Latin America
R. James Ferguson © 2006
Week 10:
The Latin American Search for Security and
Foreign Policy Convergence in the 21st Century
Topics: -
1. Types of Security
2. The Problem of Insecurity in the Latin American Context
3. Beyond Traditional Patterns of Military Cooperation
4. Lessons from the Malvinas Dispute: Diplomatic Mismanagement
and Military Over-reach
5. Haiti and the Failure of International Invention
6. The Search for a Convergent Foreign Policy in the 21st Century
7. References and Resources
1. Types of Security
This week we will look at the issue of security in the Western Hemispheric and Latin
American contexts. Security here means much more than just the security of the
nation-state in military terms, and the ability to defend the state's borders and
resources from external attack. It also includes the dimension of internal domestic
security, including the safety of social groups, minorities and individuals. In the
broader sense it also includes economic security and the ability of citizens to maintain
their political rights. It thus includes the ideas of comprehensive security (Malik
1992, p47) and human security for individuals and communities (Axworthy 1999).
In spite of progress in democratic reform in many countries, improvements in
security and development have been uneven: For many Latin Americans . . . hopes of economic development, political stability, and
government institutions able to provide justice and security and basic human
requirements remained unfulfilled. The regions' two-decade-long struggle to reform
state institutions, so that they promote economic growth and provide capable civilian
leadership focused on public welfare rather than personal convenience or gain,
continued to yield mixed results. (Bearman 2001, p70)
Security perceptions at one level (the state, the region) may have negative impact
on the level of security experienced at other levels (the individual, the local region
etc.). Furthermore, different emphases in security will sometimes involve negative
trade offs, e.g. increased policing and security monitoring can impinge on human
rights, privacy, and the well-being of minority rights and indigenous groups. When
security concerns are raised it is always import to ask 'security for whom', and
assessment negative trade-offs that may occur with the emphasis on one kind of
security over others (see earlier lectures for these debates in relation to Mexico and
Colombia). On this basis security should never just be measured at the national level;
it should also operate the regional, local community and human levels (see Tickner &
Mason 2003).
At present, it seems that in spite of strong efforts at regional cooperation and past
successes in demilitarisation (see lectures 7 & 9), these has not yet fully created a
Lecture 9
1
security community consistently addressing these issues regionally, though this has
begun to be considered in the Southern Cone, as well as in the inter-related
transnational problems of the Andean Region. The security community concept can
be summarised: A security community is in essence a group of states within a region that share
dependable expectations of peaceful change. That is, the community itself provides
some degree of security against a perceived common external enemy and reinforces
the norms and practices related to intragroup nonviolent conflict resolution. The
expectation of peaceful resolution of conflicts among the members is attributable to
three elements:
1. Trust that the other members of the community will abide by the same norms that
comes not only from shared interests but also from a shared identity in part molded
by a common political or civic culture
2. Community governance structures that shape institutions, practices, and
understandings related to peaceful conflict resolution
3. The embedding of the sovereign members in a set of social relations within the
community that generates shared understandings of security, welfare, and autonomy
Although security communities are commonly conflated with regional structures of
economic integration, it is important to stress that they go far beyond the fairly narrow,
self-interested basis of economic cooperation contemplated by integration theory.
(Tickner & Mason 2003)
2. The Problem of Insecurity in the Latin American Context
Problems in creating security at all these levels has been identified as a major problem
for Latin America. Low security, both in terms of perception and identified
conditions of violence, is caused by or linked with: 
Violence (political and criminal) and crime wastes or redirectes a
sizeable percentage of GDP, thus slowing growth and development.
The Inter-American Development Bank (IDP) argued that 'violence against
goods and people is equivalent to the destruction or transfer of resources
equal to nearly 14.2% of Latin America's entire gross domestic product'
(Bearman 2001, p84). It is possible to argue that the 'transfer of resources
from victims to thieves is greater than the sum total distributive effect of all
public-finance policies' (Bearman 2001, p84). In effect, this is the highjacking of development. In such conditions, well-intentioned neo-liberal
reform can be easily undermined, e.g. the mixed success of privatisation
programs and aid flows over the last decade (Arbelaez & Milman 2000).

Under such conditions, there may be a need to further reform the reform
process to inspire greater public confidence and inclusiveness (see Lora &
Panizza 2002). On this basis, strong resistance to the 'Washington Consensus'
of neo-liberal economic reform continues in many groups within Latin
American states (Ross 2002). Indeed, a rigid application of a complete
neo-liberal agenda may be destabilising for developing states: -
2
More than anywhere else in the world, Latin America's current predicament
shows the definitive failure of the Washington Consensus as an engine for
sustainable development. Applied by both conservative and progressive
administrations in virtually all Latin American countries for the last 25 years,
the so-called Consensus encompassed the full range of market-oriented
policies advocated by economic orthodoxy--liberalization of trade and
financial flows, deregulation of market-based activity, and the privatization of
industry and public services. China, India and parts of East Asia, in contrast,
never accepted many of these key policy ingredients. The payoff has been
evident not only in social outcomes, but also in such key economic indicators
as low inflation and reduced government deficits. Asia's experience stands
out in marked contrast to Latin America's anaemic growth rates and stagnant
levels of per capita income. (Lopez 2003; see further Aiyer 2001)
* Real and perceived social threats undermine progress towards genuine
democracy and power-sharing within Latin American societies, as distinct
from procedural democracy with high levels of corruption and political
indifference (see Lecture 9). In Haiti, for instance, voter turn-out in elections in
the year 2000 may have been as low as 15%, though the exact number is disputed
(Kennedy 2001; see below). Likewise, these problems still beset reform in
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and to some extent Chile, even as these states build
stronger democratic credentials.
* Threat perceptions and violence lead to political polarisation, and the
formation of either revolutionary groups (guerrillas) or self-help groups
(paramilitaries) that may engage in fracturing the unity of the state
(oligopoly of sovereignty), or virtual civil war (as in Colombia). In other cases,
local segments of the nation feel excluded and seek autonomous social
formations, e.g. autonomous communities in the Chiapas region of Mexico, and
reform movements in Brazil, indigenous Mapuche associations which have
occupied land and engaged in strong protests in Chile (Devalpo 2006; Munoz
2003).
* Patterns of organised and trans-nationally networked crime and their
control of sections of the national resource base, including the illegal drug trade
and a growing arms trade (see Klare 1997), as well as money laundering,
corruption of government institutions, kidnapping and protection rackets
directed at companies and individuals and people smuggling. This remains a
major transnational as well as national problem for the Western hemisphere,
heightening insecurity across borders. Though perhaps most notable in Colombia
and to a lesser degree Mexico, these patterns of exports have used different
routes at different types, e.g. via Panama, the Caribbean, at time Haiti and Brazil.

Lecture 9
Patterns of political and economic corruption, often based on the longterm failure or weaknesses of government institutions. This is exacerbated
and utilised by organised criminal organisations, as well as by ongoing
patterns of poverty, unemployment and lack of confidence in government
legitimacy. In Brazil, for example, a long-term investigation published in
December 2000 cited 827 individuals across the country that should be
prosecuted, including 'federal and state deputies, mayors, governors, police,
bankers and businessmen', with the Brazilian Senate for the first time
expelling some of its elected representatives for 'misconduct' (Bearman 2001,
p74). In the case of Colombia, linkages between organised crime and
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armed groups may now be a larger source of insecurity than
revolutionary political ideals, with paramilitary groups turning in their arms
to some degree through 2005-2006 under the governments Justice and Peace
Law, but with continued survival of hidden criminal networks that can rearm
or re-organise at later dates (see lecture 5). In once assessment: By early March 2006, President Alvaro Uribe had achieved demobilisation of
some 24,000 of an estimated 27,000 to 29,000 paramilitaries, including its
most notorious commanders, using a 2002 law which authorises pardons for
rebellion and sedition. Focusing on dismantling the overt military structures of
the paramilitaries, but not their powerful mafia-like criminal networks that
continue to exist in many parts of Colombia, however, his government has
not sent a clear signal that it is determined to apply the JPL rigorously and
take into account the arguments of its many critics. Indeed, the new law is still
not being implemented – because of a constitutional court review but also
tactical calculations. (ICG 2006)
* The interconnection between drugs, insurgent groups, and cross-border
activities. This has been a major problem for the Andean countries (see Tickner
& Mason 2003) and for Mexico. Thus, even successful efforts to control drugrunning guerrillas can simply move these problems across borders. Thus through
the late 1990s: In Peru, Fujimori managed to constrain, if not completely eliminate, the drugrunning Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) guerrillas and to cut off the supply
chain for coca production. This allowed peasants to move into other crops. To
complete the job, the Peruvian Air Force took to shooting down the drug
runners' light aircraft. The end result was to chase the narcotics business
further north to Colombia (Bearman 2001, p82; see further Stone 2002)
In turn, there are fears in Brazil, Venezuela and Ecuador that even a successful
Plan Colombia and Democratic Security agenda would simply push guerrilla activities
across international borders again, as well as increase refugee flows out of
affected areas (Bearman 2001, p82). Although there are now efforts to contain
the drug flow at the level of the region, via Washington's Andean Counterdrug
Initiative, with $731 million in aid for the program, this has still not led to a
strongly coordinated policy across different states, and over half of this aid still
goes to Colombia (Chipman 2003, p176). Chile has also tightened control of its
borders in relation to these concerns, via its special border control units, the
Carabineros (Chipman 2003, p177). Likewise, resistance to drug eradication
programs in Peru and Bolivia also contain elements of social protest, leading to
slow progress in these programs: Anti-drug, law enforcement and alternative development efforts in
Bolivia and Peru over the last twenty years have not achieved a lasting
reduction of illicit coca crops. Since the large-scale eradication campaigns in
the second half of the 1990s, coca cultivation has again gained momentum in
both countries, reaching 73,000 hectares at the end of 2003 when the UN
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated combined annual cocaine
production potential at 215 tons. Early indications are that there was another
increase in 2004. . . .
While it is unconstructive and unwise to brand the Bolivian and
Peruvian social movements and their leaders as "narco-delinquents" or
"narco-terrorists", the coca grower organisations in those countries will only
gain greater international credibility if they sever all existing ties with drug
trafficking networks and articulate democratically their legitimate demands for
4
socio-economic change, including legal coca cultivation for traditional
purposes. (ICG 2005)
* The response over the last five years has in part been the militarisation of
social problems, whereby governments and agencies seek to control social
problems through enlarging and modernising their military and police
forces (Isacson 2001). Ironically, these overly strong militaries often then
continue to be a source of insecurity for ordinary citizens. This has occurred
in the past in Mexico and Brazil, and is currently a strong component of U.S.
foreign policy and Colombia domestic policy through Plan Colombia (see Week 6).
The training of special anti-narcotic battalions and the purchase of 60 Blackhawk
and 42 Huey helicopters (Bearman 2001, p81) has aided the ability of the
Colombian government to militarily engage guerrillas and insurgents, but is
unlikely to lead to a political or social solution to the problem, with the Uribe
government through 2006 recognising that a straightforward military solution is
unlikely, in spite of the weakening of one of the main guerrilla groups (ELN). In
general terms, the Colombian army remains too reliant on a large draft
contingent, and lacks the large number of elite troops needed to engage the
FARC across all fronts, as distinct from a specialised operations focusing on
particular areas, though this equation has begun to change through 2002-2006.
The Uribe government of Colombia has sought to balance some of these trends
by embedding these military strategies within a wider 'democratic security'
agenda, strengthening other government institutions and civil society, but the
civil components of the country have only begun to develop slow (see Mason
2003; ICG 2006).
* In effect, many of these problems are tried to the issue of transboundary
effects, or to uncontrolled transnational activities and effects. Issues such as
pollution, refugees, organised criminal groups and illicit forms of trade cross
national boundaries with considerable ease. For example, in 2000, some 10,000
rifles intended for FARC, originating from Jordan, were dropped into Peruvian
territory for further transhipment (Bearman 2001, p83). This problem is in part
based on strong trade flows within regional and international trade flows (e.g.
across the border between the U.S. and Mexico), but often uses traditional
geographical patterns: The complex jungle-river network that integrates Colombia, Ecuador, Peru,
Venezuela and Brazil is an open highway for smuggling drugs and small
arms. No country has the resources or manpower to patrol the vast,
unpopulated tropical forest of the interior region where contraband moves
with ease. In early 2001, Brazil took steps to triple its Federal Police presence
along the Colombia-Brazil border and to increase army presence and mobility
along its borders with Peru, Venezuela and Guyana. When its air-surveillance
radar network (SIVAM) becomes operative in 2002, permitting identification of
the true level of illegal flights in the region, Brazil will become the focal point
of illegal trafficking information in the Amazon. Brazil has already organised a
monthly meeting of intelligence chiefs in the region to promote information
sharing. (Bearman 2001, p83; see further Filho & Zirker 2000).
The problem, of cause, will then be the appropriate level of force to use against
such flights. Already mistakes have been made, on one occasion leading to the
shooting down of innocent small aircraft (Stone 2002). From 2003, this has been
stepped up with a multi-pronged strategy by Brazil: -
Lecture 9
5
Protecting Brazil's 11,200 kilometer Amazonian border is not easy. Today,
the country has a two-part strategy: It has established the Northern Gutter
program, which is aimed at populating the country's border regions with selfsustaining military-civilian settlements; and it has installed a $1.4 billion hightech radar and surveillance system called the Amazon Vigilance System, or
Sivam, which went into operation last July.
There are currently some 25,000 troops patrolling Brazil's Amazon borders,
including several battalions of jungle combat soldiers, special forces
personnel, and a flotilla of navy ships that patrol the region's rivers.
"Practically the entire Amazon force is comprised of acculturated Native
Americans who know indigenous languages and the numerous trails in the
hinterlands. It is one of the best trained jungle forces in the world," Cavognari
[A Brazilian Colonel] boasts. (Flynn 2003; brackets added)
Another sensitive issue is whether SIVAM air-data should be passed onto
neighbours, and especially Colombia, where it can be used against FARC (Flynn
2003). The Caribbean nations, also, with U.S. help, have created the Unified
Caribbean On-Line Regional Network (UNICORN) to share intelligence on
drug flows, which has had some success in interdicting drug flows towards
Europe, though Venezuela has refused to cooperate with this network (Bearman
2001, p83).
* Instability within Latin American countries can induce various types of
intervention, either by powerful individual states, such as the U.S., or multilateral
humanitarian interventions, either under UN or OAS auspices. Whether hostile
or invited, such interventions indicate a lack of national security at the local level,
at least until peace and reconstruction programs are effectively developed.
Intervention by international agencies, even when militarily successful,
does not guarantee a return of national or human security (as we have seen
in the cases of Colombia and Haiti).
* A sense of weak national security and limited political legitimacy can also
invoke the effort to use strident nationalism and militraism to promote
unity and support for a government. Such nationalism can tempt states to
heighten their military spending, and in the worst case scenario lead to
adventurist wars that fail. This was the case with the Argentine effort to secure
the Malvinas Islands (Falkland Islands). Setting aside the issue of whether their
claim was valid or not, the method involved Argentina in a short sharp war with
British forces in 1982, one of the last traditional wars fought over territory and
national claims, and between an 'old' European power and a state which wished
to emerged as a regional power in the South Cone. This war was disastrously lost
and government of Lt. General Leopoldo Galtieri was soon forced to resign (see
Aldea & Darnel 2002; see further below). Nationalism has also been
mobilised in the context of socialist policies in Cuba, Venezuela, and Bolivia,
and in the past was a core tool of military governments in Argentina, Brazil
and Chile.
* Ongoing over-exploitation of resources, in part driven by poverty, in part
by poor enforcement and corruption of existing legal regulative frameworks.
Although public awareness has increased, especially after 1992, and some
proactive government policies are in place, destruction of rainforest habitats and
6
erosion of agricultural land continues, e.g. in the Amazon basin and the drier
regional areas of northern Mexico. The issue of the connections among
environment, development, debt and trade, is now becoming more central to
international debate. Thus Latin American and Caribbean countries may be
forced to play closer attention to these issues, even if environmental rules have a
weak and secondary role in NAFTA and other trade processes (see Pope 2002; se
lecture 3): The environment has played an important role in the production of resourcebased commodities as well as in the provision of food and other amenities for
the population. Nevertheless, an integral relationship between economic and
social development and the environment did not form the basis for
development strategies and policies pursued in the Caribbean.. (ECLA 2001)
Thus, in spite of an average growth of 4% though Latin America during 2000
(Bearman 2000, p71), certain Latin American countries experienced ongoing
insecurity: e.g. increasing pockets of poverty in Mexico even as GDP grew (see
lecture 3; Ross 2002), financial crisis in Argentina through 2001-2003, insurgency
and a collapse of the peace process in Colombia, while many of the countries still
have high levels of external debt and debt-servicing. Although less problematic in the
Caribbean region, some countries still had high levels of debt servicing in terms of a
ratio of debt to GDP, e.g. the Commonwealth of the Bahamas (34%) and Jamaica
(46.3%) in 1999 (ECLA 2002), and for Jamaica a debt servicing ratio of 14.5% in
2001 (DFAT 2004). Trade flows in most cases remain reliant on the health of the U.S.
and EU economies, and on the buoyancy of the world economy, while strong regional
flows between Brazil and Argentina had been troubled during 1999-2002 by the
changing financial conditions within the two countries. Thus patterns of trade in Latin
America are often strongly focused on traditional partners, e.g. U.S.-Mexico trade in
2000 reached $250 billion, exceeding the total U.S. trade with the rest of Latin
America (Bearman 2001, p72).
3. Beyond Traditional Patterns of Military Cooperation
Taken as whole, we have seen a reduction in the political role of militaries in the
region as a whole (see lectures 7-8), though the military remains an important political
'consideration' in countries such as Chile, Argentina, and Colombia, and to a lesser
extent in Brazil and Venezuela. Through the 1980s and 1990s there had been a trend
towards budget cuts in military spending across the region, reducing at around 3%
year on average across the region, and the 'proportion of armed forces personnel to the
total population came down at an average rate of 5 per cent' (Kruijt 2001, p416; see
also Bearman 2001, p84). The Latin American and Carribean average for defence
spending was 1.42% of GDP in 2003, and 1.3% in 2004, the lowest in a decade
(Chipman 2004, p332; Chipman 2005, p355), with only Colombia and Venezuela
showing strong tendencies toward increasing military capabilities through 2006. In the
case of Venezuela, its Strategic Plan for Consolidation of Defence includes
procurement of new light arms, possible acquisition of MiG 29s from Russia, and new
patrol boats and corvettes (Chipman 2005, p356). Thus Argentina's defence spending
dropped to 1.24% of GDP in 1997 (Pion-Berlin 2000). Likewise, military access to
direct economic inputs, e.g. via set revenues from cooper mines in Chile and a
Lecture 9
7
percentage of oil sales in Ecuador, are now the exception rather than the rule (Kruijt
2001, p416).
Likewise, the troubled Central American region has begun to slowly reap the
benefit of regional peace processes and democratisation, with an emphasis on
civil authority: The 1990s in Central America generally showed a demilitarisation paired with a redemocratisation of the countries in the isthmus. Through a popular vote, Panama
followed Costa Rica's example, untying itself from the armed institution and entrusting
public order and security to a civilian body. Nicaragua followed this tendency despite
the initial resistance of the Sandinista Army to reducing its officer corps, equipment
and number of soldiers in active service. . . . A civil police force has been formed. The
decade of the 1990s has been beneficial for the development of democracy in
Honduras as well. Despite the economic weight of the armed forces within Honduran
society, a military accommodation to democracy could be observed starting in the
1980s. . . . In post-war El Salvador various reforms were launched: the restructuring
of the armed forces and the parallel reduction of the numbers in the officer and
soldier ranks, and the creation of a new police force. (Kruijt 2001, p418).
In the case of Honduras, however, in spite of the end of its past involvement in the
contra war against Nicaragua from 1981, the settlement of borders with El Salvador
and Nicaragua (1992-1999), and a serious effort to demilitarise society, still has
ongoing human rights abuses, including the use of the military to provide security
against youth gangs, and the use of death squads against children, with tensions
continuing through 2001-2004 (BBC 2005). Honduras also suffers from illegal
logging, a network of corruption at official levels, with death threats being made
against those opposing the environmental destruction as well as against human rights
groups such as the Honduras-based NGO Democracy without Borders (US Newswire
2005).
Nonetheless, there have been some selective areas of defence capability,
modernisation and re-organisation of military that need to be noted: * The development of nuclear power potential in both Argentina and Brazil
through the 1970s and 1980s forced the countries to rethink their relationship,
recognising that the first state to actually develop nuclear arms and actually
weaponise their defence forces would immediately change the balance of power
between these two states. This recognition, along with a return to democratic
governments in both states, aided the Foz de Iguazu Declaration of November
1985, whereby nuclear programs were to be peaceful only. Both countries were to
'make their nuclear energy policies compatible, exchange information, visit each
other's sites, and create mechanisms of compliance and enforcement' (PionBerlin 2000).
* In 1984 Chile and Argentine signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship,
putting an end to their Beagle Channel feud, and obliging both countries to a
peaceful resolution of any conflict or dispute (Pion-Berlin 2000). This is of some
significance because of the highly independent posture of the Chilean
military, and their relative modernisation during the late 1990s onwards
based on a relatively strong economy. Most recently, Chile is purchasing 10 F-16
C/D fighters for $700 million, with Brazil intending to purchase new fighters to
8
balance regional capabilities (Doyle & Isacson 2001), a trend that was delayed
through 2003 under the socially oriented policies of Lula da Silva (Economist
2003a). Peru has also gone through relative modernisation of its armed forces
through the last two decades (for details see Chipman 2002; Chipman 2004).
* Argentina remains the U.S. major non-NATO ally in the region, engaging
in joint exercises and intensified cooperation with the U.S. through 2001 (for this
terminology, see Larrinaga 2000). Thus Argentina had sent vessels and troops to
the Gulf War, and has sent peace-keepers to Yugoslavia (Pion-Berlin 2000), and
has even expressed some interest in joining NATO, though this has been refused.
This has led to some resentment in Brazil, who is reluctant to see regional
states take on a regional policing role for the U.S. 'Big Brother' (Pion-Berlin
2000). Argentina has also moved to an all-volunteer professional army, a move
that may be followed by Peru and Chile (Bearman 2001, p85).
* At the same time as the U.S. has supported multilateral agenda such as the OAS
and the Summits of the Americas, it has also created a U.S.-led bilateral web of
military cooperation and intelligence gathering with many Latin American
states, e.g. Peru, Chile, Colombia, the Netherlands Antilles, Ecuador, Antilles,
and Argentina (Doyle & Isacson 2001). In the past, this was based on the effort
to contain communism, then as part of the war on drugs. Most recently, it has
been linked with the war on terror. It has involved the training of a total of
13,000 Latin American officers, options for Forward Operating Locations, bases
and hubs in the region, as well as contracting private CIA-linked companies in
engaging in training, military efficiency reviews, and surveillance of air flights (see
Doyle & Isacson 2001; Chipman 2003, p176). Total military assistance was
greater than economic assistance in 2000 ($900 million compared to $800 million,
Doyle & Isacson 2001), indicating a trend that has deepened through 2001-2002.
By July 2003 this was extended via the Inter-American Convention Against
Terrorism, supporting information sharing and joint training, with 33 of
the OAS states having signed the treaty (Chipman 2003, p176).
On this basis, there have been suggestions for an even more assertive and
comprehensive intelligence, security and military system for the entire
region (see Johnson 2002). However, there may be some dangers in such a
system. In the past, the training of Latin American officers at the former School
of the Americas (renamed the Defense Institute for Hemispheric Security
Cooperation) has been highly controversial, leading to charges that this
worsened rather than increased the respect for human rights among these
trainees (for the debate, see Ramsey & Raimondo 2001; Isacson 2001). In general
terms, through 2001 the scale of military and security cooperation was as larger
than normal foreign affairs channels: The U.S. military presence in the region rivals—and perhaps surpasses—that
of civilian diplomats. The State Department has about 16,000 direct-hire
employees at posts throughout the world; Latin America accounts for a
modest fraction of that total (about 4,000). Meanwhile, the Southern
Command, the unit responsible for U.S. military activities in Latin America
and the Caribbean, has a staff of 800 military and 325 civilian employees at
its Miami headquarters, while two of its components—U.S. Army South in
Puerto Rico and Joint Task Force-Bravo in Honduras—combine for an
additional 570 military and 1,390 civilian staff. Another 107 officers work in
Milgroups, managing security assistance programs at U.S. embassies
Lecture 9
9
throughout the region, and still more are assigned to Special Operations
Command South in Puerto Rico and at “Forward Operating Locations”—
support bases for U.S. counterdrug aircraft—in Ecuador, El Salvador, and the
Netherlands Antilles. (Isacson 2001)
* The Amazon and its regional borders has become of major concern to
several nations, especially Brazil, which is seeking to control and monitor flows
of people and resources out of its great hinterland (Filho & Zirker 2000). On this
basis, Brazil has been able to move troops out of the south as Southern Cone
relations improve, and has begun to prepare a strong military presence in the
Amazon itself. In the past, Brazil only had about 600 soldiers to monitor these
border regions (Pion-Berlin 2000), but this has been boosted to a multi-service
force many thousands strong (see above). It has also developed the SIVAM
(Sistema de Vigilancia da Amazonia) system to monitor all flights in the region.
It is in this context, that some militaries in the region have begun to consider
transformed roles for themselves, including peacekeeping, control of drug flows, and
anti-terrorist roles. However, there are dangers in such a move towards
comprehensive security roles for the military (rather than policing) agencies: But South American governments themselves have qualms about assigning some of
the aforementioned missions to regional defense forces. Pursuing drug traffickers,
terrorists, or polluters could embroil soldiers in violent operations within their own
borders, bring them into contact with the civilian population, and thereby increase the
chances for human rights violations.
Counternarcotics work, for example, clashes directly with the military's
concept of professionalism; it involves police work that soldiers increasingly resent. It
can expose troops to the temptation of corruption, spread violence to innocent
bystanders in the course of pursuing drug traffickers, and bring unwanted
confrontations between soldiers and peasants who grow coca or harbor traffickers.
(Pion-Berlin 2000)
Put simply, its seems that the 'War on Drugs' might be merged with the 'War on
Terrorism' (see further Ross 2002), leading to the a real danger that militaries will
not use proportional force, and a new round of human rights abuses might occur
based on military over-reaction, corruption and securitisation.
As we have seen, the developing countries have been troubled by a host of related
problems that are often interlinked. These interlinked social, economic and
political problems thereby challenge the political legitimacy of governments, while at
the same time stressing their economic institutional resources and inability to respond
politically. This in effect constitutes a failure of governance (Bearman 2001, p84),
even if at the same there are some steps towards improved democratic institutions.
Thus, surveys suggest that even if most prefer democracies, up to 76% of Latin
Americans had little confidence in political parties, and 67% lacked confidence
in their legislatures (Bearman 2001, p86), a trend supported by voting patterns in
Argentina, Brazil, and Haiti, though slight improvements have emerged through the
2003-2006 period. Some of these problems can be seen in Paraguay.
Problematic Stability: Recent Dates in Paraguay's History (BBC 2002-2005)
1954 - General Alfredo Stroessner seizes power in coup, ushering in more than 30 years
of ruthless dictatorship.
10
1989 - Stroessner deposed in coup led by Gen Andres Rodriguez, who is then elected
president. However, Stroessner's centre-right military-backed National Republican
Association-Colorado Party wins parliamentary elections.
1992 - New democratic constitution promulgated.
1993 - Colorado Party wins simple majority of seats in first free multiparty elections,
while its candidate, Juan Carlos Wasmosy, wins first free presidential elections.
1998 - Colorado Party candidate Raul Cubas elected president amid allegations of fraud.
1999 - President Cubas resigns in wake of assassination of Vice-President Luis Maria Argana.
2000 October - An army major and two other men are sentenced to long
prison terms for their roles in Argana's murder.
2000 December - Judge requests extradition of deposed dictator Alfredo Stoessner from Brazil
in connection with the disappearance and presumed murder of a Paraguayan doctor in
1977.
2001 May - The head of the Paraguayan central bank, Washington Ashwell, resigns over
his alleged involvement in the fraudulent transfer of $16m to a US bank account.
2002 April - Prosecutors accuse President Gonzalez Macchi of corruption, for his alleged role
in an illegal investment scandal.
2002 July - State of emergency declared after violent street protests. Protesters demand
resignation of President Gonzalez Macchi and scrapping of free-market policies.
Government says former general and coup-plotter Lino Oviedo orchestrated the
unrest.
2002 December - Congress votes to start impeachment proceedings against President
Gonzalez Macchi over charges which include corruption. The upper house, the
Senate, will have the final say on whether to oust the president.
2003 August - Nicanor Duarte Frutos, from ruling Colorado Party, sworn in as president. He
won April's presidential poll. Predecessor Luis Gonzalez Macchi barred from leaving
country and put on trial on corruption charges.
2004 April onwards - Peasants stage series of land invasions and other protests, demanding
redistribution of agricultural land.
2004 June - Former military commander General Oviedo returns from exile in Brazil and is
arrested at airport.
2005 February - President Nicanor Duarte promises a crackdown on organised crime
following the kidnapping and murder of the daughter of former president Raul Cubas.
2005 June - Lower house rejects government proposals to privatise public utilities.
2005 August - Paraguay hosts the first-ever conference of landlocked nations. More than 30
states take part and demand preferential treatment in world trade talks.
We can also see this in instability in Paraguay, where a 'flat' economy with rising
unemployment deepened the impact of political turmoil through the middle and
late 1990s (Bearman 2001, pp74-75). Corruption scandals and stalemate in
government decision making through 1999-2002, with only gradual improvements in
government capabilities through 2003-2005 (for ongoing instability in 2003, see
Ceaser 2002; BBC 2003a). Even with elections, ongoing political violence had led
to regional concerns about the future of the Paraguay: Paraguay has had a great deal of assistance from the World Bank, the IMF,
European Union and assorted aid agencies, but has not been able to muster the
collective resolve to cut government spending or the government bureaucracy. Both
the economy and the political system continued to be fragile . . . with little to
encourage much optimism in the short term. The country's neighbours, especially
Brazil and Argentina, monitor Paraguay's democratic mood closely, and democracy is
a prerequisite to the country remaining within Mercosur, the Southern Cone's
common market. (Bearman 2001, p75).
It is not surprising in this context that governance problems have had a spill over
effect for nearby states. Thus Paraguay's Ciudad del Este region had been viewed
as a major shipment point for drugs and black market operations (worth up to 10
Lecture 9
11
billion dollars a year), while in the past it may have been a safe-haven for the
terrorists who in the past bombed the Jewish Centre in Buenos Aires (1994) and
planned the bombings of Argentina's Israeli Embassy (Pion-Berlin 2000). In this
context, both Argentina and Brazil tried to insist that Paraguay take on a strong
policing of its borders in 1996 and 1998, but with very limited effect (Pion-Berlin
2000). Nicanor Duarte (and the ruling Colorado Party), won presidential elections in
April 2003, but still has deal with clamping down on crime and corruption (BBC
2003b), as well as restore confidence in government. These problems indicate that
security and organised crime issues are deeply engaged with the problems of
governance and the level of government legitimacy. In spite of some progress through
2003-2004, key challenges remained for the country: Just over a year into his term, Mr Duarte has in fact done a good job of clearing a
backlog of debts and adopting most of the reforms that the IMF demanded as part of
a stand-by loan agreement last year. However, the kidnappings, which brought 5,000
people out in protest last week, are just one result of long-term social problems now
coming to the surface.
Paraguay has a rich rural economy, and agri-business accounts for most of the
country's export revenues. But more than 40% of the rural population lives in poverty.
Over 1m people have no clean drinking water, and earlier this month UNICEF
reported that one in seven children under five suffers from chronic malnutrition. There
is little industry; even soy, which makes up 75% of agricultural exports, is sent abroad
to be processed, and re-imported as veggieburgers.
Three decades of land reform and subsidies have had little success. Peasants say at
least 144,000 hectares in the land reform were illegally allocated, particularly to
friends of Alfredo Stroessner, Paraguay's dictator for 35 years. By some estimates
300,000 peasants are landless. For the past 15 years they have held annual protests
against the land reform, privatisation, free trade, and most recently--part of the IMF
agreement--the proposed abolition of value-added-tax exemptions for the poor.
(Economist 2004)
Likewise, Paraguay has been concerned with the dominance of Brazil within
Mercosur, and to some degree has turned toward the United States as a counterbalance through 2005: For Paraguay, the main worry is Mercosur, and Brazil in particular. Although trade
within Mercosur is supposed to be free, Paraguay complains that its neighbours
strangle its exports in red tape. When convenient, Brazil ignores its Mercosur
partners, for example by awarding China "market economy" status. Paraguay
recognises Taiwan. . . .
The 300,000 Brazilians who have settled in Paraguay own many of its most
productive farms. But they speak Portuguese, prefer samba to local music, and their
children attend Brazilian schools. One day, some Paraguayans fear, Brazil's flag will
follow its culture. "Our sovereignty is threatened by Brazil, not by the United States,"
says Carlos Mateo Balmelli, a senator from the opposition Liberals. (Economist 2005)
With recent counter-moves by Venezuela, countries such as Paraguay may be
important levers in changing future regional alignments: To the United States, Paraguay looks like a friend in a troubling region. It sits at the
southern end of an arc of instability, a chain of weak democracies that are being
undermined, the United States alleges, by Venezuela's leftist president, Hugo
Chavez. Paraguay's democracy is also shaky and its discontents profound. But the
12
United States regards its president, Nicanor Duarte Frutos, as a serious reformer. An
American official in Asuncion says he has made "good progress" in fighting illegal
drugs and pirated goods and in blocking financing for terrorist groups all of which
flourish at the spot where Paraguay's border meets Brazil's and Argentina's.
(Economist 2005)
4. Lessons from the Malvinas Dispute: Diplomatic Mismanagement and Military
Over-reach
We can see these linkages further from both historic and contemporary examples. The
Islas Malvinas or Falkland Islands conflict (including South Georgia Island)
provide an instructive example of the failure of military policies for Argentina, and
failures in international diplomacy, which did not avert a major military
confrontation. Although this conflict came to a head in the early 1980s, it continues
to have a strong legacy: Argentina's armed forces have yet to fully recover, both psychologically and
materially, from losing the Malvinas War of 1982. The military remains a vanquished
institution that still questions its capacity to mount a viable defense, let alone project
any offensive power. Officers' periodic (and exaggerated) assertion about Argentine
indefensiveness expose an underlying anxiety about national security. (Pion-Berlin
2000)
The Argentine military, in particular, has been pre-occupied with learning from this
experience, leading towards the effort to create a more cooperative system of
regional security in the Southern Cone of South America (Pion-Berlin 2000).
Argentina continues to claim these islands, though seeks to secure them through
diplomatic means. National memory of the conflict remains, with marches in
Argentina during April 2002 remembering both the defeat of the Argentine military
forces and re-iterating the Argentine claim to the islands. This unresolved issue still
has implications for Argentina-UK relations and for the economic development of the
islands. Thus former President Eduard Duhalde told the press that "The Malvinas are
ours and we'll get them back . . . Not with wars but in the manner Argentines use to
recover their things - with faith, patience and perseverance." (BBC 2002b)
The island were probably first seen by an English ship (1592), first landed on by the
British in 1690, the first settlement was made by the French in 1764, with the islands
thereafter being given to Spain (CIA 2004). The dispute over legitimate ownership
of the islands has been going on since 1833, when Britain seized the islands from
Argentina, on the basis that they had earlier on discovered them (Adams 1988, p12).
Britain and Argentina continued their negotiations from 1965 from the basis of a
United Nations resolution requiring them to resolve the issue, but the problem of
sovereignty has not been resolved (Adams 1988, p13). The British government and
parliament, in particular, wished to take into account the wishes of the Falkland
Islanders themselves, while the Falkland Islands Legislative Council itself suggested
that the two governments had no right to bring sovereignty into the discussions
(Adams 1988, p13). The Argentine military regime, led from 1981 by Lt. General
Galtieri engaged in the conflict through a mixture of opportunism, genuine belief
in their cause, and in an effort to bolster the popularity of their government
during a period of economic and political tension (Aldea & Darnell 2002). The
Argentines argued that they willing to take into account the interests of the
Lecture 9
13
Falkland Islanders, but not their self-determination (Adams 1988, p69). Almost
all the islanders opposed return of the islands to Argentina.
After an earlier triggering incident concerning the control of South Georgia island in
late March 1982, the attack on the Falkland Islands began on 2 April 1982,
spearheaded by Argentine commandos and marines, quickly followed by an initial
force of 1,400 soldiers who soon secured the island against a small garrison of 67
British soldiers (Adam 1988, pp8-9). Up to 10,000 Argentine soldiers would
eventually garrison the island, but many of these were conscripts. Though some were
well trained and equipped, such as the 'heroic' 25th Regiment (Aldea & Darnell 2002),
others were poorly trained and not so effectively led.
A round of multilayered diplomacy failed to resolve the problem before hostilities
were engaged. In response, the United Nations Security Council, responding to British
diplomacy and lobbying, called for a withdrawal of Argentine forces. Britain also
ensured that West Germany and France, key sellers of arms to Argentina, stopped
their supply on the basis of European Community Sanctions approved from 9th April
onwards (Adams 1988, p20), thereby reducing the effectiveness of operations by the
Argentine air force. During this period, the U.S. moved forward as a negotiator,
hoping to avoid a conflict that might undermine the status of itself and its allies
in South America. Shuttle diplomacy by U.S. officials failed to bring the Argentina's
acceptance of a military withdrawal, and the U.S. warned that it might move to
diplomatically support the British. The Argentine military government, which had
launched to war to bolster its popularity, did not believe that the British could mount
such a long range operation, and did not believe that the U.S. would move from a
position of neutrality. They were proved wrong on both counts. On April 30th the U.S.
imposed military and economic sanctions on Argentina, and provided fuel,
ammunition, weapons and military intelligence to the British (Adams 1988, p28). The
OAS called for a withdrawal of both military forces in late April, but this had little
effect. After hostilities were well under way, the UN Security Council considered a
proposal for withdrawal of Argentine forces and the creation of a UN trusteeship over
the islands, but Britain, as a permanent member, vetoed the resolution (Adams 1988,
p50).
Basically, Britain had opted for a military solution to Argentina's military
occupation. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher ordered a task force including aircraft
carriers, nuclear powered submarines (dispatched first), and commandoes to be
formed and sent to the islands. On 12th April 1982 the British declared a 320 km
Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ) around the Falklands, thereby helping justify its
engagement of any Argentine ships in the zone. This was extended on 30th April to a
Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ), banning aircraft was well from entering the region
around the islands (Adams 1988, p28). Hostilities began in earnest in May, with one
of the most controversial actions of the conflict. On 2nd May a British submarine
sank the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano, even though it was apparently
outside the exclusion zone and sailing away from the British task force (and therefore
not a threat) at the time of being sunk, leading to a loss of 368 lives (Adams 1988,
p33). Debate has since raged about the legality of the actions, whether it was designed
to escalate hostilities and sink a Peruvian peace plan that was being developed and
which might have been accepted by the British Cabinet, and whether there was a
subsequent British government cover up on the issue (Adams 1988, pp33-36; Time
14
1984). Alternatively, it is possible that wider hostilities had already been engaged
between the British and Argentine navies (see Gill 2002).
The ensuing conflict was short, sharp and bitter. The Argentine airforce, using its
limited number of Exocet missiles, inflicted severe damage on British ships, including
the destruction of the HMS Sheffield. Several other ships were badly damaged by air
attacks, indicating the vulnerability of the entire task force. Some 5,000 British troops
were onboard, and forces were landed on the western side of the island, away from the
main Argentine defensive positions. The British then had to move over difficult
terrain past several choke points and come down on Port Stanley from the landward
side. This surprised Argentine forces, which fought stubbornly and without secure
command of the air. Eventually, after a sharp battle at Goose Green (Aldea & Darnell
2002), Argentine forces had to withdraw, and when the situation became
militarily hopeless, eventually surrendered. Argentina had lost the Falklands war.
The political results were immediate. Amid major public protests, President Galtieri
resigned, followed by a return to democratic rule in October 1983. Galteri would
later on be charged with human rights abuses, then for incompetence in the this war,
leading to imprisonment in 1986, but received a pardon in 1990 (BBC 2003d).
However, the following governments of Argentina argued that it still had a right to the
islands. Through the 1980s there were also disputes over fishery rights in the waters
around the Falklands, with negotiations run through the Food and Agriculture
Organization failing to solve the problem of overfishing. In 1987, Britain 'unilaterally
declared a fishery conservation' around the islands, thereby licensing fishing in the
area (Adams 1988, p60). For Britain, too, the high costs of the war (2.6 billion
pounds) and the cost of maintaining a larger garrison on the island (Adams 1988, p6061) called into question whether a military solution would be enough to ensure the
future of islands. Almost a thousand men died in the conflict, over 700 of them
Argentines. International opinion was also now strongly divided on the rights and
wrongs of the case, with many OAS states supporting Argentina's historical claim
to the islands, though not supporting the military intervention.
Lecture 9
15
Argentina the Islas Malvinas (Falkland Islands) in the Southern Atlantic
(Courtesy PCL Map Library)
However, from the early 1990s, fisheries and squid catches, combined with prospects
for oil, indicated that the small island could be economically viable, but with too
small a population (approximately 3,000) for effective independence - it therefore
remains an overseas territory of the UK administered by a Governor, Howard Pearce,
supported by an executive council and a local Legislative Council (see Royle 1995;
CIA 2004). The fisheries of the island helped provide a local recovery for the
islands: What transformed the Falklands' prospects was the discovery, a few years after the
war, that the waters round the islands were teeming with huge quantities of seafood,
especially two types of squid: illex, a delicacy widely enjoyed in East Asia; and loligo,
served up as calamares in Spain and other Mediterranean countries. The Falklands
declared a 200-mile fisheries-conservation zone and proceeded to grow rich by
selling fishing licences. By 1991, Britain was able to stop providing economic aid to
the islands, though it continues to maintain its military garrison there, costing around
[pound]70m ($100m) a year. (Economist 2002b)
Internally, there was a recognition that the vaunted power of the Argentine armed
forces was rather limited. Through the late 1980s, the Argentine Armed Forces
proceeded to replace lost equipment, modernise other items include submarines,
destroyers, missiles (including more Exocets), and the formation of helicopter-borne
assault brigades (Adams 1988, p56). At a deeper level, however, with budget cuts in
16
the 1990s, it was recognised that the army might not be able to unilaterally guarantee
national goals, even against regional states. This reality, along with the development
of economic cooperation through Mercosur, led to Argentina proposing the idea of
regional security cooperation and intelligence sharing on some issues (see lecture
8). Likewise, through the late 1990s Argentina continued to cooperate closely with the
U.S., thereby increasing its value as a partner in regional affairs.
Political uncertainty has also affected investment into the islands, and the
ongoing search for oil in its region: Five consortia formed from 12 companies won oil licenses in October 1996. Since
that successful first-ever bidding round, speculation has effectively replaced fishing
and sheep as the gross national product of these windswept islands. Twelve billion
bbl of oil could lie beneath Falkland waters, and this has been projected further to $66
billion in tax revenues, or about $30 million per islander. Suddenly everyone wants to
live in the Falklands. Incredibly, all of this is based on seismic studies. . . .
One looming negative is Argentina. Despite losing a war in 1982 and signing
an exploration agreement in 1995, Argentina does not seem to recognize Britain's
right to authorize oil licensing around the Falklands. The 1995 agreement allowed
both countries to levy royalties on oil - Falklands at 9% and Argentina at 3% - without
recognizing each other's right to levy the charge. Sovereignty issues have not been
settled in the "Special Cooperation Zone" southwest of the islands. Argentina recently
passed draft legislation that would impose a $10-million fine for unpaid taxes.
Furthermore, it could bar delinquent companies from any commercial activities in
Argentina. (World Oil 1998)
There are still a number of lessons to be learned from the conflict, including the
role of government with weak legitimacy using nationalism to support their claims,
as in Argentina. Likewise, even stronger governments might be tempted to use
management of conflict to gain electoral support, as in the UK. Other issues
include: "What can be done to prevent foreign ministries from misunderstanding each
others' signals? And if signals have been misinterpreted, how can a crisis be managed
both diplomatically and militarily? What, too, can be learned from the way the media
were used (and abused) during the campaign?" (Anderson 2002) It was surprising,
given the mediating roles possible for the OAS, the U.S. and even Peru that hot
conflict and traditional warfare could proceed so quickly: this stands as a major
failure of modern diplomacy. The U.K. recently admitted that some of the British
ships involved in this conflict carried nuclear weapons, leading to a demand from
Argentina's President Nestor Kirchner that an apology be made for this dangerous
policy (Australian 2003a).
Through the late 1990s, the Southern Cone nations have moved towards greater
transparency, joint military exercises, and a range of confidence building measures.
Thus the Argentine and Brazilian navies have engaged in join manoeuvres in 1997,
the navies of Chile and Argentina conducted joint exercises in 1998, and armed units
from Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay have conducted peace-keeping training exercises
together (Pion-Berlin 2000). However, the Argentine idea of greater cooperative
security integration has been treated with caution by neighbouring states, with
Brazil and Paraguay wary of this proposal, and other states directly opposed (PionBerlin 2000). In part, this is due to suspicion by the weaker states of military
dominance by stronger neighbours (based on issues of national pride in Paraguay),
and a recognition by Brazil and Chile that the military balance of power has shifted in
their favour with the relative weakening the Argentine economy (Pion-Berlin 2000).
Lecture 9
17
The problem is whether there will be an 'equilibrium' of declining military power
in the region, as military forces take on new tasks and roles (Pion-Berlin 2000).
5. Haiti and the Failure of International Invention
The Republic of Haiti and the Dominican Republic are the two modern states
that divide the island of Hispaniola, the second largest island the Caribbean. At first
under Spanish control, the French took control of the western part of the island in
1679. Partly under the influence of the French revolution, the African population of
the island sought both freedom from slavery and national independence, leading to a
series of revolts between 1791-1803 under the leadership of Toussaint L'Ouverture
(Skidmore & Smith 2000, p296). Haiti would break away from French control in 1804
to form the second free Republic of the Americas, and the first predominantly
'black' republic in the world. This proud democratic tradition would run into
ongoing crisis during the 20th century (see Haggerty 1989), crises not solved by
repeated U.S. and international intervention.
Haiti (Map Courtesy of JPL Map Library)
Like Cuba and Jamaica, the economy of the island had been dominated by sugar
plantations (and a lesser emphasis on coffee, indigo and cotton) and the need to
import slave labour (Conway 1998; Skidmore & Smith 2000, p293). This resulted in a
society which was about 90% African in origin (speaking a creole language), with a
small 10% of mulattoes of mixed blood forming an economic and political elite
(largely French speaking). The tension between these social groups has been one of
the background causes of ongoing instability in Haiti. The second major background
factor was the structure of the economy, which Haiti shared with many other
Caribbean islands. Aside from its agricultural resource base, manufacturing played a
limited role in its development, leading to a highly agricultural society in which job
18
opportunities away from the land would be very limited (Skidmore & Smith 2000,
p295). With diversification in sugar production globally, and poorly distributed land,
this would lead to high levels of unemployment and underemployment in the late
20th century. This has led to the saying: 'All Caribbeans have equal access to their fair
share of poverty' (Skidmore & Smith 2000, p295).
Between 1911-1915 Haiti entered a chaotic political period with six presidents
dying violently. This, along with fears that another European power might occupy the
island during World War I (Conway 1998), led to the U.S. occupation of the island
in 1915, with the American administration staying there until 1934, and retaining a
strong administrative influence on the island down to 1941 (Skidmore & Smith 2000,
p297). After the rule of Sténio Vicent and then Colonel Paul E. Magloire, who was
overthrown by a coupe in 1956, power passed to Francoise Duvalier in 1957.
Francoise Duvalier would proceed to gain control of the army, police, the
security forces and thereby of the economy. He created a special police unit called
the Tontons Macoutes, creole for 'bogeymen' (Conway 1998), who through terror and
murder removed all effective opposition and ensured that in following elections
Duvalier would be become president for life (Skidmore & Smith 2000, p298).
Duvalier tried to gain the loyalty of the poor people by supporting their vodum
religious cults (for the history of 'voodoo' and its relationship to Catholicism, see
Schaeffer 1998), and tried to associate himself with the powerful 'mythical figure' of
Baron Samedi (Skidmore & Smith 2000, p298). Voodoo remains an important social
force, in that many of the devotees form close-knit groups, providing 'a central
organising structure to small communities' under the leadership of a priest (Hougan)
or priestess (Mambo). Duvalier tried to garner international support for his regime by
supporting U.S. policy in fora such as the UN and the OAS, but soon found his regime
isolated to the point where it became a kind of 'international pariah' (Skidmore &
Smith 2000, p299). Duvalier, who became know as 'Papa Doc', became vilified as
the archetype of an authoritarian leader ruling by violence. He died in 1971.
Papa Doc was succeeded by Jean-Claude Duvalier, his son, thereby dubbed 'Baby
Doc'. Although he tried some reforms, the country remained under the control of a
small clique who ran the government as 'a means of self-enrichment' (Skidmore &
Smith 2000, p299). Amid discontent and internal struggles, he fled the country aboard
a U.S. Air Force plane, eventually retiring to France. The removal of Baby Doc,
however, did not lead to stability. The elections of 1987 were 'a bloodbath, as
paramilitary forces assaulted voters and opposition candidates', leading to a period of
rule by military figures such as General Prosper Avril, who formerly had been part of
the Duvalier regime.
Real reform began in 1990, but this did not lead to a stable democracy, even after
open elections in December 1990: Emerging with two-thirds of the vote was Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a Roman Catholic
priest who espoused liberation theology and advocated far-reaching political and
social change. In January 1991 disgruntled "Duvalierists" attempted a military coup to
prevent the "Communist" Aristide from taking office: the effort failed but left 74 dead
and 150 injured. Since his party did not win even a plurality in the legislature, Aristide
had to construct an effective ruling coalition from a position of weakness. Late in
Lecture 9
19
1991, unruly elements within the military ousted him from office. (Skidmore & Smith
2000, p300)
This was the beginning of the further rounds of crisis which led to a large scale
international intervention, followed by ongoing political crisis. The chain of events
(briefly discussed in earlier weeks) included: * A strong protest from the U.S., the OAS and the international community
due to the overturning of a democratically elected leader. The OAS imposed an
embargo on Haiti through the early 1990s(Skidmore & Smith 2000, p300).
* The creation of a mass refugee exodus of thousands of Haitans on small
rafts, with up to 40,000 people trying to leave the island (Conway 1998), often on
unsafe rafts and small boats. In turn this led to a fluctuating U.S. policy, with
the U.S. coast guard first picking up refugees and taking to the Guantanamo
naval station in Cuba, followed by an effort to return rafters to Haiti, followed by
a system whereby Haiti rafters were processed at sea and a selected group were
granted asylum (Skidmore & Smith 2000, p300). The refugees were probably a
major reason for future U.S. intervention.
* In 1994 a large occupation force of 20,000 troops took control of Haiti
(Boniface 2002, p370), with the U.S. force being replaced by an international
peacekeeping force in early 1995.
* The international intervention aimed at stabilising Haiti for elections, and
at improving the human rights situation on the island. For this reason, the
military peacekeeping force was accompanied by a Human Rights Observer
mission as the part of joint United Nations/Organisation of American
States International Civilian Mission, peaking at 200 observers. This group
focused on political education and human rights, but avoided developmental and
economic issues (Orenstein 1998).
* In spite of hope through 1994-1995 for a major reform of the economy based
on resumed IMF, World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank
(IDB) aid, this in fact proved problematic to administer through 1997-2000,
with declining aid flows through the late 1990s due to governmental
instability in Haiti: In October 1994, the new government launched a program of fiscal
stabilization and structural reforms, and cleared its arrears to the International
Development Association (IDA)*, Inter-American Development Bank (IDB),
and the International Monetary Fund by December 1994. This enabled these
institutions to resume lending activities. A new IMF standby agreement was in
place by March 1995, leading to significant improvements in basic
macroeconomic indicators. That year, real GDP, supported by significant
inflows of external aid, grew about 4.5 percent. Inflation declined from 43 to
17 percent.
However, a growing political crisis impeded the sustained
implementation of the macroeconomic reforms agreed with donors. . . .
(World Bank 2000)
* This correlated with declining government revenues and growing
economic instability: -
20
Despite efforts to keep the government deficit low (0.5 percent of GDP in
1997) and to tighten current expenditure controls, real GDP growth remained
modest, at 3.1 percent in 1998 and 2.2 percent in 1999. Disbursements of
international aid, which peaked at US$625 million in 1995, declined to
US$377 million in 1997 and to US$357 million in 1999. Sharp increases in
the fiscal deficit beginning in October 1999, combined with persistent declines
in investments and external aid, raised 12-month inflation to about 12 percent
by March 2000. The national currency (gourde) has depreciated by some 16
percent since September 1999, and domestic deficit financing by the Central
Bank, fuelled by rising petrol prices and mounting government discretionary
spending, poses serious concerns about the country's ability to maintain
macroeconomic stability in the coming months while a new Government is
awaited. (World Bank 2000)
* In spite of these operations, it could be argued that from 1997, 'violence,
poverty, hunger, and death' still dominated the island (Orenstein 1998), with only
limited improvements through 2002-2006 (see below). Thus, the intervention
has the signs of being an interrum effort, rather than a long-term solution:
International efforts in Haiti may have been successful in the sense that
Haiti's military facade is now gone, and civilian rule restored. But in many
ways, the international community made short shrift of its own peacekeeping
goals. By tolerating criminals, buffering the elite, imposing economic policies
sowing inequality, and lending the United Nations' moral legitimacy for such
flawed solutions, we foreigners helped ensure the continuity of Haiti's real
nightmare: the banal and often deadly realities of normal daily life. (Orenstein
1998)
* The holding of elections which led to René Preval, a former close associate
of Aristide, taking office in February 1996. Efforts to impose pro-market
reforms and stalemates in the parliament through the late 1990s led to a
period of no effective government (Fauriol 2000), problems in approving
budgets, strikes and demonstrations, political violence, and stagnation in the
economy. Unemployment reached 60% (Skidmore & Smith 2000, p301).
* By 2004, it has been argued by supporters that the poor performance was in
part due to a closing down of effective international support from the late
1990s onwards. One controversial view suggests that The United States in collusion with France blocked international assistance to
the duly elected government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide and demanded
repayments on debt incurred by past dictator regimes it knew the government
couldn't pay. At the same time, the United States and France funded a wide
range of antigovernment organizations in the name of promoting democracy.
While Aristide tried to negotiate with the hydra-headed opposition, his
opponents steadfastly refused any compromise short of his removal. They
knew that they could not defeat Aristide in a fair election, so they boycotted
the 2000 presidential election, leaving Aristide 92 percent of the vote. In
subsequent legislative elections that the United States and France
characterized as flawed, Aristide's party won a plurality but not a majority of
votes in the election of nine senators. In a supreme act of hypocrisy, the Bush
administration, renowned for its devotion to democratic niceties, worked with
France to block direct aid to the Haitian government on all levels.
(McCollester 2004)
Lecture 9
21
* In 2001 Jean-Bertrand Aristide was re-elected into office, but this time
with a rather sinister twist to the way he held power. It has been claimed
that: "Opposition politicians and journalists have been hounded, and their offices
and homes burned, by the chimere, Mr Aristide's hired thugs from the slums."
(Economist 2002). To maintain control, Aristide seems to have to rely on his
Lavalas party (lavalas indicates the idea of a cleansing flood), which was
originally organised around Catholic activists, leftists, and middle-class reformers
(Kennedy 2001). However, the Lavalas Party seems to have taken up some
criminal elements, including dissident mafia groups that have attempted coups
against the government during 2000-2001 (Economist 2002). Through 2001,
there were also ongoing reports of threats and harassment of human rights
activists, including a possible 'hit list' (Donovan 2001). In practical terms, it
seems that President Aristide had forged alliances with remnant Duvalierists.
He was therefore then opposed by peasant leaders such as Chavannes JeanBaptiste, and a group of diverse political parties called the Democratic
Convergence formed to get Aristide out of office (Kennedy 2001).
Through 2001-2006 Haiti remained a troubled democracy and impoverished
nation: * Haiti is the poorest state in the Western Hemisphere, with an average
annual per capita income of about $390 (Economist 2006b; Skidmore & Smith
2000, p296). Two-thirds of the nation live in extreme poverty, up to half are
illiterate and less then a quarter of rural children attend school (Economist 2002).
Though there was some improvement in purchasing power of people from 1997,
the country still remained extremely poor (Conway 1998). The gap between
poor and rich remains extreme, with 8% of the population controlling 70% of
the cultivable land, and 5% controlling 50% of the country's wealth (Najman
2004, p34). Approximately 65% of the population remains illiterate, reducing
their options for future development (Najman 2004, p35).
* Due to poverty, rapid deforestation has eroded the island as the poor use
wood and charcoal for cooking. This has led to further damage to the topsoil
of the island, in turn further damaging the agricultural base of Haiti (Conway
1998). Clean drinking water is only securely supplied to 20-30% of the population
(Conway 1998). Currently, Haiti suffers from 'extensive deforestation', serious
soil erosion, inadequate clean water, 'widespread water-born diseases' and
'decimated fisheries' (Haiti Review 2003). Overall, health indicators on the island
are among the worst in the Caribbean and Latin America.
* Agrarian reform has been weak, attempting to distribute land during the late
1990s, but only managed to allocate some 2,000 acres, though a grassroots land
occupation program has since seized a much larger amount of land (up to 46,000
acres) for the poor (Kennedy 2001).
* Since peasants represent some 60% of the population, this represents a
major factor behind poverty and non-sustainable development. Many occupy
small plots of land, are unable to produce commercial sugar crops (the sugar
export industry has largely collapsed), and now make marginal livelihoods in the
production of coffee and cocoa (Najman 2004, p34).
22
* Haiti has a high rate (5%) of HIV/AIDS infection (PR Newswire 2002;
Economist 2002), along with other health problems and a very poor medical
system. In spite of a high infant mortality rate (130 in 1000), the population is
growing rapidly, and may climb from the current 8 million to 20 million by 2040
(Conway 1998).
* It is possible that Haiti had become a major re-shipment point for 10-15% of
the drugs entering the U.S., with rumours of large pay-offs from drug lords
into the national economy, (Economist 2002), suggesting a secondary motive for
international intervention.
* Some areas of exports have begun to improve, with a small
manufacturing industry based on the assemblage of goods utilising cheap
Haitian labour, along with some coffee exports. However, one of the main
sources of the economy remains the $100 million of remittances each year from
the close to a million Haitians living abroad, mainly in the Dominican Republic,
U.S., Canada and France (Conway 1998; Najman 2004, p35).
* Due to foreign perceptions of problems in governance, foreign aid worth
$500 million had been blocked from reaching the island, leading to a claim
by the Haitian government that the international community was engaging in
'economic terrorism' (Economist 2002). The main reason for international caution
were the disputed results of the May 2000 parliamentary elections, which
opposition groups such as Democratic Convergence say were unfair and rigged a charge which the U.S., Canada and the European Union feels needs answering
(Kennedy 2001). This is part of longer timeline of problems that included a U.S.
'veto power on Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) board of directors to
block release of already-approved loans for health care, education, and water'
(Farmer et al. 2003).
* Structural adjustment programs, suggested as a condition of continued aid
from the World Bank and IMF, remain unpopular among poor Haitians. Thus
demonstrations in Haiti have labelled these World Bank economic reforms as
plan lamo, or death plan, or as a kind of virtual economic coupe d'etat (Orenstein
1998). Through 2002-2003, demands for the end to fuel subsidies stopped a $50
million aid loan form the IMF being delivered (BBC 2003). In 2004, some writers
remain highly critical of the IMF requirements as extremely destabilising for
Haiti, creating too much austerity and too rapid a market opening for the
poor country (see Forbes 2004).
* Ongoing protests against government corruption continued from January
2002, with these protests being quelled by tear gas and live bullets from police
(Economist 2002). These protests concerned corruption in the rice importation
program. Through the late 1990s reports of malnutrition and local famines and
rising costs of living continued to inflame the political situation (Orenstein
1998). Through the late 1990s cheap U.S. agricultural imports did enter the
island, wiping out domestic producers, e.g. rice imports grew from 8% in 1985 to
73% of local consumption in 1996 (Kennedy 2001).
* The OAS and CARICOM from January 2002 once again called for the
international community to help Haiti, and agreed to continue its mediation
Lecture 9
23
between the Haitian government and opposition groups that form the
Democratic Convergence (PR Newswire 2002). In July 2002, Haiti became a full
member of CARICOM. However, fresh violence continued to undermine
stability through late 2002 and early 2003, driven in part by mass protests of
those for and against the Aristide government, working along dividing lines
set up since 2000. Aristide planned to stay in office to the end of his elected fiveyear term in 2006 (BBC 2003b).
* Fresh violence continued to undermine stability from late 2002 down to
early 2006, driven by the political conflict among those for and against the
Aristide government, working along dividing lines set up since 2000. Through
March 2004, Aristide lost control of the island, in large measure due to armed
militias coming in from the west and securing urban areas. He was at last forced
to leave, and with the help of a U.S. military aircraft was taken from the island,
first to the Central African Republic and then to Jamaica. International
peacekeepers from France, the US, Chile and Canada then mediated stability
(NotiCen 2004a) between former opposition groups, armed militia, former
military groups, business elites, former police, and ordinary people hoping for a
margin improvement of terrible conditions. The current interim government is
based on 'Group of 184, an umbrella group of business and civic groups and
political parties opposed to Mr Aristide', with none of the former president's
Lavalas party', under the leadership of Gerard Latortue, the interim prime
minister (Economist 2004c). The issue is highly controversial, with the
overthrow of Aristide being technically a coup, and claims of engineered
pressure on Aristide economically over the last four years, and foreign support
for opposition groups from overseas, especially the U.S. and various aid agencies
(see Wilentz 2004 for one view). In particular, support for 'civil society' groups
may have emerged as support for opposition groups: One should be clear about the opposition in Haiti . . . : although it includes
some very good people, it is largely a group of malcontent career politicians,
wealthy businessmen and ambitious power-seekers. It is exactly the kind of
"civil society" opposition the United States encouraged and financed when it
was attempting to remove Manuel Noriega in Panama. The Haitian
opposition, too, was financed and organized during the Aristide years by USfunded groups like USAID's Democracy Enhancement Project and the
International Republican Institute, an organization established in 1983 "to
advance democracy worldwide." These have played a central and critical role
in keeping an unpopular Haitian opposition alive and obstructionist. At every
turn, the US-backed opposition tried to bring political life under Aristide to a
halt. (Wilentz 2004)
On this basis Amy Wilentz suggests that support for democracy was really
regime change: In the current coup, there are several players. There is the
disgruntled former Haitian army (an institution with a violent and unpalatable
recent history), which has been wielded many times in the service of coups
d'etat, often subsidized by its masters, the elite of Haiti. The elite, too, had
their hand in this coup--it's hard to believe in this day and age, but they must
be called the entrenched class enemies of the Haitian people. There is "a
growing enthusiasm among businessmen to use the rebels as a security
force," said a news report from the Los Angeles Times after the remnants of
24
the Haitian army that helped engineer the coup descended on the capital.
"[The businessmen] welcomed the rebels." (Wilentz 2004)
Over these concerns there has been a call by Venezuela for the OAS to
investigate the removal Aristide, and concern from CARICOM over possible
'constitutional rupture' (NotiCen 2004a).
* Through early 2006 elections were held at first peacefully, but violent
protest emerged once it seems that candidate Rene Preval, former
colleague of Aristide, might not have a clear majority, forcing a second
round presidential run-off: The international community ganged up on reluctant Haitian officials Feb. 16
to award the delay-plagued presidential election to Rene Preval. Vote
counting was halted Feb. 15, after leading candidate Preval alleged fraud and
called for an inquiry. The count had been 90% completed, and Preval held an
insurmountable lead, 48%, against his nearest rival, Leslie Manigat, whose
tally did not surpass 11.8%. Both candidates are ex-presidents. Preval's term
(1996-2001) was sandwiched between the terms of Jean-Bertrand Aristide
(1991, 1994-1996, 2001-2004). Manigat ruled briefly in 1988.
At stake was a first-round victory for Preval. If his total did not reach at least
50% plus one, the Constitution mandates a runoff. Early in the counting
process, Preval was ahead by a very wide margin, but his percentages began
to drop suspiciously, people began to protest in the streets, and signs of crisis
emerged.
On Feb. 11, two members of the Conceil Electoral Provisoire (CEP), Patrick
Fequiere and Pierre Richard Duchemin, charged there had been
manipulations to force a second round. This accusation brought on a massive
demonstration by Preval supporters, mostly the very poor, and partisans of
Fanmi Lavalas. (NotiCen 2006)

The elections, then, though initially run with limited violence, were still
marred by fears of manipulation and strong political expectations that
could not be run through normal political or constitutional channels. If not
fraudulent, there were problems with uncounted and blanc votes: David Wimhurst, UN spokesman, said the ballots could have come from any
of nine voting stations across the country that were ransacked on election
day by political factions, or, in one case, by people tired of waiting in line. An
estimated 35,000 votes were thrown out. The spokesman also conjectured
that the ballots could have been dumped to give the appearance of fraud.
But Associated Press reporters said they saw hundreds of empty ballot
boxes, at least one vote-tally sheet, and several empty bags numbered and
signed by the heads of polling stations. They also saw thousands of ballots,
many of them marked, strewn across the dump. Wimhurst responded to the
news, saying, "That's extraordinary."
Also denying fraud was Organization of American States (OAS) SecretaryGeneral Jose Miguel Insulza, who flew into Haiti on Feb. 15 to respond to the
impasse. "I don't believe that there was fraud, although there were errors in
the process," he said. (NotiCen 2006a)
Lecture 9
25
It seems that in part these problems were driven by an effort to stop the
victory of Rene Preval, but were also due to some lack of confidence in the
electoral process: As a result, the electoral authority invalidated almost 150,000 votes, many
from the capital's slums. That hurt Mr Preval, not only because he was strong
in those areas, but because 50% of all votes, including blank and spoilt ones,
were required to avoid a run-off. Similarly, many questioned whether at least
some of the 85,000 blank votes had not been stuffed into ballot boxes to stop
Mr Preval. In addition, tally sheets for some 8% of the ballots disappeared,
some when party activists attacked polling stations in the interior. Mr Preval's
supporters found thousands of burned ballots still smouldering on a rubbish
dump in the capital.
The UN initially said it found no evidence of fraud. But some other election
observers criticised a lack of openness by the electoral council. Two of its
nine members said they were excluded from its deliberations. "You have to
wonder about all this messing around with the tally sheets," said Mark
Schneider, an observer from Crisis Group, a Brussels-based NGO.
(Economist 2006)
In February 2006 Rene Preval was 'declared the winner' but only after a
'deal' was reached over spoiled ballot papers - the electoral council 'declared Mr
Preval the winner with 51.15% of the vote, following a decision to divide more
than 80,000 blank ballots among all 33 presidential candidates' (BBC 2006a; for a
somewhat different analysis of the deal see NotiCen 2006a; Of the 33 candidates,
only Leslie Manigat, 'had reached double figures, with 11.8%.', Economist 2006).
Regardless of whether this was constitutionally valid, the Preval leadership may
not have enough of a mandate to heal the rift between different segments
in Haitian society: If Preval wins the presidency, it will show the polarization that exists in Haitian
society. With the majority of Haitians being impoverished, it is natural for
populist leaders to be voted into power. The forcible removal of Aristide from
power radicalized the poor, who are unwilling to accept any leader who does
not conform to their populist standards. Preval fits this mold. This paradigm is
difficult for Haiti's business community and wealthy elite to accept.
Nevertheless, in a democratic system, this condition will remain as long as
the majority of Haiti's 8.1 million people linger in poverty. (PINR 2006)
In the end, Preval will still need to rely in part on the support, like Mr Aristide,
'from the other Haiti, of the poorest slums in the Americas where real power
rests in the hands of youthful drug gangs' (Economist 2006).
It can be seen then, that in spite of U.S. unilateral intervention earlier in the 20 th
century, and UN and OAS intervention in the 1990s, and the application of partial
programs by the IMF and World Bank, the problems of Haiti have not been solved
though the democratic process has made moderate gains. The state suffers from
ongoing comprehensive economic, social and political instability, and has been
viewed as a classic example of a 'failed state'. Although Aristide was at first viewed
almost as a saviour, in later years his government failed to deliver to the people which
originally supported it. Haiti's past governance has been described by one source as a
'predatory state', the source of underdevelopment, and riddled by a mafia who
26
use the country as a transit point for cocaine, regardless of the who wins an election
(Najman 2004, p35). Likewise, the efforts of regional players and international
agencies such as the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM)
(Skidmore & Smith 2000, p296), the OAS, the World Bank and the UN Stabilisation
Mission for Haiti (MINUSTAH) have been insufficient for the economy or stability of
the small republic could be guaranteed. In large measure, this has been due to the
selective nature of the interventions, whether based on U.S. political interests, or by
international agencies to deal separately with economic and political problems. Haiti
represents one of the worst outcomes of regional and international intervention, in
spite of real gains towards a democratic process in the 1990s. The last round of
intervention through 2004-2006 faces a massive task in rebuilding not just the
economy of the island, but faith in a badly damaged political system and poorly
developed aid programs. In spite of the presence of UN peacekeeping forces, strongly
supported by the OAS, some 400 Haitians died in rioting and political violence
through late 2004 and early 2005 (Economist 2005). Even though the UNSC had
authorised peace-keeping forces '6,700 soldiers and 1,600 civilian police' (Xinhua
2004), including troops from Chile, Peru, Uruguay, Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay,
the international community pledged a total of $1 billion, and the World bank released
$46 million in early 2005, this has yet to shape into a comprehensive solution for a
stable Haiti (PINR 2006; Economist 2005; Xinhua 2004).
Time-line Haiti 2002-2006 (BBC 2006)
2002 July - Haiti is approved as a full member of the Caribbean Community (Caricom) trade
bloc.
2003 April - Voodoo recognised as a religion, on a par with other faiths.
2004 January-February - Celebrations marking 200 years of independence are marred by
violent uprising against President Aristide. Rebels seize towns and cities; dozens are killed.
Mr Aristide is forced into exile; an interim government takes over.
2004 May - Severe floods in south, and in parts of neighbouring Dominican Republic, leave
more than 2,000 dead or disappeared.
2004 June - First UN peacekeepers arrive, to take over security duties from US-led force and
to help flood survivors.
2004 July - International donors pledge more than $1bn in aid.
late 2004 - Rising levels of deadly political and gang violence in the capital; armed gangs
loyal to former President Aristide are said to be responsible for many killings.
2005 April - Prominent rebel leader Ravix Remissainthe is killed by police in the capital.
2006 7 February - General elections, the first since former President Aristide was overthrown
in 2004. Rene Preval is declared the winner of the presidential vote after a deal is reached over
spoiled ballot papers.
6. The Search for a Convergent Foreign Policy in the 21st Century
As we have seen, national and regional insecurity over the last century has led to
several orientations whereby states seek to improve their international environment.
These foreign policy orientations include: 1) The effort to positively engage the dominant superpower as a guarantor of
security, and as a genuine partner in development. This has been a major strategy
in Colombia, and to a lesser extend in Chile and Argentina (the later is the major
non-NATO ally of the U.S. in Latin America). Here, there may be a need to
maintain the importance of Latin America to the U.S. and the European Union
even after the events of September 2001. Latin America cannot afford to be
Lecture 9
27
become part of a 'benign neglect' syndrome, with attention being focused
mainly on security and drug issues (see Haluani 2003). Through early 2001, the
Bush administration had spoken of a new focus on Latin America and its
engagement, but this was sidetracked by the 'war on terror' (Haluani 2003).
This had originally been based on the idea of use of U.S. soft power and
influence (see Haluani 2003), but was re-directed by the need to exert 'hard
power' and control through interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and in
sustained homeland security concerns including the need for a more tightly
controlled border with Mexico. In the worst case scenario, this may lead to a
continued need for regional 'pre-emption' (Haluani 2003), where hard
interventions are used to stifle regional problems as they occur, whether in
Colombia, Haiti, or elsewhere.
2) The effort to build regional organisations that improve economic
development and reduce conflict, e.g. Mercosur, NAFTA, the OAS, Summit of
the Americas, the Rio Group, and others. These efforts have been moderately
successful, though no single organisation, model nor linkage among
organisations (formally or via subsidiarity) has managed to establish
strong governance for the entire region. Different models of integration
verses cooperation, however, will need to address, if a wider FTAA is to be
created. At present, though cooperative diplomacy has been established through
the OAS, this has yet to emerge in a strong and balanced cooperative security
community (see Tickner & Mason 2003).
3) The limited use of the traditional strategy of power and diplomatic
balance among powerful players in the Western hemispheric system, or among
near neighbours. As we have seen, most border issues have been dealt with in
Latin America, and the time of major wars, as distinct from border tensions,
between nation-states is over (Kruijt 2001, p410). Most conflicts are now
within nations or are generated by transnational spill-over of such
problems. These involve political violence, often compounded by net-worked
criminal activity that undermines the power and authority of even democratic
states. In this setting, moreover, it is not surprising that many national armies in
the region have been highly politicised in the past, with strong roles in policing
functions, and in development agenda (as occurred in Guatemala, Peru and
Chile). Even with the systematic reduction of their political role over the last two
decades, more needs to be done to reduce unclear roles and the misuse of armed
forces and intelligence agencies, e.g. as occurred under the Fujimori regime in
Peru (Kruijt 2001, pp410-411, pp421-423). A 'shadow' may still exist from
past corruption in military and police forces, particularly in poor nations and
subregions.
4) Competition has moved into the economic area, with concerns about
the building of stable national economies which are open to global trade
and financial flows, but resilient to regional or global financial shock. Thus
Brazil seeks some degree of independence from U.S. foreign policy, in part
through balancing Mercosur and FTAA options, and in part by a conscious
policy of engaging EU and East Asia economically. This notion of balance was
traditionally used to reduce tensions among Brazil, Argentina and Chile. Likewise,
Paraguay has sought to reduce Brazil's local dominance by seeking increased U.S.
aid through 2005 (see above). Today, though the U.S. is the only superpower in
28
the region, it still has to deal with the concerns of several regional powers that
wish to retain relative independence in the international system, and a
number of smaller state that seek new opportunities.
5) Efforts to restructure security, democratisation and economic policies to
cope with domestic and globalisation pressures. Responsiveness of Latin
American governments has been uneven, often due to governance problems, lack
of resources, or the onset of economic and political crises. Yet these problems
cannot be resolved in the long term by stronger militaries, nor by a narrow
securitisation approach to regional problems (Isacson 2001). Some critiques have
suggested that Latin America suffers from 'Low Intensity Democracies', i.e.
democracies beset by a range of legal, governance and social problems that
severely limit the power of the democratic system, even once authoritarian
government has been ended, and the military has been pushed back 'into the
shadows' (see Kruijt 2001).
Even major states in the region (recently including Brazil, Argentina, Peru and
Mexico) still suffer from ongoing national and human insecurity. This has not been
permanently solved by U.S. aid or intervention, nor by the regional organisations such
as the OAS. It is thus possible to argue that current defence efforts are not truly
strategic in that they do not meet the future needs of the region, but are driven
by partial responses to particular problems and interests (Fauriol 1999). The
limited convergence in foreign and security policy in the region comprises both a
major problem and potential future agenda for reform in Latin America.
7. References and Resources
Resources
The webpage for the Caribbean Community (Caricom), contain updates and news
briefings, will be found at http://www.caricom.org/
A wide range of regional, economic and development information on Latin
American can be found through the World Bank webpage at
http://www.worldbank.org/developmentnews/
The Corruption Perceptions Index, formulated by Transparency International, will be
found at http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2001/cpi2001.html#cpi
Useful position papers on Latin American affairs can be found via the International
Crisis Group webpage at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1094&l=1
A useful video web-feed of Haiti and its current conditions can be found of the ABC
World News Webpage at http://abc.net.au/news/world/default.htm
Suggested Further Reading: If you wish to take these issues further, please read one
or more of the following: GWYNNE, Robert N. & KAY, Cristobal (eds.) Latin America Transformed: Globlization and
Modernity, London, Arnold, 1999
HALUANI, Makram "Benign Neglect: Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere",
Harvard International Review, Winter 2003, pp50-54 [Access via Ebsco Database]
Lecture 9
29
KRUIJT, Dirk "Low Intensity Democracies: Latin America in the Post-dictatorial Era",
Bulletin of Latin American Research, 20 no 4, 2001, pp409-430 [Access via Ebsco
Database]
LORA, Eduardo & PANIZZA, Ugo Structural Reforms in Latin America Under Scrutiny,
Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department, Paper for the
Reforming Reforms Seminar, Fortaleza, Brazil, 11 March 2002 [PDF document,
Internet Access via http://www.iadb.org/exr/topics/article_state_reform.htm]
McCOLLESTER, Charles "Haiti Matters", Monthly Review, 56 no. 4, Sept 2004, pp26-46
[Access via Infotrac Database]
NotiCen "Haiti Has a President, but Not Necessarily a Democracy", NotiCen: Central
American & Caribbean Affairs, Feb 16, 2006 [Access via Infotrac Database]
SKIDMORE, Thomas E. & SMITH, Peter H. Modern Latin America, Oxford, OUP, 2000
TICKER, Arlene B. & MASON, Ann C. "Mapping transregional security structures in
the Andean region", Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 28 no.3, June-July 2003,
pp359-393 [Access via Infotrac Database]
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