
future attack. Considering this, I cannot recommend shutting down the program without an adequate alternative in place, especially in light
There is no easy way to calculate the value of this program. But the
of what I view to be the relatively small actual intrusion on privacy interests.
Death counts don’t quantify efficacy – domestic surveillance confers numerous
strategic benefits
Elizabeth Cook 14, member of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, "Report on the
Telephone Records Program Conducted under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and on the
Operations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court," 1/23/14, https://www.pclob.gov/library/215Report_on_the_Telephone_Records_Program.pdf
Finally, I have a different view from the Board as
to the efficacy and utility of the Section 215 program. Although the Report
program might be valuable for reasons other than preventing a specific terrorist
attack, the tone and focus of the Report make clear that the Board does believe that to be the most important
(and possibly the only) metric. I consider this conclusion to be unduly narrow. Among other things, in today’s
world of multiple threats, a tool that allows investigators to triage and focus on those who are more likely to be doing
harm to or in the United States is both good policy and potentially privacy-protective. Similarly, a tool that allows
investigators to more fully understand our adversaries in a relatively nimble way, allows investigators to verify and
reinforce intelligence gathered from other programs or tools, and provides “peace of mind,” has value.¶ I
purports to consider whether the
would, however, recommend that the NSA and other members of the Intelligence Community develop metrics for assessing the efficacy and
value of intelligence programs, particularly in relation to other tools and programs. The natural tendency is to focus on the operation of a given
program, without periodic reevaluations of its value or whether it could be implemented in more privacy-protective ways. Moreover, the
natural tendency of the government, the media, and the public is to ask whether a particular program has
allowed officials to thwart terrorist attacks or save identifiable lives. Periodic assessments would not only
encourage the Intelligence Community to continue to explore more privacy protective alternatives, but also allow the government to
explain the relative value of programs in more comprehensive terms. I hope that our Board will have the
opportunity to work with the Intelligence Community on such an effort.
2nc: Phone link
Telephony metada solves terrorism—communications targeting
Brand et al 14 [Rachel Brand 14, Senior Advisor to the U.S. Chamber Litigation Center and member of
the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, "Report on the Telephone Records Program Conducted
under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and on the Operations of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court," 1/23/14, https://www.pclob.gov/library/215Report_on_the_Telephone_Records_Program.pdf//jweideman]
The threat of terrorism faced today by the United States is real. While the core group of Al Qaeda that planned the 9/11
attacks from Afghanistan largely has been decimated by military action, recent years have seen the rise of new al Qaeda affiliates in other nations plotting operations
against the United States and Europe. President Obama described the emergence of these groups in a speech last May on the dangers currently posed by international
terrorism: “From
Yemen to Iraq, from Somalia to North Africa, the threat today is more diffuse, with Al
Qaeda’s affiliates in the Arabian Peninsula — AQAP — the most active in plotting against our
homeland.”534 Most of these affiliates presently are focused on executing attacks in their own regions, but such attacks can claim U.S. lives in addition to
wreaking devastation on residents of the nations where they occur. Moreover, failed attacks against the United States, such as
the attempted 2009 Christmas Day airplane bombing and the attempted 2010 Times Square bombing,
serve as a reminder that foreign terrorist organizations continue to pose a danger to residents of this
nation. Political upheavals in the Middle East, meanwhile, threaten to create opportunities for safe havens
where new terrorist affiliates can plan attacks. At the same time, the United States has seen evidence that radicalized individuals inside this
country with connections to foreign extremists can carry out horrifying acts of violence, as appears to have been the case with the shooting at Fort Hood in Texas and
the bombing of the Boston Marathon.535 Thus, while al Qaeda’s core group has not carried out a successful attack on U.S. soil since 2001 and is less capable of doing
so, and while the violence now being attempted by emergent terrorist affiliates has not yet approached the scope of the 9/11 attacks, the
danger posed to
the United States by international terrorism is by no means over.536 Communications are essential to the
facilitation of a terrorist attack against the United States, but awareness of those same communications
can permit the United States to discover and thwart the attack. A key challenge — and a key opportunity — facing those who
are tasked with preventing terrorism is that would-be terrorists utilize the same communications networks as the rest of the world. Identifying the communications of
individuals plotting terrorism within those networks, without intruding on the communications of law-abiding individuals, is a formidable task. This challenge is
compounded by the fact that terrorists, aware that attempts are being made to uncover their communications, may employ a range of measures to evade those efforts
and keep their plans secret. III. Capabilities
Provided by the NSA’s Bulk Collection of Telephone Records Because
communication by telephone is useful, if not indispensable, in the coordination of terrorist efforts, wouldbe terrorists can be expected to employ this method of communication in planning and carrying out their
violent attacks. Records of telephone calls therefore can serve as a trail helping counterterrorism
investigators piece together the networks of terrorist groups and the patterns of their communications.
Ultimately, such analysis can support the intelligence community’s efforts to identify and locate
individuals planning terrorist attacks and to discover and disrupt those attacks before they come to
fruition. The NSA’s wholesale collection of the nation’s telephone records, under the authority granted by the FISA court pursuant to Section 215, is but one
method of gathering and analyzing telephone records for counterterrorism purposes. As described below, this method offers certain logistical advantages that may not
be available through other means of gathering calling records. The broad scale of this collection, however, even when combined with strict rules on the use of the
records obtained, carries serious implications for privacy and civil liberties.
Link: SSRA
SSRA gets rid of all phone monitoring
Williams 15 [Lauren, Staff writer for Think Progress. March, 24 2015. “House Members Move To
Repeal The Patriot Act With Strongest Anti-Surveillance Bill To Date”
http://thinkprogress.org/election/2015/03/24/3638234/house-members-move-repeal-patriot-act-strongestanti-surveillance-bill-date///jweideman]
Overshadowed by congressional budget talks, Reps.
Mark Pocan (D-WI) and Thomas Massie (R-KY) quietly introduced
the strongest anti-surveillance bill to date that would strip the government of much of its spying power.
“This isn’t just tinkering around the edges, it’s a meaningful overhaul that makes sure the meaningless surveillance of
emails and cell phones are done away with,” Pocan said in a briefing for congressional staffers Tuesday. The Surveillance State
Repeal Act, or HR 1466, aims to repeal the Patriot Act, including the controversial telephony metadata
collection program, and strip many of the surveillance permissions granted under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act amendments passed under
President George W. Bush in 2008.
Title iii CP
1nc
CP Text: The United States federal government should establish a prohibition on government
required electronic surveillance backdoors, repeal the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, and repeal
all portion of the USA Patriot Act with the exception of Title Three of the USA Patriot Act.
Perm Do Both – still include “SSRA”s repeal of Title 3 of the Patriot Act
Perm Do CP – Textually and Functionally sever out of “Surveillance State Repeal Act”
Terrorist financing is the biggest danger—Title 3 solves safe havens and money-laundering
Baldwin 2 [Professor Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr.Chesterfield Smith Professor of Law Director, The Centre
For International Financial Crimes Studies Levin College of Law University of Florida. 2002. “MONEY
LAUNDERING COUNTERMEASURES WITH PRIMARY FOCUS UPON TERRORISM AND THE
USA PATRIOT ACT 2001”
https://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/sem/2002/cdmfl/eng/baldwin.pdf//jweideman]
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism1 , euphemistically the
USA Patriot Act
2001, is in direct response to terrorism world-wide as noted in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373. The USA Patriot Act
followed Congressional authorization of September 14, 2001 granting broad power to the executive to seek out and destroy terrorists. The Act is, in part, 1) intended
to complement and support the military campaign in Afghanistan and elsewhere and 2) allocate to law enforcement more realistic weapons and user friendly laws to
fight terrorists and terrorists funding. The
two goals require a broad redesign of the United States Bank Secrecy Act and
its subsequent amendments.2 The USA Patriot Act (hereinafter: the Act) defines terrorism and focuses upon enhancing domestic security by
implementing legislation involving, among other things, computer privacy, electronic surveillance, warrants to trap and trace, no knock searches, and extra-territorial
search warrants. The Act also implicates matters involving immigration and borders including bulk cash smuggling. More importantly,
in Title III
there are over forty complex new banking and other money transmitting regulations impacting upon
extra-territoriality, off-shore correspondent banking, underground banking, as well as new predicate
crimes complementing the crime of money laundering, and agency sharing.3 Much of the focus of the Act is
international money laundering and anti-terrorism financing. The focus derives from the extreme danger the modern terrorist poses
to the infrastructure, the national defense, and the International economic system. 2 Title III, of the Act, as well as the subsequent rules promulgated
thereunder by the Treasury Department, impacts upon the illicit money trails, foreign bank correspondent accounts,
foreign person private banking accounts, savings associations, credit unions, casinos and others similarly
situated. In brief, Title III grants to the Secretary of the Treasury extensive powers to impose special
measures against any foreign financial institution, regardless of jurisdictional considerations. The Act permits
forfeiture of proceeds even if the crime took place on foreign soil as long as the proceeds from the illicit act were transferred to or invested in the United States. The
specific crimes include any crime of violence, bribing of a public official, embezzlement of public funds, munitions smuggling, or any offense which if committed in
Title III permits in rem forfeiture
of funds where illicit funds are transferred from a correspondent bank account to an interbank account and
the illicit funds account is traceable to funds originally deposited in a foreign bank or other financial
institution holding the account. Under the Act, the foreign bank from which the funds are forfeited has no standing in a United States court to contest
the United States would subject the perpetrator to extradition or criminal prosecution. Of significant importance,
the forfeiture. Only the “owner” of the funds account in the foreign bank has standing. Significant problems and conflicts may develop within the foreign bank’s home
jurisdiction if there is a mandated duty to pay depositors. The United States Congress in Title
III is also attempting for the first time to regulate
the underground banking systems such as Hawala, or Hundi. On October 26, 2001 President Bush signed the Patriot Act into law4
With the apparent lack of political will that existed prior to September 11, 2001 no longer 3 an obstacle federal law enforcement has moved quickly to begin the
implementation of the Act. The goal was, and is, to penetrate the heart of the terrorist organizational machine, or as author Peter L. Bergen termed it: Holy War, Inc.5
The goals of the Act implicate and require international cooperation, re-designation of internal laws, and enhanced cross-border cooperation. Without international
To be successful, terrorist as well as organized
crime operations require sturdy support internationally and otherwise6 “user-friendly” states citizens,
and institutions are a necessity. Banks, citing bank secrecy; nations, citing sovereignty concerns; and
elected public officials, citing freedom from governmental financial controls; intentionally or
unintentionally created safe havens for the transfer and hiding of the illicit funds and profits of
organized crime and organized terrorists. Funds gathered within lax jurisdictions are funneled to terrorist
cells around the world. Lax banking regulations and poor financial oversight provides stepping stones
and networks for the financing of terrorist activity. Law enforcement world-wide had noted increased activity by terrorist groups,
cooperation, the Act will lose most of its intended impact. II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
but had received little governmental support in their efforts.7 Reading such recent works as Holy War, Inc., one has reason to speculate that there was very little
political will to encourage law enforcement to conduct an all-out assault upon the financial networking of organized terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda.8 Nevertheless,
who could have ever envisioned the catastrophic acts of September 11, 2001? The events of September 11, 2001, appear to have changed the political posturing
mileau. In the United States, the recognition of vulnerability to, and threat of, future acts resulted 4 in the USA Patriot Act. The Act, controversial to be sure,
nevertheless signaled support from previously silent elected and appointed officials for the efforts of law enforcement in the transnational arena. Governments,
democratic and otherwise, have now signaled their approval and support for an all-out assault upon the holdings of terrorist groups.
Key to solve nuclear terror
Luna 14 [David M. Luna Senior Director for Anticrime Programs, Bureau of International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs. November 18, 2014 “Remarks to NATO Advance Research Workshop:
Neutralizing Radicalized Threat Networks, Disrupting WMD Illicit Traffickers and Targeting Corrupt
Facilitators” http://traccc.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/NATO-notes.pdf//jweideman]
Illicit Trafficking: A Threat to the Legal Economy and Global Security Now let me address the dangers of
traditional forms of WMD and the perils posed to the international community by illicit trafficking
networks. It is often said that where there is money to be made in illicit markets and the illegal economy,
criminals will be very entrepreneurial to oversee and regulate the trading and selling of contraband. This
was certainly true for the A.Q. Khan network in Pakistan as it supplied North Korea and Libya with
expertise, technology, and materials to their WMD program. This brings me to the linkage with another theme of our discussion
today. As underscored earlier, we know that ISIL, Al-Qaeda, and other terrorist groups want to inflict as much
damage as they can to innocent communities and their sworn enemies. In fact, Osama bin Laden in his earlier years with alQaeda had stressed to his jihadist followers that it was a “religious duty” to seek and secure WMD as part of
their campaigns of terror. As potential customers and end-users of WMD, ISIL, al-Qaeda, and others, will remain interested in trying
to obtain these powerful weapons to maximize catastrophic harm. To achieve their nefarious terror goals,
these groups will likely need to resort to illicit trafficking channels, where corruption, criminals, and black market
facilitators come together across supply and demand vectors to obtain WMD. Their success can only be achieved if we let our
guard down. In the past, we have seen how determined terrorists have obtained mustard and sarin gas, ricin, anthrax, missiles, and other WMD by exploiting
corrupt or other vulnerable channels including in countries that have massive stockpiles of WMD or states that are on the verge of great instability and insecurity
including Libya, Syria, North Korea, and states of the former Soviet Union. An Unholy Trinity: Corruption, Criminality, and Terror As Dr. Louise Shelley, Director of
the Terrorism, Transnational Crime, and Corruption Center (TraCCC), George Mason University, has enlightened us in her recent book “Dirty Entanglements:
Corruption Crime, and Terrorism”: “ The
understanding of financial flows, the role of facilitators from the legitimate
economy, and the centrality of particular routes and nodes are crucial to addressing the problem. By
focusing only on the crime and terror components, while ignoring the centrality of corruption, it is not
possible to effectively address the threat of WMD proliferation, or the possibility of attack. Analysis of the dirty
entanglements will be crucial to preventing future attacks.” In a world of convergence, how difficult is our challenge to combat WMD proliferation amidst the
entangled webs of corruption, criminality and terrorism? First, when we realize that nuclear, biological, and radiological materials inhabit many sections of our lives,
we begin to comprehend the complex task very quickly. From hospitals to the smoke detectors in this room, the use of these materials can benefit our everyday lives.
However, when used for malicious purposes, nuclear and radioactive materials
pose a dangerous and disruptive threat to
everyone. It is because of the potential of this new black market niche that organized criminals have gravitated to seek profit based on demand. This is
basic economics: if there’s a product in high demand, then there will be suppliers working to procure and
sell it at a profit. It just so happens that in this case, the product that terrorists and criminals want is closely guarded and extremely dangerous. In Lyudmila
Zaitseva and Kevin Hand’s 2003 article “Nuclear Smuggling Chains,” they describe the three main types of actors involved in the illegal movement of nuclear
material: the suppliers, the intermediaries, and the endusers. I want to focus particularly on the suppliers and intermediaries—let’s call them facilitators, because they
are the ones who enable the illicit use of nuclear material, and the ones that we should be most concerned about. Facilitators can be almost anyone—from organized
criminals who traffic hazardous material across borders, to radiology technicians in the hospital, to a corrupt general in a nation’s army who wants to bolster his own
paycheck. Anyone who has access to nuclear materials has the potential to be a facilitator or a complicit actor in the illicit trafficking supply chain of WMD
proliferation. Following
the break-up of the Soviet Union, we saw nuclear scientists from around the postSoviet landscape smuggling material out of their labs and attempting to sell it on the black market. They
had suffered a loss of reputation and status in the new post-communist Russia, but most importantly they
had lost a degree of financial security. These scientists believed that there was a profitable market for nuclear materials that they could tap into.
This perception holds as well for other facilitators—that there’s a huge money-making opportunity out there in trafficking of
WMD and hazardous materials. These are among the challenges we face today. As long as facilitators believe that
there is a market for nuclear and radiological materials or weapons of mass destruction—regardless of
whether there actually is—this will place even greater importance on the integrity of those tasked with
guarding such materials. The potential for corruption and blackmail is high: the stakes are higher.
Terrorism causes extinction---hard-line responses are key
Nathan Myhrvold '13, Phd in theoretical and mathematical physics from Princeton, and founded
Intellectual Ventures after retiring as chief strategist and chief technology officer of Microsoft
Corporation , July 2013, "Stratgic Terrorism: A Call to Action," The Lawfare Research Paper Series
No.2, http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Strategic-Terrorism-Myhrvold-7-32013.pdf
Several powerful
trends have aligned to profoundly change the way that the world works. Technology ¶ now
allows stateless groups to organize, recruit, and fund ¶ themselves in an unprecedented fashion. That,
coupled ¶ with the extreme difficulty of finding and punishing a stateless group, means that stateless groups are
positioned to be ¶ lead players on the world stage. They may act on their own, ¶ or they may act as proxies for
nation-states that wish to ¶ duck responsibility. Either way, stateless groups are forces ¶ to be reckoned with.¶ At the same time, a
different set of technology trends ¶ means that small numbers of people can obtain incredibly ¶ lethal power.
Now, for the first time in human history, a ¶ small group can be as lethal as the largest superpower . Such ¶ a group could
execute an attack that could kill millions of ¶ people. It is technically feasible for such a group to kill billions of people, to
end modern civilization—perhaps even ¶ to drive the human race to extinction. Our defense establishment was shaped over
decades to ¶ address what was, for a long time, the only strategic threat ¶ our nation faced: Soviet or Chinese missiles. More recently, ¶ it has
started retooling to address tactical terror attacks like ¶ those launched on the morning of 9/11, but the reform ¶ process is incomplete and
inconsistent. A
real defense will ¶ require rebuilding our military and intelligence capabilities from the ground
up. Yet, so far, strategic terrorism has ¶ received relatively little attention in defense agencies, and ¶ the efforts
that have been launched to combat this existential threat seem fragmented.¶ History suggests what will happen.
The only thing that shakes America out of complacency is a direct threat from a determined adversary
that confronts us with our shortcomings by repeatedly attacking us or hectoring us for decades.
**2nc: Solvency**
AT: Title 3 k2 advantage
Not key to solvency—Title 3 is only anti-laundering requirements
Freis 11 [James H, Director of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network at the Treasury department.
11/18/11, “Finding that the Islamic Republic of Iran is a Jurisdiction of Primary Money Laundering
Concern” http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Documents/Iran311Finding.pdf//jweideman]
On October 26, 2001, the President signed into law the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act of 2001 (the
“USA PATRIOT Act”), Public Law 107-56. Title III of the USA PATRIOT Act amends the
anti-money laundering provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”), codified at 12 U.S.C. 1829b, 12 U.S.C 1951-1959, and 31
U.S.C. 5311-5314 and 5316-5332, to promote prevention, detection, and prosecution of international money 2
laundering and the financing of terrorism. Regulations implementing the BSA appear at 31 CFR Chapter X.
2nc: Title 3 solves internet
Title 3 improves internet freedom
Smith et al 2 [Marcia S. Smith, Jeffrey W. Seifert, Glenn J. McLoughlin, and John Dimitri Moteff
Resources, Science, and Industry Division at EPIC. Congressional Report. March 4, 2002. “The Internet
and the USA PATRIOT Act: Potential Implications for Electronic Privacy, Security, Commerce, and
Government” https://epic.org/privacy/terrorism/usapatriot/RL31289.pdf//jweideman]
Title III
responds to concernsthat more can be done to prevent, detect, and prosecute international money
laundering and the financing of terrorism. Over time, these provisions may affect ecommerce broadly, and electronic fund transfers
specifically. Electronic government (e-government) could be affected by the Act in both positive and negative
ways. The intense focus on improving data collection and information sharing practices and systems may
contribute to the establishment of government-wide technical standards and best practices that could
facilitate the implementation of new and existing e-government initiatives. It could also promote the
utilization of secure Web portals to help ensure the data integrity of transactions between the government
and citizens and business. However, concern about potential abuses of data collection provisions could dampen citizen enthusiasmfor carrying out
Although the Act does not explicitly address electronic commerce (e-commerce), many of the law’s provisions may impact it. In particular,
electronic transactions with the government.
AT: decapitation
Decapitation fails—anti-financing is key
Dietz 10 [Rebekah, NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL. “ILLICIT NETWORKS: TARGETING
THE NEXUS BETWEEN TERRORISTS, PROLIFERATORS, AND NARCOTRAFFICKERS”
December 2010. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a536899.pdf//jweideman]
In addition to creating a more cohesive, whole-of-government approach to catching these criminals from
multiple angles, there is one important lesson to draw from this analysis of all three networks: follow the
money. Money is the key that makes each network tick, whether it is financially motivated or not . In each
case, these networks could not operate without a steady cash flow. They utilize remarkably similar techniques to conceal and move
their capital. If the U.S. government were able to synchronize efforts on just one platform, I recommend it be
in tracking and prosecuting illicit finance. Bankers are largely able to avoid prosecution because law enforcement fails to expose evidence of
their involvement in dirty money.335 As former federal agent, Robert Mazur, writes in his recent New York Times op-ed, the U.S. government needs an elite
multiagency task force to identify institutions and businesses that facilitate illicit finance around the globe.336 Because banks and front companies often engage in
multiple illicit activities, a detailed database for all types of unlawful financial transactions could help identify important linkages that might otherwise be overlooked
by network-specific bureaucracies. Stemming the flow of dirty would restrict the stream of illegal commodities and severely hinder the operations of organizations
and individuals that threaten national and international security. It
is clear that a strategy based exclusively on decapitation is
not effective in any of the three networks—terrorist, proliferation or narcotics. While targeting a drug kingpin or
terrorist figurehead may appear to be the clear course, this “leadership interdiction” is not sustainable in a
complex adaptive system that is able to adjust to changing circumstances.337 Targeted kill/capture
missions are an important part of an overall strategy, but SNA is not an adequate tool in and of itself to
prosecute them. SNA is an extremely useful instrument—a way to visualize the actors in any given network—but cannot adequately explain the motivations
of individual actors or how their personalities affect the overall organization. Algorithms that attempt to identify the most “important” network members based on
different quantifications do not sufficiently describe the extent to which these individuals affect network operations. I recommend that analysts pay serious attention to
network leadership and personalities, even if their involvement in the appears purely charismatic. Their ability to inspire, influence, manipulate and enable others for
their personal gains can be significant, and, in some cases, targeted “leadership interdiction” may be the most effective way to stop them.
A2 Terror Now
Terrorism is getting lower and lower
The Nation 15 [April 27, 2015 http://nation.com.pk/national/27-Apr-2015/terrorism-incidents-witness-a-decline-in-2015 “Terrorism
incidents witness a decline in 2015”] (Vaibhav)
Terrorism incidents throughout the country witnessed a substantial decline as compared to previous years.
According to official documents, around 252 incidents of terror occurred since January 1, 2015 till date in which
139 citizens and 51 security men were martyred. The documents revealed that in the past 5 years, a total of 8520
terror incidents occurred in which 28779 people were killed. In 2010, 2061 incidents of terror occurred in
which 502 security men were killed and 1454 civilians lost their lives. In 2011, 1680 incidents of terror
occurred in which 948 civilians and 408 security men were killed. In 2012, 1316 incidents occurred in which 347 security men
and 816 civilians were killed In 2013, 1571 incidents claimed lives of 555 security men and 1239 civilians. According
to the report in 2014, 1640 incidents of terror occurred in which 434 security men and 672 civilians were
martyred.
**Impact**
2nc: solves terror
Title 3 is key to preventing terrorist financing
Weiss 13 [Martin A. Weiss, Coordinator Analyst in International Trade and Finance Foreign Affairs,
Defense, and Trade Division. August 3, 2005. “Terrorist Financing: U.S. Agency Efforts and InterAgency Coordination” https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL33020.pdf//jweideman]
Title III of the USA PATRIOT Act. In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress passed the USA
PATRIOT Act.36 Congress devoted Title III of this act to combating terrorist financing.37 Given that
funds used to finance terrorist activities are often not derived from illegal activities, prosecution for
funding terrorist activities under the pre-USA PATRIOT Act money laundering laws was difficult. Title
III, however, made providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization a predicate offense for
money laundering prosecution under section 1956 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code.38 Under Title III, the Treasury Secretary may require domestic
financial institutions to undertake certain “special measures” if the Secretary concludes that specific regions, financial institutions, or transactions
outside of the United States are of primary money laundering concern.39 In addition to retaining more
specific records on financial institutions, these special measures include obtaining information on
beneficial ownership of accounts and information relating to certain payable-through40 and
correspondent accounts.41 The Treasury Secretary is also empowered to prohibit or restrict the opening of these payable-through and correspondent
accounts,42 and U.S. financial institutions are required to establish internal procedures to detect money
laundered through these accounts.43 In addition, financial institutions and broker-dealers are prohibited
from maintaining correspondent accounts for foreign “shell banks,” i.e., banks that have no physical
presence in their supposed home countries.44 Institutions are subject to fines of up to $1 million for
violations of these provisions.45 Title III allows for judicial review of assets seized due to suspicion of
terroristrelated activities and the applicability of the “innocent owner” defense,46 although the government is permitted
in such cases to submit evidence that would not otherwise be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence, if following those rules would jeopardize national
security.47 Title III also allows for jurisdiction over foreign persons and financial institutions for prosecutions under sections 1956 and 1957 of Title 18 of the U.S.
Code.48 The USA PATRIOT Act permits forfeiture of property traceable to proceeds from various offenses against foreign nations.49 The act also permits forfeiture
of accounts held in a foreign bank if that bank has an interbank account in a U.S. financial institution; in essence, law enforcement officials are authorized to substitute
funds in the interbank account for those in the targeted foreign account.50 Forfeiture is also authorized for currency reporting violations and violations of BSA
prohibitions against evasive structuring of transactions.51 Title
III requires each financial institution to establish an anti-money
laundering program, which at a minimum must include the development of internal procedures, the
designation of a compliance officer, an employee training program, and an independent audit program to
test the institution’s anti-money laundering program.52 In order to allow for meaningful inspection of
financial institutions’ AML efforts, Title III requires financial institutions to provide information on their
AML compliance within 120 hours of a request for such information by the Treasury Secretary.53 Also,
financial institutions applying to merge under the Bank Holding Act or the Federal Deposit Insurance Act must demonstrate some effectiveness in combating money
laundering.54 Financial institutions are allowed to include suspicions of illegal activity in written employment references regarding current or former employees.55
Title III extends the Suspicious Activity Reports filing requirement to brokerdealers,56 and
gives the Treasury Secretary the authority to
pass along SARs to U.S. intelligence agencies in order to combat international terrorism.57 Anyone
engaged in a trade or business who receives $10,000 cash in one transaction must file a report with the
Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) identifying the customer and
specifying the amount and date of the transaction.58 In addition, the USA PATRIOT Act makes it a crime to knowingly conceal more
than $10,000 in cash or other monetary instruments and attempt to transport it into or outside of the United States. This offense carries with it imprisonment of up to
five years, forfeiture of any property involved, and seizure of any property traceable to the violation.59 Significantly,
the USA PATRIOT Act
requires financial institutions to establish procedures so that these institutions can verify the identities and
addresses of customers seeking to open accounts, and check this information against governmentprovided
lists of known terrorists.60 Title III also allows the Treasury Secretary to promulgate regulations that
prohibit the use of concentration accounts to disguise the owners of and fund movements in bank
accounts.61 Under Title III, FinCEN has statutorily-based authority to conduct its duties within the Treasury Department.62 Significantly, the act requires
FinCEN to maintain a highly secure network so that financial institutions can file their BSA reports electronically.63
2nc: Prolif Impact
Title 3 solves proliferation
Zarate 9 [Juan C. Zarate. Senior Adviser, Transnational Threats Project and Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism Program at CSIS. October 2009. The Washington Quarterly. “Harnessing the Financial
Furies: Smart Financial Power and National Security”
http://www.artisresearch.com/articles/Zarate_Harnessing_Financial_Furies.pdf//jweideman]
The United States supplemented these tools by implementing Section 311 of the PATRIOT Act, which
allowed the secretary of treasury to apply regulatory measures to financial entities, jurisdictions, and
classes of transactions identified as ‘‘primary money laundering concerns.’’ The U.S. Department of
Treasury used this authority aggressively between 2003 and 2005 as part of a ‘‘bad bank initiative’’ to isolate those financial
institutions around the world facilitating an assortment of illicit financial activity. The use of this
regulatory tool in 2005 against Banco Delta Asia a private bank in Macau that was facilitating money
laundering, proliferation, and counterfeiting on behalf of the North Korean regime served as a way to
notify the international financial community of the ongoing practices of concern by this financial entity
and Pyongyang. The use of targeted financial sanctions and related international focus has also expanded to issues such as proliferation finance and high-level
or regime corruption, often referred to as ‘‘kleptocracy.’’ In the United States, the president’s signing of executive order 13382 on June 29, 2005, provided the
domestic legal and regulatory framework to expand this paradigm to proliferation financing, which has been used to identify front companies from China, North
Korea, and Russia engaged in suspect proliferation activities.5 As seen in the Iran-related sanctions at the UN and by Europe and the United States, there is a growing
reliance on targeted sanctions and broader financial warnings to help pressure the Iranian regime by isolating those entities and activities possibly engaged in the
development of a nuclear weapons program. The use of such tools against autocratic regimes and leadership in countries such as Burma, Belarus, Liberia, Sudan,
Syria, and Zimbabwe has also served to expand ongoing efforts in the EU and the United States to deter and prevent large-scale corruption. The power of this marketbased financial isolation was made evident in 2005 against North Korea. 48 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY/ j OCTOBER 2009 Juan C. Zarate The
increasing use of these tools has spawned a new line of business within governments and the private
sector focused on developing, analyzing, and using financial data and information to understand
vulnerabilities and to prevent their exploitation by illicit networks of concern. In the United States, the Office of
Terrorism and Financial Intelligence was established within the Department of Treasury in 2004, with a dedicated intelligence office charged with developing
financial information and analysis within the intelligence community for potential use by policymakers and the private sector. The effects of these
sanctions
were amplified by private lawsuits from victims of terrorism, which served as de facto sanctions on those individuals, companies,
and financial institutions implicated in the lawsuits. The deterrent power of such lawsuits was seen most vividly in the case
of victims of Hamas terror, whose threats of suits against institutions willing to provide financial services
to Hamas entities effectively shut down Hamas’ access to banks such as Arab Bank PLC and Cairo
Amman Bank, especially after Hamas took over the Gaza strip. The reliance on financial information and targeted financial
sanctions to identify and isolate rogue actors from the financial system is a hallmark of the last eight
years, with a broadening expansion of these powers. Though there are limitations and challenges to the use of such power and the
information that can be used or shared, there is no question that such sanctions and related regulatory and prosecutorial actions remain a cornerstone of the
international community’s approach to using financial power and influence to affect a wide range of national security concerns. Integrating the International Financial
Community and Private Sector A key dimension of this new paradigm is the central role and influence of the private sector for issues of international security import.
There has been an enormous anti-money laundering/counterterrorist financing regulatory burden placed on financial and commercial actors since September 11.
Governments have relied more and more on the ability of financial institutions to act as protective gatekeepers to the financial system by identifying, reporting, and
preventing the use of financial facilities by transnational actors and criminals of concern. The international banking community has grown acutely sensitive to the
business risks attached to illicit financial activity and has taken steps to avoid the taint of such activities being facilitated through their institutions. Sensitivity
by
this communitythe primary gatekeepers to international commerce and capitalhas been the amplifying
element that has motivated private sector actors to cease problematic or suspect business relationships,
even absent government mandate or requirements. The legitimate international financial community will
ultimately act based on its own business interests, which is aligned with the interests of governments
desiring to isolate rogue financial actors. In this post-September 11 environment, there is a natural convergence between the interests of
responsible governments and the financial community to protect the integrity of the international financial system. This sensitivity to both commercial and
reputational risks has been shaped in large part by increased anti-money laundering regulatory scrutiny at a global level, well-publicized enforcement actions by
national governments, lawsuits brought on by victims of terror, and the explosion of available information sources on terrorist financing and transnational threats of
concern (credible or otherwise) that form part of the required review and due diligence by compliance officers around the world. These factors have amplified the
perceived risks of illicit financial activity assessed by financial institutions as worth avoiding at all costs. This has led to some distortions and unintended
consequences such as diminishing access to the international financial system by smaller, yet legitimate, entities unable to prove their bona fides or ability to vet
customers to larger financial institutions. There
is no better example of this dynamic than the efforts by the United States
and other governments over the past four years to identify and isolate the illicit and dangerous financial
activity of the regimes in North Korea and Iran. Government actions have spurred banks to make independent
cost-benefit determinations leading to closing accounts and ending banking relationships with North
Korean as well as Iranian organizations and front companies, shipping lines, and pass-through and shell account holders. In this field and in others related to
issues of international security import, the financial community, for better or for worse, has become the frontline actor in the quest to protect the integrity of the
financial system and to isolate rogue and illicit financial activityUnleashing the Financial Furies... With few concrete levers to influence rogue regimes in Pyongyang,
Tehran, and elsewhere,
the United States will continue to rely heavily on this new brand of financial suasion to
isolate those engaged in activities that threaten both national security and the integrity of the financial
system. In this new paradigm, actors bring this financial isolation on themselves given the nature of their
illicit or suspect activities and the manner by which they try to hide or mask the ultimate purposes of their
financial dealings. ... Against North Korea The power of this market-based financial isolation was made evident in
2005 against North Korea. As part of a strategic pressure campaign, the U.S. Department of Treasury issued a domestic
regulation in September 2005, under Section 311 of the PATRIOT Act, ordering U.S. financial
institutions to close any correspondent accounts for Banco Delta Asia, a small private bank in Macau.
This bank was facilitating money laundering, proliferation, and counterfeiting on behalf of the North
Korean regime. The regulation cut the bank off from the U.S. financial system. More importantly, what
appeared to be a simple unilateral regulation against a private bank unleashed the market-based financial
furies against North Korea. Banks in Asia and Europe stopped doing business with Pyongyang,
ultimately denying North Korea access to the international financial system. North Korean bank accounts were
closed, their transnational commercial transactions were cancelled, and their officials’ financial activities were carefully scrutinized. Without further prompting from
governments or the UN, the private sector reacted in this manner based on their own commercial interests. No bank wanted to be seen as the North Korean regime’s
bank of choice when the regime was engaged in both illicit and dangerous commercial activity, which would then put the financial institution’s own access to the U.S.
and international financial systems in jeopardy. The pressure hurt the North Korean regime. Pyongyang scrambled to regain access to their money and accounts
around the world while trying to undo the official damage done to its reputation in the international financial community. The key
state actors,
including China, had no incentive to block the full effect of the market reaction. On the contrary, they did
not want their banks or financial reputation caught up in the taint of North Korean illicit financial activity.
This pressure became the primary leverage for the United States to press North Korea’s return to
the Six-Party negotiating table, which it eventually did in late 2006. With the Six-Party Talks reassembled, the international
financial squeeze was gently loosened, though a direct link was never officially acknowledged. In the face of North Korean recalcitrance and
belligerence, this type of financial smart power is being leveraged again, with the elements of a financial pressure campaign
emerging. The UN adopted Security Council resolution 1874 on June 12, 2009, serving as a rejuvenated international baseline to ramp up financial pressure, along
with an amplified arms ban and a new system for inspection of North Korean cargo.6 This was quickly followed on June 18, 2009, by the U.S. Department of
Treasury advising the financial community of the dangers of doing business with North Korea and the threat to the integrity of the financial system, given the
likelihood of continued deceptive and criminal activities. That advisory also listed 17 North Korean banks whose commercial he use of such institutions by the regime
to evade sanctions, engage in proliferation activities, and in broader illicit activity. Late in June and July 2009, the Departments of State and Treasury designated three
North Korean commercial entities tied to the regime’s missile proliferation and nuclear weapons programs. North Korea’s suspect activitiesproliferation, sanctions
evasion, counterfeiting, drug trafficking, and smugglingprovide the continued seeds of their own isolation. These revelations and sanctions will be the heart of this
new pressure campaign against Pyongyang. Along with Japan and South Korea, the United States will use North Korea’s recalcitrance and illicit behavior to drive
public and private sector efforts to stop North Korea’s international commercial activity critical to the development of their weapons program, financing, and potential
proliferation. Over time, this will include public and private threats of sanctions, regulatory actions, or public revelations against those financial institutions that
If fully realized, it will also include a more aggressive use
of targeted financial sanctions and regulatory actions, including an aggressive campaign to uncover and
freeze leadership assets. As leadership assets are critical to regime loyalty, an international campaign to
freeze those assets would build tension and suspicion within the leadership’s ranks.
continue to do business with suspect North Korean entities and officials.
Prolif leads to extinction
Kroenig ’12, Council on Foreign Relations Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow and Georgetown
University assistant professor of government
Matthew, “The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have A Future?”,
http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1182&tid=30
The spread of nuclear weapons poses a number of severe threats to international peace and U.S. national
security including: nuclear war, nuclear terrorism, emboldened nuclear powers, constrained freedom of
action, weakened alliances, and further nuclear proliferation. This section explores each of these threats in
turn.¶ ¶ Nuclear War. The greatest threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons is nuclear war. The more
states in possession of nuclear weapons, the greater the probability that somewhere, someday, there is a
catastrophic nuclear war. A nuclear exchange between the two superpowers during the Cold War could
have arguably resulted in human extinction and a nuclear exchange between states with smaller nuclear
arsenals, such as India and Pakistan, could still result in millions of deaths and casualties, billions of
dollars of economic devastation, environmental degradation, and a parade of other horrors.¶ To date,
nuclear weapons have only been used in warfare once. In 1945, the United States used one nuclear
weapon each on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing World War II to a close. Many analysts point to sixtyfive-plus-year tradition of nuclear non-use as evidence that nuclear weapons are unusable, but it would be
naïve to think that nuclear weapons will never be used again. After all, analysts in the 1990s argued that
worldwide economic downturns like the great depression were a thing of the past, only to be surprised by
the dot-com bubble bursting in the later 1990s and the Great Recession of the late Naughts.[53] This
author, for one, would be surprised if nuclear weapons are not used in my lifetime.¶ Before reaching a
state of MAD, new nuclear states go through a transition period in which they lack a secure-second strike
capability. In this context, one or both states might believe that it has an incentive to use nuclear weapons
first. For example, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons neither Iran, nor its nuclear-armed rival, Israel, will
have a secure, second-strike capability. Even though it is believed to have a large arsenal, given its small
size and lack of strategic depth, Israel might not be confident that it could absorb a nuclear strike and
respond with a devastating counterstrike. Similarly, Iran might eventually be able to build a large and
survivable nuclear arsenal, but, when it first crosses the nuclear threshold, Tehran will have a small and
vulnerable nuclear force.¶ In these pre-MAD situations, there are at least three ways that nuclear war could
occur. First, the state with the nuclear advantage might believe it has a splendid first strike capability. In a
crisis, Israel might, therefore, decide to launch a preemptive nuclear strike to disarm Iran’s nuclear
capabilities and eliminate the threat of nuclear war against Israel. Indeed, this incentive might be further
increased by Israel’s aggressive strategic culture that emphasizes preemptive action. Second, the state
with a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal, in this case Iran, might feel use ‘em or loose ‘em pressures.
That is, if Tehran believes that Israel might launch a preemptive strike, Iran might decide to strike first
rather than risk having its entire nuclear arsenal destroyed. Third, as Thomas Schelling has argued,
nuclear war could result due to the reciprocal fear of surprise attack.[54] If there are advantages to
striking first, one state might start a nuclear war in the belief that war is inevitable and that it would be
better to go first than to go second. In a future Israeli-Iranian crisis, for example, Israel and Iran might
both prefer to avoid a nuclear war, but decide to strike first rather than suffer a devastating first attack
from an opponent. ¶ Even in a world of MAD, there is a risk of nuclear war. Rational deterrence theory
assumes nuclear-armed states are governed by rational leaders that would not intentionally launch a
suicidal nuclear war. This assumption appears to have applied to past and current nuclear powers, but
there is no guarantee that it will continue to hold in the future. For example, Iran’s theocratic government,
despite its inflammatory rhetoric, has followed a fairly pragmatic foreign policy since 1979, but it
contains leaders who genuinely hold millenarian religious worldviews who could one day ascend to
power and have their finger on the nuclear trigger. We cannot rule out the possibility that, as nuclear
weapons continue to spread, one leader will choose to launch a nuclear war, knowing full well that it
could result in self-destruction.¶ One does not need to resort to irrationality, however, to imagine a nuclear
war under MAD. Nuclear weapons may deter leaders from intentionally launching full-scale wars, but
they do not mean the end of international politics. As was discussed above, nuclear-armed states still have
conflicts of interest and leaders still seek to coerce nuclear-armed adversaries. This leads to the credibility
problem that is at the heart of modern deterrence theory: how can you threaten to launch a suicidal
nuclear war? Deterrence theorists have devised at least two answers to this question. First, as stated
above, leaders can choose to launch a limited nuclear war.[55] This strategy might be especially attractive
to states in a position of conventional military inferiority that might have an incentive to escalate a crisis
quickly. During the Cold War, the United States was willing to use nuclear weapons first to stop a Soviet
invasion of Western Europe given NATO’s conventional inferiority in continental Europe. As Russia’s
conventional military power has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has come to rely
more heavily on nuclear use in its strategic doctrine. Indeed, Russian strategy calls for the use of nuclear
weapons early in a conflict (something that most Western strategists would consider to be escalatory) as a
way to de-escalate a crisis. Similarly, Pakistan’s military plans for nuclear use in the event of an invasion
from conventionally stronger India. And finally, Chinese generals openly talk about the possibility of
nuclear use against a U.S. superpower in a possible East Asia contingency.¶ Second, as was also discussed
above leaders can make a “threat that leaves something to chance.”[56] They can initiate a nuclear crisis.
By playing these risky games of nuclear brinkmanship, states can increases the risk of nuclear war in an
attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down. Historical crises have not resulted in nuclear war,
but many of them, including the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, have come close. And scholars have
documented historical incidents when accidents could have led to war.[57] When we think about future
nuclear crisis dyads, such as India and Pakistan and Iran and Israel, there are fewer sources of stability
that existed during the Cold War, meaning that there is a very real risk that a future Middle East crisis
could result in a devastating nuclear exchange.
UQ: Banking
Banking is booming
Conerly 15 [Bill, Forbes contributor. 1/12/2015. “Banking Forecast 2015: Earnings Headed Up”
http://www.forbes.com/sites/billconerly/2015/01/12/banking-forecast-2015-earnings-headedup///jweideman]
Banks should do well in 2015, thanks to economic growth and higher interest rates, which will boost
spreads even for liability-sensitive banks. The economy will expand throughout 2015 (as described in more detail in
Economic Forecast 2015-2017), prompting the Federal Reserve to boost short-term interest rates in the spring or summer. It is a good environment for
credit quality, though most bank loans are now in very good condition. Loan volumes will improve, and this is a major
positive for commercial banks. Consumers will continue to grow their credit, but only in pace with their overall income.
Look for four-to-five percent consumer loan growth. The big gains will be in commercial and real estate loans. Commercial
and industrial loans have three triggers: accounts receivable, inventories and capital spending.
Receivables will grow along with the overall economy, about five percent. Inventories will probably grow just a little faster,
as inventories grow or contract on more than a one-for-one basis with the overall economy. Capital spending, however, will be the largest
force for greater C&I volumes. Businesses are loosening their purse strings and will do so even more in
2015. Real estate lending will improve markedly on the residential side. With the boom’s excess supply nearly worked off, new housing construction must match
the needs of a growing population, meaning at least a 20 percent gain in starts. Non-residential activity will only grow modestly, though, as vacancy rates are still
pretty high in most markets.
AT: Warming
Long timeframe- it will take hundreds of years for the Earth to change past the
tipping point
Iacurci 14 (Jenna Iacurci, Journalist for Nature World News, University of Connecticut, Nature World News,
http://www.natureworldnews.com/articles/8232/20140724/scientists-identify-possible-tipping-point-of-global-warming.htm,
7/24/14, 7/5/15, MEM)
According to the research, synchronization of climate variability in the North Pacific and North Atlantic
Oceans is that tipping point - where rapid melting of ice and further warming may become irreversible.
This is what happened a few hundred years before the rapid warming that took place at the end of the last ice age about 15,000 years ago. The
study, published this week in the journal Science, suggests that this combined ocean warming may have
forced the Earth's climate past the point of no return. "Synchronization of two major ocean systems can
amplify the transport of heat toward the polar regions and cause larger fluctuations in northern
hemisphere climate," lead author Summer Praetorius, a doctoral student in marine geology at Oregon State, said in a press release.
"This is consistent with theoretical predictions of what happens when Earth's climate reaches a tipping
point." For those nervous about our current predicament with global warming, Praetorius is quick to point out that this research doesn't
necessarily mean that the same thing will happen in the future, "but we cannot rule out that possibility," she said. Over a period of 10 years, the
OSU team examined marine sediment cores recovered off southeast Alaska. These geologic records of climate change portrayed a detailed
history of changing temperatures on a scale of decades to centuries over many thousands of years. They found that once the North Pacific and
North Atlantic were in sync with each other, they began to change more and more until both oceans experienced an abrupt warming event of
several degrees within a few decades. "As the systems become synchronized, they organized and reinforced each other, eventually running away
like screeching feedback from a microphone," explained co-author Alan Mix, a professor in OSU's College of Earth, Ocean, and Atmospheric
Sciences. "Suddenly
you had the combined effects of two major oceans forcing the climate instead of one at
a time." Mix notes that a tipping point for climate change can happen at any time, but it's likely that the
Earth's climate system will take hundreds or even thousands of years to change in response.
IPCC model was flawed- warming not harmful and distracts us from other causes of
environmental degradation
Bastasch 3/24 (Michael Bastasch, Reporter at The Daily Caller News Foundation, “IPCC runs from claims that global
warming will cause mass extinctions”, http://dailycaller.com/2014/03/24/ipcc-runs-from-claims-that-global-warming-will-causemass-extinctions/, 3/24/14, 7/7/15, MEM)
But Der Spiegel reports that the
IPCC is shying away from such claims and gives no concrete numbers for how many
plant and animal species could be at risk if global temperatures increased. While the IPCC does say that the pace of
global warming is making it hard for some species to adapt, the lack of basic data makes it impossible for there to be any hard evidence to back
up this claim. Zoologists actually fear that the focus on global warming has drawn attention away from issues
that actually cause extinctions, like destruction of natural habitats. “Monoculture, over-fertilization or soil
destruction destroy more species than several degrees temperature rise ever assets,” University of Rostock
zoologist Ragnar Kinzelbach told Der Spiegel.
**Perm/Theory**
Competition
The plan gets rid of the whole patriot act—CP is plan minus
Hattem 15 [Julian, staff writer for the Hill. 3/24/15, “House effort would completely dismantle Patriot
Act” http://thehill.com/policy/technology/236769-house-effort-would-completely-dismantle-patriotact//jweideman]
A pair of House lawmakers wants to completely repeal the Patriot Act and other legal provisions to
dramatically rein in American spying. Reps. Mark Pocan (D-Wis.) and Thomas Massie (R-Ky.) on Tuesday unveiled their Surveillance
State Repeal Act, which would overhaul American spying powers unlike any other effort to reform the
National Security Agency. “This isn’t just tinkering around the edges,” Pocan said during a Capitol Hill briefing on the
legislation. “This is a meaningful overhaul of the system, getting rid of essentially all parameters of the Patriot Act.” The bill would completely
repeal the Patriot Act, the sweeping national security law passed in the days after Sept. 11, 2001, as well as the 2008 FISA Amendments Act, another
spying law that the NSA has used to justify collecting vast swaths of people's communications through the Internet. It would also reform the secretive court that
oversees the nation’s spying powers, prevent the government from forcing tech companies to create “backdoors” into their devices and create additional protections
for whistleblowers. “Really, what we need are new whistleblower protections so that the next Edward Snowden doesn’t have to go to Russia or Hong Kong or
whatever the case may be just for disclosing this,” Massie said.
Third Party PIC
1NC
1NC Shell
The Federal Judiciary should presume that warrants are required for the Federal
Government to obtain all electronically stored data for the purpose of surveillance
in the United States with the exception of public health data.
Electronic data on public health is necessary to prevent disease outbreak —only the
rapid response times of electronic data solve bioterrorism.
Bravata et al 4 — Dena M. Bravata, Kathryn M. McDonald, Wendy M. Smith, Chara Rydzak,
Herbert Szeto, David L. Buckeridge, Corinna Haberland, and Douglas K. Owens, e University of
California, San Francisco–Stanford Evidence-based Practice Center and Center for Primary Care and
Outcomes Research, Stanford University School of Medicine, Stanford, California; Veterans Affairs Palo
Alto Healthcare System, 2004 (“Systematic Review: Surveillance Systems for Early Detection of
Bioterrorism-Related Diseases,” Annals of Internal Medicine, June 1st, Available Online at:
http://annals.org/article.aspx?articleid=717496, Accessed: 7-24-2015)
Considerable controversy remains about the best methods of data analysis and presentation to facilitate
public health decision making based on surveillance data. Most surveillance systems routinely analyze the
data by calculating rates of cases over time. Few included reports described the methods for calculating
the expected rate of disease or for setting thresholds to determine when the observed rate differs
significantly from expected. Several authors described methods for stochastically modeling the spread of
communicable disease (206–210). The use of these methods may allow for more accurate determination
of the expected rates of disease and deviations from expected. Some of the surveillance systems designed
specifically for bioterrorism (for example, ESSENCE) routinely perform both temporal and spatial
analyses. The routine application of advanced space–time analytic methods may detect aberrations in
bioterrorism surveillance data with greater sensitivity, specificity, and timeliness. However, no
published report has evaluated whether a surveillance system that uses both temporal and spatial analyses
is probably more timely or sensitive than a system that performs only temporal analyses. We need
evaluations of surveillance systems that specifically evaluate various methods of presenting surveillance
data to public health officials to determine which methods best facilitate decision making.
Bioterrorism leads to extinction —the threat of bioterror is growing rapidly due to new technology.
Casadevall 12 — Arturo Casadevall, Department of Microbiology and Immunology and the Division
of Infectious Diseases of the Albert Einstein College of Medicine, 2012 (“The future of biological
warfare,” Microbial Biotechnology, March 21st, Available Online at:
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1751-7915.2012.00340.x/full, Accessed: 7-25-2015)
The realization that a handful of envelopes containing B. anthracis in 2001 was sufficient to cause
widespread panic, and precipitated the first evacuation of the houses of the US government since the war
of 1812, provided a clear demonstration of the power of cheap biological weapons. In an age of terrorism
biological weapons are perfectly suited for asymmetric warfare where the relatively low costs of
producing such weapons combined with their potential for amplification through communicability have a
disproportionately strong effect on targeted populations. Consequently, biological weapons are likely to
remain very attractive to terrorists and fringe groups like millennial sects. Thus the near horizon is likely
to witness continued concern about low intensity use of biological weapons fashioned around known
pathogenic microbes such as Salmonella spp. and B. anthracis, which have already been used in terrorism.
The scene on the far horizon is much harder to discern simply because the current rapid the pace of
technological advance suggests that new technologies are likely to be developed in coming years that will
completely change the landscape for biological warfare offensive and defensive possibilities. Even
without envisioning new biological agents, such as those that could be generated by synthetic biology, the
technology already exists for significantly enhancing the lethality of biological weapons. The introduction
of antimicrobial resistance genes into bacterial agents could significantly enhance their lethality by
reducing treatment options. In this regard, it is relatively easy to generateB. anthracis resistant to first line
antimicrobial therapies such as ciprofloxacin (Athamna et al., 2004). The efficacy of vaccines can be
circumvented by genetically modifying agents to express immune modifier genes that interfere with the
immune response as was demonstrated by the expression of IL-4 in ectromelia virus (Jackson et al.,
2001). It is noteworthy that microbial modifications to increase lethality is only one possible outcome for
engineering biological weapons since these could also be designed to incapacitate instead of kill.
Given the enormous universe of microbial threats, the power of modern biology to enhance the microbial
virulence and the high likelihood that biological weapons will continue to threaten humanity one must
face the question of how best to protect society. The sheer number of threats and the availability of
technologies to modify microbes to defeat available countermeasures suggest that any attempt to achieve
defence in depth using microbe-by-microbe approaches to biodefence is impractical and ineffective.
2NC/1NR Extensions
2NC Overview
The aff restores privacy protections of sensitive information regardless of who owns
the server and expands the requirement for warrants to “all the information
collected by machines over the Internet” — that’s their Collins evidence.
Only the CP provides the most rapid and accurate means of preventing disease
outbreaks and pandemics—timeframe and efficiency is key.
Bean and Martin 01 — Nancy H. Bean, Chief of Biostatistics and Information Management Branch
and project leader of the Laboratory Information Tracking System in the National Center for Infectious
Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and Stanley M. Martin, the former Chief of the
Biostatistics and Information Management Branch and former project leader of the Laboratory
Information Tracking System at the National Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, 2001 (“Implementing a Network for Electronic Surveillance Reporting from Public
Health Reference Laboratories: An International Perspective,” Emerging Infectious Diseases, Sep-Oct,
Available Online at: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2631881/, Accessed: 7-24-2015)
Electronic surveillance systems meet three broad surveillance objectives: they generate hypotheses,
monitor trends, and detect clusters and outbreaks (11). Electronic data transmission enables these
objectives to be met very rapidly and often more accurately than with other reporting systems, thus
extending the benefits to actually controlling the spread of illness. While the information needs for
tomorrow and capacities to meet them can change overnight, the underlying surveillance principles and
objectives are constant. Generating Hypotheses One role of surveillance is to provide hypothesisgenerating data (e.g., demographic characteristics of patients, risk factors for illness, or antimicrobial
resistance patterns of infecting organisms). Surveillance databases should not be expected to provide
answers to all questions about a particular disease or topic but to comprise a minimum data set to suggest
hypotheses about events under surveillance. Monitoring Trends Surveillance systems that collect
consistent data over extended periods can provide valuable information about spatial, temporal, and
demographic changes in disease incidence. For example, the emergence or reemergence of pathogens,
changes in antimicrobial resistance, or changes in target populations can be detected rapidly by examining
electronic surveillance data. Information on trends or patterns provides a reliable basis for decision
making about preventing and controlling disease. Before the initiation of electronic reporting, surveillance
data may have signaled only that a cluster had occurred; this signal was often of little value in outbreak
control since the outbreak may have been over before it was recognized. Detecting clusters often
depended on alert laboratorians or epidemiologists recognizing increases in disease occurrence on the
basis of their increased workload or their memory rather than actual data. With electronic reporting, data
can be transmitted so rapidly that an outbreak can be detected and investigated while it is ongoing
and interventions can be implemented. Statistical evaluations of surveillance data reported electronically
can be more timely and accurate, and they will have greater value in detecting and curtailing outbreaks
early (5,10,12-16).
2NC Solvency Extension
No solvency deficit —private health information is still protected but public health
data, which is key to preventing bioterrorism must remain available at a moment’s
notice —that’s Bravata.
Public health surveillance protects privacy rights regardless of warrant
requirements —no solvency deficit.
Stoto 8 — Michael A. Stoto, Professor of Health Services Administration and Population Health,
Georgetown University School of Nursing & Health Studies, 2008 (“Public Health Surveillance in the
Twenty-First Century: Achieving Population Health Goals While Protecting Individuals’ Privacy and
Confidentiality,” The Georgetown Law Journal, Vol 96, Available Online at:
http://georgetown.lawreviewnetwork.com/files/pdf/96-2/Stoto.PDF, Accessed: 7-24-2015)
Traditional public health surveillance programs monitor disease using prespecified case definitions and
employ manual data collection, human decision making, and manual data entry.54 In contrast, current
electronic surveillance systems employ sophisticated information technology and statistical methods to
gather and process large amounts of data and display the information for decision makers in a timely way.
For instance, syndromic surveillance systems assume that during an attack or a disease outbreak, people
will first develop symptoms, then stay home from work or school, attempt to self-treat with over-thecounter (OTC) products, and eventually see a physician with nonspecific symptoms, all days before they
are formally diagnosed and reported to the health department.55 To identify such behaviors, syndromic
surveillance systems regularly monitor existing data for sudden changes or anomalies that might signal a
disease outbreak.56 Syndromic surveillance systems have been developed to include data on school and
work absenteeism, sales of OTC products, calls to nurse hotlines, and counts of hospital emergency room
(ER) admissions or reports from primary physicians for certain symptoms or complaints.57 The
possibility “of earlier detection and more rapid response to a bioterrorist event has tremendous intuitive
appeal,”58 but there are practical concerns about the use of these systems in state and local public health
practice. In statistical terms there is a relatively narrow window between what can be detected in the first
few days and what is obvious.59 As a result, the statistical value of syndromic surveillance for detecting
bioterrorist attacks has not yet been demonstrated.60 In addition, syndromic surveillance’s success
“depends on local health departments’ ability to respond effectively.”61 When a syndromic surveillance
system sounds an alarm, health departments typically wait a day or two to see if the number of cases
continues to remain high or if a similar signal is found in other data sources. Doing so, of course, reduces
both the timeliness and sensitivity of the original system. If the health department decides that an
epidemiological investigation is warranted, it may begin by identifying those who are ill and talking to
their physicians. If this does not resolve the matter, additional tests must be ordered and clinical
specimens gathered for laboratory analysis. Health departments might also choose to initiate active
surveillance by contacting physicians to see if they have seen similar cases.62
2NC Disease/Pandemics Impact
Pandemics spread like wildfire and cause extinction — only resistance monitoring
solves in the necessary timeframe.
Ferguson et al 6 — Neil M. Ferguson, Derek A. T. Cummings, Christophe Fraser, James C. Cajka,
Philip C. Cooley, and Donald S. Burke, Department of Infectious Disease Epidemiology, Faculty of
Medicine, Imperial College London, Department of International Health, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg
School of Public Health, 2006 (“Strategies for mitigating an influenza pandemic,” Nature, April 26th,
Available Online at: http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v442/n7101/full/nature04795.html#B3,
Accessed: 7-26-2015)
Once a new pandemic virus starts to be transmitted in a country, interventions must be targeted for
maximum impact. Applying the type of intensive control strategies envisaged for containing a pandemic
at source6 is impractical as infection will constantly be reseeded in a country by visitors
(see Supplementary Information). Clinical cases are clearly then the first priority for any more-targeted
approach, as prompt treatment with antivirals reduces clinical severity and
infectiousness18 (see Supplementary Information). Our results indicate that only very rapid treatment
can significantly reduce transmission (Fig. 2c, d), because cases are at their most infectious soon after
symptoms develop (seeSupplementary Information). For the high transmissibility scenario, same-day
treatment of 90% of cases reduces cumulative attack rates from 34% to 29% and peak daily attack rates
from 1.9% to 1.6%, with an antiviral stockpile sufficient to treat 25% of the population (the size many
countries have ordered19) being adequate to implement the policy. If treatment is delayed by 1 day, the
cumulative attack rate for the high transmissibility scenario increases to 32% (meaning that a 29%
stockpile is needed), and the peak daily attack rate to 1.9%. The impact of treatment on the peak daily
attack rate at the height of the epidemic is always greater than that on overall attack rates. Assuming that
more than 50% of infections result in clinical illness requiring treatment would increase the required
stockpile (see Supplementary Information). A real threat to the effectiveness of antiviral-based
mitigation policies would be if resistant strains arose with transmissibility close to the wild-type level20.
Such strains have not yet been detected, but resistance monitoring during a pandemic will be essential.
2NC Bioterror Impact
Bioterror is possible and likely.
Cairns 8 — John Cairns, Jr., 2008 (“PUTTING BIOTERRORISM IN PERSPECTIVE,” Bioterrorism
and Biological Warfare, 2008, Available Online at:
https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/bitstream/handle/10919/25010/cairns_bioterrorism_in_perspective.pdf?sequ
ence=1&isAllowed=y, Accessed: 7-25-2015)
The risk of terrorism cannot be reduced to zero. Living on an overcrowded planet with less resources per
capita daily (1.5 million more people added each week) means that terrorism is a reality that people must
learn to live with. Approximately 3 billion people are inadequately nourished, poorly housed, and have
inadequate medical care. The wealth gap between most people and the ultra-rich has increased markedly
in the 21st century and may continue to do so. This situation will probably produce quite a few terrorists
who have had a family member suffer because food, housing, and medical care were too expensive. In the
United States, especially following the publication of the general public and their political representatives
insisted they be told the “safe” concentration of various chemical substances, especially pesticides.
Investigators could show that exposure under particular test conditions for a specific length of time for a
particular compound would often result in no observable effects. However, a few individuals of a species
may be more sensitive to a particular compound than the limited number of organisms in the actual tests.
Moreover, conditions outside the laboratory may be different in some areas than the conditions used in
the tests. Using scientifically validated concentrations of chemicals that produced no-observable effects
has dramatically reduced, but not eliminated, risk. The same approach is true for bioterrorism, and all
other types of terrorism, but risk can never be reduced to zero in a multivariate, dynamic Earth. Just living
is a risky activity, but it is far preferable to the alternative.
AT: Public Health Surveillance Bad
Public health surveillance is ethically justified regardless of violations of privacy to
further the greater good and to protect individuals’ basic interest.
Lee 13 — Lisa M. Lee, Ph.D., M.S. () Office of Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Laboratory Services,
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2014 (“Health Information in the Background: Justifying
Public Health Surveillance Without Patient Consent,” Emerging Pervasive Information and
Communication Technologies, May 9th, Available Online at:
http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-007-6833-8_3, Accessed: 7-25-2015)
Rubel, finding no adequate guide to the conflicts between privacy and public health surveillance, takes a
“basic interests” approach to justifying the collection of public health data without patient consent (Rubel
2012). The foundation for this approach is Rawls’s view that persons living in a pluralistic society have
basic interests regardless of their conception of a good life and that therefore supersede personal interests
based solely on their conception of a good life (Rawls 2001). 52 L.M. Lee Health, maximized in large
part through public health, is one of these interests, and unless another person’s basic interests are at
stake, activities that promote society’s basic interests are generally justifiable, perhaps obligatory. Rubel
offers several conditions that temper the permissibility of public health interventions that promote health
as a basic interest, and calls this the “unreasonable exercise argument” (Rubel 2012, p. 12). This argument
allows for conditions where persons could justify a privacy claim over a public health good, specifically
where there are important personal interests the exercise of which would not unreasonably burden the
basic health interest. Using this approach, Rubel argues that public health interventions – including public
health surveillance – that are necessary to further the basic interest of health are justified when
implementation does not impose on another person’s basic interests. 3.5 Conclusion Collecting and using
data without one’s knowledge or consent does not always constitute an ethical affront. In the context of
health – considered a human right by some, a basic interest by others – pursuing the best possible
outcomes is not possible on an individual level; population health is critical for individual health and the
role of public health surveillance in population health is indispensable. The role of a government in
protecting and enhancing the health of its people, thus meeting a basic interest of its population, is clear
when the activities necessary are those that individuals cannot implement themselves. In a pluralistic
society there will be disparate views on how much information the government ought to collect and store
about its citizens, but there is no argument that it is possible to collect, store, and use public health
surveillance data under ethical circumstances to better the health of a nation.
Health officials are responsible and put individual’s privacy first despite political
pressures.
Richards 9 — Edward P. Richards J.D, M.P.H, Harvey A. Peltier Professor of Law and Director,
Program in Law, Science, and Public Health at the Paul M. Herbert Law Center, Louisiana State
University, 2009 (“DANGEROUS PEOPLE, UNSAFE CONDITIONS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
BASIS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH SURVEILLANCE,” The Journal of Legal Medicine, 2009, Available
Online at: http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/Articles/ULGM_A_369622_O.pdf, Accessed: 7-25-2015)
There have been few abuses of public health administrative searches. Public health authorities, if
anything, have been too reticent to use proper surveillance techniques. Although some of this reticence is
because of concerns about being seen as violating individual rights, most of it stems from lack of staff and
other resources.113 Despite the push on public health preparedness since the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001, health departments around the United States continue to suffer budget and staff cuts.
The impacts of these cuts are exacerbated by legislatures pushing ever-increasing responsibilities on
health departments without providing the budgets or staff to carry out these new tasks.114 The hardest
issue for public health policy makers is to avoid pressures to transform public health agencies into
extensions of the Department of Homeland Security. As we have seen from the adoption of Draconian
emergency powers laws, it is more difficult to maintain a balance between individual rights and
community protection than to attempt to satisfy political pressures by swinging wildly between extreme
positions.115
AT: Public Trust I/L
The CP builds trust — the public expects fast action on health threats.
Lee 13 — Lisa M. Lee, Ph.D., M.S. () Office of Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Laboratory Services,
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2014 (“Health Information in the Background: Justifying
Public Health Surveillance Without Patient Consent,” Emerging Pervasive Information and
Communication Technologies, May 9th, Available Online at:
http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-007-6833-8_3, Accessed: 7-25-2015)
Scientific justification of data collection for the public good is well documented (Brown 2000; Carrel and
Rennie 2008; Tu et al. 2004; Verity and Nicoll 2002). Data are needed for scientific and medical research,
such as development of chemotherapies or methods of infection control, as well as biobehavioral research
that informs behavioral influences on health. Data are also needed to support a learning health system
(Friedman et al. 2010) – a health system that improves by learning from itself by establishing a system of
quality improvement that combines health services research and comparative effectiveness analyses of
routinely collected clinical data. The aim of the learning health system is to improve both quality and
efficiency of health care for all patients. In addition to improving clinical medicine for individuals,
medical data are needed to drive recognition of public health threats, implement appropriate interventions,
and evaluate effectiveness of action for communities and populations. Public health surveillance data
are the foundation of all public health action. The public expects public health officials to act swiftly
to reduce morbidity and mortality as much as possible. To do so, officials must ensure the unbiased,
complete, representative, and timely collection of information from the populations they serve. The legal
justification for public health data collection has a long history and is clear. Often it occurs in the
‘background’ of the health system with reportable disease notifications sent to local or state health
officials by health care providers without individual patient consent per state laws (see Sect. 3.
AT: Perm
Perm fails— It links to the net benefit since the aff still uses warrants for public
health surveillance—this destroys solvency.
1) Uncertainty —the aff creates a presumption against warrants and toward
curbing public health surveillance. Even if some warrants are allowed
uncertainty still fails in safeguarding against bioterror.
2) Delays— the warrant process causes massive delays and ramps up costs.
Richards 9 — Edward P. Richards J.D, M.P.H, Harvey A. Peltier Professor of Law and Director,
Program in Law, Science, and Public Health at the Paul M. Herbert Law Center, Louisiana State
University, 2009 (“DANGEROUS PEOPLE, UNSAFE CONDITIONS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
BASIS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH SURVEILLANCE,” The Journal of Legal Medicine, 2009, Available
Online at: http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/Articles/ULGM_A_369622_O.pdf, Accessed: 7-25-2015)
The Court recognized that requiring Fourth Amendment warrants would make it difficult to carry out
public health inspections. In particular, the Fourth Amendment model fails for preventive inspections,
where the inspection is to discover public health threats rather than to respond to complaints about
known threats. The Fourth Amendment does not allow screening for crime, but screening is key to public
health.57 The Fourth Amendment model is also resource intensive, which raises the cost of enforcement.
When a warrant is constitutionally required, cost is not an issue,58 but when there is no constitutional
requirement for full criminal law due process protections, costs are a valid consideration.59 Thus, the
Court was unwilling to burden public health officials with the costs and delays inherent in the Fourth
Amendment warrant process. The compromise takes place in the area warrant arena. In these cases, which
involve building inspections, the court has held that if the owner refused entry, the public health inspector
would need to get a warrant from a judge. But rather than having to show the judge individualized
probable case for a specific building, the inspector would need to show only a reasonable rationale for the
inspection, the legal basis for the inspection,60 and the area covered by the warrant.61 For example, a
warrant for fire inspections could be based on time period, such as yearly inspections, the statute or rule
allowing such inspections, and a geographical or other method of determining which buildings would be
inspected. This single warrant would be good for all of the buildings being inspected, obviating any
specific knowledge of conditions or the identity of the owners of specific buildings.
**Aff Answers**
Exports PICs
AT: Net Benefits
2AC L/ to Politics
Counterplan links to politics – maintaining export controls is uniquely unpopular
Douglas M. Stinnett and Bryan R. Early 11 (Academic Advisor at the Center for Policy Research-University at Albany and Faculty
Expert in Economic Sanctions, “Complying by Denying: Explaining Why States Develop Nonproliferation Export Controls”, August 3 rd 2011,
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1528-3585.2011.00436.x/full)
Combating proliferation through export controls has many of the characteristics of a collective action
problem. First, it can be economically or politically costly. Implementing and administering export
controls will impose financial costs on industry due to administrative burdens (Cupitt et al. 2001) and lost market
share for exports (Beck and Gahlaut 2003). Restricting the transfer of sensitive technology can also hinder the pursuit
of foreign policy goals by some states. Recent research on the supply-side of proliferation demonstrates that states transfer nuclear
technology to further their strategic objectives. Fuhrmann (2009a), for example, concludes that states use civilian nuclear cooperation agreements
as a means of strengthening friends and allies and pursuing strategic objectives.
AT: Militarization NB
Impact of DA inevitable – other states will just export the tech
Douglas M. Stinnett and Bryan R. Early 11 (Academic Advisor at the Center for Policy Research-University at Albany and Faculty
Expert in Economic Sanctions, “Complying by Denying: Explaining Why States Develop Nonproliferation Export Controls”, August 3rd 2011,
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1528-3585.2011.00436.x/full)
The problem
of compliance with nonproliferation norms stems from this combination of costly compliance
and unevenly distributed benefits. States may be tempted to free ride in order to achieve strategic goals or maintain exports markets
while letting others shoulder the burden of addressing global security. Bergenäs (2008), in particular, notes that implementing export
controls has the features of a tragedy of the commons. In restricting the trade of dual-use technology,
there is always the possibility of “undercutting,” which occurs when a government denies approval for the
export of an item to a particular party only to have another government approve that same transaction to
that party (Gahlaut and Zaborsky 2004). Thus, states may not view export controls as worthwhile when the
likelihood of undercutting is high. If enough suppliers of a controlled good defect, the efforts of those states imposing export controls
may have little effect on proliferators’ ability to acquire what they seek.
No reason US is uniquely key – Pakistan will get its dual use tech from Europe –
empirics prove
Rizwana Abbasi 12 (PhD in International Security and Nuclear Non-proliferation from the University of Leicester, “Studies in the History
of Religious and Political Pluralism, Volume 7 : Pakistan and the New Nuclear Taboo : Regional Deterrence and the International Arms Control
Regime”, Published by Peter Lang, May 2012)
By March 1979, Pakistan faced a new challenge, when the CIA informed the US government that
Pakistan was busy on a
centrifuge plant to produce weapons-grade uranium. Britain and the United States tightened their export
regulations. When the CIA, in coordination with other intelligence agencies, prepared a report on Kahuta, Malik reveals that Pakistan
had already acquired all the material and components needed for the enrichment plant. The export control
policies were weak, security at the global level was lax, and the dual-use technology which Pakistan
acquired was not covered by the Zangger Committee or the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) list. Riffat Hussain, Hans Blix, James
Acton, and others interviewed for this study admitted that this was indeed the case. Khan himself stated that it was not possible for us to make
each and every piece of equipment or component within the country. Attempts to do so would have killed the project in the initial stage. We
devised a strategy by which we would go all out to buy everything that we needed in the open market to lay the foundation of a good
infrastructure and would then switch over to indigenous production as and when we had to. 144 He further stated, ‘my long stay in Europe and
intimate knowledge of various countries and their manufacturing firms was an asset. Within two years we had put up working prototypes of
centrifuges and were going at full speed to build the facilities at Kahuta’. 145 When interviewed, General Ehsan revealed that it was lust for
money and greed which made foreign firms sell dual-use technology to Pakistan. Khan states: we received many letters and telexes and people
chased us with figures and details of equipment they had sold to Almelo, Capenhurst etc. They literally begged us to buy their equipment. We
bought what we considered suitable for our plant and very often asked them to make changes and
modifications according to our requirements. One should realise that all this equipment was what we call
conventional technology. It was normal chemical process and vacuum technology equipment which had a thousand and one uses in
other disciplines. 146 Indeed, ‘almost all the equipment in Kahuta was imported from Europe’. 147 Khan had full
authority, independently, to import the required technology to complete his goal of building centrifuges at the Kahuta plant. Furthermore, lax
security at FDO, loopholes and inadequate guidelines of the London Club, and inadequate export regulations gave Khan a capability to reach the
international market for making any necessary purchases. Khan
was staying ahead of Western export control laws, in
order to circumvent export restrictions and was able to procure much-needed technology and components
from the international market.
Indian and Pakistani nuclear facilities are far behind and they get their tech from
other countries
Gary Milhollin 02 (founder of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, “The Use of Export Controls to Stop Proliferation”, April
15th 2002, http://www.iranwatch.org/our-publications/speech/use-export-controls-stop-proliferation)
Both India and Pakistan have tested nuclear weapons, but still have progress to make. Both countries are trying to
develop missiles with longer ranges, and smaller warheads to mount on these missiles. This will require
better guidance systems, testing equipment, machine tools, and high-speed computers. Both countries will
continue to try to procure these items. Both India and Pakistan have developed their nuclear and missile
programs almost exclusively with imports. Virtually every element of the programs in both countries have been imported or
based on foreign designs. India's plutonium comes from reactors supplied by Canada that run on heavy water
imported from China, Russia and Norway through a German broker. The United States also sold heavy
water to India. India's rockets use solid fuel stages copied from U.S. designs, liquid fuel stages based on
Russian and French designs, and a guidance system developed with help from Germany. Pakistan's
nuclear warheads use a Chinese design and are fueled with enriched uranium made with help from China,
Germany, Switzerland and other countries. Pakistan's missiles come from China and North Korea. In the future, we must
expect India to develop the ability to deliver nuclear weapons by surface ships, submarines and longrange bombers as well as long-range missiles. Pakistan can now produce its own short-and medium-range
missiles and has nuclear capable F-16 fighter-bombers from America. Each country will continue to have enough nuclear
warheads to inflict immense damage on the other. In a nuclear war, India would lose its high-tech industry, and lose its bid to be seen as a
significant actor on the world stage - the opposite of what India's nuclear weapons appear designed to achieve. Pakistan could lose its status as an
independent nation.
Solvency Deficit
2AC Transparency
The only way to solve the aff is through greater transparency – all states should be
treated equally or it turns the aff - causes mistrust and kills relations
Rizwana Abbasi 12 (PhD in International Security and Nuclear Non-proliferation from the University of Leicester, “Studies in the History
of Religious and Political Pluralism, Volume 7 : Pakistan and the New Nuclear Taboo : Regional Deterrence and the International Arms Control
Regime”, Published by Peter Lang, May 2012)
Secondly, dual-use
technologies are critical. There is a need to address sensitive technologies more clearly,
the case of dual-use technology, all states should be treated equally.
There is need for greater transparency in nuclear export controls. Export control measures
undertaken through the ZC and the NSG should be open and transparent. These measures should be promoted
within a framework of dialogue and cooperation among those states which participate in negotiations with
non-party states. The NSG countries pursue a cartel policy (the ‘no undercutting’ principle), while Pakistan and India are
expected to follow the NSG guidelines without having been made beneficiaries of the ‘no
undercutting’ principle. The question arises as to why these non-NPT states should be expected to put themselves at a commercial
and to consider their registration carefully. In
disadvantage in the trade of dual-use technologies? Also with no information regarding denials – as NSG states share denial notices only among
themselves – states
like Pakistan, even if they wanted to, cannot take informed decisions regarding the export of
dual-use technology. The implementation of NSG export controls requires better sharing of best practice
at the international level.
Perms
2AC Perm DB
Perm do the plan and the counterplan – it’s not severance because the specification
of maintaining controls of Pakistan is a mandate of the counterplan so it includes all
of the plan and part of the CP
2AC Perm do the CP
Perm do the CP – it’s an example of the way the plan can be done – and it’s justifies
<insert PICs bad>
FDA PIC
Aff
2AC—Whistleblowers Solve
Whistleblowers provide key info on fraud suspects and prevent harmful use of FDA
data.
Davis and Abraham 13 —Courtney Davis, senior lecturer in sociology, and John Abraham,
professor of sociology, 2013 (“Is there a cure for corporate crime in the drug industry?,” BMJ, February
6th, Available Online at: http://www.bmj.com/content/bmj/346/bmj.f755.full.pdf, Accessed: 7-28-2015)
Nearly 30 years ago, Braithwaite’s Corporate crime in the Pharmaceutical Industry showed that unethical
and corrupt behaviour was endemic in the sector. Sadly, there is growing evidence that little has changed.
Recent research suggests that violation of the law continues to be widespread. Most new medicines offer
little or no therapeutic advantage over existing products, so promotion plays a huge role in achieving
market share. In a crowded and competitive marketplace the temptation for companies to resort to
misleading claims is great. According to Gøtzsche (doi:10.1136/bmj.e8462),1 as of July 2012, nine of the
10 largest drug companies were bound by corporate integrity agreements under civil and criminal
settlements or judgments in the United States. The corporate activity that has led to recent government
investigations has involved unethical and unlawful practices that are well beyond mere administrative
offences. Whistleblowers’ and other “insider” accounts in the US typically include allegations that
companies systematically planned complex marketing campaigns to increase drug sales, which involved
illegal and fraudulent activities. These included active promotion of off label, or otherwise inappropriate,
use of drugs, despite company knowledge that such use could seriously harm patients.2
2AC—No Impact
Pandemics are unlikely — new technology and better medical practices prevent
spread.
Song 14 — Liting Song, Hope Biomedical Research, PostDoc Position, University of Toronto 2014 (“It
is Unlikely That Influenza Viruses Will Cause a Pandemic Again Like What Happened in 1918 and
1919,” Frontiers in Public Health, May 7th, Available Online at:
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4019839/, Accessed: 7-28-2015)
Nowadays, we travel faster, and we travel more frequently and globally, and we have more complicated
social activities and lifestyles, thereby increasing the chances of viral mutation; and we realize that
influenza viruses are even easier to reassort, recombine, and mutate in nature than many other RNA
viruses. However, we are now living in a technologically, economically, and socially much better and
advanced society. I believe influenza virus infections are controllable and preventable, with the increased
population health and immunity, with the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System, and
with standard/routine epidemiological practices, and with new effective anti-viral agents and vaccines in
production in the future. Now, I first predict that influenza viruses will unlikely again cause a pandemic
on a level comparable to what happened in 1918 and 1919. Hopefully, one day we could consider a
strategy to produce a universal vaccine that can prevent people from infections of all influenza virus
strains, or we could produce some very effective anti-influenza virus drugs; then influenza would not be a
problem anymore. We should learn lessons from the mistakes we made in the past. It is reasonable and
necessary to be cautious about influenza viruses, but overreactions or catastrophic reactions should be
avoided in the future. My opinion is anti-traditional; the purpose of this article is to influence public
health policy, and to save some of the limited resources and money for more important diseases like heart
diseases, cancer, diabetes, AIDS, hepatitises, and tuberculosis (15).
Foreign Students PICs
China
2ac- S/D STEM
China is the most important country for US STEM
Lane and Kinser 13 [Jason E. Lane and Kevin Kinser @ The Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of
Government, the public policy research arm of the State University of New York, conducts fiscal and
programmatic research on American state and local governments. May 2013. “The US Relies Heavily on
Foreign Students to Support STEM Fields and the Knowledge Economy: Could the Foreign Talent
Bubble Burst?” http://www.rockinst.org/observations/lanej/2013-05Is_Bubble_Bursting.aspx//jweideman]
There has been much talk recently in the United States about a higher education bubble bursting. The growing student loan debt is a big bubble that’s about to pop, if
it hasn’t already. Some pundits and politicians in the United States have also begun to point to increasing costs and continued high unemployment as an indicator that
higher education writ large is creating a new bubble. Only time will tell if these trends are part of a new norm or if these booms are soon to be busts. One other bubble
that has gotten less attention, however, may be on the verge of popping. And if it does, it could have a transformative effect on higher education and the nation’s
knowledge economy. Colleges
and universities in the United States have become increasingly reliant on
international students to fill Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM)-related
graduate programs and support their STEM-related research agendas and patent generation. Moreover, because
demand among foreign students for a U.S. degree seems unlimited, many colleges and universities have seen them as a quick fix for offsetting lagging interest among
domestic students in graduate education, especially in STEM fields. These international students represent real revenues and significant enrollments. According to the
latest data from National Center for Educational Statistics, international students account for around 10 percent of all graduate enrollments (compared to about 3
percent in undergraduate programs). In many fields, programs would not be viable if not for the significant international enrollment they draw. Many pay full fees and
those that don’t are critical for supporting external grant funding that provides an important source of funding for universities — funding that often relies on
international graduate students as research assistants and postdocs. Much like the easy-to-obtain loans prevalent before the housing market crash in 2008, international
students have been considered a triple-A investment with reliable returns. But a recent report from the Council of Graduate Schools (CGS) reveals that the credit line
may be starting to dry up. The number of international applications to graduate school increased by only 1 percent this year, following three consecutive years of
about 10 percent growth. Maybe a 1 percent growth rate is not that alarming — especially following so many years of near double-digit growth. It’s probably only a
small blip that will rebound next year, right? Perhaps. But we think the 1 percent increase could be a leading indicator of a more troublesome future and we think state
and university leaders would be wise to consider the implications. First, international graduate students provide a substantial amount of talent in science and
engineering — the fields that tend to drive the knowledge economy. The National Science Foundation (NSF) reports that 84 percent of foreign students who earned
doctoral degrees in the period of 2001-11 did so in high-demand areas in the fields of science and engineering. The NSF also reports that the percentage of science and
engineering doctorates awarded to foreign students peaked at 41 percent in 2007. About 35 percent of postdocs are temporary visa holders. Finally, according to a
report by the Partnership for a New American Economy, foreign students, postdocs, and other nonfaculty researchers were behind 54 percent of the patents issued by
universities in 2011. This means that any “blip” in international student enrollments will disproportionately affect the areas of science and engineering. Second,
about half of all foreign applicants are from one nation: China. In fact, the NSF reports that about 40
percent of all foreign students who received doctoral degrees from 2001-11 came from China. According to the
CGS report, applications to graduate school from China declined by 5 percent. This is a dramatic reversal following seven consecutive years of double-digit increases
in Chinese applications. In
an ideal scenario, the proportion of applications would be distributed among enough
nations that a downturn in one country is offset by an increase in another. And, in fact, the decline in Chinese applications
was offset by a 20 percent increase in applications from India. But that is only shifting, not diversifying, the source. In fact, the NSF data reveals that individuals
from China, India, and South Korea account for half of all doctoral degrees in science and engineering awarded to foreign
visa holders. When most foreign applicants come from just a few source countries, what happens when those students suddenly start deciding to go somewhere else?
1ar S/D- STEM
Chinese students are key to the economy
Freifelder 14 [Jack, China Daily USA. Citing data from the Brookings Institution. 9/1/14, “China makes
up largest share of foreign students in US” http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/201409/01/content_18522649.htm//jweideman]
China remains by far the largest source country for foreign students coming to the US for higher
education, according to a new report from the Brookings Institution. From 2008 to 2012, more than 1.1 million
foreign students attended school in the US, and China comprised the largest portion of that group, with
285,000 students entering the US with F-1 student visas, showed the new study The Geography of Foreign Students in US Higher Education: Origins and Destinations
on Aug 29. During that time foreign students studying in the US contributed more than $21 billion in tuition and close to $13 billion in living costs to the American
economy. But just 45 percent of these students extended their visas after graduation and got jobs in the US. "Chinese
students are coming to the
US to study in fields that are highly sought out, and to get the skills to compete in this global economy,"
Neil G. Ruiz, an associate fellow at Brookings, who wrote the new study, told China Daily. "China is
special because the numbers are so large, but a lot of foreign students are coming from newly-emerging
cities in China, like Nanjing, Guangzhou, Wuhan, etc," Ruiz said, "so Beijing and Shanghai are not the only cities that these
students are coming from because of the high demand for an American education." The report shows that two-thirds of foreign
students are studying in "STEM (science, technology, engineering and math) or business, management and marketing fields," compared to 48
percent of their US counterparts. "America has a lot of top universities and the US takes in 21 percent of all foreign students studying abroad," Ruiz said. "Students
will continue to want to come to the US because it is a center of research and development, and our universities have research facilities in all types of fields." Foreign
students attending colleges and universities in the United States bring significant amounts of money to the US economy, but more can be done to encourage their
interest in remaining in the US post-graduation, the report says.
A decrease in Chinese applications is the worst situation possible
ICEF 13 [ICEF organises international student recruitment workshops, makes student recruitment
management software and offers recruitment consulting services. 2013. “American graduate schools see
alarming drop in applications from Chinese students” http://monitor.icef.com/2013/04/american-graduateschools-see-alarming-drop-in-applications-from-chinese-students///jweideman]
The 5% decrease
among Chinese students may result in a huge blow to many American universities, since as
of a year ago, Chinese students accounted for half of all foreign applicants to American graduate schools
and one-third of those enrolled. Other countries contributing to percentage declines in US graduate school applications this spring are South Korea
and Taiwan (-13% each) and Mexico (-11%). These source countries are often prioritised in national and institutionspecific recruitment targeting, so the decreases here are also very notable. Debra W. Stewart, president of the
Council of Graduate Schools, is on record as being very concerned about the Chinese drop in particular, calling it “disturbing” and “precipitous” … “a
post-9/11 kind of drop.” She attributed at least part of the decrease to a restricted funding environment for students attending US schools, and said: “ As a
country, we simply can’t afford to maintain obstacles to international graduate study, especially as other countries are
decreasing these barriers for highly qualified students.”
Relations A/O
The plan solves U.S. China Relations
Chang 14 [Anthony, Writer for the Diplomat. 6/20/14, “Is Overseas Study Helping US-China
Relations?” http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/is-overseas-study-helping-us-china-relations///jweideman]
Both the number and growth of Chinese students at American universities is one of the more startling
phenomena in higher education. A welcome one, too: study abroad would seem to promise a future where
U.S.-China relations might be characterized by greater firsthand knowledge of American culture among
the Chinese. By generating greater understanding, their experience in the U.S. should also expand their
sense of common interests, brightening prospects for cooperation between the world’s main powers.
While few would object to such a future as a goal of foreign policy, how realistic is it? Unsentimental Education Let’s start with the numbers: the Institute of
International Education reports there were more than 235,000 Chinese students in the U.S. during the
2012/2013 academic year, a 21 percent increase from the year prior, making China the number one source
of foreign students in America for four years running. Nearly half of these students are studying either
business or engineering; adding math and the hard sciences would account for over two-thirds. These are
ultimately more applied subjects that tend to be less popular among other international students, let alone among Americans: in 2011/2012, for instance, only 16
percent of U.S. bachelor’s degrees were conferred in these fields. Of course, it isn’t just academic majors that determine the character of study abroad, but even so,
there are few indications Chinese students’ experiences are especially representative, independent of what their coursework looks like. That means less class
participation, less involvement in extracurricular activities, and fewer friendships with Americans, even compared with other foreign students, despite the fact most
American consider all these things inseparable elements of university life. And if Chinese students’ time abroad isn’t reflective of that broader U.S. experience, then
one should ask to what extent their studies are really maximizing their understanding of America. Given that Chinese numbers have surged only recently, it might be
unrealistic to expect this kind of integration so quickly. Plus, these challenges can face students no matter where they originally come from, especially places where
university culture may differ dramatically. But
the stakes involved in helping China’s youth obtain a more representative
view of the U.S. are frankly higher, and both the number of international students (not to mention the tuition they often
pay in full) can actually make it harder for universities to take their acculturation seriously. The more Chinese choose to study in America, the more tempting it
becomes to measure success by the revenue they bring than educational quality, even as these students find it easier to spend their days with compatriots. Mandarin Is
the (Distant) Future (Maybe) At the same time, educational exchange is a two-way street. While more and more Chinese arrive on U.S. campuses, there is no
comparable trend in the other direction, making one question just how well America’s next generation will know the Chinese. In 2011/2012, fewer than 15,000
Americans were hitting the books in China, a mere two percent increase from the previous year, and only half the number studying abroad in Italy. And among this
already small group, only 2,200 of them are actually pursuing a degree in China, a number that encompasses programs taught in English. Even high-profile initiatives
like the Schwarzman Scholars program – a kind of Rhodes Scholarship to attend Tsinghua University – will have all its courses taught in English, despite the
program’s founder saying, “In the 21st century, China
is no longer an elective course.” Yet here is a course that currently
has few requirements.
Absent mutual understanding, US-China war is inevitable and goes nuclear
Fisher 11 [Max Fisher is a former writer and editor at The Atlantic. Currently a journalist at VOX.
10/31/11, “5 Most Likely Ways the U.S. and China Could Spark Accidental Nuclear War”
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/10/5-most-likely-ways-the-us-and-china-couldspark-accidental-nuclear-war/247616///jweideman]
After 10 years of close but unproductive talks, the
U.S. and China still fail to understand one another's nuclear weapons
policies, according to a disturbing report by Global Security Newswire. In other words, neither the U.S. nor China knows when
the other will or will not use a nuclear weapon against the other. That's not due to hostility, secrecy, or deliberate foreign
policy -- it's a combination of mistrust between individual negotiators and poor communication; at times, something
as simple as a shoddy translation has prevented the two major powers from coming together. Though nuclear war between the U.S. and China is still extremely
unlikely, because
the two countries do not fully understand when the other will and will not deploy nuclear
weapons, the odds of starting an accidental nuclear conflict are much higher. Neither the U.S. nor China has any
interest in any kind of war with one other, nuclear or non-nuclear. The greater risk is an accident. Here's how it would happen. First, an
unforeseen event that sparks a small conflict or threat of conflict. Second, a rapid escalation that moves
too fast for either side to defuse. And, third, a mutual misunderstanding of one another's intentions. This
three-part process can move so quickly that the best way to avert a nuclear war is for both sides to have absolute
confidence that they understand when the other will and will not use a nuclear weapon. Without this, U.S. and Chinese policy-makers
would have to guess -- perhaps with only a few minutes -- if and when the other side would go nuclear. This is especially scary because
both sides have good reason to err on the side of assuming nuclear war. If you think there's a 50-50
chance that someone is about to lob a nuclear bomb at you, your incentive is to launch a preventative
strike, just to be safe. This is especially true because you know the other side is thinking the exact same thing. In fact, even if you think the other side
probably won't launch an ICBM your way, they actually might if they fear that you're misreading their intentions or if they fear that you might over-react; this means
they have a greater incentive to launch a preemptive strike, which means that you have a greater incentive to launch a preemptive strike, in turn raising their
incentives, and on and on until one tiny kernel of doubt can lead to a full-fledged war that nobody wants. The
U.S. and the Soviet Union faced
similar problems, with one important difference: speed. During the first decades of the Cold War, nuclear
bombs had to be delivered by sluggish bombers that could take hours to reach their targets and be recalled
at any time. Escalation was much slower and the risks of it spiraling out of control were much lower. By the
time that both countries developed the ICBMs that made global annihilation something that could happen within a matter of minutes, they'd also had a generation to
sort out an extremely clear understanding of one another's nuclear policies. But
the U.S. and China have no such luxury -- we
inherited a world where total mutual destruction can happen as quickly as the time it takes to turn a key
and push a button. The U.S. has the world's second-largest nuclear arsenal with around 5,000 warheads (first-ranked Russia has more warheads but less
capability for flinging them around the globe); China has only about 200, so the danger of accidental war would seem to disproportionately threaten China. But the
greatest risk is probably to the states on China's periphery. The borders of East Asia are still not entirely settled; there are a number of small, disputed territories, many
of them bordering China. But the biggest potential conflict points are on water: disputed naval borders, disputed islands, disputed shipping lanes, and disputed
underwater energy reserves. These regional disputes have already led to a handful of small-scale naval skirmishes and diplomatic stand-offs. It's not difficult to foresee
one of them spiraling out of control. But what if the country squaring off with China happens to have a defense treaty with the U.S.? There's a near-infinite number of
small-scale conflicts that could come up between the U.S. and China, and though none of them should escalate any higher than a few tough words between diplomats,
it's the unpredictable events that are the most dangerous. In 1983 alone, the U.S. and Soviet Union almost went to war twice over bizarre and unforeseeable events. In
September, the Soviet Union shot down a Korean airliner it mistook for a spy plane; first Soviet officials feared the U.S. had manufactured the incident as an excuse to
start a war, then they refused to admit their error, nearly pushing the U.S. to actually start war. Two months later, Soviet spies misread an elaborate U.S. wargame
(which the U.S. had unwisely kept secret) as preparations for an unannounced nuclear hit on Moscow, nearly leading them to launch a preemptive strike. In both
cases, one of the things that ultimately diverted disaster was the fact that both sides clearly understood the others' red lines -- as long as they didn't cross them, they
could remain confident there would be no nuclear war.
ME
S/D ISIS
Can’t solve the ISIS advantage—The counterplan is massive discrimination against middle eastern
students that plummets goodwill—that’s Zeman
S/D and link turn
The aff solves extremism, and the Middle East is the growing in importance to US STEM
IIE 14 [The Institute of International Education. Non-Profit. 11/17/14, “Open Doors 2014: International
Students in the United States and Study Abroad by American Students are at All-Time High”
http://www.iie.org/Who-We-Are/News-and-Events/Press-Center/Press-Releases/2014/2014-11-17-OpenDoors-Data//jweideman]
“International
education is crucial to building relationships between people and communities in the United
States and around the world. It is through these relationships that together we can solve global challenges
like climate change, the spread of pandemic disease, and combatting violent extremism,” said Evan M.
Ryan, Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs. “We also need to expand access
to international education for students from more diverse backgrounds, in more diverse locations of study,
getting more diverse types of degrees. Only by engaging multiple perspectives within our societies can we
all reap the numerous benefits of international education - increased global competence, self-awareness
and resiliency, and the ability to compete in the 21st century economy,” Assistant Secretary Ryan
remarked. “International experience is one of the most important components of a 21st century education, and study abroad should be viewed as an essential
element of a college degree,” said IIE’s President Dr. Allan E. Goodman. “ Learning how to study and work with people from other
countries and cultures also prepares future leaders to contribute to making the world a less dangerous
place." In 2013/14, there were 66,408 more international students enrolled in U.S. higher education compared
to the previous year. While students from China and Saudi Arabia together account for 73 percent of the growth, a
wider range of countries contributed to the increase, with India, Brazil, Iran and Kuwait together accounting for an additional 18 percent of growth. The number of
The fastest
growing student populations in the United States in 2013/14 were from Kuwait, Brazil, and Saudi Arabia, all countries whose
governments are investing heavily in scholarships for international studies, to develop a globally competent workforce. The fastest growing region
this year was the Middle East and North Africa, with an increase of 20 percent in students enrolled in U.S. higher education. There were eight percent
Indian students increased by 6 percent to 102,673, reversing a three-year trend of declining numbers of Indian students at U.S. campuses.
more students from Latin America and the Caribbean, which has benefited from support from 100,000 Strong in the Americas, a public-private partnership led by the
U.S. State Department. Students from Asia increased by 8 percent as well, driven by a 17 percent increase from China.
Privacy Amendment CP
Solvency Deficits
2AC Courts Key
Supreme Court good for wide-spread informational privacy protections
Michael P Seng 85, co-executive director of The John Marshall Law School Fair Housing Legal Support
Center and Fair Housing Legal Clinic, “THE CONSTITUTION AND¶ INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY,
OR HOW¶ SO-CALLED CONSERVATIVES¶ COUNTENANCE GOVERNMENTAL¶ INTRUSION
INTO A PERSON'S PRIVATE¶ AFFAIRS”, 1985,
http://library.jmls.edu/pdf/ir/lr/jmlr18/49_18JMarshallLRev871(1984-1985).pdf, AB)
Although the
Supreme Court has not closed the door to a right¶ to informational privacy, its acceptance of
the concept has been¶ somewhat less than enthusiastic. The Court has given limited recognition¶ to the right to
be free from governmental disclosure, but¶ its rejection of an independent interest in one's honor and reputation ¶ has made its support of this right
somewhat tentative.
The¶ Court's failure to recognize any limits to government surveillance¶ and data gathering
beyond those contained in the fourth amendment¶ is troublesome, especially given the clear intent of the conservatives¶
on the Court to cut back on the protections accorded by¶ the fourth amendment. 122 Consequently, the right to informational¶
privacy in the United States may actually lag behind what is articulated¶ by international standards¶ While reliance on
state law may provide some protection¶ against invasions by state and local governments and by private¶ groups and individuals, it leaves
the federal government free from¶ such restraints. It is the proliferation of federal bureaucracies and¶ law enforcement schemes
that pose perhaps the biggest threat to¶ privacy interests today. Legislation can provide some protection,¶ but legislation is
always dependent upon the popular will and is unlikely¶ to provide a check if the majority is willing to
tolerate an¶ invasion. This of course means that the privacy rights of minorities¶ will always be in jeopardy. While
Americans are generally concerned¶ about their privacy, 12 3 many people are willing to put up ¶ with some intrusions in order to enforce their
own moral standards¶ upon the whole. 124¶ Conservatives
on the Supreme Court may couch their opinions¶ in terms
of judicial restraint and deference to Congress and the¶ states, but this is only a camouflage. No matter
how they express¶ themselves they have made a value judgment that the Constitution¶ provides little or no
protection to the individual against governmental¶ intrusions. The conservatives on the Court may not be saying¶ they like
invasions of privacy, but they are in effect giving their¶ blessing to legislators or bureaucrats who want to intrude into private¶ affairs on one
pretext or another. Just as the post-Civil War¶ Supreme Court proclaimed itself powerless to stop segregation and¶ thereby ushered in the
"Separate but Equal" era,125 so might the¶ conservatives on this Court be ushering in an era of "Big Brother."¶ It is entirely true that
recognition of a constitutional right to¶ information privacy will require the Court to reconcile the right¶
with freedom of the press and the public's right to know, but this¶ should not be a deterrent. In fact, this is
the reason we have federal¶ judges whose pay and tenure is protected. It is their job under our¶
Constitution to make these decisions. Federal judges one way or¶ another do decide the underlying
substantive issues.126 They either¶ do so explicitly in a well written opinion which tries to balance or¶ reconcile the particular values
presented, or they do so implicitly¶ when they duck the issues and talk about judicial restraint and federalism. ¶ Whichever way they
proceed, the judges do decide and¶ should be held accountable for the substantive results which flow¶
there from.
The Supreme Court is key to provide a model for lower courts and executive action
Timothy Azarchs 14, Law Clerk at the IRS, University of Pennsylvania, “Informational Privacy: Lessons from Across the Atlantic,”
2014, http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jcl/vol16/iss3/5/,
Ideally, the legislature would provide clearly defined privacy rights that protect individuals from infringements by the executive. If
a general privacy
right existed, the Equal Protection Clause could provide at least some protection to minority groups whose
privacy is singled out. But in the absence of such a law, executive actors may act with impunity in circuits that
have not found a constitutional right. And in the absence of any guidance from the Supreme Court, circuit
courts continue to reach disparate results based on intuition instead of coherent principles. Following the European
model, the Supreme Court could provide clear guidance to the lower courts on how and when to review
executive action. “Legitimate expectations of privacy” would allow actions clearly authorized by statute to escape scrutiny altogether because there can be no
legitimate expectation that a statute will not be enforced.
But “legitimate expectations” would give the lower courts something
more concrete to guide them than the hypothetical right and conflicting opinions they have now. Government
action could receive deferential review appropriate to the reality that collecting and disseminating information can often be very useful to the government, but courts
could still punish the egregious violations like purposeless disclosure of rape details,163 HIV status,164 or sex tapes.165 And recognition
that
informational privacy is an important right could affect the Court’s decision-making when it balances that
right against others.166 Regardless of what the legislature does, the law would benefit from a clear statement by the Court
that the Constitution protects informational, and not just decisional, privacy.
Supreme Court adapts to technologies – Congressional approaches are too
reactionary
Rebecca M. Lee 12, leader of an ISP project on the ALI’s Restatement of Information Privacy
Principles. Editor of the Yale Journal of Law and Technology, co-founder of a reading group on Internet
law and policy, intellectual property legal assistant and at the Federal Communications Commission,
“CONTESTED CONTROL:¶ European Data Privacy Laws and the Assertion of Jurisdiction¶ Over
American Businesses”, May 9 2012,
https://s3.amazonaws.com/citpsite/teaching/certificate/RMLThesis.pdf, AB)¶
Constitutional privacy protections also took shape in the twentieth century. Because¶ constitutional privacy
protections apply only against the government, they are not discussed ¶ in great detail here. However, these Supreme Court decisions
are illustrative of the¶ connection between technological innovation and the challenges of adapting and
applying¶ existing legal principles to provide protection against emerging privacy threats.42 ¶ In Olmstead v.
United States (1928), the Supreme Court held that the Fourth¶ Amendment did not require the government to obtain a search warrant before
conducting¶ telephone wiretapping surveillance because wiretapping did not entail search or seizure.43 ¶ The Court later overturned Olmstead in
Katz v. United States (1967), holding that the government wrongly wiretapped the defendant in a phone booth, where he had a ¶ “reasonable
expectation of privacy.”44 The Court thus created a new, context-dependent¶ protection against governmental violations of privacy beyond
physical search and seizure.45¶ In Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), the Supreme Court ruled against a governmental ban ¶ on contraceptives,
establishing protection for decisional privacy. Despite the absence of an ¶ explicit mention of privacy in the Constitution, the Court reasoned that a
right to privacy¶ emanated from the penumbra of the Bill of Rights and created a new legal foundation for¶ privacy protections. In Roe v. Wade
(1973), the Court held that this right to privacy also¶ protected a woman’s decision to have an abortion from governmental interference.46¶ In
Whalen v. Roe (1977), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of New York ¶ statutes requiring the collection of prescription medication
information. However, the Court¶ also recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Bill of Rights also includes an ¶ interest in “avoiding
disclosure of personal matters,”47 or informational self-determination.¶ Since Whalen, the Court had not expanded on or clarified the right to
informational privacy¶ with respect to the government until recently. In United States vs. Jones (2012), the Court ruled ¶ that the Fourth
Amendment prevented police from attaching a global positioning system¶ (GPS) device to a suspect’s car without a search warrant¶ In the late
twentieth century,
the growth of computers, digital databases, and early¶ ICTs led to increasing Congressional
and regulatory awareness of commercial informational privacy issues. However, American commercial data
privacy policy regime is primarily reliant¶ on market forces and self-regulation to protect privacy.
Regulation through federal statutes¶ and administrative policies play a secondary, complementary role.¶ As
James Whitman rightly argues, “[T]here are, on the two sides of the Atlantic, two¶ different cultures of privacy, which are home to different
intuitive sensibilities, and which¶ have produced two significantly different laws of privacy.” 49
The American policy approach¶ to
commercial data privacy is the product of a distinctly American legal, social, and political¶ culture of
privacy. In the United States, privacy is traditionally conceptualized as a liberty¶ interest (as opposed to a dignity
interest) in maintaining a sphere or zone of privacy that is¶ protected from intrusion, especially by the
government.50 This conception of privacy reflects¶ distrust of the government and greater confidence in
the market to respect privacy. In¶ addition to influencing the target of privacy protections, governmental distrust strengthens¶ societal
reluctance to state regulation of commercial data privacy. The First Amendment and ¶ the cultural importance of freedom of speech further
constrain the government’s ability to¶ regulate commercial data privacy. In American jurisprudence,
freedoms of speech and access¶
to information supersede privacy claims when the two interests conflict.¶ Thus the American culture of privacy has
resulted in limited regulation of¶ commercial data privacy through legislation. In Lessig’s terms, the market is the
primary¶ regulator of informational privacy in the United States. The American government’s role in¶
protecting informational privacy from commercial abuses is limited and takes two forms.¶ First, the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) monitors industry compliance with stated¶ privacy practices to improve consumer
information accuracy and facilitate the market for privacy. This policy approach reflects and reifies the conception of
commercial¶ informational privacy as a consumer interest, as opposed to a fundamental human right. The¶ corollary is that personal data can be
traded off, like a commodity, for economic gain or¶ other benefits including the use of free web services. In order to carry out this calculus,¶
consumers need accurate information about how businesses collect, process, and ¶ disseminate personal data. Second, the
government
protects privacy in special cases through¶ sectoral federal statutes, which apply only to specific industries
or types of sensitive personal¶ data.¶ The following federal informational privacy laws bear several
important¶ characteristics. First, the American approach to legislating informational privacy protection is¶ ad
hoc and reactive. Instead of attempting to anticipate and avert privacy threats, Congress¶ tends to pass
legislation in response to privacy issues after their materialization. Second,¶ many of the federal statutes incorporate a
limited or diluted version of the FIPs. Protection¶ is often limited to a few specific activities, like collection or disclosure.51 Lastly and most ¶
importantly,
federal informational privacy laws are sectoral and protect data in specific highstakes ¶ contexts,
complementing the default market-based mode of regulation for all other¶ types of data. There is no
comprehensive commercial informational privacy statute.
2AC AT: Lower Courts
Lower Courts Fail
Timothy Azarchs 14, Law Clerk at the IRS, University of Pennsylvania, “Informational Privacy: Lessons from Across the Atlantic,”
2014, http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jcl/vol16/iss3/5/,
It is easy to understand why the lower
courts have been eager to find a constitutional protection of privacy. But
leaving the interpretation up to the lower courts is a flawed solution. Without guidance on the scope or even the
existence of the right, the lower courts have produced a morass of conflicting positions and left a hazy line that
tells neither the government agent contemplating action nor the victim contemplating suit what side of
that line a given action falls on. Without higher authority, many circuits are reluctant to extend the right as
far as is deserved.
2AC Amendment Fails
Legislative action fails – doesn’t protect minorities, unenforced, and vague
Timothy Azarchs 14, Law Clerk at the IRS, University of Pennsylvania, “Informational Privacy: Lessons from Across the Atlantic,”
2014, http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jcl/vol16/iss3/5/,
However, legislative
action is not always effective at protecting disfavored minority groups.103 The majority
may wish to oust these outsiders, or it may simply lack the motivation to overcome the inertia of the
legislative process. For instance, it might be easier to pass a law that allowed the government to collect information about immigrants—
ostensibly because they are more likely to be terrorists or drug runners—than to pass a law that protects homosexuals from disclosure of their
sexual orientations. The
right to privacy is fundamentally a minority protection, allowing a sphere of
autonomous decision-making and freedom from the fear of the majority’s ridicule of one’s personal
choices. To lay the burden of protecting this right at the feet of the majority suffers from the same
problems as asking the majority to decide whether one might engage in consensual homosexual relations
or join the communist party.104 Recognition by the courts that informational privacy is an important
right with constitutional dimensions could help ensure that the courts will scrutinize such
infringements, whether affirmatively enacted by the legislature or committed by the executive in
the absence of legislative protections. The idea that so important a right can exist on so shaky a ground–or indeed not exist at
all—is fundamentally problematic. In addition, these gaps in legislative protections for the right to privacy have persisted for a very long time,
and it is not altogether clear that the gears are turning to close them now.105 Even if legislative clarity is preferable to judicial clarity, one
clear answer from the Supreme Court is preferable to twelve vague ones from the circuits. The current
uncertainty has several detrimental effects. First, insofar as there is a “correct” answer to the question, a
circuit split implies that one side or the other is “incorrect.” Either constitutional rights are being
underenforced in jurisdictions that improperly narrow the right, or nonexistent rights are being enforced in jurisdictions
that improperly broaden it. Second, this assumed, but unconfirmed, right leaves the lower courts, government
actors, and potential claimants with little guidance. As Justice Scalia suggested in his concurrence in NASA v. Nelson, this
encourages an endless stream of hopeful plaintiffs to flood the courts with claims that are different on one or another dimension from decided
cases because they have no grounds on which to determine whether those differences are relevant.106 A vague
right may therefore
result in even more litigation than a broad but clear one. Another possibility is that, for fear of prosecution, government
agencies will be unwilling to cross a boundary whose location is uncertain and will be deterred from beneficial policies that approach but do not
step over that boundary.107 The question should be settled, one way or the other, and the Supreme Court may be the only institution that can
settle it.
2AC Amendment Backfires
Explicit constitutional right to privacy backfires
Mary Fan 12, Professor of Law at the University of Washington, “CONSTITUTIONALIZING
INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY BY ASSUMPTION”, 3/2012,
https://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/conlaw/articles/volume14/issue4/Fan14U.Pa.J.Const.L.953(2012).pd
f,
It is high time to call out the assumption for the hazy moral intuition that it is and situate the moral intuition in law, and as law,
insofar as it is supportable. Resting a protection—even a hazy hypothetical protection—on a moral intuition is dangerous from a
pragmatic as well as principled perspective. Moral intuitions are akin to “naïve theories” and heuristics—
error-prone and intuition-guided generalizations—that suffer from the manifold cognitive biases identified in
the judgment and decision making literature.18 Status quo bias is an example of a cognitive bias with the potential to chill policy innovations if we persist in an
intuitive, feels-wrong approach to determining violations.19 New ideas rouse vague feelings of unease and disquiet because they disrupt the status quo, to which we
are intuitively attached. We
cannot always trust and use as a guide the affective sense that a particular policy
seems disquieting in the change it wreaks. Moreover, inability to distinguish the chaff risks demeaning an
important guide and principle for understanding what the liberty explicitly safeguarded by the
Constitution means. This Article argues that the work of privacy as a constitutional concept is to adapt the idea of
liberty in times of social change. Insofar as constitutionally relevant, the idea of informational privacy
helps further define, and should be informed by, the freedoms safeguarded in the Constitution, such as the
protections for liberty under procedural and substantive due process. There is a principled reason for distinguishing between the cases of HIV and sexual orientation
outings by the state with the aim of marring employment, family, and friendships and cases where state employees want a job representing an important public trust
but do not want to get drug tested like the rest of us. And it is more than the crude rule of thumb that we know a violation when we feel it.
Perms
2AC Perm DB
Perm do both solves and shields the link to the net benefit – no reason why a
constitutional amendment can’t be passed along with the Supreme Court ruling the
Constitution contains a right to informational privacy in the 4th amendment
AT: Net Benefits
2AC L/ to Politics
CP links to politics – inclusion of action taken by Congress risks triggering the link
to politics – only the plan avoids it – using the courts isn’t perceived in the political
process
The plan is ridiculously capital-intensive
Albert 14 (Richard Albert, Associate Professor at Boston College Law School, "Constitutional Disuse or Desuetude: The
Case of Article V." Boston University Law Review 94, (2014): 1029-.,
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1758&context=lsfp, AB)
“Nothing
is ‘easy,’” writes Henry Paul Monaghan, “about the processes prescribed by Article V.”112 Scholars today
describe the requirements of Article V as practically impossible to meet.113 For instance, Bruce Ackerman views Article V
as establishing a “formidable obstacle course.”114 Sanford Levinson argues that “ Article V, practically speaking, brings us all too close
to the Lockean dream (or nightmare) of changeless stasis,”115 and that it is “the Constitution’s most truly egregious
feature.”116 Rosalind Dixon has described the “virtual impossibility of formal amendment to the Constitution under
Article V.”117 Jeffrey Goldsworthy observes that “the supermajoritarian requirements of Article V are so onerous as to be arguably undemocratic, by making it
much too easy for minorities to veto constitutional amendments.”118 Vik Amar explains that Article V establishes “particular and
cumbersome processes.”119 And Richard Fallon laments that “[e]ven under the best of circumstances, the requirement
that three-fourths of the states must ratify constitutional amendments makes it nearly impossible to
achieve significant change in our written Constitution through the Article V process.”120 Article V, in short, is
seen as a dead end. This is not a new perspective on the difficulty of successfully using Article V. Writing in 1885, Woodrow Wilson decried the
“cumbrous machinery of formal amendment erected by Article Five.”121 Even earlier, at the adoption of the Constitution, John DeWitt doubted
whether it would ever be possible to amend the Constitution using Article V: “[W]ho is there to be found among us, who
can seriously assert, that this Constitution, after ratification and being practiced upon, will be so easy of alteration?”122 DeWitt believed states would have
views too different to meet Article V’s required supermajority threshold: Where is the probability that
three fourths of the States in that Convention, or three fourths of the Legislatures of the different States,
whose interests differ scarcely in nothing short of everything, will be so very ready or willing materially
to change any part of this System, which shall be to the emolument of an individual State only?123 The answer,
he predicted, was that formal amendment would be rare.
Links to Circumvention
2AC
It’s unpopular – this link turns the aff and causes circumvention
Albert 14 (Richard Albert, Associate Professor at Boston College Law School, "Constitutional Disuse or Desuetude: The
Case of Article V." Boston University Law Review 94, (2014): 1029-.,
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1758&context=lsfp, AB)
Political parties and increased political polarization may have exacerbated the difficulty of Article V. As
American political parties have become nearly evenly divided across both the federal and state
governments over the last two generations, writes David Kyvig, “divisions within society together with the requirements
of Article V frustrated every attempt to bring about fundamental change.”132 Kyvig adds that the close balance
between political parties and among the forces of federalism alongside the “centripetal power of the federal government and the centrifugal
strength of the states” have combined to inhibit agreement on formal amendment.133 Daryl Levinson and Rick Pildes observe that political
parties in the United States “today are both more internally ideologically coherent and more sharply
polarized than at any time since the turn of the twentieth century.”134 Rick Pildes connects the onset of today’s
hyperpolarized politics to the adoption of the Voting Rights Act of 1965: [T]his polarization reflects the deep structural and historical
transformation in American democracy unleashed in 1965 by the enactment of the VRA. That moment began the process of ideologically
realigning the political parties and of purifying them, so that both parties are far more ideologically coherent, and differentiated from each other,
than at any time in many generations. The
culmination of that historical transformation – which can be seen as the maturation
or full realization of American democracy – is today’s hyperpolarized partisan politics.135 Pildes concludes that “[t]he
reality is that the era of highly polarized, partisan politics will endure for some time to come.”136 This
only complicates an already difficult formal amendment process that relies on strong supermajorities
across both the federal and state institutions. Nevertheless, as Christopher Eisgruber cautions, measuring amendment difficulty is
itself difficult because amendment difficulty turns “upon a number of cultural considerations, such as the extent to which state politics differ from
national politics and the extent to which people are receptive to or skeptical about the general idea of constitutional amendment.”137 The
difficulty of measuring amendment difficulty has not discouraged scholars from comparing amendment difficulty across nations. In such
measures, the
United States has ranked among the most difficult to amend.138
SSRA PICs
Amash-Conyers CP
2ac S/D
The Counterplan solves none of the aff—it doesn’t dismantle the legal architecture
for surveillance which opens the door to executive circumvention.
The cp leaves databases and old data in place
Martin 13 [Kate Martin, Director, Center for National Security Studies. 7/23/13, “Amash-Conyers
amendment to Defense Appropriations to stop bulk collection of Americans’ telephone metadata.”
http://democrats.judiciary.house.gov/sites/democrats.judiciary.house.gov/files/images/CNSSAnalysis.pdf/
/jweideman]
Enacting this amendment will not leave the NSA “in the dark.” As outlined above, there are other existing
authorities that allow the collection of call data and such data is apparently already being kept by many of
the major telephone companies for at least a year. Moreover, the government apparently already has an
existing data-base of this information on millions if not billions of Americans’ phone calls going back at
least five years. This amendment does not address the retention or use of that database.
AT: Telephony metadata key
Telephone data collection doesn’t solve terror—new studies
Nakashima 14 [Ellen Nakashima Reporter for the Washington Post. Cites a study by the New America
Foundation, a Washington-based nonprofit group. 1.12.14, “NSA phone record collection does little to
prevent terrorist attacks, group says” https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsaphone-record-collection-does-little-to-prevent-terrorist-attacks-group-says/2014/01/12/8aa860aa-77dd11e3-8963-b4b654bcc9b2_story.html//jweideman]
An analysis of 225 terrorism cases inside the United States since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks has
concluded that the bulk collection of phone records by the National Security Agency “has had no
discernible impact on preventing acts of terrorism.” In the majority of cases, traditional law enforcement
and investigative methods provided the tip or evidence to initiate the case, according to the study by the
New America Foundation, a Washington-based nonprofit group. The study, to be released Monday,
corroborates the findings of a White House-appointed review group, which said last month that the NSA
counterterrorism program “was not essential to preventing attacks” and that much of the evidence it did turn up “could readily
have been obtained in a timely manner using conventional [court] orders.” Under the program, the NSA amasses the metadata — records of phone numbers dialed and
call lengths and times — of virtually every American. Analysts may search the data only with reasonable suspicion that a number is linked to a terrorist group. The
content of calls is not collected. The
new study comes as President Obama is deliberating over the future of the
NSA’s bulk collection program. Since it was disclosed in June, the program has prompted intense debate over its legality, utility and privacy impact.
Senior administration officials have defended the program as one tool that complements others in building a more complete picture of a terrorist plot or network. And
they say it has been valuable in knocking down rumors of a plot and in determining that potential threats against the United States are nonexistent. Director of
National Intelligence James R. Clapper Jr. calls that the “peace of mind” metric. In an opinion piece published after the release of the review group’s report, Michael
Morell, a former acting CIA director and a member of the panel, said the program “needs to be successful only once to be invaluable.” The researchers at the New
America Foundation found that the program provided evidence to initiate only one case, involving a San Diego cabdriver, Basaaly -Moalin, who was convicted of
sending money to a terrorist group in Somalia. Three co-conspirators were also convicted. The cases involved no threat of attack against the United States. “The
overall problem for U.S. counterterrorism officials is not that they need vaster amounts of information from the bulk surveillance programs, but that they don’t
sufficiently understand or widely share the information they already possess that was derived from conventional law enforcement and intelligence techniques,” said
the report, whose principal author is Peter Bergen, director of the foundation’s National Security Program and an expert on terrorism. In at least 48 instances,
traditional surveillance warrants obtained from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court were used to obtain evidence through intercepts of phone calls and e-mails,
said the researchers, whose results are in an online database. More
than half of the cases were initiated as a result of traditional
investigative tools. The most common was a community or family tip to the authorities. Other methods
included the use of informants, a suspicious-activity report filed by a business or community member to
the FBI, or information turned up in investigations of non-terrorism cases.
Links to ptx
The amendment links to politics
O’Keefe 13 [Ed, staff writer for the Washington Post. 6/24/13, “Plan to defund NSA phone collection
program defeated” http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/07/24/plan-to-defundnsa-phone-collection-program-has-broad-support-sponsor-says///jweideman]
A controversial proposal to restrict how the National Security Agency collects telephone records failed to
advance by a narrow margin Wednesday, a victory for the Obama administration, which has spent
weeks defending the program since media leaks sparked international outrage about the agency’s reach.
Lawmakers voted 217 to 205 to defeat the proposal by an unlikely political pairing: Rep. Justin Amash
(R-Mich.), a 33-year-old libertarian who often bucks GOP leadership and Rep. John Conyers (D-Mich.), an 84-year old liberal stalwart and the
chamber’s second longest-serving member. Usually divergent in their political views, they joined forces in recent weeks in response to revelations about the NSA’s
ability to collect telephone and Internet records that were leaked by Edward Snowden, a former NSA contractor who is seeking asylum in Russia. Speaker John A.
Boehner (R-Ohio), who as head of the House rarely votes on legislation, voted against the amendment.
The plan would restrict how the NSA can collect bulk phone records and metadata under the Patriot Act.
Agency officials would be able to continue collecting telephone records, but only for people connected to
relevant ongoing investigations. The proposal also would require that secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) court opinions be made
available to lawmakers and that the court publish summaries of each opinion for public review. Conyers said the proposal “would curtail the ongoing dragnet
collection and storage of the personal records of innocent Americans.” House Intelligence Committee Chairman Mike Rogers (R-Mich.) blasted the Amash-Conyers
proposal Wednesday, calling it "inflammatory and certainly misleading." In an interview with a Michigan radio station ,
Rogers said that Amash was
trying "to take advantage, at any rate, of people's anger" over various scandals such as the IRS
investigation of conservative groups and the killing of the U.S. ambassador to Libya in Benghazi. Other
Republicans agreed that the amendment would jeopardize ongoing counterterrorism operations. Rep. Tom
Cotton (R-Ark.), a U.S. Army veteran who served tours of duty in Iraq and Afghanistan, said the amendment “takes a leaf blower and blows away the entire
haystack.”
Title iii CP
S/D: Internet
Title 3 causes law enforcement overreach and wrecks internet innovation
Smith et al 2 [Marcia S. Smith, Jeffrey W. Seifert, Glenn J. McLoughlin, and John Dimitri Moteff
Resources, Science, and Industry Division at EPIC. Congressional Report. March 4, 2002. “The Internet
and the USA PATRIOT Act: Potential Implications for Electronic Privacy, Security, Commerce, and
Government” https://epic.org/privacy/terrorism/usapatriot/RL31289.pdf//jweideman]
However, some have raised concerns that Title
III (as well as other provisions) may have a broader scope than many of its
supporters intend.17 While many are concerned that the civil liberties of individuals may be compromised if law enforcement
officials extend their reach, Title III may also have implications for a wide range of e-commerce activities.
It is unlikely that the Act will immediately affect retail e-commerce (e.g., online catalogue orders) or business-to-business e-commerce (e.g., the use of the Internet for
inventory ordering and management). While these forms of e-commerce are growing very rapidly, to date they have not been identified as being particularly
susceptible to misuse by terrorists. Retail
e-commerce and business-to-business e-commerce require verifiable
information between parties that may include names, addresses, credit card numbers and other
information, and can be traced relatively easily. However, some observers have not ruled out terrorists using existing e-commerce
exchanges to facilitate their activities in the future.18
Title 3 is internet surveillance
Smith et al 2 [Marcia S. Smith, Jeffrey W. Seifert, Glenn J. McLoughlin, and John Dimitri Moteff
Resources, Science, and Industry Division at EPIC. Congressional Report. March 4, 2002. “The Internet
and the USA PATRIOT Act: Potential Implications for Electronic Privacy, Security, Commerce, and
Government” https://epic.org/privacy/terrorism/usapatriot/RL31289.pdf//jweideman]
There are a number of provisions in the USA PATRIOT Act that are relevant to e-government interests.
E-government involves using information technology, and especially the Internet, to improve the delivery
of government services to citizens, business, and other government agencies.27 Most of these provisions
are independent of one another, reflecting the often disparate and disconnected nature of e-government
initiatives. Many of the provisions in the USA PATRIOT Act related to e-government focus on government-to-government (G2G) relationships, both within the
federal government, and between federal, state, local, and foreign governments. Fewer of the provisions focus on government-to-business (G2B) or government-to
customer (G2C) interactions. The
relevant provisions can be found in titles III, IV, VII, IX, and X, and are briefly discussed
in turn. ! Section 361 supercedes Treasury Order Number 105-08, establishes the Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (FinCEN) in statute, and charges the bureau with, among other things, establishing
a financial crimes communication center to facilitate the sharing of information with law enforcement
authorities. This section also requires FinCEN to maintain a government-wide data access service for
information collected under anti-money laundering reporting laws, information regarding national and
international currency flows, as well as information from federal, state, local, and foreign agencies and
other public and private sources. ! Section 362 seeks to enhance cooperation between the federal government and the banking industry by directing
the Security of Treasury to establish a “highly secure network” in FinCEN to enable financial institutions to file reports required by the Bank Secrecy Act and receive
alerts regarding suspicious activities electronically.
S/D EU relations
Title 3 can’t access EU privacy internal links
JonesDay 7 [Ranked among the world's most integrated law firms and best in client service, Jones Day
has locations in centers of business and finance throughout the world. Written by Robert Graves. 2007
“Extraterritorial Application of the USA PATRIOT Act” http://www.jonesday.com/files/News/2df0b6051cc3-4729-ae61-a0305551bbe5/Presentation/NewsAttachment/742ac421-2ea3-4f3f-b275a25219eb8eee/Foreign%20Bank%20Compliance%20with%20PATRIOT%20Act.pdf//jweideman]
The effort of the U.S. government to expand its subpoena powers over records held abroad has created
privacy concerns, particularly in Europe, where data protection is tightly regulated. The U.S. has no
general law of financial privacy analogous to the various European laws implemented pursuant to the
European Data Protection Directive. The Right to Financial Privacy Act18 protects against intrusion by the federal government without due
process, but the private market is regulated only lightly by a variety of statutes that operate primarily on the basis of notice and opt-out. The landmark
Supreme Court case of United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), held that the U.S. Constitution does
not provide for a right to financial privacy. Lawmakers reacted swiftly, drafting the Right to Financial Privacy Act, which provided limited
protection against government access to customer financial records held by financial institutions. Regulation of financial data transferred
among private entities is far more limited. The Fair Credit Reporting Act19 states the circumstances in which financial data collected by
consumer reporting agencies may be disseminated to third parties. In limited circumstances, companies may share information
regarding a customer’s transactions with third parties without giving notice to the customer. A broader range of
information may be provided to affiliated companies. The Electronic Funds Transfer Act20 gives consumers using electronic fund transfer systems the right to require
financial institutions to provide information concerning disclosure of their account information to third parties. The Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, which
amended provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, prohibits affiliated companies from sharing customer information for marketing solicitation unless the consumer
is provided clear and conspicuous notification and an opportunity to opt-out.
Europeans are worried about financial information requirements
ROTENBERG 11 [MARC ROTENBERG, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY
INFORMATION CENTER. 2011. “CYBERSECURITY AND DATA PROTECTION IN THE
FINANCIAL SECTOR” Hearing before Congress. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG112shrg72701/pdf/CHRG-112shrg72701.pdf//jweideman]
We are in a global economy with global businesses.
Particularly with the Internet, people are purchasing products all around the world and a lot of customer
data moves around the world, particularly now that we have cloud computing services that are offered in
many different jurisdictions. We have actually worked with the Administration to urge the development of a comprehensive
framework for privacy protection, and there is interest. In fact, part of the White House cybersecurity strategy talks
about the need to strengthen privacy safeguards for commercial data flows, particularly between the United
States and Europe. We hope they will go further for many of the reasons that you have outlined. The
Europeans are also concerned about what happens to their financial data. There is a need to establish there
a common framework with clear legal protections. And I think what you are reading now about the data
breaches, of course, it is not just customers in the U.S., it is people all around the world.
Now, the other question you raise, Senator, is also key in this area.
2ac: Title 3 ineffective
Title 3 fails to stop terrorism and curbs freedom
Rockett 8 [James M. co-chairs Bingham s Financial Institutions Corporate and Regulatory Group. He is a
prominent banking lawyer who has spent more than 30 years exclusively representing banking and
financial services clients. 2008. “FINANCIAL SERVICES AND E-COMMERCE THE UNDUE
BURDENS OF THE BANK SECRECY ACT” PDF//jweideman]
This
brings us to another question about the whole BSA/AML construct and that is: why has this been sold
to the American public in such a disingenuous manner? The American public largely believes the PATRIOT Act was passed under
anti-terrorism rubric. In fact, the banking system is not and will never be an effective vehicle to combat terrorist
financing. The 9/11 terrorists used approximately $500,000 over a period of several years to finance their
horrifying acts. During that time hundreds of trillions of dollars flowed through the banks of this country.
There were no characteristics or patterns that would have distinguished the 9/11 terrorists from any other
foreign students in the U.S. who received money from home and paid tuition and living expenses with
those funds. Nothing that U.S. banks are now being required to do will actually identify terrorists; that
job must be done by old-fashioned investigative work by intelligence agencies. And we could certainly craft laws that will allow them access to financial records if
they have good cause to suspect terrorist financing is taking place .
What this highlights is what I will call the “equivalency” flaw
of the current BSA/AML construct. By this I mean that the laws and regulations and the manner of their
enforcement make no distinction between, and basically equate terrorist financing with, maintaining an
account for Augusto Pinochet10 or a common crime, such as check kiting or a Ponzi scheme.11 It is one thing to say that we are
preventing terrorist financing by setting up this elaborate, costly, intrusive bank account spying network;
it is quite another to burden our society with a blatantly ineffective regulatory scheme in order to prevent
current or former foreign government officials from maintaining U.S. bank accounts. That could be handled much
like Office of Financial Asset Control regulations. And to have check kites or Ponzi schemes governed by the same rules is just plain silly. Finally, the American
public has to be told candidly that every financial transaction that they undertake is being monitored for suspicious characteristics and anything that they do that is out
of pattern is reported to the government. At
a time when financial privacy has become a rallying cry, our citizens
should know the truth about the unprecedented government scrutiny of their financial activities by
deputizing their banks to indiscriminately spy on them. And this spying 74 E n g a g e Volume 6, Issue 2 is not limited
to “terrorist financing;” it is a general spy network that reports any unusual financial activity to the of abuse inherent in such a scheme. Back some 30 years ago, a
quaint regulation called Reg Q allowed banks to give out toasters to new customers who opened bank accounts. How far we have come? Now, under
the
guise of the USA PATRIOT Act, the Bank Secrecy Act and the AML regulations, instead of toasters
banks are required to give customers the equivalent of ankle bracelets to monitor their every move. This is
not progress and should not be viewed as consistent with the freedoms that the U.S. Constitution was established to protect.
2ac: Banking turn
Kills the economy and banking
Rockett 8 [James M. co-chairs Bingham s Financial Institutions Corporate and Regulatory Group. He is a
prominent banking lawyer who has spent more than 30 years exclusively representing banking and
financial services clients. 2008. “FINANCIAL SERVICES AND E-COMMERCE THE UNDUE
BURDENS OF THE BANK SECRECY ACT” PDF//jweideman]
Adverse Economic Impact of AML Environment The
consequences of this lack of balance are predictable but need to be
examined. First, and most obviously, banks are incurring enormous compliance costs. These are not small amounts of money
that can be easily absorbed. Our largest banks are investing tens of millions of dollars each and mid-size and
community banks are spending proportionately even more on everything: regulatorily required
technology systems, compliance personnel, training account officers and new account clerks and tellers
and loan officers and branch personnel, internal auditors, external consultants, independent auditors,
executive management time, directors’ time’ monitoring accounts and financial transactions by
customers; and filing largely meaningless SARs with the government. These monies are being taken from banks and their
shareholders, under threat of regulatory enforcement penalties or even criminal prosecution, without any recompense from the government. These are not traditional
“costs of doing business” nor are they routine processes of compliance that with time will be regularized. These are law enforcement expenses that should rightfully
be borne by the government. Secondly, and even more importantly, the
impact of the Bank Secrecy Act and Title III on the U.S.
economy is staggering. This is a fact that has not been examined with any scholarly precision and is probably immeasurable in real dollars. But, cost
structures of this magnitude have to be passed on to the users of banking services either directly or indirectly. These costs are also putting U.S.
banks in an uncompetitive position in the rapidly globalizing world of financial services. There is also a
significant but unquantifiable loss of foreign investment in the United States. Because of enhanced due diligence on foreignoriginated transactions, many foreigners have become increasingly reluctant to do personal business or
invest in the United States. This trend is rapidly accelerating and will only be greatly exaggerated by
the Treasury Department’s proposal to force U.S. financial institutions to collect and turn over data
related to crossborder wire transfers.7 This also comes at a time when the U.S. economy is most
vulnerable and can least afford such a foreign pullback. However it is not just the American consumer of banking services, or
foreign investors, or the banks themselves that are paying the price. An entire industry of money services businesses is being
driven out of the banking system and, in most instances, affecting those who can least afford it: the poor migrant
and immigrant workers who come to the U.S. to perform labor at low wages and who want to cash a
check or send funds back home to their families. Despite the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) and the bank regulators
having protested that they do not intend to create this result, the facts speak for themselves: money transmitters are viewed as “high risk” customers and the enhanced
due diligence requirements are so onerous that bankers are faced with the Hobson’s choice of either undertaking ongoing monitoring (of not just the bank customer
but the customer’s customer) at great expense or risking regulatory enforcement action. The only prudent decision is to withdraw from providing banking services to
such money transmitters.8 But the money transmitters aren’t alone in being deemed to be “high risk.” In a list that on its face is preposterous, the bank regulators have
identified the following “high risk” banking customers: · Foreign banks · Money Services Businesses (currency dealers or exchangers, check cashers, money
transmitters, and issuers, sellers, or redeemers of travelers’ checks, money orders and stored value cards) · Non-bank financial institutions (casinos (tribal and nontribal), card clubs, brokers and dealers in securities) · Senior foreign political figures and their family members and close associates · Non-resident aliens and accounts
of foreign persons · Foreign corporations with transaction accounts, particularly offshore corporations in high-risk geographies · Deposit brokers, particularly foreign
deposit brokers · Cash intensive businesses (e.g., convenience stores, restaurants, retail stores, liquor stores, cigarette distributors, privately owned ATM operators,
vending machine operators, and parking garages) · Non-governmental organizations and charities (domestic and foreign) · Professional service providers (attorneys,
accountants, doctors, real estate brokers) · Import-export companies · Jewelry, gem and precious metal dealers · Travel agencies · Car, boat and airplane dealerships
With this guidance for “high risk” is there any wonder banks are filing hundreds and thousands of useless SARs which are ignored by the very government that
mandates them?9 Each
new SAR builds an even denser haystack in which the needle becomes more
imperceptibility embedded. And, if and when a terrorist attack actually takes place, somewhere an
ignored SAR will be languishing among the hundreds of thousands of SARs filed because of the current
indiscriminate regulatory environment.
Expanded financial sector activity solves warming
Mazzeo and Dlugolecki et al 2 [Michael J. Mazzeo is an Associate Professor in the Department of
Strategy, and a Faculty Associate at Northwestern University's Institute for Policy Research. He serves on
the editorial board of the Review of Industrial Organization. With guidance from UNEP Finance
Initiatives Project Coach Dr. Andrew Dlugolecki. 2002. “Climate Change & The Financial Services
Industry”
http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/mazzeo/htm/sp_files/021209/(4)%20Innovest/Innovest%20
Publications/Innovest_UNEP2_10_15_02.pdf//jweideman]
History teaches us that for politically-driven market systems to function effectively, financial institutions
must play a prominent role in the market evolution process. From the creation of initial demand for an
underlying good or service (as in the U.S. SO2 market in the 1990s), to the promulgation of transaction regulations, the protection of property rights
and enforceable legal ownership provisions, and the requirement for transparency and disclosure, the finance sector has a critical role to play
in creating the right conditions for market-based, commodity-oriented solutions to thrive3. Valuable
experience in creating markets around the energy sector has already been acquired, so that commentators
believe that the process of developing a mature market for carbon may take as little as five years (see Figure 2).
As Module I showed, policymakers are now united in their belief that market solutions will play a pivotal role in
whatever course of strategy national and regional lawmakers take, whether this is the Kyoto Protocol; the
voluntary carbon intensity method (as advanced by the U.S.); “Contraction and Convergence”. And for market
solutions to function effectively, financial institutions must play a full and active role in their
development and operation (see box insert). From discussions with financial institutions and other GHG market specialists during the course of this
study, the following suggestions can be made on how financial institutions can effectively deliver market
solutions to the climate change problem:
o Helping to structure and monitor an efficient market system by working with securities and
exchange regulators, actuaries, accountants and other agents of the financial markets
o Meeting statutory responsibilities and voluntary commitments to look at social and
environmental issues and in doing so focus greater attention on climate change as an analytical
factor.
o Working to create other conditions crucial to the formation of an efficient emissions trading
system i.e., a standardized “commodity”; standardized trade characteristics, organized exchanges,
etc.
o Creating and providing products and services that contribute towards adaptation and mitigation
efforts (such as weather derivatives and catastrophe bonds)
o Reexamining the extent to which fiduciary duties may necessitate examining potential sector and
company risk relating to climate change, and factoring this into their proxy voting strategies.
o Managing their own property risks arising from extreme weather events and pursuing leadership
in areas such as energy efficiency within their own property portfolio.
Moreover,
financial institutions have a key role to play in advising companies and investors on the
potential market risks associated with climate change and government GHG regulation, in the raising of finance for
GHG projects, in structuring deals for potential vendors and purchasers of emissions credits, and in developing solutions to manage financing risks. Indeed, banks
and insurance companies are used to dealing with highly complex issues, and over the years have
developed carefully conceived, proprietary quantitative risk management methodologies to help them
characterize and value complex risk scenarios.
Climate change will result in extinction- IPCC agrees
Snow 15 [Anthony McMichael receives funding from The National Health and Medical Research Council. He is affiliated with The
Climate Institute. Colin Butler receives funding from the Australian Research Council. He is co-director of the NGO Benevolent Organisation for
Development, Health and Insight. Helen Louise Berry receives funding from the National Health and Medical Research Council and the
Australian Research Council. She is a member of the Australian Labor Party.March 31, 2014 http://www.smh.com.au/environment/climatechange/climate-change-could-make-humans-extinct-warns-health-expert-20140330-35rus.html “Climate change could make humans extinct,
warns health expert”] (Vaibhav)
The Earth is warming so rapidly that unless humans can arrest the trend, we risk becoming ''extinct'' as a
species, a leading Australian health academic has warned. Helen Berry, associate dean in the faculty of health at the
University of Canberra, said while the Earth has been warmer and colder at different points in the planet's history,
the rate of change has never been as fast as it is today. ''What is remarkable, and alarming, is the speed of the change since
the 1970s, when we started burning a lot of fossil fuels in a massive way,'' she said. ''We can't possibly evolve to
match this rate [of warming] and, unless we get control of it, it will mean our extinction eventually.''
Professor Berry is one of three leading academics who have contributed to the health chapter of a Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) report due on Monday. She and co-authors Tony McMichael, of the Australian National University, and Colin Butler, of the University of
Canberra, have outlined the health risks of rapid global warming in a companion piece for The Conversation, also published on Monday. The
three warn that the adverse effects on population health and social stability have been ''missing from the discussion'' on climate change.
''Human-driven climate change poses a great threat, unprecedented in type and scale, to wellbeing, health
and perhaps even to human survival,'' they write. They predict that the greatest challenges will come from undernutrition and
impaired child development from reduced food yields; hospitalisations and deaths due to intense heatwaves, fires and
other weather-related disasters; and the spread of infectious diseases. They warn the ''largest impacts'' will be
on poorer and vulnerable populations, winding back recent hard-won gains of social development
programs. Projecting to an average global warming of 4 degrees by 2100, they say ''people won't be able to cope, let alone work productively,
in the hottest parts of the year''. They say that action on climate change would produce ''extremely large health benefits'', which would greatly
outweigh the costs of curbing emission growth. A leaked draft of the IPCC report notes that a warming climate would lead to fewer cold weatherrelated deaths but the benefits would be ''greatly'' outweighed by the impacts of more frequent heat extremes. Under a high emissions scenario,
some land regions will experience temperatures four to seven degrees higher than pre-industrial times, the report said. While
some
adaptive measures are possible, limits to humans' ability to regulate heat will affect health and potentially
cut global productivity in the warmest months by 40 per cent by 2100. Body temperatures rising above 38
degrees impair physical and cognitive functions, while risks of organ damage, loss of consciousness and
death increase sharply above 40.6 degrees, the draft report said. Farm crops and livestock will also
struggle with thermal and water stress. Staple crops such as corn, rice, wheat and soybeans are assumed to
face a temperature limit of 40-45 degrees, with temperature thresholds for key sowing stages near or
below 35 degrees, the report said.
XT: solves warming
A strong finance sector is key to warming resiliency and mitigation
Bowman 14 [HR Business Partner at Apple Past Director, Human Resources at Novelis, General
Manager, Human Resources at Porsche Cars North America, Vice President of Human Resources at
Abbott... Education Vanderbilt University - Owen Graduate School of Management, Harvard University.
May 8 2014, “DEVELOPMENT AND GLOBAL SUSTAINABILITY: THE CASE FOR ‘CORPORATE
CLIMATE FINANCE’” http://www.hcs.harvard.edu/~res/2014/05/development-and-globalsustainability-the-case-for-corporate-climate-finance///jweideman]
In short, moving
to a low-carbon global economy and increasing climate resilience in developing nations will
require significant capital outside of normal government channels and beyond business as usual. Indeed it
will involve one of the largest market and economic transitions in modern global society. Given this reality, the
finance sector has a key role to play in helping address climate change in terms of assisting developing
countries with adaptation. Public finance actors, such as the World Bank and the newly created Green Climate Fund, tend to take the spotlight here.
Far less attention has been given to the potential of and processes for directly engaging private finance
sector actors as positive societal change-agents. Specifically, transnational private sector financial actors
that are headquartered in developed countries are global economic gatekeepers and financial
intermediaries, making them critical actors in the transition to a low-carbon global economy. They comprise
insurers (especially re-insurers), institutional investors (especially pension funds) and banks. The potential of these private finance actors to assist climate change
adaptation in developing nations and also the shift to a low-carbon economy globally has been largely unnoticed by scholars and policy-makers. The purpose of this
article is to demonstrate that we
need to start paying attention now. Public Climate Finance The role of financial capital in
addressing climate change becomes clear by examining its relevance to sustainable development and ‘the
environment’ more generally. Financial support for projects and technological innovation will almost
always have environmental effects of some kind whether adverse or beneficial. Wholesale decisions regarding future development often arise in
the finance sector; so this is where future pressures on the environment begin. As Richardson notes: “[i]f sustainable
development is understood to imply, among other things, maintenance of natural and human-made capital for posterity, the role of capital markets must be recognized
as pivotal to this goal.” (2006:309) Since the 2007 Bali
Action Plan, international action on climate finance has centered on
the provision of financial aid by developed countries to developing countries via public (usually
multilateral or bilateral) institutions to build their resilience against climate variability (e.g. Chaum et al. 2011;
Brahmbhatt 2011; Fankhauser and Burton 2011) and facilitate mitigation. For example, Climate Investment Funds are
managed by the World Bank and implemented jointly with regional developing banks, which can
leverage support from developed countries and buy-down the costs of low-carbon technologies in
developing countries. Another option is the Green Climate Fund (GCF), a new multilateral fund that was agreed by Parties at the 2010 UNFCCC
conference as an operating entity of the UNFCCC’s financial mechanism. The GCF’s purpose “is to promote, within the context of sustainable development, the
paradigm shift towards low-emission and climate-resilient development pathways by providing support to developing countries to help limit or reduce their
greenhouse gas emissions and to adapt to the unavoidable impacts of climate change.” (Green Climate Fund 2014). It will do this by allocating funds pledged by
developed nations – US$100 billion per year by 2020 – to both mitigation and adaptation activities in developing nations, especially the most vulnerable (Cancun
Agreements, Decision 1, CP16). The GCF is still under construction; its Board will aim to decide essential matters of how the GCF will receive, manage, programme
and disburse funds in May 2014 (Green Climate Fund 2014). There is no doubt that multilateral efforts are vital. In particular, the GCF is a most welcome and timely
global initiative; however, there are at least two initial concerns. First, looking at the sums of money cited in the Introduction, US$100 billion is insufficient to meet
the task at hand. Due to the limited availability of public funds, investments at scale will also require private sector funding. To this end, the GCF employs a Private
Sector Facility (PSF) to promote the participation of private sector actors in developing countries, particularly “small and medium-sized enterprises and local financial
intermediaries.” (Green Climate Fund 2013:1). Private
sector entities (like Google or Coca Cola) can provide funds
through the GCF’s External Affairs division, alongside public contributions. This raises the second concern: that a vital
opportunity to directly engage the private finance sector will be missed under these arrangements. Neither the PSF nor the External Affairs (donations) division will
capture or engage multinational and transnational financial intermediaries, such as a large U.S. pension fund or a European bank. Why does this matter? Private
finance sector actors are economic gatekeepers with access to large and multiple pools of money and the
innate ability to move it around. Their raison d’être is to make intermediating decisions about where
money (as an asset, debt or equity) comes from and where it flows to (via sourcing, allocation and advisory processes). In
short, they have a central role to play in climate change efforts because, as noted by Lord Stern, “reducing
emissions and adjusting to climate change involves investment and risk” (UNEPFI 2007:2).
XT: Warming impact
Warming is the only existential risk
Deibel ’07 [Prof IR @ National War College Terry, “Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American
Statecraft,” Conclusion: American Foreign Affairs Strategy Today. PDF//jweideman]
Finally, there is one major existential threat to American security (as well as prosperity) of a nonviolent
nature, which, though far in the future, demands urgent action. It is the threat of global warming to the stability of the climate upon
which all earthly life depends. Scientists worldwide have been observing the gathering of this threat for three decades now, and what was once a mere
possibility has passed through probability to near certainty. Indeed not one of more than 900 articles on
climate change published in refereed scientific journals from 1993 to 2003 doubted that anthropogenic
warming is occurring. “In legitimate scientific circles,” writes Elizabeth Kolbert, “it is virtually
impossible to find evidence of disagreement over the fundamentals of global warming.” Evidence from a
vast international scientific monitoring effort accumulates almost weekly, as this sample of newspaper reports shows: an
international panel predicts “brutal droughts, floods and violent storms across the planet over the next century”; climate change could “literally alter ocean currents,
wipe away huge portions of Alpine Snowcaps and aid the spread of cholera and malaria”; “glaciers in the Antarctic and in Greenland are melting much faster than
expected, and…worldwide, plants are blooming several days earlier than a decade ago”; “rising sea temperatures have been accompanied by a significant global
increase in the most destructive hurricanes”; “NASA scientists have concluded from direct temperature measurements that 2005 was the hottest year on record, with
“Earth’s warming climate is estimated to contribute to more than 150,000 deaths and 5
million illnesses each year” as disease spreads; “widespread bleaching from Texas to Trinidad…killed broad swaths of corals” due to a 21998 a close second”;
degree rise in sea temperatures. “The world is slowly disintegrating,” concluded Inuit hunter Noah Metuq, who lives 30 miles from the Arctic Circle. “They call it
climate change…but we just call it breaking up.” From the founding of the first cities some 6,000 years ago until the beginning of the industrial revolution, carbon
dioxide levels in the atmosphere remained relatively constant at about 280 parts per million (ppm). At present they are accelerating toward 400 ppm, and by 2050 they
will reach 500 ppm, about double pre-industrial levels. Unfortunately, atmospheric CO2 lasts about a century, so there is no way immediately to reduce levels, only to
slow their increase, we are thus in for significant global warming; the only debate is how much and how serous the effects will be. As the newspaper stories quoted
we are already experiencing the effects of 1-2 degree warming in more violent storms, spread of
disease, mass die offs of plants and animals, species extinction, and threatened inundation of low-lying
countries like the Pacific nation of Kiribati and the Netherlands at a warming of 5 degrees or less the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets
could disintegrate, leading to a sea level of rise of 20 feet that would cover North Carolina’s outer banks,
swamp the southern third of Florida, and inundate Manhattan up to the middle of Greenwich Village.
above show,
Another catastrophic effect would be the collapse of the Atlantic thermohaline circulation that keeps the winter weather in Europe far warmer than its latitude would
otherwise allow. Economist William Cline once estimated the damage to the United States alone from moderate levels of warming at 1-6 percent of GDP annually;
severe warming could cost 13-26 percent of GDP. But the most frightening scenario is runaway greenhouse warming, based on positive feedback from the buildup of
water vapor in the atmosphere that is both caused by and causes hotter surface temperatures. Past ice age transitions, associated with only 5-10 degree changes in
Faced
with this specter, the best one can conclude is that “humankind’s continuing enhancement of the natural
greenhouse effect is akin to playing Russian roulette with the earth’s climate and humanity’s life support
system. At worst, says physics professor Marty Hoffert of New York University, “we’re just going to
burn everything up; we’re going to heat the atmosphere to the temperature it was in the Cretaceous when
there were crocodiles at the poles, and then everything will collapse.” During the Cold War, astronomer Carl Sagan
average global temperatures, took place in just decades, even though no one was then pouring ever-increasing amounts of carbon into the atmosphere.
popularized a theory of nuclear winter to describe how a thermonuclear war between the Untied States and the Soviet Union would not only destroy both countries but
Global warming is the post-Cold War era’s equivalent of nuclear winter at least as
serious and considerably better supported scientifically. Over the long run it puts dangers from terrorism
and traditional military challenges to shame. It is a threat not only to the security and prosperity to the
United States, but potentially to the continued existence of life on this planet
possibly end life on this planet.
AFF UQ: Banks
Growth is limited by regulatory constraints
Smith and Eckenrode 15 [Kenny Smith, Vice chairman at Deloitte outlook firm. Jim Eckenrode,
Executive director at delloitte. 2015. “2015 banking outlook: boosting profitability amidst new
challenges” www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Financial-Services/gx-us-fsioutlook-banking-final.pdf//jweideman]
Focus for 2015 Despite
an improving economy, new liquidity and capital constraints will create major headwinds
for profitability in 2015, making balance sheet optimization a top priority. This is particularly so for the largest banks, which
have to comply with the LCR rule in 2015. These institutions will have to hold enough liquid assets to weather 30 days of serious market stress. As a result, their
balance sheets will be burdened with more low-yielding assets. This pressure and low loan originations have already resulted in a greater share of securities on banks’
balance sheets, as shown in Figure 5. To minimize the pressure on NIM, firms will look to control funding costs by replacing wholesale funds with retail deposits.
This pattern may in turn
lead to higher interest expenses. These conflicting pressures in combination with the potential for lower
asset yields may compress margins despite rising interest rates.6
Yet, as interest rates rise, we could see a reversal in recent trends with deposits flowing into higher interest accounts (Figure 6).
Third Party PIC
Aff Answers
2AC — No Solvency
No solvency — electronic data creates overload and massive cost overruns for public
health institutions.
Lenert and Sundwall 12 — Leslie Lenert, with the Department of Medicine, and David N.
Sundwall, with the Department of Family and Preventive Medicine, School of Medicine, 2012 (“Public
Health Surveillance and Meaningful Use Regulations: A Crisis of Opportunity,” U.S National Library of
Medicine, March, Available Online at: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3487683/,
Accessed: 7-26-2015)
Meaningful use regulations pose a significant challenge for public health officials: they require public
health institutions to be able to receive data transmissions in forms specified by ONC. This is likely to
become a substantial problem because of the many types of health information technology (IT) systems,
the number of different providers, the relative immaturity of standards, and the costs of becoming
compliant with these requirements. If public health departments are not able to support connectivity,
health care providers and hospitals in their jurisdiction are exempted from requirements to provide data to
these departments.2
Furthermore, meaningful use requirements are designed to evolve rapidly: in stage 2, scheduled to begin
in 2014, public health departments are expected to be able to receive data regularly from clinical
providers for notifiable conditions, immunizations, and syndromic surveillance. In stage 3, beginning in
2015, electronic health records systems with new capabilities, such as the ability to work with public
health alerting systems and on-screen “buttons” for submitting case reports to public health are
envisioned.4 Public health departments will be required not just to upgrade their systems once, but also to
keep up with evolving changes in the clinical care system prompted by meaningful use regulations.
The size of the task facing public health departments to manage receipt of data from the clinical care
system is daunting. With more than 5000 individual hospitals (> 3700 independent hospitals)5 and more
than 230 000 physician practices in the United States,6 each of which might require a unique connection
to 1 or more public health departments at the state and local levels, the task of building an integrated
infrastructure is significant. Even with anticipated consolidation of practices and hospitals through health
information exchanges, it will be costly and difficult. Furthermore, the requirement for continual
evolution of the types of communications proposed for meaningful use adds to the problem. Each
connection between public health departments and clinical care providers may need to be revised several
times as requirements evolve. Where are state and local public health departments to find the funds to
adapt their IT systems to this massive and constantly evolving data stream?
1AR- No Solvency
Surveillance data overloads public health departments and prevents solvency —they
don’t have sufficient infrastructure or resources to deal with electronic data.
Lenert and Sundwall 12 — Leslie Lenert, with the Department of Medicine, and David N.
Sundwall, with the Department of Family and Preventive Medicine, School of Medicine, 2012 (“Public
Health Surveillance and Meaningful Use Regulations: A Crisis of Opportunity,” U.S National Library of
Medicine, March, Available Online at: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3487683/,
Accessed: 7-26-2015)
Data from a recent survey by the Association of State and Territorial Health Officers suggest that public
health departments are ill prepared to meet even the initial requirements for surveillance systems.7 Fewer
than 45% of state health departments reported being ready to test receiving meaningful use data on
syndromic surveillance. Rates of reported readiness for testing of notifiable diseases and immunization
data were higher, but additional work is needed. The most common obstacle, as might be expected (37 of
48 respondents), is a lack of funding. The benefits of upgrading to be able to receive messages from
meaningful use are not clear: one survey respondent said,
Updating our [ELR] infrastructure … will cost over $100 000 including re-certification… . Updating …
will not provide any real benefit to us as the Public Health Department.7(p13)
Local health departments likely face even greater challenges in responding to meaningful use. A recent
National Association of City and County Health Officials survey of local health departments found that
72% identified insufficient funding among their top 3 barriers to system development.8 However, money
is not the only problem. Lack of time or resources to divert from current programs and responsibilities
was a top barrier to system development for 55% of survey respondents.
A further problem is growth in the volume of data that will come to the public health systems. Estimates
from the Indiana Health Information Exchange suggest that automation of reporting for notifiable
diseases will increase the volume of reported diseases about 4 to 10 times over that of manual
reporting.9 New systems and work flows will be needed to process these reports, for example, automating
access to electronic medical records to facilitate case investigation. Increases in the volume of data for
syndromic systems could be much greater. Many local agencies with functional systems only receive
syndromic data from a few hospitals in their jurisdiction.
Demands on immunization registries also will increase, because providers are essentially mandated to
report immunizations to registries, potentially overwhelming existing infrastructure. New kinds of
capabilities are also envisioned for later stages of meaningful use, such as linking electronic health
records with chronic disease registries, buttons for reporting of notifiable diseases, and vaccine
forecasting.4Therefore, public health readiness for meaningful use requires more than a 1-time
investment: it requires ongoing upgrades of public health infrastructure.
2AC — No Impact
Bioterrorism is unlikely and alt causes to solvency — hard to access to technology
and alarmism disprove.
Leitenberg 9 — Milton Leitenberg, Swedish Institute of International Affairs and the Center for
International Studies Peace Program at Cornell University, and he has been a Senior Fellow at CISSM,
2009 (“THE SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY OF BIOTERRORISM,” Nonproliferation Review,
March, Available Online at: http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/161_review_leitenberg.pdf, Accessed: 7-272015)
The intellectual history of touting the bioterrorist threat is a dubious one. It began in 1986 with an attack
on the validity of the BWC by Douglas Feith, then an assistant to Richard Perle in President Ronald
Reagan’s Defense Department and more recently undersecretary of defense for policy until August 2005.
Feith introduced the idea that advances in the microbiological sciences and the global diffusion of the
relevant technology heighten the threat of BW use. Though advances in molecular genetics and
globalization increased drastically by 2008 in comparison to 1986, the number of states that maintain
offensive BW programs has not. And despite the global diffusion of knowledge and technology, the threat
of terrorist networks creating BW is low. But the invocation of overly alarmist themes continues. In 2005,
Tara O’Toole, chief executive officer and director of the Center for Biosecurity at the University of
Pittsburgh Medical Center, said, ‘‘This is not science fiction. The age of Bioterror is now.’’31 It hardly
comes as a surprise to learn that the office of Vice President Cheney was the driving force behind the
Bush administration’s emphasis on bioterrorism.32 But one vital point missed by Clark is that Cheney
was influenced by, among other things, the very same ‘‘Dark Winter’’ scenario with which Clark opens
his book. The other influences on Cheney were a veritable hysteria of fears and phantoms in the White
House following the 9/11 and the Amerithrax attacks, several of which concerned the potential of terrorist
use of BW and which reportedly led Cheney to believe he might soon become a victim.33 What must be
noted is that although Al Qaeda’s interest in BW failed, the group’s efforts were specifically provoked by
the severely overheated discussion in the United States about the imminent dangers of bioterrorism. A
message from Ayman al-Zawahiri to his deputy on April 15, 1999, noted that ‘‘we only became aware of
them [BW] when the enemy drew our attention to them by repeatedly expressing concerns that they can
be produced simply with easily available materials.’’34 (In a similar vein, terrorism expert Brian Jenkins
of the RAND Corporation has been at pains to point out that, ‘‘We invented nuclear terror.’’)35 If in the
coming decades we do see a successful attempt by a terrorist organization to use BW, blame for it can be
in large part pinned on the incessant scaremongering about bioterrorism in the United States, which has
emphasized and reinforced its desirability to terrorist organizations.
No bioterrorism — four failed incidents disprove and future attacks are unlikely.
Leitenberg 9 — Milton Leitenberg, Swedish Institute of International Affairs and the Center for
International Studies Peace Program at Cornell University, and he has been a Senior Fellow at CISSM,
2009 (“THE SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY OF BIOTERRORISM,” Nonproliferation Review,
March, Available Online at: http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/161_review_leitenberg.pdf, Accessed: 7-272015)
Finally, the history of attempts by non-state actors to develop or use biological agents has been
remarkably limited. The significant episodes are all well known, and Clark, a research scientist and
professor of immunology, briefly summarizes them in Bracing for Armageddon? The first was the use of
Salmonella, a bacterium that causes diarrhea, in the United States in 1984 by the Rajneeshshee cult, in
The Dalles, Oregon, in a failed attempt to influence a local election. The second was Aum Shinrikyo’s
19901993 failed effort to obtain and culture strains of Clostridium botulinum and Bacillus anthracis and
disperse the resulting products. The group never succeeded in obtaining a pathogenic strain of either
organism, and its culturing and dispersal efforts also came to naught. The third was the effort by Al Qaeda
in Afghanistan between 1997 and 2001 to obtain a pathogenic culture of B. anthracis and to initiate work
with the organism. Once again, the effort failed, as the organization was unable to obtain a pathogenic
strain of B. anthracis. Al Qaeda’s work was incompetent in the extreme and had barely advanced beyond
early speculation by the time a joint allied military team raided and occupied its facilities in December
2001. The last significant episode was the dispersal of a purified, dry powder preparation of B. anthracis
sent through the U.S. postal system to multiple addressees in September and October 2001*the so-called
Amerithrax incidents. The Al Qaeda and the Amerithrax events are the most significant. The barely
initiated, rudimentary, and failed attempt by Al Qaeda is important because of the nature of the group*a
true international terrorist organization with a wide organizational THE SELF-FULFILLING
PROPHECY OF BIOTERRORISM 99 structure, demonstrated initiative, and a record of successful,
albeit conventional, attacks. The Amerithrax attacks are significant because of the nature of the material
prepared and the perpetrator; the mailings demonstrate what a professional is capable of, but identifying
the perpetrator was essential to explaining who could make such a product and under what conditions. In
other words, identification would provide critical insight into both the likelihood of international terrorist
organizations developing similar capabilities and how quickly such a threat could emerge. It is notable
that since the interruption of the Al Qaeda BW project in December 2001, there are no indications that the
group has resumed those efforts.24 (Accounts of Al Qaeda offshoot groups in the United Kingdom,
France, or Iraq producing ricin are all spurious.) There have also been no publicly identified indications
that any other international terrorist group has initiated the development of BW agents in the intervening
years
2AC — Public Health Surveillance Bad
Public health practices ignore privacy in the interest of national security —this
undermines democracy and hurts disease prevention.
Bayer and Fairchild 10 — Ronald Bayer, Professor, Center for the History and Ethics of Public
Health, Columbia University's Mailman School of Public Health, and Amy Fairchild, Associate Professor
and Chair, Department of Sociomedical Sciences, Columbia University's Mailman School of Public
Health, 2010 (“ When Worlds Collide: Health Surveillance, Privacy, and Public Policy,” Social Research,
Vol 77, September 1st, Available Online at:
http://web.a.ebscohost.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=134f036b3bfa-496f-a0d2-6b5df6c6260b%40sessionmgr4002&vid=1&hid=4104, Accessed: 7-27-2015)
And yet privacy advocates remained uneasy about the apparent political consensus over public health
surveillance. They argued that good public health and the protection of privacy need not be in tension.
Indeed, proponents of privacy in the latter part of the twentieth century have invoked instrumental claims
when warning of the consequences of intrusions on what they viewed as sacrosanct domains. They have
When Worlds Collide 925 sought to demonstrate that limits on the confidentiality of the doctorpatient
relationship would subvert not only clinical care but also the pubhc's health. In the context of anxieties
about how national security considerations could narrow the purchase of privacy, Janlori Goldman wrote
that The codification of vague promises that power will not be abused and good judgment will be
employed ignores the historical lesson that during a crisis, privacy and civil liberties are given little
weight in the balancing of competing law enforcement, national security, and commercial interests.
Preserving public health and protecting privacy can— and must—go hand in hand (Goldman 2005:526).
But alarm has extended beyond the issue of national defense. There are anxieties, too, about efforts to
draw clinical medicine and public health into a closer relationship. Arguing for the most stringent
protections of surveillance data, privacy advocates assert that it essential to address the question of
whether an effective public health program always requires the use of personally identifiable reports. The
conventions of public health surveillance dating firom the beginning of the twentieth century need not
determine how we confront the challenges of the twenty-first. Finally, there were, they have argued, no
necessary trade-offs between a robust commitment to privacy and good public health practice. An
alternative view, one that we hold, sees the tension between privacy and the need to know on the part of
public health agencies as enduring even if it is not always expressed in bitter controversy. On this view, it
is the open recognition of tensions that holds out the prospect for recognizing both the claims of privacy
and public health. The vitality of democratic communities requires an ongoing effort to negotiate and
renegotiate the boundaries between privacy, society's "limiting principle," and public health, which at its
best has sought to expand the role of govemment as a guardian against disease and suffering
SOX PIC
Negative
1NC
Text: The United States federal government should no
longer apply the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 to small
businesses valued at $75 million or less.
The counterplan solves the entire Aff – it removes SOX surveillance regulations on
small business but maintains them on large corporations – this is the best balance
Grinberg 07 (The Impact of Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 on Small Firms ,
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1055&context=honorscollege_theses)
Although SOX has restored investor confidence, it has been more disadvantageous for small firms in
comparison to large and medium-size firms. The SEC acknowledges that implementing SOX for small
firms is a much harder task; therefore, the SEC gave a one-year extension to small businesses.4
Furthermore, after receiving many complaints about the Act, the SEC created an advisory committee to
investigate SOX’s effect on small public firms. The committee suggested that the SEC grant a one year
extension to small firms because the firms were having trouble finding funds to establish necessary
controls required by SOX.5 Therefore, the SEC was considering giving small firms that have up to $75
million in market capitalization an additional one year extension that would extend the compliance
deadline to July 2007.6 The committee’s consideration is in line with the findings of many studies
which conclude that SOX benefits large public firms, but inhibits and stifles small public firms. The
high cost of SOX implementation is financially draining many small firms. The Sarbanes Oxley Act
doesn’t make a distinction between large-cap billion-dollar companies and small-cap, $75-million
companies.7 Therefore, the Act requires all public companies to comply with the same regulations.
The act doesn’t take into consideration that small companies aren’t as complex in organizational structure
as large companies. Since large corporations have more complex business models, they have more
complicated accounting practices; therefore, in order to ensure the efficiency of their operations, large
firms already have a lot of controls in place that are required by SOX. On the other hand, smaller
companies have simpler organization structures and, thus, have simpler accounting practices, which
generate simpler financial statements. These small firms require less internal controls. Therefore, since
small companies have simpler business models and less complicated accounting practices, they
shouldn’t be subject to the same internal controls and external auditing requirements of large
companies. In addition, Mr. Wolkoff, chairman & CEO of the American Stock Exchange, a public
exchange that caters mostly to small and mid-size firms with market capitalization between $50
million and $500 million, points out that majority of corporate scandals have occurred in large
corporations with “thousands of unsuspecting shareholders, and their securities were the bulk of
many retirement/pension accounts.”8 However, small companies don’t have such investor interests and
are usually owned by the entrepreneurs who started the companies, their families, and public
shareholders that are not out to cheat themselves.9 Therefore, although shareholder interests should be
protected, SOX regulations aren’t needed for smaller firms that have simple business structures and a
small number of shareholders that are unlikely to defraud themselves. On the other hand, SOX
requirements should be tailored to company size and be designed to improve the profitability and
efficiency of smaller companies instead of placing them at a competitive disadvantage and stumping
their growth by requiring them to spend excessive amounts of money and time on implementing
regulations.
Specifically, keeping SOX regulatory scheme in place on large corporations is
critical to prevent mass fraud
Hanna 14,(http://www.forbes.com/sites/hbsworkingknowledge/2014/03/10/the-costs-and-benefits-ofsarbanes-oxley/, Associate Editor at Harvard Business School, The Costs And Benefits Of SarbanesOxley)
Despite high initial costs of the internal control mandate, evidence shows that it has proved beneficial.
“Markets have been able to use the information to assess companies more effectively, managers
have improved internal processes, and the internal control testing has become more cost-effective
over time,” according to Srinivasan. and investment in research and growth. Another concern that the act
would shrink the number of IPOs has not been borne out either; in fact, the pricing of IPOs post-SOX
became less uncertain. The cost of being a publicly traded company did cause some firms to go private,
but research shows these were primarily organizations that were smaller, less liquid, and more fraudprone. “Yes, SOX may have cut off public market financing to these companies, but the question is
whether it was appropriate for them to be in public markets in the first place,” Srinivasan says. “That is a
value judgment, to be sure. But it may not be a bad thing if certain companies are restricted in their
access to financing, simply because loss of trust in public capital markets has big consequences for
the entire economy.” A 2005 survey by the Financial Executives Research Foundation found that 83
percent of large company CFOs agreed that SOX had increased investor confidence, with 33
percent agreeing that it had reduced fraud.
That kills the economy
Troxell 14, (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Global-LeadershipLearning-From-History/2014/07/15, Research Professor of National Security and Military Strategy, with
the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Op-Ed: Global Leadership — Learning From
History)
World War I was botched on the front end and the back end. The failure to achieve a just and lasting
peace in 1919 led to the outbreak of World War II. Economic distress during the interwar years
resulted in the rise of fascist states and easily rekindled the embers of nationalist revanchism.
President Woodrow Wilson’s 14 points were not adhered to, including the all-important point 3: “the
removal, as far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade
conditions among all nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its
maintenance.” In terms of post-war economic relations, the opposite occurred as nations scrambled to
respond to the 1929 crash. Nations participated in a series of competitive devaluations and enacted
crippling tariffs, sending the global economy into a death spiral. Our second major commemoration of
this summer is the Bretton Woods conference, convened shortly after the D-Day landings and well before
the end of World War II. It was focused on creating a post-war international regime based on rules
designed to govern the global economy. Following the collapse of the Soviet empire, these rules now
govern the vast majority of the globally interconnected economy. The results of this conference point
to the importance of institutional arrangements to monitor and support the global economy, including the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, better
known today as it has evolved into the World Bank (WB); and the commitment to free trade. Conference
attendees initially debated the creation of the International Trade Organization, which at the time proved
to be a bridge too far, and thus they settled on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
Through a series of multinational negotiating rounds and agreements, culminating in the creation of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, GATT, and now the WTO, have succeeded in broad tariff
reductions and a dramatic increase in global trade. The liberal world economy, based on open markets
and free trade, and managed by rules-based, international monetary and trade regimes, has
furthered both individual and collective interests and promoted international cooperation. When it
comes to the support for international institutions, the President is correct in highlighting their
importance. But some of that support should also be expressed in action, particularly as it relates to the
global economy. Once again the President is right to focus on the “key source of American strength: a
growing economy,” and there is nothing wrong with domestic nation building, but only if it does not
replace an equal emphasis on the management and continued engagement in geoeconomic affairs.
2NC Solvency
Fraud erodes small firms – Hurts the economy
Bhasin 13, (Bang College of Business, KIMEP University, Almaty, Republic of Kazakhstan,
“Corporate Accounting Fraud: A Case Study of Satyam Computers Limited,” March 2013, Open Journal
of Accounting)
Organizations of all types and sizes are subject to fraud. On a number of occasions over the past few decades, major public
companies have experienced financial reporting fraud, resulting in turmoil in the capital markets, a
loss of shareholder value, and, in some cases, the bankruptcy of the company itself. Although, it is generally accepted that the SarbanesOxley Act has improved corporate governance and decreased the incidence of fraud, recent studies and surveys indicate that investors and management
continue to have concerns about financial statement fraud. For example: found that financial statement fraud, while representing less than five percent of the cases of
Survey participants estimated that the
typical organization loses 5% of its revenues to fraud each year. Applied to the 2011 Gross World Product, this
figure translates to a potential projected annual fraud loss of more than $3.5 trillion. The median loss caused
fraud in its report, was by far the most costly, with a median loss of $1.7 million per incident.
by the occupational fraud cases in our study was $140,000. More than one-fifth of these cases caused losses of at least $1 million. The frauds reported to us lasted a
median of 18 months before being detected.
Small Businesses are Key to economic Growth
Bagley 12, (http://www.forbes.com/sites/rebeccabagley/2012/05/15/small-businesses-big-impact/,
president and CEO of NorTech, an organization that strengthens Northeast Ohio's economic vitality,
Small Businesses = Big Impact)
small businesses are the engines of job creation in the United States. Their value and the
role they play in our economy is sometimes underestimated because, they are in fact, small. But the
truth is there’s nothing small about the impact they have on our economy. According to
Entrepreneur Magazine there are between 25 million and 27 million small businesses in the U.S.
that account for 60 to 80 percent of all U.S. jobs. And, a recent study by Paychex, says that small
businesses produce 13 times more patents that larger firms. So, how do we ensure small businesses are getting the resources they need to
grow? What can we do to not only help them succeed, but thrive in an ever changing economy? Providing the right climate for entrepreneurial
firms to succeed, including access to capital and business advisors can be extremely valuable. Smart
regulations and tax structures can also give small businesses a boost and better chance of survival.
We often hear that
The good news is there are programs and support organizations around the country trying to help small businesses gain the tools they need to be sustainable and profitable ventures. For example,
last week I attended an event to mark the launch of Goldman Sachs 10,000 Small Businesses initiative in Cleveland, Ohio the 7th city to become part of the program. The investment firm and its
foundation are taking an integrated approach to help small businesses around the country create jobs and economic opportunity by providing them with greater access to business education,
financial capital, and business support services. The goal is to help established small businesses get to the next level, as opposed to other programs that focus on supporting only start-ups and
aspiring entrepreneurs. There is also an emphasis on diversity and selecting businesses that are representative of the communities that the program serves. According to a Goldman Sachs
Small businesses play a vital role in creating jobs and growth in America’s economy.
Through 10,000 Small Businesses we are providing the skills, capital and mentoring small
businesses need to grow, create jobs and build more prosperous neighborhoods. This unique program is tailored to each
spokesperson, “
local market by an outstanding team of local partners led be leading community colleges. Already we are seeing 10,000 Small Businesses participants increasing revenues and creating jobs.”
Goldman Sachs’ $500 million program is aimed at reaching 10,000 small businesses nationwide. A $15 million investment in the City of Cleveland will help companies gain access to business
classes at community colleges, like Cuyahoga Community College, as well as other opportunities for grants or loans.
SOX PIC Aff Answers
Movement in Squo prove the CP Non-Inherent
Loten 11, (Bill Seeks to Ease Sarbanes-Oxley for Small Firms, http://blogs.wsj.com/incharge/2011/09/26/bill-seeks-to-ease-sarbanes-oxley-for-small-firms/is a New York-based reporter for
The Wall Street Journal, where he writes about startups, entrepreneurship and small business)
In a bid to lower barriers to capital for fast-growth companies, House legislation unveiled last week
would allow small businesses to opt out of costly internal-control measures under the SarbanesOxley Act for up to 10 years after going public. The Startup Expansion Investment Act, introduced by
Rep. Ben Quayle (R., Ariz.), would temporarily exempt companies with market valuations below $1
billion from section 404 of the act. The current market-cap threshold to be exempt is $75 million.
Small firms have long complained about onerous compliance costs under the act, known as SOX,
which was put in place nearly a decade ago after widespread accounting scandals erupted at Enron,
WorldCom and other large, publicly-traded companies. Among other measures, section 404 requires all
public companies to seek an outside audit of internal controls, adding as much as $1 million in costs for
small companies, according to a recent survey by Protiviti, a global risk and business consulting firm.
Since its inception, delays and temporary reprieves have largely shielded these firms from the act’s
tougher measures. Quayle’s bill would create a permanent 10-year window. “Access to the public capital
markets is vital for a company to expand and hire new workers,” Quayle said in a statement. Similar
measures were recently proposed in the Startup Act of 2011, unveiled in July by the Ewing Marion
Kauffman Foundation, a Kansas City, Mo., research group. Robert Litan, the group’s vice president of
research, said in a statement that Quayle’s bill was “an important step as we try to increase the
number of companies that go public” and create jobs. Supporters of Sarbanes-Oxley say the law is
necessary to protect shareholders from lax corporate accounting and fraud.
Turn – Small Corps. Exploit SOX by intentionally being valued under $75 Million
Gao 08, Unintended Consequences of Granting Small Firms Exemptions from Securities Regulation:
Evidence from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1014054,
Associate Professor of Accounting at the University of Illinois at Chicago College of Business
Administration)
Second, we document a heretofore unrecognized consequence of SOX – non-accelerated filers
keeping their public float below $75 million. Prior studies suggest SOX can change a firm’s costbenefit
tradeoff of participating in U.S. public capital markets (Engel et al., 2007; Leuz et al., 2007; Piotroski and
Srinivasan, 2007; Hostak et al., 2007; and Gao, 2007). Our results indicate that for firms remaining
public, SOX also altered their incentives to grow. Lower growth has social welfare implications if it
affects employment, wealth creation, and real investment. Finally, we provide additional evidence on
the economic consequences of SOX and in particular, its Section 404 provisions on internal controls, for
small public companies. A common theme emerging from prior studies is that SOX more adversely
affects small firms (Engle et al., 2007; Leuz et al., 2007; and Piotroski and Srinivasan, 2007). Our
findings add to this literature and are consistent with the view that Section 404 of SOX imposes net costs
on small businesses (e.g. Ribstein, 2002; Gordon, 2003; Romano, 2005; Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2003).