State’s Attorneys
Appellate Prosecutor
Case Law Update
PATRICK J. DELFINO
DIRECTOR
BRIAN J. TOWNE
CHAIRMAN
Researched and Drafted by
DAVID J. ROBINSON, FOURTH DISTRICT
DEPUTY DIRECTOR
February 2014
Case Law Update
February 2014
ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT
People v. Bailey, 2014 IL 115459 (February 6, 2014) (J. Kilbride)
(DuPage Co.):
Revestment Doctrine
The Supreme Court granted defendant’s PLA to determine whether a
party may satisfy the revestment doctrine’s requirement that the
subsequent proceeding be inconsistent with the prior judgment
simply by failing to object on the basis of its untimeliness or the
finality of the final judgment. A unanimous supreme court concluded
that for the revestment doctrine to apply, both parties must “(1)
actively participate in the proceedings, (2) fail to object to the
untimeliness of the late filing, and (3) assert positions that make the
proceedings inconsistent with the merits of the prior judgment and
support the setting aside of at least part of that judgment.”
People v. Cregan, 2014 IL 113600 (February 21, 2014) (C.J. Garman)
(McLean Co.):
Search Incident to Arrest
The Supreme Court granted defendant’s PLA to determine whether
the search of his bag—in which the police found contraband inside a
small hair-product container—was a valid search incident to arrest
under Gant. (Defendant was arrested at the train station on a
warrant for failure to pay child support.)
The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s holding that the
search was valid as a search incident to arrest, concluding first that
the forfeiture exceptions from Enoch applied to both capital and
noncapital cases. The court further held that the search analysis
from Gant did not apply to a search incident to arrest of the person
or items immediately associated with the defendant (See
Robinson)—that is, Gant analysis is limited to vehicle searches. Thus,
an item “immediately associated” with a defendant is subject to a
search incident to arrest; for example, when, as here, the subject
who is arrested has luggage with him.
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J. Burke & J. Freeman dissented, opining that the majority’s opinion
was unworkable primarily because the rationale for permitting the
search would also apply to the vehicle in Gant, a rationale the US
Supreme Court rejected. In short, the majority expanded the search
of the person to objects “within close proximity” to the defendant,
which the dissenters believed was not the law.
People v. Tousignant, 2014 IL 115329 (February 21, 2014) (J.
Freeman) (Livingston Co.):
Rule 604(d)
The Supreme Court granted the State’s PLA to determine whether
counsel’s Rule 604(d) certificate was in strict compliance with Rule
604(d). The court found that it was not, rejecting the State’s
argument that the word “or” had to be given its literal, disjunctive
reading, and concluding that in order to effectuate the intent of Rule
604(d)—namely, the language requiring counsel to certify that he has
consulted with the defendant to “ascertain defendant’s contentions
of error in sentence or the entry of a guilty plea”—the word is
considered to mean “and.” Thus, counsel is required to certify that
he has consulted with the defendant about both his sentence and
the entry of his guilty plea.
J. Thomas specially concurred merely to point out that the Rule
should be amended to reflect the obvious.
J. Karmeier, J. Kilbride, and J. Thies dissented, opining that “the plain
and unambiguous language of the rule is to the contrary” of the
majority’s position.
In re James W., 2014 IL 114483 (February 21, 2014) (J. Karmeier)
(Randolph Co.):
Involuntary Admission
The Supreme Court granted the State’s PLA to determine whether
the trial court’s judgment for involuntary admission was fatally
flawed because the patient was not brought to trial within 15 days as
required by the Mental Health Code. The court reversed, concluding
that the Code’s 15-day brought-to-trial requirement was directory,
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rather than mandatory, leaving to be determined whether the
patient suffered prejudice as a result of the 96-day delay in this case.
The court held that the patient was not prejudiced, concluding that
the patient had failed to present any evidence that the delay kept
him from presenting any particular evidence.
J. Theis specially concurred, writing separately to highlight concern
with the trial court’s disregard for the Code’s 15-day directive.
J. Burke, C.J. Garman, and J. Freeman dissented, opining that the
patient was entitled to be brought to trial within 15 days unless the
continuance was attributed to him.
ILLINOIS APPELLATE COURT
1st District
People v. Branch, 2014 IL App (1st) 120932 (January 15, 2014) (P.J.
Hyman) (Cook Co.):
Reasonable Doubt / Intent to Deliver
Defendant appealed from his possession-with-intent-to-deliver
conviction, arguing that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt where the State failed to show that the drugs that
were found on his person were not for personal use. The appellate
court affirmed, concluding that the State presented sufficient
evidence that the heroin in his possession after the drug deal were
not for personal use, such that a trier of fact could have reasonably
concluded that he possessed the heroin with intent to deliver it.
People v. Schaffer, 2014 IL App (1st) 113493 (January 17, 2014) (J.
Pucinski) (Cook Co.):
Reasonable Doubt / Cross-Examination
Defendant appealed from his convictions for aggravated criminal
sexual assault, home invasion, and armed robbery, arguing that the
State improperly cross-examined him regarding other witness’s
credibility and that the prosecutor made other comments that
prejudiced him.
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The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial,
concluding that the prosecutor acted improperly, asking questions
that were designed to demean and ridicule defendant. The appellate
court took the prosecutor to task for, among other things, asking
defendant about why he held a knife to the victim’s neck, whether he
thought the cut in the screen door made him seem guilty, whether
detectives were lying, and whether he pleaded for a misdemeanor
rather than a felony.
Jovan A., 2014 IL App (1st) 103835 (February 13, 2014) (J. Epstein)
(Cook Co.):
Hearsay
Defendant appealed from his juvenile adjudication, arguing that the
trial court improperly relied upon the hearsay content of a
craigslist.com advertisement to find that he had committed theft of a
bicycle. The appellate court reversed and remanded for further
proceedings, concluding that because the content of the
craigslist.com advertisement impacted the “very essence of the
dispute: whether [defendant] was the person who took [the] bicycle”
and that information was not necessary to explain the course of the
investigation, the content was hearsay and therefore inadmissible.
J. Pucinski dissented, opining that the conviction should have been
reversed “outright”—that is, without remand for further
proceedings.
In re Ashli T., 2014 IL App (1st) 132504 (January 21, 2014) (J. Simon)
(Cook Co.):
Fitness & Termination
The State appealed from the trial court’s order dismissing the State
petition for adjudication of wardship, arguing that the trial court
lacked authority to grant custody to the minor’s father without
conducting an adjudicatory hearing and disposition hearing. The
appellate court reversed, concluding that because the court did not
conduct an adjudicatory hearing or make determinations as to
whether the minor was abused and did not conduct a dispositional
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hearing to determine best interest, the court did not have authority
to enter an order granting permanent custody.
In re Omar M., 2014 IL App (1st) 100866-B (January 31, 2014) (P.J.
Gordon) (Cook Co.):
Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile Prosecutions
The juvenile appealed from his EJJ prosecution and sentence for firstdegree murder, arguing that (1) the State’s proffer was insufficient
because two of the State’s four eyewitness failed to appear at trial,
(2) the EJJ statute violated his right to due process because it permits
a judge to find him guilty by a preponderance rather that an jury
beyond a reasonable doubt, and (3) the EJJ statute was
unconstitutionally vague.
The appellate court affirmed, concluding that (1) the State’s proffer
was sufficient, (2) because the EJJ statute is an adjudicatory one, not
a dispositional one, it does not determine guilt or innocence, and (3)
the EJJ statute was not unconstitutionally vague.
2nd District
People v. Tapia, 2014 IL App (2nd) 111314 (January 9, 2014) (J.
Birkett) (Lake Co.):
The Post-Conviction Hearing Act
Defendant appealed from the trial court’s third-stage dismissal of his
postconviction petition, arguing that the court erred by dismissing his
petition because his trial counsel failed to correct an error in his PSI
that led to his 15-year sentence. The appellate court affirmed,
concluding that defendant had forfeited his claim because he failed
to include it in his post-trial motion or on direct appeal. The
appellate court further concluded that even if he had not forfeited
the issue, his counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge the
Georgia conviction on his PSI.
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In re B’Yata I., 2014 IL App (2nd) 130558-B (January 21, 2014) (J.
Hudson) (Winnebago Co.):
Fitness & Termination
Defendant appealed from the trial court’s unfitness finding and
termination of parental rights. The appellate court had remanded
the cause—while retaining jurisdiction—ordering the trial court to
enter oral or written factual basis for its unfitness findings. The trial
court did so and the appellate court affirmed the unfitness and
subsequent termination based upon those findings.
People v. Lentz, 2014 IL App (2nd) 130332 (January 24, 2014) (J.
Schostok) (Du Page Co.):
The Post-Conviction Hearing Act
Defendant appealed from the trial court’s summary dismissal of his
postconviction petition, arguing that the court erred by entering its
order more than 90 days after the petition was filed and docketed
(the trial court had concluded that the date for running of the 90
days did not begin until the petition was placed on the call and set
for hearing).
The appellate court reversed, concluding that the clock begins to run
on the 90 days when the case is filed and docketed, which occurred
in this case more than 90 days before the court’s summary dismissal.
3rd District
People v. Porter, 2014 IL App (3rd) 120338 (January 13, 2014) (J.
O’Brien) (Peoria Co.):
Search & Seizure
Defendant appealed from his conviction for armed violence following
a stipulated bench trial, arguing that the trial court erred by denying
his motion to suppress the gun found on his person. The appellate
court reversed and vacated defendant’s conviction, concluding that
the officer had “no reason to believe that the defendant was armed
and dangerous” when he initiated the patdown of defendant.
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February 2014
People v. Hunter, 2014 IL App (3rd) 120552 (January 16, 2014) (J.
Wright) (Will Co.):
Fines & Fees
Defendant appealed from his sentence, requesting that the appellate
court adjust certain monetary charges that the court purportedly
ordered defendant to pay. The appellate court vacated and
remanded with directions for the trial court to review and, if
necessary, correct the costs imposed on the Circuit Clerk’s cost sheet,
as some of those costs appeared to have been ordered by the Clerk
rather than the trial judge.
People v. Williams, 2014 IL App (3rd) 120240 (January 23, 2014) (J.
Wright) (Peoria Co.):
Reasonable Doubt / Fines & Fees
Defendant appealed from his conviction and sentence for possession
of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, arguing that (1) the
State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and (2)
his fines were improperly assessed and accounted for. The appellate
court affirmed his conviction but remanded for recalculation of
defendant’s fines, concluding that (1) the evidence of the drugs
found separately packaged and the testimony that defendant buys
“re-ups” was sufficient for a fact-finder to determine that he had
intent to deliver and (2) that the fines were improperly calculated so
the trial court must recalculate them; the appellate court refused to
do so.
People v. Guzman, 2014 IL App (3rd) 090464 (January 23, 2014) (P.J.
Lytton) (Will Co.):
Guilty Pleas
Defendant appealed from his conviction for aggravated possession of
stolen firearms as a result of a negotiated guilty plea, arguing that
the trial court erred by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea
where counsel failed to advise him of the immigration consequences
of his appeal. The appellate court reversed, concluding that
defendant made the requisite prejudice showing under Strickland
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where he demonstrated that counsel failed to advise him under
Padilla.
J. Holdridge specially concurred, opining that the trial court’s failure
to admonish defendant would have been a sufficient basis to reverse
its denial of his motion to withdraw his plea.
In re B.D.P., 2014 IL App (3rd) 120781 (January 23, 2014) (J. O’Brien)
(Whiteside Co.):
Juvenile Court Act
The minor was adjudicated delinquent when he was 15 years old and
sentenced to 5 years of probation. When he was 20 years old, the
minor admitted to a probation violation, for which the trial court
sentenced him to 5 days in jail. The minor appealed, arguing that he
need not serve the 5 days in jail because, as a now 21 year old, he
was not subject to the juvenile court act. The appellate court
reversed, concluding that because the individual was no longer
subject to the Act due to his age, the court’s sentence was not
authorized by the Act.
In re Antoine B., 2014 IL App (3rd) 110467-B (February 4, 2014) (J.
Carter) (Peoria Co.):
Juvenile Sentencing
The minor was adjudicated delinquent on two counts of felony theft
and committed to DJJ for a period not to exceed three years. The
minor appealed, arguing that his commitment was excessive. The
appellate court vacated and remanded, concluding that (1) his
adjudications should have been entered as misdemeanors rather
than felonies, and (2) his commitment to DJJ was thus void as
unauthorized.
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4th District
People v. Montag, 2014 IL App (4th) 120993 (January 28, 2014) (J.
Knecht) (Woodford Co.):
Rule 604(d) / Fines and Fees
Defendant appealed from his sentence in three separate cases.
Defendant’s counsel filed a certificate in compliance with Rule 604(d)
and a month later filed an amended posttrial motion, which the trial
court later denied. Defendant appealed.
The appellate court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded
with directions, concluding that (1) although counsel’s 604(d)
certificate did not strictly comply with the Rule, remanding it for a
new certificate would have been pointless given that he filed an
amended motion after his 604(d) certificate, and (2) the Circuit Clerk
improperly imposed several of defendant’s fines, rending that
portion of his sentence void. The appellate court also scolded
appellate counsel for failing to catch the void sentence.
People v. Chester, 2014 IL App (4th) 120564 (January 28, 2014) (J.
Knecht) (McLean Co.):
The Post-Conviction Hearing Act / Fines and Fees
Defendant appealed from the first-stage dismissal of his
postconviction petition, arguing that (1) he had the right to withdraw
his petition without prejudice during the first state, (2) the trial court
abused its discretion by failing to rule on his motion to stay before
dismissing the petition, and (3) he was entitled to certain credit
against his fines and fees.
The appellate court affirmed but remanded with directions for the
trial court to impose the proper fines and fees, concluding that a
defendant has no right under the Act to withdraw his postconviction
petition once it has been filed absent court approval, and the fines
improperly imposed by the Circuit Clerk had to be vacated and reimposed by the trial judge.
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In re Javaun I., 2014 IL App (4th) 130189 (February 14, 2014) (J. Pope)
(Vermillion Co.):
Sentencing / One-Act, One-Crime
The juvenile appealed following his juvenile adjudication for home
invasion, attempt (aggravated robbery), and criminal trespass to
residence, arguing that (1) the State failed to prove him guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) the court erred as a matter of law
when it sentenced him without following the DOJJ statutory
requirements, and (3) his convictions for home invasion and criminal
trespass to a residence violate the one-act, one-crime rule.
The appellate court affirmed in part and vacated in part, concluding
that (1) the State presented sufficient evidence to convict the
juvenile, (2) the court considered the least restrictive means as
alternatives to incarceration where the record showed that the State
presented alternatives to incarceration, but (3) his convictions for
home invasion and criminal trespass to a residence violated the oneact, one-crime rule where both charges were based on the same
physical act—namely, unlawfully entering a home.
People v. Garza, 2014 IL App (4th) 120882 (January 28, 2014) (J.
Knecht) (Champaign Co.):
Firearm Enhancements
Defendant appealed from the trial court’s dismissal of his
postconviction petition, arguing that he was entitled to withdraw his
plea because his sentence was void—the court had failed to impose a
mandatory 25-year firearm enhancement where it could be
“inferred” from the factual basis that he personally discharged a
firearm.
The appellate court affirmed, concluding that because the factual
basis merely permitted the trial court to “infer” that he personally
discharged the firearm, the Illinois Supreme Court’s ruling in White
did not require the 25-year enhancement; to impose such a
sentence, the factual basis must be explicit.
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People v. Green, 2014 IL App (4th) 120454 (January 30, 2014) (J.
Pope) (Sangamon Co.):
Aguilar / Plea Agreements
Defendant appealed from his conviction as an armed habitual
criminal, arguing that he was entitled to withdraw his guilty plea
because one of the underlying felonies used to justify his status as an
armed habitual criminal was a prior conviction under the UUW
statute that the supreme court had found unconstitutional. The
appellate court affirmed, concluding that his fully negotiated plea
agreement was valid because both the State and defendant received
the benefit of the bargain and defendant was not prejudiced by the
supreme court’s holding in Aguilar.
5th District
People v. Inman, 2014 IL App (5th) 120097 (February 4, 2014) (J.
Chapman) (St. Clair Co.):
The Post-Conviction Hearing Act
Defendant appealed from the second-stage dismissal of his
postconviction petition, arguing that the resentencing court violated
the principles of double jeopardy by ordering his sentences to run
consecutively. The appellate court rejected defendant’s arguments
and affirmed, concluding that because his natural life sentence had
been vacated and he was resentenced to 35 years for murder and 30
years for attempt (murder) to run consecutively, his aggregate term
of incarceration had been reduced from natural life and, therefore,
the court did not impose a punishment that exceeded the sentence
he would have been expected to serve when he was originally
sentenced.
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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
United States v. Hinton, No. 13-6440 (February 24, 2014) (Per
Curiam)
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The Supreme Court granted cert and remanded for further
proceedings, interpreting the first prong of Strickland. In so doing,
the Court held that “[a]n attorney’s ignorance of a point of law that is
fundamental to his case combined with his failure to perform basic
research on that point is a quintessential example of unreasonable
performance under Strickland.” In this case, counsel erroneously
believed that the State had a $1000 cap on fees for experts, which it
did not. Because no lower court had evaluated the prejudice prong
of Strickland, the Court remanded for that determination.
Fernandez v. California, No. 12-7822 (February 25, 2014) (J. Alito)
Search & Seizure
The Supreme Court granted cert to determine whether the consent
of one occupant to a residence may provide consent to search that
residence when the other occupant is not physically present. The
Court held that she could, as follows:
“Our cases firmly establish that police officers may search jointly
occupied premises if one of the occupants consents. [Citation.] In
Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006), we recognized a narrow
exception to this rule, holding that the consent of one occupant is
insufficient when another occupant is present and objects to the
search. In this case, we consider whether Randolph applies if the
objecting occupant is absent when another occupant consents. Our
opinion in Randolph took great pains to emphasize that its holding
was limited to situations in which the objecting party occupant is
physically present. We therefore refuse to extend Randolph to the
very different situation in this case, where consent was provided by
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an abused woman well after her male partner had been removed
from the apartment they shared.”
J, Scalia concurred, agreeing that Randolph required the result but
writing separately to address the issue of the defendant’s rights
under property law to exclude police.
J. Thomas concurred, agreeing that Randolph required the result but
writing separately to emphasize his disagreement with Randolph.
J. Ginsburg, joined by J. Sotomayor and J. Kagan, dissented, opining
that the Fourth Amendment flat out barred such a search.
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Index:
Page:
Aguilar
12
Cross-Examination
4
EJJ Sentencing
6
Fines & Fees
8, 10
Fitness & Termination
5, 7
Firearm Enhancements
11
Guilty Pleas
8, 12
Hearsay
5
Ineffective Assistance
13
Intent to Deliver
4
Involuntary Admission
3
Juvenile Court Act
9
One-Act, One-Crime
11
Post-Conviction Hearing Act
6, 7, 10, 12
Reasonable Doubt
4, 8
Revestment Doctrine
2
Rule 604(d)
3, 10
Search & Seizure
7, 13
Search Incident to Arrest
2
Sentencing
11
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