Linguistic Intuitions
Michael Johnson
Outline
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0. Outline
1. Metasemantics
2. Intuitions
3. A Puzzle about Intuitions
4. Confronting the Puzzle
5. A Realist Solution
6. Conclusions
1. METASEMANTICS
Lexical vs. Meta- Semantics
Lexical Semantics
Metasemantics
Answers the question:
Answers the question:
What do individual words
mean?
In virtue of what do individual
words mean what they do,
rather than something else, or
nothing at all?
Today’s Talk
Today I’ll be concerned
with metasemantic
accounts of reference:
that is, accounts of why
words have the referents
they do, rather than other
referents or no referents
at all.
The Descriptive Theory of Reference
According to Descriptivism, names are disguised definite
descriptions.
Descriptivism: A name refers to the object, if there is
one, that uniquely satisfies the description whose
disguise it is.
Tired example: ‘Aristotle’ might be associated with the
description ‘last great philosopher of Antiquity.’ So
‘Aristotle’ refers to Aristotle because Aristotle is the last
great philosopher of antiquity.
Causal Theories of Reference
According the Causal Theories, causal, lawful, or informational
connections between word and world make it the case that
words mean what they do.
One example of a causal theory is this dumbed-down version of
Evans:
Evans: A name N in a society S refers to the object that is the
dominant causal source of S’s N-involving beliefs.
Example: ‘Aristotle’ refers to Aristotle because it is largely
Aristotle’s doings and goings that are the cause of our ‘Aristotle’involving beliefs.
2. INTUITIONS
The Final Frontier
Let’s suppose that most
Americans believe all & only the
following about Neil Armstrong:
• He was the first man in space.
• He was an American.
In this scenario, most Americans
are wrong. Yuri Gagarin was the
first man in space.
The Anti-Descriptivist Intuition
If you accepted my last claim,
that in the scenario described,
most Americans are wrong
that Neil Armstrong was the
first man in space, then you
have anti-descriptivist
intuitions. There are only two
candidates for the description
‘Neil Armstrong’ is a disguise
for:
1. ‘The first man in space’
2. ‘An American who was the first man in space’
The Anti-Descriptivist Intuition
1. ‘The first man in space’
If (1) determines the referent of ‘Neil Armstrong,’ then most
Americans are right, because Yuri Gagarin was the first man in
space.
The Anti-Descriptivist Intuition
2. ‘An American who was the
first man in space’
If (2) determines the referent of ‘Neil Armstrong,’ then most
Americans are neither wrong nor right, because no one was
an American who was the first man in space.
3. A PUZZLE ABOUT INTUITIONS
The Evidential Relevance of Intuitions
Many philosophers have found this sort of argument
compelling. Many have converted to some or another
causal theory of reference because of just such
arguments.
But why? Why are intuitions about these cases any sort
of evidence at all?
The Evidential Relevance of Intuitions
After all, nothing about Evans’ theory predicts, entails,
or even suggests that if it’s true, we should have
intuitions that accord with it.
And nothing about Descriptivism says we can’t be
convinced it’s false, even when it’s true.
Both theories are equally compatible with the fact that
we have the intuitions we do. So the intuitions just
don’t seem to be evidence one way or another.
Today’s Talk
In this talk, I am going to
claim that our intuitions
are evidence for which
theory is true. But also, in
a deeper sense, I’m going
to claim that neither
theory is true.
A Crude Model of Semantic Intuitions
We are given a story, S (e.g. the Neil Armstrong Story).
We are asked to decide on the basis of the story whether
some conclusion C follows, e.g. whether most Americans’
beliefs are wrong.
We take S, add to it our background beliefs B, and answer:
• “Yes” if we compute C from S & B.
• “No” if we compute not-C from S & B.
• “I don’t know/ underspecified” if we cannot compute
either C or not-C from S & B.
A Reconstruction
Add in the background beliefs B1 and B2 to the Neil Armstrong
story S:
B1: Neil Armstrong is the dominant causal source of most
Americans’ ‘Neil Armstrong’ involving beliefs.
B2: A name N in a society S refers to the object that is the
dominant causal source of S’s N-involving beliefs.
S & B1 & B2 entail C, that most Americans are wrong.
So, assuming everyone believes B1, the fact that we are
inclined to answer “C is true” is evidence that we hold B2. If
we didn’t, we wouldn’t have the intuitions we do.
Halfway There
We’re closer now to solving
our puzzle. Now we can see
how our intuitions about cases
are evidentially relevant to
what metasemantic theories
we (tacitly) believe.
What remains is to provide a
bridge between what
metasemantic theories we
(tacitly) believe and what
metasemantic theories are
actually true. Why is believing
a certain metasemantic theory
evidence of its truth?
The Synthetic A Priori
The reason the gap seems difficult to bridge, though, is
that it’s an instance of a much older problem.
How could our intuitions, which are supposedly a
priori, and not derived from experience, provide us
knowledge of which metasemantic theory was true,
which is a synthetic fact.
How is the synthetic a priori possible?
4. CONFRONTING THE PUZZLE
Four Ways to Bridge/ Trivialize the Gap
1. Anti-Intuitionist Realism: Deny that our intuitions have
any evidential relevance to what metasemantic theory is
true.
2. Semantic Skepticism: Deny that there are facts about
reference and truth, explain our intuitions in a way that
doesn’t advert to ‘tracking the truth.’
3. Intuitionist Realism: Claim that we have genuine
knowledge of mind-independent semantic facts without
empirical investigation and explain how this is so.
4. Idealism: Claim that the semantic facts are constituted/
determined by mind-dependent facts like our intuitions/
our dispositions to have certain intuitions.
Option 1: Anti-Intuitionist Realism
“I,” says the anti-intuitionist, “don’t think that intuitions
have any evidential relevance to what metasemantic
theory is true. You have to go investigate the facts
before you can know what things mean or why they
mean it…
Option 1: Anti-Intuitionist Realism
“You think ‘cow’ applies to those brown mooing things
because they’re what normally cause you to say things
like ‘Look at that cow!’ But you don’t know that. ‘Cow’
could be true of all and only isosceles triangles, because
it’s most frequently spoken on a Wednesday.
What metasemantic theory is true is an a posteriori
matter completely. You don’t know what ‘cow’ means or
why until you have a PhD in linguistics and have done
fieldwork in English-speaking countries.”
Here’s what I meant by giving the anti-intuitionist
that farcical speech:
If intuitions are evidentially irrelevant to which
metasemantic theory is true, then those things
that are evidentially relevant had better be close
by, noticeable, and ubiquitous, otherwise we risk
concluding that none of us know what ‘cow’
means.
Now I don’t actually know of any AntiIntuitionist Realists, because the intuition
haters I’m acquainted with are all skeptics.
I’m happy to join the anti-intuitionist if no
other option on my list pans out.
But, in the absence of a really good story
about what other than intuitions is evidence
for which metasemantic theory is true, the
view does sound a little… crazy.
Troubles for Anti-Intuitionist Realism
Suppose a descriptivist
traveler visits a “causal”
community and attempts to
learn the correct
metasemantic theory for the
natives.
What differences will he
notice about their behavior
that will “tip him off” that
they’re not descriptivists?
Troubles for Anti-Intuitionist Realism
At least in the literature (e.g.
Machery, Mallon, Nichols &
Stich, 2004), when it’s
claimed that two
communities instantiate
different metasemantic
theories, the only difference
described is the intuitions of
the communities. But again,
that is at best evidence of
what the speakers believe.
Option 2: Semantic Skepticism
“I,” says the Semantic Skeptic, “don’t accept that
intuitions have evidential relevance to which
metasemantic theory of reference is true.
In fact, I don’t accept that anything has evidential
relevance to which metasemantic theory is true,
because none of them are.
There is no reference and thus there is no true theory
of why things refer to what they do. They don’t.”
Inverting the Theory
of Reference
Hartry Field (1990) has
proposed a particularly
“Humean” skeptical
solution to the problem
of the synthetic a priori in
linguistic intuitions.
Inverting the Theory
of Reference
Field’s idea is that we
accept a primitive
inference rule: from “x is
the dominant causal
source of our N-involving
beliefs” to derive “N
refers to x”
Inverting the Theory
of Reference
But that’s the whole
story.
Just as Hume thought
there was no causation,
but we were primitively
disposed to reason as if
there were, Field thinks
there is no reference, we
just reason as though
there is.
Semantic Skepticism
I’ll reserve comment until
later as to what reasons
there are or at least could
be to reject Semantic
Skepticism.
Option 3: Intuitionist Realism
“I,” says the Intuitionist Realist, “am exactly the person
for whom this problem is a problem for. So I must say
something about it. Let me see here…”
Realist Response #1 (not a real
Williamson quote)
“Look, linguistic intuitions
are intuitions (duh). If
you’re gonna start being
skeptical about some
intuitions, you won’t have
any principled place to
stop. So unless you’re
prepared to doubt all of
science, why not just
accept linguistic
intuitions?”
Realist Response #1
But I am not an intuition
skeptic.
I like intuitions. Or at least,
linguistic intuitions.
I just want to know what
justifies them, and this
response just says: “Stop
asking so many questions!”
Realist Response #2 (not an actual
Bealer quote)
“Look, linguistic intuitions
are intuitions (duh).
Intuitions are a basic source
of evidence. They’re like
seeing or smelling. You don’t
go around doubting that a
foul stench justifies the
belief that there’s
something stinky there. So
don’t go doubting your
linguistic intuitions either.”
Realist Response #2
The first thing to say is
that this response is pure
epistemic mysterianism.
Not even Kant was
satisfied with answers of
that form, and he believed
in the synthetic a priori.
Realist Response #2
The second thing to say is that
the response isn’t just
mysterian, it’s mistaken. If we
could directly grasp the
philosophical truths, we
wouldn’t disagree with one
another on philosophical
matters so much.
For the intuition-defender, this
is the problem of conflicting
intuitions.
The Problem of Conflicting Intuitions
Machery, Mallon, Nichols, and Stich (2004) argue, from
experiments they conducted on Western and East Asian
subjects, that Westerners have intuitions that align
with causal theories whereas East Asians have more
descriptivist intuitions.
I won’t argue that that is true, I’ll just point out that if
it’s true, it gives the lie to the idea that we have direct
intuitive access to the metasemantic facts. Two people
with conflicting intuitions can’t both be right.
Option 4: Idealism
“I,” says the Idealist, “have no problem of explaining
how our intuitions are evidence for the semantic facts.
According to me, the semantic facts depend upon, are
grounded in, hold in virtue of, and are made true by our
intuitions.
If we had different intuitions, the semantic facts would
be different.”
Two Types of Idealist
Formal Idealist: The formal (structural) facts about our
intuitions ground the semantic facts for the language
we speak.
Semantic Idealist: The semantic facts about our
intuitions (the content of those intuitions) ground the
semantic facts for the language we speak.
Formal Idealism e.g. Conceptual Role
Semantics
According to Conceptual or
Inferential Role Semantics, a
word means what it does
because of the (formal) role
it plays in inferences
involving it. If you change
those inferences– including
the “intuition” inferences
from a story to a judgment
about the story– then you
change what the word
means.
Formal Idealism a.k.a. Conceptual Role
Semantics
This would explain how
the synthetic a priori is
possible.
Unfortunately, CRS has to
deny our intuitions: the
anti-descriptivist intuitions
are just as much anti-CRS
intuitions. “Meaning ain’t
in the head” is the slogan.
Semantic Idealism, e.g. Intention
Based Semantics
“The intention theorist
seeks to reduce the having
of content of marks and
sounds to the having of
content of psychological
states…”
Semantic Idealism, e.g. Intention
Based Semantics
“Then, having reduced all
questions about the
semantical features of public
language items to questions
about mental content, he
sees his task as having to
answer those further
questions, but free now to
pursue those answers
without any further appeal
to public language
semantical properties.”
(1982)
Fodor against Semantic Idealism
“[W]ords can’t have their
meanings just because
their users undertake to
pursue some or other
linguistic policies; or,
indeed, because of any
purely mental
phenomenon, anything
that happens purely ‘in
your head.’…
Fodor against Semantic Idealism
“…Your undertaking to call
John ‘John’ doesn’t, all by
itself, make ‘John’ a name
of John. How could it? For
‘John’ to be John’s name,
there must be some sort
of real relation between
the name and its bearer;
and intentions don’t, per
se, establish real
relations…”
Fodor against Semantic Idealism
“…This is because, of course,
intentions are (merely)
intentional; you can intend
that there be a certain
relation between ‘John’ and
John and yet there may be
no such relation. A fortiori,
you can intend that there be
a semantical relation… and
yet there may be no such
relation…”
Fodor against Semantic Idealism
“…Mere undertakings
connect nothing with
nothing; ‘intentional
relation’ is an oxymoron. For
there to be a relation
between ‘John’ and John,
something has to happen in
the world. That’s part of
what makes the idea of a
causal construal of semantic
relations so attractive.”
5. A REALIST SOLUTION
Twin Earth
Let’s consider another case where certain intuitions
have been taken to support causal theories over
descriptive ones: Putnam’s Twin Earth.
Twin Earth is a planet on the other side of the galaxy. In
most ways, it is just like Earth, down to the smallest
detail. You have a twin on Twin Earth who’s just like
you, I have a twin who’s just like me, they’re sitting in a
twin seminar room, and my twin is giving a talk just like
this one to your twin. And so on and so forth.
Earth
Twin Earth
Twin Earth
There is however one difference between Earth and
Twin Earth. On Earth, all the watery stuff is H2O. On
Twin Earth, the watery stuff is composed of a
complicated chemical compound we can abbreviate
XYZ.
H2O and XYZ look and behave exactly the same. They
taste the same, they boil at the same temperatures at
the same distance above sea level, their conductance is
the same, etc.
Twin Earth
Consider two twins,
Arnold on Earth and Twin
Arnold on Twin Earth.
Neither knows any
chemistry. What they
know/ believe about the
stuff they call ‘water’ is
the same. Q: Would it be
true for Arnold to call the
stuff on Twin Earth
‘water’?
Twin Earth
The intuition is supposed
to be that, no, Arnold’s
word ‘water’ is true of all
an only H2O, whereas
Twin Arnold’s word
‘water’ is true of all and
only XYZ
A Realist Explanation
Let me suggest the following explanation for the
intuition.
The reason Arnold’s word ‘water’ is true of all and only
H2O, and not true of any XYZ, is that were he to know
all the relevant facts (about the chemistry and
distribution of the two substances) and were in a
position to distinguish samples of the two substances,
he would apply ‘water’ to H2O but not XYZ.
A Realist Explanation
I want to emphasize that this is a Realist and not an
Idealist story.
The reason why Arnold’s word ‘water’ means what it
does is that he would act in a certain manner if certain
very specific circumstances obtained. This could arise
because he intended to act in that manner, but it is not
merely his intention but his disposition to follow
through on it that makes his words mean what they do
(according to the claim).
A Realist Explanation
The view is this.
Suppose A’s and B’s both cause you to apply some term T.
However, were you to know about the difference
between A’s and B’s and be able to distinguish A’s from
B’s as such, you would apply T to A’s but not B’s.
Then, in that case, T would mean A-but-not-B.
How You Know What You Mean 1
So how can you know, without getting a PhD in
linguistics and doing fieldwork, that your word ‘cow’ is
true of cows and not, say, isosceles triangles?
Easy. You know that you would apply ‘cow’ to cow and
wouldn’t apply it to isosceles triangles were you to be
able to tell the difference between the two, because
you can tell the difference, and you do apply ‘cow’ to
cow and not isosceles triangles.
How You Know What You Mean 2
What if you’re like Arnold
though. What if you can’t
tell the difference between
H2O and XYZ? Suppose
someone confronts you with
the Twin Earth case. How do
you know your intuition is
reliable– that under those
circumstances, your word
‘water’ would mean H2O
and not XYZ?
How You Know What You Mean 2
Recall that the prompt stipulates that you know all
the relevant information. It tells you that there’s a
difference between the watery substances on Earth
and Twin Earth, and it tells you that H2O is what
you’ve got on your planet.
If you intuit that ‘water’ only applies to the thing on
your planet, that’s good evidence that were you to
actually be in epistemically ideal circumstances, you
would only use ‘water’ for the stuff on your planet.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Linguistic Intuitions and
Metasemantics
So, can we use intuitions to tell us which
metasemantic theory (descriptivism, Evans’
theory, my theory, etc.) is true?
My considered view is: it depends.
Linguistic Intuitions and
Metasemantics
If I’m wrong, then since for Williamsonian reasons we
shouldn’t be intuition skeptics, we can use intuitions as
we normally would, which is: take them as evidence
but not super-evidence.
However, it does seem that since most metasemantic
theories outside of a small class (which includes my
view) don’t have any plausible story to tell about the
epistemology, we should probably correspondingly
discount those intuitions.
Linguistic Intuitions and
Metasemantics
And the intuitions are even less helpful if I’m right:
If my theory is true, then our linguistic intuitions are
evidence for what our words mean. So we can
know ‘a priori’ without empirical investigation,
what we mean. If the theory is true.
But we cannot infer, from the meaning facts, to the
theory that best fits them. Because we had to
assume that theory in the first place to arrive at the
meaning facts!
Sort of like this…
Linguistic Intuitions and
Metasemantics
It follows, or so I claim,
that metasemantic
theorizing is not to be
done by intuition. We
can’t use Armstrong/
Gagarin, Gödel/ Schmidt,
H2O/ XYZ, etc. cases to
determine which
metasemantic theory is
true.
Metasemantic Theory-Building
Instead, we must establish the role that meaning plays
in our ultimate theories of cognition and
communication.
Until then, we are subject to attack from the Semantic
Skeptic, who claims there is nothing to be explained by,
and hence no reason to believe in, semantic properties
construed Realistically.
Fin