CONFERENCE ON DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION
Working Group 5: The Role of Armed Forces and Security Forces
Coordinator: Rut Diamint
Civil-Military Relations in Asia: The Ascendance of Democratic
Civilian Control
Muthiah Alagappa
The relationship of the soldier to the state in Asia has undergone substantial change
over the past five decades but there have been significant continuities as well. At the
founding moment, civilian supremacy characterized civil military relations in nearly every
country except Thailand. Beginning in 1958 and through the 1960s and 1970s there was a
surge in military and military backed regimes. Since the mid-1980s, however, the trend in
Asia has been toward a reduction in the political power, influence, and role of the military,
and a corresponding increase in civilian supremacy. There is the likelihood of reversals in a
few countries as in Pakistan in 1999, but a repeat of the 1960s and 1970s appears rather
unlikely. For reasons explored in this paper, the declining political influence of the military
appears quite firmly rooted and set to continue into the foreseeable future.
However, advance in effective civilian control over the military in post-authoritarian
states is likely to be incremental and gradual subject to protracted struggle and negotiation,
and at times setbacks. There could also be limited military role expansion, especially at the
local level, in countries that have experienced civilian control for a considerable period.
Further, the content of state-soldier relations is likely to vary across countries, even when
they have similar political systems. Civil-military relations in Asia in the foreseeable future
will continue to be complex and dynamic, and will be characterized by multiple patterns
although democratic civilian control is likely tobecome the dominant mode. Taking a
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regional perspective, this paper identifies and explains some of the key changes and
continuities in Asian civil-military relations. It also identifies the obstacles to and the
measure that should be taken to deepen democratic civilian control.
Coercion in Governance
The initial surge and subsequent decline in the political influence of the military in
Asia is best explained by the changing significance of coercion in governance. In Asia, as
elsewhere, post-colonial and post-revolutionary governments faced enormous challenges in
state and nation building as well as in developing legitimate political systems. Although
experiences vary, in many countries power and authority were not concentrated in the state,
state institutions were unable to dominate the entire country, minorities resisted integration
into national communities, political systems were challenged by groups espousing rival
organizing ideologies, legitimacy of governments were contested by competing elite, and in
several cases the new states were confronted with severe international threats to their very
existence. Internal and international security was prime concerns of a large number of
Asian countries.
State coercion played a dominant role in most if not all these processes in a large
number of countries leading to role expansion and a dramatic increase in the organizational
and political power and influence of the military. While Asian countries still continue to
face major challenges and in some cases the challenges have become more acute, over the
last five decades or so several have made substantial progress in the internal and
international consolidation of nation and state, and in the development of widely accepted
systems and institutions for the acquisition and exercise of state power. In these countries
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the resort to coercion, especially the private, partisan, and repressive use of force in
governance has declined, and so has the political power and influence of the military.
Concurrently, a large number of Asian countries, particularly those in East and
Southeast Asia, also experienced high rates of economic growth for well over two decades.
The highly successful export led-growth strategies of these countries integrated their
national economies into the global capitalist economy, instituting new rules and procedures
for their management with spillover social and political effects. Sustained economic
development in the capitalist mode made for a more complex economy that demanded
sophisticated management which was well beyond that can be provided by the military. It
also set in train the development of new domestic forces-an independent private sector,
growth of middle and working classes, strong and vibrant civil societies among themmaking for much more complex states and societies with the latter demanding greater
welfare, accountability, and participation in governance. Such development also
strengthened the other state institutions as well as the political and civil societies, titling the
distribution of power against the military and altering the norms and rules of governance.
Simultaneously, and especially since the mid-to late-l980s, the international context
altered decidedly in favor of democracy, human rights, and market economy. International
organizations and key external actors condemned military coups and ostracized military
governments. Not only have these developments altered the normative structure and
distribution of power in favor of civilian institutions with a corresponding decline in the
political influence of the military in several countries, they have also generated close
domestic and international scrutiny of military institutions and their activities. The interplay
of coercion, political legitimacy, and economic development in the context of a changing in
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the international system, we argue, explains long-term change or lack thereof in Asian
civil-military relations.
Except for Burma, civil-military relations in all other Asian countries are in the midst
of change-more dramatic in some than in others-and further change is in prospect especially
in the socialist states and in the states undergoing democratic transition. Although the
"ultimate" patterns are unlikely to become clear for quite some time to come, the trend in
Asia is toward a reduction in the political salience and role of the military with a
corresponding increase in civilian control. However, the rise of civilian control does not
equal one pattern of civil-military relations. Asia has in the past and will continue in the
foreseeable future to be characterized by multiple patterns. The subjective type civilmilitary relations in Malaysia, Singapore, and Sri Lanka (at the national level) grounded in
ethnic considerations are durable and likely to continue. Similarly, the Leninist pattern of
civil-military relations in the Asian socialist states is likely to continue in the short to
medium term. In the longer term, it appears untenable and likely to change. With the
increasing irrelevance of the communist ideology and greater integration of the Chinese
economy into the global capitalist economy, the party state regime in the PRC begins to
resemble in important ways that of the pre-1987 KMT regime in Taiwan. However, there
are significant differences as well and it is not foreordained that the PRC would follow in
the path of Taiwan. At the same time, the vanguard role of the CCP and its monopolization
of power will also be increasingly difficult to sustain.
Rise of Democratic Civilian Control
Although Asia will continue to be characterized by multiple patterns, democratic
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civilian control is becoming the dominant mode of civil-military interaction. This has been
the pattern in post-war Japan and in India and is likely to continue. Although civil-military
relations in Malaysia, Singapore, and Sri Lanka are of the subjective type, they do exhibit
certain features of democratic civilian control. Democratic civilian control is being
consolidated in Taiwan, South Korea, and, to a lesser degree, in the Philippines and
Thailand as well. Bangladesh and especially Indonesia are still in an early stage of their
democratic transition. Military exit from politics is almost total in Taiwan and South Korea.
In the Philippines, Thailand, Bangladesh and Indonesia there has been a formal exit, but the
militaries still wield informal political influence. In these countries, the militaries have
attempted to retain as much autonomy and control as possible over its institutional matters,
off-budget revenues, and security policy making. However, civilian authorities have also
made major advances in restricting military jurisdiction in these areas. Right now it is a
mixed picture.
The experiences of the last several decades suggests that enhancement of civilian
control entails strengthening the legitimacy, capacity, and roles of civilian institutions,
sustained economic development, and reducing the salience of coercion in governance.
These hinge on forging of political agreement on the basis for the nation-state and the
system for political domination, making economic growth and development a key priority,
as well as developing political and socioeconomic policies and processes to address
political and social problems. This does not imply that coercion is irrelevant for
governance. Only that its role should be limited and indirect, and be viewed as the ultimate
sanction, not the first recourse.
In this connection, it is important to observe that although the role of coercion in the
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international consolidation of the nation-state-safeguarding its international security-is
salient, the significance and role of coercion in domestic governance in enforcing the writ
of the government and in maintaining internal order and security--because of its more direct
connection to political legitimacy and capacity-is the more crucial determinant of the
relationship between the state and the soldier. The prominence of coercion in securing
loyalty and obedience from citizens of the state is a direct reflection of the weakness of the
political legitimacy of the nation-state and the government. There is no such corresponding
relationship between the international deployment of state coercion and political
legitimacy. The impact could be positive or negative depending on the circumstances. It is
therefore imperative to limit the role of coercion and the military in internal governance,
though this may not always be possible. When necessary, deployment of coercion and the
military in the internal security role should be limited to legitimate state purposes and
carefully controlled to prevent abuse of state power and to ensure oversight by civilian
authority that itself is legitimate and accountable to the citizens of the state.
Civil-Military Relations in post-Authoritarian States
Although democratically elected governments have replaced military and autocratic
ones in South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, Bangladesh, and Indonesia, and
there have been alternations in power in the first five countries, democratic civilian control
of the military has advanced only in an incremental fashionand is still far from complete. It
is most advanced in South Korea and Taiwan, less so in the Philippines and Thailand, and
least advanced in Bangladesh and Indonesia. All countries still face a number of challenges.
Those confronting Bangladesh and Indonesia are the most extensive and acute.
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In explaining the progress (or the lack of it) in enhancing democratic civilian control
in these countries, our argument runs as follows. A decisive shift in the distribution of
power between democratic forces and antidemocratic forces in the society at large which
includes but is not limited to the military is the crucial variable in explaining the onset of
democratic transition and initiation of democratic civilian control. In the interregnum
following the collapse of the military regime and when the military is n the defensive, the
new civilian leadership has considerable freedom in shaping national policy including civilmilitary reform. Such a window of opportunity is usually short. Further success in and
enhancement of democratic civilian control hinges on the continuation and strengthening of
the distribution of power in favor of democratic forces and their translation into strong
democratic institutions. As the democratic framework and institutions become strong and
deep rooted, and as state capacity develops to address the challenges confronting the
country through non-coercive means, the salience of coercion in governance and the power
of the military further declines, tilting the balance even more durably against the coercive
institutions of the state. Sustained functioning of the military within a democratic
framework enhances the legitimacy of the political system, as well as inculcate and
internalize the norm of democratic civilian control in the military and the society at large.
In all the six countries considered in this section, the advantage in brute power lay
with military or military backed governments. However, with the exception of the
government in Taiwan, all others lost their moral authority to govern. The application of
coercion to sustain themselves in office further undermined rather than enhance their
political authority. The shift in the balance of moral power combined with the inaction or
withdrawal of the support of coercive power led to the ouster of the military and autocratic
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governments. In nearly every case, the military or the military faction that controlled the
political helm in its own right or backed an authoritarian ruler emerged from the crisis as a
thoroughly discredited institution and on the defensive. The balance of power was clearly in
favor of the forces advocating regime change. The latter usually comprised a wide array of
organizations, groups, and movements: opposition political parties from different parts of
the political spectrum, students, churches and religious groups, organized labor, business
associations, the press, human rights organizations, other NGOs, and, in some cases like the
Philippines, reformist elements within the military. Often these groups were united only in
their opposition to the incumbent military or military backed government. Nevertheless, the
unity of these groups, however opportunistic and temporary, was critical in bringing about
the change in government and regime.
The continuation of a favorable balance of power is crucial for strengthening and
deepening democracy and developing strong institutions for democratic governance.
However, coalitions forged to oppose an autocratic ruler often break down soon after the
ouster of the incumbent government. In their quest for political power, opposition parties
splinter and the competing interests of other groups dominate their political interaction.
The ensuing change in the balance of power allows conservative forces including the
military to regroup and limit damage. The pace of democratic reform including civilian
control of the military slows. In South Korea for example, the split between Kim Youngsam and Kim Dae-jung in 1987 contributed to the victory of Roh Tae-woo, a member of the
Hana faction. For him reducing the power of that faction and reforming civil-military
relations were not high priority. These had to wait till the presidency of Kim Young-sam,
the first genuine civilian president in the post-1987 period. Similarly, the collapse of the
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anti-Marcos coalition in the Philippines exposed Aquino to challenges from the right and
left, increasing her reliance on the core of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) under
the leadership of Ramos. Reliance on the institution that had to be reformed tempered the
content and pace of civil-military reform. The appointment of a large number of retired
military officers including those from the RAM to key government positions under the
succeeding Ramos administration further tempered civil-military reform in the Philippines.
Coalition breakdowns occurred in Bangladesh and Indonesia as well.
Apart from increasing the leverage of the military and slowing civil-military reform,
polarization and maneuvering among political parties could lead to political penetration of
the military and involving it in politics for personal and party gain as has been the case in
Bangladesh. In Indonesia, Abdurrahman Wahid has actively solicited the support of the
military to declare an emergency with a view to dissolving the parliament which has
initiated impeachment proceedings. The military has thus far refused to support him on the
ground that it is a national institution, not his personal force, and that the order goes against
the constitution. In South Korea Kim Young-sam' s empowerment of the intelligence
agencies in 1995 was interpreted as trying to improve the prospects for his party in the 1997
elections. A strong understanding among political parties not to involve the military in
politics and a deep commitment on the part of civil society to act as a watchdog in keeping
the military out of politics are crucial for the continuation of civil-military reform. The
power and commitment of civil societies is particularly important in countries like
Bangladesh where the political parties are deeply polarized and democratic institutions are
still weak. It is crucial for reform oriented leaders to cultivate and mobilize like-minded
groups to keep the balance of power in favor of reform.
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However, this alone is not enough. To be durable, the favorable balance of power
should be deployed to create and empower strong democratic institutions which are crucial
for the next stage of civil-military reform. As the medium through which power is
translated into policy, institutions can strengthen democratic civilian control in several
ways. By compelling political, bureaucratic, and military actors to interact in accordance
with specified rules and procedures in the development of policy, institutions condition all
actors to operate under a democratic framework and reduce (though not eliminate) the
salience of power in their interaction. The cross cutting alliances and cleavages made
possible by the interaction through institutions also contribute to the development of
understanding and respect for different perspectives leading to moderation and
compromise. These developments enhance the legitimacy of the democratic system.
Accustomed to operating in a democratic framework, the military in the long run
internalizes the norm of civilian control. Further, institutional design-in terms of issues,
jurisdiction, and actors-can affect policy outcome, which is the substance of civilmilitary
relations. By being able to influence the substance of policy as well as the power and
interests of competing actors, institutions can also affect the civil-military balance in favor
of civilian authority.
However, strong democratic institutional development has not been a key feature of
the countries under consideration-at least not thus far. Institutional development is perhaps
most advanced in Taiwan where increasingly the military has to interact with political and
civilian bureaucratic officials in the making of security policy and in matters pertaining to
the management of the military as an institution. Even in Taiwan, there are several
institutional gaps and weaknesses that have to be rectified. Institutions like the Legislative
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Yuan and the Control Yuan with responsibility for oversight of the military budget and
arms procurement, for example, have been inhibited in discharging their functions
effectively due to a lack of expertise and institutional capacity as well as legal provisions
and procedures that limit access to information in a timely fashion. Democratic institutions
with oversight responsibilities in the areas of security policy making and management of
the military as an institution are also in various stages of construction in South Korea, the
Philippines, and Thailand. However, because of limited resources and competing priorities
as well as military evasion and intransigence, they have not been high priority. Poor
institutional development explains in part the tentative nature of civilian supremacy in the
Philippines and Thailand, and even more so in Bangladesh and Indonesia. Institutions for
making and implementing policy on a wide range of issues have yet to be constructed in the
latter two countries.
In terms of priority, the focus of civil-military reform has been on removing the
military from the structure of political domination. Considerable progress has been made in
this area in nearly all countries although the durability of change in some is open to
question. Progress in other areas (redefining military role and reorienting the military
toward the external defense function, terminating off-budget revenues from military owned
business enterprises and illegal activities, and civilian oversight of security policy as well as
the management of the military as a state institution) is more varied and has been
influenced by considerations of resource availability, the presence or absence of security
threats, and the corporate interests of the military.
Resource availability is a key consideration in reorienting the military away from
internal security to its external defense function. In Taiwan and South Korea, this factor has
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not been a major obstacle. Further, because of the grave external threats confronting these
two states, external defense has always been a key focus of their militaries. Termination of
military role in internal security and intelligence in Taiwan and South Korea has been a
function of political will and availability of civilian expertise. However, resource constraint
has been a key factor in Thailand, Philippine, and especially in Indonesia. The military
modernization programs in Thailand and the Philippines, which are an integral part of
reorienting the militaries to the external defense function, have been delayed due to lack of
resources-especially in the Philippines, which has since attempted to provide, in part, for its
external security needs by reinvigorating its security relationship with the United States.
Reorienting the military to the external defense function has made the least progress in
Indonesia because of the continuing grave internal security threats, a weak police force,
absence of clear external threats, and lack of resources. Lack of adequate government
funding for the military has also made it difficult to terminate the off-budget revenues of
the militaries in Thailand and Indonesia. It is estimated that government funding accounts
for less than 30 percent of the military budget needs in Indonesia. Lack of adequate funding
has also contributed to the erosion if not breakdown of the TNI command and control
system making central control of regional and local forces especially in the outlying regions
difficult with negative consequences for implementing military reform and holding regional
military commanders accountable.
Civilian oversight of security policy and in the management of the military are two
areas in which progress has been more limited even in countries like Taiwan and South
Korea. Limited progress in these areas may be explained by the presence of acute security
threats, the shortage of qualified civilian personnel, and military resistance to civilian
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encroachment in areas that it considers its turf. For fear of provoking the military, civilian
political leaders have treaded gingerly in these two areas. However, substantive and durable
democratic civilian control requires the civilian authority to have ultimate jurisdiction in
these areas as well, although it may delegate specific powers to the military establishment.
Continued military jurisdiction in these areas provides the military with power not only to
limit civilian authority but also to overturn it when its interests are negatively affected as
has been the case in Pakistan.
To summarize, there are two sides to deepening of democratic civilian control of the
military. One entails the continuation and strengthening of the pro-democracy forces, and
deploying such power to construct strong democratic institutions including those necessary
to exercise oversight of the military. Concurrently it is essential to develop the state's noncoercive capacity to address the many internal and international challenges confronting
these countries so that reliance on state coercion can be reduced. The second side entails
permanently removing the military from the structures of political domination, ensuring
civilian control of security policy making, civilian oversight of military institutional
matters, divesting the military's commercial enterprises, and forbidding military
involvement in illegal activities.
Recommendations
As observed earlier, multiple patterns characterize civil-military relations in Asia.
Although democratic civilian control is becoming the dominant mode, the state of
democratic development including democratic civilian control of the military varies widely
across countries. Thus the specific recommendations for deepening democratic civilian
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control would vary by country. Below are some general recommendations that can be
tailored to suit the circumstances of each country. Drawing on our earlier discussion they
are grouped in three categories.
Development and Consolidation of Democracy
1.
Develop strong civilian consensus on democracy such that the balance of
power is clearly in favor of democratic forces. This is crucial for the nascent democratic
regime to survive threats from the military.
2.
Translate the consensus on democracy into widely accepted institutions for
the acquisition and exercise of state power. This must proceed to the level where the
acquisition of political power by means other than free elections is viewed as illegitimate.
3.
Foster the development of strong political parties and a strong civil society.
The first is crucial to ensure competitive politics and to allow choice while the second is
crucial to hold the government accountable.
4.
Exclude the military from all structures of political domination. Limit
secondment of military personnel to political and administrative positions.
5.
Foster sustained economic development. Limit and eventually exclude the
military from economic development including rural development and from commercial
ventures.
Strengthen Civilian Oversight of the Military
6.
Institute ultimate civilian authority over key national-security decision-
making processes including mission definition, procurement, appointments and promotions.
7.
Build civilian expertise and capacity in the executive, legislature,
bureaucracy, and civil society to ensure effective oversight of security affairs and the
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military as an institution.
8.
Develop alternative sources of intelligence and develop civilian capacity to
assess and decide on threat assessments.
Develop a Professional Military
9.
Limit the military to the external defense function. Provide adequate
resources to reorient the mission of the military.
10.
Make internal security the responsibility of the police force under a separate
ministry. Develop a regular police force and limit if not avoid altogether the development
of paramilitary troops. If the military has to be deployed in the internal security role, it
should be with a clear mission and defined parameters under civilian authority. Such a role
should be for limited duration only.
11.
Regularize and make transparent the institutions and procedures for
command and control, recruitment, appointments and promotions, and procurement.
12.
Prevent the development of factions and personal allegiances within the
military through a strong chain of command system, meritocracy, and regular transfer of
officers.
13.
Institute rigorous education and training requirements including a strong
emphasis on civilian supremacy over the military.
14.
Regularize and make transparent the military’s budget and terminate the
military’s off-budget revenues.
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