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Ambassador Ali Sarwar Naqvi
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
1.
Pakistan and the International Nuclear Order
1
Amb. Ali Sarwar Naqvi
2.
Strategic Restraint in South Asia
9
Tariq Osman Hyder
3.
NFU: Impact on Proliferation and Nuclear
Stability
16
Farzana Siddique
4.
Evolution of Thinking on FMCT
27
Huma Rehman
5.
UN Arms Trade Treaty: An Analysis
38
Afsah Qazi
6.
Newsbytes
7.
Book Reviews:
46
i.
The 33 Strategies of War
49
ii.
Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America and the
Future of Global Jihad
52
iii.
Iran and the Bomb, Nuclear Club Busted
54
iv.
On China
56
v.
Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and Future of
American Power
58
Editor’s Note
Some developments impacting upon Pakistan’s security have occurred since the first
issue of ‘CISS Insight’ was published in March, 2013, and need to be put in focus
The situation in Afghanistan is becoming more and more challenging. Clashes
between the armies of the two countries in the first week of May this year, on border
security posts construction, are indicative of how bad are the relations between the two
neighbours. In normal circumstances the dispute could have been resolved in a flag
meeting between the officers of the two armies present in this sector but the hostilities
have been allowed to linger. How the situation develops after withdrawal of American
forces from Afghanistan in 2014 is too early to predict but Afghanistan may take a few
more years before it stabilizes. Meanwhile Mr. Hamid Karzai, its President, visited
India and asked for large quantities of military equipment for its armed forces. ISAF
forces have been training and providing the required equipment to Afghan National
Army (ANA) for several years. They have also pledged to continue supporting the
ANA in future. Why Mr. Karzai needs Indian military equipment has not been
explained. This lack of transparency adds to Pakistan’s concerns.
Pakistan-India deterrence has been holding since the two countries went nuclear.
Pakistan being a smaller power, its interest is better served if number of nuclear
weapons and their delivery systems remained restricted in both countries. India being a
bigger power, with bigger economic and diplomatic clout now, seems to take steps that
disturb regional strategic stability obliging Pakistan to take measures to reestablish the
balance. Cold Start Doctrine subsequently rechristened “Proactive Strategy” was one
such step taken by India earlier. Now Mr. Shyam Saram, Chairman of India’s National
Security Board in a speech on April 24, 2013, articulated India’s nuclear policy. In
what he described as his personal views, he said among other things that in the
eventuality of Pakistan’s decision to develop tactical nuclear weapons to deter Indian
aggression against its territory by five times bigger Indian conventional forces, India
would respond with “massive retaliation” causing unacceptable damage on its
adversary.
Apart from being inflammatory, Mr. Saram’s statement has introduced the element of
assured destruction to nuclear situation in South Asia. His statement instead of
strengthening deterrence which stands on the notion of non-use of nuclear weapons
has opened the dangerous possibility of actual use of these weapons by India. Pakistan
will now have to respond to this situation in a manner it deems fit.
As a result of these developments, the regional security situation again seems to be
fraught with risks and dangers that have the potential of upsetting the strategic balance
in the region.
Pakistan and the International Nuclear Order
Ambassador Ali Sarwar Naqvi
The evolution of nuclear order can be traced back to the advent of nuclear weapons,
which led to a realization of the intensity with which nuclear energy could impact
upon the lives of human beings. William Walker defined Nuclear Order in his book, A
Perpetual Menace: Nuclear Weapons and International Order as,
“Given the existence of nuclear technology, the international nuclear order
entails evolving patterns of thought and activity that serve primary goals of
world survival, war avoidance and economic development; and the quest for a
tolerable accommodation of pronounced differences in the capabilities,
practices, rights and obligations of states.”
Creating an order within the nuclear realm was a strategy devised to save mankind of
the disasters unleashed by the creation of nuclear weapons. The goals of the nuclear
order which evolved and which exist even today were two-dimensional. The first
dimension is concerned with ensuring a global access to nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes while the other dimension tries to restrict, limit and check the diversion of
available nuclear energy for weapons build-up. Thus the international nuclear order
faces an eternal and inherent paradox, promoting access to nuclear energy on the one
hand while restricting it to selected states on the other.
However, the biggest challenge to the existing nuclear order has been its
discriminatory nature which creates the well-known divide between nuclear haves and
have-nots. Apart from this conceptually inherent flaw, the order faces a challenge
regarding the three end goals it claims to endeavor achieving. These include nonproliferation, access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and disarmament. None
of these objectives have been realized, neither are there any prospects in sight which
could give hope for their achievement. The task of ensuring global access to nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes has been performed in a way relatively better than the
other two. But even this area has its own limitations and question marks. In nonproliferation, discriminations saw a zenith. The graphs of horizontal proliferation
remained static for some time, but discriminations, lack of assurances, security
dilemmas and most importantly ever-rising graphs of vertical proliferation forced a
1
rise in them too. Lastly the goal of disarmament, an important part of bargain had been
dealt with in the most perfunctory manner as evident from the little progress made in
this direction.
For a long time, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was considered an
effective regime for guarding against nuclear proliferation (which essentially involves
the diversion of nuclear fuel for power to weapons grade fissile material). The Treaty
provides for IAEA inspection of nuclear power facilities in adherent states and thus
stops them from acquiring nuclear weapons capability. The first half of the 90s saw the
voluntary renunciation of nuclear programs geared to weapons capability by Argentina
and Brazil and later South Africa, and the termination of nuclear programs in the
Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Byloe Russia. The NPT Review Conference in 1995 was an
upbeat, self congratulatory meeting, in which the NPT was given a permanent lease of
life.
However, the nuclear tests conducted by India and later Pakistan in 1998 cast a pall of
gloom on the NPT Review Conference in 2000. Then, in the very first few years of the
new century, some NPT signatory states were found to be in violation of their
obligation of abstaining from any steps leading to weapons development: North Korea,
Libya, which confessed and came out clean, and Iran, where traces of enriched
uranium were found on imported centrifuges, which were unexplained. The NPT
regime seemed to be collapsing, as its own members were found to be in violation of
its provisions. The NPT Review Conference in 2005, held in New York, in which I
was the Pakistan Observer, met for a month, took more than two weeks to even agree
on an agenda, and ended without an agreed statement, which had never happened
before. The nuclear order, carefully crafted in 1968, much like the Treaty of Versailles
of 1919 in the inter-war years, was fraying at the seams and spiralling downward
towards possible collapse. As the North Korean and Iranian programs continued
eluding international monitoring and inspection, the descent towards collapse seemed
to continue unchecked, and many feared, unstoppable. To boot, the entry into force of
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) decisively blocked by the US Senate, and
the FMCT negotiations stalemated, the outlook of global non-proliferation looked
bleak. It is this situation that the Obama administration found itself confronted with
when it assumed office.
Meanwhile, in the wake of the emerging realities, some elder statesmen in the US had
been giving serious thought as to how the imbroglio that had developed could be
cleared up. Quite naturally they realized that the root of the problem lay in the original
discrimination or unfairness embodied in the NPT. The famous bargain struck between
the nuclear weapon states (NWS) and the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) in the
2
negotiations leading to the finalization of the NPT required implementation of both the
articles IV and VI, but as it transpired, Article IV has been rigorously implemented
and Article VI has been largely ignored.
Realizing that this selective execution of the Treaty was gradually bringing the NPT
regime to a collapse, the elder statesmen, Senator Sam Nunn, Former US Secretaries
George Shultz, our host today, Secretary William Perry and Mr. Henry Kissinger,
wrote a joint article in the Wall Street Journal in January 2007 urging the
Administration to go for eventual nuclear disarmament or what they termed as the
Nuclear Zero option, in implementation of Article VI of the NPT. They argued that
nuclear weapons had outlived, with the end of the Cold War, whatever utility they
might have had, “that the various risks associated with their retention by existing
powers, and acquisition by new ones, not to mention terrorist actors, meant that the
world would be better off without them”. An active debate ensued over the following
years, in which the proponents of the Nuclear Zero argument gained general support.
This eventually led to President Obama’s Prague speech in 2009, which officially
committed the United States to total disarmament in the years to come, through a stepby-step process leading to complete elimination of nuclear weapons.
Obviously, a lot has changed since 1968 when the NPT was drafted. As we look back
more than forty five years ago, and glance at the nuclear order that has prevailed over
these years, we notice certain glaring shortcomings that characterize the old order:
1. It lacks equity, as the NPT allows only five countries to have nuclear weapons, and
disallows the rest of the world from having them.
2. Some important states that remained outside the NPT developed nuclear weapons,
thus undermining the entire international non-proliferation regime.
3. In course of time, there have also occurred violations of NPT regulations by
signatory states, thus almost depriving the NPT of its legal and moral authority.
4. The old order has not brought about the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT) or meaningful negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off
Treaty (FMCT), which are both vital adjuncts to the NPT.
3
In the wake of the angst of the international community, particularly the Western
countries, at the collapsing international regime on nuclear non-proliferation on the
other, new initiatives and approaches seem to suggest that an emerging nuclear order
may eventually take shape. These are:

The issuance of the US Nuclear Posture Review of 2010, in which the US declared
that it would not launch nuclear attacks against non-nuclear weapon states, unless
faced with a WMD attack, and announced cuts/reductions in its nuclear and missile
development programs.

The signing of a new US-Russia Start Treaty, reducing their respective arsenals by
30%, to be effected in seven years time, and current negotiations for further
reductions.

A voluntary plan for nations to secure thousands of tons of fissile material now
existing in many countries adopted in the Washington Nuclear Security Summit in
2010. By focussing on the safety and security of nuclear technology and material,
the Summit effectively relegated the goal of non-proliferation to a lower priority.
This was followed by a second Nuclear Summit in Seoul in the spring of 2012.
This Summit while renewing the political commitments of the previous one in
2010, deliberated upon the inter-connectedness of Nuclear Safety and Security in
the light of the Fukushima disaster in addition to mitigation of the risks of nuclearradiological terrorism.

The 2010 NPT Review Conference that ran through a four week session in New
York and aimed at the strengthening of the NPT laid greater emphasis on safety
and security, and disarmament, rather than on non-proliferation.

Concurrently, the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament, headed by former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans and
Japanese diplomat Yoriko Kawaguchi, is lobbying internationally for support of a
graduated program of global disarmament.
All these events and actions seem to indicate revised thinking in regard to the major
issues of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, which is likely to result in
changes in the nuclear order that now prevails. While the contours of the new order
have yet to take shape and form, some likely features that would characterize it could
be:
4

A degree of flexibility in the rigid non-proliferation regime of old, as has already
manifested itself in the Indo-US nuclear deal. The US decision to extend to India
extensive nuclear cooperation, under the deal, despite the fact that India did not
sign the NPT and developed a nuclear weapons program in open defiance of the
non-proliferation principles, was a body blow to the NPT, and demonstrated its
virtual obsolescence.

Greater focus on safety and security of nuclear materials and nuclear technology,
to avoid the danger of nuclear terrorism, resulting from nuclear material falling
into the hands of non-state actors and terrorist groups.

Continued serious efforts towards forward movement on global disarmament, both
at the level of states and in multi-lateral fora. In this regard, the International
Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament has published a
report entitled “Eliminating Nuclear Threats---A Practical Agenda for Global
Policy Makers” which has charted out a full program of action for national
governments, and has begun strong advocacy of the issue in multi-lateral events.
Interestingly, for Pakistan these trends carry positive implications. It is well-known
that Pakistan has been against the statusquo in regard to the existing nuclear order.
Whatever flexibility or change takes place in the present unfair and rigid international
nuclear regime, Pakistan is bound to benefit.
The Nuclear Security Summits held in 2010 and 2012 seem to have exonerated
Pakistan from the earlier stigma of a suspected proliferating state pinned upon it
following the exposure of an illicit network trading in nuclear technology and material
headed by Dr. A.Q.Khan. The argument that Pakistan has been making that, (a) the
government did not know about the clandestine network nor support its activities, and
b) it took strong action against Dr. A.Q.Khan and his accomplices and has dismantled
the network when it was discovered, finally seems to have been conceded, albeit
tacitly. As this was perhaps the principal reason why the US with-held a civilian
nuclear deal a la India to Pakistan, it should now look forward to developing a
framework for nuclear cooperation with Western countries, particularly the United
States. If this were to happen, Pakistan would be able to break out of the present
isolation and virtual ostracism that it faces from the international nuclear community.
The great benefit of such a deal would be to open up the possibility of civilian nuclear
cooperation with other advanced countries as well, besides of course the United States.
Pakistan has already made a request for civilian nuclear cooperation with the US, and
5
significantly has not been rebuffed in recent interactions. In any case, Pakistan has
contracted a civilian nuclear deal with China, which provides for the setting up of two
additional nuclear power plants in Pakistan. As China is also a member of the Nuclear
Suppliers Group, which does not allow nuclear cooperation with Pakistan as a nonsignatory of the NPT, the Chinese decision is akin to the US decision to undertake
nuclear cooperation with India. The effect of the China-Pakistan deal could eventually
impel the US to accede to Pakistan’s request for a civilian nuclear deal.
Pakistan should also expect less pressure on it for signing the NPT. There has been
talk in the non-proliferation community of some creative ways to accommodate nonsignatory Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) in the NPT, either through associate
membership or some kind of adherent status. With less rigidity in regard to the NPT,
some movement in this regard may eventually take place.
Pakistan faces the demand of signing the CTBT and moving forward on negotiations
for an FMCT, but here too, it can raise its own concerns, before it could oblige. For
example, Pakistan can press for a nuclear restraint regime in South Asia, or even a
resolution of issues like Kashmir and water sharing with India. At the 2010 Nuclear
Security Summit in Washington, Pakistan proposed (a) the setting up of a nuclear
restraint regime in South Asia, (b) a balance in conventional forces, and(c) a
meaningful conflict resolution mechanism in South Asia. Pakistan maintains that its
nuclear weapons program is security driven, and an improvement in the security
environment in the region was necessary before it can enter into negotiations regarding
a fissile material cut-off treaty. This position has already been taken by Pakistan at the
Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, and is likely to be maintained.
Of course, Pakistan is often blamed as the only state blocking FMCT negotiations and
thus undermining the broader nuclear order. However the facts suggest that Pakistan
has never acted to promote the dilution of the order, in fact Pakistan has tried in the
best possible way to abide by and implement the rules and regulations considered
important for maintaining the nuclear order. It tries to follow the standards for nuclear
safety and security through national set-ups and organizations such as PNRA,
SECDIV and NCA, in addition to introducing the PRPs. Pakistan took considerable
steps to deal with the issue of non-state actors in light of the UNSC resolution 1540 by
passing the Export Control Act of 2004. Pakistan took strong action to deal with the
alleged AQ Khan network in order to conform to international standards.
These actions show Pakistan’s commitment to play a constructive role in meeting the
goals set by the NPT regime as a responsible nuclear weapon state. Pakistan, having a
realization of the significance of regional stability for a stable global nuclear order, had
6
been proposing the establishment of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) in South
Asia for more than two decades and now it proposes the establishment of a strategic
restraint regime as a more viable option for stability in the region. If Pakistan had the
goal of disturbing the nuclear order, it would have considered introducing BMD and
other technologies which could destabilize the region. But contrarily, Pakistan believes
that the strategic stalemate in the region, in addition to provocative military doctrines
and sea based second strike platform, are blocking progress towards meaningful and
realistic arms control mechanisms in South Asia. Pakistan can’t be blamed as
responsible for disturbing the order since it never deliberately violated any of the rules.
Pakistan’s nuclearization itself was purely security driven and we followed only after
India, we did not set the precedent.
Actually, the Indo-US deal can be considered as one of the main blows to the
established nuclear order as it presents a classic case of discriminations based on
tactical motives made possible only by violating the norms and by giving a legal cover
to those violations. The deal shattered the four decades long consensus regarding
nuclear order in addition to destabilizing the south Asian deterrence in favor of India.
It also nullified the basic principle, championed by US previously and underlying this
entire regulatory regime i.e. the principle of withholding cooperation with nonsignatories while assisting the NPT adherents in developing civilian nuclear energy.
The amendments in NSG guidelines, US domestic laws and established IAEA
safeguards shook the existing order. This NSG waiver allowed India; a non-signatory
to NPT, a non-adherent to the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement, to import
civilian nuclear fuel and technology, which in no case was possible under the original
NSG guidelines and so was effected with the help of amendments and introducing a
facility specific safeguard agreement. The entire process represents the acceptance of
India’s defiance of the existing nuclear order, setting a precedent which is probably
being followed by North Korea in the current phase. In fact what has set the precedent
for a constant disintegration of nuclear order by prompting more states to go nuclear
have been the policies of the P5, particularly the US as William Walker has put it,
‘Among the foremost challenges to the sustenance and strengthening of the nuclear
order is Washington itself’.
The international nuclear order needs to transform itself, to become more flexible in an
attempt to overcome its discriminatory nature that is probably becoming a concern for
more and more states now. This flexibility is direly needed to integrate states within
the order and check proliferation. The outliers need not be alienated since this would
multiply their numbers. Efforts are needed to integrate them within the system, by
providing them adequate alternatives and assurances. If Pakistan is considered a
7
spoiler, leaving it aside won’t lead to a solution. For ensuring the survival and
sustenance of the nuclear order we need to work together: Pakistan would get
integrated into this order only when its concerns would be given consideration as a
sovereign nation state.
What is also clear is that various possibilities for Pakistan will open up once the old
order loses its rigidity and sole focus on nuclear non-proliferation. The approach of
heavy sanctions and restrictions on a country like Pakistan, whose “sin” was nonsignature of the NPT and the CTBT, and that of developing an indigenous nuclear
program, is seriously out of date. Pakistan has long remained “out in the cold”, in the
phrase of John le Carre, and deserves to come back inside. If that happens, Pakistan
would become part of the new nuclear order that comes about in due course of time.
Ambassador Ali Sarwar Naqvi is the Executive Director of CISS. This Paper
was presented by him, at the Stanford University US-Pakistan Dialogue,
supported by the Carnegie Corporation and the MacArthur Foundation, in
Vienna Center for Disarmament and Nonproliferation on 6-7 May 2013.
8
Strategic Restraint in South Asia
Tariq Osman Hyder
The national requirement for strategic restraint for any country is derived from its
political judgment given its location and the prevailing strategic environment. The
cutting edge lies in the military domain and the contours of the quantum of strategic
restraint depend on the military capabilities of the country concerned and the threats it
faces both current and foreseen. While the military potential has its own impact on
objectives and developments, it is largely in the diplomatic field in which efforts are
launched and sustained in bilateral and multilateral engagement to reach the political
objectives which define strategic restraint, and to deal with situations in which calls
for such restraint go unheeded.
Seven facts should be clear to any objective observer in the context of South Asia:

First of all, Pakistan as the smaller country with a correspondingly smaller
economy, defence budget and armed forces, has vested interests in better
relations with India which include strategic restraint. This would allow Pakistan
to devote a larger amount of its limited resources to nation building and the
welfare of its people.

Secondly, any such policy and objectives require a positive response from India.

Thirdly, Pakistan has already experienced to its cost its division into two
countries at the hands of a military intervention by India in 1971: the first
example of a state being dismembered after the end of the Second World War.

Fourthly, the international community has the ability to act in a manner which
facilitates strategic restraint in South Asia or in a manner which leads to its
destabilization.
Fifthly, the empirical approach of India has been to keep Pakistan off balance and to
destabilize it through a number of actions. These include trying to control the flow of
waters guaranteed by the Indus Waters Treaty, destabilization of Balochistan through
Afghanistan, hostile propaganda at every level including in multilateral forums, and
unwillingness to tackle core issues and disputes in the Composite Dialogue peace
process which is switched on and off at India’s will. Senior Indian strategists including
9
policy1 makers continue to assert that India has no interest in Pakistan not breaking
apart if it remains obdurate to Indian demands. Other influential Indian voices predict
that Pakistan will break apart2, a consistent theme since 1947 of the RSS and its
offshoots as well as of numerous other Indian nationalists.
 Sixthly, Pakistan’s strategic environment has deteriorated due to the occupation of
Afghanistan which has led to the rise of extremism and terrorism within Pakistan as
well as a now hot western border.
 Seventhly, the increasing narrative of the Western countries is that Pakistan must
exercise strategic restraint by curtailing its rather limited fissile material production
and its nuclear capability, including by supporting FMCT negotiations. Western
analysts also advise Pakistan that developing and deploying tactical nuclear weapons
would be counterproductive.
That is the mise en scene. In a talk limited to 10 minutes let me now concentrate on the
strategic restraint dimension. As soon as both countries became overtly nuclear
Pakistan offered to India its Strategic Restraint Regime (SRR) proposal, with its three
interlocking elements of nuclear restraint, conventional balance and dispute settlement.
The SRR has remained on the table since then and most recently has been re-offered to
India in the current Nuclear and Conventional CBMs talks which began in 2004. India
has consistently rejected Pakistan’s SRR. Nor have the Western countries since 1998
demonstrated any interest in, or support for, this regime.
On the contrary the Western countries and Russia continue to build up India’s strategic
capabilities in both the nuclear and conventional fields. Massive conventional arms
sales dominate the bilateral agendas of the major Western powers and Russia vis a vis
India.
On the nuclear side the US-India nuclear deal, compounded further by the exemption
which undermines the NPT given to India by the NSG, and followed by liberal
bilateral nuclear agreements for nuclear technology and uranium supplies,
demonstrates that rather than nuclear restraint, nuclear license is the Western objective
for a combination of reasons commercial and geo-strategic. Paramount among these is
the buildup of India as a key partner, both regionally and globally, particularly in the
See former Indian Foreign Secretary’s Kanwal Sibhal’s speech on ‘Indian Foreign Policy Options”, at
IDSA on 30th November 2012.
2
Former Supreme Court Justice Katju, now Chairman of the Indian Press Council.
1
10
context of China. Support for India’s candidature for Permanent Membership of the
Security Council is a pillar of this policy
Conversely in respect to Pakistan which is more fossil fuel deficient than India, in a
clearly discriminatory approach similar access to civil nuclear energy for power
generation, critical for Pakistan’s energy security, has not been given.
The US-India deal has excluded from safeguards 8 Indian reactors3, well suited for
weapons grade Plutonium production, which have the ability to produce 240 nuclear
weapons a year. There was no justification for such an exemption by an agreement that
the USA disingenuously termed an advance for the global objective of
nonproliferation. The entire ambitious Indian 13 breeders reactors programme has
similarly been left out of safeguards, despite the fact that the rationale for all breeder
programmes worldwide has always been to extract the maximum from limited
uranium supplies and not to produce unsafeguarded fissile material. The Indian Prime
Minister stated in Parliament that no part of India’s nuclear programme would be
placed under safeguards if it was of a strategic nature. The dual use purpose of the
breeders programme is therefore clear.
Supplies of uranium from NSG countries free up India’s own limited uranium reserves
for weapons production. Furthermore the overhang of India’s unsafeguarded
Plutonium has also been left out of safeguards. The International Panel of Fissile
Material (IPFM) in its 2010 publication stated that India’s 6.8 tons of unsafeguarded
plutonium was sufficient for 850 nuclear weapons even if it be totally of reactor grade
plutonium. Probably due to low burn up a significant portion would be of weapons
grade plutonium. However, the nuclear weapons capability of this Indian Plutonium
overhang is never taken into account by Western critics of Pakistan.
One measure of the level of discrimination in the energy field towards Pakistan is the
fact that, unlike India, all of Pakistan’s nuclear reactors for power generation are under
safeguards, and the GOP has avowed that all future power reactors will also be
safeguarded. In the US/NSG-India deal, India has been given the right to keep future
reactors out of safeguards.
Pakistan, the last nuclear country to start fissile production, is criticized for increasing
its modest plutonium production capacity from one to four dedicated reactors, but it
would have to build some 150 more to match India’s existing weapons grade
plutonium production capacity.
3
Pu production of the 8 unsafeguarded Indian reactors is annexed.
11
Another example is that while energy shortages constitute a very major challenge to
Pakistan’s economy and ability to generate resources for both development and
internal security, the gas pipeline project with Iran is opposed by the USA which
however, has taken no concrete action to initiate the gas pipeline project with
Turkmenistan through Afghanistan which in its first incarnation began promisingly in
the mid 1990s. In fact the US made UNOCAL withdraw and disband the Consortium,
not heeding Pakistan’s argument that beginning work on the pipeline would show all
Afghan factions that from peace they would gain more than from war. Had that gone
ahead the moderate Taliban would have come out on top and the history that followed
may well have been different. The same holds true today. The Iranian pipeline is
closer to completion now by far, although eventually over time South Asia will need at
least two pipelines.
To the people of Pakistan it thus seems that they are consigned to the status referred in
the Bible as “hewers of wood and drawers of water”.
In the Peace Dialogue Pakistan has responded positively to India’s main interests on
trade and people to people contacts. However it has not budged on Pakistan’s core
concern of Kashmir or on resolving the Siachin and Sir Creek sea boundary disputes,
and has hardened further its position on all three, as well as on the Indus Waters where
it seeks not only to control their flow in violation of the Indus Waters Treaty but also
objects to vitally needed Pakistani dams downriver to the extent of attempting to
block construction assistance from the IFIs.
Even on progressing on Nuclear and Conventional CBMs and in observing those
agreed upon India continues to drag its feet as if wanting to delink from Pakistan. It
ignores the wise maxim coined in the environmental arena that a country must “think
globally but also act locally”.
Recently India carried out two SLBM launches which require prenotification to
Pakistan under the terms of their bilateral legal agreement, but did not do so4, coming
up with a vague response -after much delay-that the missiles were not ballistic despite
DRDO Press Releases to the contrary. This is a troubling development for a CBM that
had worked well so far, better for instance than the Hague Code of Conduct. One
hopes it is not the start of a trend.
“Pakistan complained
to MEA that is was notified about the missile test conducted on 27
January.”Article by Suman Sharma, datelined New Delhi the Sunday Guardian. 16 February 2013.
4
12
India and Western analysts oppose Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons without
taking into account the need to close the gap posed by the aggressive Indian Cold
Start/Proactive Doctrine aimed at placing India in a coercive position to threaten
Pakistan with strikes to seize territory while remaining under the nuclear overhang.
Pakistan is quite transparent that if forced to, in extremis, it can use nuclear weapons,
including Tactical Nuclear Weapons, to defend itself. However paradoxically India
and others who hold that Pakistan should publish a nuclear doctrine, criticize this
unambiguous Pakistan assertion , implying that it is ‘unfair’ to limit India’s otherwise
available options accruing from its conventional superiority.
Hence when our friends are interested in discussing themes such as restraint with us,
they should think of what would make sense to us. Even in this area their definition of
restraint seems driven by the objective that we should slow down production of our
nuclear weapons. They conveniently ignore the responsibility of their own countries to
exercise restraint in supplying India with conventional, non-conventional and strategic
weapons and technology. They have also showed no restraint in accommodating our
neighbour into multilateral export control regimes, while denying us such
participation. They do not object to Russia supplying nuclear submarines to India
which can carry nuclear cruise missiles and critical technical assistance to India’s
nuclear submarine programme as acknowledged by the Indian Prime Minister.
It is curious to note that the major Western powers advocate bilateralism with India on
the Kashmir dispute in order to create a comfort zone in which they do not annoy
India. On the other hand when Pakistan insists on a bilateral approach on strategic
issues in South Asia our Western friends follow the Indian position and bring in
concern over China to excuse India from conventional or strategic restraint. This is
despite the fact that the major part of India’s military assets are deployed against
Pakistan
In terms of the unilateral strategic restraint advocated for Pakistan, one can see what is
in it for India and for its Western and Russian friends, but the question is what is in it
for Pakistan. The 180 million people of this country cannot afford that the country
falters or falls under external threat. The existence of a strong nuclear capable Pakistan
is also considered a source of strength, like the concept in naval strategy of a “fleet in
being”, by Muslim countries and their people, the Muslims of India and also by the
Muslim Diaspora worldwide at a time when Islam, and its adherents in Muslim
countries and elsewhere, are perceived to be under threat.
13
Pakistan’s proposals in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s in the nuclear and missile areas
affirm the restraint DNA of Pakistan. The irony is that our friends advocate restraint
only when they see Pakistan responding to a strategic environment facilitated and
supported by them. They need to develop strategic clarity and realism as well.
To conclude with the way forward; much depends on India reciprocating Pakistan’s
objective and proposals for strategic restraint and much also depends on the
international community supporting this objective in an even handed manner.
Ambassador Tariq Osman Hyder led Pakistan’s delegations in Nuclear and
Conventional CBM’s talks with India between 2004-2007. This paper was
presented by him, at the joint CISS-IISS Workshop on Defence, Deterrence
and Nuclear Weapons in Islamabad on 7th March, 2013.
14
15
NFU: Impact on Proliferation and Nuclear Stability
Farzana Siddique
Introduction
Advent of nuclear weapons have irrevocably changed warfare. These weapons of mass
destruction have also deeply impacted threat perception of states forcing reorientation
of their security doctrines. A number of states have developed nuclear weapons since
they were first used in 1945. Rationale generally offered for acquisition of nuclear
weapons by states is that they provide security, particularly, if the opponent is also
equipped with the same kind of weapons.
Because of lethality of their effect and universal opposition to their use, the task for a
state to rationalize the use of nuclear weapons at doctrinal level is a complex one. The
stated purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter possible aggression. To meet this
challenge a nuclear weapon state has to build a narrative that addresses security needs
of that state besides projecting its intention of being a responsible member of the
international community. The existing international order demands of states that their
nuclear policy supports non-proliferation and disarmament and arms control goals.
A number of measures have been taken at multilateral level and also unilaterally by
certain states to stop nuclear proliferation, exercise arms control and to achieve
disarmament. But the graph of both horizontal and vertical proliferation is rising
continuously. At collective level NPT which is the only legally binding international
framework on nuclear non-proliferation has failed to achieve its stated objectives.
Options like No First Use (NFU), minimizing strategic stockpiles, redefining strategic
force structure are available to states but their implementation poses complications due
to states’ commitments to their nuclear policies.
Globally the term ‘Outlawing’1 is used for nuclear weapons which denies their use
under all circumstances, be it a preventive war, a preemptive strike or a retaliatory
action. This is a universal pledge to eliminate use of such weapons in future.2 NPT
George Perkovich and James M. Acton, “Outlaw Use of Nuclear Weapons,” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, April 21, 2010. Available at, http://carnegieendowment.org/2010/04/21/outlawuse-of-nuclear-weapons/1mvy
2
In contemporary strategic thinking a preemptive strike usually means a strike at an opponent ready for
and obviously intending to attack. Preventive strike is designed to prevent an opponent from some
undesirable action, aside from a direct aggression. Retaliation is usually interpreted as a second or
responsive strike after an opponent’s first strike.
1
16
article VI mentions nuclear disarmament, which is relevant to outlawing of nuclear
weapons, but NPT, does not place a legal ban on their use. At the same time NPT
supports the notion of nuclear deterrence which creates space for states for possession
of nuclear weapons. Prima facie the universal NFU pledge can be a viable option to
minimize the chances of nuclear weapon use, but the relation between NFU concept
and international arrangements for elimination of nuclear weapons has not received
sufficient attention from scholars. This article will study NFU and explore its impact
on disarmament and arms control.
Why states go nuclear?
An ultimate determinant of a state’s security arrangements is the threat which it
perceives from its adversaries. Regional security arrangements and global security
trends are also reflected in states’ security policies and doctrines. It is commonly
believed that states seek to develop nuclear weapons when they face a military threat
to their security that cannot be met through alternative means. But this may not be
true in all cases.
Considerable scholarship exists which indicates that security is not the only reason for
the acquisition of nuclear weapons by states. There are a number of other reasons
which determine states’ decision to go nuclear. In Scott D. Sagan’s perspective there
are three models for understanding nuclear motivations of states; security, prestige and
domestic politics.3 We can also add security dilemma and world political order in this
list. Another aspect of states’ motivation to acquire nuclear weapons is given by
William Potter, where he sees deterrence, warfare advantage, weapons of last resort,
bureaucratic and domestic politics, technological momentum, weakening of security
guarantee, as the objectives of states for seeking nuclear weapon status. These factors
also impact on the formulation of states’ nuclear doctrines and policies. 4
What is a Nuclear Doctrine?
Nuclear doctrines reflect strategic force posture of a state at declaratory policy level.
Doctrines in general refer to a set of principles that a country employs to conduct its
security strategy in pursuit of its national objectives. The nuclear doctrine spells the
Scott D. Sagan, “The Origins of Military Doctrine and Command and Control Systems,” quoted in Dr.
Rifaat Hussain, “Nuclear Doctrines in South Asia,” SASSU Report No. 4, 2005. Available at,
kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/99918/.../RR+No+04.pdf
4
Adil Sultan, “Pakistan’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Impact of Drivers and Technology on Nuclear
Doctrine,” Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI). Available at
http://www.issi.org.pk/publication-files/1340000409_86108059.pdf
3
17
following in a state’s policy guidelines for military and political decision and policy
makers;




Rationale of states nuclear program
Objectives of states security policies
Nuclear capability and credibility
Nuclear employment, deployment and infrastructure mechanism
According to Scott D. Sagan there are three different approaches that help in
understanding the rationale of nuclear doctrine of states.5 First is interest of a state’s
organizational and security establishments. According to organizational theory
strategic doctrines reflect objectives of the military. Therefore to protect their own
interests, prestige and autonomy militaries prefer offensive strategies, preventive wars,
and decisive military options in their doctrines.
Second approach is the nature of international order which is chaotic according to the
realist perspective. States are sensitive to the security environment in which they exist.
In order to maintain their sovereign identity states cheat, lie, and use force against their
adversaries. National security being the principal aim of the state these objectives are
reflected in its policies and strategic doctrines.6
Third is a state’s strategic culture. According to this perspective states’ strategic and
security policies are driven by their historical experiences, and religious and cultural
norms. Their strategic culture leads to a security dilemma which is also reflected in
their nuclear policies. One may infer from this argument that the doctrinal arrangement
of the state, in terms of security and formation of its doctrinal beliefs, reflects
organizational structure of the military and its approach towards the security
challenges arising from the anarchic nature of international order.7
Although many factors are responsible for a state becoming a nuclear weapon state as
discussed earlier, security and prestige are dominant among them, which are also
reflected in their nuclear doctrines, and force postures. The USA was the first country
to acquire nuclear weapons. Not faced with any external security threat US still
maintains one of the largest nuclear weapons arsenals as a symbol of power and
prestige.
Scott D. Sagan, “The Origins of Military Doctrine and Command and Control Systems,” quoted in Dr.
Rifaat Hussain, “Nuclear Doctrines in South Asia,” SASSU Report No. 4, 2005. Available at,
kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/99918/.../RR+No+04.pdf
6
Ibid
7
Ibid
5
18
During the Cold War, a major challenge for US and NATO was to provide extended
“nuclear umbrella” for protecting their allies against possible Soviet aggression.
NATO then mainly relied on nuclear weapons to compensate for conventional force
inadequacies. Soviet Union with an edge in conventional weapons over US also
developed nuclear weapons to achieve balance of power.
Similarly Britain and France who were threatened by erstwhile Soviet Union during
the Cold War are no longer threatened by any power. Both these countries now
maintain their nuclear arsenals for prestige. Same is the case with India in South Asia.
It is believed by many analysts that India’s great power ambition rather than security
imperatives drives its nuclear weapons program.
There are two options for a state to declare the use of its nuclear weapons in certain
circumstances. Most states have first use policy. Only India and China have adopted
policy of No First Use. First use policy is a weapon of a weaker state with weak
conventional force whereas NFU is a tool of a militarily strong state possessing a
second strike capability.
Evolution of Different Nuclear Weapon States Doctrines
Declaratory policy of a state reflects war planning, procurement procedures, and
operational use of its forces. The main objective of declaratory nuclear policy of a
state is deterrence stability.8 Nuclear weapons also have psychological impact on a
state’s enemies therefore declaratory policy of a state reflects its intentions and
capabilities of nuclear weapon use during crisis. It also helps to shape the intellectual
atmosphere in which nuclear weapons policy is formulated.
As the history of nuclear weapons originates from US and the Soviet Union’s
acquisition of nuclear weapon, same is true of the policies of nuclear use. As noted
earlier during the time of Cold War United States retained its policy of nuclear first
use because of its weak conventional weapon force against the Soviet Union. At the
end of Cold War US was no longer facing a threat from conventional force imbalance,
its policy makers, however, found it necessary to assign a role to nuclear weapons in
its declared policy.
Malcolm Chalmers, “Nuclear Narratives Reflections on Declaratory Policy,” Royal United Services
Institute (RUSI), White Hall Report 1-10, 2010. Available at,
http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/WHR_Nuclear_Narratives.pdf
8
19
End of Cold War brought changes in international order. A direct consequence of this
change was a softer stance and policies pursued, by the United States. The US had
modified its nuclear policies while keeping intact its security assurance to its allies.
Allies of US had wanted guarantees of their security against the use of nuclear
weapons. The matter was therefore pursued in UN outside the NPT but in close
conjunction with it.9
US reviewed its nuclear posture in Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) of 2010. According
to the US NPR US policy of non-use will continue. It also mentioned that US could
use nuclear weapons in certain circumstances. The policy thus effectively maintains
ambiguity on NFU pledge; “US will continue to strengthen conventional capabilities
and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks. It would only
consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend its vital
interests or of its allies. And maintain its pledge of negative security assurance to non
nuclear weapons states in certain conditions.”10 According to NPR 2010, US declared
that;11

The United States will continue to strengthen conventional capabilities and
reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks, with the
objective of making deterrence of nuclear attack on the United States or our
allies and partners the sole purpose of US. nuclear weapons.

The US would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme
circumstances to defend the vital interests of the US or its allies/partners.

The US will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear
weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear
non-proliferation obligations.
In 1982, the Soviet Union undertook a unilateral pledge not to resort to first use of
nuclear weapons but it did not last long. Disintegration of Soviet Union at the end of
Cold War forced Russia to review its policy and made changes in Russian pledge of
NFU. Russia changed its NFU policy maintaining an option to use nuclear weapons
Jean du Preez , “Security Assurances Against the Use or Threat of Use of
Nuclear Weapons: Is Progress Possible at the NPT PREPCOM?” Center for Non-proliferation Studies,
Monterey, Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA, April 28, 2003 Available at,
http://cns.miis.edu/treaty_npt/pdfs/security_assurances.pdf
10
US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) 2010. Reproduced from original
11
Ibid
9
20
against a nuclear aggressor, including non-nuclear states that are allied with nuclear
weapon states. According to Russian Military Doctrine of 2010;
Russia reserves the right to utilize nuclear weapons in response to the utilization of
nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies,
and also in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation involving the use of
conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is under threat.12
France has non-use policy according to which France considers its nuclear weapons as
weapons of last resort. Nuclear weapons, however, form an essential part of its
security policy. France’s non-use policy does not mean No First Use. It shows
confidence in the reliability of its nuclear deterrence posture and rejection of a nuclear
war fighting strategy. Like other states France also gives negative security assurance to
non nuclear weapon states signatory to NPT. According to French nuclear policy:
France’s nuclear deterrence protects it from any aggression against its vital interests
emanating from a state-wherever it may come from and whatever form it may take.
France’s vital interests, of course, include the element that constitutes its identity and
its existence as a nation-state, as well as the free exercise of its sovereignty. 13
Britain has aligned its nuclear policy with US and NATO allies. According to British
2010 Strategic Defense and Security Review;
The UK will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon
states parties to the NPT. In giving this assurance, we emphasize the need for universal
adherence to and compliance with the NPT, and note that this assurance would not
apply to any state in material breach of those non-proliferation obligations’. 14
On nuclear use against chemical and biological attack British policy stance differs
from the US.
12
Russian Military Doctrine: White Paper 2010. Available at,
http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/Russia2010_English.pdf
13
Speech by Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the French Republic: Presentation of le terrible submarine in
Cherbourg, on March 21, 2008. Available at,
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf/Speech_by_Nicolas_Sarkozy__presentation_of_Le_Terrible
_submarine.
14
Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) 2010. Available at,
http:/www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg
_191634.pdf
21
It is mentioned in SDSR that, “while there is currently no direct threat to the UK or its
vital interests from states developing capabilities in other weapons of mass
destruction, for example chemical and biological, and it reserves the right to
reassurance if the future threat, development and proliferation of these weapons make
it necessary'. The UK’s nuclear deterrent supports collective security through NATO
for the Euro-Atlantic area; nuclear deterrence plays an important part in NATO’s
overall strategy and the UK’s nuclear forces make a substantial contribution’.15
China maintains a policy of NFU. China is the only country which has not changed its
stance over unconditional NFU pledge.
According to Indian Draft Nuclear Doctrine of 1999 India has conditional NFU policy.
“The fundamental purpose of its nuclear weapons is to deter the use and threat of use
of nuclear weapons by any state or entity against India and its forces, but will respond
with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail”. 16 It has also maintained negative
security assurance to non-nuclear weapon states.17
Contrary to India, Pakistan has adopted no NFU nuclear policy against Indian
aggression due to its weaker military strength which cannot counter India’s
conventional force superiority during an aggression. Pakistan’s case of first use
declaratory policy is in line with other states like Russia, and NATO which also have
weak conventional war fighting capabilities in comparison to their potential
adversaries. Pakistan like other nuclear states has also maintained negative security
assurance pledge.
NATO is the only example of security alliance in the world. NATO’s security policy is
a reflection of importance given by its member states to nuclear weapons in their
security calculus. NATO’s security policy is mainly focused on Euro-Atlantic security
pledge. It is agreed by all NATO states that as long as there are nuclear weapons in the
world, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. NATO still maintains its nuclear posture
of extended deterrence, adopted during the Cold War. Its member states believe that
NFU is incompatible with the commitments which were made to provide the security
to its allies.
According to NATO 2010 Summit in Chicago,” the circumstances in which any use of
nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely rare.” NATO also “is
15
Ibid
Indian Draft Nuclear Doctrine, 17 August, 1999. Available at, Arms Control Association,
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999_07-08/ffja99
17
Ibid
16
22
resolved to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without
nuclear weapons.18
This declaration by NATO contradicts its member states’ declaratory polices. With
this contradiction and gap between the two stances, NATO’s desires regarding
disarmament and non-proliferation initiatives, outlined in the policy review of 2010
cannot get a practical shape.
The case of Israel is different from all other nuclear weapon states. Israel does not
declare its nuclear weapons as part of its official deterrence policy at doctrinal level,19
but its nuclear use policy is based on imminent existential threats posed by
neighboring states. North Korea also has NFU but its position and postures do not
support its declaratory nuclear use policy.
No First Use Policy
There are two types of NFU policies. A nuclear state declares NFU unconditionally
against all states, whether they are nuclear or nonnuclear weapon states. Second is the
NFU assurance to non-nuclear weapon states signatory to NPT, which is
internationally recognized as Negative Security Assurance (NSA). Seemingly main
objective of NFU is to minimize the role of nuclear weapons in states’ security
policies which might lead towards disarmament initiatives in addition to placing these
countries on a high moral ground. This view however, glosses over the fact that no
country would sacrifice its core security interests for moral reasons. 20
UN recognizes the possibility of nuclear threat to states. UN resolution 225 21 (1968)
stipulates that the “Security Council would have to act immediately to provide
18
Official text Issued by the Heads of state and Government participating in the meeting of the NATO
in Lisbon, 2010. Available at, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm. Also see
NATO 25th Summit Meeting Chicago 20-21 May 2012. Available at,
http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120905_SummitGuideChicago2012eng.pdf
19
George Perkovich, “Reducing the Role of Nuclear Weapons: What the NDPI can do,” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, November 27, 2012. Available at,
http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/11/26/diminishing-role-of-nuclear-weapons-non-proliferation-anddisarmament-initiative-s-good-beginning/emyn#
20
Ken Berry, “Draft Treaty on Non-First Use of Nuclear Weapons Ken Berry,” International
Commission on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament( ICNND), June 2009, Available at,
http://icnnd.org/Documents/Berry_No_First_Use_Treaty.pdf
21
Quoted in Jean du Preez , “Security Assurances Against the Use or Threat of Use of
23
assistance, in accordance with its obligations under the United Nations Charter, to a
state victim of an act of nuclear weapons aggression or object of a threat of such
aggression.” This positive security assurance was welcomed by all states but states
also demanded negative security (NSA) to ensure legally binding commitment by the
nuclear weapon states (NWS) not to use their arsenals against non-nuclear weapon
states (NNWS).22
The first legally-binding NSA was contained in the Treaty of Tlatelolco (1969), which
made Latin America and the Caribbean a nuclear weapon free zone.23 In 1995 during
the NPT negotiations NNWS were given NSAs as a reassurance to show that their
decision to give up nuclear options would not expose them to nuclear coercion. 24 In
connection with the NPT, nuclear weapon states provided assurances on non-use of
nuclear weapons to NNWS. Such assurances are usually referred to as “negative
security commitments” (I will not attack you) as opposed to “positive security
commitments” (I will defend or help you if you are attacked). 25
The NPT Review and Extension Conference decided the same year that further steps
were necessary to assure NNWS against nuclear threat. The idea of signing a
convention legally fixing full-scale commitments of NWS to non-nuclear NPT states
was supported in 1995 by Russia and Britain, but was not endorsed by other NWS
who claimed that such a commitment would contradict the doctrine of nuclear
deterrence. The 2000 NPT Review Conference stated that legally binding assurances
were needed.26
To date there are only two countries, China and India having declared NFU pledge,
but their commitment is not recognized by other nuclear weapon states. Apart from
China, the negative security assurances given by the other nuclear weapon states
(NWS) under the NPT to non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) are also left less reliable
due to their conditional commitments and ambiguous nuclear use doctrines.
Nuclear Weapons: Is Progress Possible at the NPT PREPCOM?” Center for Non-proliferation Studies,
Monterey, Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA, April 28, 2003 Available at,
http://cns.miis.edu/treaty_npt/pdfs/security_assurances.pdf
22
Ibid
23
White paper of Treaty of Tlatelolco, Available at
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Resources/Treaties/Tlatelolco.pdf
24
Malcolm Chalmers, “Nuclear Narratives Reflections on Declaratory Policy,” Royal United Services
Institute (RUSI), White Hall Report 1-10, 2010. Available at,
http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/WHR_Nuclear_Narratives.pdf
25
Alexie Arbatov, “Non-First Use as a Way of Outlawing Nuclear Weapons,” International Commission on
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND), November 2008. Available at,
icnnd.org/Documents/Arbatov_NFU_Paper.doc
26
Ibid
24
NFU and Nuclear Proliferation
In the doctrines of all nuclear weapon states the main purpose of nuclear weapons is to
deter threat of adversary’s use of nuclear weapons. NFU is one of the options available
to states to base their doctrine on. NFU commitment means that the country
undertaking such commitment will plan not to use nuclear weapons first, but other
countries will never be quite sure that their potential adversary will not use nuclear
weapons. So, nuclear use remains an existential deterrent regardless of a country’s
declaratory policy.
Most countries of the world adhere to nuclear first use policy. China and India are the
only exceptions as stated before. But China’s NFU pledge is not recognized
internationally. It is percieved that in a crisis China will not refrain from first use of
nuclear weapons. India has in fact premised its nuclear program by declaring China’s
NFU as non-credible. Similarly Pakistan does not recognize India’s NFU pledges.
There are two types of proliferation horizontal and vertical. Horizontal proliferation
refers to proliferation to other states while vertical proliferation refers to increase in
the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapon states. It includes researching and
developing new types of nuclear weapons, materials and means of delivery systems.
NPT only focuses on horizontal proliferation and ignores impact of vertical
proliferation on non-proliferation and disarmament process. Proliferation has taken
place both horizontally and vertically even after NPT came into force. India, Pakistan
Israel and North Korea which did not possess nuclear weapon before 1968 when NPT
was opened for signature are now nuclear weapon states. As noted above P5 countries
have proliferated vertically and improved the design of the weapons and delivery
systems during the last four decades or more.
NFU works both ways; it might prove helpful in non-proliferation efforts or vice
versa. It is often considered a first step towards a comprehensive ban and complete
elimination of nuclear weapons. To some extent it can prove helpful in stabilizing
relationship between two states but believing it to lead to complete disarmament seems
to be a distant dream for now. Some states however, believe that NFU is a ruse to
infuse complacency in the adversary and therefore doubt its credibility. They think that
no guarantees can be placed about a provocation by an adversary that remains below
the threshold of a nuclear response. That is the reason, why in the real world states
neither compromise nor sacrifice their security.
25
Conclusion
No nuclear weapons state would commit itself to non-use of nuclear weapon at least as
long as such weapons are possessed by other states. If a state does so it would not be
considered credible by other states. Under the circumstances, the threat of nuclear
retaliation is perceived as the most reliable deterrent against a nuclear attack by
another country. Goals of disarmament and non-proliferation as outlined in NPT seem
unachievable due to existing dichotomy between the commitments which the treaty
calls for and the policies of nuclear weapons states. The salience of nuclear weapons in
military doctrine of NWS requires a comparative analysis to arrive at a better
understanding of the relationship between the imperatives of disarmament and the
determinants of military doctrines. The doctrinal complexity of nuclear weapon states
complicates purposes and objectives of their use and acquisition respectively.
NFU, considered by some scholars as the only practical strategy to minimize if not
completely eliminate the role of nuclear weapon in states’ security policies, is itself
contrary to international law and UN charter27. NFU is at variance with ICJ’s 1996
advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. According
to ICJ opinion states could use nuclear weapon “in extreme circumstances of selfdefense, in which the very survival of a state would be at stake.” 28The Court however
did not explain kind of circumstances which a state may consider extreme before
deciding to use nuclear weapons. The concerned state would therefore decide whether
threat to its security is so extreme that it warrants the use of nuclear weapons. In any
case ICJ’s opinion allows the option of nuclear weapons possession by states.
For these reasons NFU policy appears to be a failure, showing that it would only be
practical if measures are taken at operational level by altering force postures of NWS.
If NFU is to be more than a declaratory policy, then it must be meaningfully reflected
in the war planning and force postures of a nuclear weapons state.
Farzana Siddique is a
CISS Research Associate
UN Charter Article 51, “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures
taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council
under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or
restore international peace and security.
28
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of ICJ, 8 July 1996. Available
at, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/7497.pdf
27
26
Evolution of Thinking on FMCT
Huma Rehman
Introduction
Efforts for control of proliferation of nuclear weapons began soon after they were used
in 1945. Much progress in this regard, however, could not be made due to states’
security imperatives. For the same reason progress on FMCT has also not been made,
but FMCT drafts give us an insight on the rationale behind the proposals suggested by
the states and organizations.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) prohibits non-nuclear
weapon states parties to the treaty, from developing nuclear weapons. The treaty,
however, exempts five ‘de-jure’ nuclear weapon states (NWS); France, China,
Russian, United Kingdom, and United States from this ban. These five states had
tested nuclear weapons before the treaty was negotiated in 1968. Three other nuclear
armed states India, Israel, and Pakistan have not joined the NPT, but are commonly
considered as ‘defacto1’ nuclear weapon states. In addition, North Korea recently
declared itself a nuclear weapon state by exploding three nuclear devices. NWS are
considered to have legitimate right to possess nuclear weapons as per NPT provisions.
Defacto nuclear weapon states’ right of possession of nuclear weapons, however, is
not yet recognized under NPT provisions or any other multilateral regime.
Background
Fissile material cutoff treaty was initially conceived and discussed in 1946 in the
Acheson-Lilienthal Report on the international control of atomic energy and the
Baruch Plan. The report included the reasons for the international control of atomic
energy, and provided for a system of inspections. The report has three sections based
on the commitment of states to international control, principal considerations in
developing a system of safeguards, and international cooperative development. It
includes preliminary ideas on safeguards. The report proposed that all fissile material
should be owned by an international body to be called the Atomic Development
1
Defacto nuclear weapon states (states that have acquired nuclear weapons after the NPT opened for
signature in 1968). Available at: http://www.slmk.org/larom/wordpress/en/fast-facts/.
27
Authority, which would release small amounts to individual nations for the
development of peaceful uses of atomic energy. The report emphasizes that the
complete path from the uranium and thorium mines to post production stage be placed
under international ownership. An internationally administrated authority will have the
right to dispense licenses to countries wishing to pursue peaceful nuclear research. 2
The rationale was to minimize international rivalry and ensure that states’ refrain from
dangerous nuclear activities.
In line with this report, another plan the Baruch Plan was proposed in 1946. Some
salient points of the Baruch Plan3 are scientific cooperation for peaceful ends; to
implement a mechanism for control of nuclear power; to promote disarmament; and to
establish effective safeguards inspection and other means to protect complying states
against the hazards of violations and evasions. The plan also borrowed heavily on the
Acheson-Lilienthal report.
However, Baruch Plan has some additional points from Acheson- Lilienthal report,
notably in asserting that “there must be no veto” to protect those who violate the
controls. It argued that there must be “immediate and sure punishment” for violations.
It also created ambiguity on whether the Atomic Development Authority should
actually own all uranium and thorium mines in the world explicitly on various “stages”
or merely exercise control over them.4 It was also not clear whether United States
would give up its bombs after the plan came into force. To support plan
implementation, US proposed creation of International Atomic Development
Authority which was also proposed earlier in Acheson-Lilienthal report. To this
authority all phases of the development and use of atomic energy would be entrusted,
starting with the raw material and including: either managerial control or ownership of
all atomic-energy activities potentially dangerous to world security, including power to
control, inspect, and license all other atomic activities. But support for establishment
of the authority from states could not be obtained because it was inconsistent with the
then-prevailing political realities. The disarmament efforts faced the challenge of
disagreement since inception of this idea. The Soviets strongly opposed the plan
Randy Rydell, “Looking Back: Going for Baruch: The Nuclear Plan That Refused to Go Away,” Arms
Control Association, June 2006. Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/print/2064. Also See; Official
Document, “The Acheson-Lilienthal & Baruch Plans, 1946,” MILESTONES: 1945-1952. Available at:
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/BaruchPlans.For Details, The Acheson-Lilienthal Report
on the International Control of Atomic Energy March 16, 1946. Available at:
http://www.learnworld.com/ZNW/LWText.Acheson-Lilienthal.html.
3
Official Document, The Baruch Plan (Presented to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission,
June 14, 1946). Available at: http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/BaruchPlan.shtml.
4
Randy Rydell, “Looking Back: Going for Baruch: The Nuclear Plan That Refused to Go Away,” opcit,
p.2.
2
28
because it allowed the US to retain its nuclear monopoly, and international inspections
of Soviet facilities would pose hurdles in its nuclear development.
After the Report and Plan, the 1953 “Atoms for Peace” speech by US President
Dwight Eisenhower was a call before the United Nations for the elimination of fissile
materials. His speech can be seen as a tipping point for international focus on the
peaceful uses of atomic energy and shift of paradigm in the approach of developing
nuclear weapons. President Eisenhower´s initiative ushered in an era of international
co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which in turn, led to the creation
of the IAEA. In contrast with the Baruch Plan, the "Atoms for Peace" proposal
envisioned the spread of nuclear fuel cycle facilities while placing emphasis on policy
commitments regarding peaceful uses and non-proliferation, and a system of
international safeguards to verify compliance.5 The important point to notice is that
idea of eliminating fissile material had gained prominence during the early stages of
the Cold War. US had officially proposed a cutoff in 1956, a suggestion the Soviets
continued to oppose until January 1989, when Mikhail Gorbachev first supported the
idea. President George H.W. Bush then rejected the proposal apprehending that it
would undermine US nuclear deterrent.6 These two documents are the basis and
precedents for further progress in the FMCT drafts and working papers by various
states.
Several states have long been calling for a ban on the production of fissile materials.
The issue has been on the UN’s agenda since 1957 and on the planned agenda of
the Conference on Disarmament (CD) for around 17 years. In 1978, the Final
Document adopted by the UN General Assembly, after its first Special Session on
Disarmament, contained a program of action on disarmament.7 In December 1993, the
UN General Assembly adopted by consensus, resolution 48/75. This resolution
recommended negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral, and internationally
and effectively verifiable treaty for banning the production of fissile material for
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.8 On 25 January 1994, CD
appointed a special coordinator, Ambassador Gerald Shannon of Canada, to get the
5
Available at: http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/fuelcycle/key_events.shtml
Kingston Reif and Madeleine Foley, Fact Sheet on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), Center
for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, February 11, 2013. Available at:
http://armscontrolcenter.org/issues/nuclearweapons/articles/071509_factsheet_fmct/#contact.
7
A Paper, “Proposed Fissile Material (Cut-off) Treaty (FMCT).”Available at:
http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/proposed-fissile-material-cut-off-reaty/.
8
A Paper by United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, “A Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
Understanding the Critical Issues,” New York and Geneva, 2010. Available at:
http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/a-fissile-material-cut-off-treaty-understanding-the-criticalissues-139.pdf.FMCT, Major reading.
6
29
sense of states on the most effective way to negotiate a fissile materials treaty which
met the demand request of the UN General Assembly. The resulting report
1995, (CD/1229), came to be known as the “Shannon Mandate.”It proposed that an
adhoc committee be constituted to pursue negotiations and settle several outstanding
issues, including, whether existing stocks should be made part of the treaty. The
substantive part of the report pertained to “ban on the production of fissile material for
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”9Ultimately, efforts to establish
the committee failed, but many states continue to refer to the Shannon Mandate as the
basis for future negotiations.10 Since then, the initiation and early conclusion of FMCT
negotiations in the CD have been approved by all states, party to the NPT, at
the 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010 NPT Review Conferences.11In this regard, for years
China and Russia persisted to link FMCT to work on the prevention of an arms race in
outer space. In August 2003, China and Russia broke from this position, and agreed to
go forth with FMCT negotiations based on the Shannon Mandate.
The efforts that have taken place in the CD so far consist of informal discussions
regarding the treaty’s purpose; definitions and scope; the production of fissile
materials for non-explosive purposes and the role of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA)12; transparency and stockpiles of fissile materials; compliance and
verification; and other provisions including settlements of disputes, entry into force,
ratifications, depositaries, duration, and conditions for withdrawal. A number of treaty
drafts and working papers 13have been presented. These include 2003 proposal by the
IAEA Safeguard Office, Green Peace International Organization’s 2004 proposal, the
US proposal of 2006 and International Panel on Fissile Material (IPFM) proposal
presented in 2009 and a Hungarian proposal of March 2013.
Attempts Made at Evolving a Consensus on FMCT
First formal draft for the FMCT on the basis of effectual control and exclusion of
fissile materials as an essential step toward nuclear disarmament was presented by
A Paper, “Proposed Fissile Material (Cut-off) Treaty (FMCT).”Available at:
http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/proposed-fissile-material-cut-off-reaty/.
10
A Paper, “Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.” Available at:
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/fact-sheets/critical-issues/4737-fissile-material-cut-offtreaty.
11
Kingston Reif and Madeleine Foley, p.2.
12
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) serves as the world's central intergovernmental
forum for scientific and technical co-operation in the nuclear field. It was set up as the world´s "Atoms
for Peace" organization in 1957 within the United Nations. The Agency works with its Member States
and multiple partners worldwide to promote safe, secure and peaceful nuclear technologies.
13
See Annex I.
9
30
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on 13 November 2003. It was an effort
for getting states’ support to produce an agreed text for a potential treaty after
conducting extensive formal/ informal consultations with key players. The draft
mentioned a number of points to rationalize the agenda of the treaty such as; certainty
of dangers of weapons of mass destruction to humankind, and of the subsequent
efforts made towards elimination of existing nuclear arsenals and prevention of further
proliferation and threats of nuclear terrorism. It promoted the view that controls on
fissile and fissionable materials could limit the development of nuclear weapons and
provide a mechanism for international verification related to nuclear disarmament and
non-proliferation.
The 2003 draft is divided into four main sections and analyzing proposed suggestions
of this draft can be helpful in understanding the evolution in thinking on FMCT in the
ensuring years. Section (A) deals with the operational features of the treaty.

Article I includes the basic undertakings in which each party to the treaty pledges
not to produce, redirect, transfer, import fissile or fissionable material facility,
equipment, and technology suitable for production or use of nuclear weapons.
Article II deals with the cessation of production of Nuclear weapons and
verification and inspection of production facilities and excess military stocks.14
Article III includes peaceful use program’s approval in which each state party to
the treaty provides a description of its nuclear facilities within 90 days of entry into
force. Moreover, within 3 years, a committee of the conference of state parties
shall review each state’s nuclear program. Findings of the committee are open to
non acceptance; states may appeal to the conference of disarmament of the states
parties.

Article IV and V deal with the non explosive military use with the condition of
approval from conference of state parties at least 2 years prior to the
commencement of production, and with the prevention of theft, and unauthorized
use of nuclear material in accordance with the provisions of INFCIRC/22515.
14
Including name, geography, purpose, date of construction and operation for future plans and
excess material released from military use, the condition to declare all existing stocks of fissile
material and fissionable material.
15
Official Document for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities.
Available at:
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1999/infcirc225r4c/rev4_content.html.
31
Section (B) of the treaty includes clauses for verification agreements incorporating
all articles of INFCIRC/153 without change16, together with a protocol additional
to the safeguard articles of INFCIRC/540.17Section (C) includes the cooperative
prospects of the treaty about confidence building measures with article VII of
transparency to report before conducting a nuclear operation within a state’s
territory.

Article VIII and IX include suggestions pertaining to participation in
complementary treaty regimes to extend the scope of the treaty for non
proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NW) and the broader concept of cooperative
threat reduction to resolve collective potential threats to the security of the states.
Thus, also to address nuclear safety and security issues.
The final part of the treaty draft section (D) comprises the administrative clauses of the
treaty which specify implementation mechanism of the treaty.
The main points of 2003 treaty draft followed the basis on which Acheson Report and
Baruch Plan were formulated. The additional thinking is visible in article III about
approval for peaceful use of nuclear program and provision of appeal to the
conference. The important point in this draft is in its section C with respect to
Confidence Building Measures. Article VII of the treaty draft obligates the states to
take transparency measures before conducting any nuclear operation. Other points in
article VIII and XI also give broad concepts of the regime and cooperative threat
reduction measures, which is an important addition in the draft proposal.
Further understanding of FMCT treaty draft is facilitated by reading the working
papers on it presented by Japan, Canada and South Africa. In 2003 Japan presented a
working paper18 on FMCT. The priority in this working paper is on multilateral
nuclear disarmament, and nuclear nonproliferation. Japan considers these two
disarmament and arms control measures crucial to world peace due to the growing
menace of nuclear proliferation and threats of nuclear terrorism by non state actors.
16
Official Document for the Structure And Content Of Agreements Between The Agency And States
Required In Connection With The Treaty On The Non-Proliferation Of Nuclear Weapons. Available at:
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc153.pdf.
17
Official Document for Model Protocol Additional To The Agreement(S) Between State(S) and The
International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards. Available at:
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1997/infcirc540c.pdf.
18
The Points are reproduced from working paper by Japan, on a Treaty to Ban the Production of Fissile
Material for Nuclear Weapons and Other Nuclear Explosive Devices, (CD/ 1714). 19 August 2003.
Available at: http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G03/640/23/PDF/G0364023.pdf?OpenElement.
32
The aim of the working paper is primarily to structure discourse on FMCT by placing
various issues in different categories. The purpose was to make FMCT a more
efficient and effective framework by enhancing transparency and promoting reduction
of existing stocks of fissile materials for nuclear weapons use. On the issue of existing
stocks various suggestions were introduced in the paper, like total inclusion of existing
stocks, as well as legally binding provisions to eliminate them. Japan emphasized that
fissile material for “…peaceful purposes should not be included in the scope of
prohibition under FMCT. In their view, only safeguarded activities for peaceful uses
of nuclear energy should be allowed as they pose no harm to the purpose of nuclear
non proliferation and disarmament.”19 Nuclear materials that are subject to IAEA
safeguards comprise two mutually exclusive categories: special fissionable materials20
and source materials21. For verification system, Japan sought clarification of
“comprehensive” and “focused” approaches which have been extensively discussed
but remained ambiguous. Comprehensive approach covers all nuclear fuel cycle
facilities and all types of nuclear materials. The focused approach includes the
enrichment, reprocessing facilities and fissile materials in downstream facilities. It
may also include R & D laboratories. The important consideration for adopting any of
the approaches is to address security confidentiality, effectiveness of verification and
cost efficiency. The working paper by Japan is important due to its innovative
approach on FMCT. Canadian working paper
presented in 1999, proposed “a
22
separate but parallel process” for existing stocks. The suggested approach by Canada
comprises four main categories; increasing transparency; declaration, placing of excess
fissile material under verification and disposition. This working paper has a few points
which were also included in Japan’s working paper with additional emphasis on
transparency.
Another viewpoint regarding FMCT draft proposal, in the form of a working paper23
was presented by South Africa in 2002. It is of much relevance for the progression on
FMCT. Clauses in this working paper stressed on the option “to ensure irreversibility
of ban on further production of nuclear material and shifting from military explosive to
19
Ibid.
Uranium and Plutonium.
21
Tritium and Thorium.
22
Official Document, “Working Paper by Canada Elements of an Approach to Dealing with Stocks of
Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices, (CD/1578),” 18 March,
1999. Available at: http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G99/609/09/PDF/G9960909.pdf?OpenElement.
23
Official Document working paper by South Africa, “The Possible Scope and Requirements of the
Fissile Material Treaty (FMT),” (CD/1671) 28, May, 2013. Available at, http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G02/616/62/IMG/G0261662.pdf?OpenElement.
20
33
peaceful use.”24The point of irreversibility is an important constraint proposed in the
South African working paper.
All three working papers are important to assess the development in thinking and
sorting out viable and appropriate solutions on the issues pertaining to FMCT. Major
thrust of all proposals on FMCT is on banning production of plutonium and highlyenriched uranium. But only Japanese working paper emphasized on the inclusion of
other elements such as tritium, depleted uranium, neptunium, natural uranium,
plutonium 240 and 242, americium, curium and californium in the treaty. These
elements are not fissile, but are used in nuclear weapons programs.
Another draft for FMCT was formally presented by Greenpeace Organization in
200425. It offers a model treaty as the basis for discussion to address the questions
critical to the feasibility and functioning of a Comprehensive Fissile Material Treaty.
Article I of the Green Peace proposal presents rationale and scope, and gives
definitions of fissile material.

Article II, includes the detailed submission of all existing stocks of weapon usable
fissile material transit through its territory.

In article III each party is directed to shut down all production, submission of
existing storage list and allowing access to all facilities for verification, in
accordance with article IV, within 60 days after entry into force.

In article V, the draft proposed the concept of establishment of a permanent
organization to achieve the objective and purpose of the treaty, to ensure the
implementation of its provisions, including those for international verification of
compliance and to provide a forum for consultation and cooperation.

From article V to VIII administrative clauses mention financial cooperation for
the national implementing measures, to enact penal legislation with respect to all
activities prohibited by this treaty which were also mentioned in the Baruch plan.
24
Ibid
Greenpeace is a non-governmental environmental organization active in over forty countries and
with an international coordinating body in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Greenpeace states its goal is to
"ensure the ability of the Earth to nurture life in all its diversity" and focuses its campaigning on
worldwide issues such as global warming, deforestation, overfishing, commercial whaling, genetic
engineering, and anti-nuclear issues.
25
34

In Article IX the point of settlement of disputes is an additional factor in
comparison to other drafts.
In comparison to the IAEA 2003 draft, Green Peace proposed one governing body
with authority to deal with all matters related to fissile material as mentioned in article
III, which was not agreed to by many states.
The United States, on its part, did not even announce its position on FMCT publicly
until July 2004. George W. Bush administration tabled a draft treaty on 18 May 2006,
which many argue is far removed from the original concept of a non-discriminatory,
verifiable treaty. The draft did not include any verification provisions, banned new
production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for use in nuclear weapons for
15 years, and the treaty provided entry into force with only five established nuclear
weapon states. This draft proposed an alternative to the draft treaty, which was limited
in scope and verification, and was submitted by the Bush Administration to CD the on
May, 2006. Majority of the member states of the CD pointed out lack of verification
mechanism, and issue regarding existing stocks as major omissions and for these
reasons considered American draft highly unsatisfactory.
On April 5, 2009, U.S. President Barrack Obama reversed the U.S. position on
verification and proposed to negotiate "a new treaty that verifiably ends the production
of fissile materials intended for use in nuclear weapons.”26
A draft by International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) was also presented in
2009.27 The IPFM draft stated serious reasons for verification. It argued that agreed
verification measures are essential for creating confidence and trust in an FMCT. For
the Non Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) the draft emphasized that parties to the NPT
had already accepted comprehensive safeguards, implemented by IAEA, in regard to
their civilian nuclear programs which were required not to divert nuclear materials for
weapons use. The justification for the verification addresses many of these states’
concerns because the nuclear-weapon states are not required to have similar safeguards
on their civilian nuclear activities, and the NPT places NNWS at a major disadvantage
in the development of civilian nuclear power. In reference to the NPT, the draft treaty
26
Kingston Reif and Madeleine Foley, Fact Sheet on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), Center
for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, February 11, 2013. Available at:
http://armscontrolcenter.org/issues/nuclearweapons/articles/071509_factsheet_fmct/.
27
The Points are reproduced from official document (CD/ 1878), “Draft for Discussion Prepared by the
International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM),” 5 February 2009. Available at:
http://fissilematerials.org/library/fmct-ipfm_feb2009draft.pdf.
35
calls upon the IAEA to implement the needed verification arrangements, but these
arrangements are not spelled out in the treaty itself.
The IPFM draft emphasized a method that would not immediately require the
elimination of existing stocks, but would instead require greater transparency, a need
to declare and a report on progress made by each state party to reduce such
stockpiles.28 This requirement for nuclear weapon states could enable an obvious
understanding of their competitors’ stocks and signify progress on the disarmament
agenda. Yet nuclear weapon states have so far been uncomfortable with such a level of
transparency. An additional idea incorporated in this draft is the requirement to
separate military materials from civilian nuclear sectors before the treaty comes into
force, and future use of fuel for naval propulsions and other military programs.29
Conclusion
All the drafts and working papers for the FMCT clearly promote the agenda of nuclear
disarmament and the idea of nuclear free world. The points of transparency, idea of
governing nuclear related activities through a central organization, full utilization of
IAEA facilities, and issues of excessive and already existing stockpiles in different
drafts indicate states’ evolving thinking on the FMCT.
The world nuclear order vis-à-vis nuclear disarmament is at a crossroads, due to
reservations and concerns of the nuclear and non nuclear weapon states. Many states,
including the United States, United Kingdom, and Japan, support a treaty which limits
only future production of fissile materials. Other states, such as those belonging to the
Non-Aligned Movement believe that the treaty should also address fissile materials
already produced and stockpiled. 30 Non-Nuclear Weapon States generally view
FMCT as a step toward elimination of nuclear weapons.
China has conditioned its support for a FMCT to the US and other parties’ cooperation
on a treaty for the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) and believes
that a FMCT should not restrict itself to weapons use of existing fissile material.
Russia officially supports a verifiable ban on the production of fissile material for
BASIC project on, “Unjamming the FM(C)T,” British American Security Information Council
(BASIC),
March 2013. Available at: http://www.basicint.org/sites/default/files/fmct-overview-2013march29.pdf.
29
Ibid. Official Document (CD/ 1878), “Draft for Discussion Prepared by the International Panel On
Fissile Materials (IPFM),” 5 February 2009. Available at: http://fissilematerials.org/library/fmctipfm_feb2009draft.pdf.
30
The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) is a group of states which are not aligned formally with or
against any major power bloc. As of 2012, the movement has 120 members and 17 observer countries.
28
36
weapons purposes to which every state with enrichment programs and the capability to
produce a nuclear weapon is a signatory. This includes India, Israel, North Korea, and
Pakistan.
Others include Israel which strongly opposes a FMCT because it believes that the
FMCT is a challenge to its strategic posture and an inadequate security measure
against Iranian nuclear program. Indian views about FMCT reflect that they would
adhere to the FMCT provided it is universal, non discriminatory and applicable to all
states and backed by verifiable mechanisms. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stated
that “India is willing to join only a non discriminatory multilaterally negotiated and
internationally verifiable FMCT as and when it is concluded in the conference on
disarmament, provided our security interests are fully addressed.” It is evident that
India is not willing to allow any limited approach towards arms control. It also
emphasized upon global elimination of weapons during CTBT and FMCT
negotiations.31In 2008, Pakistan issued a letter to the President of the CD outlining its
position on FMCT. Apprehensive that India possesses a larger stockpile of fissile
material, it wants a verifiable treaty that addresses past, present, and future production
of fissile material.
It is obvious from various drafts and working papers that the nuclear and non nuclear
states have divergent stances on FMCT thinking. The most critical states also have
reservations vis-à-vis suggested options in the drafts. Hence, consideration of and
thinking on FMCT is still in the process of evolution. It may take some time for states
to arrive at a consensus on the subject.
Huma Rehman is a
CISS Research Associate
Excerpts from Prime Minister's Reply to Discussion in Rajah Sabha on “Civil Nuclear Energy
Cooperation with the United State," the Hindu Online Edition, August 17, 2006. Available at,
http://www.hindu.com/nic/indoUSdeal.htm.
31
37
UN Arms Trade Treaty: An Analysis
Afsah Qazi
Introduction
On April 2nd this year, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) passed the
Arms Trade Treaty with a majority vote that has been described as a landmark
achievement by many analysts. The issue was brought into the limelight by wide scale
violations of basic human rights witnessed during a series of crises in different parts of
the world.1 The efforts towards this end started in early 1990s with Amnesty
International’s advancement of the cause. With a maturation process still to follow, the
treaty must be recognized as a step towards strengthening international as well as
human security. It directly links the trade among parties in conventional arms to the
state of human rights.
Awareness about the issue gradually increased due to the support of Nobel Laureates,
NGOs and many others, leading to the establishment of a Code of Conduct on Arms
Exports by European Union in 1998, which was revised in 2000. 2 Things kept
evolving until the debate gained vigor after re-entering UN in 2006. A UNGA
resolution supporting the treaty was finally passed in 2009, when Obama
administration decided to get on board. The ATT has now been passed. Majority of
states have approved the treaty, but initially the states could not be mobilized
effectively and the draft was taken to the General Assembly as a last resort, where it
was finally adopted by a majority vote.
ATT is unique in comparison to other trade regulating frameworks due to the altruistic
spirit which underlies it. Its emphasis is on human security; trying to minimize the
violations of basic human rights due to inappropriate and illicit use of arms. It appears
to be an improvement over the existing situation, but the draft at this initial stage
brings to mind lots of questions regarding the logic, final shape and likely
implementation mechanisms that would impact the future shape of the treaty.
‘The long journey towards an Arms Trade Treaty’, Amnesty International, March 27, 2013. Available
at, http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/long-journey-towards-arms-trade-treaty-2013-03-27.
2
Ibid.
1
38
The Logic of Linking Trade in Conventional Arms to Human Rights
The basic logic for this linkage is provided by humanitarian law and the human rights
law which call for the protection of basic living rights of all human beings in all
circumstances on the basis of equality. States are the political entities responsible for
ensuring these rights for their citizens.
Currently, a number of international and intra-national conflicts are taking place in
different parts of the world. Bloodshed and human rights abuses observed in these
places help us to understand the existing link between international peace, security and
arms trade. With reference to this conspicuous link, the treaty aims to regulate the
behavior of states regarding the use of weapons and arms they buy. The initiative is
meant to reduce human suffering which increases with innovation and multiplication
of arms.
The ongoing Syrian civil war presents the best manifestation of this link, reinforcing
the logic which underlies the treaty. The war in Syria is worrisome where there are
two conflicting sides relying heavily on the use of arms. The state is using lethal
weapons without bothering to differentiate between rebels and non-rebels. This two
year long unrest shows the intensity with which irresponsible arms trade can impact
human rights of larger populations making them indirect victims of the conflict.
ATT attempts to make the preservation of human rights a pre-requisite for the arms
trade, compelling governments to take better care of their citizens, contributing to an
over-all well being of humans across the globe. The logic gains greater strength from
the success of earlier efforts made in this direction such as the UN Register of
Conventional Arms, established in 1991 which has become a key international
mechanism of official transparency on arms transfers.3 Another is the effectiveness of
1997 Convention dealing with use, production and destruction of Anti-Personnel
Mines, also known as the Ottawa Treaty, which strengthens ATT’s logic. It has
reduced landmine use to two states in 2007 against 15 in 1999, when it came into
force.4
3
Assessing the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, UNODA Occasional Papers No. 16,
April 2009. Available at,
http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/OccasionalPapers/PDF/OP16.pdf.
http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/transparency/un_register
4
Anup Shah, Landmines, Global Issues. Available at,
http://www.globalissues.org/article/79/landmines .
39
About The Treaty
The treaty has 28 articles in all. The first one defines the object and purpose of the
treaty. The rest cover the scope, checks and controls, and procedural matters pertaining
to ratification, implementation, amendments and withdrawal.
Checks and Controls
Article 2 defines the scope of the treaty, i.e. the arms and weapons whose trade and
transfers would be directly impacted by the treaty. These include battle tanks, armored
combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters,
warships, missiles and missile launchers and small arms and light weapons. 5 In
addition to this list, the export regulation also covers ammunition, spare parts and
components which could be used one way or the other to complement the listed
weapons and arms.
To meet the above objective, the treaty calls for establishing national control systems;
maintenance and public availability of national control lists; specifying national
contact points for exchanging relevant information; all meant to increase transparency.
It restricts trade with countries facing sanctions and embargoes, making states to
follow the rules prescribed by internationally agreed frameworks.
From voting to implementation
The passage of the treaty at UNGA has raised great hopes but this initial stage is only
the first step towards making the treaty functional. The treaty would get real value
only after it is formally implemented, which would take at least 2-3 years. The journey
towards implementation begins in June this year when it will be opened for signatures
and subsequent ratification by the states. Ratification by at least 50 states is needed to
enforce the treaty. Ninety days after the ratification by the 50th state the treaty would
enter into force. Only after that the treaty would attain the legal status to impact the
international arms trade.6
Judging on the basis of time taken by the treaty to arrive at this initial consensus, the
processes of implementation, being more complex, are expected to take relatively
longer. This is because the states think critically, they do a cost-benefit analysis, and
5
Original text of the ATT as adopted by United Nations General Assembly, Available at,
http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/docs/ATT_text_(As_adopted_by_the_GA)-E.pdf.
6
Ibid
40
only after foreseeing the cost effectiveness of proposals they agree or disagree with a
treaty. If states decide to remain out, they cannot be forced into it. For ATT the
ratifications will follow the same course and some states might take longer than others
to fully analyze and ratify the treaty. Therefore, no precise estimate when it would get
implemented can be given. After all, debating the issues at national level under diverse
forms of political structures is a time consuming process.
Potential obstructers might succeed in hampering the progress in addition to those who
opposed the treaty (Iran, Syria and North Korea) and abstained from the voting
process during passage of the treaty by the General Assembly. Already abstentions by
major global actors including China, Russia, and India in addition to Arab League
members have raised concerns about the future of the treaty. These have diminished
the hopes of any real impact as the acceptance of these states is crucial to the success
of such initiatives and vice versa. Both the abstentions and negative votes challenge
the universality of the treaty.
Analyzing the Treaty Draft
The text of the treaty expresses a genuine effort towards ensuring human security by
regulating trade in conventional weapons. It tries to ensure peace and stability in
addition to promoting confidence building, cooperation and transparency at a global
scale. The Preamble recognizes the mutually reinforcing inter-linkages which exist
between development, peace and security and human rights. It makes a special
reference to women and children who form the majority among those facing direct
consequences of conflict and armed violence.7 It however tries not to obstruct
legitimate arms trade in view of states’ political, security and commercial interests,
and so lacks components of arms control or disarmament. The treaty also respects the
sovereignty of states as at no place it calls for bypassing the limits of their national
laws, practices and policies.8
The proposed mechanisms, steps and procedures dealing with regulatory authorities,
control lists, national records, reporting and exchange of information are aimed at
checking diversion, creating increased transparency, enhancing cooperation and
reducing the chances of abuse of human rights. All the mechanisms support the cause
of the treaty and aim to help states improve their performance and compliance. An
exceptional aspect of the treaty is related to withdrawal where a state party to the
7
ibid
UN approves first-ever global arms trade treaty, Pakistan Today, April 2, 2013. Available at
http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2013/04/02/news/foreign/un-approves-first-ever-global-arms-tradetreaty/.
8
41
treaty, if it decides to withdraw afterwards, would not be free of any obligations to
which it was bound while being a party to it.9 This step tries to induce a permanent
behavioral change in states regarding arms trade.
Apart from the prospects for a positive change and betterment associated with the
ATT, a number of concerns have been cited by many states, most of which arise from
the ambiguities and contradictions in the treaty draft.

Article 51 of UN Charter, recognizing the right to self defense of all states, has
been listed among the main principles on which the treaty is based. This article
authorizes states to bypass any treaty obligations under the compulsions of self
defense. Although the article guarantees the sovereignty of states, it also
provides space to deviate from treaty protocols for the purpose of ensuring self
defense; a justification in itself, with no further explanations needed. So, this
article may contradict the goals which ATT aims to meet.

There is an imbalance in the status of importing and exporting states, putting
greater restrictions on the former, leaving them in no position to have any
decisive impact on the trade in conventional arms. This obvious tilt towards
exporting states is in fact an imbalance between rights and responsibilities, with
exporters being given greater rights, including the right to decide what should be
exported and to whom. The importers contrarily, are over-burdened with duties
to ensure the preservation of human rights in their states. How exporters
contribute towards promoting human rights is not the subject of the treaty.

Exporters have the power of assessing the possibilities of diversion of arms for
inhuman purposes in the importing states before authorizing the transfers. This
aspect gives exporters’ a leverage to assess the needs of importers and allow the
transfers. This tilt in favor of one group causes concern in the other group due to
several reasons:

Firstly a neutral and un-biased assessment cannot be guaranteed as in most
cases the task of assessment is subjective in nature.
9
Original text of the ATT as adopted by United Nations General Assembly, Available at,
http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/docs/ATT_text_(As_adopted_by_the_GA)-E.pdf.
42


No clear criteria have been defined on which to base assessments. No
specific agencies or organization could be considered as authentic sources
of human rights records, nor does ATT specify any.

Exporters’ assessment and the sharing of authorization related information
are subject to their national laws, practices and policies. This negates the
idea of transparency the treaty wants to achieve and creates space for
transfers to un-authorized actors. This also points towards a lack of
accountability for exporters.

Permitting the exporters to assess the needs of the importing states as well
as the use of weapons within importers’ territory tantamount to intervention
within the internal jurisdiction of states. This calls for a forced adherence of
importers to arrangements to which exporters are a party without caring if
they (importers) are also a party. This violates Article 2 (7) of the UN
Charter which is one of the principles on which the treaty is based. This
broadens exporters’ domestic jurisdiction, strengthens their role while
giving them greater rights vis-à-vis importers.

Last but not the least, the processes of assessment and authorization put a
big question mark facing the exporters especially when we refer to cases
like Iraq, Afghanistan and the human rights violations faced by Kashmiris
and Palestinians. In such cases, consciously authorized arms exports at one
time in history, turned into massive disasters for states and peoples at some
other (in some cases many years later). This shows the inevitability of the
unintended, unexpected and un-thought-of results of arms transfers,
authorized in the first place in the best interests of states as well as
international peace and security. Arms transferred through authorized trade
have played a great part in the wide scale abuse, torture and killing of
innocent populations (non-direct conflict participants) in a number of
places, most prominent being Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Syria, Lebanon,
Kashmir and Palestine in addition to others. Unfortunately the export
assessment does not cater for the issue of such distant-in-future reversals
and the possible responses and counter-measures in case they occur.
The defense cooperation agreements among states would remain unaffected by
the treaty. This is a partial behavior. This implies that Israel, India, and many
others would retain access to arms under such agreements, strengthening their
potential to victimize innocent populations.
43

The treaty has not proposed any central verification mechanisms to check and
counter-check the performance and compliance of states. No space has been left
for amendments which the states might want before ratification and
implementation; this can cause delay in its enforcement.

Pakistan voted in favor showing its endorsement of the cause of the treaty and
the need of setting universally applicable standards for arms transfers. It,
however, desired the treaty to be more inclusive. It would have been possible if
some states had shown flexibility to achieve unanimity which could help achieve
a long term global improvement. Pakistan’s representative to the UN highlighted
the imbalance in the draft regarding the status of importers and exporters which
leads to a lack of accountability for the latter. Ambassador Masood Khan pointed
to the issue of excessive production being left out, which could impact the
treaty’s effectiveness. He further emphasized that omission of certain important
definitions was a departure from the established protocol, which might provide
space to interpret these definitions to suit the interests of exporters. 10

Syria opposed the treaty by pointing towards the selective criteria for denying
exports. It also had reservation over the lack of any guarantees regarding the
access to weapons of un-authorized actors; an element which gets least focus
without any concrete measures being outlined to aptly manage the problem. It
further demanded that the right of self-determination of peoples living under
foreign occupation must be referred to in the text of the treaty and their status
must be clarified in relation to human rights abuses carried out by use of
conventional arms (in special reference to Israel). It cannot be discarded as a
mere excuse to avoid voting.11 This is a crucial issue as the defense cooperation
agreements helping actors like Israel to have access to technologically advanced
weapons, stay out of the treaty’s ambit and will remain unaffected. Syrian
opposition based on above reasons and abstention by Syria’s major trading
partners clearly shows that ATT’s success with respect to managing Syria (if that
is the tactical goal as widely believed) cannot be guaranteed.
‘Statement by Ambassador Masood Khan Pakistan's Permanent Representative to the United Nations,
at the Final United Nations Diplomatic Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty’, Pakistan Mission to
United Nations, 28 March 2013. Available at,
http://www.pakun.org/statements/First_Committee/2013/03282013-01.php.
11
‘We have an Arms Trade Treaty! But the hard work starts now’, Arms Trade Treaty Legal Blog, April
2, 2013. Available at, http://armstradetreaty.blogspot.com/2013/04/we-have-arms-trade-treaty.html.
10
44
Conclusion
The ATT is a step forward towards regulating arms trade to counter human rights
abuses. However presently, it is far from being perfect and needs amendments to
remove its weaknesses and get aligned with the proposed end goals. Among its major
weaknesses is the free-hand given to exporters, without calling for their accountability
regarding trade. A number of states have already shown their concerns over this
imbalance. For ensuring a responsible arms trade, the treaty must strike a balance
between the rights and duties of exporters and importers and ideally both must be
equally liable to sanctions in case of going astray.
A lack of accountability for exporters as opposed to stringent checks and controls for
importing states is a cause of concern for the latter and needs a review to avoid the
treaty being labeled as the one unfairly tilted in favor of exporters. Additionally, the
treaty must also focus on international and internationalized conflicts in addition to
intra-state conflicts which are currently its main target. This is because such conflicts
in Iraq and Afghanistan had violently killed more people in 2006-2007 as compared to
intra-state conflicts.12
Most importantly if technologically advanced countries like China, Russia and North
Korea remain outside the treaty, restricting the emergence of cases like Syria becomes
a difficult and almost an un-attainable task. Iran, India, Indonesia, Cuba, Sudan,
Belarus, S. Arabia, Vietnam, Bahrain, Sri Lanka, Egypt and Kuwait were also among
the abstaining parties. 13 The genuine reservations of these parties must be addressed
in order to make ATT more inclusive and more universal, thus ensuring its long term
success.
Afsah Qazi is a
CISS Assistant Research Officer
12
Global burden of Armed Violence, Geneva Declaration Secretariat, Switzerland; Paul Green Printing,
2008, p. 10. Available at, http://www.genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/Global-Burden-of-ArmedViolence-full-report.pdf.
13
Debidatta Aurobinda Mahapatra, ‘Arms Trade Treaty: The RIC Perspective’, Russian & India report,
April 9, 2013. Available at,
http://indrus.in/world/2013/04/09/arms_trade_treaty_the_ric_perspective_23637\.html.
45
Newsbytes
Iran Is Seen Advancing Nuclear Bid- NY Times
International nuclear inspectors reported on Wednesday that Iran had increased its
nuclear production while negotiations with the West dragged on this spring, but the
new information suggested that Tehran had not gone past the “red line” that Israel’s
leaders have declared could incite military action.
India expects Nawaz to stick to his word regarding bilateral relations- Pakistan
Today
Indian Foreign Minister Salman Khurshid has urged Pakistan’s incoming prime
minister Nawaz Sharif to “convert into reality” the “positive signals” with he had
given during his election campaign with reference to India, the Press Trust of India
(PTI) reported.
“There were many positive signals from Nawaz Sharif with relation to India during the
election campaign. We hope that he will work towards converting these positive
signals into reality upon assuming office,” Mr. Khurshid told journalists.
Hackers from China Resume Attacks on U.S. Targets- NY Times
Three months after hackers working for a cyber unit of China’s People’s Liberation
Army went silent amid evidence that they had stolen data from scores of American
companies and government agencies; they appear to have resumed their attacks using
different techniques, according to computer industry security experts and American
officials.
Islamist Rebels Create Dilemma on Syria Policy – NY Times
In Syria’s largest city, Aleppo, rebels aligned with Al Qaeda control the power plant, run the
bakeries and head a court that applies Islamic law. Elsewhere, they have seized government oil
fields; put employees back to work and now profit from the crude they produce. Across Syria,
rebel-held areas are dotted with Islamic courts staffed by lawyers and clerics, and by fighting
brigades led by extremists. Even the Supreme Military Council, the umbrella rebel
organization whose formation the West had hoped would sideline radical groups, is stocked
with commanders who want to infuse Islamic law into a future Syrian government.
Nowhere in rebel-controlled Syria is there a secular fighting force to speak of.
This is the landscape President Obama confronts as he considers how to respond to growing
evidence that Syrian officials have used chemical weapons, crossing a “red line” he had set.
More than two years of violence have radicalized the armed opposition fighting the
46
government of President Bashar al-Assad, leaving few groups that both share the political
vision of the United States and have the military might to push it forward.
Assad Warns Israel, Claiming a Stockpile of Russian Weapons- NY Times
President Bashar al-Assad of Syria displayed a new level of defiance on Thursday,
warning Israel that he could permit attacks on the Golan Heights and suggesting that
he had secured plenty of weapons from Russia — possibly including an advanced
missile system — as his opponents faltered politically and Hezbollah fighters infused
force into his military campaign to crush the Syrian insurgency.
Chinese, Indian Leaders Call for Cooperation- Time Magazine
The leaders of India and China played down their recent border dispute and other
tensions Monday, pledging to work together for regional stability and the economic
growth of the world’s two most populous nations. Friction has been building between
the Asian giants in recent years as they vie for regional influence and access to fuel
needed to feed their growing economies. Li Keqiang’s trip to India, his first visit
abroad since becoming Chinese premier, seems intended to minimize those tensions.
Pakistani Taliban withdraws peace talks offer after death of deputy leader- Washington
Post.
The Pakistani Taliban withdrew their offer of peace talks Thursday, following the
death of the group’s deputy leader in an American drone attack, a spokesman for the
group said, a blow to the incoming government of Nawaz Sharif that was elected
partly on promises to restore security after years of deadly attacks.
Karzai to seek military aid during India visit – The Hindu
The Afghan President’s trip comes during escalating border tension with Pakistan. An
aide to Afghan President Hamid Karzai says he will seek military aid from India
during a three-day visit this week. Mr. Karzai’s trip comes during escalating border
tension with Pakistan. Mr. Karzai spokesman Aimal Faizi says the President will
discuss recent border skirmishes with Pakistan when he visits New Delhi starting
Monday. He added that Karzai would seek Indian help in “strengthening of our
security forces”. The visit could irk Pakistan, which suspects its rival India of seeking
influence in Afghanistan, which Pakistan considers its own backyard. Analyst Wadir
Safi says the timing of Mr. Karzai’s India trip is likely related to recent border
skirmishes with Pakistan. Each side has been accusing the other of firing across the
border.
47
Drone strike shows that secret CIA attacks will continue despite Obama pledge
for transparency- Washington Post
The drone attack that killed a Pakistan Taliban deputy leader this week was a clear
signal that despite President Barack Obama’s promise last week of new transparency
in the drone program, the CIA will still launch secret attacks on militants in north
Pakistan and the administration will not have to tell anyone about it.
Preventing a Nuclear 'Great Game'- Wall Street Journal
For over a decade, the U.S. presence in South Asia has helped dampen security
competition between nuclear-armed Pakistan and India. But America's imminent
withdrawal from Afghanistan and "rebalancing" to the Pacific raise the possibility of
renewed tension. With this month's election of Nawaz Sharif as Pakistan's next prime
minister, Islamabad and New Delhi have a fleeting window of opportunity to improve
relations.
India test-fires supersonic BrahMos cruise missile- The Nation
India successfully test-fired its supersonic BrahMos cruise missile from a warship off
the coast of the western state of Goa, sources said. "The missile, with a range of 290
kms, was test-fired from the Indian Navy's Russian-built warship INS Tarkash and it
successfully hit the target off the Goa coast," the sources said, adding the warship was
commissioned in last November.
Obama, Xi pledge to build new relations, remain divided on cyber espionageDaily Globe and Mail
President Barack Obama and President Xi Jinping of China ended two days of
informal meetings here Saturday moving closer on pressuring a nuclear North Korea
and addressing climate change, but remaining sharply divided over cyber espionage
and other issues that have divided the countries for years.
Airspace violation: 2 Indian fighter planes enter Pakistan territory- The Express
Tribune
Two Indian fighter planes entered Pakistan’s airspace near Head Sulemanki border.
According to initial details, the fighter planes entered Pakistani territory at around
10:41am and stayed there for around two minutes. The planes were reportedly five to
seven miles inside Pakistan.
48
Book Review
By
Afsah Qazi
Robert Greene, The 33 Strategies of War
(London: Profile Books, 2006), pp. 471
The book ‘33 strategies of war’ is written by Robert Greene, author of three other
bestsellers. Greene writes mostly about the issues related to power; about strategies of
how to achieve it, how to dominate and stand victorious against enemies and how to
gain mastery and success in life. He holds a degree in Classical studies from the
University of Wisconsin—Madison. He has worked as an editor, writer, translator as
well as a story developer in Hollywood.
As the name indicates, the book discusses strategies that would ensure success if
followed during and before war (while preparing), helping to meet the ultimate ends
for which the war is fought. Corresponding to the number of strategies, the book has
33 chapters, each discussing a single strategy in detail. The strategies have been
categorized under five different forms of warfare including self-directed warfare,
organizational, defensive, offensive and unconventional warfare, dividing the book
into five parts. Greene has thoroughly filtered the annals of history to search for events
and examples relevant to each strategy clearly displaying its evolution, execution and
effectiveness, and also the consequences in case it is not adopted. A single event has
been discussed under different strategies to show that how a mixture, capable of
flowing, and shifting like a fluid, proved efficient, instead of a rigid and coherent
model.
All chapters follow a consistent pattern where a strategy’s introduction and definition
are followed by discussion of historical events showing its existence and repeated
usage since the earliest times. Then there are the keys to warfare extricated from
author’s interpretation of these examples and events. Next is the description of an
image, visualizing which we can see a particular strategy at work. Each chapter ends
with a mention of the situations under which a strategy can be reversed. This pattern
represents author’s deep understanding about the subject; he clearly marks the
strategies which cannot be reversed in any case; in every case you must hit the
enemy’s centre of gravity, control the dynamic and must be conceptually clear about
the exit strategy before entering a war.
49
The book is a meticulous and praiseworthy work and a must read for the students of
security, war and strategy. It helps to improve the basic understanding about the nature
and characteristics a practical and perfect strategy must and should possess. It is an
elaborate research into the life histories of the greatest men known to world, to many
of whom Greene refers repetitively. These include Hannibal, Julius Ceaser, Alexander
the Great, Genghis Khan, Frederick the Great, Karl Von Clausewitz, Napoleon,
Clemens Von Metternich, Queen Elizabeth, Alfred Hitchcock, Franklin D. Roosevelt,
Mao Tse Tung, Muhammad Ali and Henry Kissinger. Various phases of an
individual’s life have been discussed to show successes ensured by strategic mastery
in one phase and failures and devastation met due to its absence in another phase.
Reference to men belonging to diverse fields such as politics, statecraft, sports,
entertainment and social progress challenges the conventional understanding about
strategy as art of the general showing that others can equally master the art. In fact
many of these people were as adept strategists as the generals, sometimes even better
than them. This broad spectrum of references also shows the usefulness and
applicability of these strategies in human lives as Greene considers human life also a
battle field.
A true strategist, according to the book must have emotional-self control, subtlety,
fluidity, presence of mind and a mastery over the art of deception if he aims to surprise
the enemy with the un-expected. He/she maneuvers perfectly and hits where it hurts
the most and makes enemy lose morale. Ensuring that enemy’s targets are missed
frustrates him making him prone to mistakes which play into your hands; Muhammad
Ali - at 20 did exactly the same to defeat and ruin Sonny Liston’s career, the then
boxing champion. Victory is always seductive, so a differentiation between a gamble
and a risk must be very clear in addition to being clear about how and where to end a
war so that going farther does not make the victory a pyrrhic one.
Greene has pondered over the irrefutable fact that understanding human mind,
psychology and exploiting enemy’s emotions, all are central to mastering the art of
strategizing; make your enemies underestimate you, do what is least expected, be it
ordinary or extra-ordinary and encircle them with all roads leading to Rome and your
strategy will succeed. Napoleon’s destruction followed this very pattern; Metternich
studied his psychology, targeted his dissatisfaction with his wife and exploited his love
for women, kept him unaware of what he was up to, in the end surprising him with the
un-expected and unforeseen.
The author has massively quoted strategists and historians from Sun Tzu to
Thucydides in an attempt to uncover the fundamental principles guiding competition
50
or combat. To provide an apt understanding about grand strategy Greene refers to
Alexander’s first campaigns against Macedonia and Persia, as an eccentric prince at
20; people doubted him, being unaware of the new way of thinking and acting he had
developed. Only after he succeeded, a grand-strategic consistency could be seen in all
his zigzag maneuvers. Greene emphasizes on timeless principles of war and strategy
which call for the alignment of ends to available means instead of doing the opposite.
A lack of innovation and dynamism in strategy formulation and execution and its
blend with obsession, lack of foresight and miscalculation is a perfect recipe for
disaster.
This book provides a thorough insight into the jargons frequently used in strategic
studies. It is a reflection of author’s strict adherence to realist approach which is
central to both the concept and practice of war. It is highly informative, wellresearched and easy to understand and can be considered a complete guide on war and
strategy. However the readers, having a prior familiarization with these concepts will
be in a better position to grasp the contents of the book. Strategy and war, as per the
book are always dynamic with no precedent to be followed blindly, since this slavish
following kills both individuality and dynamism.
51
Book Review
By
Majid Mehmood
Bruce Riedel, Deadly Embrace: Pakistan,
America and the Future of Global Jihad
(Washington DC: The Brookings Institute,
2011).pp.144
This volume titled “Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America and the Future of Global
Jihad” is written by Bruce Riedel. The author has previously served in important
positions in the United States government such as service in the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), Advisor to four US Presidents, on Middle East and South Asia, and
chairman of President Obama’s interagency review board of policy towards
Afghanistan and Pakistan during his first term in 2008. Bruce Riedel is currently a
senior fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East policy of Brookings institute.
This book is an American perspective on the evolution and conduct of forces battling
United States today in the Islamic World particularly in Afghanistan, and it also
examines how US-Pakistan relations have unfolded over the years. The target
audience of the book is academic researchers, practitioners of policy and strategy in
the fields of security, foreign policy and importantly the observers of US-Pakistan
relations. The book is divided into seven chapters, and the sequence is set in a coherent
manner that fits the narrative built by the author on the subject.
US-Pakistan relations continue to be an important theme of discussion both as an
academic pursuit and as foreign policy discourse within Pakistan and United States.
This is particularly true for Pakistan because many in this country believe that US is
part of the problem rather than the solution and an unreliable “friend”. Reidel aptly
brings out this fact through describing multiple international surveys conducted by
credible sources that in Pakistan, US outpolls India as the bad guy.
The book dwells on what is perceived by United States and the West as “global jihad”
and “Islamic extremism” in the broader context of US – Pakistan relations. Author’s
primary argument in the book is that United States and Pakistan, with support of some
Middle Eastern countries, created forces which now need to be countered and
confronted, and that Pakistan today is the epicenter of radical Islamic forces which
constitutes a threat to international peace and security.
The narrative presented in this book, in many ways, is consistent with the official
United States narrative on political and strategic developments in Afghanistan and
52
South Asia. The author instead of objectively analyzing various aspects of the problem
relies heavily on official US narrative of blaming Pakistan for all the problems in the
region. This assertion, however, remains far from the factual position as the author
fails to highlight US failure in Afghanistan, its role in destabilizing the region and
indifference to Pakistan’s legitimate security concerns.
The tone of the author matches the narrative when he talks of targets, redlines,
unilateralism and verifications. For example, in the concluding chapter titled ‘Helping
Pakistan’ the author states:
“But Washington should also be abundantly clear that there are behaviors it cannot
tolerate, the most important being collusion with terror….that the days of double
dealing need to end...”
With three decades of experience in United States government in different capacities,
more recently as chairman of President’s Obama’s first term Af-Pak review
committee, Bruce Reidel has explained some interesting aspects with regards to US
policy in the region. For example he talks about changing Pakistan Army’s India
centric threat perception, resolution of Kashmir dispute on existing territorial status
quo, keeping intelligence pressures on Pakistan through developing capabilities inside
the country and recognition of Afghan – Pakistan border.
It can be seen very clearly that the policies mentioned by Mr. Reidel are already being
implemented by the US in this region as a result of which we have seen Pakistan’s
position in the region steadily erode in the overall strategic equation.
With regards to the text, the language is simple and easy to understand for the readers,
something that is difficult to achieve considering the complex problems under
discussion. The flow of narrative is coherent, consistent and easy to follow.
53
Book Review
By
Farzana Siddique
Ghani Jafar and Shams-uz-Zaman, Iran and
the Bomb,
Nuclear Club Busted
(Rawalpindi: Pindori Books, 2013), pp.258
Iranian nuclear programme has been the focus of western policy makers for the last
several years. Most of the commentaries and studies, on the Iranian programme, have
also been written by western analysts and reflect the western perspective on the issue.
These studies generally blame Iran for pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapon
programme. Iran and the Bomb, Nuclear Club Busted has been written from a nonwestern view point. Despite its provocative title the book is a serious study of Iran’s
nuclear programme. Divided in eleven chapters the book covers Iranian nuclear
programme from its inception to the latest developments, which include IAEA
inspector’s observations, concerns of regional states, and its impact on Pakistan’s
nuclear programme.
The book gives the history of Iran’s nuclear programme since the 1950s and how
western powers were, then, too willing to help Iran during Shah’s rule with its
peaceful nuclear programme, even though Iran had not even signed Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT). The book draws attention to the Iranian Revolution (1979) and
deteriorating Iran-US relations that marked a change in the attitude of the Western
states towards Iranian nuclear programme. Iran’s nuclear programme, which it claims,
is for peaceful purposes, is viewed with suspicion by the Western countries,
particularly the USA; they believe that Iran is secretly making nuclear weapons in
violation of its NPT obligations. The fact that no evidence supports this assessment is
often ignored. NPT being the only framework available for controlling proliferation of
nuclear weapons, Ghani Jafar and Shams-uz-Zaman have analyzed Iranian nuclear
program in the perspective of the NPT, which is also the theme of book’s first chapter.
The authors discuss, in considerable detail Iran’s nuclear programme in the prevailing
international political environment and various diplomatic efforts for resolution of the
issue. Besides providing useful information about Israel’s nuclear and missile
programmes, the book examines various diplomatic initiatives that presented
opportunities to find a solution to the problem arising from Iranian nuclear programme
These opportunities were lost and the wide gap in the perception of US and the West
and Iran’s nuclear policy continued to mar the prospect of better relations between the
54
two countries. The authors have also discussed Israel’s role in sabotaging efforts for
reaching a solution to the Iranian nuclear programme issue. A solution of the problem
would have removed a major hurdle in the way of better US-Iran relations, which did
not suit Israel.
There is basic contradiction between the title and the theme of the book. The title
refers to Iran and the bomb, but the book argues that Iran’s nuclear program is for
peaceful purposes. How can the two be reconciled?
The authors have discussed complex issues pertaining to US-Iran relations, Iran’s
nuclear program, its history, and political context as well as various efforts made at
different times to find a solution to the complex problem of Iranian nuclear
programme in simple and easy to read style. The book is well documented and gives
detailed quotations from authentic sources. The book Iran and the Bomb, Nuclear
Club Busted provides useful material for research on the subject of Iranian nuclear
programme in particular, and politics of nuclearization in general.
55
Book Review
By
Huma Rehman
Henry Kissinger, On China
(New York: The Penguin Press, 2011), pp 586.
The book by one of the most prominent diplomats of our time, who has held positions
of Secretary of State and National Security Advisor in US administrations, is an
authentic account of his observations based on his experiences of dealing with China
in his official capacity as well as visits in other capacities.
Divided in 18 Chapters the book could be termed a dissertation on historical, social,
political and diplomatic relations of China. It reflects keen observation of the author
during his personal encounters with Chinese leaders. The book records author
understands of China’s transformation from turmoil to stability.
In the chapter ‘Singularity of China’, Mr. Kissinger explains the special features of
Chinese civilization which according to him has no beginning, because it appears in
history less as a stereo typed nation-state than a permanent natural phenomenon.
Chinese history is marked by many periods of peace and progress as well as civil wars
and chaos. The words in a fourteenth century Chinese novel quoted by the author
beautifully express Chinese experience of its existence: “The empire, long divided,
must unite; long united must divide. Thus it has ever been.” The author attributes the
era of Chinese preeminence, to its strategic location as it has smaller states like Korea,
Vietnam, Thailand, and on its periphery Burma which are populated by different
societies. Its unique geographical location made China, in its own perception the
center of the world “the Middle Kingdom.”
The author quotes American political scientist Lucian Pye that in the modern age
“China remains a civilization pretending to be a nation state.” He maintains that the
predominant values of Chinese society are influenced by Confucian thoughts which
emphasize cultivation of social harmony rather than the machination of power. In
regard of Chinese concepts of international relations, the author observes that the
Chinese approach to world order is vastly different from that of the West. China never
engaged in sustained contact with another country on the basis of equality for the
simple reason that it considered itself incomparable in culture or power. The
realpolitik trend in Chinese thinking is fashioned by Sun Tzu‘s Art of War in the
author’s opinion. The Kowtow question and the Opium War are explained in the
56
context of Macartney Mission and the clash of two world orders. Chinese experience
of Qiying’s diplomacy in ‘soothing the barbarians’ was a turning point in their
strategic thinking. The realization of their position from preeminence to a weak power
status was a shock to the Chinese. According to the author, Managing the decline was
a great achievement resulting in the creation of modern China.
The US perception of China according to Mr. Kissinger was that China like the Soviet
Union would grow into a world power to compete with the US. The Chinese
Communist Party’s views as observed by the author were “loosely aligned with the
world communist movement in the 1950s.” Even though the Party was promoted and
supported by Moscow, and Mao Tse- tung considered himself a disciple of Stalin.
Mao’s political ideology was different as explained by the author. In the continuous
revolution of 1950-60s Mao had contempt for the rule of law and for human dignity,
and the major reason Beijing is such a difficult entity to deal with is because of Mao’s
legacy, not Chinese tradition.
In the chapter on triangular diplomacy and Korean War, the author quotes all the
developments in minute details, but at the end skipped the US role which makes the
account incomplete. The assumed understanding by Mr. Kissinger of the Chinese role
in Korean War led him to the conclusion that a different approach to deterrence was
needed to deal with the situation. This line of thinking did not allow development of
normal relations between the two countries. One obvious flaw here is that the Korean
War’s discussion by the author is based on US official stance and does not give an
objective analysis of the situation.
Criticism of Mao’s approach by the author is obvious as Mao in the author’s view
caused tremendous suffering to Chinese people which overshadowed his achievements
in other fields. Events of Tinaunmen Square (1989), genocide in Rwanda, and mass
killing in Cambodia by Khmer Rouge had made the US to move cautiously towards
China. The author predicts growing complexities in US and Chinese societies and
fears that they would be intensified in future. He is alarmed at the possibility of the
cold war between the two states and thinks that if it happens it would be detrimental to
the progress of both. Kissinger draws heavily on notes of his travels to Beijing to
celebrate the pragmatism of Mao’s successors. He observes that they are content to
remain within their restored historic position of preeminence, prepared to await a
peaceful reunion with Taiwan and continue their remarkable economic growth and
eradicate China’s widespread poverty.
This book “On China" is like a journey and certainly interesting reading for those
who wish to know how diplomacy works in the interaction of nations.
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Book Review
By
Muhammad Faisal
Robert D. Kaplen, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and
Future of American Power
(New York: The Random House Publishing Group,
2011) pp.331
"Europe defined the 20th century; the Indian Ocean will define the 21st” argues Robert
Kaplan. The events happening around the greater Indian Ocean will shape the future
course of geopolitics at the global level. Booming economies of India and China are at
the core of shifting patterns of global trade and commerce, hence making sea lanes
along the ancient East-West trading routes crucial to the grand strategy of the United
States, if it has to retain its great power status.
To make his case, the author traverses from west to east following the monsoon winds,
threading the storyline with perspectives of three powers– the United States, India, and
China and Islamic countries. Kaplan provides broad strategic overview of the region.
He examines India and China from dual perspectives as both influencing each other. In
his world, India is expanding horizontally across the Indian Ocean, whereas China
vertically into it as well as across it. This expansion is the result of growing trade in
goods, raw materials, energy resources and religious ideas.
Kaplan articulates how critical Indian Ocean region has become to American strategy
in the 21st century and eloquently describes the “New Great Game” unfolding across
the Indian Ocean. China has set this game in motion, as its tankers now ply the waters
from Western Pacific, down through narrow Strait of Malacca, across the Indian
Ocean to Persian Gulf. Struggling to break “Malaccan dilemma”– as this narrow
passageway can be blocked by outside powers anytime, and denying ship movement to
China– China has responded by pursing its “strings of pearls strategy”. It is building
naval power and seeking alternate supply routes that are less susceptible to
interruption by U.S or other hostile powers.
Kaplan posits that the Indian Ocean region will be the “center of gravity” of world
powers and a zone of conflict in the future. It is here that interests and influence of
India, China and United States converge and diverge, thus setting in motion changes in
international system beyond the control of these nations. It is in these crucial regions
that battles for democracy, energy resources and religious freedom will be fought and
it is here, that the U.S. must direct its foreign policy focus.
This active and more visible engagement by China in a region considered its
“backyard” by India, has led New Delhi to compete with China, as Indian planners are
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now looking beyond their immediate neighborhood. India is now competing with
China for influence in Myanmar and to counter its initiatives around the Bay of Bengal
by strengthening ties with Vietnam and Indonesia in the South China Sea.
Additionally, India is investing in its naval power by developing a blue water navy,
which will give it the means to defend its own energy routes and perhaps in future it
may threaten China in case of a confrontation.
The futuristic thesis put forward by Kaplan, is rooted in realism and history. At each
point along his long journey the varying mixtures of fast spreading capitalism, cultural
diversity, ethnic tensions, ecological strains and political turmoil shape the evolving
story. These factors along with strategic moves and counter moves by the various
powers add critical weight to the Kaplan thesis. The author admits that U.S. cannot
avoid its own decline, and it is not the question of preventing China and India from
rising, but it is about managing the transition from a uni-polar world to a multi-polar
international system.
This book is a mix of first-person travel reporting, brief historical sketches, and deep
and wide-ranging strategic analysis. Kaplan provides an on-the-ground outlook of
most volatile countries in the region, beset by weak infrastructures and young
populations attracted to extremism. The text contains few but critical short-comings.
Kaplan makes sweeping conclusions or generalizations on occasion, without backing
these statements with concrete evidence or logic of argument. Among many others,
these generalizations include the idea that for the West, democracy is an end to itself,
while in the Middle East the goal is justice (not democracy) through religious and
tribal authority. While in another chapter, he opines that to resolve issues in
Afghanistan or Pakistan, U.S. must solve for both Afghanistan and Pakistan to
implement a solution for either. On various occasions he portrays states such as
Pakistan, as ‘artificial constructs” of colonial powers.
One crucial shortcoming of a book, written from a realist perspective is that it offers
too much hope and optimism about the future of India; while it ignores socioeconomic challenges besetting Indian state and society. The possibility of close naval
cooperation between declining America and rising India and China, for pursing their
shared interests in trade, development and opposition to piracy in the ocean is also an
exaggerated notion considering the fact that, these states are also locked in intense
security competition across the wider Indian Ocean region.
Though primarily written as a wakeup call for U.S. foreign policy establishment, it
also awakens the ordinary reader to the monumental changes awaiting us.
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CISS was established in October 2010 and has embarked on a challenging task,
that of promoting a better understanding of international strategic issues
pertaining to our region, both in Pakistan and abroad. We feel that there is a need
now, more than ever before, for objective and impartial analyses and assessment
of international issues from a Pakistan perspective.
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