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MEDAL OF HONOR
RECONSIDERATION PACKET
FOR THE ARMY BOARD OF CORRECTIONS OF MILITARY RECORDS
CAPTAIN LAWRENCE M. LISS
CONTENTS INCLUDE EVIDENCE, NEW POINTS OF
CONSIDERATION AND CLARIFICATION FROM THE PREVIOUS
REVIEW COMPLETED BY THE ARMY AWARDS BRANCH.
ENDING IN A DECLINATION IN 2011
AS FAILING TO:
“MEET THE CRITERIA OF THE MEDAL OF HONOR”
THIS SUBMISSION ADDRESSES THE UNIQUE INTREPEDITY
ENCOUNTERED AT CAU SONG BE, VIETNAM
(LATER RENAMED CHI LINH)
IT FURTHER BRINGS TO LIGHT THE ADDED HEROIC ACTIONS TAKEN
BY
CPT. LAWRENCE M. LISS
ON 14 MAY 1967
THE ORIGINAL AWARD WAS
THE DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS
The National geographic Film Documentary can be seen at
www.larryliss.com
Research was started in 2008 and compiled by ILT (Ret) Arthur E. Liss
360-907-7329
Credit for CPT Liss’ biography goes to Jack Swickard http://swickardworld.blogspot.com
His blog “The Forgotten Mission”
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INJUSTICE
Question Five of DD 149:
The following are being submitted as injustices in this case which took place at the time of the
original award conferral in 1967 then during the upgrade review process and up to the present
preparation of the DD 149.
1.
The injustice of: An admission of adverse command influence by the II Field Force Flight
Detachment S-3, CPT John Green representing the Chain of Command.
2.
The injustice of: The limit on time waiver is being addressed by the attached document
referring to the start on 14 April 2007 till the last on 12 April 2013…six years.
3.
The injustice of: Letters were written and being ignored in attempts to clarify “why and
specifically how CPT Liss did not meet the criteria for the Medal of Honor”.
4.
The injustice of: Disallowing the reconsideration of the use of the Main Rotors by LTC
Stewart Stephenson on Sept 2, 2009 in his letter to Congressman Joe Sestak failed to
allow consideration of the procedure as being impossible and rare if ever used before.
5.
The injustice: By failing to consider General Weyand’s request in 2008/2009 for an
upgrade. A new affidavit is submitted by John Lovell aide to Congressman Pearce
discussing the events surrounding the decision by General Weyand to address the
issues so many years later (See section )
6.
The injustice of: Battle field conditions added to the hazards and risk associated with
flying an unarmed aircraft and succeeding over five complete landings and extractions.
The National Geographic Documentary Helicopter Wars-Vietnam Firefight submitted as
evidence. Here we redirect it back to the request for that added information that day.
7.
Clarification of the Act of Uncommon Valor demonstrated by CPT Liss and sworn to by
WO Tom Baca by exiting the aircraft defending the troops.
8.
Clarification of the Chain of Command requests.
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Injustice Points:
1.
Adverse command influence at the time of the action.
8. This case is about an “injustice” that took place after the mission participants returned done
admittedly by a young twenty-three year old CPT and Army Rotary aviator the S-3 of II Field
Force HQ’s Flight detachment. CPT John Green who in his own protective way (see attached emails) gave his friend and fellow aviator WO Tom Baca who had 10 days in country, an easy
mission did assign he and CPT Liss on his day off to an unarmed VIP helicopter while on a
Sunday to be his co-pilot. I have included the signed page from CPT Liss flight log showing the
action the day of 14 May 1967
9. CPT Green states he was remiss in conferring with the pilots after the mission due to a
misunderstanding. That misunderstanding was that CPT Liss who volunteered to fill in as the Copilot took command of the aircraft from WO Tom Baca during the highly dangerous rescue
mission. Further conversations with the pilots, crew or the Special Forces soldiers were not
conducted.
10. The history of that action was recorded in the DFC citations. It was not known that he was
angered by an assumption that CPT Liss as the ranking officer on board had assumed control of
the aircraft during the heat of combat. This misassumption has placed doubts on the accuracy of
the citation. (See tab referring to some of the original points of “new and substantial” submitted
in 2009).
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2.
The limit on time waiver
On April 13, 2007 an inquiry began out of the New Mexico office of Congressman Stevan
Pearce to the April 12, 2013 response from Assistant Secretary of the Army Thomas
Lamont. Ever since October 17, 2013 ongoing e-mails and phone calls to assit with
HRC/Army Awards Branch in the preparation of the DD 149 have occurred between COL
Mark Rado Deputy, The Adjutant General of the US Army US Army Human Resources
Command and LTC Collen Carr, Chief Army Awards and Decoration Branch.
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April 13, 2007…received Award Recommendations as written by Commander David F.
Williams, Jr. USNR (RET).
May 2007 to August 2007…attempted to gather information concerning the operation
and Award Citations for all concerned (per John Lovell at Congressman Pearce’s office.
June 2007 — David Williams submits note to New Mexico Congressman Steve Pearce,
recommending aircrews of award upgrades
June 2007 — Pearce aide John Lovell asks for affidavits from people involved in mission
June 10, 2007 — Receive email note from Kenneth Dolan, Jack Swickard’s copilot on Cau
Song Be mission
June 21, 2007 — Jack Swickard writes affidavit about mission
June 26, 2007 — Tom Baca writes affidavit about mission
July 2, 2007 — Larry Liss writes affidavit about mission
July 7, 2007 — Albert Croteau, Jack Swickard’s gunner on Cau Song Be mission, writes
affidavit
Oct. 15, 2007 — James Dopp, Special Forces medic at Cau Song Be, writes affidavit
August 22, 2008…Letter to Major General Galen Jackman, U. S. Army, Chief of the Office
of Army Legislative Affairs from Congressman Stevan Pearce concerning the letter from
Commander David F. Williams, Jr. USNR (RET), who wrote of the helo crews and their
conspicuous gallantry, superb airmanship and service above and beyond the call of duty
while under intense fire from enemy combatants by the crewmembers, rescued more
than 80 CIDG Forces from Cau Song Be Camp Detachment A 333, and with all
documentation from crewmembers and recommending upgrades for all of the members
present in these 10 helicopter extraction flights.
September 2, 2008…Letter to General Fredrick C. Weyand, U.S. Army (RET) from
Congressman Stevan Pearce, New Mexico requesting that the General might possibly be
the Recommender for awards upgrade for five crewmembers in the DA Form 638 which
requires an Officer’s signature, who had knowledge of this action and agrees to be the
Recommender.
September 15, 2008…John Lovell called and talked to General Weyand and CWO
Howard S. Okada, Adjutant to General Frederick C. Weyand in Hawaii. We talked about
all of the papers being submitted to the General for his review and a suggestion was
requested that the General please submit letters as he felt appropriate to assist in the
upgrade of the awards previously received by the helicopter crews under his command
in Vietnam. During this call to the General, he advised that upgrades of all the awards
were warranted and as soon as he received the package, he would help in the upgrade process.
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September 16, 2008…Mailed the letter and all attachments to General Fredrick C. Weyand that
we were submitting to the Army and honestly requested his advice on how to improve the
submission of the material. He was additionally requested to write any letter he felt was
necessary to further the cause of the eight heroic crewmembers.
November 10, 2008…Congressman Pearce was the recipient of a Letter from General Fred C.
Weyand. The General cites the performance of Captain Lawrence M. Liss, and says that he did
believe that these specific actions warranted the upgrading of an award performed an act of
bravery and heroism under intense combat conditions which merits an award for valor.
January 2009 — James Lovell, an aide to Congressman Steve Pearce, has documents for award
upgrades delivered to New Mexico Sen. Jeff Bingaman
Jan. 26, 2009 — Jack Swickard signs Right to Privacy Authorization Form, allowing Sen. Jeff
Bingaman’s staff to research background
April 2, 2009 letter to Senator Bingaman from LTC Marion Salters, Chief Military Awards Branch
(signed for him by LTC Stephen L. Harmon)
May 29, 2009 — Retired Lt. Col. Wallace Johnson, commander of Cau Song Be Special Forces
Camp on May 14, 1967, writes affidavit about helicopter rescue and recommends upgrade to
Medal of Honor for Tom Baca, Jack Swickard and Larry Liss; Distinguished Service Cross for Al
Croteau and Robert Gibson; and Silver Star Medal for Kenneth Dolan, James Dopp, Dan Lawler
(KIA) and Doug Lloyd (KIA)
May 29, 2009 letter from Congressman Sestak to then MG Galen Jackman Chief Legislative
Liaison
July 10, 2009 — Retired Gen. Fred C. Weyand, former Army chief of staff and commander of U.S.
military forces in Vietnam, writes letter to Maj. Gen. Galen B. Jackman, chief legislative liaison,
suggesting awards previously granted to aircrew members be reviewed to determine if
upgrades are warranted
July 24 and July 31, 2009 written by Congressman Joe Sestak to Awards Branch
July 24, 2009 — Frank G. Mills Sr., Pennsylvania VFW State Commander, writes letter to
Pennsylvania congressional delegation, recommending Larry Liss for the Medal of Honor
Aug. 3, 2009 — M.A. Gedra of the National Archives writes letter to Larry Liss, informing him
award case files, aside from this recommending award of the Medal of Honor, were not
considered permanent records before 1969 and, therefore, are not on file
Aug. 9, 2010 — Art Liss compiles listing of information learned about mission since May 14,
1967, as required by Department of the Army rules for award upgrade
Sept. 2, 2009 letter to Senator Casey from LTC Stephenson (signed for him by LTC Stephen L.
Harmon C/O Kurt Imhof
to Congressman Joe Sestak of Pennsylvania about Larry Liss’s award upgrade recommendation
Sept 2, 2009 letter to Senator Casey from LTC Stephenson (signed for him by LTC Stephen L.
Harmon
September 17, 2009 letter from LTC Stephen Harmon Awards Branch to Senator Casey C/O Kurt
Imhof
September 18, 2009 letter from Senator Casey to Larry
Big pause…………………while LTC request was being worked on.
February 21, 2010 Letter from LTC Stewart Stephenson to Larry answering clarification
questions.
June 25, 2010 letter to then Defense Secretary Robert Gates by Congressman Gerlach
June 25, 2010 Letter from LTC Stewart Stephenson to Senator Casey C/O Teresa Dennis
July 7, 2010 Letter From Teresa at Senator Casey’s office to Larry
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July 19, 2010 Letter from LTC Stewart Stephenson to Arthur Liss
July 22, 2010-Baca writes eye witness affidavit on Liss
July 22, 2010-Baca writes eye witness affidavit on Swickard
July 28, 2010- Liss writes eye witness affidavit on Baca
August 3, 2010-Swickard writes eye witness statement on Baca
August 3, 2010-Swickard writes eye witness statement on Liss
August 3, 2010-Swickard writes eye witness on Croteau
August 3, 2010 letter to Vice President Biden from Widener University (formally Pennsylvania
Military College) President James Harris.
August 4, 2010-Croteau writes eye witness statement on Swickard
August 9, 2010-Liss writes eyewitness on Swickard
August 10, 2010- Final copy of “New Facts about Cau Song Be” completed
August 31, 2010 Dept. of Army response to June 25, 2010 letter to Sec of Defense Robert Gates
September 21, 2010 from Stephenson to Gerlach regarding phone call on 08.17.2010
September 23, 2010 John Green letter attesting to adverse command influence sent to the DOA
Branch Chief
December 3, 2010 letter from Congressman Gerlach to LTC Stephenson
February 1, 2011 Letter from LTC Stewart Stephanson Awards Branch Chief to Congressman
Gerlach
March 29, 2011 letter from Senator Toomey to COL Laura Richardson your Senate Liaison which
was sent to LTC Stephenson
April 18, 2011 letter from LTC Stewart Stephenson to Senator Pat Toomey
May 11, 2011 letter from Senator Pat Toomey about the declination
July 27, 2011 letter from National VVA President John Rowan to Secretary of the Army McHugh
forwarded back to LTC Stephenson
October 5, 2011 Letter from Congressman Gerlach to Secretary of the Army John McHugh
Jan 3, 2012 letter from Secretary of the Army Mc Hugh to Congressman Gerlach
May 22, 2012 Letter to Asst Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs with
signatures of Pearce, Toomey and Gerlach
August 7, 2012 Letter from LTC Michael Reis Asst Chief Awards Branch to Congressman Gerlach
December 13, 2012 another letter to Asst Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve
Affairs with signatures of Pearce, Toomey and Gerlach
April 12, 2013 Letter from Lamont to Senator Toomey
May 7, 2013 Letter from Jeanne Rowan AMCMR with a DD 149 attached
The year starts here
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3.
Letters were written and were ignored in attempts to clarify “why and
specifically how CPT Liss did not meet the criteria for the Medal of
Honor” and reference to a “comparison” cannot be done as pointed
out by Secretary McHugh.
A) Congressman Jim Gerlach submitted this three page narrative to the Army Awards Branch
on 12.03.2010. It did not contain specific reference to how the Medal of Honor was
achieved. Nowhere in the narrative did he refer to the Medal of Honor thereby not
presenting the “reasons for” other than statements “about”.
B) February 1, 2011 the letter from LTC Stephenson the Awards Branch Chief said “that the
degree of action and service rendered did not meet the criteria for the proposed award.”
C) October 5, 2011 Congressman Gerlach wrote Secretary of the Army Mc Hugh and for the
first time specifically referred to the fact the criteria was meet offering the some of the
following points:
1) Flying in an unarmed helicopter
2) Volunteered to rescue allied troops against an estimated 600-700 enemy combatants
3) That they did something never done before using the main rotors to clear through
vegetation up to 40’ creating their own LZ
4) That General Fred Weyand the units Commanding General wrote in 2009 citing the
mission calling their action “Uncommon Valor”.
5) That 5th Special Forces CDR sited “extraordinary heroism” saving over 80 soldiers.
6) That there was no A-1E aircraft support no gunship support nor artillery support.
7) That the definition of the MOH as it refers to “Conspicuous Gallantry” and intrepidity at
the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while engaged against in an action
against an enemy of the United States did in fact reach that level.
8) He further said ‘While I have exchanged several letters and participated in a conference
call with Army staffers, I have yet to receive a satisfactory and reasonable explanation
why I have yet to receive a satisfactory and reasonable explanation on why, if CPT Liss
meets the criteria established by the Army, his application for upgrading his
Distinguished Flying Cross Medal to the Medal of Honor has been rejected”.
D) January 3, 2012 (letter incorrectly stated 2011) from Secretary of the Army John Mc Hugh
provided that answer “The Board did not recommend upgrade to the Medal of Honor
because it determined that CPT Liss’ package, compared to other awards packages from the
same time frame, did not merit the awarding of the Medal of Honor.
1) The only viable comparisons at the MOH level are seven. During the entire war out of
246 MOH decorations, only seven were to Army Rotary aviators. There is no
comparison; each case is unique and different. The following are comparisons of each of
the seven pointing out the unique aspects to each. We have provided the proposed
citation for CPT Liss noting those unique qualities that were apparent during his mission.
CPT Liss in his mission shared the flight duties, & going down through tall vegetation himself, exited the air craft on
two occasions firing his weapons. Something none of the other seven MOH recipients did .
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Clarification of miscommunications via the
loss of Legislative elections in
2008/2010/2012 and staff changes
Legislative disruption slowed the process down and contributed to a lack of
understanding from office holder to office holder.
a) Congressman Stevan Pearce submitted original “upgrade” inquiry with
attachments on 22 August 2008 to then Legislative Liaison MG Galen
Jackman and a personal letter to General Fred Weyand on 2 Sept 2008 and
19 Nov 2008 file preparation e-mail for Senator Bingaman.
He lost his election 4 November 2008
b) Congressman Joe Sestak began work in 2009. He recommended the Medal
of Honor 29 Sept 2010
He lost his election 2 November 2010
c) Senator Jeff Bingaman was involved and retired effective with the 2012
election
His term ended 6 November 2012
d) Senator Casey changed staff positions in 2010 where Kurt Imhoff was
replaced by Teresa Dennis. Also through E-mails note the delays with the
New Mexico delegation.
e) Senator Patrick Toomey after the 2012 election began advocating
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Introducing all seven Army aviation Medal of Honor citations
and extracting those points of intrepidity/valor to compare
to the proposed MOH citation of CPT Liss.
Intrepidity as it pertained to the Seven Medal of Honor Army rotary aviators
These are condensed and specific references not a full citation.
1) Ed Freeman:
Intrepidity: Captain Freeman risked his own life by flying his unarmed helicopter through a
gauntlet of enemy fire time after time, delivering critically needed ammunition, water and medical
supplies to the besieged battalion. Captain Freeman flew 14 separate rescue missions, providing
life-saving evacuation of an estimated 30 seriously wounded soldiers -- some of whom would not
have survived had he not acted. All flights were made into a small emergency landing zone
within 100 to 200 meters of the defensive perimeter where heavily committed units were
perilously holding off the attacking elements.
2) Bruce Crandall: Crandall made the decision –
without anyone requesting that he do so - to fly the medevac missions. When he asked for
volunteers, his former colleague in Vietnam, Maj. (ret.) Ed Freeman, who had been his friend for
10 years before they deployed together to Vietnam, immediately stepped forward. Crandall's
helicopter led the two, and he supervised the loading of seriously wounded Soldiers over the
course of 14 landings under intense enemy fire. He and Freeman saved the lives of some 70
wounded Soldiers.
Intrepidity: While medical evacuation was not his mission, he immediately sought volunteers
and with complete disregard for his own personal safety, led the two aircraft to Landing Zone XRay. Despite the fact that the landing zone was still under relentless enemy fire, Major Crandall
landed and proceeded to supervise the loading of seriously wounded soldiers aboard his aircraft.
After his first medical evacuation, Major Crandall continued to fly into and out of the landing zone
throughout the day and into the evening. That day he completed a total of 22 flights, most under
intense enemy fire, retiring from the battlefield only after all possible service had been rendered to
the Infantry battalion. His actions provided critical resupply of ammunition and evacuation of the
wounded.
3) Pat Brady: awarded the Medal of Honor for a series of rescues during which he used 3
helicopters to rescue over 60 wounded.
Intrepidity: volunteered to rescue wounded men from a site in enemy held territory which was
reported to be heavily defended and to be blanketed by fog. To reach the site he descended
through heavy fog and smoke and hovered slowly along a valley trail, turning his ship sideward to
blow away the fog with the backwash from his rotor blades. Despite the unchallenged, closerange enemy fire, he found the dangerously small site, where he successfully landed and
evacuated 2 badly wounded South Vietnamese soldiers. He was then called to another area
completely covered by dense fog where American casualties lay only 50 meters from the enemy.
Two aircraft had previously been shot down and others had made unsuccessful attempts to reach
this site earlier in the day. With unmatched skill and extraordinary courage, Maj. Brady made 4
flights to this embattled landing zone and successfully rescued all the wounded. (How many?)
4) Stephen W. Pless:
Intrepedity: serving as a helicopter gunship pilot. Maj. Pless displayed exceptional airmanship as
he launched a devastating attack against the enemy force, killing or wounding many of the enemy
and driving the remainder back into a treeline. His rocket and machinegun attacks were made at
such low levels that the aircraft flew through debris created by explosions from its rockets. When
the wounded men were aboard, Maj. Pless maneuvered the helicopter out to sea. Before it
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became safely airborne, the overloaded aircraft settled 4 times into the water. Displaying superb
airmanship, he finally got the helicopter aloft. Major Pless' extraordinary heroism coupled with his
outstanding flying skill prevented the annihilation of the tiny force.
5) William E. Adams…Posthumously
Intrepidity: On May 25, 1971, Adams, a major, volunteered to fly a lightly armed helicopter
mission to rescue three wounded soldiers from a besieged firebase in Kontum Province, despite
the clear weather which would provide the numerous enemy aircraft around the location with
clear visibility. Despite fire from machine gun emplacements and rockets, Adams succeeded in
landing at the firebase while supporting attacked the enemy positions. After takeoff, however, the
helicopter was hit by fire. Adams momentarily regained control and attempted to land, however
the helicopter exploded in mid air and crashed. Adams, who was 31 at the time, was killed.
6) Frederick E. Ferguson: CWO Ferguson, commander of a resupply helicopter
Intrepidity: monitoring an emergency call from wounded passengers and crewmen of a downed
helicopter under heavy attack within the enemy controlled city of Hue, unhesitatingly volunteered
to attempt evacuation. Despite warnings from all aircraft to stay clear of the area due to heavy
antiaircraft fire, CWO Ferguson began a low-level flight at maximum airspeed along the Perfume
River toward the tiny, isolated South Vietnamese Army compound in which the crash survivors
had taken refuge. Coolly and skillfully maintaining his course in the face of intense, short range
fire from enemy occupied buildings and boats, he displayed superior flying skill and tenacity of
purpose by landing his aircraft in an extremely confined area in a blinding dust cloud under
heavy mortar and small-arms fire. Although the helicopter was severely damaged by mortar
fragments during the loading of the wounded, CWO Ferguson disregarded the damage and,
taking off through the continuing hail of mortar fire, he flew his crippled aircraft on the return route
through the rain of fire that he had experienced earlier and safely returned his wounded
passengers to friendly control. CWO Ferguson's extraordinary determination saved the lives of 5
of his comrades.
7) Michael Novosel: CWO Novosel, 82d Medical Detachment, distinguished himself while serving
as commander of a medical evacuation helicopter.
Intrepidity: He unhesitatingly maneuvered his helicopter into a heavily fortified and defended
enemy training area where a group of wounded Vietnamese soldiers were pinned down by a
large enemy force. Flying without gunship or other cover and exposed to intense machinegun fire,
CWO Novosel was able to locate and rescue a wounded soldier. Since all communications with
the beleaguered troops had been lost, he repeatedly circled the battle area, flying at low level
under continuous heavy fire, to attract the attention of the scattered friendly troops. This display of
courage visibly raised their morale, as they recognized this as a signal to assemble for
evacuation. On 6 occasions he and his crew were forced out of the battle area by the intense
enemy fire, only to circle and return from another direction to land and extract additional troops.
Near the end of the mission, a wounded soldier was spotted close to an enemy bunker. Fully
realizing that he would attract a hail of enemy fire, CWO Novosel nevertheless attempted the
extraction by hovering the helicopter backward. As the man was pulled on aboard, enemy
automatic weapons opened fire at close range, damaged the aircraft and wounded CWO
Novosel. He momentarily lost control of the aircraft, but quickly recovered and departed under the
withering enemy fire. In all, 15 extremely hazardous extractions were performed in order to
remove wounded personnel. As a direct result of his selfless conduct, the lives of 29 soldiers
were saved
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8) LISS, LAWRENCE M. CPT II Field Force Vietnam
Intrepidity: Distinguished himself by conspicuous gallantry and intrepidness above and beyond the
call of duty on 14 May 1967, in combat with an opposing armed force in the Republic of Vietnam. On
this date, Captain Liss was both the CMD pilot (extraction 2 and 4) and co-pilot (extraction 1,3 and
5) sharing the duties in an unarmed, VIP helicopter while transporting the II Field Forces (Vietnam)
staff chaplain on this Sunday to Special Forces camps in the III Corps area for services. Upon arriving
at Cau Song Be Special Forces Camp, the pilot in command, Warrant Officer Thomas Baca on the
first extraction was asked by a Special Forces major to evacuate wounded members of a South
Vietnamese Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) company and U.S. Special Forces advisors who
had been ambushed and were under fire near Cau Song Be. While the command pilot flew to the
evacuation zone, Captain Liss continued to call for additional help. Upon reaching the evacuation
site, Captain Liss assessed the unfolding ambush by the North Vietnamese Regulars and reported his
assessment to the commander of the Special Forces advisors at Cau Song Be. To reach the wounded
troops on the ground, the command pilot used the helicopter’s main rotor blades to chop through
bamboo and trees as it descended. After evacuating the wounded troops and under continuous
enemy fire, the helicopter crew was asked to help extract the remaining CIDG troops and Special
Forces advisors. Captain Liss flew the helicopter with its damaged rotor blades on the second and
fourth of five extractions under fire. On the third approach to extract the South Vietnamese and
U.S. troops, Captain Liss realized radio contact with the ground force had been lost. Upon landing,
he left his seat and, exposing himself to intense ground fire from the enemy, helped the CIDG
troops get on board his helicopter. Continuous small-arms fire wounded and killed more of the
troops already aboard the aircraft. The helicopter again flew the troops back to Cau Song Be.
Captain Liss then flew the fourth extraction flight. Knowing full well the perimeter had shrunk to a
diameter of less than 50 feet and the enemy was increasing its resolve to stop the extraction and
bring down the helicopter, Captain Liss was able to maneuver his UH-1D helicopter for takeoff and
again returned to the camp. On the fifth extraction, flown by the command pilot, the perimeter
had shrunk to a small group of CIDG troops, Captain Liss again left the cockpit, with total disregard
for his own safety, and continued to assist evacuees onto the aircraft. Liss knew his helicopter had
to extract all of the remaining 18 soldiers. Captain Liss directed troops into the cargo bay and told
others to stand on the skids. He then returned to his seat in the cockpit and gave the “go” sign to
the command pilot to take off. As the helicopter was taking off, Captain Liss held onto two CIDG
soldiers hanging onto his door and window by their lapels until the helicopter landed safely at the
camp. Liss’s actions in the rescue of an additional 87 South Vietnamese and U.S. soldiers were in
keeping with the highest traditions of the U.S. Army and reflect great credit upon himself and the
United States Army.
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4.
The injustice of: Disallowing the reconsideration of the use of the Main Rotors by LTC
Stewart Stephenson on Sept 2, 2009 in his letter to Congressman Joe Sestak failed to allow
consideration of the procedure as being impossible and rare if ever used before. It is a basis for
the criteria for the Medal of Honor as presented:
(Continued below)
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DISCUSSION:
The use of the Main Rotors to chop down or cut your way into a landing zone is risky placing the lives of
the crew at risk, downing the aircraft, the skills necessary to work under heavy combat conditions while
watching out for main and tail rotor strikes especially in an unarmed VIP helicopter. CPT Liss and crew
were subjected to six separate and ongoing rescue missions and this as not just simple “weed whacking.
Is this the definition of the Medal of Honor that of intrepidity “above and beyond the call of duty”
performed as such to separate him from “what would be expected of their peers”?
AN EXPERT’S POINT OF VIEW:
1. General Brown’s letter is a way for him to describe the risks of a “blade strike”. As an
experienced Vietnam Veteran and Army Rotary Wing Aviator, General (Ret) Doug Brown
is not making a formal MOH recommendation. His point of view does lead the reader to
understand the risks and “what if at 40’ it could be proven”?
TO RECAP WHAT HE OFFERED:
a. “Using a rotor blade as a way to chop into an LZ is not taught, recommended or
allowed”
b. The letter from Congress states it was “dense vegetation and bamboo to 40’, if
accurate that would indeed be an amazing feat, one that I have never seen.”
c. “It would be totally impossible in my judgment to chop your way through dense
vegetation and not destroy the blades. They may get you home but would not be
useable again”.
d. “Again, I am totally impressed with the Act of Valor, but to know if it is sufficient
for me to recommend and MOH would take would take great additional study or
analysis”
2. I refer back to the original DFC of CPT Liss which said “to successfully land on a narrow
dirt road flanked by bamboo thickets and heavy foliage, CPT Liss had to use his rotors to
cut through the dense underbrush … an extremely hazardous undertaking…again using
his Rotors to clear a path for takeoff CPT Liss brought the wounded soldiers back to Cau
Song Be. Upon landing he was asked to return to evacuate the entire company.”
3. The reference to 40’ was affirmed by the SF Medic on the flight SPC 5 James Dopp who
attested to: “the vegetation was tall, by my estimation 40’. There was no clear opening; The
piloting to maneuver down through the same vegetation was unusual yet bold and decisive; it
took extreme courage for these pilots to return to the area with neither active air support nor a
ground element to suppress anti-aircraft fire; the pilot found a small extremely small landing
pad, surrounded by tall trees (I estimate 40’-50’ or more). We took out the first 5-6 CIDG’s to
reach the helicopter. As we lifted off we received intense small arms fire directed at the
helicopter. Some of the fire with green tracers appeared to me to be from what I came to know
as a wheel mounted, 51 caliber machine gun, a formidable anti-aircraft weapon.”
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4. Further reference to aviation intrepidity can be gleaned from the book “We were Soldiers” on
page 109/110 where in MOH recipient Bruce Crandall wrote:
“Crandall now powered his over loaded Huey out of X-ray, hitting some tree tops with his Main Rotor
on the way, he recalls. We almost didn’t make it. In training sometimes we deliberately hit the tree
tops with our skids to scare the shit out of the Infantry, especially if they were new guys. But hitting
trees with the rotor blades scared the shit out of me. Once we cleared the trees we again received
fire. When we got back to Plei Me, I switched back to my first ship which had been checked out and
refueled”.
POINT OF REFERENCE:
This was an accidental strike going up not a purposeful strike coming down.
Reality was to even MOH recipient Bruce Crandall…it scared the shit out of him.
Further, he changed helicopters.
16
5.
The injustice: Lack of consideration to General Weyand’s request in 2008/2009 for an upgrade.
He was the highest ranking General Officer at the time of the original award. A new affidavit is
submitted by John Lovell dated 21 January 2014 aide to Congressman Pearce discussing the events
surrounding the decision by General Weyand to address the issues so many years later.(See A43)
General Weyand had a sterling career spanning three wars. Of note in his attention to this case was the
fact he was:
1) The Legislative Liaison from 1962 to 1964
2) Weyand was in Vietnam through three critical periods, arriving as commander of the 25th
Infantry Division in Vietnam. He commanded II Field Force. After serving on the US negotiating
team in Paris peace talks for two years, Weyand returned in 1970 for his final Vietnam tour as
Commander of MACV.
3) Appointed Army Chief of Staff, succeeding Gen. Creighton Abrams who died of lung cancer in
September 1974. He retired in 1976
General Weyand, Congressman Pearce and his aide John Lovell period 2008
Two time frames were involved: 1) the initial conversations that produced references to CPT Liss and the
initial recommendation for a Silver Star on 10 November 2008 and 2) the added evidence he received
which prompted the more compelling “Uncommon Valor” letter of 10 July 2009 recognizing all of the
original awards should be higher.
The process started with
1) CDR David Williams a Riverine SQD operative during Vietnam who wrote a letter on 13 April
2007 to Congressman Pearce informing him of Jack Swickard ’s part in the historic mission.
2) Congressman Pearce writes MG Galen Jackman the Legislative Liaison on 22 August with
attachments.
3) Congressman Pearce out reaches to General Fred Weyand well into retirement on 2 Sept
2008 sending him similar attachments asking for assistance in being “the recommender”
and assist with the appropriate paperwork. He included the picture of he and CPT Liss at the
Awards presentation.
4) John Lovell spoke with General Weyand on 15 Sept 2008 who “advised that upgrades of all
awards were warranted and as soon as he received the package, he would help in the
upgrade process.”
5) John Lovell mailed the packet on 16 September 2008 to General Weyand who “was
additionally requested to write any letter he felt was necessary to further the cause of the
eight heroic crew members.”
6) Congressman Pearce received a letter 10 October 2008 from General Fred Weyand. “He cited
the performance of CPT Liss and said that he did believe that these specific actions
17
warranted the upgrading of an award performed an act of bravery and heroism under
intense combat conditions which merits an award for Valor.”
Six months later new evidence was gathered for the General to review
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
The National Geographic Documentary depicting his role at the end of the movie.
A copy of the DFC citation he personally signed on 19 June 1967 for CPT Liss
Photo of CPT Liss and General Weyand at Awards presentation at II Field Force Hq.
An MOH recommendation from Congressman Joe Sestak
The “key document” was the personal account from CPT Wallace Johnson an eye witness
who wrote an affidavit about the missions success as commander of 5th Special Forces
Detachment A-333
6) New facts on Cau Song Be
7) July 11, 2009…CWO Okada sent a copy of General Weyand’s letter of July 10, 2009 to Major
General Galen B. Jackman, Chief of Legislative Liaison, 1600 Army Pentagon Washington, DC
20310. It was a heads up notifying me that the upgrades recommended all of the flight
crewmembers deserved further consideration for higher awards. He considered that the
process might begin now and completed later. I still have CWO Okada’s envelope that was
sent to me on July 11, 2009.
8) July 10, 2009 “Uncommon Valor” letter from General Weyand to MG Galen B. Jackman
recommending upgrades of all awards.
18
6.
Battle field conditions added to the hazards and risk associated with flying an unarmed aircraft
and succeeding over five complete landings and extractions. The Documentary is submitted supporting
the request on 2 Sept 2009 from LTC Stewart Stephenson Chief, Awards Branch:
An award narrative that specifically details “the conditions and situation at the time of the Soldier’s action
as well as details concerning the actions of said Soldier, records, extracts, sketches, maps, diagrams and
photography which support the level of heroism, an official unit, report of the action, and multiple
eyewitness statements that specifically details the soldiers actions”.
Battlefield Conditions
The conditions that existed that day were germane to both WO Baca and CPT Liss who shared
the flight duties while CPT Liss exited the aircraft twice and experienced what is described as
follows. The uniqueness of this mission is in the piloting maneuverability required to operate not
once but five times in these conditions as well as exiting the aircraft twice under these
conditions. This mission was on the last day of JUNCTION CITY a major offense. This map could
be viewed as enemy forces being driven that last day to the NE, right into the A-333 patrol.
.
The size of the enemy force as reported in the original three DFC’s was:
1) LISS” “well armed enemy force”
2) BACA “numerically superior force
3) SWICKARD “heavily armed force”
Higher command did not know that the extent of the numbers stated by Johnson and Dopp was 600
and never made known to the pilots. None of them were interviewed as part of the preparation for
the award of the DFC.
Allied soldiers onboard or getting onboard the helicopter
Attested to since the award from 1967
1) The aircrews providing statements during 2009 and 2010 and the 2009/2010 BBC film entitled
“Vietnam Firefight,” clearly state that numerous allied soldiers were killed on the aircraft while
they were boarding the helicopters or already had boarded.
2) SF Medic Dopp along with many of the crew members describes through statements and the
film “Vietnam Firefight, seeing many allied soldiers shot as they tried to reach the helicopter
flown by Baca and Liss during the medical evacuation that immediately preceded the rescue of
the allied unit.
Prior to the award in 1967
3) There is no mention in the award citations and orders of the allied soldiers being killed during
the extraction from the Landing Zone. There is actually no mention of wounded or dead, since
no one was ever interviewed.
4) Nor is there mention of allied soldiers being shot as they tried to reach the Baca-Liss helicopter
during the medical evacuation.
19
SPC 5 Medic James Dopp with Detachment A-333 in his affidavit dated 15 October 2007
Actions of the flight preceding Liss/Baca:
Although new in country and new to the team, MSG Lloyd insisted on taking his turn on the next
operation and was joined by the most experienced NCO on the team SFC Hughes. They walked into a large
ambush. The survivors were regrouping and radioing for assistance. The vegetation in the area was
extremely dense with short visibility and few remarkable features that would make it impossible to
identify their location from earlier reports they had sent in. We were over very thick vegetation not far
from the Song Be River. There was no clear area near these men where a helicopter could set down or
even hover safely. Despite the potential danger Major Ronnie Mendoza ordered his pilot to go in closer.
The he started to tie a rope around my waist, telling me he wanted me on the ground as quickly as
possible to help SFC Hughes. The helicopter began taking small arms fire. To keep me from being exposed
too long he asked his pilot to move down as close as he could get. Then the rear tail rotor clipped a tree
and the helicopter started to wobble erratically. The pilot said he thought we were going down. He
managed to keep us in the air for several minutes then set us down on a road.
Actions related to the Liss/Baca flight:
The Major was able to get several other helicopters (Liss/Baca and Swickard/Dolan) sent to pick us up and
start the extraction of the entire CIDG Company. In as much as one helicopter had already been forced
down it took extreme courage for these pilots to return to the area with neither active air support nor a
ground element to suppress anti-aircraft fire.
The pilot found a small extremely tight landing pad surrounded by tall trees (I estimate 40-50’ tall). We
took out the first 5-6 CIDG’s to reach the helicopter. As we lifted off, intense small arms fire was directed
at the helicopter. Some of the fire with green tracers appeared to me to be from what I came to know as a
wheel mounted 51 cal. machine gun, a formidable anti-aircraft weapon.
Our other team medic SGT Wm. Gallagher went on the next extraction. He reported that the small arms
fire intensified more with each trip as the enemy force was able to close in on the evacuation site as the
number of defenders dwindled.
It was determined later by the 1st IN Div that the force encountered by the helicopter crews was Battalion
size or greater.
With the exception of the protracted engagement of the Special Forces Camp Loc Ninh in October 1967,
the level of fire was the most intense I encountered during the war. What was most remarkable was the
willingness of the helicopter pilots to work in an area with such dense cover and poor landing conditions
and so much concentrated fire power. On other occasions I experienced having pilots decline to even set
us down in areas far less hostile.
SPC 5 Medic James Dopp with Detachment A-333 in his affidavit dated 13 February 2014
See attached for vivid recollections
20
ILT Al Croteau was with the 118th Assault Helicopter Co and Commander of the
198th Signal Corp Detachment…
He was an Avionics Engineer. He was required to be sure the ability to talk from “helicopter to other
helicopter, ground combat forces and air traffic control. These absolute requirements make the Signal
Detachment an essential part of the overall team within the Assault Helicopter Co.
A door gunner is a crewman tasked with firing and maintaining manually directed armament aboard a
helicopter. The actual role will vary depending on the task given on a particular mission...
ILT Croteau volunteered on this mission to be the acting door gunner a duty which he was not trained
for.
I have attached his affidavit dated 4 August 2010 and 12 December 2013
He refers to the action while on the second aircraft in the LZ.
1) “When we hit the ground troops appeared I left the craft and started to load the ship with
wounded and dead.
2) Whenever we landed, soldiers rushed both ships to get on. At times they had to be removed or
prevented from boarding otherwise the ship would have been extremely overloaded even more so
then they were. It was only through courage and extra ordinary skill of both PICS that the
helicopters ever took off.
3) “We took in the load, the dead bodies were piling up, one guy lost his head and I grabbed his
carbine and put it next to me.
4) Al remembers holding people off, making sure nobody else got on”. “You could see the fear
there, but there wasn’t panic. There weren’t people pushing and shoving; they were trying to get
on, but it was a politeness to it”. “They were disciplined”.
5) When the Huey chopped its way to the ground, Al remembers it as a whirlwind.”
6) “It was an absolutely devastating noise. It was almost like a tornado type of noise. My mind was
just picturing those rotor blades> I thought “He’s just destroying this aircraft>” It was just horrifying:
it was horrifying. The noise was tremendous. And the debris was flying everywhere.”
7) Though Al’s M-60 machine gun has jammed as the Huey approached the South Vietnamese
soldiers, Jack thought it was still operating. I remember telling Jack, “the gun has jammed; my M60’s were jammed…”.
8) “When I was on the ground, I never fired. Once we landed, I never fired. I emptied ,my .45 and
put it back in the holster, and once we landed, I never used a weapon again.”
21
CPT Wallace Johnson, CDR Detachment A-333 in his affidavit dated 29 May 2009
“The pilots (Baca on the initial run) successfully created a makeshift LZ close to Gibson's position by
forcing the helicopter down through the bamboo forest. That was an unheard of maneuver for a UH-1
aircraft, but doing it five additional times makes it really unique. At this point, I have to state that about
15 minutes prior to that moment, another helicopter had attempted a similar landing on the trail, but
damaged its tail rotor blade and had to withdraw to a safer position. We extracted 6 or 7 CIDG on that
initial run and returned to the camp to figure out how to get closer to Gibson and Lloyd and the rest of
the Civilian Irregulars, which numbered about 100.”
“We arrived back at Cau Song Be (Chi Linh), and as we landed, we saw that the Paymaster's helicopter,
piloted by Jack Swickard, had also landed on our air strip. The pilots began coordinating how to extract
the remaining forces. I elected to stay back to coordinate what I knew would have to be the total the
extraction of our entire unit. We totally lost communication between the second and third extraction.
The pilots, Baca, Liss, Swickard and Dolan managed to fly 5 or 6 sorties each while extracting our entire
CIDG Company and two USSF soldiers. Each time that they returned, the pilot flying that particular sortie
had to again, use his rotor blades to make more room to maneuver to get close enough to our remaining
forces. The enemy force that our folks encountered that Sunday afternoon was much larger and more
determined than any another VC/NVA force we had met on previous missions. The pilots and crew
members of those two helicopters were extremely brave and demonstrated extraordinary heroism by
flying a non-MEDEVAC and unarmed helicopter into the midst of an intense fire fight that resulted in
saving 80 or more lives with no fire support from gunships, artillery or A-IE aircraft support.”
“Once again, had it not been for the heroic efforts of the helicopter pilots and their crews, the entire
team of close to 100, would have been killed or captured and Camp Cau Song BelChi Linh, under
equipped on that day, would surely have been overrun. I have also since reviewed all of the statements
and affidavits that constitute a part of the submissions for the three Medals of Honor, two Distinguished
Service Crosses and four Silver Stars. Based upon that information and my own personal remembrance
of, and involvement in, the events that took place at Camp Cau Song Bel Chi Linh, all of the information
is accurate and clearly represents the extraordinary actions of that day.”
“Intrepidity” a point of comparison at Cau Song Be and by Dakota Meyer in Afghanistan a recent MOH
recipient regarding returning to rescue soldiers not once but five times during the battlefield
CDR David Williams observing for Congressman Pearce said this about Cau Song Be on 16 Sept 2008“It is one thing
to do a heroic act instinctively in a moment of danger; it is quite another to have time to think about it, do it once
and see the danger up close and personal, and then do it several more times knowing the danger is mounting with
each mission. You could have chosen at any time to not go back and no one would have faulted you. But you kept
going back for as long as there was hope for more rescues.
Bing West, a Marine combat veteran of the Vietnam War and former assistant secretary of defense, wrote about
Meyer in his book, “The Wrong War,” saying: “For a man to charge into fire once requires grit that is instinctive
in few men ... to go in a fourth time is to know you will die; to go in a fifth time is beyond comprehension.
22
The attached photos are “clips” from the National Geographic Documentary
“Helicopter Wars-Vietnam Firefight 2009 and were taken in Vietnam in
2008 at the landing zone and are representative of the conditions that
existed at the time. One photo is a computerized enhancement of the act of
descending down through the same vegetation.
Simulated blade
strike from the Documentary
23
24
7.
Clarification of the Act of Uncommon Valor demonstrated by CPT Liss and sworn to by WO Tom
Baca by exiting the aircraft defending the troops while speeding their evacuation.
WO Tom Baca had 10 days left in country. He was the CMD Pilot and was the eyewitness who
attested to the actions of CPT Liss. Both WO Baca and CPT Liss were awarded the Distinguished
Flying Cross for Valor.
I refer now to two documents, the affidavit dated 22 July 2010 and the narrative from the
National Geographic Documentary as it pertains to the actions of CPT Liss.
Excerpts from affidavit dated 22 July 2010.
1. Upon being asked to volunteer to go and rescue the besieged soldiers, “I
remember thinking…no machine guns, no medics, only a crew chief and no
gunner. We had an active firefight on the ground and no gunship support. I had
only a few weeks remaining before I headed home.”
2. Upon arriving at the landing site…””it was a narrow trail covered by 30”’ high
bamboo forest that extended away from the trail for several thousand meters. I
descend down through on the first extraction. CPT Liss assessed the situation
tactically staying close to the controls. His valuable call outs of obstacles, etc
during the approach and landing allowed me to complete the initial landing
without disastrous failure”.
3. “After the first return we received a call to be prepared to evacuate the entire
force. CPTL Liss flew the third and fifth trips. Due to friendly troop’s movement,
he had to cut through new bamboo in order to land close to them inside the
shrinking perimeter.”
4. “I witnessed CPT Liss, in total disregard for his own well-being and safety exit
the aircraft on the fifth and six landings with his personal weapons to assist in
rallying the troops left on the ground. He was totally exposed to small arms fire
on both of these courageous initiatives. They were outside of his normal duties
of a pilot, but showed bravery beyond the call of duty.”
25
This incident was described as narrative discussion while in Vietnam in 2008 at
the LZ in the documentary “Helicopter Wars Vietnam Firefight”.
36:03
Announcer: “amid the flying bullets Larry Liss leaves Tom at the controls and jumps
out.”
36:09 Liss: “People were struggling to get on, we would have to come back again and I got
out…and I shoved three or four people on. And I just said to myself “I’m going to get
shot in the back, and then I said I’m going to get shot in the back and I am going to live
and be a paraplegic. I had all this stuff was going through my head.”
36:33 Baca:” I mean he has an infantry background, Special Forces background and so you
know he was a hard charging guy and he got out with his CAR 15 and he was out there
fighting and I was just sitting there waiting to die and holding onto the controls.”
5. “During the last extraction we were overloaded with CIDG Forces, with some on
the skids. On take-off CPT Liss virtually held onto two troops standing on the
skids while staying close to the controls…”
6. The active participation of CPT Lawrence Liss resulted in the rescue of over 80
allied troops and one US Special Forces Advisor. His ground tactical experience
and knowledge, plus his aviation expertise were invaluable to the successful
outcome of the mission.
7. In my opinion, CPT Liss’ courage, aggressiveness, determination nd leadership
under extreme conditions warrants an upgrade from the Distinguished Flying
Cross to the Medal of Honor. Had the details of the mission been known at the
IIFF Headquarters, such a recommendation would probably been made at the
time.
8. The Special Forces personnel involved did not have the administrative
mechanism to fully present the nature of the mission to higher authorities. Just
recently participants in the mission have been contacted to solicit their
recollections of that day. CPT Johnson and SP/5 Dopp have provided supporting
witness statements for this unselfish act of heroism by CPT Liss. Recognition and
upgrade are overdue.
26
8.
Clarification of the Chain of Command requests.
The Chain of Command consisted of two…and one more…CPT Wallace Johnson
(on the ground and an eye witness) who assumed command the moment the
helicopters volunteered their aircraft for this mission.
1) General Weyand was Commander of II Field Force
a) General Weyand as former commander of IIFF signed his letter on 10 July 2009
and was sent a DD Form 638 on CPT Liss’ action on 14 April 2009
2) Major Harry Drotor was CDR IIFF Flight Detachment and died in 1973.
3) The Flight Detachment had no XO, CPT John Green was the second in command
writing to LTC Stephenson on 23 Sept 2010 as his staff S-3 offering an apology for his
part in adverse command influence that existed at the time.
4) CPT Wallace Johnson, CDR 5th Special Forces Detachment A-333
a) CPT Wallace Johnson affidavit 29 May 2009, DD Form 638 on CPT Liss’ action as
well as proposed MOH citation
27
Some concluding thoughts
The case is being submitted for an upgrade of the original award.
It is the request of the applicant that the Medal of Honor be conferred and or the
Distinguished Service Cross if proof is still not discernable for this action as it pertains
to CPT Lawrence M. Liss. WO Baca the CMD pilot attested to CPT Liss exiting the
aircraft twice firing his weapons to speed the ground troops. This added to the already
piloting risk he placed on himself and the mission “above and beyond the call of duty”.
A pilot though trained for this if in desperate straits, is not equipped to do so unless
taking extreme measure to save their own lives. Herein it was done to save others.
A Rotary Wing pilot is not a combatant. On 14 May 1967 he flew an unarmed VIP
helicopter which was not equipped for combat and voluntarily chose to go on this rescue
mission was asked by the besieged 5th Special Forces CDR Wallace Johnson of
Detachment A-333.
He was not authorized to attempt a blade strike to chop his way into a nonexistent LZ
which, if unsuccessful, would have compromised the mission.
Many aviators disbelieve this was possible. LTC Stewart Stephenson as Chief, Army
Awards Branch on 2 Sept 2009 in a letter to then Congressman Joe Sestak chose to dis
allow reintroduction of the blade strike. This unfairly fails to address the rarity of the
event of which this discussion has so focused itself.
CPT Liss as well as all of the original seven participants are still alive. He wishes to be
heard and address the ABCMR Board as its highest ranking officer.
Arthur E. Liss
1LT USAR 1968-1970
Applicant for CPT Lawrence M. Liss
360-907-7329
19502 NE 14th Circle
Camas, WA 98607